THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

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OF  CALIFORNIA 

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SCHOOL  OF  LAW 


c0nuJ^Ur 


K    ~  /S<~J- 


A    TREATISE 


ON   THE 


AMERICAN  LAW  OF  ADMINISTRATION. 


Vol.  I. 


A    TREATISE 


ON  THE 

AMERICAN  LAW  OF  GUARDIANSHIP 
OF  MINORS  AND  PERSONS  OF 
UNSOUND  MIND. 

By  J.  G.  WOERNER. 
%  volume.     8vo.     Sheep.     $6.00  net. 


TREATISE 


ON    THE 


AMERICAN  LAW  OF  ADMINISTRATION. 


BY 

J.  G.  WOEKNER, 

AUTHOR  OF   "AMERICAN   LAW  OF  GUARDIANSHIP." 


SECOND    EDITION. 


IN   TWO    VOLUMES. 
Vol.  I. 


BOSTON: 
LITTLE,  BROWN,  AND   COMPANY. 

1899. 


i 


Copyright,  1889, 1899, 

BT  J.    G.    WOBKNEa 


^rinttrB 

8.  J.   TAnKlIILL  <t    CO.,  H08TON,  U.  8.  A. 


4- 


u. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION. 


In  submitting  to  the  public  the  second  edition  of  the  "  Ameri- 
can Law  of  Administration,"  the  editors  take  this  opportunity  to 
acknowledge  their  grateful  appreciation  of  the  many  kind  expres- 
sions of  approval  from  the  bench  and  bar  which  the  work  has 
received,  and  of  the  encouraging  welcome  accorded  to  it. 

This  edition  is  the  product  solely  of  the  personal  labors  of  the 
editors  during  the  last  ten  years,  particularly  of  the  junior  editor, 
who,  it  may  be  added,  took  an  important  part  in  the  preparation 
of  the  first  edition,  and  was  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  work 
from  its  inception. 

It  has  been  their  constant  object  in  this,  —  as  it  was  in  the 
complementary  volume  on  the  "  American  Law  of  Guardianship," 
recently  published  by  the  same  author,  and  which  really  is  in- 
cluded in  the  term  Administration  and  forms  part  thereof  in  its 
most  comprehensive  sense,  —  to  present  to  an  American  bar,  from 
an  American  standpoint,  a  practical  and  comprehensive  treatment 
of  a  subject  that  is  becoming  emphatically  more  and  more  the 
development  of  our  own  peculiar  institutions,  and  to  which  the 
English  works  upon  the  subject  are  every  year  becoming  less 
applicable  and  more  unsatisfactory. 

In  adapting  the  present  edition  to  the  changes  wrought  by  ten 
years  of  development  in  this  live  subject,  some  alterations  have 
been  made  and  a  few  portions  rewritten.  Besides  which  the 
constant  use  of  the  book  in  their  own  practice  has  enabled  the 
editors  to  detect  some  defects  and  remedy  the  same  in  this  edition. 
A  number  of  articles  on  practical  subjects  in  administration 
matters  occurring  in  the  active  practice  of  the  profession  have 
been  added,  or  much  enlarged  upon,  and  will,  we  hope,  prove  a 
welcome  feature. 


PREFACE. 

Great  care  has  been  taken  in  collating  the  authorities.  It  is 
safe  to  say  that  every  decision  on  our  subject,  officially  reported 
in  the  interim  since  the  first  publication,  has  been  carefully  ex- 
amined, involving  an  enormous  amount  of  labor  and  of  time,  and 
from  amongst  them  all,  nearly  5000  new  cases  have  been  selected 
with  painstaking  discrimination  and  added  to  the  work.  The 
statutes  referred  to  have  also  been  sedulously  compared  and 
brought  down  to  the  time  of  the  revision.  We  are  confident  that 
the  law  of  administration  is  given  as  it  stood  in  this  country  at 
the  time  of  sending  the  copy  to  the  printer. 

The  index,  which  has  necessarily  been  remodelled,  has  been 
prepared  with  great  care,  and  it  is  hoped  will  furnish  a  ready  key 
to  the  contents  of  the  book. 

The  editors  submit  their  labor  to  the  consideration  of  a  kind 
public,  trusting  that  it  may  meet  with  the  same  leniency  of  criti- 
cism that  was  extended  to  the  first  edition. 

J.   G.   WOERNER. 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  WM.   F.   WOERNER. 

March,  1899. 


PREFACE   TO   THE  FIRST  EDITION. 


The  present  treatise  originated  in  the  endeavor  to  qualify 
myself  for  the  office  of  judge  of  probate,  now  more  than  eighteen 
years  ago.  The  study  of  the  statutes  was  found  insufficient. 
Questions  often  arose  in  practice  to  which  they  afforded  no 
adequate  solution.  Obscure  provisions  of  uncertain  application, 
as  well  as  the  omission  to  provide  for  some  cases  of  daily 
occurrence,  not  altogether  remedied  by  interpretation  and  con- 
struction on  the  part  of  courts  of  last  resort,  made  it  necessary 
to  seek  light  elsewhere.  Text-books  by  American  authors,  fur- 
nishing valuable  help  certainly,  served,  on  the  other  hand,  to  cre- 
ate new  perplexity  by  the  widely  differing  constructions  therein 
shown  to  be  put  on  statutes  of  similar  import  in  different  States, 
even  by  courts  of  the  same  State  on  the  same  statute,  and  by  the 
unreconciled  difference  in  the  standpoints  from  which  the  sev- 
eral courts  deduced  the  principles  governing  them  in  their  de- 
cisions. Recourse  to  English  books  presented  a  new  difficulty : 
while  to  the  English  practitioner  the  grand  works  of  Jarman  on 
Wills  and  of  Williams  on  Executors  and  Administrators,  consti- 
tuting a  masterly  and  thorough  exposition  of  the  law  governing 
estates  of  deceased  persons,  furnish  a  readily  accessible  and  safe 
guide,  they  are  of  assistance  to  the  American  practitioner  only  in 
so  far  as  he  is  conversant  with  the  departure  from  the  common 
in  the  modern  English  law,  as  well  as  with  the  changes  wrought 
in  the  common  law  by  American  statutes,  usage,  and  policy.  Re- 
liance upon  them  without  continually  remembering  the  bearing 
of  these  changes  is  dangerously  misleading,  and  may  be  looked 
upon  as  accounting,  in  a  large  measure,  for  the  vacillation  and  in- 
consistency so  often  complained  of  as  characterizing  the  decisions 


PREFACE. 

of  American  courts.  Late  American  editions  of  these  works  by- 
men  of  more  than  national  reputation  for  learning  and  ability, 
enriched  by  valuable  and  instructive  editorial  notes  and  compre- 
hensive citations  of  American  cases  up  to  the  time  of  publication, 
have  accomplished  much  in  the  way  of  guarding  against  this  dan- 
ger, and  still  constitute  the  most  reliable  books  of  reference  to 
American  judges  and  practitioners,  at  least  in  all  cases  deter-  . 
mined  by  the  common  law,  unaffected  by  English  or  American 
statutes.  Their  influence  is  plainly  discernible  in  the  briefs  and 
arguments  of  counsel  and  the  opinions  of  courts,  although  not 
always  expressly  acknowledged,  —  not  always,  indeed,  perceived 
by  them.  But  the  heterogeneity  beween  text  and  notes  is  bewil- 
dering to  any  but  a  very  careful  observer,  thoroughly  familiar 
with  the  spirit  at  least  and  the  general  outline  of  the  American 
law  on  the  subject.  The  very  excellence  of  these  treatises  —  the 
close  sequence  of  reasoning  and  symmetry  of  arrangement  which 
place  them  so  high  as  authority  —  serves  to  emphasize  the  in- 
congruity between  the  English  text  and  the  American  notes,  by 
increasing  the  difficulty  of  applying  the  former  to  the  essentially 
different  conditions  presented  by  American  theory  and  practice. 

In  prosecuting  these  studies  I  was  impressed  with  the  force  of 
the  thought,  so  obvious  when  once  suggested,  that,  as  the  stat- 
utes cannot  be  fully  understood  without  the  knowledge  and 
presupposition  of  the  common  law,  constituting  at  once  the  sub- 
stratum upon  which  they  rest  and  a  not  inconsiderable  element 
in  the  enactments  themselves,  so  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
transformation  brought  about  in  the  common  law  by  engrafting 
upon  it  principles  of  American  growth  become  clearly  apparent 
only  when  considered  in  the  light  of  the  underlying  principles,  — 
tbc  raison  d'etre  of  the  English  as  well  as  of  the  American  law. 
Thus,  in  searching  for  the  reason  of  the  distinction  existing  in 
both  countries,  though  not  in  both  to  the  same  extent,  between 
courts  intrusted  with  testamentary  jurisdiction  and  those  of 
general  or  plenary  powers,  we  are  led  to  see  that  it  lies  deeper 
than  tin:  historical  one  at  the  surface, —  the  recognition  of  secular 
authority  in  ecclesiastical  tribunals,  which  Blackstone  character- 
izes as  a  "peculiarity"  of  the  British  constitution,  which  earlier 


PREFACE. 

English  writers  looked  upon  as  an  encroachment  by  the  Church, 
and  which  common  law  courts  jealously  resented.  The  origin  of 
distinct  courts  with  probate  powers  in  America  cannot,  certainly, 
be  ascribed  to  such  a  cause,  since  ecclesiastical  tribunals  never 
possessed  secular  powers  in  this  country.  The  reason  is  found 
in  the  nature  of  property,  which  requires  for  its  control,  after  the 
owner's  death,  tribunals  with  functions  different  from  those  of 
courts  adjusting  property  rights  between  litigants  sui  juris. 
Again,  it  is  well  known  that  the  common  law  is  shaped  in  many 
particulars  by  the  feudal  principles  introduced  by  the  Conqueror, 
while  in  America,  at  least  since  the  Revolution,  the  feudal  tenure 
has  never  been  recognized,  and  feudal  theories  are  therefore  in- 
applicable here.  It  is  obvious,  then,  that  property  means  quite  a 
different  thing  at  common  law,  as  modelled  on  feudal  principles, 
from  property  in  the  sense  of  modern  statutes,  whether  English 
or  American,  and  that  the  construction  of  such  a  statute  from 
the  common  law  point  of  view  would  be  liable  to  lead  to  error 
and  inconsistency. 

In  the  following  pages  the  attempt  has  been  made  to  present  the 
American  Law  of  Administration  as  it  appears  when  expounded  in 
the  light  of  the  causes  which  called  it  into  being,  and  contrasted 
with  its  background  of  common  law  traced  to  the  condition  of 
things  from  which  it  originated.  In  the  Introduction  will  be  found 
a  brief  examination  of  the  nature  of  property,  the  principle  of  its 
devolution  on  the  owner's  death,  and  the  officers  and  tribunals 
necessary  to  accomplish  the  devolution.  The  body  of  the  work 
constitutes  the  amplification  in  detail  of  the  principles  deduced 
from  the  nature  of  property  and  the  logical  functions  of  courts. 
The  common  law  as  well  as  the  statutes,  the  decisions  of  courts 
as  well  as  the  rules  which  govern  their  procedure,  not  omitting 
the  reasoning  and  announcements  of  text  writers,  have  all,  so  far 
as  my  ability  allowed,  been  considered  in  the  light  thrown  upon 
them  by  tracing  them,  as  effects,  to  their  causes.  For  the  law, 
which  Coke  demands  to  be  the  perfection  of  human  reason, 
cannot  be  arbitrary  or  capricious  in  its  requirements,  and  must 
therefore  reflect  some  actual,  real  condition,  which,  when  discov- 
ered, makes  apparent  its  purpose.     Since  the  law  is  necessarily 


PREFACE. 

administered  in  the  light  of  antecedent  adjudications,  —  every 
decision  by  a  competent  court  of  last  resort  constituting  thence- 
forth the  law  of  the  land,  as  much  as  the  statute  which  it 
construes,  —  the  treatise  necessarily  deals  with  the  law  as  so 
announced.  To  give  it  value  to  practitioners,  it  must  refer  them 
to  the  source  of  the  law,  whether  a  statute,  the  common  law,  or 
adjudication  by  a  court  of  binding  authority.  Hence  the  nu- 
merous citations  of  text-books,  statutes,  and  decided  cases,  which 
yet  constitute  a  small  proportion  of  the  innumerable  authorities 
whieli  might  be  cited.  In  the  selection  made  I  was  guided  some- 
what by  my  own  experience,  and  received  valuable  assistance  from 
my  son,  whose  fresh  vigor  and  practical  acquaintance  with  the 
views  and  wants  of  the  bar  served  to  clear  up  doubts  on  many 
controverted  topics.  In  some  few  instances  I  did  not  hesitate  to 
announce  my  own  views  on  points  upon  which  I  could  not  see  the 
logic  of  preponderating  authorities,  but  was  careful,  in  every  such 
case,  to  quote  the  arguments  from  which  I  dissented.  English 
cases  are  referred  to  only  where  American  cases  in  point  have 
not  been  found,  or  to  throw  light  on  points  upon  which  the  latter 
disagree. 

I  offer  the  result  of  my  labors  to  my  brethren  of  the  bench  and 
bar,  mistrusting  that  their  uniform  courtesy  and  kindness  to  me 
personally  may  have  unduly  emboldened  me  to  the  venture ;  be- 
speaking for  the  work  that  indulgence  and  leniency  of  judgment 
which  I  feel  to  be  its  chief  passport  to  public  favor.  But,  I  may 
add,  I  was  sustained  in  the  laborious  task  of  many  years  by  the 
hope  that  it  might,  to  some  slight  extent,  lessen  the  wearying 
work  of  over-burdened  judges,  assist  the  busy  lawyer  in  finding 
the  authorities  decisive  of  a  case  under  examination,  and  furnish 
to  some  of  my  brother  probate  judges  suggestions  not  entirely 

without  value. 

J.  G.  W. 
St.  Louis,  Mo., 

March,  1889. 


CONTENTS. 


Volume  I. 

Page 

Ta3le  op  Cases  Cited xxxv 


INTRODUCTION. 

OF   THE  NATURE   OF  PROPERTY  AND   THE   PRINCIPLE 
DETERMINING   ITS   DEVOLUTION. 


CHAPTER   I. 

OF   PROPERTY   IN   GENERAL.  Star  Paga 

§  1.  The  Acquisition  of  Property 1 

2.  Tenure  and  Use  of  Property ;  its  Loss  by  Non-user 2 

3.  Alienability  of  Property 3 

4.  Operation  of  the  Owner's  Will  after  his  Death 3 

5.  Distinction  between  Rational  and  Capricious  Will 4 

6.  Relation  of  Property  to  the  Family 5 

7.  Testamentary  Disposition  of  Property 6 

8.  Succession  of  Property  at  Law 7 

9.  The  Law  as  the  Rational  Will  of  the  Owner 8 

10.  Administration :  Functions  of  Executors  and  Administrators  ....  9 

11.  Functions  of  Courts  controlling  the  Devolution  of  Property     ....  10 

CHAPTER   II. 

OF   THE   DISTINCTION    BETWEEN    REAL   AND   PERSONAL   PROPERTY. 

12.  Distinction  between  Movable  and  Immovable,  or  Real  and  Personal 

Property 12 

13.  Origin  of  the  Tenure  of  Real  Estate  at  Common  Law 13 

14.  Substantial  Abrogation  of  the  Feudal  Tenure  by  English  Statutes     .     .  14 

15  The  Devolution  of  Real  Property  to  the  Heir  or  Devisee,  and  of  Per- 

sonal Property  to  the  Administrator  or  Executor 15 

16  Incongruity  of  the  Rule  in  America    ...          16 

xi 


CONTENTS. 


TITLE   FIRST. 

OF  THE  DEVOLUTION   OF  PROPERTY   ON   THE  DEATH 
OF  ITS   OWNER. 


PART   FIRST. 

OF  THE  DEVOLUTION  AS  DETERMINED  BY  THE  ACT  OE 
THE  OWNER. 


BOOK    FIRST. 
OF  TESTAMENTARY  DISPOSITION  OF  PROPERTY. 


CHAPTER   III. 

OF  THE    EXTERNAL   LIMITS   UPON   TESTAMENTARY   CAPACITY. 

Star  Page 

§  17-  Limitation  of  the  Property  disposable  by  Will 19 

18.  Limitations  upon  Testamentary  Capacity 20 

19.  Incapacity  of  Aliens 22 

20.  Incapacity  of  Infants 23 

21.  Incapacity  of  Married  Women 25 

22.  Incapacity  of  Criminals 28 


CHAPTER  IV. 

INCAPACITY   ARISING   FROM    MENTAL   DISABILITIES. 

§  23.  Degree  of  Mental  Vigor  requisite  to  make  a  Will 30 

24.  Incapacity  of  Idiots 32 

25.  Incapacity  of  Lunatics 32 

20.  Presumption  of  Sanity,  and  Lucid  Intervals 35 

27.  Presumption  of  Insanity 38 

88.  Competency  of  Witnesses  on  Questions  of  Sanity 40 

29.  Incapacity  from  Imbecility 42 

30.  Incapacity  in  Consequence  of  Force,  Fraud,  or  Intimidation    ....  44 

81.  Incapacity  arising  from  Undue  Influence 45 

32.  Presumption  against  Legacies  to  Fiduciary  Advisers 49 

83.  Presumption  as  to  Seamen's  Wills      .  50 

84    Partial  Avoidance  of  Will  by  Undue  Influence 51 

35.   0Tilla  of  Deaf,  Dumb,  and  Blind  Persons 52 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  V. 

FORM,    EXECUTION,    AND    ATTESTATION   OP   WILLS. 

Star  Page 

§  36.  Absolute  aud  Conditioual  Wills 54 

37.  Joiut  and  Mutual  Wills 56 

38.  General  Rules  as  to  the  Form  of  Wills 59 

39.  The  Signature 63 

40.  Attestation 66 

41.  Competency  of  Attesting  Witnesses 72 

42.  Wills  valid  as  to  Personal,  but  not  as  to  Real  Property 76 

43.  Holographic  Wills 78 

44.  Nuncupative  Wills 79 

45.  Statutory  Regulations  in  respect  of  Nuncupative  Wills 81 

46.  Wills  of  Soldiers  and  Mariners 84 

47.  Codicils 85 

CHAPTER  VI. 

OF   THE   REVOCATION   OF   WILLS. 

§  48.  Revocation  by  Cancelling,  Obliterating,  Burning,  etc 88 

49.  Partial  Revocation  by  Cancelling,  Obliterating,  etc 93 

50.  Revocation  by  Subsequent  Will 95 

51.  Effect  of  Subsequent  upon  Prior  Will 96 

52.  Revival  of  a  Prior  by  the  Revocation  of  a  Later  Will 99 

53.  Revocation  by  Inconsistent  Disposition  of  the  Testamentary  Gift     .     .  101 

54.  Revocation  by  Marriage 104 

55.  Revocation  by  Marriage  and  Birth  of  Issue  under  English  and  Ameri- 

can Statutes 107 

56.  Republication  of  Wills 112 


BOOK    SECOND. 
OF  GIFTS  EXECUTED  IN  ANTICIPATION  OF  IMMEDIATE  DEATH. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

DONATIONES   MORTIS   CAUSA. 

§  57.  Origin  and  Nature  of  Gifts  Mortis  Causa 115 

58.  Definitions  of  the  Term 117 

59.  By  whom,  to  whom,  and  of  what  a  Donatio  Mortis  Causa  may  be  made  117 

60.  Apprehension  of  Death 120 

61.  Delivery  of  the  Thing  Given 121 

62.  Revocability  of  Gifts  Mortis  Causa 125 

63.  Liability  of  Gifts  Mortis  Causa  to  Creditors  and  Family  of  the  Donor  126 

xiii 


CONTENTS. 


PART  SECOND. 

OF  THE  DEVOLUTION  BY  OPERATION  OF  LAW. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

DESCENT   AND   DISTRIBUTION   OF   PROPERTY   OF   INTESTATES. 

Star  Page 

§  64.  Nature  and  Origin  of  the  llules  of  Descent  and  Distribution      .     .     .  130 

65.  Rights  of  Children 132 

66.  The  Surviving  Husband  as  Heir 133 

67.  The  Widow  as  Heiress 134 

68.  The  Father  as  Heir 137 

69.  The  Mother  as  Heiress  ;  Adopted  Children 139 

70.  Brothers  and  Sisters  ;  Heirs  of  the  Full  and  of  the  Half  Blood  .     .     .  141 

71.  Descendants  taking  by  Representation 146 

72.  Computation  of  the  Next  of  Kin 150 

73.  Devolution  of  Ancestral  Estates 153 

74.  Posthumous  Children 154 

75.  Illegitimate  Children 156 

76.  Descent  from,  to  or  through  Aliens 159 


CHAPTER  IX. 

PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OF   THE   FAMILY. 

§  77.  Nature  and  Office  of  Statutory  Allowances  for  the  Provisional  Support 

of  the  Family 160 

78.  Statutory  Provisions  touching  the  Extent  and  Mode  of  the  Allowance  162 

79.  Rules  governing  the  Amount  of  the  Allowance 164 

80.  To  what  Extent  Liberality  should  govern  the  Court 166 

81.  Cases  illustrative  of  the  Amount  of  Allowance  deemed  reasonable    .     .  168 

82.  The  Allowance  in  Testate  Estates 170 

83.  The  Allowance  with  respect  to  the  Solvency  or  Insolvency  of  the  Estate  172 

84.  How  affected  by  Marriage  Settlements 17& 

85.  How  affected  by  Liens  or  Preferred  Debts  of  the  Decedent    ....  175 

86.  When  the  Allowance  takes  Effect 177 

87.  Separate  Property  of  the  Widow  affecting  the  Allowance 178 

88.  What  constitutes  a  Family 180 

89.  Allowance  to  the  Widow  alone 1S2 

90  Allowance  to  the  Children  alone 185 

91  Oui  of  what  Property  to  be  allowed 186 

92.  Time  and  Procedure  to  obtain  the  Allowance 188 

9V>.    Additional  Allowances 191 

jciv 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  X. 

EXEMPTION   OP  THE   HOMESTEAD. 

Star  Page 

§  94.  Nature  of  the  Homestead  Right  of  the  Surviving  Family     ....  194 

95.  What  Tenement  constitutes  the  Homestead  descending 198 

96.  Homestead  Rights  of  the  Widow 202 

97-  The  Homestead  as  aifected  by  the  Widow's  Dower 205 

98.  The  Widow's  Right  to  sell  the  Homestead 206 

99.  Homestead  Rights  of  Minor  Children 207 

100.  Homestead  Rights  of  Widow  and  Children  as  affected  by  Incumbrances  209 

101.  Homestead  Rights  as  affected  by  Inconsistent  Disposition  of  the  Es- 

tate by  the  Deceased  Owner 212 

102.  Homestead  Rights  as  affected  by  Administration 213 

103.  Procedure  in  Probate  Courts  in  setting  out  Homestead 215 

104.  The  Rights  and  Burdens  connected  with  the  Enjoyment  of  the  Home- 

stead    216 

CHAPTER  XL 

ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND   CURTESY. 

§105.  Nature  and  Purpose  of  Dower 218 

106.  Dower  under  the  Statutes  of  the  several  States 219 

107.  Marriage  as  a  Requisite  to  Dower 222 

108.  Alienage  as  Barring  the  Dower  Right 225 

109.  Misconduct  of  the  Wife  as  a  Bar  to  her  Dower 226 

110.  What  Property  is  subject  to  Dower 229 

111.  The  Estate  or  Interest  in  Property  necessary  to  support  Dower  in  the 

Widow 231 

112.  Inchoate  Dower 241 

113.  Dower  as  affected  by  Acts  of  the  Husband 244 

114.  The  Wife's  Relinquishment  of  Dower 248 

115.  Dower  Consummate  before  Assignment 253 

116.  Quarantine  of  Dower 255 

117-  Assignment  of  Dower 258 

118.  Ante-Nuptial  Contracts  as  affecting  Dower 263 

119.  Election  between  Dower  and  Devise 266 

120.  Dower  as  affected  by  the  Statute  nf  Limitations,  and  by  Estoppel  .     .  273 

121.  Estate  by  the  Curtesy 275 

122.  Community  Property   .                        277 

CHAPTER   XII.  w 

ESTATES   OF   DECEASED   PARTNERS. 

§  123.  Dissolution  of  the  Partnership  by  the  Death  of  one  of  its  Members    .  281 

124.  Powers  and  Liabilities  of  Surviving  Partners 283 

125.  Remedies  of  Partnership  Creditors  in  Equity 286 


CONTENTS. 

Btar  Page 

126.  Effect  of  Dissolution  on  Partnership  Real  Estate 288 

127.  Distribution  of  Partnership  Effects 290 

128.  Jurisdiction  of  Probate  Courts  over  Partnership  Estates 29 1 

129.  History  of  the  Missouri  Statute  giviug  Jurisdiction  to  Probate  Courts 

over  Partnership  Estates 297 

130.  Effect  of  Giving  or  Refusing  to  give  Bond 300 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

ESCHEATS. 

§  131.  Devolution  of  Property  in  Default  of  Heirs 302 

132.  Escheat  at  Common  Law "    .     .     .  302 

133.  Escheats  under  the  Statutes  of  the  several  States 30-1 

134.  Nature  of  the  Title  by  which  the  State  holds  Escheats 30S 

135.  Administration  of  Escheated  Estates 310 


TITLE   SECOOT. 

OF  THE   INSTRUMENTALITIES   EFFECTING  THE 
DEVOLUTION. 

§  136.  Tribunals  and  Officers  employed  by  the  Law  to  accomplish  the  Devo- 
lution       312 


PART   FIRST. 

OF  THE  TRIBUNALS  CONTROLLING   THE   ADMINISTRATION  OF 
THE  ESTATES  OF  DECEASED  PERSONS. 


CHAPTER   XIV. 

PROBATE   POWERS   AS    EXISTING    AT   COMMON    LAW   AND    UNDER 
ENGLISH    STATUTES. 

§  137.  Origin  of  the  Ecclesiastical  Jurisdiction  over  the  Probate  of  Wills      .  313 

138.  Origin  of  Administration  in  England 315 

139.  Powers  of  Ecclesiastical  Courts  in  England 316 

140.  Probate  Jurisdiction  in  other  English  Courts 318 

xvi 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XV. 

NATURE   OF   PROBATE   COURTS   IN    AMERICA. 

Star  Page 

§  141.  Origin  of  Probate  Courts  in  America 321 

142.  American  Statutes  tbe  only  Source  of  Probate  Powers  in  tbe  States  .  322 

143.  Their  Dignity  as  Courts 324 

144.  Their  Powers  as  Judicial  Tribunals 326 

145.  Conclusiveness  of  their  Judgments  in  Collateral  Proceedings    .     .     .  327 

146.  How  far  Probate  Courts  may  correct  their  Judgments 331 

147.  Entering  Judgment  2V runc  pro  Tunc 333 

148.  Proceeding  in  Rem  and  in  Personam 337 

149.  Method  of  Procedure  in  Probate  Courts 339 


CHAPTER   XVI. 

OF  THE   SUBJECT   MATTER   WITHIN   THE   JURISDICTION   OF   PROBATE 

COURTS. 

§  150.  Scope  of  the  Jurisdiction 343 

151.  Jurisdiction  as  limited  to  the  Devolution  of  Property  on  the  Owner's 

Death 344 

152.  Liabilities  arising  from  the  Administration 34-7 

153.  Adjudication  of  Claims  against  the  Deceased 34S 

154.  Incidental  Powers  conferred  by  necessary  Implication 349 

155.  Power  to  construe  Wills 351 

156.  Conclusive  and  Concurrent  Jurisdiction ;  Jurisdiction  of  Federal  Courts  355 


CHAPTER   XVII. 

DOMICILIARY   AND   ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION. 

§  157.  Authority  of  Representatives  limited  to  the  State  granting  it    .     .     .  358 

158.  Administration  of  the  same  Succession  in  different  Countries    .     .     .  359 

159.  Jurisdiction  of  Property  removed  to  another  Country  after  Owner's 

Death 361 

160.  Legal  Status  of  Foreign  Administrators 362 

161.  Validity  of  voluntary  Payment  to  Foreign  Administrator     ....  364 

162.  Extra-territorial  Validity  of  Title  once  vested 366 

163.  Statutory  Authority  of  Foreign  Executors  and  Administrators      .     .  368 

164.  Liabilities  of  Foreign  Administrators 370 

165.  Probate  Jurisdiction  affected  by  Change  of  Government 372 

166.  Procedure  governed  by  the  Law  of  the  Forum 374 

167-  Payment  of  Debts  and  Distribution  to  Non-Residents 375 

168.  Real  Estate  governed  by  the  Lex  Rei  Sitce 378 

169.  Provisional  Alimony  of  Widow  and  Minor  Children 379 

vol.  i.  —  b  xvii 


CONTENTS. 

PART  SECOND. 

OF  THE  OFFICE  OF  EXECUTORS  AND  ADMINISTRATORS. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

NATURE   OF    THE  TITLE  VESTING  IN   EXECUTORS   AND   ADMINISTRATORS. 

p 
Star  Page  » 

§170.  Conduit  of  the  Inheritance 381 

171.  Distinction  between  Executors  and  Administrators 382 

172.  When  the  Title  vests  in  the  Executor,  and  when  in  the  Administrator  383 

173.  Relation  of  the  Appointment  to  the  Time  of  the  Testator's  or  Intes- 

tate's Death      385 

174.  Title  of  Executors  and  Administrators  in  Auter  Droit 386 

175.  Power  of  Alienation 387 

176.  Other  Methods  of  Conversion 388 

177.  Property  in  Auter  Droit  distinguished  from  Property  in  Jure  Proprio  389" 

CHAPTER   XIX. 

OF   SPECIAL   AND   QUALIFIED   ADMINISTRATORS. 

§  178.  Administrators  cum  Testamento  annexo 392 

179.  Administrators  de  Bonis  non 393 

180.  Public  Administrators .395 

181.  Administrators  pendente  Lite 40O 

182.  Administrators  durante  Minore  Mtate 403 

183.  Administrators  durante  Absentia 404 

184.  Other  Temporary  and  Limited  Administrators 405- 


TITLE   THIRD. 

OF  THE  DEVOLUTION  TO  THE  LEGAL  KEPRESENTATIVES. 


PART    FIRST. 

OF  THE  ESTATE  WITHOUT  OFFICIAL   REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTER   XX. 

WnAT   MAY   BE   DONE   BEFORE   PROBATE    OR   GRANT   OF  LETTERS. 

§  185.  To  whom  the  Real  and  to  whom  the  Personal  Property  descends  .     .     408 

186.  Authority  of  Kxerutors  before  Grant  of  Letters  Testamentary  .     .     .     410 

187.  Authority  of  Administrators  before  Grant  of  Letters 411 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

OP  EXECUTORS   DE  SON  TORT. 

8  tar  Page 

§  188.  Definition 413 

189.  Acts  which  create  the  Liability 415 

190.  Status  of  the  Person,  and  other  Circumstances  fixing  the  Liability     .  416 

191.  Acts  of  Intermeddling  which  do  not  create  the  Liability 418 

192.  Coexistence  of  Executor  or  Administrator  de  Jure  and  de  son  Tort    .  419 

193.  Nature  of  the  Liability  of  Executors  de  son  Tort 420 

194.  Extent  of  their  Liability  to  Creditors 422 

195.  Liability  to  the  rightful  Executor  or  Administrator 424 

196.  Effect  of  the  Appointment  of  Executor  de  son  Tort  upon  his  previous 

Tortious  Acts 425 

197.  Validity  of  the  Title  acquired  by  an  Alienee  from  an  Executor  de  son  Tort  426 

198.  Application  of  the  Doctrine  in  America 427 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

OP  THE   NECESSITY   OP   OFFICIAL   ADMINISTRATION. 

§  199.  Why  Administration  is  necessary 430 

200.  Cases  holding  Administration  necessary 431 

201.  Exceptions  permitted  in  some  States 433 

202.  Residuary  Legatees  and  Widows  taking  Estates  without  Administra- 

tion     434 

203.  Administration  in  Louisiana 436 


PART   SECOND. 

OF  THE  INDUCTION  TO  THE  OFFICE  OF  EXECUTOR  AND 
ADMINISTRATOR. 


CHAPTER   XXIII. 

OF    THE    PRELIMINARIES  TO   THE    GRANT   OP  LETTERS    TESTAMENTARY 
AND   OF   ADMINISTRATION. 

§  204.  Local  Jurisdiction  to  grant  Letters  Testamentary  and  of  Administration  438 

205.  Jurisdiction  over  the  Estates  of  Deceased  Non-Residents     ....  440 

206.  What  constitutes  Domicil  or  Residence 442 

207-  Proof  of  Death 443 

208.  Administration  on  the  Estates  of  Living  Persons 447 

209.  Reasons  for  the  Invalidity  of  such  Administration 449 

210.  Cases  holding  Administration  of  Estates  of  Living  Persons  valid  .     .  452 

211.  Conclusiveness  of  Judgments 455 

212.  Administration  of  Estates  of  Absent  Persons 459 

213.  Administration  on  the  Estates  of  Persons  civilly  dead 462 

xix 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   XXIV. 

OP  THE   PROBATE    OF   THE   WILL. 

Star  Page 

§  214.  Production  of  the  Will  for  Probate 464 

215.  Validity  of  Probate  in  Probate  Courts 467 

216.  Method  of  Proof  in  Common  Form 470 

217-  The  Probate  in  Solemn  Form 472 

218.  Proof  when  the  Testimony  of  Subscribing  Witnesses  cannot  be  obtained  474 

219.  Witnesses  disqualified  by  Interest 476 

220.  Proof  of  the  Testator's  Sanity 478 

221.  Proof  of  Lost  Wills 480 

222.  Probate  of  Wills  in  Part  and  in  Fac  Simile 484 

223.  Probate  of  Holographic  Wills 487 

224.  Proof  of  Nuncupative  Wills 489 

225.  Admissibility  of  Declarations  as  Evidence  in  the  Probate  of  Wills      .  489 

226.  Wills  proved  in  a  Foreign  Jurisdiction 491 

227.  Revocation  of  Probate ;  Contest  of  Probate 496 

228.  Effect  of  the  Probate 501 

CHAPTER   XXV. 

OF  THE  GRANT  OF  LETTERS  TESTAMENTARY. 

§  229.  How  the  Executor  is  constituted 503 

230.  Residence  as  a  Qualification  to  the  Office  of  Executor 505 

231.  Infancy  as  a  Disqualification 506 

232.  Coverture  as  a  Disqualification  to  the  Office  of  Executrix     ....  506 

233.  Mental  Incapacity,  Immorality,  and  other  Disqualifications  ....  507 

234.  Acceptance  or  Refusal  of  the  Office  of  Executor 510 

CHAPTER   XXVI. 

LETTERS    OF   ADMINISTRATION. 

§  235.  Principles  governing  the  Grant  of  General  Letters  of  Administration  515 

236.  The  Husband's  Right  to  Appointment 517 

237-  The  Widow's  Right  to  Appointment 519 

238.  Right  of  Next  of  Kin  to  the  Appointment 521 

239.  Right  of  Creditors  to  Appointment 522 

240.  Right  of  the  Public  Administrator  to  the  Administration      ....  523 

241.  Disqualifications  excluding  from  the  Right  to  Appointment .     .     .     .  524 

242.  Considerations  governing  the  Discretion 527 

243.  Renunciation  of  the  Right  to  administer 530 

244.  Effect  of  Renunciation  or  Waiver 532 

245.  Administrators  cum  Testamento  annexo 534 

246.  Administrators  of  Estates  of  Non-Residents 536 

247>  Administrators  de  Bonis  non 537 

248.  Administrators  with  Limited  Powers 538 

XX 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   XXVII. 

OF  THE   ADMINISTRATION   BOND. 

B Ur  Page 

§  249.  Origin  of  the  Law  requiring  Administration  Bonds 540 

250.  Bonds  of  Executors 541 

251.  Power  of  Court  to  order  Bond 543 

252.  Circumstances  rendering  Bond  necessary 543 

253.  Invalidity  of  Administration  without  Bond 545 

254.  When  Additional  Bond  may  be  ordered ■.     .  546 

255.  Nature  of  the  Liability  of  Sureties;  Effect  of  New  Bonds    ....  547 

256.  Technical  Execution  of  the  Bond 552 

257.  Amount  of  the  Penalty 555 

258.  Joint  or  Separate  Bonds 557 

259.  Approval  and  Custody  of  Bonds 559 

260.  Special  Bonds 560 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

OF    THE    PROCEDURE   IN   OBTAINING    LETTERS    AND    QUALIFYING  FOR 

THE   OFFICE. 

§  261.  The  Petition  for  the  Grant  of  Letters  Testamentary  or  of  Administra- 
tion        561 

262.  Notice  to  Parties  entitled  to  Administer 563 

263.  Nature  of  the  Proceeding 565 

264.  Nature  of  the  Decree,  and  its  Authentication 565 

265.  Oath  of  Office 567 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

OF   THE   REVOCATION   OF  LETTERS   TESTAMENTARY   AND   OF 
ADMINISTRATION. 

§266.  Conclusiveness  of  the  Decree  or  Order  granting  Letters      ....  568 

267.  Jurisdiction  to  revoke  Letters 569 

268.  Recall  of  Letters  granted  without  Authority  in  the  Court    ....  570 

269.  Theory  of  Removal  for  Cause 572 

270.  Causes  justifying  Revocation  of  Letters 575 

27L  What  deemed  insufficient  to  justify  Revocation 577 

272.  Who  may  move  for  Revocation 580 

273.  Resignation  of  Executors  and  Administrators 582 

274.  Consequences  of  the  Revocation  of  Letters 584 


CONTENTS. 

PART   THIRD. 

OF  THE  PROPERTY  TO  WHICH  THE  TITLE  OF  EXECUTORS  AND 
ADMINISTRATORS  EXTENDS. 


CHAPTER   XXX. 

OF   PROPERTY    IN   POSSESSION. 

Star  Page 

§  275.  Joint  and  Partnership  Property 592 

276.  Real  Estate 592 

277.  Chattels  Real 593 

278.  Chattels  Real  of  the  Wife 594 

279.  Mortgages 595 

280.  Chattels  Animate 596 

281.  Chattels  Vegetable 597 

282.  Emblements 598 

283.  Fixtures,  as  between  the  Heir  and  the  Personal  Representative    .     .  COO 

284.  Modern  Statement  of  the  Rule       602 

2S5.  Fixtures,  as  between  Personal  Representatives  of  Life  Tenant  and 

Remainderman 605 

286.  Separate  Property  of  the  Wife 606 

287-  Ante-nuptial  and  Post-nuptial  Settlements 608 

288.  The  Wile's  Savings  from  Separate  Trade,  Pin-money,  Gifts,  etc.    .     .  611 

289.  The  Wife's  Paraphernalia 613 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

TITLE  OF  EXECUTORS  AND    ADMINISTRATORS  TO   CHOSES   IN    ACTION. 

§290.  Survival  of  Actions  at  Common  Law 015 

291.  Reason  of  the  Rule 616 

292.  American  Statutes  regulating  the  Survival  of  Actions 6,8 

293.  Actions  for  Injuries  to  Property 620 

294.  Actions  for  Injuries  to  the  Person 622 

295.  Actions  for  Injuries  resulting  in  Death 626 

296.  Property  conveyed  by  Decedent  in  Fraud  of  Creditors 630 

297.  Annuities  and  Rent  Charges 633 

298.  Apprentices  and  Servants 633 

299.  Copyrights  and  Patents 634 

300.  Rents 636 

301.  Apportionment  between  Life  Tenant  and  Remainderman     ....  637 

802.  The  Wife's  Choses  in  Action 63S 

303.  Actions  accruing  to  the  Representative  o'fficially  or  individually    .    .  643 

xxii 


CONTENTS. 

Volume  II. 
TITLE  FOURTH. 

OF  THE  DUTIES   OF  THE   PERSONAL   REPRESENTATIVE 
IN   RESPECT   OF   THE   ESTATE. 


PART   FIRST. 

OF  ACQUIRING   POSSESSION  OF  THE  ESTATE. 


CHAPTER   XXXII. 

WHAT    CONSTITUTES    ASSETS.  Star  Page 

5  304.  When  Property  becomes  Assets 644 

305.  Meaning  of  the  Term  Assets 644 

306.  Assets  not  possessed  by  the  Decedent 646 

307.  Accretions,  Interest,  Rents,  Profits 647 

308.  Property  in  Foreign  Jurisdiction 648 

309.  Debts  as  Assets  where  Debtor  resides 650 

310.  Property  lost  through  Administrator's  Negligence  as  Assets     .     .     .  651 

311.  Debts  of  Executors  or  Administrators  as  Assets 652 

312.  Property  in  Auter  Droit  not  Assets 655 

313.  Legal  and  Equitable  Assets 656 

314.  Personal  and  Real  Assets 658 

CHAPTER   XXXIII. 

OF  THE   INVENTORY   AND   APPRAISAL. 

■§315.  Office  and  Necessity  of  the  Inventory 660 

316.  Within  what  Time  the  Inventory  must  be  filed 661 

317.  What  Property  must  be  inventoried 664 

318.  Details  of  the  Inventory 667 

319.  Indication  of  the  Value  of  Assets 668 

320.  Appraisement  of  the  Goods 669 

CHAPTER   XXXIV. 

DUTIES   OF   EXECUTORS    AND    ADMINISTRATORS    IN    TAKING   CHARGE  OF 

THE   ESTATE.  » 

<§  321.  Duties  of  Administrators  to  take  Estate  into  Possession 672 

322.  Right  of  Administrator  paramount  to  the  Heir  or  Legatee   ....  674 

323.  Their  Duty  to  prosecute  and  defend  Actions  pending  by  or  against 

the  Estate 675 

324.  Actions  to  recover  or  defend  the  Estate 677 

325.  Summary  Proceedings  to  recover  Assets 679 

xxiii 


CONTENTS. 

PART   SECOND. 

OF  THE  MANAGEMENT  OF  THE  ESTATE. 


CHAPTER   XXXV. 

OP   THE   DUTIES   OF   EXECUTORS   AND    ADMINISTRATORS  IN  RESPECT   OF 

PERSONAL   PROPERTY.                                       _„  _ 

Star  Page 

§  326.  Compounding  with  Debtors 683 

327-  Arbitration 685 

327 a. Protest  and  Notice  respecting  Negotiable  Paper 686 

328.  Duties  in  Relation  to  the  Contracts  and  Trade  of  the  Deceased    .     .  686 

329.  Preserving  the  Property ;  Taxes  on  Personalty 690 

329a.Duties  in  Respect  of  the  Succession  Tax 691# 

330.  Sale  of  Perishable  Property 691a 

331.  Transfer  of  Property  by  the  Executor  or  Administrator      ....  692 

332.  Method  and  Notice  of  Sale 695 

333.  Terms  and  Method  of  Payment 697 

334.  Purchase  of  Personalty  by  the  Executor  or  Administrator  himself     .  700 

335.  Record  and  Report  of  the  Sale 703 

336.  Duties  in  Respect  of  the  Investment  and  Custody  of  Funds     .     .     .  704 

CHAPTER   XXXVI. 

OF  THE   MANAGEMENT   OF   THE   REAL   ESTATE. 

§  337.  States  in  which  Real  Estate  goes  to  the  Executor  or  Administrator  .  712 

338.  Interest  of  the  Executor  or  Administrator  in  Real  Estate    ....  715 

339.  Power  over  Real  Estate  conferred  by  Will 716 

340.  Power  given  in  a  Will  not  following  the  Office  of  the  Executor     .     .  719 

341.  Statutes  regulating  the  Power  over  Real  Estate  conferred  by  Will    .  721 

342.  Constructive  or  Equitable  Conversion 72& 

343.  Powers  vested  in  Devisee  of  a  Life  Estate 728 

344.  Duties  and  Liabilities  arising  to  Executors  and  Administrators  in 

Respect  of  Real  Estate 730 

345.  Power  to  mortgage  the  Real  Estate 731 


PART   THIRD. 

OF  THE  PRIVITY  AMONG  EXECUTORS  OR  ADMINISTRATORS  OF 
THE  SAME  ESTATE. 


CHAPTER   XXXVII. 

UNITY   OF   ESTATE    AMONG    EXECUTORS    AND    ADMINISTRATORS    OF   THE 

SAME    DECEDENT. 
§  346.   Power  of  Co-executors  to  bind  each  other  by  Acts  of  Administration     733 
347-  Acknowledging  or  Promising  to  pay  a  Debt  by  one  of  several  Execu- 
tors or  Administrators 735 


CONTENTS. 

Star  Page 

§  348.  The  Liability  of  one  Co-executor  or  Co-administrator  for  the  Acts  of 

another 737 

349.  Remedies  in  Protection  of  Co-admiuistrators  against  Liability  for  one 

another's  acts 739 

350.  Executor's  Executor  representing  the  Executor's  Testator  ....  741 

351.  Succession  in  the  Administration 743 

352.  Administrators  de  Bonis  non  under  American  Statutes 746 

353.  Privity  between  Successive  Administrators 750 

354.  Privity  between  Special  and  General  Administrators 752 


TITLE    FIFTH. 

OF  THE  PAYMENT   OF  DEBTS  BY  EXECUTORS   AND 
ADMINISTRATORS. 

§  355.  Origin  of  the  Common  Law  System  of  Paying  Debts  of  Deceased 

Persons 754 


PART   FIRST. 

OF  THE  PRIORITY  OF  DEMANDS  AGAINST  THE  ESTATES  OF 
DECEASED  PERSONS. 

§  356.  Distinction  between  the  Debts  of  the  Decedent,  and  Liabilities  con- 
tracted by  the  Personal  Representative 756 


CHAPTER   XXXVIII. 

OF   THE   PAYMENT   OP   LIABILITIES    ARISING    AFTER   THE   DEATH    OF 
THE   DECEDENT. 

\  357.  Funeral  Expenses  allowable  as  Incidental  to  the  Administration     .     .  759 

358.  What  constitutes  Funeral  Expenses 760 

359.  Extent  of  Allowance  for  Funeral  Expenses  out  of  Insolvent  Estates  .  763 

360.  Extent  of  Allowance  in  Solvent  Estates .  764 

361.  Expenses  of  Last  Illness  when  preferred  to  Debts 765 

362.  Expenses  necessary  in  the  Administration  of  the  Estate 766 

363.  Provisional  Alimony  for  the  Surviving  Family 767 

CHAPTER   XXXIX. 

OF   THE   PRIORITY   OF    DEBTS    CREATED   BY   THE   DECEDENT. 

§  364    Priority  of  Debts  at  Common  Law 769 

365.  Expenses  of  Funeral  and  Last,  Illness  as  Debts 770 

366.  Debts  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States 771 

367.  Debts  to  the  State  and  State  Corporations 772 

XXV 


CONTENTS. 

Star  Page 

§368.  Debts  owing  in  a  Fiduciary  Capacity 773 

309.  Judgments  against  the  Decedent  in  las  Lifetime 774 

370.  Recognizances,  Mortgages,  and  Obligations  of  Record 77S 

371.  Debts  by  Specialty       773 

372.  Rent 779 

373.  Wages 779 

374.  Simple  Contract  Debts 7  SO 


PART   SECOND. 

OF  THE  COMMON  LAW   SYSTEM  OF  PAYING  DEBTS  OF 
DECEASED   PERSONS. 

§375.  Payment  of  Debts  according  to  their  Priority 783 


CHAPTER   XL. 

OF  THE  PAYMENT  OP  DEBTS  AT  COMMON  LAW. 

376.  Preference  among  Creditors  of  equal  Degree 785 

377.  Right  of  Retainer  at  Common  Law 786 

378.  Application  of  the  Doctrine  of  Retainer  to  the  several  Classes  of  Ad- 

ministrators      787 

379.  Consequence  of  Paying  Legatee  before  Notice  of  Debt 7S'> 

3S0.  Defences  against  Actions  for  Debts  of  the  Deceased 79  L 

381.  Effect  of  Admissions  and  Promises  by  Executors  or  Administrators    .  794 

382.  Enforcing  Judgments  de  Bonis  Testatoris  at  Common  Law  ....  796 

383.  Liability  of  Executors  and  Administrators  in  Equity 798 


PART   THIRD. 

OF    THE    SYSTEM    OF    PAYING    DEBTS    OF    DECEASED    PERSONS 
UNDER  AMERICAN   STATUTES. 

§  384.  Contrast  between  Common  Law  and  American  System S0O 

385.  Notice  to  Creditors  of  the  Grant  of  Letters 801 


CHAPTER   XLI. 

OP   THE   EXHIBITION    OF   CLAIMS   TO,    AND    THEIR   ALLOWANCE   BY,  THE 
EXECUTOR    OR    ADMINISTRATOR. 

§  3s6.  Creditors  required  to  exhibit  Claims 803 

387.  What  constitutes  a  sufficient  Exhibition 804 

388.  Time  for  the  Exhibition  of  Claims £06 

389    Adidavit  of  Creditors  necessary 808 

390.  Allowance  or  Rejection  of  Claims  by  the  Administrator 810 

xxvi 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   XLII. 

OF   ESTABLISHING   CLAIMS   AGAINST  THE    ESTATES   OF   DECEASED 

PERSONS. 

Star  Pag* 

§391.  When  Claims  may  be  established  in  Probate  Court 813 

392.  What  Actions  and  Defences  are  triable  in  Probate  Courts  ....  815 

393.  Claims  not  matured 817 

394.  Contingent  Claims 81 S 

395.  Claims  of  Executors  and  Administrators 820 

396.  Claims  by  Relatives  ;  Evidence  in  Proving  Claims  against  Estates  .  822 
397-  Notice  to  the  Administrator  of  Claims  to  be  established  ....  825 
398.  Set-offs  in  Probate  Courts,  and  Parties  as  Witnesses S27 

CHAPTER  XLIII. 

OF   THE    TIME   WITHIN    WHICH    CLAIMS    MUST   BE   ESTABLISHED. 

§  399.  Time  of  establishing  Claims  with  Reference  to  their  Rejection  by  the 

Administrator 833 

400.  Special  Limitation  of  Time  to  establish  Claims  against  Estates  .     .     .     839 

401.  Application  of  the  General  Statute  of  Limitations  to  Executors  and 

Administrators 84)3 

402.  Application  of  the  Statute  of  Non-Claim,  or  Special  Limitation      .     .     845 

403.  Effect  of  Proving  Claims  after  the  Time  fixed  therefor  by  Statute  .     .     848 

CHAPTER   XLIV. 

OF    CLAIMS   AGAINST   INSOLVENT  ESTATES. 

§  404.  How  Estates  are  declared  Insolvent 851 

405.  Special  Administration  of  Insolvent  Estates 853 

406.  Procedure  in  establishing  Claims  against  Insolvent  Estates  ....  856 

407.  Time  withiu  which  Claims  must  be  presented  against  Insolvent  Estates  856 

408.  Rights  of  Creditors  holding  Collateral  Security  to  Assets  of  Insolvent 

Estates 859 

409.  Actions  to  foreclose  Collateral  Secm-ities 860 

CHAPTER   XLV. 

OF   THE   PAYMENT   OF   DEBTS  WHEN   ESTABLISHED. 

§  410.  Nature  and  Effect  of  the  Allowance  or  Judgment  establishing  Claims    862 

411.  The  Order  or  Decree  to  pay  Debts 86 1 

412.  Enforcement  of  the  Order  or  Decree  to  pay  Debts 865 


CONTENTS. 

TITLE   SIXTH. 

OF  LEGACIES   AND   DEVISES. 

Star  Page 

§  413.  Legacies  and  Devises 868 


PART    FIRST. 

OF  ASCERTAINING  THE  MEANING  OF  WILLS. 


CHAPTER   XLVI. 

OF   THE  GENERAL  RULES   APPLIED   IN   EXPOUNDING   WILLS. 

§  414.  Ascertaining  the  Testator's  Intention 870 

415.  Rule  requiring  the  several  Parts  of  a  Will  to  be  construed  together. 

Precatory  Words 873 

416.  General  Intent  controlling  the  Particular  Intent 877 

417.  Rule  allowing  Words  and  Limitations  to  be  Transposed,  Supplied,  or 

Rejected 879 

418.  Testator's  Intention  viewed  iu  the  Light  of  Policy  of  the  Law  .     .     .  882 

419.  From  what  Period  the  Will  speaks  in  Respect   of  the  Law  govern- 

ing it 885 

420.  From  what  Period  the  Will  speaks  in  Respect  of  the  Testator's  In- 

tention . 888 

421.  Extrinsic  Evidence  in  Aid  of  Construction 891 

422.  Testamentary  Donees  as  Classes .  895 

423.  Classes  designated  by  Technical  Terms 899 

CHAPTER   XLVII. 

TESTAMENTARY    DISPOSITIONS    CONTROLLED    BY   PUBLIC    POLICY. 

§  424.  Gifts  for  Immoral  or  Superstitious  Purposes 907 

425.  Gifts  prohibited  by  the  Statute  of  Mortmain 909 

426.  Corporations  as  Testamentary  Donees 911 

427.  Rule  against  Perpetuities 914 

428.  Accumulation  of  the  Income 917 

42!)    Gifts  to  Charitable  Uses 919 

430.  What  constitutes  a  Charitable  Gift  in  the  Legal  Sense 925 

4:H.  Validity  of  the  English  Statute  of  Charitable  Uses  in  America  ...  928 

432.  The  Doctrine  of  Cy  Pres 929 

4:5:}.  Gifts  of  Benevolence  or  Private  Charity 932 

xxviii 


CONTENTS. 

PART    SECOND. 

OF  CARRYING  WILLS  INTO  EFFECT. 


CHAPTER   XLVIII. 

LEGAL   INCIDENTS   AFFECTING   DEVISES   AND   LEGACIES. 

Star  Page 

§  434.  Lapse  of  Testamentary  Gifts  by  the  Death,  of  the  Donee  before  that 

of  the  Testator 935 

435.  Statutory   Exceptions    in    Favor  of   Representatives   of  Deceased 

Legatees 938 

436.  The  Doctrine  of  Lapse  as  affected  by  the  Contingent  or  Vested  Char- 

acter of  the  Devise  or  Legacy 941 

437.  Devolution  of  Void  and  Lapsed  Devises  and  Legacies 943 

438.  The  Devolution  of  Void  and  Lapsed  Devises  and  Legacies  as  affected 

by  Statutes 945 

439.  Remainders,  and  Executory  Devises  and  Bequests 947 

440.  Devises  and  Legacies  on  Condition 951 

441.  Repugnant  Conditions 954 

442.  Conditions  obnoxious  to  Public  Policy 957 

443.  Conditions  in  Restraint  of  Marriage 960 

444.  Classification  of  Legacies 964 

445.  Cumulative,  Repeated,  and  Substituted  Legacies 969 

446.  Ademption  and  Satisfaction  of  Legacies  by  Act  of  the  Testator     .     .  972 

447.  Legacies  in  Satisfaction  of  Debts 974 

448.  Ademption  of  Legacies  given  as  Portions 977 

449.  Admissibility  of  Parol  Evidence  on  Questions  of  Ademption     .     .     .  979 

450.  Statutory  Provisions  affecting  Ademption  or  Satisfaction  of  Legacies  9S2 

CHAPTER  XLIX. 

OF   THE   SATISFACTION    OF   LEGACIES   BY   THE   EXECUTOR. 

§451.  Preference  of  Creditors  over  Legatees 984 

452.  Order  in  which  Legacies  abate 985 

453.  Executor's  Assent  to  Devises  and  Legacies 990 

454.  Time  for  Paying  or  Delivering  Legacies 994 

455.  Time  for  Paying  Legacies  fixed  by  Statutes 996 

456.  Payment  of  Bequests  for  Life  with  Remainder  over 998 

457-  Relative  Rights  of  Life  Tenants  and  Remaindermen  to  Dividends 

of  Stock 1003 

458.  Interest  on  Legacies 1005 

459.  Interest  when  Time  of  Payment  is  fixed  by  the  Will 1008 

460.  Persons  competent  to  receive  Payment  of  Legacies 1011 

461.  The  Doctrine  of  Election 1015 

462.  Payment  of  the  Residue 1017 

xxix 


CONTENTS. 


TITLE    SEVENTH. 

OF  THE  APPLICATION  OF  THE  ASSETS  FOR  THE  PAY- 
MENT   OF   DEBTS   AND   LEGACIES. 


PART   FIRST. 

OF  THE  LIABILITY  OF  REAL  ESTATE  FOR  THE  DEBTS  OF 
DECEASED  PERSONS. 


CHAPTER  L. 

OF   THE   PROCEDURE   IN   OBTAINING   THE   ORDER   OF   SALE. 

Star  Page 

§  463.  Nature  of  the  Power  to  sell  Real  Estate  for  the  Payment  of  Debts  1020 

464.  Who  may  apply  for  the  Order  to  sell  Real  Estate 1022 

465.  Within  what  time  Application  may  be  made 1024 

466.  Notice  of  the  Application  to  Heirs  and  Devisees 1029 

467-  Who  may  appear,  and  what  may  be  shown  against  the  Application  .  1031 

468.  What  the  Petition  must  show 1035 

469.  Proof  of  the  Existence  of  Debts 1037 

470.  Proof  of  the  Insufficiency  of  the  Personalty. 1040 

471.  What  Interest  of  the  Decedent  in  Lands  may  be  ordered  to  be  sold .  1042 

472.  Of  the  Bond  and  Oath  required  of  Executors  and  Administrators     .  1045 

473.  The  Order,  License,  or  Decree  to  Sell 1017 

CHAPTER  LI. 

OF  THE   SALE   AND   ITS   CONSUMMATION. 

§  474.  Time  of  Selling 1050 

475.  Notice  or  Advertisement  of  the  Sale 1051 

476.  Appraisement  required  before  the  Sale 1053 

477.  Conducting  the  Sale 1055 

478.  Report  and  Confirmation  of  the  Sale 1059 

479.  Payment  of  the  Purchase  Money 1063 

480.  The  Deed  of  Conveyance 1065 

CHAPTER  LTI. 

OF  THE  CONSEQUENCES  ATTENDING  THE  SALE. 

§  481.  Application  of  the  Proceeds 1069 

482.  Purchaser's  Liability  for  Encumbrances 1071 

483.  Purchaser's  Liability  to  Dowrcss  and  Homestead  Tenants      .     .     .  1074 


CONTENTS. 

Star  Page 

484.  How  Purchasers  are  affected  by  the  Rule  of  Caveat  Emptor    .     .     .  1077 

485.  The  Purchaser's  Rights  in  Equity 1078 

486.  The  Purchaser  as  affected  by  the  Statute  of  Frauds 1082 

487.  Executors  and  Administrators  as  Purchasers 1082 

488.  Validity  of  the  Sale  in  Collateral  Actions 1088 


PART   SECOND. 

OF  THE  RELATIVE   LIABILITY  OF  ASSETS  TO  CREDITORS  AND 

LEGATEES. 


CHAPTER   LIII. 

OF   MARSHALLING    ASSETS    FOR   THE   PAYMENT   OF   DEBTS   AND 

LEGACIES. 

§  4S9.  Order  of  the  Application  of  Funds  Liable  to  the  Payment  of  Debts  .  1093 

490.  Charge  of  Debts  on  Real  Estate 1095 

491.  Charge  of  Legacies  on  Real  Estate 1097 

492.  Effect  of  Devise  of  Rents  and  Profits 1100 

493.  Exoneration  of  the  Personalty 1103 

494.  Exoueration  of  Mortgaged  Property 1105 

495.  Marshalling  Assets  in  the  Course  of  Administration 1106 

496.  Marshalling  Assets  among  Creditors,  Legatees,  Devisees,  Heirs,  and 

Distributees 1109 

497.  Statutes  affecting  the  Marshalling  of  Assets 1111 


TITLE    EIGHTH. 

OF  ACCOUNTING  AND   SETTLEMENTS  BY  EXECUTORS 
AND   ADMINISTRATORS. 


CHAPTER  LIV. 

OF  THE  COMMON  LAW  AND  STATUTORY  SYSTEM  OF  ACCOUNTING. 

498.  Of  Accounting  at  Common  Law  in  Courts  of  Probate 1115 

499.  Accounting  in  Common  Law  Courts 1116 

500.  Accounting  in  Equity 1117 

501.  Statutes  requiring  Periodical  Accounting 1118 

502.  Rendering  the  Account  and  Passing  upon  it 1120 

xxxi 


CONTENTS. 

Star  Pag« 

§  503.  Exclusive  and  Concurrent  Jurisdiction  over  Administration  Accounts  1122 

504.  Conclusiveness  of  Partial  Settlements 1123 

505.  Nature  of  Final  Settlements 1126 

506.  Couclusiveness  of  Final  Settlements 1128 

507.  Setting  aside  Final  Settlements  in  the  Probate  Court 1130 

508.  Setting  aside  Final  Settlements  in  Chancery 1131 

CHAPTER  LV. 

OF   THE    DEBIT   SIDE   OF   THE   ACCOUNT. 

§  509.  What  the  Accountant  must  show 1134 

510.  Inventoried  Assets  to  be  charged  in  the  Account 1136 

511.  What  Interest  Administrators  are  chargeable  with 1136 

512.  Debts  of  Executor  or  Administrator  to  be  charged 1139 

513.  Rents  and  Proceeds  of  Real  Estate  chargeable  to  the  Executor  or 

Administrator 1141 

CHAPTER  LVI. 

OF  THE  CREDIT   SIDE  OF  THE   ACCOUNT. 

§  514.  What  the  Accountant  may  take  Credit  for 1144 

515.  What  Counsel  Fees  will  be  allowed 1145 

516.  What  Counsel  Fees  will  not  be  allowed 1147 

517.  Costs,  including  Probate  and  establishing  the  Right  to  administer   .  1149 

518.  Disbursements  in  Respect  of  the  Real  Estate 1151 

519.  Payments  to  Widow  and  Heirs 1152 

520.  Disbursements  in  Payment  of  Debts 1154 

521.  Payments  at  Discount,  or  in  Depreciated  Currency 1157 

522.  Credits  for  Difference  between  Inventoried  and  Actual  Values     .     .  1158 

523.  Interest  on  Advancements  by  the  Executor  or  Administrator  .     .     .  1159 

CHAPTER  LVII. 

COMPENSATION   OF  EXECUTORS   AND   ADMINISTRATORS. 

§  524.  Commissions  allowed  by  Statute 1160 

525.  Compensation  allowed  in  the  Absence  of  Statutory  Provision  .     .     .  1163 

526.  Compensation  in  Cases  of  Maladministration 1163 

527.  Discretion  of  the  Court  under  the  Statutes 1164 

528.  Upon  what  Property  Commissions  are  allowable 1166 

529.  Compensation  for  Extra  Services 1168 

530.  Compensal ion  of  Joint  Executors  or  Administrators 1170 

531.  Compensation  to  Successive  Administrators 1172 

532.  Compensation  determined  by  the  Testator 1174 

533.  Credit  for  Commissions  in  the  Administration  Account 1176 

xxxii 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   LVIII. 

OF   THE    METHOD   AND    PROCEDURE   IN    ADJUDICATING   THE   ACCOUNT. 

Star  Page 

§534.  Devastavit 1178 

535.  Accounting  by  Co-executors  or  Co-administrators 11/  -J 

536.  Accounting  by  Successive  Administrators  . 1181 

537.  Accounting  for  Assets  received  in  Foreign  Jurisdiction 1183 

538.  Compelling  Final  Settlement 1185 

539.  Falsifications  and  Surcharges  on  Final  Settlement 1186 

540.  Verification  and  Evidence 1187 

541.  Judgment  on  the  Adjudication  of  the  Account 1189 

CHAPTER   LIX. 

OF  APPEALS  FROM  COURTS  OF  PROBATE. 

§  542.  Treatment,  of  the  Subject 1192 

543.  Right  of  Appeal  given  by  Statutes 1192 

544.  Who  may  Appeal 1193 

545.  From  what  Decisions  of  Probate  Courts  Appeals  are  allowable     .     .  1196 

546.  How  Appeal  is  taken 1199 

547.  Powers  of  the  Probate  Court  after  Appeal 1202 

548.  The  Question  of  Supersedeas  under  the  Statutes 1204 

549.  Nature  of  the  Trial  in  the  Appellate  Court 1206 

550.  Nature  of  the  Trial  de  Novo 1208 


TITLE    NINTH. 

OF  THE  CLOSE   OF  THE   ADMINISTRATION". 


PART  FIRST. 

OF    DISTRIBUTION  TO  LEGATEES  AND  NEXT  OF  KIN. 
§  551.  Duty  of  Probate  Courts  to  order  Distribution 1211 


CHAPTER    LX. 

OF   ADVANCEMENTS. 

§  552.  Definition  of  Advancements 1213 

553.  Advancements  in  Testate  Estates 1215 

554.  To  whom  the  Doctrine  ef  Advancements  applies 1216 

555.  What  constitutes  an  Advancement 1217 

556.  Rights  of  Donees  in  Respect  of  Advancements 1219 

tol.  i.  —  c  xxxiii 


CONTENTS. 

Star  Page 

§  557-  Computation  of  the  Value  of  Advancements 1221 

558.  How  the  Existence  of  Advancements  may  be  shown 1222 

559.  Statutory  Provisions  as  to  Advancements 1224 

CHAPTER   LXI. 

OF   THE   DECREE    OR   ORDER    OP   DISTRIBUTION. 

§  560.  Refunding  Bonds 1227 

561.  Parties  to  the  Order  of  Distribution 1229 

562.  Nature  and  Scope  of  the  Decree 1231 

563.  Rights  of  Assignees  of  Distributees 1235 

564.  Set-off  to  Legacies  and  Distributive  Shares 1236 

565.  The  Law  vesting  the  Rights  of  Legatees  and  Distributees      .     .     .  1238 

566.  Voluntary  Distribution 1241 

567.  Partition  of  Real  Estate  in  Courts  of  Probate 1243 

568.  Enforcing  the  Order  to  pay  Legacies  and  Distributive  Shares      .     .  1246 

569.  Enforcement  of  Distribution  under  American  Statutes 124& 


PART   SECOND. 

OF  THE  ESTATE  AFTER  OFFICIAL  ADMINISTRATION. 


CHAPTER   LXIL 

OF   THE   STATUS   OF   EXECUTORS   AND   ADMINISTRATORS    AFTER  FINAL 

SETTLEMENT. 

§  570.  Res  Judicata  as  a  Defence  after  Final  Settlement 1253 

571.  Duration  of  the  Office  at  Common  Law 1254 

572.  American  Theory  of  the  Duration  of  the  Office 1255 

573.  Statutory  Provisions  for  the  Discharge  of  Executors  and  Adminis- 

trators        1257 

CHAPTER  LXIII. 

OF   THE   LIABILITY  OF   THE   ESTATE   AFTER    FINAL   SETTLEMENT. 

§  574.  Liability  of  the  Estate  at  Common  Law 1261 

575.  Principle  of  Liability  under  American  Statutes 1262 

576.  Extent  of  Liability  of  the  Heir 1264 

577.  Exhaustion  of  Remedies    against   Personal   Representative  before 

Action  will  lie  against  Heirs 1267 

578.  Time  within  which  Claims  may  be  enforced  against  Heirs  ,     .     .  1268 

579.  Nature  of  the  Action  against  Heirs  and  Devisees,  Distributees,  and 

Legatees 1270 


Indkx 1273 

xxxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  star  or  Bide  pages.] 


1028 
367 
434 
631,  1070 
609 
562 
391 


919 


892 
543,  546 
678 
367 
1039 
468 
640 


Aaron's  Succession  (11  La.  An.  671)  180 

Abbav  v.  Hill  (64  Miss.  340)  848,  1096 

Abbey  v.  Aymar  (3  Dern.  400)  881 

Abbis  v.  Winter  (3  Swanst.  578,  n.)  785 

Abbott  v.  Abbott  (41  Mich.  540)  473,  475 

v.  Bosworth  (36  Oh.  St.  605)  236 

v.  Downs  (168  Mass.  481) 

v.  Miller  (10  Mo.  141) 

v.  People  (10  111.  App.  62) 

v.  Tenney  (18  N.  H.  109) 

v.  Winchester  (105  Mass.  115) 

Abel  v.  Love  (17  Cal.  233) 
Abell  v.  Grady  (79  Md.  94) 
Abend  v.  Endowment  Fund  (74  111.  App. 

654) 
Abercrombie   v.    Abercrombie   (27    Ala. 

489) 

v.  Sheldon  (8  Allen,  532) 

v.  Skinner  (42  Ala.  633) 

v.  Stillman  (77  Tex.  589) 

Abilaw.  Burnett  (33  Cal.  658) 

v.  Padilla  (14  Cal.  103) 

Abington  v.  Travis  (15  Mo.  240) 
Abraham  v.  Wilkins  (17  Ark.  292)  41,  67,  68 
Abram  v.  Cunningham  (2  Lev.  182)  585 

Academv  v.  Adatns  (65  N.  H.  225)  931 

v.  Clemens  (50  Mo.  167)  920,  931 

Acherley  v.  Vernon  (Willes,  153)  951,  952 
Achenbach  v.  Coal  Co.  (2  Kan.  App.  357)  815 
Achilles  v.  Achilles  (151  111.  136)  608 

Ackermau's  Case  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  533)  1140 
Ackerman  v.  Emot.t  (4  Barb.  626)  1138 

v.  Shelp  (8  N.  J.  L.  125)  254,  256 

v.  Vreeland  (14  N.  J.  Eq.  23) 

Ackermann,  In  re  (33  Minn.  54) 
Ackerson  v.  Orchard  (7  Wash.  377) 
Ackley  v.  Dygert  (33  Barb.  176) 
Acklin  v.  Goodman  (77  Ala.  521) 
Ackrovd  v.  Smithson  (1  Bro.  C.  C.  503)     728 
Adair  v.  Brimmer  (74  N.  Y.  539)       738,  1155 

v.  Brimmer  (95  N.  Y.  35)  1203 

v.  Shaw  (1  Sch.  &  Lef.  243)  401 

Adams's  Appeal  (47  Pa.  St.  94)  1160,  1176 
Adams,  Goods  of  (L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  367)        62 

v.  Adams  (11  B.  Mon.  77) 

v.  Adams  (46  Ga.  630) 

v.  Adams  (154  Mass.  299) 

v.  Adams  (10  Met.  170) 

t\  Adams  (57  Miss.  267) 

v.  Adams  (7  Oh.  St.  83) 

v.  Adams  (21  Vt.  162) 


915 
1029 
1039 
1049 

325 


375 

204,  206 


161,  178 

223 

1184 

331,  332,  1131, 

1198 

v.  Adams  (22  Vt.  50)  325,  356,  661,  815, 

1123,  1128,  1246 


Adams  v.  Akerlund  (168  111.  632) 

v.  Bass  (18  Ga.  130) 

v.  Beall  (60  Ga.  325) 

v.  Board  (37  Fla.  266) 

v.  Butts  (16  Pick.  343) 


*Page 

23 

931 

1201 

830,  833 

760,  828 


v.  Chaplin  (1  Hill,  S.  C  Eq.  265)         71 

v.   Eartherly   Hardw.   Co.    (78  Ga. 

485)  830 

v.  Edwards  (115  Pa.  St.  211)  832 

v.  Fassett  (149  N.  Y.  61)  845,  1268 

v.  Field  (21  Vt.  256)  65 

V.  Gillespie  (2  Jones  Eq.  244)  950 

v.  Gleaves  (10  Lea,  367)  1180 

v.  Larrimore  (51  Mo.  130)  397,  1047 

v.  Lathan  (14  Rich.  Eq.  304)  1174 

v.  Lewis  (5  Sawy.  229)  350 

v.  Marsteller  (70  Ind.  381)  296 

v.  Morrison  (4  N.  H.  166)  1056 

v.  Olin  (61  Hun,  318)  975 

v.  Palmer  (51  Me.  480)  251 

v.  Peirce  (3  P.  Wins.  11)  992 

v.  Railroad  (67  Vt.  76)  629 

V.  Richardson  (5  Tex.  App.  439)       1068 

v.  Smith  (19  Nev.  259)  1155 

v.  Storey  (135  Ilk  448)  228 

v.  Supervisor  (154  N.  Y.  619)  1151 

v.  Thomas  (44  Ark.  267) 

v.  Toomer  (44  Ark.  271) 


1062,  1079 

1062,  1079, 

1080 


v.  Turner  (12  S.  C.  594)  1242 

v.  Wilbur  (2  Sumn.  266)  885 

Addams  v.  Heffeman  (9  Watts,  529)  1011 
Addington  v.  Wilson  (5  Ind.  137)  34 
Addison  v.  Bowie  (2  Bl.  Ch.  606)  270 
Additon  v.  Smith  (83  Me.  551)  965,  988 
Aden  v.  Aden  (16  Lea,  453)  1217 
Adev  v.  Adev  (58  Mo.  App.  408)  432 
Adie  v.  Cornwell  (3  T  B.  Mon.  276)  992 
Adkinson  v.  Breeding  (56  Iowa,  26)  177 
Adlum's  Estate  (6  Phila.  347)  375 
Adriance  v.  Crews  (45  Tex.  181)  689 
Adshead  v.  Willetts  (29  Beav.  358)  881 
Adsit's  Estate  (Myr.  266)  498 
Adsit  v.  Adsit  (2  Johns.  Ch.  448)  267 
Adve  v.  Smith  (44  Conn.  60)  928,  930,  934 
^Etna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Swayze  (30  Kan.  118)  684 
Affleck  v.  Snodgrass  (8  Oh.  St.  234)  1075 
Agan  v.  Shannon  (103  Mo.  661)  254,  1060 
Agnew  v.  Fetterman  (4  Pa.  St.  56)  1096 
Agricultural  Bank  v.  Rice  (4  How.  225)  250 
Aguirre  v.  Packard  (14  Cal.  171)  865 
Ahearn  v.  Mann  (63  N.  H.  330)  1200 
Ahern  v.  Steele  (48  Hun,  517)  1262 
v.  Steele  (115  N.  Y.  203)                    1262 

XXXV 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 
[Inferences  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


1083 


Aicard  v.  Daly  (7  La.  An.  612) 
Aiken  r.  Bridgman  (37  Vt.  24'J) 

v.  Coolidge  (12  Or.  244) 

v.  Morse  (104  Mass.  277) 

v.  Weckerly  (19  Mich.  482) 

Aikin  v.  Dunlap  (16  John.  77) 

Aikman  v.  Harsell  (08  N.  Y.  186) 

Ailev  r.  Burnett  (134  Mo.  313) 

Ains'lie  v.  Radcliff  (7  Pai.  439) 

Ainsworth  v.  Bank  (119  Cal.  470) 

Ake's  Appeal  (21  Pa.  St.  320) 

Aken  v.  Geiger  (52  Ga.  407) 

Akers  v.  Akers  (16  Lea,  7) 

Akin  v.  Kellogg  (119  N.  Y.  441) 

Akins  v.  Hill  (7  Ga.  573) 

Alabama   Conference   r.  Price   (42   Ala. 

39)  1021 

Alabama  State  Bank  v.  Glass  (82  Ala 

278) 
Albanv   Bank  v.  McCarthy  (149  N.  Y 

71)  " 
Albanv  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bay  (4  N.  Y.  9) 
Albeer.  Carpenter  (12  Cush.  382) 
Alberger  r.  Bank  (123  Mo.  313) 
Albers  v.  Whitney  (1  Sto.  310) 
Albert  v.  Albert  (68  Md.  352) 
Albro  v.  Robinson  (93  Ky.  195) 


812 

858 

44 

'254 
195 
776 
827 

1129 
212 
676 
270 

1132 


839 


833 

i:vi 

639 

646 

336 

902,  906,  915 

558,  559, 

1243 

1057,  1058 

110 

814 

620 


Alcorn  v.  State  (57  Miss.  273) 
Alden  v.  Johnson  (63  Iowa,  124) 
Aldrich  v.  Annin  (54  Mich.  230) 

v.  Howard  (8  R.  I.  125) 

Aldridge   v.   McClelland  (36   N.  J.   Eq. 

288)  1139,  1147,  1151,  1152 

Ales  v.  Plant  (61  Miss.  259)  1026 

Alexander's  Will  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  463)  499 

Alexander  v.  Alexander  (70  Ala.  212)       1128 

v.  Alexander  (0  De  G.  M.  &  G.  593)  876 

v.  Alexander  (26  Neb.  68)  330,  1246 

v.  Alexander  (120  N.  C.  472)  1148 

v.  Barlield  (6  Tex.  400)  432 

v.  Bourdier  (43  La.  An.  321)  1022 

■ v.  Fisher  (18  Ala.  374)  1229 

v.  Hening  (54  Ga.  200)  1064 

v.  Kelso  (1  Baxt.  5)  419 

v.  Kelso  (3  Baxt.  311)  684 

v.  Lane  (Yelv.  137)  422 

v.  Leakin  (72  Md.  199)  1246 

v.  McMurrv  (8  Watts,  504)  1096 

v.  Masonic' (126  111.  558)  902 

V.  Maverick  ( 18  Tex.  179)        1049,  1078 

v.  Miller  (7  Heisk.  65)  1104 

v.  Mullens  (2  R.  &  Mvl.  568)  798 

v.  Nelson  (42  Ala.  462)  331 

v.  Ranev  (8  Ark.  324)  752 

v.  Rice  (52  Mich.  451)  330 

v.  Stewart  (8  G.  &  J.  226)  394,  744 

v.  Wallace  (8  Lea,  509)  902 

v.  Waller  (6  Bush,  330)  935,  1094 

Alfonso's  Appeal  (70  Pa.  St.  347)  369 

Alfonso  v.  United  States  (2  Sto.  421)  671 

Alford  v.  Balbert  (74  lex.  340)  432 

v.  Lehman  (76  Ala.  526)  212 

Alfricnd  v.  Daniel  (48  Ga.  154)  418,  423 

Allaire  v.  Allaire  (37  X.  J.  I-  312)71,  475,  493 

0.  Allaire  (.!!)  N .  .1.  I..    11:))  71 

Allan  v.  Gillel  (21  Fed.  EL  27:;,  1085 

Allegheny  Bank  v.  Hays  (12  Fed.  Rep. 

663)  '■'s'» 
Alleman  <••  Alleman  (44  Mo.  App.  4)  1224 
v.  Bergeron  (16  La.  An.  191)  437 


•Page 

1148 

1026,  1039,  1040 

532 

896 


Allen,  Ex  parte  (89  111.  474) 

Ex  parte  (15  Mass.  57) 

In  re  (78  Cal.  581) 

In  re,  (151  N.  Y.  243) 

Allen's  Succession  (48  La.  An.  1030) 

Will  (25  Minn.  39)  68,  70 

Allen  v.  Allen  (3  Dem.  524)  761,  1144 

v.  Allen  (112  111.  323)  275 

v.  Allen  (28  Kan.  18)  58 

v.  Allen  (20  Mo.  327)  795 

v.  Allen  (18  Oh.  St.  234)  768 

v.  Allen  (12  R.  I.  301)  596 

v.  Allen  (18  S.  C.  512)  978,  979,  980 

v.  Allen  (18  How.  U.  S.  385)  892 

v.  Ashley  (102  Mass.  262)     '  1070 

v.  Barnes  (12  Pac.  R.  912)  354,  1102 

v.  Boomer  (82  Wis.  304)  1016 

v.  Bradford  (3  Ala.  281)  337 

v.  Bvers  (12  Ark.  593)  807 

v.  Clark  (2  Blackf.  343)  357 

i'.  Clavbrook  (58  Mo.  124)        111 

v.  Cra'ft  (109  Ind.  476)  1358 

v.  Crosland  (2  Rich.  Eq.  68)  1009 

v.  Dean  (148  Mass.  594)  720 

v.  Duudas    (3  T.  R.   125)  448,  449. 

501,  508,  587 

v.  Edwards  (136  Mass.  138)       976,  1238 

B.  Elliott  (67  Ala.  432)  807 

v.  Everett  (12  B.  Mon.  371)  65 

v.  Froman  (96  Kv.  313)  466 

v.  Graffins  (8  Watts,  397)  795 

v.  Griffin  (69  Wis.  529)  37,  68,  70 

v.  Hawlev  (66  111.  164)  201 

v.  Hillman  (09  Miss.  225)  844 

v.  Irwin  (1  S.  &.  R.  549)  752 

v.  Jackson  (L.  R.  1  Ch.  D.  399)  961,  962 

v.  Jeter  (6  Lea.  672)  489 

v.  Keith  (26  Miss.  232)  857 

v.  Kimball  (15  Me.  116)  417 

v.  Krips  (125  Pa.  St.  504)  1028 

v.  McCoy  (8  Ohio,  418)  230 

r.  McFarland  (150  111.  455)  60 

v.  McPherson  (1  H.  L.  Cas.  191)        485 

v.  McRae  (91  Wis.  226)  631 

r.  Manasse  (4  Ala.  554)  182 

v.  Matthews  (7  Ga.  149)  794 

v.  Prav  (12  Me.  138)  268 

v.  Public  Administrator  (1  Bradf .  378)  48 

v.  Rovster  (107  N.  C.  278)  1147 

v.  Russell  (39  Oh.  St.  3:J0)  202 

v.  Sales  (56  Mo.  28)  336 

v.  Sanders  (34  N.  J.  Eq.  203)  549 

».  Shanks  (90  Tenn.  359)   363,  739,  1022 

v.  Shepard  (87  111.  314)   1058,  1061,  1063 

v.  Shields  (72  N.  C.  504)  209 

r.  Simons  (1  Curt.  122)  432,  1241 

v.  Smith  (29  Ark.  74)  860 

v.  Smith  (80  Me.  480)  1194 

t\  Smith  (72  Miss.  689)  865 

v.  Tarbell  (65  Vt.  150)  1143 

v.  Walt  (!(  Heisk.  242)  609 

v.  Watts  (98  Ala.  384)  727 

v.  Whitaker  (34  Ga.  0)  941 

v.  Wilkins  (3  Allen.  321)  518,  642 

Allensworth  v.  Kimbrough  (79  Ky.  332) 

207,  214 

Ailing  v.  Chatfield  (42  Conn.  276)  268 

v.  Munson  (2  Conn.  691)  685,  811 

Allison  v.  Abrams  (40  Miss.  747)     1182,  1185 

v.  Allison  (4  Hawkes,  141)  75 

v.  Chaney  (63  Mo.  279)  873 


TABLE    OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


951 

60,61 

1012,  1107 

204 

519 

323,  529 

63 

809 

200 

689 

691  a 


762 

782 


927 


Allison  v.  Kurtz  (2  Watts,  185)  1067 

v.  Smith  (16  Mich.  405)  911 

v.  Wilson  (13  S.  &  R.  330)  555 

Allmon  v.  Pigg  (82  111.  149)  46 

Allsnp  v.  Allsup  (10  Yerg.  283)  363,  369,  371 
Almy  v.  Jones  (17  R.  I.  264)  920,  927,  929,  941 

v.  Probate  Court  (18  R.  I.  612)  1138 

Alsop's  Appeal  (9  Pa.  St.  374)  313 

Alsop  v.  Mather  (8  Conn.  584)  283,  1182 

v.  Russell  (38  Conn.  99)  873 

Alston  v.  Alston  (7  Ired.  Eq.  172)  1240 

v.  Davis  (2  Head,  266) 

v.  Davis  (118  N.  C.  202) 

v.  Munford  (1  Brock.  266) 

v.  Ulmann  (38  Tex.  157) 

Altemus's  Case  (1  Ashm.  49) 

•  Estate  (32  La.  An.  364) 

Alter's  Appeal  (67  Pa.  St.  341) 
Alter  v.  Kinsworthv  (30  Ark.  756) 
Altheimer  v.  Davis' (37  Ark.  316) 

u.  Hunter  (56  Ark.  159) 

Alvaney  v.  Powell  (2  Jones  Eq.  51) 
Alvis  v.  Oglesbv  (87  Tenn.  172)  1138,  1248 
Alvord  v.  Marsh  (12  Allen,  603)  385,  426,  699 
Ambler  v.  Lindsav  (L.  R.  3  Ch.  D.  198)  417, 

421 
Ambre  v.  Weisharr  (74  111.  109) 
Ambrose  v.  Kerrison  (10  C.  B.  776) 
Ambs  v.  Caspari  (13  Mo.  App.  586) 
American   Academy  ».  Harvard  College 

(12  Gray,  582) 
Amencan,  &c.  Assoc,  v.  Lett  (42  N.   J. 

Eq.  43)  1097 

American   Bible   Society  v.   Hebard   (51 
Barb.  552)  1247 

v.  Hebard  (41  N.  Y.  619)  1247 

v.  Marshall  (15  Oh.  St.  537)  513 

v.  Pratt  (9  Allen,  109)  892 

v.  Price  (115  111.  623)  41 

American  Board's  Appeal  (27  Conn.  344)  743, 

856 
American  Board  v.  Nelson  (72  III.  564)  107 
American  C.  Co.  v.  Clemens  (132  Ind. 

163)  1099 

American  Case  Co.  v.  Shaughnessy  (59 

Miss.  398)  675 

American  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Shulz  (82  Pa. 

St.  46)  830,  836 

American  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Bovd  (92  Ala. 

139)  996 

American  Tract  Society  v.  Atwater  (30 

Oh.  St.  77)  913 

Ames,  In  re  (3  McArth.  30)  1182 

Ames's  Estate  (52  Mo.  290)  359,  367,  368,  650 

Succession  (33  La.  An.  1317)  1011 

Will  (51  Iowa,  596)  43 

Ames  v.  Ames  (148  111.  321)  357 

v.  Ames  (128  Mass.  277)  820,  1234 

v.  Armstrong  (106  Mass.  15) 

v.  Downing  (1  Bradf.  321 ) 

v.  Jackson  (115  Mass.  508) 

v.  Williams  (72  Miss.  760) 

Amherst  College  v.  Ritch  (151  N.  Y.  282) 

691  n,  895,  911 
Amherst  College  v.  Smith  (134  Mass.  543)  1100 
Amis  v.  Cameron  (55  Ga.  449)  433,  1241 

Amiss  v.  Williamson  (17  W.  Va.  673)        999 
Amnion's  Appeal    (31  Pa.  St.  311)  1146 

Amos  v.  Amos  (117  Ind.  37)  145 

v.  Campbell  (9  Fla.  187)  802,  1247, 

1250 


558,  737 

281 

841,  1155 

330,  439 


Page 
1157 
212 
365 
365 


Amos  v.  Heatherby  (7  Dana,  45) 
Amphlett  v.  Hibbard  (2!)  Mich.  298) 
Amsden  v.  Danielson  (18  R.  I.  787) 

v.  Danielson  (19  R.  I   533) 

Amy  v.  Amy  (12  Utah,  278)        145,  153,  154 
And'erson's  Appeal  (36  Pa.  St.  476)  269 

Appeal  (102  Pa.  St.  258)  1258 

r.  Ackerman  (88  hid.  481)  284 

v.  Agnew  (38  Fla.  30)  805 

v.  Anderson  (37  Ala.  683)  1147 

v.  Anderson  (112  N.  Y.  104)       469,  501 

v.  Anderson  (183  Pa.  St.  480)  653 

v.  Arnold  (79  Ky.  370)  623 

v.  Beebe  (22  Kan.  768)  295 

v.  Belcher  (1  Hill,  S.  C.  246)  632 

v.  Bell  (140  Ind.  375)  145 

v.  Bradley  (66  Ala.  263)  1067 

v.  Burwell  (6  Grat.  405)  1247 

v.  Cary  (36  Oh.  St.  506)  955 

v.  Crist  (113  Ind.  65)  876 

v.  Davison  (42  Hun,  431)  989 

v.  Earle  (9  S.  C.  460)  721 

v.  Felton  (1  Ired.  Eq.  55)  942 

v.  Green  (46  Ga.  361)  702,  1087 

v.  Gregg  (44  Miss.  170)  339,  1 137 

v.  Hall  (80  Kv.  91)  949 

v.  Irwin  (101  "ill.  411)  483 

v.  Lery  (33  Ark.  665)  1029 

v.  McGowan  (42  Ala.  280)  721 

v.  Northrop  (30  Fla.  012)  672, 1258 

v.  Norton  (15  Lea,  14)  286 

v.  Piercy  (20  W.  Va.  282)        678,  1007, 

1138,  1149,  1158 

v.  Smith  (159  111.  93)  212 

v.  Stockdale  (62  Tex.  54)  725 

v.  Tindall  (26  Miss.  332)  853,  863 

v.  Wynne  (62  Ala.  329)  699 

Andover  v.  Merrimack  Co.  (37  N.  H. 

437)  639 

Andrade  v.  Superior  Court  (75  Cal.  459)  296 
Andres  v.  Powell  (97  N.  C.  155)  1229,  1269 
Andress's  Estate  (14  Phila.  263)  190 

Andress  v.  Weller  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  604)  892 

Andrew  v.  Andrew  (1  Colly.  686)  936 

v.  Bible  Soc.  (4  Sandf.  156)  936 

v.  Gallison  (15  Mass.  325,  n.)  426 

v.  Hinderman  (71  Wis.  148)  631 

Andrews'  Estate  (92  Mich.  449)  271 

Andrews  v.  Andrews  (8  Conn.  79)  264 

v.  Andrews  (7  Heisk.  234)  725 

v.  Andrews  (110  111.  223)  929 

v.  Andrews  (12  Mart.  713)  79 

v.  Andrews  (7  Oh.  St.  143)  1149 

v.  Avorv  (14  Grat.  229)     '  452 

v.  Bernliardi  (87  111.  365)  329, 1089 

v.  Brown  (21  Ala.  437)  283 

v.  Can-  (2  R.  I.  117)  579 

v.  Hall  (15  Ala.  85)  1215,  1217 

v.  Huckabee  (30  Ala.  143)  843 

v.  Hunneman  (6  Pick.  126)    ■    992,993 

v.  Jones  (10  Ala.  400)  608 

v.  Melton  (51  Ala.  400)  215 

v.  Morse  (51  Kan.  30)  860,  861 

r.  Sehoppe  (84  Me.  170)  969 

v.  Tucker  (7  Pick.  250)  576,  666 

Androscoggin  Bank  v.  Kimball  (10  Cush. 

373)  52 

Andrus  v.  Foster  (17  Vt.  556)  824 

Andruss  ?\  Doolittle  (11  Conn.  283)  631,  666 
Angell  v.  Angell  (14  R.  I.  541)  325 

Anger's  Succession  (36  La.  An.  252)         1110 
xxxvii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages/] 


Anger's  Succession  (38  La.  An.  492)  1062 
Angevine  v.  Jackson  (103  N.  Y.  470)  1208 
Anglo-Nev.  A.  Corp.  v.  Nadeau  (90  Cal. 


393) 
Annable  v.  Patch  (3  Pick.  360) 
Annin  v.  Annin  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  184) 
Anshutz  v.  Miller  (81  Pa.  St.  212) 
Ansley  v.  Baker  (14  Tex.  607) 
Anson  v.  Stein  (6  Iowa,  150) 
Anthonv  c.  Anthony  (55  Conn.  256) 

v.  Rice  (110  Mo.  223) 

Apel  V.  Kelsey  (47  Ark.  413)  1030,  1054, 1059 


861 
896,  897 
609 
888 
429 
1234 
266 
214 


1030,  1089 

792,  1248, 

1254,  1255 

892 

254,  267, 

360,  442 

480,  481 

990 

608 

2:!2 

479 


..  Kelsev(52  Ark.  341) 
App  v.  Dreisbaeh  (2  Rawle,  287) 

Appel  v.  Bvers  (98  Pa.  St.  479) 
Apperson  v.  Bolton  (29  Ark.  418) 

v.  Cottrell  (3  Port.  51) 

Apple's  Estate  (66  Cal.  432) 
Apple  v.  Allen  (3  Jones  Eq.  120) 

o.  Apple  (1  Head,  548) 

Appleby  V.  Brock  (76  Mo.  314) 

Applegate  v.  Cameron  (2  Bradf.  119)  164,  192 

v.  Conner  (93  Ind.  185)  251 

r.  Gracv  (9  Dana,  215)  249 

v.  Smith  (31  Mo.  166)  378,  493,  494,  887 

91 

560 

1046 

1028 

704 

843 

65 

154 

554 

1240 

612 

836 

49 

1236 


Appling  v.  Eades  (1  Grat.  286) 
Apthorp  r.  North  (14  Mass.  167) 
Arguelle,  Estate  of  (50  Cal.  308) 
Arguello,  In  re  (85  Cal.  151) 

In  re  (97  Cal.  196) 

Ariail  v.  Ariail  (29  S.  C.  84) 
Armant's  Succession  (43  La.  An.  310) 
Armington  v.  Armington  (28  Ind.  74) 
Armistead  v.  Bozman  (1  Ired.  Eq.  Ill) 

8.  Dangeriield  (3  Munf.  20) 

Armitage  r.  Mace  (96  N.  Y.  538) 

v.  Snowden  (41  Md.  119) 

Armors  Estate  (154  Pa.  517) 
Armour  v.  Kendall  (15  R.  I.  193) 
Armstrong's  Appeal  (63  Pa.  St.  312)  965,  987 

Estate  (80  Cal.  71) 

Armstrong  v.  Armstrong  (29  Ala.  538) 

v.  Armstrong  (14  B.  Mon.  333) 

v.  Armstrong  (1  Oreg.  207) 

ti.  Armstrong  (63  Wis.  162) 

v.  Baker  (9  Ired.  109) 

0.  Crapo  (72  Iowa,  604) 

v.  Huston  (8  Ohio,  552) 

v.  Lear  (12  Wheat.  169) 

o.  Loomis  (97  Mich.  581) 

v.  McKelvey  (104  N.  Y.  179)    728 

p.  Moore  (59  Tex.  646) 

v.  Moran  (1  Bradf.  314) 

v.  Park  (9  Humph.  195) 

v.  Storall  (26  Miss.  275) 

p.  Stove  (77  X.  C.  360) 

v.  Walker  (150  Pa.  St.  585) 

Arnett  p.  Arnett  (14  Ark.  57) 

p.  Arnett  1 27  111.  247) 

Am. ,ld  -■.  Arnold  (62  da.  627) 

v.  Arnold  (H  B.  Mon.  202) 

r.  Babbitt  (5  .1.  .1.  Marsh.  665) 

v.  Blackwell  (2  Dev.  Eq.  1) 

v.  Buffmn  (2  Mason,  208) 

, p.  Commonwealth  (80  Kv.  186) 

r.  Dean  (61  Tex.249) 

p.  Donaldson  (46  Ob.  St.  73)  1056,  1077 

p  Earle  (2  Lee  Eccl.  K.  539)      24 


202 

65 

873 

1239 

47 

472 

873 

1062 

492 

1045,  1267. 

1271 

1271 
210 
938 
725 
632 
576 

1110 
230 
82 
441 
232 
552 

1164 
881 
SKI 

1099 


*  Page 
Arnold  v.  Haroun  (43  Hun,  278)      1215 

v.   Lanier  (Car.  Law  Rep.  143)     625 

v.  Ruggles  (1  R.  I.  165)  639 

v.  Sabin  (1  Gush.  525)  522,  530 

v.  Sabin  (4  Cush.  46)  588,  1204 

v.  Smith  (14  R.  I.  217)  1153,  1165,  1229, 

1249 

v.  Spates  (65  Iowa,  570)  1122,  1132 

Arrington  v.  Dortch  (77  N.  C.  367)  372,  1217 

v.  Hair  (19  Ala.  243)  751 

v.  McLemore  (33  Ark.  759)  501 

Arrowsmith  v.  Gleason  (129  U.  S.  86)       357, 

546 
Arterburn  v.  Young  (14  Bush,  509)  1200 

Asburv  v.  Mcintosh  (20  Mo.  278)  298 

AscheV  Asche  (113  N.  Y.  232)  268,  726 

v.  Yungst  (65  Tex.  631)  198 

Ash  v.  Ash  (9  Oh.  St.  383)  110 

v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  (72  Md.  144)  630 

v.  Calvert  (2  Camp.  387)  467 

Ashbrook  !>.  Ryon  (2  Bush,  228)  119 

Ashburn  v.  Ashburn  (16  Ga.  213)  393 

Ashburner  v.  Macquire  (2  Bro.  Ch.  108)    973 
Ashby  v.  Child  (Styles,  384)  420 

v.  Costin  (L.  R.  21  Q.  B.  401)  648 

Ashford  v.  Ewing  (25  Pa.  St.  213)    344,  1249 
Ashlev  v.  Gunton  (15  Ark.  415)  809 

v.  Hendee  (56  Vt.  209)  824 

Ashley  v.  Pocock  (3  Atk.  208)  785 

Ashmead's  Appeal  (27  Conn.  241)  855 

Ashton's  Estate  (134  Pa.  St.  390)  902 

Ashton  v.  Miles  (49  Iowa,  564)  804 

v.  Wilkinson  (53  N.  J.  Eq.  227)       1008 

Asinari  v.  Bangs  (3  Dem.  385)  89 

Askew  v.  Askew  (103  N.  C.  285)  236 

v.  Bynum  (81  N.  C.  350)  260 

v.  Hudgens  (99  111.  468)  1162 

Aspden's  Estate  (2  Wall.  C.  C.  368)   902,  903 
Aspden  v.  Nixon  (4  How.  467)  360,  361 

Aspinwall  v.  Pimie  (4  Edw.  Ch.  410)       1174 
Aston's  Estate  (5  Whart.  228)  1172 

Astor,  Matter  of  (6  Dem.  402)  691  a 

v.  Hovt  (5  Wend.  603)  646 

Atcheson  v.  Robertson  (4  Rich.  Eq.  39)    1146 
Atchison  v.  Atchison  (89  Ky.  488)  140 

v.  Smith  (25  Tex.  228)  828 

ti.  Twine  (9  Kan.  350)  627 

Atkins  v.  Atkins  (18  Neb.  474)  225 

v.  Atkins  (69  Vt.  270)  817 

v.  Hill  (Cowp.  284)  993 

v.  McCormick  (4  Jones,  274)        532,  565 

v.  Sawyer  (1  Pick.  351)  793 

v.  Scarborough  (9  Humph.  517)  819 

Atkinson  v.  Christian  (3  Grat.  448)  546 
v.  Hastv  (21  Neb.  663)                  529,  530 

v.  Rowson  (1  Mod.  208)  788 

v.  Sutton  (23  W.  Va.  197)  267 

Atlantic    Bank   v.   Taveuer    (130    Mass. 

407)  610 

Atterbury  v.  Gill  (2  Flip.  239)  626 

Attorney-General    v.  Briggs   (164  Mass. 

561)  931 

v.  Brigham  (142  Mass.  248)         646,  848 

v.  Fishmongers'  Co.  (2  Beav.  151)      907 

v.  Garrison  (101  Mass.  223)  927 

B.  Gibson  (2  Beav.  317)  931 

P.  Goulding  (2  Bro.  C.  C.  428)  910 

r.  Hall  (2  Ir.  R.  (1897)  426)  909 

r.  Hewer  (2  Vern.  387)  933 

V.   Ironmongers'  Co.  (2  Myl.  &  K. 

576)  927,  931 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  aide  pages.] 


Attorney-General  v.  Jollv  (1   Rich.  Eq. 

99)  919,  929,  930 

v.  Meeting-house  (3  Gray,  1)  923 

v.  Painter-Stainers  (2  Cox  Ch.  51)      927 

v.  Providence  (8  R.  I.  8)  310 

v.  Trinity  Church  (9  Allen,  422)         922 

v.  Wallace  (7  B.  Mon.  611)  929,  931,  949 

v.  Williams  (4  Bro.  C.  C.  394)  933 

Atwater  v.  Barnes  (21  Conn.  237)  1135 

Atwell  v.  Helm  (7  Bush,  504)  543,  545 

Atwood's  Estate  (14  Utah,  1)  111,  834 

Atwood  v.  Atwood  (22  Pick.  283)  232 

v.  Frost  (59  Mich.  409)  1108,  1114 

Aubert  v.  Aubert  (6  La.  An.  104)  39,  502 

Aubuchon  v.  Aubuchon  (133  Mo.  260)       1085 

v.  Lory  (23  Mo.  99)  621,  715 

Auburn  State  Bank  v.  Brown  (172  111. 

284)  849 

Auch's  Succession  (39  La.  An.  1043)  922 

Auguisola  v.  Arnaz  (51  Cal.  435)  346 

Augustus  v.  Seabolt  (3  Met.  Ky.  155)  880 
Aulick  v.  Wallace  (12  Bush,  53"l)  880 

Aull  v.  Day  (133  Mo.  337)  149 

Austell  v.  Swann  (74  Ga.  278)  257,  258 

Austin's  Estate  (73  Mo.  App.  61)  184 

Austin,  Matter  of  (45  Hun,  1)  70 

v.  Austin  (50  Me.  74)  258,  259 

v.  Davis  (128  Ind.  472)  59 

v.  Fielder  (40  Ark.  144)  71 

v.  Gage  (9  Mass.  395)  650 

v.  Holmes  (1  Ired.  399)  827 

v.  Jordan  (35  Ala.  642)  1185,  1186 

v.  Lamar  (23  Miss.  189)  332 

v.  Munro  (47  N.  Y.  360)  757 

v.  Saveland  (77  Wis.  108)  807,818 

v.  Varian  (16  N.  Y.  App.  D.  337)       691 

v.  Willis  (90  Ala.  421)  1078 

Avery's  Estate  (34  Pa.  St.  204)  691  a 

Avery  v.  Avery  (12  Tex.  54)  632 

v.  Chappel  (6  Conn.  270)  892 

v.  Dufrees  (9  Ohio,  145)  1043 

v.  Everitt  (110  N.  Y.  317)  462 

v.  Mvers  (60  Miss.  367)  285 

: v.  Pixlev  (4  Mass.  400)  94 

Axtell's  Appeal  (6  Atl.  550)  3149 

Axton  v.  Carter  (141  Ind.  672)  1087 

Ayer  v.  Ayer  (123  Mass.  575)  1006 

! v.  Chadwick  (66  N.  H.  385)  805 

' v.  Messer  (59  N.  H.  279)  1131 

Ayers  v.  Ayers  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  565)  68,  70 

v.  Donnell  (57  Mo.  396)  844 

v.  Dixon  (78  N.  Y.  318)  621 

Aynsworth  v.  Pratchett  (13  Ves.  321)  1009 
Ayres  v.  Probasco  (14  Kan.  175)  212 

- —  v.  Shannon  (5  Mo.  282)  1073 

v.  Weed  (16  Conn.  291)  512 

Ayrey  v.  Hill  (2  Add.  206)  39,  40 

Baacke  v.  Baacke  (50  Neb.  18)  109 

Babb  v.  Reed  (5  Ruwle,  151)  932 

Babbett  v.  Doe  (4  Ind.  355)  1046 

Babbidge  v.  Vittum  (156  Mass.  38)  988 

Babbitt  v.  Bowen  (32  Vt.  437)  434 

v.  Day  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  392)  233 

Babcock,  Matter  of  (115  N.  Y.  450)  691 

v.  Babcock  (53  How.  Pr.  97)  245,  264 

v.  Booth  (2  Hill,  N.  Y.  181)  658 

v.  Cobb  (11  Minn.  349)  1046 

v.  Collins  (60  Minn.  73)       369,  386,  494 

v.  Eckler  (24  N.  Y.  623)  609 


*Page 
Babcock  v.  Probate  Court  (18  R.  I.  555)    163, 

189 
Bachelor  v.  Schmela  (49  Neb.  37) 
Backhouse  v.  Jett  (1  Brock.  500) 
Bacon  v.  Chase  (83  Iowa,  521) 

v.  Crandon  (15  Pick.  79) 

v.  Fairman  (6  Conn.  121) 

v.  Gassett  (13  Allen,  334) 

v.  Morrison  (57  Mo.  68) 

v.  Parker  (12  Conn.  212) 

v.  Pomeroy  (104  Mass.  577) 

v.  Probate  Judge  (100  Mich. 


1125 

632,1124 

1079 

811 

653 

1216 

1060,  1085 

415,  420 

1267 

183)      166, 

189,  190 

1264 

856 

261 

1266 

748 

1163 

705,  711 

951 


v.  Thornton  (16  Utah,  138) 

v.  Thorp  (27  Conn.  251) 

Baden  v.  McKenny  (18  D.  C.  268) 
Badger  v.  Daniel  (79  N.  C.  372) 

v.  Jones  (66  N.  C.  305) 

Badillo  v.  Tio  (7  La.  An.  487) 
Baer's  Appeal  (127  Pa.  St.  360) 

Matter  (147  N.  Y.  348) 

Bagger's  Estate  (78  Iowa,  171) 
Baggott  v.  Boulger  (2  Duer,  160) 
Bahnert's  Estate  (12  Phila.  27) 
Baier  v.  Baier  (4  Dem.  162) 
Bailey,  Goods  of  (2  Sw.  &  Tr.  156) 
Bailev's  Appeal  (32  Pa.  St.  40) 
Bailey's  Cased  Atl.  131) 
Bailey's  Succession  (30  La.  An.  75) 
Bailey  v.  Bailey  (35  Ala.  687) 

v.  Bailey  (115  111.  551) 

v.  Bailev  (25  Mich.  185) 

v.  Bailev  (8  Oh.  239) 

v.  Blanchard  (12  Pick.  166) 

v.  Boyce  (4  Strobh.  Eq.  84) 

v.  Boyd  (59  Ind.  292) 

V.  Briggs  (56  N.  Y.  407) 

v.  Brown  (9  R.  I.  79) 

v.  Miller  (5  Ired.  L.  444) 

v.  Munden  (58  Ala.  104) 

v.  Patterson  (3  Rich.  Eq.  156) 

v.  Rinker  (146  Ind.  129) 

v.  Sanger  (108  Ind.  264) 

v.  Scott  (13  Wis.  618) 

v.  Spofford  (14  Hun,  86) 

v.  Stewart  (2  Redf.  212) 

v.  Stiles  (2  N.  J.  Eq.  220) 

v.  Strong  (8  Conn.  278) 

v.  Tavlor  (11  Conn.  531) 

Baillif  v.  Gerhard  (40  Minn.  172) 
Baillio  v.  Wilson  (5  Mart.  N.  S.  214) 
Bailv's  Estate  (153  Pa.  St.  402) 

"  Estate  (156  Pa.  St.  634)  1236,  1237 

Baily  v.  Osborn  (33  Miss.  128)  498 

Bainbridge's  Appeal  (97  Pa.  St.  482)  765 

Baines  v.  McGee  (1  Sm.  &  M.  208)  094 

Bainway  v.  Cobb  (99  Mass.  457)  605 

Baird  v.  Baird  (7  Ired.  Eq.  265)  873,  884 

v.  Boucher  (60  Miss.  326)  880 

v.  Brooks  (65  Iowa,  40)  431 

Bake  v.  Smilev  (84  Ind.  212)  1196 

Baker's  Appeal  (56  Conn.  586)  161,  175 

Appeal  (107  Pa.  St.  381)  64,  65 

Will  (2  Redf.  179)  51 

Baker  v.  Baker  (8  Gray,  101)  903 

v.  Baker  (51  Oh.  "St.  217)  64 

v.  Baker  (51  Wis.  538)  193 

v.  Baker  (57  Wis.  382)  170, 171 

v.  Bancroft  (79  Ga.  672)  76 

v.  Bean  (74  Me.  17)         1265,  1267, 1269 

v.  Bowie  (74  Md.  467)  749 

xxxix 


1198 

803 

1229 

584 

29 

1048 

721 

654 

63 

1098 

873,  903 

467 

1188,  1189 

268 

157 

354 

722 

414 

1153 

901 

370, 1023 

884 

395 

736 

499 

473,  482 

1122 

94 

200 

323 

976 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 

Baker  v.  Bradsbv  (23  111.  632)  1068 

v.  Brown  (18  111.  91)  844 

v.  Chalfant  (5  Whart.  477)  145 

v.  Chase  (6  Hill.  482)  244 

v.  Crandall  (78  Mo.  584)  625 

o.  Dening  (8  Ad.  &  El.  94)  63 

v.  Dobvns  (4  Dana,  220)  483 

o.  Fuller  (69  Me.  152)  795 

v.  Haskell  (47  X.  H.  479)  825 

o.  Henry  (03  Mo.  517)  1060 

v.  Johnston  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  493)  1175 

v.  Reiser  (75  Md.  332)  956 

v.  Keith  (72  Ala.  121)  195,  197 

v.  MeLeod  (79  Wis.  534)  950 

v.  Mitchell  (109  Ala.  490)  356 

v.  Oakwood  (49  Hun,  416)  277 

v.  O'Riordan  (05  Cal.  368)  333 

v.  Pender  (5  -Tones,  351)  880 

v.  Railroad  (122  Mo.  396)    239,  240,  243, 

244 

v.  Railroad  (91  X.  C.  308) 

i'.  Red  (4  Dana,  158) 

o.  Scott  (62  111.  86) 

v.  Smith  (3  Met.  Kv.  264) 

v.  State  (17  Fla.  406) 

v.  Williams  (34  Ind.  547) 

Bakes  v.  Reese  (150  Pa.  St.  44) 
Balch  v.  Blagge  (157  Mass.  144) 
b.  Hooper  (32  Minn.  158) 


v.  Smith  (12  NT.  H.  437) 

v.  Smith  (4  Wash.  497) 

v.  Stone  (149  Mass.  39) 

Baldozier  v.  Havnes  (57  Iowa,  683) 
Baldridge  v.  Scott  (48  Tex.  178) 
Baldwin's  Estate  (13  Wash.  666) 
Baldwin  v.  Ashbv  (54  Ala.  82) 

v.  Baldwin  (22  Beav.  413) 

v.  Baldwin  (7  X.  J.  Eq.  211) 

r.  Baldwin  (81  Va.  405) 

v.  Buford  (4  Yerg.  16) 

v.  Davidson  (139  Mo.  118) 

v.  Hill  (97  Iowa,  586) 

v.  Mitchell  (88  Md.  379) 

v.  Sheldon  (48  Mich.  580) 

v.  Standish  (7  Cush.  207) 

r.  Timmins  (3  Gray,  302) 

r.  Tuttle  (23  Iowa,  66) 

Baldwine  v.  Spriggs  (65  Md.  373) 

v.  State  (12  Mo.  223) 

Baldy's  Appeal  (40  Pa.  St.  328) 
Bald'y  p.  Hunter  (171  X.  S.  388) 
Bales  v.  Elder  (118  111.436) 
Ball*.  Ball  (3  South  R.,  La.  644) 

r.  Brown  (Bai.  Ch.  374) 

v.  First  Xational  Bank  (80  Kv.  501)  630, 

637,  1059,1142 

v.  Harris  (4  Mvl.  &  Cr.  264)      732,  1096 

Ballantine  o.  Proudfoot  (62  Wis.  216)  31,  34 
Ballantyne  v.  Turner  (6  .lones  Eq.  224)  873 
Ballard'-'.  Ballard  (18  Pick.  41)  935,  939 

v.  Charlesworth  (1  Dem.  501)  524 

v.  Johns  (84  Ala.  70)  832 

Ballentine's  E  tate  (45  Cal.  696)  202 

Estate  (Mvr.  86;  202,  1145,  1148 

Ballentine  v.  Povner(2  Il.ivw.  110)  230 

r.  Wood  (4*2  N.  .1.  Eq.  652)  937 

Balliet'a  Appeal  (I  I  Pa,  St.  45l)  966 

Ballinger*.  Redhead  (1  Elans.  App.  434)  295 
Ballon  v.  Tilton  C i  N.  II.  605)  835 

Baltimore  Co.  p.  Ritchie  (31  Md.  191)        022 
xl 


628 

639 

901 

371 

214 

121 

1143 

646 

583,  748, 

1128 

54 

713 

149 

271 

1079 

37 

836 

98 

893 

67,  68 

571 

1131,  1133 

271 

401 

976 

554,  556 

348 

860 

105,  106 

41 

175 

710 

156 

873 

1166 


*  Page 

Bambrick  v.  Ass'n  (53  Mo.  App.  225)        384, 

386,  686,  690 

Bancroft  v.  Andrews  (6  Cush.  493)    394,  1194 

v.  Curtis  (108  Mv.ss.  47)  609 

v.  Otis  (91  Ala.  279)  49 

Bane  v.  Wick  (14  Oh.  St.  505)  171,  1103 

Banes  v.  Gordon  (9  Pa.  St.  426)  1064 

Bank  v.  Carpenter  (7  Oh.  pt.  1,  p.  21)      1129 

v.  Fairbank  (49  X.  H.  131)  857 

v.  Owens  (31  Md.  320)  242 

Bankhead  v.  Hubbard  (14  Ark.  298)  542,  543 
Bank  of  Alabama  v.  Hooks  (2  Port.  271)  792 
Bank  of  Brighton  v.  Russell  (13  Allen, 

221)  675 

Bank  of  Hamilton  v.  Dudley  (2  Pet.  492)  1051 
Bank  of  Lansingburgh  v.  Crarv  (1  Barb. 

542)  597 

Bank  of  Louisville  v.  Board  (83  Ky.  219)  444 
Bank  of  Missouri  v.  White  (23  Mo.  342)    693 
Bank  of  Mobile  v.  Smith  (14  Ala.  416) 
Bank  of  Montgomery  v.  Plannett  (37  Ala. 

222) 
Bank  of  Xewburgh  v.  Seymour  (14  John. 

219) 
Bank  of  Orange  v.  Kidder  (20  Vt.  519) 
Bank  of  Poughkeepsie  v.  Hasbrouck  (6 

X.  Y.  216)  1156.  1259 

Bank  of  the  State  v.  Gibbs  (3  M.  Co.  377)  773 
Bank  of  Troy  v.  Topping  (9  Wend.  273)   795 

v.  Topping  (13  Wend.  557)  795 

Bank  of  Ckiah  v.  Shoemake  (67  Cal.  147)  838 
Bank  of  United  States  v.  Beverly  (1  How. 

134)  1096 

v.  Burke  (4  Blackf .  141 )    632,  633,  1070 

v.  Dandridge  (12  Wheat.  64)  560 

v.  Moss  (6  How.  U.  S.  31 )  336 

v.  Planters'  Bank  (9  Wheat.  904)        773 

Bank  of  Versailles  v.  Guthrey  (127  Mo. 

190) 
Banking   Co.    v.   Morehead   (116   X.    C. 

410) 

v.  Morehead  (116  X.  C.  413) 

Banking  House  v.  Rood  (132  Mo.  256) 


809 
842 


336 
865 


214 


757 
757 


836 

1078 

91 

262 

677 


Banks  v.  Amnion  (27  Pa.  St.  172) 

v.  Banks  (65  Mo.  432) 

v.  Banks  (2  Th.  &  C.  483) 

r.  Machen  (40  Miss.  256) 

v.  Speers  (97  Ala.  560)         198,  712,  713 

v.  Speers  (103  Ala.  436)     653,  748,  1040 

v.  Steele  (27  Xeb.  138)  288 

v.  Sutton  (2  P.  Wms.  700)  218 

Bannatvne  v.  Bannatvne  (14  Eng.  L.  & 

Eq.  581)  32 

Bannister  v.  Jackson  (45  X.  J.  Eq.  702)  40 
Banta  v.  Moore  (15  X.  J.  Eq.  97)  360 

Bantz  r.  Bant/.  (52  Md.  686)  1126,  1144 

Baptist  Association  v.  Hart  (4  Wheat.  1)  920 
Baptist  Church  v.  Roberts  (2  Pa.  St.  110)  91 
Baptist  Convention  v.  Ladd  (58  Vt.  95)    1010 

v.  Ladd  (59  Vt.  5)  893 

Baracliffe  v.  Griscom  (1  X.  J.  L.  165)  792 
Barasien  v.  Odum  (17  Ark.  122)  428,  429 

Barbe  v.  Hvat  (50  Kans.  86)  214 

Barl.cc  v.  Barbee  (109  X.  C.  299)  1219 

r.  Perkins  (23  La.  An.  331)  329 

Barber's  Appeal  (63  Conn.  893)  37,  38 

Barber,  Matter  of  (92  Hun,  489)  94 

v.  Bab.d  (::i;  Cal.  ll)  212 

v.  Barber  (3  Mvl.  &  Cr.  688)     937,  1008 

r.  Bowen  (47  Minn.  118)  816 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Barber  v.  Bush  (7  Mass.  510)  526 

v.  Collins  (18  II.  I.  760)  852 

v.  Converse  (1  Kedf.  330)  530,  571 

v.  Davidson  (73  III.  App.  441)  964,  965 

v.  Ellis  (68  Miss.  172)  184 

v.  Eno  (2  Root,  150)  465 

.  —  v.  Slade  (30  Vt.  191)  639 

v.  Williams  (74  Ala.  331)  206,  257 

Barbero  v.  Thurman  (49  111.  283)  826 

Barbour  v.  Barbour  (46  Me.  9)  243 

v.  De  Forest  (95  N.  Y.  13)  918 

v.  Moore  (4  I).  C.  App.  535)  490 

v.  Moore  (10  D.  C.  App.  30)  48 

Barclay's  Estate  (11  Phila.  123)  118.  765 

Barclay  v.  Kimsey  (72  Ga.  725)  508 

Barclift  v.  Treece  (77  Ala.  528)  329,  362 

Barco  v.  Fennel  1  (24  Fla.  378)  214 

Barcroft  v.  Snodgrass  (1  Cold.  430)  286,  283 

Bardell  v.  Bradv  (172  111.  420)  500,  8:4 

Barhite's  Appeal  (126  Pa.  St.  404)  1167 
Barings  v.  Willing  (4  Wash.  U.  S.  C.  C.) 

248  740 

Barker's  Estate  (5  Wash.  390)  1240 

Barker,  Ex  parte  (2  Leigh,  719)  526,  569 

Goods  of  (1  Curt.  592)  530 

In  re  (2  John.  Ch.  233)  32 

Succession  of  (10  La.  An.  128)  1154 

v.  Barker  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  259)  490 

v.  Barker  (14  Wis.  131)  330 

v.  Bell  (46  Ala.  216)  112 

v.  Comins  (110  Mass.  477)  478 

v.  Jenkins  (84  Va.  895)  203 

v.  Koneman  (13  Cal.  9)  609 

v.  Kunkel  (10  111.  App.  407)  348 

v.  Parker  (17  Mass.  564)  246 

v.  Parker  (1  T.  R.  295)  281 

v.  Pearce  (30  Pa.  St.  173)  895 

v.  People  (150  N.  Y.  52)  691 

Barkesdale  v.  Hopkins  (23  Ga.  332)  100 

Barklev  v.  Donellv  (112  Mo.  561)  913,  922 
Barksdale  v.  Barksdale  (12  Leigh,  535)        96 

v.  Cobb  (16  Ga.  13)  556 

v.  Garrett  (64  Ala.  277)  273,  274 

Barlage  v.  Railway  (54  Mich.  564)  622,  714, 

1185,  1186,  1242 

Barlow  v.  Clark  (67  Mo.  App.  340)  1028 

v.  Coggan  (1  Wash.  Ter.  257)  686 

Barnard  v.  Edwards  (4  N.  H.  107)  273 

v.  Fall  River  Bank  (135  Mass.  S26)     269 

v.  Gregory  (3  Dev.  223) 

v.  Pumfrett  (2  Myl.  &.  Cr.  63) 

Barnawell  v.  Smith  (5  Jones  Eq.  168) 


Barnes  v.  Barnes  (66  Me.  280) 

v.  Brashear  (2  B.  Mon.  380) 

v.  Dow  (59  Vt.  530) 


419 

991 

843, 

1188 

37,  46 

368 

834 

Greenzebach  (1  Edw.  Ch.  41)  899 

v.  Hanks  (55  Vt.  317)  971,  972 

v.  Huson  (60  Barb.  598)  940 

v.  Jarnagin  (12  Sm.  &  M.  108)  791 

v.  Mowrv  (11  R.  I.  420)  854,  855 

v.  People  (25  111.  App.  136)  122,  123 

v.  Reynolds  (4  How.  (Miss.)  114,  119) 

686 

v.  Ryder  (3  McLean,  374)  867 

v.  Scott  (29  Fla.  285)  806,  814,  863 

v.  Underwood  (54  Ga.  87)  584 

Barnett's  Appeal  (104  Pa.  St.  342)    935,  936, 

938,  985 
Barnett  v.  Kincaid  (2  Lans.  320)  1036 

■ v.  Tarrence  (23  Ala.  463)  1127 


Barnett  v.  Vanmeter  (7Ind.  App.  45)        337, 

1129,  1258 

v.  Wolf  (70  111.  76)  1030 

Baruewall  v.  Murrell  (108  Ala.  366)       62,  65, 

70,  475 
Barney  v.  Chittenden  (2  Green,  165)  472 

v.  Hayes  (11  Mont.  99)  86 

v.  Saunders  (16  How.  U.  S.  535)        707, 

1138 
Barnhart  v.  Smith  (86  N.  C.  473)  31 

Barnhizel  v.  Ferrell  (47  Ind.  335)  140 

Barnitz  v.  Casey  (7  Cr.  45^)  903 

Barnsley,  Ex  parte  (3  Atk.  168)  32 

Barnum  v.  Baltimore  (62  Md.  275)      913,  958 

«.  Barnum  (119  Mo.  63)  149 

v.  Barnum  (26  Md.  119)  917 

v.  Boughton  (55  Conn.  117)         161,  390 

v.  Farthing  (40  How.  Pr.  25)  610 

v.  Reed  (136  III.  388)  122,  123 

Barr  v.  Galloway  (1  McLean,  476)  277 

v.  Gray  bill  (13  Pa.  St.  396)  476 

Barrell  v.  Hanrick  (42  Ala.  60)  895 

Barrett's  Succession  (43  La.  An.  61)  706 

Barrett  v.  Barrett  (8  Me.  346)  366 

v.  Choen  (119  Ind.  56)  599 

v.  Failing  (111  U.  S.  523)  229 

v.  Morriss  (33  Grat.  273)  1214,  1222 

v.  Plympton  (13  Mass.  454)  626 

v.  Provincher  (39  Xeb.  773)  432 

v.  Richardson  (76  X.  C.  429)  214 

Barron  v.  Barron  (24  Vt.  375)  611 

v.  Burney  (38  Ga.  264)        414,  424,  425 

Barrus  i?.  Kirkland  (8  Gray,  512)  871 

Barry's  Appeal  (88  Pa.  St.  131)  376 

Barry  v.  Barry  (15  Kan.  587)  28 

v.  Brown  (2  Dem.  309)  70,  90 

v,  Briggs  (22  Mich.  201)  284 

v.  Butlin  (1  Curt.  637)  49,  50 

v.  Davis  (33  Mich.  515)  679 

17.  Harding  (1  Jones  &  Lat.  475)        1100 

v.  Lambert  (98  N.  Y.  300)  708,  733 

Barsalou  i\  Wright  (4  Bradf.  164)  812 

Barstow  ».  Goodwin  (2  Bradf.  413)     903,  904 

v.  Sprague  (40  N.  H.  27)  494 

Bartee  17.  Thompson  (8  Baxt.  508)  37 

Barter's  Estate  (86  Cal.  411)  110 

Bartell  v.  Baumann  (12  III.  App.  450)  390 
Barth  ».  Lines  (118  111.  374)  264 

Bartholick,  Matter  of  (141  N.  Y.  166)  469 
Bartholomew's  Appeal  (75  Pa.  St.  169)  97 
Bartholomew  v.  Henlev  (3  Phillim.  317)      61 

v.  Jackson  (20  John.  28)  823 

v.  May  (1  Atk.  487)  1106 

Bartle's  Case  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  50)  1221 

Bartlett.  Appellant  (82  Me.  210)  1201 

Petitioner  (163  Mass.  509)  928,  1008 

17.  Ball  (43  S.  W.  R.  783)    220,  243,  1261 

v.  Fitz  (59  N.  H.  502)  1137,  1149 

17.  Hyde  (3  Mo.  490)  365,  427,  432 

17.  Janeway  (4  Sandf.  Ch.  396)  242 

t7.  King  (12  Mass.  537)  922 

17.  Manor  (146  Ind.  621)  500 

17.  Nve  (4  Met.  378)  923 

17.  Parks  (1  Cush.  82)  286 

p.  Slater  (53  Conn.  102)  1005 

17.  Sutherland  (24  Miss.  395)  723 

Bartling  t\  Jamison  (44  Mo.  141)  825 

Bartmess  v.  Fuller  (170  111.  193)  1226 

Barto  v.  Tomkins  (15  Hun,  11)  1078 

Barton,  Ex  parte  (70  N.  C.  134)  1200 

Barton's  Estate  (55  Cal.  87)  1173 

xli 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Barton's  Trust  (L.  R.  5  Eq.  238)  1003 

Barton  v.  Higgins  (41  Mil.  539)  359,  306 

v.  Rice  (22  Pick.  508)  1226 

v.  Robins  (3  Pnillim.  455)  484 

Barwick  v.  Rackley  (45  Ala.  215)     1128, 1131 
Basan  v.  Brandon  "(8  Sim.  171)  974 

Bascom  v.  Albertson  (34  N.  Y.  584)     920,  932 
Basket  v.  Hassell  (107  U.  S.  602)  116, 119,  121 
Baskin's  Appeal  (38  Pa.  St.  65) 
Baskin  v.  Baskin  (48  Barb.  200) 
Baskins  v.  Wylds  (39  Ark.  347) 
Bason  v.  Holt*  (2  Jones,  323) 
Bass  v.  Bass  (S8  Ala.  408) 

v.  Chambliss  (9  La.  An.  376) 

Bassett  v.  Bassett  (9  Bush,  696) 

v.  Elliott  (78  Mo.  525) 

v.  Granger  (136  Mass.  174) 

v.  Hawk  (118  Pa.  St.  94) 

o.  McKenna  (52  Conn.  437) 

v.  Miller  (8  Md.  548) 

Slater  (81  Mo.  75) 


Batchelder,  Petitioner  (147  Mass.  465) 

v.  Russell  (10  N.  H.  39) 

Batchelor,  Matter  of  (04  How.  Pr.  350) 

Batchelor's  Succession  (48  La.  An.  278) 
Batchelor  v.  Batchelor  (1  Deni.  209) 
Bate  v.  Bate  (11  Bush,  639) 

v.  Bate  (L.  R.  43  Ch.  D.  600) 

v.  Graham  (UN.  Y.  237) 

v.  Iucisa  (59  Miss.  513) 

Bateman  v.  Reitler  (19  Colo.  547) 
Bates  v.  Bates  (27  Iowa,  110) 
v.  Bates  (97  Mass.  392) 


190 

71 

825 

1014 

1186 
699 
224 

1071 

653 

901 

631 

534,  1172 

776, 1073 

906, 
944 
435 

531, 
504 
973 
564 

1172 

1094 
631 
495 

1090 

43 

205 


v.  Bates  (134  Mass.  110)       728,  917,  934 


v.  Dewson  (128  Mass.  334) 
—  v.  Elrod  (13  Lea,  156) 

v.  Gillett  (132  111.  287) 

i'.  Kenipton  (7  Gray,  382) 

v.  OlKcer  (70  Iowa,"343) 

v.  Kvberg  (40  Cal.  403) 

v.  Varv  (40  Ala.  421) 

v.  Webb  (8  Mass.  458) 

Batione's  Estate  (130  Pa.  St.  307) 
Batsell  v.  Richards  (80  Tex.  505) 
Batson  v.  Murrell  (10  Humph.  301) 
Battle  v.  Speicht  (9  Ired.  L.  288) 
Batton  v.  Allen  (5  N.  J.  Eq.  99) 
Batts  r.  Scott  (37  Tex.  59) 
Baucua  V.  Barr  (45  Hun,  582) 

v.  Barr  (107  N.  Y.  624) 

v.  Stover  (24  Hun,  109) 

v.  Stover  (89  N.  Y.  1) 

Bauer  v.  Grav  (18  Mo.  App.  164) 
Baugarth  v.  Miller  (20  Oh.  St.  541) 
Baugb  v.  Bolus  (00  Ind.  370) 


905 
806,  843 
903 
119 
75 
1195 
348,  1146 
951 
273 
1243 
821,  822 
887 
1236 
210 
654 
654 
187, 1166,  1107 
1140,  1107 
1243 
480 
460 
Baum's  Succession  (9  La.  An.  412)  706 

BaumarVs  Succession  (30  La.  An.  1138)    1187 
Baumgartner  v.  Haas  (08  Md.  32)         414,  419, 

422 
Bauquier,  In  re  (88  Cal.  302)  503,  508,  525 
Bauserman  t.  Charlotl  (40  Kans.  480)  844 
Bauakett  v.  Keitt  (22  S.  C.  187)  92 

Baxter  v.  Abbott  (7  Gray,  71)         37,  41,  47U 

v.  Baxter  (23  S.  (!.  114)  772,  773 

v.  Burfield  el  StrangB,  1200)  087 

v.  Robinson  (11  Mich.  520'        730,1043 

Baxter  and  Bale's  <  ase  ( l  Leon.  90)  585 

Bayeaux  v.  Bayeaux  (8  Pai.  833)  503 


Baylesa  v.  Baj  lew  |  i  C 

x  1  i  i 


859)       177,  187 


Bavless  v.  Powers  (62  Iowa,  601)         809,  826 
Bavlies  v.  Davis  (1  Pick.  206)  1194 

Bavliss's  Trust  (17  Sim.  178)  881 

Bavlor  v.  Dejarnette  (13  Grat.  152)  1096 

Bavly  v.  Muehe  (65  Cal.  345)  713 

Bazzo  v.  Wallace  (16  Neb.  293)  1199 

Beach  v.  Baldwin  (9  Conn.  476)  791 

v.  Bell  (139  Ind.  167)  800 

v.  Fulton  Bank  (2  Wend.  225)  1197 

v.  Norton  (9  Conn.  182)  740,  1122 

Beadle  v.  Beadle  (2  McCra.  586)     593,  719,  728 

v.  Steele  (86  Ala.  413)        647,  789,  1038, 

1041 
Beadles  v.  Alexander  (9  Baxt.  604)  475,  491 
Beale  v.  Hall  (22  Ga.  431)  396,  631 

Bealey  v.  Blake  (70  Mo.  App.  229)    637,  1143 
Beall  v.  Blake  (16  Ga.  119)  980 

v.  Darden  (4  Ired.  Eq.  76)  651 

v.  Drane  (25  Ga.  430)  921 

v.  Fox  (4  Ga.  404)     '  929 

v.  Holmes  (6  H.  &  J.  205)  884 

v.  New  Mexico  (16  Wall.  535)  744 

v.  Sell  lev  (2  Gill,  181)  1016 

Beals  v.  Crowlev  (59  Cal.  665)  122 

v.  Peck  (12  Barb.  245)  686 

Beam  v.  Copeland  (54  Ark.  70)  455,  462 

Beamond  v.  Long  (Cro.  Car.  208)  387 

Bean  v.  Burleigh  (4  N.  H.  550)  1200 

v.  Farnam  (6  Pick.  209)  685,  811 

v.  Mvers  (1  Coldw.  220)  948 

v.  Patterson  (122  U.  S.  496)  610 

Beane  v.  Yerbev  (12  Grat.  239)  70 

Beard  v.  Dedolph  (29  Wis.  130)  613 

v.  Hale  (8  S.  W.  R.  150;  s.  c.  95 

Mo.  10)  274 

v.  Knox  (5  Cal.  252)  221,  206 

v.  Moselv  (30  Ark.  517)  153 

Beardslee  v.  Beardslee  (5  Barb.  324)  232 

Beardslev  v.  American  Society  (45  Conn. 
327)    *  893 

v.  Marstellar  (120  Ind.  319)  1155 

v.  Selectmen  (53  Conn.  489)  924 

Beaston  v.  Farmers'  Bank  (12  Pet.  102)     771 
Beattie  v.  Abercrombie  (18  Ala.  9)  387 

Beattie  v.  Thomason  (16  R.  I.  13)  48 

Beatty  v.  Trustees  of  Societv  (39  N.  J. 
Eq.  452)  893;  901,  1147,  1149 

v.  Wrav  (19  Pa.  St.  316)  284 

Beaubien  v.  Cicotte  (12  Mich.  459)41,  48,  479 

v.  Poupard  (Ilarr.  Ch.  200)  1058 

Beaufort  v.  Collier  (0  Humph.  487)  607 

Beaumont  v.  Fell  (2  P.  Wms.  140)  893 

v.  Keim(50  Mo.  28)  91,100 

Beauregard  v.  Lampton  (33  La.  An.  827)  522 

v.  New  Orleans  ( 1 8  How.  497)  1030 

Beavan  v.  Went  (155  111.  592)  23,  159 

Beazley  v.  Denson  (40  Tex.  416)  37 

Beck  v.  Beck  (64  Iowa,  155)  213 

v.  McGillis  (9  Barb.  35)  973,  974 

v.  Rebow  (1  P.  Wms.  94)  601 

v.  Thompson  (22  Nev.  109)  284 

Becker's  Fstate  (150  Pa.  St.  524)  727 

Becker,  Matter  of  (28  Hun,  207)  499 

v.  Lawton  (4  Dem.  341)  580 

v.  Wallworth  (45  Oh.  St.  169)  593 

Beckett,  In  re  (103  N.  Y.  107)  70 

Matter  of  (35  Ilun,  447)  70 

v.  Selover  (7  Cal.  215)        397,  713,  1033 

Beckford  V.  Parnecott  (Cro.  Eliz.  493)  ]  12 
Beckham  v.  Newton  (21  Ga.  187)  l')79 
v.  Wittkowski  (04  N.  C.  404)  .'Go 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Page 
978 
050 
531 
621 
116 


Beckton  v.  Barton  (27  Beav.  99) 
Becroft  v.  Lewis  (4  Mo.  App.  546) 
Beddoe  v.  Wadsworth  (21  Wend.  120) 
Bedell,  In  re  (97  Cal.  339) 

v.  Carll(33N.  Y.  581) 

v.  Fradenburgh  (65  Minn.  361)      886.  890 

Bedford's  Succession  (38  La.  An.  244)       1199 

v.  Bedford  (136  111.  354)  276 

v.  Bedford  (99  Kv.  273)  878 

Bedloe  v.  Homer  (16  Gray,  432)  873 

Beebe  v.  Estabrook  (79  N".  Y.  246)  1224,  1225 

v.  Griffing  (14  N.  Y.  235) 

v.  Lockert  (6  Ark.  422) 

Beeber's  Appeal  (8  Atl.  R.  191) 
Beech's  Estate  (63  Cal.  458) 
Beecher  v.  Beecher  (43  Conn.  556) 
v.  Buckingham  (18  Conn.  110) 


145 
1193 
1120 

520 
1246 
387, 

693 

432 


r.  Crouse  (19  Wend.  306) 

Beecroft,  Curatorship  of  (28  La.  An.  824) 

1125 

Beekman  v.  Beekman  (2  Dem.  635)  491 

v.  Bousor  (23  N.  Y.  298)  925 

v.  Vanderveer  (3  Dem.  619)  272 

Beeler  v.  Dunn  (3  Head,  87)  363,  370 

Beene  v.  Collenberger  (38  Ala.  647)  690 

Beers  v.  Haughton  (9  Pet.  329)  202 

v.  Shannon  (73  N.  Y.  292)  441,  043 

Beeson  v.  Beeson  (1  Harr.  100)  1010 

v.  Beeson  (9  Pa.  St.  279)  1087 

Beeston  v.  Brooih  (4  Madd.  161)  987 

Begien  v.  Freeman  (75  Ind.  398)  433 

Behrens  v.  Leucht  (2  Cin.  217)  758 

Beirne  v.  Imboden  (14  Ark.  237)  809 

Belcher's  Will  (66  N.  C.  51)  60 

Belcher  v.  Belcher  (16  R.  I.  72)  968,  990 

v.  Branch  (11  R.  I.  220)  720,  1142 

Belden  v.  Meeker  (47  N.  Y.  307)  508 
Belding  v.  R.  R.  Co.  (3  So.  Dak.  369)627,  628 

Belfield  v.  Booth  (03  Conn.  299)  353 

Belford  v.  Crane  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  265)  609 

Belfour  v.  Ranev  (8  Ark.  479)  690 

Bell's  Appeal  (60  Pa.  St.  498)  720 

Appeal  (71  Pa.  St.  471)  350 

Estate  (25  Pa.  St.  92)  609 

Bell,  Ex  parte  (14  Ark.  76)  1165 

Goods  of  (L.  R.  4  P.  D.  85)  504 

v.  Andrews  (34  Ala.  538)  829 

v.  Armstrong  (1  Add.  365)  501 

v.  Bell  (1  Ga.  637)  639 

v.  Bell  (25  S.  C.  149)  727 

v.  Bell  (84  Ala.  64)  212 

v.  Briggs  (63  N.  H.  592)  701,  705 

v.  Fleming  (12  N.  J.  Eq.  13)  858,  859 

v.  Fothergill  (L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  148)       94 

v.  Funk  (75  Md.  308)  821,  1148 

v.  Green  (38  Ark.  78)  1054 

v.  Hall  (70  Ala.  546)  166,  189 

v.  Hepworth  (135  N.  Y.  442)  285 

v.  Hewett  (24  Ind.  280)  686 

v.  Humphrey  (8  W.  Va.  1)  718 

v.  McCoy  (136  Mo.  552)  284 

v.  McMaster  (29  Hunt,  272)  479 

v.  Mousset  (71  Ind.  347)  1196 

v.  Nealy  (1  Bai.  312)  227 

v.  Nichols  (38  Ala.  678)  368,  673 

v.  People  (94  111.  230)  551 

v.  Phvn  (7  Ves.  453)  235 

v.  Rice  (50  Neb.  547)  824 

v.  Scammon  (15  N.  H.  381)  950 

v.  Schwartz  (37  Tex.  572)  198 


Bell  v.  Smalley  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  478)  1240 

v.  Speight  (11  Humph.  451)  751 

v.  Timiswood  (2  Phillim.  22)  529 

Bell  County  v.  Alexander  (22  Tex.  350)   922, 

929   951 
Bellerjean  v.  Kotts  (4  N.  J.  L.  359)  1180 

Bellew  v.  Jockleden  (1  Roll.  Abr.  929)  792 
Bellinger  v.  Ford  (21  Barb.  311)  384,  411 

V.  Ingalls  (21  Oreg.  191)  1199 

v.  Thompson  (26  Oreg.  320)       543,  547, 

548,  549,  554 
Bellocq,  Succession  of  (28  La.  An.  154) 

1125,  1127 
Bellows,  In  re  (60  Vt.  224)  1197 

v.  Cheek  (20  Ark.  424)  812 

v.  Goodall  (32  N.  H.  97)  423 

v.  McGinnis  (17  Ind.  64)  1068 

v.  Sowles  (57  Vt.  164)  960 

Belslay  v.  Engel  (107  111.  182)  901 

Belton  v.  Summer  (31  Fla.  139)  501 

Bemis  v.  Bemis  (13  Gray,  559)  839 

Benbow  v.  Moore  (114  N.  C.  203)  727 

Bendall  v.  Bendall  (24  Ala.  293)  1149 

Bender  v.  Bean  (52  Ark.  132)  589,  1050 

v.  Dietrick  (7  W.  &  S.  284)  882 

v.  Luckenbach  (102  Pa.  18)        593, 1233 

Benedict  v.  Ball  (38  N.  J.  Eq.  48)  899 

v.  Beurmann  (90  Mich.  390)  1088 

v.  Bonnot  (39  La.  An.  972)  1204 

v.  Montgomery  (7  W.  &  S.  238)         500 

v.  Webb  (98  N.  Y.  400)  884 

Benesch  v.  Clark  (49  Md.  497)  949 

Bengough  v.  Edridge  (1  Sim.  173)  881 

Beniteau's  Estate  (88  Mich.  152)  1028 

Benjamin  r.  DeGrot  (1  Denio,  151)  385 

v.  Dimmick  (4  Redf.  7)  978 

v.  Laroche  (39  Minn.  334)  177,  178 

v.  LeBaron  (15  Oh.  517)  429,  632 

Bennalack  v.  Richards  (116  Cal.  405)  1023 
Bennet  v.  Bradford  (1  Coldw.  471)  758 

Bennett's  Appeal  (33  Conn.  214)  854,  855 

Estate  (132  Pa.  St.  201)  1234 

Estate  (148  Pa   St.  139)  989 

Bennett  v.  Bennett  (50  N.  J.  Eq.  439)  49 

v.  Chapin  (77  Mich.  526)  719,  723 

v.  Coldwell  (8  Baxt.  483)         1040,  1080 

v.  Cutter  (44  N.  H.  69)  195 

v.  Dawson  (15  Ark.  412)  1208 

v.  Dawson  (18  Ark.  334)      817,  818,  819 

v.  Fulmer  (49  Pa.  St.  163)  825 

v.  Gaddis  (79  Ind.  347)  1024 

v.  Graham  (71  Ga.  211)  548 

v.  Harms  (51  Wis.  251)  225 

v.  Hutchinson  (11  Kan.  398)  28 

v.  Ives  (30  Conn.  329)  414,  424,  706 

c.  Reek  (16  Colo.  431)  176 

v.  Tiernav  (78  Kv.  580)  336 

v.  Woolfolk  (15  Ga.  213)  287 

Benoist  v.  Murrin  (58  Mo.  307)  31,  34,  500 
Benoit  v.  Brill  (7  Sin.  &  M.  32)  1231 

Benslev  v.  Haeberle  (20  Mo.  App.  648)  1200 
Benson,  Matter  of  (96  N.  Y.  499)  273,  944 
Benson,  Estate  of  (169  Pa.  602)  888 

v.  Bennett  (112  N.  C.  505)  842 

v.  Bruce  (4  Des.  463)  1164 

v.  Maude  (6  Madd.  15)  1005 

v.  Rice  (2  N.  &  McC.  717)  568 

v.  Swan  (60  Me.  160)  145 

v.  Wolf  (43  N.  J.  L.  78)  402 

Bent's  Appeal  (35  Conn.  523)  485,  502 
Appeal  (38  Conn.  20)  485 


xliii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Bent  v.  Bent  (44  Vt.  555)  611 

r.  Weeks  (44  Me.  45)  329 

Bentham  v.  Wiltshire  (4  Mad.  44)  716 

Bentley's  Estate  (9  Phila.  344)  1186 

Bentley  r.  Brown  (123  Ind.  454)  821 

Berauf's  Succession  (21  La.  An.  666)  523 

Berberet  v.  Berberet  (131  Mo.  399)  50,  71 

Berfuse's  Succession  (34  La.  An.  599)  503 
Berg'tv  Anderson  (72  Pa.  St.  87)  949 

Bergev's  Appeal  (GO  Pa.  St.  408)  612 

Bergin  v.  McFarland  (26  N.  H.  533)  636 

Berkev  v.  Judd  (27  Minn.  475)  777 

Bermingham  v.  Forsvthe  (26  S.  C.  358)  1266 
Berries  v.  Weisser  (2  Bradf.  212)  777 

Bernheimerr.  Calhoun  (44  Miss.  426)340,  814 
Berrv  v.  Bellows  (30  Ark.  198)  577 

'v.  Dobson  (68  Miss.  483)  200 

v.  Folkes  (60  Miss.  576)  283 

v.  Furhman  (30  Iowa,  402)  274 

v.  Graddv  (1  Met.  Kv.  553)  787 

v.  Hamilton  (10  B.  Mon.  129)  76 

v.  Hamilton  (12  B.  Mon.  191)  508 

v.  Parkes  (3  Sm.  &  M.  625)  684 

Berton  v.  Anderson  (56  Ark.  470)  1271 

Bertrand  v.  Elder  (23  Ark.  494)  609 

Berwick  v.  Halsev  (4  Redf.  18)  1138 

Besancon  v.  Browiison  (39  Mich.  388)        464, 
498,  561,  563 
Best  v.  Farris  (21  111.  App.  49)  902 

v.  Jenks  (123  111.  447)  206,  207,  212 

v.  Kinston  (106  N.  C.  205)  627 

v.  Vedder  (58  How.  Pr.  187)  625 

Betha  v.  McColl  (5  Ala.  308)  432 

Bethel  v.  Stanhope  (1  Cro.  Eliz.  810)415,  422 
Bethell  r.  Moore  (2  Dev.  &  B.  L.  311)  93,475 
Bettes  v.  Magoon  (85  Mo.  580)  612 

Belts  v.  Betts  (4  Abb.  N.  O.  317)       727,  1174 

v.  Blackwell  (2  St.  &  P.  373)  697 

v.  Harper  (39  Oh.  St.  639)  58 

Beurhans  v.  Cole  (94  Wis.  617)  913,  920,  922 
Bevan  t\  Cooper  (72  N.  Y.  317)  352 

v.  Tavlor  (7  Serg.  &  R.  397)  154 

Bevelot  v.  Lestrode  (153  111.  625)  40 

Bewick  v.  Whitfield  (3  P.  Wins.  266)  597 
Bev's  Succession  (40  La.  An.  773)  39 

Biava  v.  Roberts  (68  Md.  510)  1242, 1248 

Bibb  v.  Avery  (45  Ala.  691)  372 

v.  Mitchell  (58  Ala  657)  856 

Bible  Society  v.  Oakley  (4  Dem.  450)       1183 

Half  (120  111.  597)  30,474 

Biddison  v.  Mosely  (57  .Aid.  89)      1200,  1202, 

1205 
Biddle's  Appeal  (99  Pa.  St.  278)  1004 

v.  Piddle  (36  Md.  630)  81 

r.  Carraway  (6  Jones  Eq.  95)  1098 

v.  Wilkins  (1  Pet.  686)  366 

Bieber'fl  Appeal  (11  Pa.  St.  157)  516,  525,  574 
Biedennan  o.  Sevmour  (3  Beav.  368)  1094 
Biedler  v.  Biedler  (87  Va.  300)  903, 1215 

Bienvenu  r.  Parker  (30  La.  An.  160)       1030, 

L033 
Bigelow  j).  Bigelow  (4  Oh.  138)  1140 

r.  Folger  (2  Met,  J.'.:.)  827 

r.  Gillotl  (123  Mass.  102)  93,  1018 

r.  Morong  (103  Mass.  287)  147 

v.  Paton  (1  Mich.  170)  645 

v.  Poole  no  Gray,  lot)  1226 

Notes  of  ('as.  001)  8!t 

Biggins  v.  Raisch  no;  Cal   210)  548 

Biggs  v.  Angus  (3  Dem.  93)  89,96.  LOO 


*  Page 

900,  942 

1008 

553 

79 

22 

229 

1159 

953 

346 

577,  1205 

1029 

891,  895 

1182,  1250 


496 

526 

1037 

1077 

1149 

525 

334 

406 

691  a 

286 

1247 

583 

58 

989 

140 

882 


p.  Beckel  (12  Oh. 


L043 


Biglev  v.  Watson  (98  Tenn.  353) 
Bignold,  In  re  (L.  R.  45  Ch.  I).  496) 
Bilden  v.  Hurlbut  (94  Wis.  562) 
Billings's  Estate  (64  Cal.  427) 
Billings  v.  Hauver  (65  Cal.  593) 

v.  Tavlor  (10  Pick.  460) 

BillingsleaV  Henry  (20  Md.  282) 

v.  Moore  (14  Ga.  370) 

Billingslev  v.  Harris  (17  Ala.  214) 
Bills  v.  Scott  (40  Tex.  430) 
Bindley's  Appeal  (09  Pa.  St.  295) 
Bingel  v.  Volz  (142  111.  214) 
Bingham,  In  re  (32  Vt.  329) 

Matter  of   (127   N.   Y.  296)  1028,  1030, 

1041 
Bingham's  Appeal  (64  Pa.  St.  345) 
Bingham  v.  Crenshaw  (34  Ala.  683) 

v.  Jones  (84  Ala.  202) 

v.  Maxev  (15  111.  295) 

Binion  r.  Miller  (27  Ga.  78) 
Binnerman  v.  Weaver  (8  Md.  517) 
Binns  v.  State  (35  Ark.  118) 
Biou,  Goods  of  (3  Curt.  379) 
Bird's  Estate  (11  N.  Y-  Supps.  895) 
Bird  v.  Bird  (77  Me.  499) 

v.  Graham  (1  Led.  Eq.  196) 

v.  Jones  (5  La.  An.  643) 

v.  Pope  (73  Mich.  483) 

v.  Stout  (40  W.  Va.  43) 

v.  Young  (56  Ohio,  210) 

Birdsall  v.  Applegate  (20  N.  J.  L.  244) 
Bird  well  v.  Kauffman  (25  Tex.  189)  826, 1131 
Birkholm  v.  Wardell  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  337)   1189 
Birmingham   v.  Kirwan  (2   Sch.  &  Lef. 
444)  266 

v.  Lesan  (77  Me.  494)  952 

Birnie  v.  Main  (29  Ark.  591)  237 

Biron  v.  Scott  (80  Wis.  206)  848 

Biscoe  v.  Madden  (17  Ark.  533)  842 

v.  Moore  (12  Ark.  77)  699 

Bishop  v.  Bishop  (11  N.  Y.  123)  604 

v.  Bovle  (9  Ind.  169)  239 

v.  Curphey  (00  Miss.  22)  647 

v.  Davenport  (58  111.  105)  149,  1221 

—  v.  Dillard  (49  Ark.  285)  828 

r.  Lalouettc  (67  Ala  197)  441 

v.  McClelland  (44  N.  J.  Eq.  450)      882, 

951 

v.  O'Conner  (69  111.  431)  1071,  1077 

Bissell  v.  Axtell  (2  Vera.  47)  798,  1117,  1253 

326 

242 

763 

903 

35 

834 

691a 

994 

356,  570 

1048 

737.  1153,  1240 

326 

344 

1164 

856 

903 

195 

731 

229 

880,  900 

707 


. .  Briggs  (9  Mass.  462) 

v.  Taylor  (41  Mich.  702) 

Bissett  v.  Antrobus  (4  Sim.  512) 
Bissonr.  I,'.  P.  (143  N.  Y.  125) 
Bitner  v.  Bitner  (05  Pa.  St.  347) 

r.  Boone  (128  Pa.  St.  507) 

Bittinger's  Estate  (129  Pa.  St.  338) 
Bitzer  v.  Hahn  (14  S.  &  R.  232) 
Bivins  v.  Marvin  (90  Ga.  208) 
Bjmerland  ».  Eley  (15  Wash.  101) 
Black's  Estate  (Tuck.  145) 
Black  v.  Black  (4  Brad.  174) 

v.  Black  (34  Pa.  St.  354) 

v.  Blakelv  (2  McCord  Ch.  1) 

v.  Bush  (7  B.  Mon.  210) 

v.  Cartmell  (10  B.  Mon.  188) 

v.  Curran  (14  Wall.  463) 

v.  Dressell  (20  Kan.  153) 

r.  Klkhorn  Co.  (103  IT.  S.  445) 

v.  Herring  (79  Md.  110) 

—  v.  Ilurbut  (73  Wis.  126) 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 

Black  v.  Meek  (  1  Ind.  180)  1048 

v.  Richards  (95  Ind.  184)  57 

v.  Storv  (7  Mont.  238)  622,  713 

v.  Wuitall  (9  N.  J.  Eq.  572)     fili'.),  1131, 

1214,  1216 

V.  White  (13  S.  C.  37)  1140 

Blackbonmgli  v.  Davis  (1  Salk.  38)  788 

Blackbourn  v.  Tucker  (72  Miss.  735)  885,  914 
Blackburn  v.  Crawiords  (3  Wall.  175)  260 
Blackerby  v.  Holton  (5  Dana,  520)  1123 

Blackinton  v.  Blackinton  (110  Mass.  401)  173 
Blacklaws  r.  Milne  (82  111.  505)  157 

Blackler  v.  Boott  (114  Mass.  24)  1236 

Blackman  v.  Wadsworth  (65  Iowa,  80) 
Blackmer  v.  Mercer  (2  Saund.  402  a) 
Blackmore  v.  Woodward  (71  Fed.  R.  C. 

C.  A.  321) 
Blackstone  v.  Blackstone  (3  Watts,  335) 
Blackstone  Bank  !>.  Davis  (21  Pick.  42) 
Black  well  V-  Broughton  (56  Ga.  390) 

v.  Townsend  (91  Ky.  609)        1037,  1067 

Blagge  o.  Balch  (162  U.' S.  439)  646,  904 

Blain  v.  Harrison  (11  111.  384)    237,  249,  254, 

255 
Blair  v.  Cesneros  (10  Tex.  34) 

v.  Murphree  (81  Ala.  454) 

v.  Sennott  (134  111.  78) 

v.  Thorp  (33  Tex.  38) 

v.  Wilson  (57  Iowa,  177) 

Blake's  Estate  (134  Pa.  St.  240) 
Blake  v.  Blake  (85  Ind.  65) 

v.  Blake  (53  Miss.  182) 

v.  Chambers  (4  Neb.  90) 

v.  Dexter  (12  Cush.  559) 

v.  Griswold  (104  N.  Y.  613) 

v.  Kimball  (22  Vt.  632) 

i'.  McMillen  (33  Iowa,  150) 

v.  Pegram  (109  Mass.  541) 

v.  People  (161  111.  74) 

v.  Rourke  (74  Iowa,  519) 

v.  Stone  (27  Vt.  475) 

Blakely's  Will  (48  Wis.  294) 
Blakely  v.  Carter  (70  Wis.  540) 

v.  Frazier  (20  S.  C.  144) 

Blakeman  v.  Blakeman  (64  Minn.  315)  171, 187 
Blakemore's  Succession  (43  La.  An.  846)  888 
Blaker  v.  Sands  (29  Kan.  551)  295 

Blanchard  v.  Blauchard  (1  Allen,  223)       730 

v.  Blanchard  (32  Vt.  62)  68,  89,  90 

v.  Chapman  (22  111.  App.  341)  876 

v.  Nestle  (3  Denio,  37)  42 

v.  Sheldon  (43  Vt.  512)  120 

v.  Webster  (62  N.  H.  467)  1089 

v-  Williamson  (70  111.  647)  816, 1185, 1255 

Blanchin  v.  Martinez  (18  La.  An.  699)     1201 


797 

691 
973 
955 
181 


713 

599 

681,  682 

210 

267 

984 

149 

632 

1123 

392,  719 

676 

1202 

686 

1123 

1238,  1249 

39,47 

901 

35 

388 

503 


Blanck  v.  Morrison  (4  Dem.  297) 
Bland  i>.  Bland  (103  111.  11) 

v.  Bland  (90  Ky.  400) 

v.  Fleeman  (58  Ark.  89) 

v.  Hartsoe  (65  N.  C.  204) 

v.  Muncaster  (24  Miss.  62) 

v.  Stewart  (35  W.  Va.  518) 

v.  Umstead  (23  Pa.  St.  316) 

Blandv  v.  Asher  (72  Mo.  27) 
Blaney's  Estate  (73  Iowa,  113) 
Blanev  v.  Blanev  (1  Cush.  107) 
Blank,  Matter  o'f  (2  Redf.  443) 
Blank's  Appeal  (3  Grant's  Cas.  192) 
Blankeuship  v.  Ross  (95  Kv.  306) 
Blanton  v.  King  (2  How.  Miss.  856) 
Blasini  v.  Blasini  (30  La.  An.  1388) 


404,  535 
873 
956 

1087 

1040,  1153 

704 

1133 
688 
204 
267 
968 
400 

1156 
156 
340 
351 


42 

241,  242 

440 

638 

22 

575 

923 

827 

1006 


987 
336 
749 
63 
111 


•Page 
Blass  v.  Hood  (57  Ark.  13)  815 

Blassingame  t;.  Rose  (34  Ga.  418)  192 

Blatchford  v.  Newberry  (99  111.  11)    267,  951 
Blauvelt,  In  re  (131  N.  Y.  249)  739,  1142 

Blava  !•.  Roberts  (68  Md.  510)  1247,  1248 

Bleakley'8  Estate  (5  Whart.  361)  535 

Bleecker  v.  Hennion  (23  N.  J.  Eq.  123)     254, 

256 

v.  Lynch  (1  Bradf.  458) 

Blevins  v.  Smith  (104  Mo.  583) 
Blewitt  v.  Nicholson  (2  Fla.  200) 
Blight  v.  Blight  (51  Pa.  St.  420) 

v.  Rochester  (7  Wheat.  535) 

Blinn,  In  re  (99  Cal.  216) 

Bliss  v.  Amer.  Bib.  Soc.  (2  Allen,  334) 

v.  Little  (63  Vt.  86) 

v.  Olmstead  (3  Dem.  273) 

v.  Seaman  (165  111.  422)  747,  1125,  1182, 

1191 
Bliven  v.  Seymour  (88  N.  Y.  469) 
Blize  v.  Castlio  (8  Mo.  App.  290) 
Blizzard  v.  Filler  (20  Oh.  479) 
Blocher  v.  Hostetter  (2  Gr.  Cas.  288) 
Block  v.  Block  (3  Mo.  594) 
Blockley  v.  Blockley  (L.   R.  29  Ch.  D. 

250)  1214,  1218 

Blodgett  v.  American  National  Bank  (49 
Conn.  9)  282 

v.  Converse  (60  Vt.  410)  418 

r.  Hitt  (29  Wis.  169)  330, 1031, 1052, 1080 

Blood's  Will  (62  Vt.  359)  42 

Blood  v.  Blood  (23  Pick.  80)  244 

v.  Havman  (13  Met.  231)  703,  1080 

v.  Kane  (130  N.  Y.  514)      434,  828,  829, 

993 
Bloodgood  v.  Bruen  (2  Bradf.  8)  658,  1039 
Bloodworth  v.  Stevens  (51  Miss.  475)         636, 

637 

Bloom  v.  Cate  (7  Lea,  471)  1022 

Bliomer  v.  Bloomer  (2  Bradf.  339)     105,  115, 

126,  127,  1151 

v.  Waldron  (3  Hill,  N.  Y.  361)  732 

Bloor  v.  Mverscaugh  (45  Minn.  29)  493 

Blough  v.  Parry  (144  Ind.  463)  31,  36 

Blount  v.  Burrow  (4  Bro.  C.  C.  72) 

v.  Pritchard  (88  N.  C.  446) 

v.  Walker  (28  S.  C.  545) 

Blow,  Matter  of  (2  Connoly,  360) 
Blower  r.  Morret  (2  Ves.  S~r.  420) 
Bloxham  v.  Hooker  (19  Fla.  163). 

Governor  v.  Hooker. 
Blue  v.  Blue  (38  111.  9) 
Bluehill  Academy  v.  Ellis  (32  Me.  260) 
Bluett  v.  Nicholson  (1  Fla.  384) 
Bluevelt  v.  De  Novelles  (25  Hun,  590) 
Blum  v.  Carter  (63  Ala.  235) 
Blume  v.  Hartman  (115  Pa.  St.  32) 
Blumenthal's  Petition  (125  Pa.  St.  412) 
Blumenthal  v.  Moitz  (76  Md.  564) 
Blvdenburgh  v.  Lowry  (4  Cr.  C.  C.) 
Blythe  v.  Ayres  (96  Cal.  522) 

v.  Hoots  (72  N.  C.  575)  735,  1024, 

1037,  1047 
Board  v.  Dinwiddie  (139  Ind.  125)  913 

Board   of  Commissioners  v.  Rogers  (55 

Ind.  297)  922 

Board  of  Education  v.  Edson  (18  Oh.  St. 

221)  931 

Board,  &c.  v.  Ladd  (26  Oh.  St.  210)  888 

Boardman  v.  Woodman  (47  N.  H.  120)        34 

35,  40,  41 
xlv 


118 

1037 
496 

1142 
986 


See 


201 

854 

1239 

1102 

201 

50 

648 

346 

370 

157 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Boatmen's  Bk.  v.  McMenamy  (35  Mo. 

App.  198)  816 

Bobb's  Succession  (27  La.  An.  344)  350,  547 
Bobbitt  v.  Jones  (107  N.  C.  658)  646 

Bobo  v.  Gunnels  (92  Ala.  601)  752 

v.  Vaiden  (20  S.  C.  271)  550 

Bockover  v.  Ayres  (22  N.  J.  Eq.  13)  1028 
Bodenheimers   Succession  (35   La.    An. 

1034)  542,  545 

Bodle  v.  Hulse  (5  Wend.  313)  739 

Boeger  v.  Langenberg  (42  Mo.  App.  7)  693 
Boerum  v.  Schenck  (41  N.  Y.  182)  702,  703 
Bofenschen's  Succession  (29  La.  An.  711)  1190 
Bofil  v.  Fisher  (3  Rich.  Eq.  1)  155 

Bogan  v.  Camp  (30  Ala.  276)  695 

Bogart  v.  Bell  (112  Ala.  412)  1083 

v.  Van  Velsor  (4  Edw.  Ch.  718)  709 

Bogert  v.  Hertell  (4  Hill,  N.  Y.  492)  718,  734, 

1070 

v.  Furmon  (10  Pai.  496)  596 

c.  Indianapolis  (13  Ind.  134)  591 

Boggess  v.  Brownson  (59  Tex.  417)  713 

Boggs  v.  Bard  (2  Rawle,  102)  643 

v.  Branch  Bank  (10  Ala.  970)  806 

i\  Hamilton  (2  Mill.  381)  541 

Bogne  r.  Watrous  (59  Conn.  247)  419 

Bogy  v.  Roberts  (48  Ark.  17)  1218 

Bohannon  v.  Combs  (97  Mo.  446)  246 

v.  Madison  (31  Miss.  348)  696 

Bohanon  v.  Walcot  (1  How.  Miss.  336)  91, 100 
Bonn  o.  Sheppard  (4  Munf.  403)  1202 

Bohon  v.  Barrett  (79  Kv.  378)  876 

b.  Bohon  (78  Kv.  408)  1221 

Boland's  Estate  (55  Cal.  310)  330,  1035,  1090 
Bolles  v.  Bolles  (44  N.  J.  Eq.  385}  570 

v.  Harris  (34  Oh.  St.  38)  81,  489 

Boiling  v.  Boiling  (88  Va.  524)  1238 

e.  Jones  (67  Ala.  508)  1043,  1077 

v.  Smith  (108  Alfl.  411)  1083 

Bollinger  v.  Manning  (79  Cal.  7)  198,  861 

Bolman  v.  Overall  (80  Ala.  451)  58 

Bolt  v.  Dawkins  (10  S.  C.  198)  844 

Bolton,  Matter  of  (146  N.  Y.  257)  1023 

v.  Jacks  (6  Rob.  N.  Y.  166)  448 

v.  Schriener  (135  N.  Y.  65)  439,  454 

r.  Whitmore  (12  Mo.  App.  581) 

Boltz  v.  Sehutz  (61  Minn.  444) 

v.  Stolz  (41  Oh.  St.  540) 

Bom.ui  v.  Boman  (49  Fed.  Rep.  329) 
Bomash  v.  Iron  Hall  (42  Minn.  241) 
Bomford  v.  Grimes  (17  Ark.  567) 


357 

255 
111 
647 
690,  768 
1144 
684 


Bompart  v.  Lucas  (21  Mo.  598) 

Bonaparte  v.  State  (63  Md.  465)  691,  772,  804 


246 

348 

639 

1071 

1077 


Bond  v.  Bond  (16  Lea,  306 

v.  Clav  (2  Head.  379) 

v.  Conway  (11  Md.  512) 

v.  Montgomery  (56  Ark.  563) 

r.  Ramsey  (89  111.  29) 

V.  Seawell  (3  Burr.  1773) 

v.  Watson  (22  Ga.  637)  1058 

Bone  '"    Sparrow  Ml  La.  An.  185)  639 

Bonham  ».  Bonham  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  476)      986 

,:  Bonham  (38  \.  J.  Eq.  419)   986,  1010 

Boniface  v.  Scott  (3  8.  &.  R.  351)  780 

Bonifanl  v.  Greenfield  (Cro.  Eliz.  80)  721 
Bonnell  ».  Bonnell  (47  N.  J.  Eq.  540)  872 
Bonnemonl  v.  Gill  (167  Mass.  338)  470,  500 
Bonner  v.  Greenlee  (6  Ala.  411)  1058 

v.  Young  (68  A  In.  86)  952 

B ly'i  E  tate  Ml'.)  Cal.  402)  279 

xl\  i 


Boody,  In  re  (113  Cal.  682) 
Boodv  v.  Emerson  (17  N.  H.  577) 
Boofter  v.  Rogers  (9  Gill,  44) 
Book  v.  Book  (104  Pa.  St.  240) 
Booker  v.  Armstrong  (93  Mo.  49) 


"Page 

279 

1034 

84 

54,  61 

677,  1138 

1158,  1159 

950 


v.  Booker  (5  Humph.  505) 

Boomhower  v.  Babbitt  (67  Vt.  327)  1002 

Boone  v.  Boone  (3  Har.  &  McH.  95)  270 

v.  Lewis  (103  N.  C.  40)  71 

Boor  v.  Lowrev  (103  Ind.  468)  625 

Booream's  Cas"e  (55  N.  J.  Eq.  759)      534,  535 
Booream  v.  Wells  (19  N.  J.  Eq.  87)  718 

Booth's  Will  (127  N.  Y.  109)  65 

Booth  v.  Ammermann  (4  Hradf.  129)        1005 

v.  Baptist  Church  (126  N.  Y.  215)     485, 

944,  953 

v.  Foster  (111  Ala.  312)  1218 

v.  Goodwin  (29  Ark.  633)    196,  200,  214, 

215 

v.  Kitchen  (7  Hun,  255) 

v.  Northrop  (27  Conn.  325) 

v.  Patrick  (8  Conn.  106) 

v .  Radford  (57  Mich.  357) 

v.  Starr  (5  Day,  419) 

v.  Stebbins  (4f  Miss.  161) 

v.  Timonev  (3  Dem.  416) 

Bootle  v.  Blundell  (19  Ves.  494) 
Boozer  v.  Addison  (2  Rich.  Eq.  273) 
Borden  v.  Fowler  (14  Ark.  471) 

v.  Jenks  (140  Mass.  562) 

v.  State  (11  Ark.  519) 

Borders  v.  Hodges  (154  111.  598) 
- —  v.  Murphv  (125  111.  577) 
Borer  v.  Chapman  (119  U.  S.  587) 


497 

675 

631,  661 

760,  765 

1271 

268 

495 

1104 

639 

805 

985,  986 

329 

1071 

1087 

334,  357 

1264 

398,  835 

833,  936 

309 

958 


Borgess  v.  Vette  (142  Mo.  560) 
Borgner  v.  Brown  (133  Ind.  391) 
Borland  v.  Dean  (4  Mason,  174) 
Born  r.  Horstmann  (80  Cal.  452) 
Borneman  v.  Sidlinger  (15  Me.  429)  118,  119, 

122   127 
Borst  v.  Corey  (16  Barb.  136)  '  609 

Bosio's  Estate  (2  Ashm.  437)  692 

Boson  v.  Statham  (1  Eden  Ch.  508)  910 

Bost  v.  Bost  (87  N.  C.  477)  478 

Bostick  v.  Blades  (59  Md.  231)  962 

Boston  v.  Bovlston  (4  Mass.  318)  1136 

c.  Murray  (94  Mo.  175)  816 

Boston  Safe  Deposit  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Plum- 

mer  (142  Mass.  257)  966,  988 

Bostwick,  Matter  of  (4  John.  Ch.  100)       1012 

v.  Atkins  (3  N.  Y.  53)  1062 

v.  Beach  (103  N.  Y.  414)  255 

v.  Bostwick  (71  Wis.  273)  823 

v.  Skinner  (80  111.  147)  328,  1036 

Boswell  v.  Townsend  (57  Ala.  308)  1132 

Bosworth  v.  Smith  (9  R.  I.  67)  842 

Bothwell  v.  Dobbs  (59  Ga.  787)  991 

Bott  v.  Barr  (90  Ind.  243)  757 

Botts  v.  Fitzpatrick  (5  B.  Mon.  397)  793 

Boudinot  v.  Bradford  (2  Dall.  266)  96 

Boudreaux,  Succession  of  (6  La.  An.  78)  1037 
Boudreaux,  Succession   of   (42   La.  An. 

296)  404,  527 

Bougere,  Succession  of  (30  La.  An.  422)     400 
Boughton  v.  Flint  (74  N.  Y.  476)        350,  975, 

1189,  1191 
Bouknight  V.  Brown  (16  S.  C.  155)  91 1 

Boulton  v.  Scott  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  231)  1131 

Bourke  v.  Wilson  (38  La.  An.  32(1)  82 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Bourne  v.  Stevenson  (58  Me.  499)  661,  666 
Bouslough  v.  Bouslough  (68  Fa.  St.  495)  631 
Boutiller  v.  Steamboat  (8  Minn.  97)  627 

Boutte's  Succession  (32  La.  An.  556)  549 

Bowden  v.  Pierce  (73  Cal.  459)  428,  1085 

v.  Pierce  (15  Pac.  64)  428 

Bowditch  v.  Andrew  (8  Allen,  339)  906 

v.  Ayrault  (138  N.  Y.  223)  942 

BowdlearY  Bowdlear  (112  Mass.  184)        140 
Bowdoin  v.  Holland  (10  Gush.  17)  441 

Bowen  v.  Allen  (113  111.  53)  893 

v.  Bond  (80  111.  351)  1050 

v.  Bowen  (2  Bradf.  336)  825 

v.  Bowen  (38  Oh.  St.  426)  354 

v.  Collins  (15  Ga.  100)  235 

v.  Crow  (16  Neb.  556)  287 

t>.  Dean  (110  Mass.  438)  948 

v.  Dorrance  (12  K.  I.  209)  987 

v.  Evans  (70  Iowa,  368)  865,  1236 

v.  Gorantlo  (73  Pa.  St.  357)  76 

v.  Johnson  (6  Ind.  110)  887,  890 

v.  Johnson  (5  R.  I.  112)  498 

v.  Montgomery  (48  Ala.  353)  678 

v.  Paytou  (14  K.  I.  257)  1102 

v.  Preston  (48  Ind.  307)  221,  2G1 

v.  Richardson  (133  Mass.  293)  741 

u.  Shav  (105  111.  132)  697 

v.  Stewart  (128  Ind.  507)     342,  431,  528, 

573 
Bower  v.  Bower  (5  Wash.  225)  111 

v.  Bower  (142  Ind.  194)  490 

v.  Holladav  (18  Oreg.  491)  863 

Buwers's  Appeal  (84  Pa.  St.  311)  1198 

Bowers  v.  Bowers  (53  Ind.  430)  109 

v.  Bowers  (26  Pa.  St.  74)  533 

v.  Emerson  (14  Barb.  652)  393 

v.  Hammond  (139  Mass.  360)       332,  865 

v.  Hard  (10  Mass.  427)  121 

v.  Keesecker  (14  Iowa,  301)  621 

v.  Porter  (4  Pick.  198)  901 

v.  Schuler  (54  Minn.  99)  833 

v.  Smith  (10  Pai.  193)  353,  354 

v.  Williams  (34  Miss.  324)       1144,  1151 

Bowersox's  Appeal  (100  Pa.  St.  434)  524 

Bowie  v.  Bowie  (73  Md.  232)  527 

v.  Ghiselin  (30  Md.  553)       348,  811,  863 

Bowker  v.  Bowker  (148  Mass.  198)  883 

v.  Pierce  (130  Mass.  262)  710,  1172 

v.  Smith  (48  N.  H.  Ill)  287 

Bowles  o.  Rouse  (8  111.  409)  440 

v.  Winchester  (13  Bush,  1)  1217 

Bowlin  v.  Pearson  (4  Baxt.  341)  237 

Bowling  v.  Bowling  (8  Ala.  538)  473,  475 

v.  Cobb  (6  B.  Mon.  356)  1191 

v.  Estep  (56  Md.  564)  1201 

v.   Shepard  (91  Kv.  273)  186 

Bowman's  Appeal  (34  Pa.  St.  19)  941 

Appeal  (62  Pa.  St.  166)  566 

Bowman's  Estate  (121  N.  C.  373)        395,  569 
Bowman  v.  Bailey  (20  S.  C.  550)  236 

v.  Long  (23  Ga.  242)  952 

v.  Woods  (1  Green,  Iowa,  441)  480 

v.  Wootton  (8  B.  Mon.  67)  544 

Bowne,  In  re  (6  Dem.  51)  535 

Bovce  v.  City  of  St.  Louis  (29  Mo.  543)      913 

v.  Davis  (13  La.  An.  554)  1122 

v.  Fisk  (110  Cal.  107)  845 

v.  Foote  (19  Wis.  199)  825 

v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.  (63  Iowa,  70)     629 

Bovd's  Appeal  (38  Pa.  St.  246)  520 

— -  Estate  (25  Cal.  511)  1199 


*Pag« 
Boyd's  Succession  (12  La.  An.  611)  580,  674 
Boyd,  In  re  (4  Redf.  154)  1142 

v.  Blankman  (29  Cal.  19)  1090 

v.  Bovd  (66  Pa.  St.  283)  43 

v.  Boyd  (1  Watts,  365)  558 

v.  Buckle  (10  Sim.  595)  996 

v.  Carlton  (69  Me.  200)  261 

v.  City  S.  Bank  (15  Grat.  501)  686 

v.  Cook  (3  Leigh,  32)  89 

v.  Eby  (8  Watts,  66)  32,  39 

r.  Harrison  (36  Ala.  533)  243 

17.  Hawkins  (2  Dev.  Eq.  329)  1160 

t7.  Hunter  (44  Ala.  705)  239 

r.  Johnston  (89  Tenn.  284)  795 

t7.  Martin  (9  Heisk.  382)  237 

v.  Oglesbv  (23  Grat.  674)  684 

v.  Orton  (16  Wis.  495)  686 

v.  Sloan  (2  Bailev,  311)  389,  745 

v.  White  (32  Ga."530)  1239 

Bovden  v.  Ins.  Co.  (153  Mass.  544)     647,  827 

17.  Ward  (38  Vt.  628)  164 

Bover  v.  Bover  (21  111.  App.  534)168, 170,189 

v.  Frick  (4  Watts  &  S.  357)  82 

■  v.  Hawkins  (86  Iowa,  40)  390 

Bovers  v.  Newbanks  (2  Ind.  388)  258 

Bovett  v.  Kerr  (7  Ala.  9)  1230 

Boykin  v  Boykin  (21  S.  C.  531)  966,  985 

Bovlan  v.  Meeker  (28  N.  J.  L.  274)       37,  490 
Bo^le  17.  Parker  (3  Md.  Ch.  42)  96,  873 

Bovles  v.  Latham  (61  Iowa,  174)  229 

Boylston  v.  Carver  (4  Mass.  595)         595,  648 
Bovnton  v.  Brastow  (53  Me.  362)     1084,  1086 

t7.  Laddy  (50  Hun,  339)  757 

y.  Nelson  (46  Ala.  501)  342 

v.  Peterborough  li.  R.  (4  Cush.  467)  408, 

636,  1142 
Bovse  t7.  Rossborough  (6  H.  L.  Cas.  2)        44, 

45,  46,  48 
Brace  v.  Black  (125  III.  33)  34,  477 

Brackenridge  v.  Holland  (2  Blackf.  377)    357 
Brackett  v.  Goddard  (54  Me.  309)  597 

v.  Griswold  (103  N.  Y.  425)         625,  626 

v.  Hoitt  (20  N.  H.  257)  385 

v.  Tillotson  (4  N.  H.  208)  761,  1151 

v.  Waite  (4  Vt.  389)  609 

Bradburv  v.  Re.  d  (23  Tex.  258) 
Bradford  v.  Andrews  (20  Ohio  St.  208) 


■v.  Boudinot  (3  Wash.  122) 

-  v.  Bradford  (66  Ala.  252) 

-  v.  Bradford  (19  Oh.  St.  546) 
•v.  Cook  (4  La.  An.  229) 

-  v.  Felder  (2  McC.  C.  168) 

■  v.  Forbes  (9  Allen,  365) 

•  t7.  Haynes  (20  Me.  105) 

•  v.  McConihay  (15  W.  Va.  732) 

-  v.  Mathews  (9  App.  D.  C.  438) 

•  v.  Monks  (132  Mass.  405) 

■  17.  Street  (84  Md.  273) 


1059 

499, 
500 

1149 
263 
960 

1060 
432 

1105 

964 

1053, 

1054 
886 
718 
838 


Bradford    Academy  v.   Grover    (55  Vt 

462)  1008 

Bradfords  v.  Kent  (43  Pa.  St.  474)  2G9 

Bradhurst  v.  Bradhurst  (1  Pai.  331)  949 

v.  Field  (135  N.  Y.  564)  882 

Bradish  v.  McClellan  (100  Pa.  St.  607)  99 
Bradlee  v.  Andrews  (137  Mass.  50)  871,  906 
Bradley's  Estate  (9  Phila.  327)  1182 

Estate  (11  Phila.  87)  765,1147 

Estate  (166  Pa.  300)  939 

Bradley  v.  Andress  (27  Ala.  596)  489 

xlvii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Bradley  v.  Bradlev  (3  Redf.  512)         534,  538 

r.  Bngham  (144  Mass.  181)  286 

v.  Commonwealth  (31  Pa.  St.  522)     417, 

546,  552 

v.  Duroche  (70  Tex.  465)  205 

V.  Hunt  (5  Gill  &  J.  54)  118 

v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (51  Neb.  653)        439 

v.  Rees  (113  111.  327)  892 

v.  Saddler  (54  Ga.  681)  608 

v.  Hixton  (117  Ind.  255)  134 

v.  Yail  (48  Conn.  375)  812 

v.  Woerner  (46  Mo.  App.  371)    191,  323, 

825 
Bradner  v.  Faulkner  (12  N.  Y.  472) 
Bradshaw  v.  Simpson  (6  Ired.  Eq.  243) 


Bradstreet  v.  Kinsella  (76  Mo.  63) 
Bradway  v.  Holmes  (50  N.  J.  Eq.  311) 


Bradwell  v.  Wilson  (158  111.  346) 

v.  Wilson  (57  111.  App.  162) 

Bradwin  v.  Harpur  (Arab.  374) 
Brady  v.  Banta  (46  Kans.  131) 

v.  Cubit  (1  Dougl.  31) 

v.  McBride  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  495) 

Bragden  v.  Brown  (2  Add.  441) 
Bragg  v.  Beers  (71  Ala.  151) 
Braham  v.  Burchell  (3  Add.  243) 
Braidsher  v.  Cannady(  76  N.  C.  445) 
Brainard  v.  Colchester  (31  Conn.  407) 
Brainerd  v.  Cowdrey  (16  Conn.  1) 

Braithwaite  v.  Harvey  (14  Mont.  208) 


1005 

387, 

693 

494 

744, 

1182 

813 

813 

893 

204,  208 

106 

38 

40 

1022 

501 

1217 

231 

893,  967, 

1106 

359, 

361 

1056 

795 

852 


Braley  v.  Simonds  (61  N.  H.  369) 
Braman's  Appeal  (89  Pa.  St.  78) 
Bramblet  v.  Webb  (11  Sm.  &  M.  438) 
Bramell  V.  Cole  (136  Mo.  201)    323,  351,  730, 

1230 
Bramhall  v.  Ferris  (14  N".  Y.  41)  956 

Branagh  v.  Smith  (46  Fed.  R.  517)  23 

Branch  v.  Hanrick  (70  Tex.  731)     1185,  1244 

Bank  v.  Donelson  (12  Ala.  741)  845 

v.  Hawkins  (12  Ala.  755)  846 

v.  Wade  (13  Ala.  427)  388 

Brandon  v.  Allison  (66  N.  C.  532)  1063 

1148, 


v.  Iloggatt  (32  Miss.  335) 


113' 

1149,  1207 

677 

434 

1271 

956 

1272 

(7  J.  J. 

1144 
702 


v.  Judah  (7  Ind.  545) 

v.  Mason  (1  Lea,  615) 

v.  Phelps  (77  N.  C.  44) 

v.  Robinson  (18  Yes.  429) 

Brangerv.  Lucy  (82  III.  91) 
Branham     v.     Commonwealth 

Marsh.  190) 
Braunon  v.  Oliver  (2  Stew.  47) 
Bransby  v.  Grantham  (l'lowd.  525)  386 

v. 'Haines  (1  Cas.  Temp.  Lee,  120)        26 

Branson  v.  Branson  (102  Mo,  620)    1202,  1205 

v.  Yancv  (1  Dev.  Eq.  77)  258 

Pram's  Will  (40  Mo.  206)  272,  987,  1103 

Brant  v.  Virginia  Coal  Co.  (93  U.  S.  326)  72!) 

r.  Wilson  (8  Cow.  50)  87,97 

Branton  p.  Branton  (23  Ark.  509)        110,  357 
Bra  bridge  v.  WoodrofEe  (2  Ark.  69)  895 

Brasfield  v.  French  (59  Ml  -.  632)       282,  689 
Brashear  v.  Williams  (Hi  Ala.  630)  443 

r  v.  Marsh  (15  Oh.  Si.  103)  881 

Bratney  v.  <  lurry  (33  [nd.  899)  177 

Brattle  v.  '  lonverse  ( I  Root,  174)  394 

i'.  (in, tin  (1  Boot,  425)  394 

xlviii 


•Page 
Brattleboro  v.  Mead  (43  Vt.  556)  915 

Brattle  Square,   &.c.  v.   Grant  (3   Grav, 

143)  917,  920,  950 

Brawner  v.  Sterdevant  (9  Ga.  69)        620,  624 
Braxton  v.  Freeman  (6  Rich.  L.  35)  267 


v.  State  (25  Ind.  82) 

—  v.  Wood  (4  Grat.  25) 

Bray  v.  Adams  (114  Mo.  486) 

v.  Dudgeon  (6  Munf.  132) 

v.  Lamb  (2  Dev.  Eq.  372) 

v.  McClurv  (55  Mo.  128) 

v.  Neill  (21  N.  J.  Eq.  343) 


558,  559 

796 

1037,  1067 

517 

1098 

337 

272,  1035. 

1036,  1048 

Bravfield  i>.  Bravfield  (3  H.  &.  J.  208)  489 
Brazeale  v.  Brazeale  (9  Ala.  491)  677,  1229 
Brazer  v.  Dean  (15  Mass.  183)  186 

Brazier  v.  Clark  (5  Pick.  96)  558,  738 

Brearlev  V.  Brearley  (9  N.J.  Eq.  21)  720 
Breathitt  v.  Whittaker  (8  B.  Mon.  530)       57, 

58 
Brecht  v.  Colby  (7  Mo.  App.  300)  390 

Bredow  v.  Mut.  Sav.  Inst.  (28  Mo.  181)  231 
Bree  v.  Bree  (51  111.  367)  1036 

Breed  v.  Pratt  (18  Pick.  115)  38 

Brendel  v.  Church  (87  Fed.  R.  262)  357 

Brenham  v.  Storv  (39  Cal.  179)  1038 

Brennan's  Appeal  (05  Pa.  St.  16)  1164 

Estate  (65  Cal.  517)  805 

Brennan  v.  Harris  (20  Ala.  185)  396 

Brenner  v.  Alexander  (16  Oreg.  349)  792 

v.  Gauch  (85  111.  308)  175 

Brent  v.  Bank  of  Washington  (10  Pet. 

596)  772 

—  v.  Clevinger  (78  Ya.  12)  1138 

v.  Washington  (18  Grat.  526)  905 

Bresee  v.  Stiles  (22  Wis.  120)  205,  1230 

Brett  v.  Cumberland  (3  Bulst.  163)  594 

Brettun  v.  Fox  (100  Mass.  234)  200,  212 

Brewer  v.  Blouyher  (14  Pet.  178)  156 

v.  Browne"(08  Ala.  210)  290 

v.  Connell  (11  Humph.  500)  248 

v.  Vanarsdale  (6  Dana,  204)  1152 

Brewster,  Matter  of  (5  Dem.  239)  532 

Brewster  v.  Benedict  (14  Ohio,  368)  154 

v.  Brewster  (8  Mass.  131)  768,  1153 

v.  Gillison  (10  Rich.  Eq.  435)  1270 

v.  Hill  (1  N.  H.  350)  593 

v.  McCall  (15  Conn.  274)  886,  944 

v.  Shelton  (24  Conn.  140)  1200 

Brian  v.  Melton  (125  111.  647)  274 

LSriant  v.  Jackson  (99  Mo.  585)  1085 

Brice  v.  Tavlor  (51  Ark.  75)  744 

Brick's  Estate  (15  Abb.  Pr.  12)  331,  464 

Brick  v.  Brick  (06  N.  Y.  144)  46 

Bricker  v.  Lightuer  (40  Pa.  St.  199)  42 

Bridge  v.  Swavne  (3  Redf.  487)  1036 

Bridgers  v.  Hutchins  (11  Ired.  68)  1218 

Bridges  v.  Pleasants  (4  Ired.  Eq.  26)  924 

v.  Wilkins  (3  Jones  Eq.  342)  607 

Bridgewater  v.  Brook  field  (3  Cow.  299)  1055 
Bridgford  v.  Riddell  (55  111.  201)  610 

Bridgman  v.  Bridgman  (138  Mass.  58)       641 

v.  Bridgman  (30  W.  Ya.  212)       525,  526 

Bridgnorth  v.  Collins  (15  Sim.  538)  899 

Bridwell  v.  Swank  (84  Mo.  455)  49 

lirien,  Ex  parte  (2  Tenn.  Ch.  33)  181 

Briers  v.  Goddard  ( Hob.  250)  404 

Brigel  v.  Starbuck  (31  oh.  St.  280)  1198 

Brigga  V.  Barker  (145  Mass.  287)     1192,  1200 

v.  Briggs  (69  Iowa,  617)  890 

v.  Carroll  (117  N.  Y.  2S8)  1097 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[.References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Briggs  v.  Ch.  K.  &   W.  R.   (56   Kans 
526) 

v.  Greene  (10  R.  I.  495) 

v.  Hartley  (14  Jur.  683) 

i'.  Smith  (83  N.  C.  300) 

v.  Starke  (2  Mills  Const.  R.  Ill) 


647 

156 

927 

1270 

736, 

796 

276,  277 

646,  900 

1143 

951 

449,  680 

832 


v.  Titus  (13  R.  I.  136) 

v.  Walker  (171  U.  S.  466) 

Brigham  v.  Elwell  (145  Mass.  520) 

v.  Shattuck  (10  Pick.  300) 

Bright  v.  Ecker  (9  S.  Dak.  449) 
— -  v.  Marconi  (121  N.  C.  86) 

v.  Moore  (87  Tenn.  186)  844 

v.  White  (8  Mo.  421)  494 

Brightman  v.  Keighlev  (Cro.  Eliz.  43)        505 
Brill  v.  Ide  (75  Wis.  il3)  807 

v.  Wright  (112  N.  Y.  129)  989 

Brim  v.  Fleming  (135  Mo.  597)  836 

Brimmer  v.  Sohler  (1  Cush.  118)         872,  886 
Brinckerhoff  v.  Lawrence  (2  Sand.  Ch.  400) 

124 
Brinckerhoof  v.  Remsen  (8  Pai.  488) 
Brine  v.  Insurance  Co.  (106  U.  S.  027) 
Brinker  v.  Brinker  (7  Pa.  St.  53) 
Brinkinan's  Succession  (5  La.  An.  27) 
Brinkman  v.  Ruegijesick  (71  Mo.  553) 
Brinley  v.  Gron  (50  Conn.  66) 
Brinson,  In  re  (73  N.  C.  278) 
Brinton's  Estate  (13  Phila.  234) 


69 

379 

341 

517 

44 

1004 

326,  577 

34 


Briscoe  v.  Tarkington  (5  La.  An.  692)        525 

v.  Wickliffe  (6  Dana,  157)  514 

Bristol  v.  Bristol  (53  Conn.  242)  924,  925 

v.  Out.  Orp.  As.  (60  Conn.  472)  803 

Sav.  Bank  v.  Woodward  (137  Mass. 

412)  859 

Bnstor  v.  Bristor  (93  Ind.  281)  612 

Brittin  v.  Phillips  (1  Dem.  57)  323,  345 

Britton  v.  Miller  (63  N.  C.  208)  896 

v.  Thornton  (112  U.  S.  526)  937 

Broach  v.  Sing  (57  Miss.  115)  81,  489 

v.  Walker  (2  Ga.  428)  588 

Broadaway's  Succession  (3  La.  An.  591)  1153 
Broadhead  v.   Shoemaker  (44  Fed.  R.   518) 

357 
Broadwater  v.  Richards  (4  Mont.  80)  1050 
Broadwav  v.  Adams  (133  Mass.  170)  950 

Brock  v.  "Brock  (92  Ya.  173)  1223 

v.  Frank  (51  Ala.  85)  493 

v.  Philips  (2  Wash.  68)  1077 

o.  S  aten  (82  111.  282)  825 

Brockenborough  v.  Melton  (55  Tex.  493)  1081 
Brockenbrough  v.  Turner  (78  Va.  438)  693 
Brocklev's  Appeal  (4  Atl.  210)  729,  948 

Broderick's  Will  (21  Wall.  503)         337,  470, 

497,  500 
Broderick  v.  Smith  (3  Lans.  26)  842 

Brodess  v.  Thompson  (2  H.  &  G.  120)  324 
Brodie  o.  Brickley  (2  Rawle,  431)       361,  363, 

369 

v.  Mitchell  (85  Md.  516)  530,  536 

Brodnax  v.  Brown  (Dudlev,  Ga.  202)  423 
Broe  v.  Bovle  (108  Pa.  St."76)  469,  501,  502 
Brogan  v.  Brogan  (63  Ark.  405)  1027,  1028 
Brokaw  v.  Hudson  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  135)        906 

v.  McDougall  (20  Fla.  212)  212 

v.  Ogle  (170  111.  115)  201,  1244 

Bromberg  v.  Bates  (112  Ala.  363)  545 

Bromlev  v.  Miller  (2  Th.  &  C.  575)  494 

Bromw'ell  v.  Bates  (98  Ala.  621)  1123 

v.  Bromwell  (139  111.  424)  339 

VOL.  I.  —  d 


(83 


•Page 
Bronaugh  v.  Bronaugh  (7  J.  J.  Marsh. 

621)  561 

Bronsdon  v.  Winter  (1  Amb.  57)  965 

Bronson,  Matter  of  (150  N.  Y.  1)  619  a 

v.  Burnett  (1  Chand.  136)  332 

Brook  v.  Brook  (3  Sm.  &  G.  481)  224 

v.  Chappell  (34  Wis.  405)     339,  351,  815 

'v.  Latimer  (44  Kans.  431)         1220, 1223 

26 

26 

610 

881 

994 

32,  39 

Ky. 

1155 

404 

47 

646 

39 

931 

1023 

634,  035 

334 

9,  999, 1000, 

1001,  1138 

334 

1097,  1100 

232 

200 

1143,  1163 

994 

1183 

386,  494 

245 

798 

1207 

549 

548 

68 

576 

752 

955 


v.  Turner  (1  Mod.  211) 

v.  Turner  (2  Mod.  170) 

Brookbank  v.  Kennard  (41  Ind.  339) 
Brooke  v.  Craxton  (2  Grat.  500) 

v.  Lewis  (Madd.  &  G.  358) 

v.  Townshend  (7  Gill,  10) 

Brooking  v.   Farmer's    Bank 
431) 

v .  Jennings  (1  Mod.  174) 

Brooks's  Estate  (54  Cal.  471) 
Brooks  v.  Ahrens  (08  Md.  212) 

v.  Barrett  (7  Pick.  94) 

v.  Belfast  (90  Me.  318) 

v.  Bergner  (83  Md.  302) 

v.  Bicknell  (3  McLean,  250) 

v.  Brooks  (52  Kans.  502) 

v.  Brooks  (12  S.  C.  422)     1J 


v.  Duckworth  (59  Mo.  48) 

v.  Eskins  (24  Mo.  App.  290) 

v.  Everett  (13  Allen,  457) 

v.  Hyde  (37  Cal.  366) 

v.  Jackson  (145  Mass.  307) 

v.  Lvnde  (7  Allen,  64) 

v.  Mastin  (69  Mo.  58) 

v.  McComb  (38  Fed,  R.  317) 

v.  McMeekin  (37  S.  C.  285) 

v.  Oliver  (1  Amb.  406) 

v.  Rayner  (127  Mass.  208) 

v.  Whitmore  (139  Mass.  350) 

v.  Whitmore  (142  Mass.  399) 

V.  Woodson  (87  Ga.  379) 

Brophy's  Estate  (12  Phila.  18) 
Brothers  v.  Gunnells  (110  Ala.  436) 

v.  McCurdy  (36  Pa.  St.  407) 

Brotherton  v.  Hellier  (2  Cas.  Temp.  Lee, 

131)  404 

v.  Spence  (52  Mo.  App.  664)  682 

Brotzmau's  Appeal  (119  Pa.  St.  645)         345, 

1099 
Broughton  v.  Bradley  (34  Ala.  694)  358,  571, 

673 
Browder  v.  Faulkner  (82  Ala.  257) 
Brower  v.  Bowers  (1  Abb.  Ct.  App.  Dec 

214) 

v.  Hunt  (18  Oh.  St.  311) 

Brown's  Appeal  (1  Dall.  311) 

Appeal  (12  Pa.  St.  333) 

Appeal  (68  Pa.  St.  53) 

Appeal  (84  Pa.  St.  457) 

Appeal  (89  Pa.  St.  139) 

Estate  (80  Cal.  381) 

Estate  (86  Me.  512) 

Estate  (93  N.  Y.  295) 

Estate  (8  Phila.  197) 

Estate  (11  Phila.  127) 

Petition  (14  R.  I.  371) 

Will  (1  B.  Mon.  56) 

Brown,  Ex  parte  (2  Bradf.  22) 

Ex  parte  (37  S.  C.  181) 

Brown,  Matter  of  (154  N.  Y.  313)  895 

v.  Anderson  (13  Ga.  171)    472,  473,  1196 

v.  Anderson  (13  Mass.  201)  846 

xlix 


331 


899 

154 

73T 

356 

1062 

346 

284 

505 

938 

883 

705, 1186 

529 

1005 

93 

393,  542,  545 

204 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 

Brown  v.  Armistead  (6  Rand.  594)  724 

v.  Baron  (162  Mass.  50)  1105,  1143 

v.  Beaver  (3  Jones,  516)  79 

v.  Bell  (58  Mich.  58)  477,  1230 

v.  Benight  (3  Blackf.  39)  416,  419 

v.  Bokee  (53  Md.  155)  640,  642 

v.  Brightman  (11  Allen,  226)  830 

v.  Bronson  (35  Mich.  415)  245 

v.  Brown  (41  Ala.  215)  1047 

v.  Brown  (1  Barb.  Ch.  189)  363,  375 

v.  Brown  (0  Bush,  648)  904 

v.  Brown  (18  Conn.  410)  116,  119 

v.  Brown  (56  Conn.  249)  805,  806 

r.  Brown  (58  Conn.  85)  805,  806 

v.  Brown  (8  El.  &  Bl.  875)       96,  98,  483 

v.  Brown  (139  Ind.  653)  1220 

i'.  Brown  (137  Mass.  539)  972 

v.  Brown  (35  Minn.  191)  370 

:  v.  Brown  (33  Miss.  39)  182 

r.  Brown  (08  Mo.  388)  202 

c.  Brown  (2  Murphv,  350)  81 

v.  Brown  (8  N.  H.  93)  1244 

p.  Brown  (43  N.  H.  17)  892 

v.  Brown  (44  X.  H.  281)  941 

v.  Brown  (48  N.  H.  90)  832 

i\  Brown  (45  S.  C  408)  808 

v.  Brown  (79  Va.  648)  985 

v.  Brown  (06  Vt.  70)  1208 

v.  Burke  (22  Ga.  574)  1218 

v.  Carroll  (36  Ga.  5G8)  81 

o.  Clark  (44  Mich.  309)  270 

v.  Clark  (77  N.  Y.  309)    71,  80,  108,  475 

v.  Cretchell  (110  Ind.  31)  1239 

v.  Durbin  (5  J.  J.  Marsh.  170)    414,  421 

v.  Dve  (2  Root,  280)  157 

v.  Eaton  (91  N.  C.  20)  78 

v.  Eggleston  (53  Conn.  110)  758,  1150 

v.  Elton  (3  P.  Wins.  202)  1014 

v.  Evans  (15  Kan.  88)     1057,  1074,  1151 


v.  Farnham  (55  Minn.  27) 

v.  Fessenden  (81  Me.  522) 

. v.  Finley  (18  Mo.  375) 

v.  Forsche  (43  Mich.  492) 

v.  Gaslight  Co.  (58  Cal.  420) 

v.  Gibson  (1  N.  &  McC.  326) 

v.  Grimes  (60  Ala.  647) 

v.  Ilanauer  (37  Ark.  155) 

v.  Harris  (9  Baxt.  380) 

v.  Hinman  (Bravt.  20) 

v.  Hodgdon  (31  "Me.  65) 


75' 
636,1141, 

1142 
632 

1242 

358 

326,  499 

1097 

1028 
489 

1199 

165,  169,  170, 

186,  270 

1108 
350 
177 
177 
200 
923 
565 


v.  James  (3  Strob.  Eq.  24) 

v.  Johns  (62  Md.  333) 

v.  Joiner  (77  Ga.  232) 

v.  Joiner  (80  Ga.  486) 

v.  Keller  (32  111.  151) 

v.  Kelsev  (2  Cush.  243) 

v.  King"(2Ind.  520) 

v.  Knapp  (79  N.  Y.  136)   366, 1007, 1009, 

1099,  1100 

V.  Lambert  (33  Grat  256)  1002 

v.  Leavitt  (20  X.  H.  493)     421,  422,  423 

t-.  Lewis  (0  K.  I.  497)  385,  043 

v.  L.  &  N.  K.  (97  Kv.  228)  440 

v.  Mattinglv  (91  Kv".  275)  1237 

v.  McAllister  (84  [nd.  375)  70 

■ v.  McKee  (108  N.  C.  387)  792 

v.  Mitchell  (7;>  Tex.  9)  42 

v.  Mitchell  (87  Tex.  140)  140 

v.  Mitchell  (83  Tex.  350)  42 

1 


Brown  v.  Noble  (42  Oh.  St.  405) 

v.  Parry  (2  Dick.  685) 

v.  Pendergast  (7  Allen,  427) 


*  Page 

691,  741 

266 

589,  677, 
752 

841,  843 
777 
1052 


v.  Porter  (7  Humph.  373) 

j).  Public  Adm'r  (2  Bradf.  103) 

v.  Redwyne  (16  Ga.  67) 

v.  Reed  (56  Oh.  St.  204)  1023, 1141,  1178, 

1189 

e.  Richards  (17  X.  J.  Eq.  32)  230 

v.  Riggin  (94  111.  500)  30,  39 

v.  Roberts  (21  La.  An.  508)  1033 

v.  Ryder  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  350)        401, 1203 

v.  San  Francisco  Co.  (58  Cal.  420)       367 

v.  Scherrer  (5  Colo.  App.  255)  107 

v.  Selwin  (Cas.  Temp.  Talb.  240)       652 

v.  Slater  (16  Conn.  192)  856 

v.  Stark  (47  Mo.  App.  370)  351 

v.  Starke  (3  Dana,  310)  250 

r.  Stewart  (4  Md.  Ch.  308)  533,  534 

u.  Strickland  (28  Ga.  387)  505,  576 

v.  Strickland  (32  Me.  174)  022 

v.  Sullivan  (22  Ind.  359)      414,  417,  418 

v.  Sumner  (31  Vt.  671)  816,  856 

v.  Tavlor  (62  Ind.  295)  1216 

v.  Temperlev  (3  Russ.  Ch.  263)         1009 

v.  Thorndike  (15  Pick.  388)  893 

v.  Torrev  (24  Barb.  583)  37 

v.  Turner  (113  Mo.  27)  603 

v.  Tutweiler  (01  Ala.  372)  676 

v.  Van  Duzee  (44  Vt.  529)  10G6 

v.  Ventriss  (24  La.  An.  187)  576 

v.  Vinvard  (Bailcv  Eq.  400)  1149 

v.  Waiter  (58  Ala".  310)  422,  425 

o.  Ward  (53  Md.  370)  34 

v.  Weatherbv  (71  Mo.  152)  559 

v.  Wheeler  (18  Conn.  199)  675 

v.  Whitmore  (71  Me.  65)  631,  794 

v.  Williams  (87  Ala.  353)  1062 

v.  Williams  (31  Me.  403)  244 

v.  Williams  (5  R.  I.  309)  896 

v.  Williamson  (36  Pa.  St.  338)  918 

V.  Wood  (Alevn,  36)  574 

v.  Wood  (17  Mass.  68)  502 

v.  Woodv  (22  Mo.  App.  253)  1057 

Browne  v.  Bockover  (84  Va.  424)  276 

v.  Doolittle  (151  Mass.  595)        984,  1234 

v.  McDonald  (129  Mass.  66)  688 

v.  Molliston  (3  Whart.  129)  43 

v.  Preston  (38  Md.  373)  811 

v.  Rogers  (1  Houst.  458)  766 

Brownell  v.  Curtis  (10  Pai.  210)  631 

Browntield  v.  Wilson  (78  111.  467)  873 

Browning,  Goods  of  (2  Sw.  &  Tr.  634)       519 

v.  Harris  (99  111.  456)  207 

v.  Headlev  (2  Rob.  Va.  340)        640,  642 

v.  Reane  (2  Phill.  69)  518 

v.  Watkins  (10  Sm.  &  M.  482)  432 

Brownlee  v.  Lockwood  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  239)  363 
Brownson  v.  Gifford  (8  How.  Pr.  389)        960 

v.  Lawrence  (L.  R.  6  Eq.  1)  1111 

Brubaker's  Appeal  (98  Pa.  St.  21)  532 

Bruce  v.  Bissell  (119  Ind.  525)  878,  942 

1>.  Griscom  (9  Hun,  280)  1219 

v.  Slemp  (82  Va.  352)      1218,  1222, 1223 

Bruch's  Estate  (185  Pa.  St.  194)         963,  1102 
Brumneld  v.  Drook  (101  Ind.  190)  718 

Hrummagim  v.  Ambrose  (48  Cal.  366)       1064 
Brunson  v.  Henrv  (140  Ind.  455)  126 

Bruscup  v.  Taylor  (20  Md.  410)  1203 

Brush  v.  Button  (36  Conn.  292)  1122 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Brush  v.  Wear  (15  Pet.  93) 

v.  Wilkins  (4  John.  Ch.  506) 

v.  Young  (28  N.  J.  L.  237) 

Brvan's  Estate  (4  Phila.  228) 
BrVan  v.  Bacheller  (G  R.  I.  543) 
— —  v.  Bauder  (23  Kan.  95) 
v.  Craigs  (G4  Ark.  438) 


*  Page 

1077 

105,  10G 

1175 

776 

227 

329,  1037,  1089 

647,  757 

v.  Hickson  (40  Ga.  405)  356 

v.  K^iles  (134  U.  S.  126)  786,  1088 

v.  McGee  (2  Wash.  C.  C.  337)    371,  374, 

649 

v.  Mulligan  (2  Hill  Ch.  361)  697 

v.  Mundy  (14  Mo.  458)  775,  776 

v.  Rhoades  (96  Mo.  485)  203 

v.  Rooks  (25  Ga.  622)  642 

v.  Thompson  (7  J.  J.  Marsh.  586)       733 

568 
1156 
326, 1193 
952 
815 
421,  425 
331 
12G7 
171,  229,  231 
548 
500 
959 
240,  1074 
63 
1146 
Buchan  v.  Rintoul  (10  Hun,  183;  s.  c.  70 
N.  Y.  1)  1181 

v.  Sumner   (2   Barb.   Ch.  165)  234, 

289,  290 
Buchanan's  Appeal  (72  Pa.  St.  448)  1098 

Buchanan  v.  Llovd  (64  Md.  306)        972,  1150 

v.  Matlock  (8  Humph.  390) 

v.  Thomason  (70  Ala.  401) 

v.  Wagnon  (G2  Tex.  375) 

Buchanon  v.  Buchanon  (99  N.  C.  308) 
Bucher  v.  Bucher  (86  III.  377) 
Buck  v.  Haines  (75  Mich.  397) 

v.  Miller  (147  Ind.  586) 

v.  Paine  (75  Me.  582) 

Buckingham's  Appeal  (57  Conn.  544) 
Buckingham  v.  Clark  (61  Conn.  205) 

v.  Jacques  (37  Conn.  4U2) 

v.  Morrison  (136  111.  437) 


v.  Walton  (14  Ga.  185) 
—  v.  Weems  (25  Ala.  195) 
Brvant  v.  Allen  (6  N.  H.  110) 
— —  v.  Dungan  (92  Kv.  627) 

v.  Fussell  (11  R.  L  28G) 

o.  Helton  (66  Ga.  477) 

v.  Horn  (42  Ala.  462) 

v.  Livermore  (20  Minn.  313) 

v.  McCune  (49  Mo.  546) 

v.  Owen  (1  Ga.355) 

v.  Pierce  (95  Wis.  331) 

v.  Thompson  (59  Hun,  545) 

Bryar's  Appeal  (111  Pa.  St.  81) 
Brvce,  Goods  of  (2  Curt.  325) 
Bryson  v.  Nickols  (2  Hill  Ch.  113) 


v.  Ludlum  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  137) 

v.  Wesson  (54  Miss.  52G) 

Buckland  v.  Gallup  (105  N.  Y.  453) 
Bucklev  v.  Barber  (6  Exch.  164) 

y.'Buckley  (11  Barb.  43) 

v.  Frasier  (153  Mass.  525) 

v.  Gerard  (123  Mass.  8) 


470 
356 
861 
915 

1142 
834 
691 
951 
499 
895 
144 
283,  998, 

1000 

287 

723, 1084 

1149 
427 
290 
140 
110 


Sup.  Ct.  (102  Cal.  6)     346,  1243,  1246 
Bucklin  v.  Chapin  (1  Lans.  443)  767 

Buckminster  v.  Ingham  (Bravt.  116)  421 

Bucknam  v.  Phelps  (6  Mass."448)  193 

Buckner  v.  Wood  (45  Miss.  57)  1046 

Bucknor's  Estate  (136  Pa.  St.  23)  1236 

Buckworth  v.  Thirkell    (3    Bos.   &   Pul. 

652)  232 

Budd  v.  Brooke  (3  Gill,  198)  494 

v.  Garrison  (45  Md.  418)  1009 

v.  Hilor  (27  N.  J.  L.  43)  230,  599 

■ — -  v.  Williams  (26  Me.  2G5)  1097 

Budde  v.  Rebenack  (137  Mo.  179)  1246 

Buddceke  v.  Buddecku  (31  La.  An.  572)     346 


Buehler  v.  Buffington  (43  Pa.  St.  278) 

v.  Fairlamb  (100  Pa.  St.  384) 

Buel's  Appeal  (60  Conn.  63) 
Buell  v.  Dickey  (9  Neb.  285) 
Buerhaus  v.  DeSaussure  (41  S.  C.  457) 


'rage 
568, 
1096 

972 
1041 

435 
684, 


1166,  1187,  11! 


Buffalo  v.  Baugh  (12  Ired.  201) 
Buffalo  Co.  v.  Leonard  (154  N.  Y.  141) 
Buffington  v.  Grosvenor  (46  Kans.  730) 

Buffinton  v.  Maxam  (152  Mass.  477) 
Bufford  v.  Johnson  (34  N.  II.  489) 
Buffum  v.  Havnes  (68  Vt.  534) 

v.  Sparhawk  (20  N.  H.  81)         165,  1200 

Buford  v.  McKee  (3  B.  Mon.  224)    1022,  1040 

1097 

439 

1123 

861 


991 
1110 

23, 

225 
1233 

857 
1203 


Bugbee  v.  Sargent  (23  Me.  269) 

v.  Surrogate  (2  Cow.  471) 

Buie  v.  Pollock  (55  Miss.  309) 
Building  Assn.  v.  King  (83  Cal.  440) 
Bultinch  v.  Benner  (64  Me.  404)  858 

Bull  v.  Bull  (8  Conn.  47)  923,  924 

r.  Fuller  (78  Iowa,  20)  365 

v.  Harris  (31  111.  487)  8G3 

v.  Kv.  Bank  (90  Kv.  452)  956 

Bullard,  In  re  (116  Cal. "355)  844 

v.  Attornev-General  (153  Mass.  249)  354 

v.  Benson  (1  Dem.  486)  1007 

v.  Benson  (31  Hun,  104)  273 

v.  Briggs  (7  Pick.  533)  242 

v.  Chandler  (149  Mass.  532)         354,  934 

v.  Moor  (158  Mass.  418)      687,  820,  12G7 

v.  Perry  (66  Vt.  479)  820 

v.  Shirley  (153  Mass.  559)  950,  954 

Bullion  v.  Campbell  (27  Tex.  653)  804 

Bullock's  Estate  (75  Cal.  419)  1128 

Bullock  v.  Bullock  (2  Dev.  Eq.  307)  902 

v.  Rogers  (16  Vt.  294)     '  385,  650 

Bundrick  v.  Havgood  (106  N.  C.  465)  81,  83 
Bundy  v.  McKnight  (48  Ind.  502)  31,  43 

Bunn  v.  Markham  (7  Taunt.  224)       121,  125 

v.  Todd  (115  N.  C.  138)  1271 

Bunnel  v.  Witherow  (29  Ind.  123)  608 

Bunnell  v.  Post  (25  Minn.  376)  1156 

Buntin  v.  Johnso  i  (28  La.  An.  796)  70 

v.  Root  (66  Minn.  454)  1090 

Burbank's  Will  (69  Iowa,  378)  948 

Burbank  v.  Payne  (17  La.  An.  15)      360,  693 

v.  SweeneV  (161  Mass.  490)  948 

v.  Whitney  (24  Pick.  146)  912 

Burch  v.  Atchison  (82  Kv.  585)  199 

v.  Burch  (19  Ga.  174)  513,  742 

Burek halter  v.  Planter's   Bank   (100  Ga. 

428)  175.  187 

Burckhartt  v.  Heffrich    (77    Mo.   381)     781, 

1243 
Burden  v.  Burden  (141  Ind.  471)  269 

Burdett  v.  Silsbee  (15  Tex.  604)  1080 

v.  Wrighte  (2  B.  &  Al.  710)  919 

Burdick,  In  re  (76  Cal.  639)  198 

Burdick,  In  re  (112  Cal.  387)  279 

Burdvne  v.  Mackev  (7  Mo.  374)  367,  622 

Burfoot  v.  Burfoot  (2  Leigh,  119)  949 

Burford  v.  Steele  (80  Ala.  147)  847 

Burge  v.  Brutton  (2  Hare,  373)  787 

t>.  Hamilton  (72  Ga.  568)        86,  483,  484 

Burger  v.  Hill  (1  Bradf.  360)  469,  484 
Burgess  v.  Burgess  (109  Pa.  St.  312)  58 
v.  Wheate  (1  Wm.  Bl.  123;  s.  c.  1 

Eden,  177)  304 

Burgle  v.  Sparks  (11  Lea,  84)  826 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Burgoyne  v.  Showier  (1  Rob.  5) 
Burgwin  v.  Hostler  (1  Tavl.  75) 
Burk  v.  Baxter  (3  Mo.  207) 

v.  Gleason  (46  Fa.  St.  297) 

o.  Jones  (13  Ala.  167) 

Burke  v.  Adams  (80  Mo.  504) 

v.  Burke  (34  Mich.  451) 

v.  Colbert  (144  Mass.  160) 

v.  Coolidge  (35  Ark.  180) 

v.  Nolan  (1  Dem.  436) 

■ v.  Stiles  (65  N.  H.  163) 

v.  Terrv  (28  Conn.  414) 

v.  Wilder  (1  McCord  Ch.  551) 

Burkett  v.  Whittemore  (36  S.  C.  428)  27 

Burkhalter  v.  Burkhalter  (88  Ind.  368)  268 
Burkhart  v.  Gladish  (123  Ind.  337)  31,  41 
Burkhead  v.  Colson  (2  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  77)  992, 

1247 
Burkholder's  Appeal  (105  Pa.  St.  31) 
Burks  v.  Bennett  (62  Tex.  277) 

v.  Osborn  (9  B.  Mon.  579) 

Burleigh  v.  Clough  (52  N.  H.  267) 

v.  Coffin  (22  N.  H.  118) 

Burlevson  v.  Whiilev  (97  N.  C.  295) 
Burlington  v.  Fosby"(6  Vt.  83) 
Burnell's  Estate  (13  Phila.  387) 
Burnell  v.  Maloney  (36  Vt.  636) 
Burnes  v.  Burton  (1  A.  K.  Marsh.  349) 
Burnet  v.  Burnet  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  595) 
Burnett  v.  Lyford  (93  Cal.  114) 

v.  Mead'ows  (7  B.  Mon.  277) 

v.  State  (14  Tex.  455) 

v.  Strong  (26  Miss.  116) 

Burnev,  Ex  parte  (29  Ga.  33) 
Burnham  v.  Ayer  (35  N.  H.  351) 

v.  Burnham  (79  Wis.  557) 

v.  Comfort  (37  Hun,  216) 

v.  Comfort  (108  N.  Y.  535) 

v.  Lasselle  (35  Ind.  425) 

v.  Porter  (24  N.  H.  570) 

Burnley  v.  Duke  (1  Rand.  108) 

v.  Duke  (2  Rob.  Va.  102) 

Bnrns's  Estate  (54  Cal.  223) 
Burns  v.  Allen  (93  Tenn.  149) 

v.  Burns  (4  Serg.  &  R.  295) 

».  Clark  (37  Barb.  490) 

v.  Cox  (10  Phila.  8) 

v.  Grand  R.  R.   Co.    (15    N.   East 

230)  629,  630 

v.  Hamilton  (33  Ala.  210)  1077 

v.  Keas  (20  Iowa,  1(J)  1200 

V.  Keas  (21  Iowa,  257)  195,  203 

v.  Travis  (117  Ind.  44)  96 

1\  Van  Loan  (29  La.  An.  560)     450,  401 

Bumside's  Succession  (34  La.  An.  728)     400, 

581,  944 
Lurnside  v.  Robertson  (28  S.  C.  583)         551, 

1137,  1249 

v.  Savier  (6  Oreg.  154)  295 

Burr,  Matter  of  (2  Barb.  Ch.  208)  39 

—  v.  McEwen  (Baldw.  154)  1146 

v.  Sherwood  (3  Bradf.  85)  639,  641 

v.  Smith  (7  Vt.  241) 

Hurra-"  V.  Briggfl  (120  .Mass.  103) 

Burris  v.  Adams  ('Mi  Cal.  664) 

v.  Kennedy  (108  Cal.  331)    323,  324,  329 

380,  337,  3-12,  1030,  1090 

v.  Page  (12  Mo.  368)  232 

Burrough    <.  Adame  (78  Ind.  160)  158 

—  v.  McLain  (37  towa,  l«:i)  846 
Burrow  v.  B  irrow  (98  [owa,  400)  23 

lii 


94 

287 

602 

190 

852 

244 

145 

28 

1151,  1186 

476 

968 

795,  1195 

898 


610 
838 
256 
949 
642 
953 
156 

1142 
622 

1125 
944 

1151 
443 
336 
952 

1168 

94 

951 

973,  978 

103,  978 

621 

259 

537,  567 

568 

1198 

111 

89 

951 

1141 


921,  929 

140 

10.S1I 


•Page 

Burrow  v.  Ragland  (6  Humph.  481)  497 

Bursen  v.  Goodspeed  (60  111.  277)      205,  214, 

1025,  1028,  1076 

Burt  v.  Burt  (41  N.  Y.  46)  739 

v.  Cook  Co.  (10  Mont.  571)  274 

i).  Herron  (66  Pa.  St.  400)  876 

v.  Randlett  (59  N.  H.  130)  136,  205 

Burtch  v.  Elliott  (3  Ind.  99)  632 

Burton's  Estate  (63  Cal.  36)  216 

Estate  (64  Cal.  428)  216,  346 

Burton,  In  re  (93  Cal.  459)  345,  1235 

v.  Burton  (4  Harr.  73)  565 

v.  Burton  (26  How.  Pr.  474)  226 

v.  Hintrager  (18  Iowa,  348)  595 

v.  Lockert  (9  Ark.  411)  1268 

v.  Mill  (78  Va.  468)  210 

v.  Newbery  (L.  R.  1  Ch.  D.  234)        101 

v.  Rutherford  (49  Mo.  255)  819 

v.  Scott  (3  Rand.  399)  42 

v.  Spiers  (87  N.  C.  87)  211,  212 

Burtonshaw  v.  Gilbert  (1  Cowp.  49)  89 

Burwell  v.  Cawood  (2  How.  560)         281,  282 

v.  Corbin  (1  Rand.  131)  69,  473 

v.  Shaw  (2  Bradf.  322)  565 

Buscher  v.  Knapp  (107  Ind.  340)    1219,  1220, 

1223 
Bush's  Appeal  (33  Pa.  St.  85) 

Appeal  (102  Pa.  St.  502) 

Bush  v.  Adams  (22  Fla.  177) 


v.  Barrow  (78  Tex.  5) 

v.  Bradley  (4  Dav,  298) 

v.  Bush  (5  Del.  Ch.  144) 

v.  Bush  (5  Houst.  245) 

v.  Bush  (87  Mo.  480) 

v.  Clark  (127  Mass.  Ill) 

v.  Lindsev  (44  Cal.  121) 

v.  Lisle  (89  Kv.  393) 

Bushee  v.  Freeborn  (11  K.  I.  149) 

v.  Surles  (77  N.  C.  62) 

Bushnell  v.  Carpenter  (92  N.  Y.  270) 

v.  Dennison  (13  Fla.  77) 

Buss  v.  Buss  (75  Mich.  163) 
Buster  v.  Newkirk  (20  John.  75) 
Bute  v.  Kneale  (109  111.  652) 
Butler's  Estate  (38  N.  Y.  397) 
Butler  v.  Benson  (1  Barb.  526) 

1?.  Butler  (3  Barb.  Ch.  304) 

v.  Butler  (5  Hair.  178) 

v.  Emmett  (8  Pai.  12) 

v.  Fitzgerald  (43  Neb.  192) 

v.  Huestis  (68  III.  594) 

v.  Ives  (139  Mass.  202) 

v.  Jarvis  (117  N.  Y.  115) 

v.  Johnson  (41  Hun,  206) 

r.  Johnson  (111  N.  Y.  204) 


817 
548 

713,  805,  841, 
861 
825 
277 
220 
236 
490 

187,  290,  293 
343 


47 

1004 

1247 

941 

1239 

1200 

596 

248 

665 

472 


484 

1072 

240,  201 

900 

609 

1201 

843 

845,  1155, 

1247,  1248 

340,  815,  844 

399 


v.  Lawson  (72  Mo.  227) 

v.  Perrott  (1  Dem.  9) 

v.  Ralston  (69  Ga.  485)  898 

v.  Rickets  (11  Iowa,  107)  609 

v.  Smith  (20  Oreg.  126)        237,  596,  712 

Butman  v.  Porter  (100  Mass.  337)  264 

Butterfield  v.  Haskins  (33  Me.  392)  881 

—  v.  Stanton  (44  Miss.  15)  611 
Butterlv's  Succession  (10  La.  An.  258)  1166 
Button  v.  Am.  Tract  Societv  (23  Vt.  336)  892 
Buttrick  r.  King  (7  Met.  20)  392,  1070 
Butts  v.  Genung  (5  Pai.  254)                      1266 

—  v.  Phelps  (79  Mo.  302]  830 
v.  Trice  (69  Ga.  74)  265 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Byerly  v.  Donlin  (72  Mo.  270) 


*  Page 

537,  1132, 

1133 

Byers  v.  Hoppe  (61  Md.  206)  61,  77 

— -  v.  McAuley  (149  U.  S.  608)  10,  338,  357 

v.  McCartney  (62  Iowa,  339)  923 

Byng  v.  Byng  (10  H.  L.  Cas.  171)  590 

Bynum  v.  "Bvnum  (11  Ired.  L.  632)  57 

Byrain  v.  By  ram  (27  Vt.  295)  215,  1198 

Byrd  v.  Bvfd  (28  Miss.  141)  844 

v.  Byrd  (117  N.  C.  523)  430 

v.  Governor  (2  Mo.  102)  1152 

v.  Jones  (84  Ala.  336)  1039,  1155 

v.  Wells  (40  Miss   711)  844,  1144 

Bvrn  v.  Fleming  (3  Head,  658)  822 

Byrne  v.  Byrne  (3  S.  &  K.  54)  975 

v.  Hume  (84  Mich.  185)  351 

v.  Hume  (86  Mich.  546)  965 

v.  McDow  (23  Ala.  404)  863 

v.  Stewart  (3  Des.  135)  516 

Byrnes  v.  Dibble  (3  Redf.  383)  519 

v.  Sexton  (62  Minn.  135)  863 

v.  Stilwell  (103  N.  Y.  453)  878,  942 


Caballero's  Succession  (25  La.  An.  646)  1125 
Cabannc5  v.  Skinker  (56  Mo.  357)  362,  363,  650 
Cabells  v.  Puryear  (27  Grat.  902)  1222 

Cables  v.  Prescott  (67  Me.  582)  146,  647 

Cabouret's  Succession  (9  La.  An.  520)  1190 
Cade  v.  Davis  (96  N.  C.  139)  1239 

Cadell  v.  Palmer  (7  Bli.  202 ;  1  CI.  &  Fin. 

372)  915 

Cadman  v.  Richards  (13  Neb.  383)  402 

Cadmus  v.  Jackson  (52  Pa.  St.  295)  1073 

Cadv  v.  Bard  (21  Kan.  667)  369 

'-  v.  Cady  (67  Miss.  425)  1098 

Caeman  v.  Van  Harke  (33  Kan.  333)  95,  98 
Cager,  Matter  of  (111  N.  Y.  343)  691  a 

Cahalan,  In  re  (70  Cal.  604)  1130 

Cahill  v.  Russell  (140  N.  Y.  402)  593 

Caig,  Ex  parte  (T.  U.  P.  Charlt.  159)  522 
Cain  v.  Chicago  &  R.  I.  R.  R.  (54  Iowa, 

255)  217 

v.  Haas  (18  Tex.  616)  523 

v.  McGeentv  (41  Minn.  194)  1084 

v.  Warford"(7  Md.  282)  752 

Caires  v.  Judge  (43  La.  An.  1133)  1266 

Cairns  v.  Chaubert  (9  Pai.  160)  1173 

Calahan's  Estate  (60  Cal.  232)  1192,  1197 

Calanan  v.  McClure  (47  Barb.  206)    805,  806, 

842 
Calder  v.  Curry  (17  R.  I.  610)  1104 

Calder  v.  Pvfer  (2  Cr.  C.  C.  430)  744,  751 
Calderwood"  v.  Tevis  (23  Cal.  335)  200 

Caldwell  v.  Anderson  (104  Pa.  St.  199)        50 

v.  Caldwell  (7  Bush,  515)  892 

v.  Caldwell  (45  Oh.  St.  512)      340,  1086 

v.  Harding  (5  Blatchf.  501)  363 

».  Hawkins  (73  Mo.  456)  300 

v.  Kinkead  (1  B.  Mon.  228)        941,  975 

v.  Lockridge  (9  Mo.  362)  333 

v.  Mc Vicar  (12  Ark.  746)  684 

■ v.  Renfrew  (33  Vt.  213)  118 

Calhoun's  Estate  (6  Watts,  185)  707,  708 

Succession  (28  La.  An.  323)  580 

Calhoun  v.  Crossgrove  (33  La.  1001)  150, 

1216 

• v.  Fletcher  (63  Ala.  574)     713,  714,  1142 

v.  King  (5  Ala.  523)  370,  371 

v.  McLendon  (42  Ga.  405)  182 

Calkins,  In  re  (112  Cal.  296)  490 


*  Page 
Calkins  v.  Johnston  (20  Oh.  St.  539)        1031 

v.  Smith  (41  Mich.  409)  720 

Call  v.  Ewing  (1  Blackf.  301)  558,  738 

v.  Houdlette  (70  Me.  308)  645,  829 

Callaghan  v.  Hall  (1  Serg.  &  R.  241)      1159, 

1176 
Callahan's  Estate  (119  Cal.  470)  110 
Callahan,  Matter  of  (152  N.  Y.  320)  349,  812 
Callahan's  Guardian  (Tuck.  62)  1250 
Callahan  v.  Griswold  (9  Mo.  784  )  397,  1033 
Calloway  v.  Gilmer  (36  Ala.  354)  1083 
Calines  u.  McCracken  (8  S.  C.  87)  211,  238 
Calvert  v.  Boullemet  (46  La.  An.  1132)  1234 
v.  Holland  (9  B.  Mon.  458)     1137,  1140, 

1157 

v.  Marlow  (18  Ala.  67)  286 

v.  Williams  (9  Gill,  172)  1203 

Calvit  v.  Calvit  (32  Miss.  124)  188 

Calyer  v.  Calyer  (4  Redf.  305)  345,  346,  1142 
Cambridge  v. 'Lexington  (1  Pick.  505)  224 
Camden  v.  Plain  (91  Mo.  117)  330,  1059, 

1060 
Camden  Co.  v.  Ingham  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  3)      28, 

466,  510 
Camden  Mutual  Association  v.  Jones  (23 

N.  J.  Eq.  171)  264 

Cameron  v.  Burlington  (56  Iowa,  320)        691 

v.  Cameron  (82  Ala.  392)  436 

v.  Cameron  (15  Wis.  1)  559,  669 

v.  Morris  (83  Tex.  14)  196,  115*4 

v.  Wurtz  (4  McCord,  278)  777 

Cameto  v.  Dupuv  (47  Cal.  79)  199,  216 

Camp's  Appeal  (36  Conn.  88)  124 

Estate  (74  Mo.  192)  1138 

Estate  (6  Mo.  App.  563)  1138 

Camp  v.  Camp  (18  Hun,  217)  1215 

v.  Crocker  (54  Conn.  21)  921 

v.  Elliott  (38  111.  App.  337)  714 

v.  Grant  (21  Conn.  41)  287,  865 

v.  Shaw  (52  111.  App.  241)         51,  93,  94 

Campau's  Appeal  (48  Mich.  236)  1209 

Campau  v.  Campau  (25  Mich.  127)      712,  714 

v.  Gillett  (1  Mich.  416)  1050 

Campbell's  Appeal  (64  Conn.  277)  23,  159 
Campbell,  Appellant  (2  Dougl.  141)  230 

Estate  of  (Tuck.  240)  1061 

Goods  of  (2  Hagg.  555)  406 

In  re  (12  Wis.  369)  1120 

v.  Baldwin  (6  Blackf.  364)  643 

v.  Beaumont  (91  N.  Y.  464)  999 

v.  Browder  (7  Lea,  240)  24 

v.  Brown  (6  How.  Miss.  230)  1080 

v.  Brown  (64  Iowa,  425)  367 

v.  Campbell  (130  111.  466)  31,  477 

v.  Campbell  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  315)  234 

v.  Clark  (64  N.  II.  328)  895 

v.  Johnson  (41  Oh.  St.  588)  653,  654 

v.  Johnston  (1  Sandf.  Ch.  148)  636 

v.  Knights  (26  Me.  224)  1046 

v.  Logan  (2  Bradf.  90)  71,  498 

v.  McDonald  (11  Watts,  179)  953 

v.  Mesier  (4  John.  Ch.  334)  675 

v.  Miller  (38  Ga.  304)  699 

v.  Moore  (15  111.  App.  129)  258 

i).  Murphv  (2  Jones  Eq.  357)        260,  274 

v.  Owens'(32  La.  An.  265)  1048 

v.  Porter  (162  U.  S.  478)  467,  501 

v.  Purdv  (5  Redf.  434)  761 

v.  Rawdon  (18  N.  Y.  412)  872 

v.  Renwick  (2  Bradf.  80)  1033 

v.  Sheldon  (13  Pick.  8)  363,  492 

liii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 

Campbell  v.  Thatcher  (54  Barb.  382)  332 

v.  Tousey  (7  Cow.  64)  363,  374,  415, 

422,  649 

v.  Wallace  (10  Grav,  162)  492 

v.  Winston  (2  Hen.  &  M.  10)  1127 

v.  Young  (3  How.  Miss.  301) 

Camptield  v.  Ely  (13  N.  J.  L.  150) 
Canada's  Appeal  (47  Conn.  450) 
Candler  v.  Candler  (2  Dem.  124) 

v.  Dinkle  (4  Watts,  143) 

Candor's  Appeal  (5  W.  &  S.  513) 
Canfield  v.  Bentlev  (12  Atl.  655) 
v.  Bostwick  (21  Conn.  550) 


760, 


765 

70 

949 

942 

825 

834 

889,  940, 

1149,  1187 

-  o.  Canfield  (4  Dem.  Ill)  86,  95 

Cann  v.  Cann  (40  W.  Va.  138)      59,  822,  845 

Cannon  v.  Apperson  (14  Lea,  553)      269,  705, 

951,  953,  1008,  1103,  1138,  1139,  1151 

■ v.  Bonner  (38  Tex".  487)  215 

v.  Crook  (32  Md.  482)  680 

v.  Jenkins  (1  Dev.  Eq.  422)  696 

r.  Ulmer  (Bai.  Eq.  204)  990 

v.  Windsor  (1  Houst.  143)  463,  823 

Canole  v.  Hurt  (78  Mo.  649)  197 

Cantelou  v.  Whitley  (85  Ala.  247)  1245 

Canterbury  v.  Tappen  (8  B.  &  C.  151)      1212 
Cantine  0.  Phillips  (5  Harr.  428)  823 

Cantrell  v.  Conner  (51  How.  Pr.  45)  181 

Cantrill  v.  Risk  (7  Bush,  158)  247 

Cape  Co.,  In  re  (16  Atl.  191)  690 

Capek  v.  Kropik  (129  111.  509)  201,  203 

Capen  v.  Skinner  (139  Mass.  190)  1200 

Capper's  Will  (85  Iowa,  83)  493 

Capper  v.  Siblev  (65  Iowa,  754)  342 

Capron  v.  Capron  (6  Mack.  340)  950 

Caraway  v.  Smith  (28  Ga.  541)  81 

Card  v.  Grinman  (5  Conn.  164)  93 

Care  v.  Keller  (77  Pa.  St.  487)  274 

Carey's  Estate  (49  Vt.  236)  104 

Carev  v.  Dennis  (13  Md.  1)  1036 

v.  Goodinge  (3  Bro.  C.  C.  97)  652 

v.  Guillow  (105  Mass.  18)  422,  424 

v.  Monroe  (54  N.  J.  Eq.  632)      171,  177, 

178 

v.  Reed  (82  Md.  383)  576 

v.  West  (139  Mo.  140)  1060,  1080 

Carhart  v.  Vann  (46  Ga.  389)  1072 

Carl's  Appeal  (106  Pa.  St.  635)  87,  911 

Carl  v.  Gabel  (120  Mo.  283)  37,  47 

v.  Poelman  (12  La.  An.  344)  429 

Carleton  r.  Ashburnham  (102  Mass.  348)     691 
Carlisle  v.  Burlev  (3  Me.  250)  643,  674 

v.  Mulhern"(19  Mo.  56)  289 

Carlton  v.  B\-ers  (70  N.  C.  691)  1040 

v.  Carlton  (40  N.  H.  14)  72 

Carlton  v.  Davant  (58  Ga.  451)  1073 

Carhle  v.  Cannon  (3  Rawle,  489)  1102 

CarlVsle  r.  Carlysle  (10  Md.  440)  342 

Carmichael,  In  re  (36  Ala.  514)  41 

v.  Carmichael  (5  Humph.  96)  274 

v.  Carmichael  (72  Mich.  76)  57 

v.  Carmichael  (2  Phill.  Ch.  101)        420 

v.  Foster  (69  Ga.  372)  1084,  1086 

i'.  Latbrop  (10S  Mich.  473)  978 

v.  Bay  (5  [red.  Eq.  365)  375 

v.  Ray  (1  Rich.  216)  359 

v.  State  (12  Oh.  St.  553)  222 

Carnall  v.  Wilson  (21  Ark.  62)    254,  260,  714 
Carnan  v.  Turner  (6  H.  &  J.  05)  1033 

Carney  p.  Carney  (95  Mo.  353)  825 

v.  Kain  (40  W.  Va.  758)  945 

liv 


*  Page 
Carnochan  v.  Abrahams  (T.  U.  P.  Charlt. 

196)  526,  1208 

Carnwright  v.  Gray  (127  N.  Y.  92)  61 

Carolina  Bank  v.  Wallace  (13  S.  C.  347, 


353) 


686 

821 

525,  5^  2 

11!  ; 

41 

41,  4.' 

J    I 

87!i.  8    i 


Carondelet  v.  Desnoyer  (27  Mo.  36) 
Carow  v.  Mowatt  (2  Edw.  Ch.  57JL 
Carpenter,  In  re  (73  Cat.  202) 

In  re  (79  Cal.  382) 

In  re  (94  Cal.  400) 

Carpenter's  Estate  (170  Pa.  St.  203) 
Carpenter  v.  Boulden  (48  Md.  122) 

v.  Brownlee  (38  Miss.  200) 

v.  Cah-ert  (83  III.  62) 

v.  Cameron  (7  Watts,  51) 

v.  Denoon  (29  Oh.  St.  379) 

v.  Dodge  (20  Vt.  595) 

v.  Fopper  (94  Wis.  146) 

v.  Garrett  (75  Va.  129) 

v.  Going  (20  Ala.  587) 

v.  Gray  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  692) 

v.  Hea'rd  (14  Pick.  449) 

v.  Murphy  (57  Wis.  541) 

v.  Probate  Judge  (48  Mich.  318)  555,  556 

».  Solicitor  (L.  R.  7  P.  D.  235)  557 

v.  Strange  (141  U.  S.  87)  360,361 

v.  Van  Olinder  (127  III.  42)  901 

Carper  v.  Crowt  (159  111.  465)     272,  941,  943. 


35,3: 
405, 


270, 


.  :;s 

503 

4    I 

lL't 

:  14 

2;  7 
427 
580 
881 
82:> 


1016 

581 

953 

221 

728 

452,  453,  462 

295,  301 

898 

277 

872 

431,  1265 

359,  1247 


201 

82 

899 

1084 


Carr's  Estate  (25  Cal.  585) 

Estate  (138  Pa.  St.  352) 

Carr  v.  Brady  (04  Ind.  28) 

v.  Branch  (85  Va.  597) 

v.  Brown  (38  Atl.  R.  9) 

v.  Catlin  (13  Kan.  393) 

v.  Estill  (16  B.  Mon.  309) 

v.  Giyens  (9  Bush,  679) 

v.  Green  (2  McCord,  75) 

v.  Huette  (73  Ind.  378) 

v.  Lowe  (7  Heisk.  84) 

Carrick  v.  Carrick  (23  N.  J.  Eq.  364)  '  744 
Carriere's  Succession  (34  La.  An.  1056)  1198 
Carrigan  v.  Rowell  (96  Tenn.  185)      199,  208, 

1029 
Carriger,  In  re  (107  Cal.  618) 
Carroll  v.  Bonhnm  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  625) 

v.  Carroll  (20  Tex.  731) 

v.  Cockerham  (38  La.  An.  813) 

v.  Connet  (2  J.  J.  Marsh.  195)   394,  513, 

609 

v.  Hanse  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  269)  50 

v.  Htue  (21  La.  An.  561)  582 

v.  Lee  (3  G.  &  J.  504)  607 

Carrolton  v.  Rhomberg  (78  Mo.  547)  '  626 
Carruthers  v.  Bailey  (3  Ga.  105)  622,  672 

Carson  v.  Carson  (1  Met.  Ky.  300)      149.  940 

v.  McFadden  (10  Iowa',  91) 

i'.  Murray  (3  Pai.  483) 

Carswell  v.  Spencer  (44  Ala.  204) 
Carter  v.  Anderson  (4  Ga.  516) 

o.  Balfour  (19  Ala.  814) 

1>.  Barnadiston  (1  P.  Wins.  505) 

v.  Carter  (39  Ala.  579) 

v.  Carter  (10  B.  Mon.  327)  384,  410,  567 

v.  Christie  (57  Kans.  492)  295,  356,  1123, 

1124 

v.  Crawley  (T.  Rvan,  496) 

v.  Cutting  (5  Munf.  223) 

t\  Dixon  (69  Ga.  82) 

v.  Edmonds  (80  Va.  58) 

v.  Dinkle  (13  Ala.  529) 


624 
253,  205 

356 
1259 

932 
1106 

957 


148 

1170,  1191 

34,  50 

1124 

177 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 

Carter  v.  Lowell  (76  Me.  342)  873 

v.  McMauua  (15  La.  An.  67G)  1031, 1054 

v.  National  Bank  (71  Me.  448)   38(i,  387, 

693 

v.  Parker  (28  Me.  509)  261 

v.  Randolph  (47  Tex.  376)  198,  199,  214, 

1075 

v.  Robbins  (8  Rich.  29)  416 

v.  Waugh  (42  Ala.  452)  1062 

v.  Worrell  (96  N.  C  358)  1098 

Carthey  v.  Webb  (2  Murph.  268)  522 

Cartwright  v.  Cartwright  (4  Hayw.  134)  677, 

1247 

v.  Cartwright  (1  Phillim.  90)  36 

Caruth  v.  Anderson  (24  Miss.  60)  326 

Caruthers  v.  Caruthers  (2  Lea,  264)  725 

v.  Corbin  (38  Ga.  75)  774,  1157 

v.  Mardis  (3  Ala.  599)  736 

Carver's  Estate  (25  N.  Y.  Supp.  991)  691  a 
Carver  v.  Lewis  (104  Ind.  438)  1126 

v.  Wells  (17  R.  I.  688)  853 

Cary  v.  Simmons  (87  Ala.  524)  1153 

Case,  In  re  (4  Dem.  124)  69 

v.  Abeel  (1  Pai.  393)    283,  290,  291,  292, 

739 


v.  Case  (Kirby,  284) 

v.  Dennison  (9  K.  I.  88) 

v.  Hall  (52  Oh.  St.  24) 

v.  Miracle  (54  Wis.  295) 

v.  Phelps  (39  N.  Y.  164) 

v.  Towle  (8  Pai.  479) 

Casebolt  v.  Donaldson  (67  Mo.  308) 
Casev,  Ex  parte  (71  Cal.  269) 

'v.  Ault  (4  Wash.  167) 

v.  Casey  (55  Vt.  518) 

v.  Gardiner  (4  Bradf.  13) 

v.  Inloes  (1  Gill,  430) 

v.  Murphy  (7  Mo.  App.  247) 

Cash  v.  Dickens  (2  Lea,  254) 

v.  Lust  (142  Mo.  630) 

Cashman's  Estate  (134  111.  88) 
Caskie  v.  Harrison  (76  Va.  85) 
Cason  v.  Cason  (31  Miss.  578) 


1099 

121 

952,  1099 


390 

610 

1208 

211 

681 

860 

952 

513 

309 

1033 

852 

500 

730 

558 

1127,  1128, 

1230 

553,  554, 

589 

Casperson  v.  Dunn  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  87)  354,  672 
Cass  v.  Thompson  (IN.  H.  65)  233 

Cassatt  v.  Vogel  (94  Mo.  646)  818 

Cassidy's  Succession  (40  La.  An.  827)  1194 
Cassily  v.  Meyer  (4  Md.  1)  375 

Castlebury  v.  Mavnard  (95  N.  C.  281)  204 
Caston  v.  Caston  "(2  Rich.  Eq.  1)  271,  274 
Castor  v.  Jones  (86  Ind.  289)  61 

Castro  v.  Richardson  (18  Cal.  478)  498 

Catham  v.  State  (2  Head,  553)  307 

Cathey  v.  Kerr  (15  La.  An.  228)  1190 

Catholic  Association  v.  Firnane  (50  Mich. 


Casoni  v.  Jerome  (58  N.  Y.  315) 


82) 


156 
65 

643 
1197 

469 
1234 


Catlett  v.  Catlett  (55  Mo.  330) 
Catlin  v.  Underhill  (4  McLean,  337) 
Catterson's  Appeal  (100  Pa.  St.  9) 
Cauffmann  v.  Long  (82  Pa.  St.  72) 
Caujolle  v.  Ferrie  (13  Wall.  465) 
Cauley  v.  Truitt  (63  Mo.  App.  356)  345,  1208 
Caulfield  v.  Sullivan  (85  N.  Y.  153)  60,  495 
Caulkins  v.  Bolton  (98  N.  Y.  511)  749 

Cave  v.  Cave  (2  Vern.  508)  604 

Cavendish  v.  Fleming  (3  Munf.  198)         1165 
Caviness  v.  Rushton  (101  Ind.  500)  58 

Cawlev's  Estate  (136  Pa.  St.  628)  57 


Cawltield  v.  Brown  (45  Ala.  552) 


Cawood  v.  Wolfley  (56  Kans.  281) 
Cawthon  v.  Coppedge  (1  Swan,  487) 
Cawthorn  v.  Jones  (73  Ala.  82) 
Cawthorne  v.  Haynes  (24  Mo.  236) 
Cayuga  Bank  v.  Bennett  (5  Hill,  236) 


•Page 
1215,  1242 


780 

1221 

1133 

490 

686, 

736 

Cazassa  v.  Cazassa  (92  Tenn.  573)  1219,  1221 
Cecil  v.  Cecil  (19  Md.  72)  1193,  1254 

v.  Rose  (17  Md.  92)  809,  994 

Central  Bank  v.  Little  (11  Ga.  346)  773 

Central  Park  Extension  (16  Abb.  Pr.  56)  240 
Chace  v.  Chace  (6  R.  I.  407)  111 

Chadboum  v.  Chadbourn  (9  Allen,  173)  685 
Chadbourne  v.  Rackliff  (30  Me.  354)  1050 
Chaddick  v.  Haley  (81  Tex.  617)  48 

Chadsev  v.  Fuller  (6  Mack,  117)  642 

Chadwell  v.  Chadwell  (98  Ky.  643)  808,  825 
Chadwick  v.  Chadwick  (13  Pac.  R.  385)     353 

v.  Cornish  (26  Minn.  28)  831 

v.  Tatum  (9  Mont.  354)  982 

Chafee  v.  Maker  (17  R.  I.  739)  1239 

Chaffee  v.  Baptist  Miss.  Convention  (10 
Pai.  85)  66.  71 

v.  Franklin  (11  R.  I.  578)  237,  596 

Chaffin  v.  Hanes  (4  Dev.  L.  103)  789 

Chafin  Will  Case  (32  Wis.  557)  34 

Chalker  v.  Chalker  (5  Redf.  480)  761 

Chalmers's  Estate  (64  Cal.  77)  216 

Chalmers  v.  Turnipseed  (21  S.  C.  126)       196. 

214,  217 

v.  Wingfield  (L.  R.  36  Ch.  D.  400)      443 

Chambe  v.  Judge  (100  Mich.  112)  691  a 

Chamberlain,  Matter  of  (140  N.  Y.  390)    597, 

598,  599 
Chamberlain  v.  Chamberlain  (43  N.  Y. 
424)  273,  912 

v.  Dunlop  (126  N.  Y.  45)  686 

v.  Stearns  (111  Mass.  267)  933 

v.  Tavlor  (36  Hun,  24)  720 

v.  Tavlor  (105  N.  Y.  185)  728,  882 

v.  Williamson  (2  M.  &  Sel.  408)         617 

Chamberlavne  v.  Temple  (2  Rand.  384)  420 
Chamberlin  v.  Chamberlin  (4  Allen,  184)  1036 
Chambers's  Appeal  (11  Pa.  St.  436)  678,  1129 
Chambers  v.  Bum  pass  (72  N.  C.  429)  1000 
v.  City  of  St.  Louis  (29  Mo.  543)        910, 

913,  926 

v.  Davis  (15  B.  Mon.  522)  272 

f.  McPhaul  (55  Ala.  367)  199 

v.  Smith  (23  Mo.  174)  1269 

v.  Wright  (52  Ala.  444)  1228 

v.  Wright  (40  Mo.  482)  715 

Chamblee  v.  Broughton  (120  N.  C.  170)  900 
Champion  v.  Cayce  (54  Miss.  695)     843,  1032 

v.  Shumate  (90  Tex.  597)  175,  176 

Champlin  v.  Champlin  (16  R.  I.  314)  245 

Champney  v.  Blanchard  (39  N.  Y.  Ill)    117, 

123,  124 
Chancy  v.  Home  Soc.  (28  111.  App.  621)  58 
Chandler's  Appeal  (34  Wis.  505)  726 

Chandler  v.  Batchelder  (61  N.  H.  370)      1227 

v.  Chandler  (87  Ala.  300)  171,  187 

v.  Davidson  (6  Blackf.  367)         416,  419 

v.  Delaplaine  (4  Del.  Ch.  503)  723 

v.  Ferris  (1  Harr.  454)  36,  46 

v.  Hocket  (12  Iowa,  269)  782 

v.  Morrison  (123  Ind.  254)  1227 

v.  Rider  (102  Mass.  268)  719 

v.  Schoonover  (14  Ind.  324)  698 

■ v.  Thompson  (Hob.  265  6)  404 

lv 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*Page 
843,  1029 
154 
34 
1022 
268,  892 
951 


Chandler  t\  Wynne  (85  Ala.  301) 
Chaney  v.  Barker  (3  Baxt.  424) 

■ «>.  Bryan  (16  Lea,  63) 

v.  Grav  (7  Rob.  (La.)  144) 

Chapin  r.  Hill  (1  R.  I.  466) 

v.  Marvin  (12  Wend.  538) 

v.  Waters  (110  Mass.  195)  654 

v.  Waters  (116  Mass.  140)  1103 

Chaplin  v.  Sawyer  (35  Vt.  286)  205 

v.  Simmons  (7  T.  B.  Mon.  337)  257 

v.  Sullivan  (128  Ind.  50)  1110 

Chapman's  Appeal  (122  Pa.  St.  331)  842 

Chapman  v.  Allen  (56  Conn.  152)  972,  979 

v.  Pity  (30  S.  C.  549)  694 

v.  Fenwick  (4  Cr.  C.  C.  431)  991,  993 

i:  Haley  (43  N.  H.  300)  854 

r.  Hollister  (42  Cal.  462)  713 

v.  Kellogg  (102  Mass.  246)  609 

v.  Kimball  (83  Me.  389)  1015 

v.  Price  (83  Va.  392)  277 

v.  Robertson  (6  Pai.  627)  379 

v.  Schroeder  (10  Ga.  321)  230 

Chappel  v.  Averv  (6  Conn.  31)  951 
Chappelear  v.  Martin  (45  Oh.  St.  126)        432 

Chappell,  Ex  parte  (34  S.  C.  99)  758 

c.  Akin  (39  Ga.  177)  570 

■ v.  Brown  (1  Bai.  528)  632 

r.  Chappell  (7  Eccl.  R.  451)  520 

Charalean  v.  Woffenden  (1  Ariz.  243)         280 

Charles  v.  Hunnicutt  (5  Call,  311)  927 

v.  Jacobs  (9  S.  C.  295)  654 

Charlick's  Estate  (11  Abb.  N.  C.  56)  976 

Charlton's  Appeal  (34  Pa.  St.  473)  677 

Appeal  (88  Pa.  St.  476)  1242 

Chase's  Case  (1  Bland  Ch.  206)  248 

Chase  t>.  Allev  (82  Me.  234)  274 

v.  Bates"(81  Me.  182)  1200 

v.  Bradley  (26  Me.  531)  684 

v.  Chase  (2  Allen,  101)  906 

v.  Fitz  (132  Mass.  359)  624 

■ ».  Kittredge  (11  Allen,  49)  67,  68 

v.  Ladd  (153  Mass.  126)  948 

v.  Lamphere  (51  Hun,  524)  873 

■ v.  Lincoln  (3  Mass.  236)  473 

v.  Lockerman  (11  Gill  &  J.  185)        878, 

966,  1109 

v.  Peckham  (17  R.  I.  385)  938 

v.  Redding  (13  Grav,  418)   119,  127,  631 

v.  Ross  (36  Wis.  267)  330 

v.  Stockett  (72  Md.  235)  925 

v.  Webster  (168  Mass.  184)  184 

v.  Whiting  (30  Wis.  544)  326,  1089 

Chasmar  v.  Bucken  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  415)       895 

Chassaing  v.  Durand  (85  Md.  420)  906 

Chattanooga  v.  Adams  (81  Ga.  319)  417 

Chauncev's  Estate  (119  N.  Y.  77)  1002 

Chaworth  v.  Beech  (4  Ves.  556)  61 

Cheairs  v.  Smith  (37  Miss.  646)  952,  957 

Cheatham  v.  Burfoot  (9  Leigh,  580)  745, 1182 

v.  Carrington  (14  La.  An.  696)        815 

v.  Hatcher  (30  Grat.  56)  476 

v.  Jones  (68  N.  C.  153)  201 

Cheever  r.  Judge  (45  Mich.  6)  499,  1 11*4 

v.  Hora  (22  Ga.  600)  1058 

».North(106  Mich. 390)  100 

Chenault  v.  Chenault(88  Kv.  83)  938 

Chenery  v.  Davis  (  16  Gr:iv,  89)  1141 

Cheney's  Case  (5  Co.  68  b)  891 

Cheney  v.  Cheney  (73  Ga.  86)  167,  170 

v.  Belman  (71  Ga.  384)  893,  896 

Cherry  >'•  Jarratt  (25  Miss.  221)  1173 
]vi 


Cherry  v.  Spight  (28  Tex.  503) 
Cheshire  v.  Cheshire  (2  Dev.  &  B. 


•Pago 
366 
254) 
976  991 

v.  McCoy  (7  Jones  L.  376)  270',  271 

Chesnut  v.  Chesnut(15  111.  App.  442)235,  253 
Chesnutt  v.  McBride  (1  Heisk.  389)  796 

Chess's  Appeal  (4  Pa.  St.  52)  326 

Chester  v.  Chester  (L.  R.  12  Eq.  444)         910 

v.  Greer  (5  Humph.  26)  389,  991 

v.  Urwick  (23  Beav.  404)  976 

Chester  Co.  v.  Hayden  (83  Md.  104)  988 

Chetle  v.  Lees  (Carthew,  167)  336 

Chevalier  v.  Wilson  (1  Tex.  161)  1157 

Chever  v.  Cbing  (82  Cal.  68)  345,  1235 

Chew's  Appeal  (45  Pa.  St.  228)  959 

Estate  (2  Parsons,  153)  577 

Chew  v.  Chew  (3  Grant  Cas.  289)        570,  576 

v.  Chew  (1  Md.  163)  222 

v.  Keller  (100  Mo.  362)  878,  902 

v.  Nicklin  (45  Pa.  St.  84)  726 

Chewett  v.  Moran  (17  Fed.  R.  820)  1269,  1271 
Chewning  v.  Peck  (6  How.  Miss.  524)  855 
Chicago  &  E.  I.  R.  R.  v.  O'Connor  (119 

111.  586)  622 

Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  v.  Chisholm  (79 

111.  584)  905 

Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Railroad  v.  Gould  (64 
Iowa,  343)  526,  581 

v.  Wasserman  (22  Fed.  R.  872)  111 

Chicago  Dock  Co.  v.  Kinzie  (49  111.  289)  253 
Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Doyle  (60  Miss.  977) 

630 
Chick  v.  Farr  (31  S.  C.  463)  551 

Chidester  v.  Chidester  (42  Ind.  469)  807 

Chidgey  v.  Harris  (16  M.  &  W.  517)  992 

Chifflet  i'.  Willis  (74  Tex.  245)  189,  663 

Chighizola  v.  Le  Baron  (21  Ala.  406)  714 

Chilcott  v.  Hart  (23  Colo.  40)  882,  917 

Child  v.  Gratiot  (41  111.  357)  526 

v.  Pearl  (43  Vt.  224)  608 

Childers  v.  Bumgarner  (8  Jones  L.  297)     296 

v.  Childers  (21  Ga.  377)  901 

Children's  Aid  Society  v.  Loveridge  (70 

N.  Y.  387)  46 

Childress  v.  Bennett  (10  Ala.  751)  375 

Childs  o.  Russell  (11  Met.  16)  941 

v.  Updvke  (9  Oh.  St.  333)  685,  811 

Chinmark's  Estate  (Mvr.  128)  93,  1147 

Chinnubbee  v.  Nicks  (3  Port.  362)  226 

Chipman  v.  Montgomery  (63  N.  Y.  221)  1016 
Chism  v.  Williams  (29  Mo.  288)  916,  917 

Chisolm  i'.  Chisolm  (4  Rich.  Eq.  266)  1007 
Chittenden  v.  Knight  (2  Lee,  559)  526,  529 
Choate  v.  Arrington  (116  Mass.  552) 

c  O'Neal  (57  Ark.  299) 

v.  Thorndike  (138  Mass.  371) 

Chouteau  r.  R.  R.  (122  Mo.  375) 


1120 
297 
653 
239,  240, 
243,244 
684 
440 
714 


v.  Suvdam  (21  N.  Y.  179) 

Chow  v.  Brockway  (21  Oreg.  440) 
Chowning  o.  Stanfield  (49  Ark.  87) 
Chrisman  v.  Chrisman  (16  Oreg.  127)    31,  37, 

43 

v.  Divinia  (141  Mo.  122)  1246 

Christ's  Hosp.  v.  Grainger  (16  Sim.  83; 

8.  C.  1  Mac.  &  G.  460)  920 

Christian  v.  Clark  (10  Lea,  630)  434 

v.  Morris  (50  Ala.  585)  795 

Christie's  Succession  (20  La.  383)  185 

Clmstlcr  v.  Meddis  (6  B.  Mon.  35)  727 

Christman  v.  Siegfried  (5  W.  &.  S.  400)  1223 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


ChristofTerson  v.  Pfenig  (16  Wash.  491)     513 
Christopher  v.  Christopher  (Dick.  445)        105 

v.  Cox  (25  Miss.  102)  506 

Christophers  v.  Garr  (6  N.  Y.  61)  842 

Christy's  Appeal  (1  Grant  Cas.  369)        1214, 

1217,  1222 

Appeal  (110  Pa.  St.  538)  1196 

Succession  (6  La.  An.  427)  706 

Christv  v.  Badger  (72  Iowa,  581)  894 

v.  Vest  (36  Iowa,  285)  440,  442 

Chrvstie  v.  Phvfe  (19  N.  Y.  344)  871 

Church  o.  Church  (15  R.  I.  138)  938,  944 

v.  Howard  (79  N.  Y.  415)  794 

v.  Kemble  (5  Sim.  525)  1016 

v.  McLaren  (85  Wis.  122)  270 

v.  Olendorf  (49  Hun,  553)  844 

v.  Warren  Manuf.  Co.  (14  R.  I.  539)  890 

Churchill  t;.  Bovden  (17  Vt.  319)        375,  376, 

377 

v.  Churchill  (2  Met.  Kv.  466)  897 

v.  Corker  (25  Ga.  479)"  61 1 

v.  Monroe  (1  R.  I.  209)  252 

Cilley  v.  Cilley  (34  Me.  102)  37,  70 

Cincinnati  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Heaston  (43  Ind. 

172)  1207 
Ciples  v.  Alexander  (3  Brev.  558)  795 
v.  Alexander  (2  Const.  R ,  S.   C.    707) 

795 
Citizen's  Bank  v.  Mitchell  (18  R.  I.  739)  116 
Citizens'  Bank  v.  Sharp  (53  Md.  521)       365, 

391 
Citizens'  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ligon  (59  Miss. 

305)  283 

Citizens  R.  R.  v.  Robbins  (128  Ind.  499)   694, 

698,  704 
City  v.  Hardie  (43  La.  An.  251)  871,  923 

v.  Trompeter  (53  Kans.  150)  432 

Clack  r.  Clack  (20  Ala.  401)  1186 

Clarlin  v.  Behr  (89  Ala.  503)  283 

v.  Clarlin  (149  Mass.  19)  995 

Clagett  v.  Hawkins  (11  Md.  381)  498 

Claghorn's  Estate  (181  Pa.  St.  600)   757,  795, 

796,  843 

Estate  (181  Pa.  St.  608)       795,  796,  800 

Claiborne  v.  Yoeman  (15  Tex.  44)  1080 

Clancy  v.  Stephens  (92  Ala.  577)      256,  1024 
Clap,  In  re  (2  Low.  168)  282 

v.  Cofran  (7  Mass.  98)  553 

Clapp  v.  Beardsley  (1  Vt.  151)  595 

v.  Clapp  (44  Hun,  451)  758 

v.  Coble  (1  Dew  &  B.  Eq.  177)  1149 

v.  Fullertou  (34  N.  Y.  190)       34,  41,  479 

v.  Ingraham  (120  Mass.  200)  050 

v.  Mason  (94  U.  S.  589)  691  a 

v.  Meserole  (38  Barb.  001)  1154 

Clare  v.  Hedges  (3  W.  &  M.,  1  Lutw.  342) 

405 
Claritv  v.  Sheridan  (91  Iowa,  304)  1246 

Clark's  Appeal  (58  Conn.  207)  153,  154 

Clark's  Estate  (53  Cal.  355)  1138 

Estate  (5  N.  Y.  Supp.  190)  691  a 

Estate  (3  Redf.  225)  1045,  1048 

Succession  (11  La.  An.  124)  488 

Will  (Tuck.  445) 

Clark,  Matter  of  (40  Hun,  233) 

Matter  of  (5  Redf.  400) 

• v.  Amer.  Sur.  Co.  (171  111.  235) 

v.  Atkins  (90  N.  C.  629) 

■ v.  Baker  (14  Cal.  612) 

v.  Bettelheim  (144  Mo.  258) 


91 
490 
536 

549 

880 

263 

339,  816, 

1152,  1190,  1191 


*  Page 
Clark  v.  Blackington  (110  Mass.  369)        387, 

441    595 

j>.  Bogardus  (2  Edw.  Ch.  387) 

v.  Bottorp  (1  Th.  &  C.  58) 

v.  Browne  (2  Sin.  &  G.  524) 

v.  Bundy  (29  Oreg.  190) 

v.  Bumside  (15  111.  62) 

v.  Carroll  (59  Md.  180) 

v.  Clark  (8  Cush.  385) 

v.  Clark  (80  Mo.  114) 

v.  Clark  (8  Pai.  152) 

v.  Clark  (17  Nev.  124) 

v.  Clark  (21  Vt.  490) 

v.  Clark  (6  W.  &  S.  85) 

v.  Clement  (33  N.  H.  563) 

v.  Clough  (05  N.  H.  43) 

v.  Company  (62  N.  H.  612) 

v.  Cordry  (09  Mo.  App.  6) 

v.  Costello  (59  N.  J.  L.  234) 


982 

230 

974 

713,  7]4 

004 

624 

224 

607 

738,  1069 

135 

1208 

518,  520 

360 

837 

844 

59 

325,  330, 

1089 

1120 

679,  854 

719 


v.  Cress  (20  Iowa,  50) 

v.  Davis  (32  Mich.  154) 

v.  Denton  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  419) 

v.  Drake  (63  Mo.  354)  1085 

v.  Dunnavant  (10  Leigh,  13)  472 

v.  Ellis  (9  Oreg.  128)  37 

v.  Eubank  (65  Ala.  245)  855 

v.  Fisher  (1  Pai.  171)  39 

v.  Fleming  (4  S.  E.  R.  12)  436 

v.  Grambiing  (45  Ark.  525)  734 

v.  Head  (75  Ala.  373)  357 

v.  Helm  (130  Ind.  117)  1222 

v.  Hership  (52  Ark.  473)  269 

v.  Hillis  (134  Ind.  421)  1030,  1089 

v.  Hogle  (52  111.  427)  812 

v.  Holt  (16  Ark.  257)  358,  442 

v.  Hornthal  (47  Miss.  434)  718,  719 

v.  Jetton  (5  Sneed,  229)  978 

v.  Knox  (70  Ala.  607)     1139, 1143,  1109 

v.  Leupp  (88  N.  Y.  228)  957 

v.  Marlow  (149  Ind.  41)  1098 

v.  Middlesworth  (82  Ind.  240)  271,  730 

v.  Morton  (5  Rawle,  235)  483 

v.  Muzzy  (43  N.  H.  59)  258 

v.  Newman  (6  T.  B.  Mon.  342)  1165 

v.  Niles  (42  Miss.  400)          543,  545,  577 

v.  Norwood  (12  La.  An.  598)  221 

v.  Parkville  R.  R.  (5  Kan.  634)  806,  826 

V.  Perry  (5  Cal.  58)  356 

v.  Pishon  (31  Me.  503)  385 

v.  Piatt  (30  Conn.  282)  1163 

v.  Shaller  (40  Conn.  119)  154 

v.  Shelton  (16  Ark.  474)       681,  682,  805 

1131 

v.  Smith  (34  Barb.  140)  89 

v.  Sprague  (5  Blackf.  412)  145 

v.  State  (12  Oh.  483)  42 

v.  Tainter  (7  Cush.  567)  721 

v.  Tennison  (33  Md.  85)  962 

v.  Thompson  (47  III.  25)  1037 

v.  Turner  (50  Neb.  290)     481,  483,  1150 

v.  Warner  (6  Conn.  355)  1218 

v.  Willson  (27  Md.  693)  1219,  1221, 1223 

v.  Winchell  (53  Vt.  408)  1207 

Clarke,  Goods  of  (1  Sw.  &  Tr.  22)  63 

v.  Berkeley  (2  Vern.  720)  103 

r.  Blount  (2  Dev.  Eq.  51)  1145 

v.  Bogardus  (12  Wend.  67)  976 

v.  Chapin  (7  Allen,  425)  556 

v.  Clarke  (46  S.  C.  230)  726 

v.  Clay  (31  N.  H.  393)  1123 

lvii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Clarke  v.  Jenkins  (3  Rich.  Eq.  318)    691,  738 

v.  Johnston  (10  N.  J.  Eq.  287)  1124 

o.  McClelland  (9  Pa.  St.  128)  G17 

v.  Perrv  (5  Cal.  58)  1127 

o.  Riee"(15  K.  I.  132)  540 

v.  Sawver  (3  Sandf.  Ch.  351)  39 

v.  Scin'ps  (2  Rob.  563)  89 

v.  Sinks  (144  Mo.  448)  1125,  1248 

v.  State  (G  G.  &  J.  288) 

v.  Terry  (34  Conn.  176) 

v.  Tufts  (5  Pick.  337) 

v.  West  (5  Ala.  117) 

Clarkson  v.  Ciarkson  (18  Barb.  646) 

v.  De  Pevster  (Hopk.  274) 

Clarv,  In  re  (112  Cal.  292) 

"v.  Clary  (2  Ired.  L.  78) 

v.  Sanders  (43  Ala.  287) 

Clason  v.  Lawrence  (3  Edw.  Ch.  48) 
Claudel  v.  Palao  (28  La.  An.  872) 
Clauser's  Estate  (84  Pa.  St.  51) 
Clausseu  v.  Lafrenz  (4  G.  Greene,  224) 


1000 

435 

1190 

1004 

799 

1249,  1258 

42 

257 

1102 

171 

1103 

410, 

419 

613 

846 

147 

1046,  1002 

284,  285 

354 

271,  724,  727 

642 


808, 


Clawson  v.  Clawson  (25  Ind.  229) 

v.  McCune  (20  Kan.  337) 

Clav  v.  Cousins  (1  T.  B.  Mon.  75) 

v.  Field  (115  U.  S.  260) 

■ v.  Field  (138  IT.  S.  404) 

v.  Gurley  (02  Ala.  14) 

v.  Hart  (7  Dana,  1) 

v.  Irvine  (4  W.  &  S.  232) 

v.  Jackson  (T.  U.  P.  Charlt.  71)         535 

v.  Kagelmacher  (98  Ga.  149)      1064,  1078 

v.  Walter  (79  Va.  92)  008 

v.  Wood  (153  N.  Y.  134)  877 

Clavcomb  v.  Clavcotnb  (10  Grat.  589)      1171 
Clavpool  v.  NorcYoss  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  524)   1199 

1  v.  Norcross  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  545)  919 

Clavson's  Will  (24  Oreg.  542)  493,  494 

ClaVton  v.  Aiken  (38  Ga.  320)  985,  980 

v.  Brown  (30  Ga.  490)  609 

v.  Drake  (17  Oh.  St.  367)  151 

v.  Liverman  (2  Dev.  &  B.  L.  558)        56 

v.  Somers  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  230)  941 

v.  Tucker  (20  Ga.  452)  417 

v.  Wardell  (2  Bradf.  1)  189 

Cleaver  v.  Cleaver  (39  Wis.  96)  939 

Cleaves  v.  Dockrav  (67  Me.  118)  553 

Cleere  v.  Cleere  (8*2  Ala.  581)  1128 

Clegg  r.  Rowland  (L.  R.  3  Eq.  308)  790 

Cleghorn  v.  Johnson  (09  Ga.  309)  187 

Cleland  v.  Waters  (10  Ga.  490)  880 

Clemens  v.  Caldwell  (7  B.  Mon.  171)  570,  575 
Clemens  v.  Walker  (40  Ala.  189)  752 

Clement's  Appeal  (49  Conn.  519)    1122,  1124, 
1125,  1139,  1149 

Estate  (150  Pa.  St.  85)  646 

Estate  (100  Pa.  St.  li'.il)  646 

Clement  v.  Brainard  (46  Conn.  174)  1234 

v.  Cozart  (107  N.  C.  695)  632 

v.  Cozart  (109  N.  C.  173)  1024 

v.  Foster  (71  N.  C.  36)  1033 

Clement-'.  Hendprson (4 Ga.  148)   1037,1048 

v.  Lacv  (51  Tex.  150)  200,  209 

v.  Rogers  (91  N.  C.  63)  997 

v.  .Swaiu  (2  X.  II.  475)  420 

Clendening  v.  Clymer  (17  Ind.  155)  978 

v.  Wvalt  (54  Ka.is.  52:!)  1221 

Clery's  Appeal  (35  Pa.  St.  54)  1104 
Cleveland  v.  Carson  (37  X.  J,  Eq.  377)      880 

v.  Chan.ll.tr  (3  Stew.  489)  645 

v.  Harrison  (15  Wis.  670)  093 

lviii 


•Page 
Cleveland  v.  Quilty  (128  Mass.  578)  1203 

v.  Spilman  (25  Ind.  95)  898 

Cliett  v.  Cliett  (1  Tex.  Unrep.  Cas.  408)      86 
Clifford  v.  Davis  (22  111.  App.  316)  1007 

v.  Kampfe  (147  N.  Y.  383)  242 

v.  Koe  (L.  R.  5  App.  447)  897 

Clift  v.  Clift  (87  Tenn.  17)  202 

—  v.  Kaufman  (60  Tex.  64)  196 

v.  Moses  (44  Hun,  312)  636 

v.  Moses  (116  N.  Y.  144)  727,  1095 

Clifton  v.  Clifton  (47  N.  J.  Eq.  227)  41 

Cline's  Appeal  (106  Pa.  St.  017)  283,  689 

Will  (24  Oreg.  175)  34 

Cline  v.  Lindsev  (110  Ind.  337)  40,  41 

Clingan  v.  Mitcheltree  (31  Pa.  St.  25)  92 

Clopton  v.  Booker  (27  Ark.  482)  371 

v.  Haughton  (57  Miss.  787)  1123 

Clos,  In  re  (110  Cal.  494)  340,  1151 

Cloud  v.  Barton  (14  Ala.  347)  1037 

v.  Bruce  (61  Ind.  171)  151 

v.  Clmkinbeard  (8  B.  Mon.  397)  975,  981 

v.  Golightly  (5  Ala.  654)  368 

Cloudas  v.  Adams  (4  Dana,  003)  1009 

Clough  v.  Clough  (117  Mass.  83)  118 

Cloutman  v.  Bailev  (02  N.  H.  44)  900 

Cluett  v.  Mattice  (43  Barb.  417)  535 

Cluff  v.  Dav  (124  N.  Y.  195)     '         551,  1252 
Clute  v.  Bool  (8  Pai.  83)  956 

Clyce  v.  Anderson  (49  Mo.  37)        1132,  1137, 

1104 
1149 


Coal  Co.  v.  Britton  (3  Kas.  App.  292) 
Coale  v.  Smith  (4  Pa.  St.  370) 
Coat  v.  Coat  (63  III.  73) 
Coates's  Estate  (12  Phila.  171) 
Coates  v.  Cheever  (1  Cow.  400) 

r.  Coates  (33  Beav.  249) 

v.  Gerlach  (44  Pa.  St.  43) 

v.  Hughes  (3  Binn.  498) 

v.  Worthy  (72  Miss.  575) 

Cobb  v.  Beardsley  (37  Barb.  192) 

t'.  Brown  (Speers  Eq.  564) 

v.  Hanford  (88  Hun,  21) 

—  r.  Garner  (105  Ala.  467) 
v.  Kempton  (154  Mass.  266) 


1084 
184 
229 
976 
611 
986 
647 
538 
642 
59 

1089 
820,  1023 


432, 


v.  Newcomb  (19  Pick.  330)  519,  530,  533 

v.  Norwood  ( 11  Tex.  550)  632 

v.  Tavlor  (04  N.  C.  193)  699 

v.  Wood  (1  Hawks,  95)  337 

Cobble  v.  Tomlins.m  (50  Ind.  550)  290 

Coburn  O.  Harris  (58  Md.  87)  838 

v.  Loomis  (49  Me.  406)  1125,  1186 

Cochran  v.  Miller  (74  Ala.  50)  201 

i'.  Thompson  (18  Tex.  052)  432,  746 

v.  Young  (104  Pa.  St.  333)  498,  501 

Cochrane's  Will  (1  T.  B.  Mon.  203)  40 

Cochrane  v.  Robinson  (11  Sim.  377)  790 

v.  Sorrell  (74  Ala.  310)  210 

Cockavne  v.  Harrison  (L.  R.  13  Eq.  432)  1001 
Cockb'urn  v.  Wilson  (20  La.  An.  39)  699 

Cocke  v.  Bailey  (42  Miss.  81)  237 

v.  Finley"(29  Miss.  127)  396 

v.  Montgomery  (75  Iowa,  259)  860 

v.  Phillips  (12  Leigh,  248)  232 

Cockin's  Appeal  (111  Pa.  St.  26)  901 

Cockins  v.  McCurdv  (40  Kans.  758)         1067, 

1068 
Cockrill  v.  Armstrong  (31  Ark.  580)  233 

( loekroft  V.  Black  (2  P.  Wins.  298)  787 

Co.ks  v.  Haviland  (124  N.  Y.  420)  739 

v.  Varney  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  514)  363 

Codding  v.  Newman  (3  Th.  &  C.  364)        513 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Coddington  v.  Bispham  (36  N.   J.  Eq. 

224)  '     1227,  1230,  1208 

Codman  v.  Brooks  (159  Mass.  477)  646 

v.  Brooks  (J 07  Mass.  499)  646 

Codv  v.  Coaly  (27  Grat.  313)  55 

v.  Raynaud  (1  Col.  272)  324 

Coe  v.  James  (54  Conn.  511)  949 

v.  Talcott  (5  Dav,  88)  1006 

v.  Washington  Mills  (149  Mass.  543)  932 

Cofer  v.  Flannigan  (1  Ga.  538)  712 

v.  Scroggins  (98  Ala.  342)  209 

Coffee  v.  Rurrin  (4  Cokhv.  487)  1156 

Coffey  v.  Joseph  (74  Ala.  271)  216 

Collin  v.  Cottle  (4  Pick.  454)  685 

v.  Otis  (11  Met.  150)  495 

Coffman  v.  Coffman  (85  Va.  459)  882 

v.  Coffman  (41  W.  Va.  8;  1216,  1220 

v.  Hedrick  (32  \V.  Va.  119)  48,  834 

Cogbill  v.  Cogbill  (2  Hen.  &  Munf.  467)      93, 

1196 
Cogburn  v.  McQueen  (46  Ala.  6bl)  588 

Cogdell  v.  Widow  (3  Uesaus.  346)  966 

Coggeshall  v.  Home  (18  R.  I.  696)  914 

v.  Pelton  (7  John.  Ch.  292)  919 

Coggins'  Appeal  (124  Pa.  St.  10)  896,  915 
Coggins  v.  Griswold  (64  Ga.  323)  1047,  1089 
Cogswell  v.  Cogswell  (2  Edw.  Ch.  231)    1000 

v.  Tibbetts  (3  N.  H.  41)  226,  227 

Cohea  v.  Jemison  (68  Miss.  510)  593 

v.  State  (34  Miss.  179)  554 

Cohen's  Appeal  (2  Watts,  175)  577 

Will  (Tuck.  280)  64 

Cohen  v.  Atkins  (73  Mo.  163)  1199 

Coit's  Estate  (3  U.  C.  Ct.  App.  246)  441 

Coit  v.  Campbell  (82  N.  Y.  509)  675 

v.  Comstock  (51  Conn.  352)  920 

Coke  v.  Bullock  (Cro.  Jac.  49;  1  Roll. 

Abr.  616)  103 

Coker  v.  Crozier  (5  Ala.  369)  618,  625 

Colberg,  Goods  of  (2  Curt.  832)  90 

Colbert  v.  Daniel  (32  Ala.  314)  357,  371 

Colburn  v.  Broughton  (9  Ala.  351)  655 

v.  Hadley  (46  Vt.  71)  935 

Colbv  v.  Duncan  (139  Mass.  398)  942 

'v.  King  (67  Iowa,  458)  846,  861 

v.  Moodv  (19  Me.  Ill)  336,337 

Cole's  Will  (49  Wis.  179)  34,  37 

Cole  v.  Cole  (19  Mart.  7 ;  n.  s.  414)  20 

v.  Cole  (79  Va.  251)  948 

v.  Dial  (12  Tex.  100)  579,  581 

v.  Elfe  (23  Ga.  235)  175 

v.  Wooden  (18  N.  J.  L.  15)  401,  753 

Cole  Co.  v.  Dallmever  (101  Mo.  57)  342 

Colei^rave  v.  Dias  Santos  (2  B.  &  C.  76)  602 
Coleman,  In  re  (111  N.  Y.  220)  70 

Coleman's  Succession  (27  La.  An.  289)  188 
Coleman  t).  Brooke  (37  Miss.  71)  180 

v.  Eberly  (76  Pa.  St.  197)  893 

v.  Farrar  (112  Mo.  54)  1121 

v.  Foster  (112  Ala.  506)  145 

v.  Hall  (12  Mass.  570)  852 

v.  Hall  (12  Mass.  588)  792 

v.  Lane  (26  Ga.  515)  992 

v.  McAnultv  (16  Mo.  173)  675 

v.  McMurdo  (5  Rand.  51)  1182 

v.  Parker  (114  Mass.  30)  123 

v.  Ravnor  (3  Cold.  25)  581 

v.  Robertson  (17  Ala.  84)  44 

v.  Smith  (14  S.  C.  511)  551 

v.  Woodworth  (28  Cal.  567)  803 

Colenburg  v.  Venter  (173  Pa.  St.  113)       102.) 


Coles  v.  Coles  (15  Johns.  159)  289 

v.  Coles  (15  Johns.  319)  254,  258 

v.  Yorks  (31  Minn.  213)  215 

Colev's  Estate  (14  Abb.  Pr.  461)  1184 

Colgan  v.  McKeon  (24  N.  J.  L.  500)  310 

Colgate  v.  Colgate  (23  N.  J.  Eq.  372)  208 


Colgrove  v.  Horton  (11  Pai.  201) 
Collagan  v.  Burns  (57  Me.  449) 
Collamore  v.  Wilder  (19  Kan.  67) 
Colles,  Matter  of  (4  Dem.  387) 
Collier's  Will  (40  Mo.  237) 
Collier  v.  Cairns  (0  Mo.  App.  188) 

v.  Collier  (3  Oh.  St.  369) 

v.  Grimsev  (36  Oh.  St.  17) 

v.  Jones  (86  Ind.  342) 

v.  Munn  (41  N.  Y.  143) 

v.  Slaughter  (20  Ala.  203) 

Colliers  v.  Hollier  (13  La.  An.  585) 
Collins,  Inre(5Redf.  20) 

v.  Ball  (82  Tex.  259) 

».  Bankhead  (1  Strobh.  25) 

v.  Bergen  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  57) 

v.  Carman  (5  Md.  503) 

v.  Coal  Co.  (150  U.  S.  385) 

—  v.  Collins  (140  Mass.  502) 
v.  Collins  (19  Oh.  St.  408) 
v.  Collins  (40  Oh.  St.  353) 


543, 


841, 


544 

90 

1203 

1184 

941,  942 

280,  298, 

3"0 

171,  708 

719 

425 

1145,  1108 

903 

576 

64 

1037 

366,  385 

938 

270,  351 

646 

435,  1128 

354 

871,884 


v.  East  Tennessee  R.  R.  (9  Heisk. 

841)  627, 629 

v.  Hollier  (13  La.  An.  585)  1119 

v.  Hoxie  (9  Pai.  81)  998,  1149 

v.  Hvdorn  (135  N.  Y.  320)  643 

v.  Pillou  (26  Conn.  308)  856 

v.  Spear  (Walk.  310)  404 

v.  Tilton  (58  Ind.  374)  1176 

V.  Townley  (21  N.  J.  Eq.  353)  43 

v.  Warren  (29  Mo.  236)  257 

v.  Wickwire  (162  Mass.  143)  949 

Collinson  v.  Owens  (6  G.  &  J.  4)  1039 

Collumb  v.  Read  (24  N.  Y.  505)  289 

Collver  v.  Collver  (4  Dem.  53)  482 

'v.  Collyer  (110  N.  Y.  481)  92,  483,  1150, 

1198 

v.  Cross  (20  Ga.  1)  1259 

Colson  v.  Brainard  (1  Redf.  324)  1030,  1036 
Colt  v.  Colt  (32  Conn.  422)  798 

v.  Hubbard  (33  Conn.  281)  942 

v.  Lasnier  (9  Cow.  320)  693 

Coltart  v.  Allen  (40  Ala.  155)  439,  582 

Colton  v.  Colton  (21  Fed.  R.  594)  877 

v.  Colton  (127  U.  S.  300)     870,  875,  876, 

877 

v.  Ross  (2  Pai.  390)  497 

Coltraine  v.  Causey  (3  Ired.  Eq.  246)  632 

Columbus    Ins.    Co.   v.   Humphries     (64 

Miss.  258)  511,  707 

Columbus    Match  Co.  v.  Hodenohvl  (61 

Hun,  557)  283 

Columbus  Match  Co.  v.  Hodenphyl  (135 

N.  Y.  430)  283 

Colvert  v.  Wood  (93  Tenn.  454)  1016 

Colvin,  Matter  of  (3  Md.  Ch.  278)     401,  402, 

752 

v.  Warford  (20  Md.  357)  99,  100 

Colwell  v.  Alger  (5  Grav,  67)  435,  1264 

Comb's  Appeal  (105  Pa".  St.  155)  72,  477 

Combs,  In  re  (3  Dem.  341)  1007 

v.  Combs  (67  Md.  11)  948 

v.  Jolly  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  625)  61 

v.  Young  (4  Yerg.  218)  218 

lix 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Comegvs  v.  Jones  (65  Md.  317)  879,  885 

ComerV.  Chamberlain  (6  Allen,  166)  276 

v.  Comer  (119  111.  170)      834,  1217,  1223 

t>.  Comer  (120  111.  420)  1241 

v.  Hart  (79  Ala.  389)  1059,  1063 

Cometo's  Estate  (Mvr.  42)  204 

Comins  v.  Hettield  (80  N.  Y.  261)  836 

Commercial  Bank  v.  Burkhalter  (98  Ga. 

726)  175 

v.  Corbett   (5   Sawy.  543)  209 

Commissioners  v.   Allen  (5  Kans.  App. 

122)  691 

v.  Greenwood  (1  Desaus.  450)  772 

v.  Poor  (169  Pa.  St.  116)  276 

v.  Way  (3  Oh.  103)  554 

Commissioners  of  Charitable  Donations  v. 

De  Clifford  (1  Dr.  &  War.  245)  920 

Commissioners  of   Emigration  (1  Bradf. 

259)  398 

Commons  v.  Commons  (115  Ind.  162)  1099 
Commonwealth  v.  Brvan  (8  S.  &  R.  128)  660, 

661,  663 

v.  Chace  (9  Pick.  15)  596 

v.  Cochran  (146  Pa.  St.  223)  984 

v.  Coleman  (52  Pa.  St.  468)  691  a 

v.  Duffieid  (12  Pa.  St.  277)       656,  691  a 

v.  Eckert  (53  Pa.  St.  102)  691  a 

v.  Forney  (3  W.  &  S.  353)  542,  543,  545, 

555  719 

v.  Griffith  (2  Pick.  11 )  '366 

v.  Hackett  (102  Pa.  St.  505)  890 

c.  Henderson  (172  Pa.  St.  135)         691  a 

v.  Hite  (6  Leigh,  588)  307 

v.  Hunt  (4  Cush.  49)  225 

v.  Judges  (10  Pa.  St.  37)  1204 

v.  Laub  (  1  W.  &  S.  201)  554 

o.  Lewis  (6  Binn.  260)  771 

v.  Manley  (12  Pick.  173)  639 

v.  Martin  (5  Munf.  117)  22 

v.  Mateer  (16  S.  &  K.  416)  401,  511,  752 

v.  Naile  (88  Pa.  St.  429)  305 

v.  Nancre.le  (32  Pa.  St.  389)        141,  522 

v.  No.  Am.  Land  Co.  (57  Pa.  St.  102) 

294,  310 

v.  Rich  (14  Grav,  335)  479 

v.  Richardson  (8  B.  Mon.  81)  632 

v.  Selden  (5  Munf.  160)  307 

v.  Shelby  (13  S.  &  R.  348)       1094, 1107 

v.  Smith  (20  Pa.  St.  100)  691  a 

v.  Stauffer  (10  Pa.  St.  350)  903 

v.  Strohecker  (9  Watts,  479)  748 

v.  Sturtivant  (117  Mass.  122  )  480 

Compher  v.  Compiler  (25  Pa.  St.  31)  170,  173 
Compo  v.  Jackson  (50  Mich.  578)  1234 

Coinptor.  v.  Barnes  (4  Gill,  55)  1149 

v.  Bloxham  (2  Coll.  201)  486 

v.  Compton  (9  East,  268)  879 

V.  McMahan  (19  Mo.  App.  494)  717,  727, 

728 

v.  Mitton  (12  N.  J.  L.  70)  70,71 

v.  Perkins  (92  Tenn.  715)  183 

v.  Pruitt  (88  Ind.  171)  1075 

Comstock's  Appeal  (55  Conn.  214)  817 

Comstock  v.  Circuit  .ludge  (95  Mich.  48)  1193 

v.  <  irawford  ('■'>  Wall.  396)  583 

r.  Hadlvme  W  <'„„„.  254)  32,  37,  74,  lit',:! 

v.  Hcrr.'.ii  (5  U.  S.  C.  C.  A.  266)  357 

p.  Mathews  (55  Minn.  Ill)  814 

v.  Smith  (26  Mich.  806)  339 

,-.  White  (Hi  Abb.  Pr.  264,  note)        293 

Conant  v.  Kent  (130  Mass.  ITS;  117 

lx 


Conant  v.  Little  (1  Pick.  189) 

V.  Palmer  (63  Vt.  310) 

v.  Stratton  {107  Mass.  474) 

Conard  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.  (1  Pet.  386) 
Condict  v.  King  (13  N.  J.  Eq.  375) 


Page 

258 


435 
771 
916, 
972,  994 
654 
1232 


Condit  v.  Winslow  (106  Ind.  142) 

Cone's  Appeal  (68  Conn.  84) 

Cone  v.  Dunham  (59  Conn.  145) 

Conger  v.  Atwood  (28  Oh.  St.  134)  1142,  1143 

v.  Babcock  (87  Ind.  497)  1190 

v.  Cook  (56  Iowa,  117)  1026,  1041 

Congregational  Church  v.  Morris  (8  Ala. 

182)  310 

Conigland  v.  Smith  (79  N.  C.  303)  647 

Conkey  v.  Dickinson  (13  Mete.  51)  551 

Conklin  v.  Davis  (63  Conn.  377)  902 

p.  Egerton  (21  Wend.  430)  393,  720 

Conley  v.  Boyle  (6  T.  B.  Mon.  637)  1265 

Connaughton  v.  Sands  (32  Wis.  387)  181 
Connecticut    Co.  v.  New  York    Co.    (25 

Conn.  265)  626 

Connecticut  Trust    Co.   v.   Security   (67 

Conn.  438)  774,  848 

Connell  v.  Chandler  (11  Tex.  249)      188,  191, 

215,  216 

v.  Chandler  (13  Tex.  5)  632 

Conner  v.  Mcllvaine  (4  Del.  Ch.  30)  740, 1181 

v.  Root  (11  Colo.  183)  117, 119,  837 

v.  Shepard  (15  Mass.  164)  229 

Connollv  v.  Branstler  (3  Bush,  702)  275 

v.  Pardon  (1  Paige,  291)  893 

Connor  v.  Eddv  (25  Mo.  72)  1078 

v.  McMurrav  (2  Allen.  202)  212 

Connors,  In  re  (110  Cal.  408)  526 

Conolv  v.  Gavle  (61  Ala.  116)  884 

Conover  v.  Porter  (14  Oh.  St.  450)  251 

v.  Walling  (15  N.  J.  Eq.  167)  1194 

v.  Wright  (6  N.  J.  Eq.  613)  274 

Conowav  v.  Spicer  (5  Harr.  425)  736 

Conrad's  Estate  (79  Iowa,  396)  647 

Conrad  v.  Long  (33  Mich.  78)  957,  958 

Consalus,  In  re  (95  N.  Y.  340)  654 

Conselvea  v.  Walker  (2  Dem.  117)  475 

Conser  v.  Snowden  (54  Md.  175)  119,  120 

Consolidated  N.  Bk.  v.  Hayes  (112  Cal. 

75)  809 

Constantinides  v.  Walsh  (146  Mass.  281)  762 
Constitution  v.  Nelson  (2  111.  511)  1208 

Contee  v.  Chew  (1  H.  &  J.  417)  773 

Continental  Bank  v.  Heilman  (81   Fed. 

Rep.  36)  357 

Continental  Co.  v.  Barber  (50  Conn.  567)  842 
Converse  v.  Converse  (21  Vt.  168)  43,  44 

v.  Sorlev  (39  Tex.  515)  808,  826 

v.  Starr"(23  Oh.  St.  491)  495 

Conwav,  Matter  of  (124  N.  Y.  455)  64,  485 
Conwav  v.  Ellison  (14  Ark.  360)  1132 

w.'Vizzard  (122  Ind.  266)  490 

Conwill  n.  Conwill  (61  Miss.  202)  1128,  1230 
Cooch  v.  Cooch  (5  Houst.  540)  1099,  1103 
Cook's  Estate  (14  Cal.  129)  865 

Cook  v.  Burton  (5  Bush,  64)  674 

v.  Carr  (19  Md.  1)  527 

v.  Cook  (92  Ind.  398)  1110 

v.  Cook  (20  N.  J.  L.  375)  727 

v.  Cook  (24  S.  C.  204)  385,  757 

v.  Grant  (16  Serg.  &  R.  198)  75 

r.  Grcgson  (3  Drew.  547)  657 

V.  Holmes  (11  Mass.  528)  878 

v.  Holmes  (29  Mo.  61)  751 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Cook  v.  Horton  (129  Mass.  527)  1197 

v.  Jennings  (40  s.  C.  204)  777 

v.  Larmiug  (40  N.  .J.  Eq.  3G9)     893,  989 

v.  Lewis  (36  Me.  340)  294,  300 

v.  Lowry  (95  N.  Y.  103)  919 

v.  McCfiristian  (4  Cal.  23)  194 

v.  Munn  (12  Abb.  N.  C.  344)  940 

v.  Roberts  (09  Ga.  742)  210 

v.  Sanders  (15  Rich.  03)  423 

v.  Weaver  (12  Ga.  47)  873 

v.  Whiting  (16  111.  480)  597 

v.  Winchester  (81  Mich.  581)  67 

v.  Bucklin  (18  R.  I.  666)  901 

Cooke  v.  Cooke  (29  Md.  538)  G78 

v.  Meeker  (36  N.  Y.  15)     994,  995, 1006 

v.  Piatt  (98  N.  Y.  35)  719 

Cool  v.  Higgins  (23  N.  J,  Eq.  308)  765 

Cooley,  In  re  (6  Dem.  77)  646 

v.  Brown  (30  Iowa,  470)  631 

v.  Smith  (17  Iowa,  99)  806 

v.  Vansvckle  (14  N.  J.  Eq.  496)  677, 1152 

Coolidge  v.  Melvin  (42  N.  H.  510)  610 

Coombs  v.  Lane  (17  Tex.  280)  1080 

Coon  v.  Bean  (09  Ind.  474)  1244 

v.  Fry  (6  Mich.  506)  330 

Coope  v.  Lowerre  (  1  Barb.Ch.  45)  526 

Cooper,  Estate  of  (127  Pa.  St.  425)  6!)la 

e.  Armstrong  (3  Kan.  78)         1208,  1209 

v.  Berrs  (143  III.  25)  134 

v.  Bockett  (10  Jur  931)  94 

v.  Burr  (45  Barb.  9)  123 

v.  Cooper  (L.  R.  7  H.  L.  53)  1016 

v.  Cooper  (5  N.  J.  Eq.  9)  570,  5,8 

v.  Cooper  (77  Va.  198)  271,  708 

v.  Horner  (62  Tex.  356)  661 

v.  Judge  (19  Me.  200)  1198 

v.  Lindsav  (109  Ala.  338)         1077,  1078 

v.  Merrihew  (Riley  Eq.  166)  284 

v.  Pierce  (74  Tex.  526)  180 

v.  Reid  (2  Hill  Ch.  549)  284 

v.  Remsen  (John.  Ch.  459)  958 

v.  Robinson  (2  Cush.  184)  1050 

v.  Simmons  (7  H.  &  N.  707)  633 

v.  Sunderland  (3  Iowa,  114)       329,  1046 

v.  White  (19  Ga.  554)  645 

Coot  v.  Bertv  (12  Mod.  232)  228 

Coote  v.  Whitiington  (L.  R.  16  Eq.  534)    421 
Coover's  Appeal  (52  Pa.  St.  427)  519 

Cope  v.  Cope  (45  Oh.  St.  464)  882 

v.  McFarland  (2  Head,  543)  7J7 

Copeland  v.  Barron  (72  .Ale.  200)  948,  949,  1000 

v.  Copeland  (7  Bush,  349)  230 

Copenhaver  v.  Copenhaver  (78  Mo.  55)       149 

i\  Copenhaver  (9  Mo.  A  pp.  200)  149 

Copp  v.  Hersey  (31  N.  H.  317)  238,  1016 

Coppa^e  v.  Alexander  (2  B.  Mon.  313)       961 
Coppels'  Estate  (4  Phila.  378)  702 

Copper  17.  Wells  (  5  N.  J.  Eq.  10)  591 

Coppin  v.  Dillon  (4  Hagg.  361)  523 

Corbett  v.  Rice  (2  Nev.  330)  803,  1123 

v.  Twentv-Third,etc.  (114  N.  Y.  579)676 

Corbin  v.  Laswell  (48  Mo.  App.  626)        1201 

v.  Mills  (19  Grat.  438)  966 

v.  Wilson  (2  Ash.  178)  941 

Corbitt  v.  Dawkins  (54  Ala.  282)  1077 

Corby  v.  Corbv  (85  Mo.  371)  876 

v.  Judge '(96  Mich.  11)  498 

Cordeviolle's  Succession  (24  La.  An.  319)  1003 
Cordrey  v.  Cordrev  (1  Houst.  2-39)  32 

Cordwell's  Estate*(L.  R.  20  Eq.  644)  976 

Corker  «.  Corker  (87  Cal.  643)  108 


•Page 
Corlass,  In  re  (L.  R.  1  Ch.  D.  460)  895 

Code  v.  Monkhouse  (47  N.  J.  Eq.  73)  598, 1000 
Corlev  v.  Anderson  (5  Tex.  C.  Ap.  213)  1024 

"v.  McElmeel  (149  NT.  Y.  228)       469,  501 

Corn  v.  Corn  (4  Dem.  394)  572 

Corneby  v.  Gibbons  (  Rob.  705)  62 

Cornelius,  Will  of  (14  Ark   675)  06 

Cornell  v.  Clark  (17  R.  I.  27)  839 

v.  Gallaher  (16  Cal.  367)  525 

V.  Lovett  (35  Pa.  St.  100)  962 

Cornett  v.  Hough  (136  I  d.  387)  154 

v.  Williams  (20  Wall.  226)         329,  1089 

Cornish  v.  Willson  (6  Gill,  299)  1096,  1107 
Cornog  v.  Comog  (3  Del.  Ch.  407)  236 

Cornpropst's  Appeal  (33  Pa.  St.  537)  524 

Cornwall's  Estate  (Tuck.  250)  1038 

Cornwell  v.  Deck  (8  Hun,  122)  711 

v.  Orton  (120  Mo.  355)  276,  948 

v.  Woolley  (47  Barb.  327)  74 

Corporation  v.  Hammond  (1  Harr.  &  J. 

58u)  252 

Corr's  Appeal  (02  Conn.  403)  856 

Corrigan  v.  Foster  (51  Oh.  St.  225)  551 

v.  Jones  (14  Colo.  311)  493,  494,  505 

Corrington's  Estate  (124  111.  303)  719,  726,  727 
Corrington  v.  Corrington  (15  LI.  App.  393)  708 
Corry  v.  Lamb  (45  Oh.  St.  203)  268 

Corwin's  Estate  (61  Cal.  160)  1199 

Corwin  v.  Merritt  (3  Barb.  341)  1031 

Corwine  v.  Corwine  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  579)  989 
Cory  v.  Corv  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  198)  271,  949 

Corya  v.  Corya  (119  Ind.  593)  704,  986,  989 
Corvton  v.  Helvar  (2  Cox,  340)  882 

Cosby  v.  Gilchrist  (7  Dana,  206)  537 

Cosgrove  v.  Pitman  (103  Cal.  2j8)  577 

Costen's  Appeal  (13  Pa.  St.  292)  1071 

Costephens  v.  Dean  (69  Ala.  3S 5)  430,431,  433 
Coster  v.  Clarke  (3  Edw.  Ch.  428)  290 

Costeley  v.  Tarver  (38  Ala.  107)  1075 

v.  Towles  (46  Ala.  660)  284 

Cothran  v.  McCoy  (33  Ala.  65)  1044 

Cotter's  Estate  (54  Cal.  215)-  532 

Estate  (Mvr.  179)  532 

Cotterel  v.  Brock  (1  Bradf.  148)  543,  544 
Cottle,  Appellant  (5  Pick.  483)  571 
v.  Yanderhevden  (11  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s. 

17)  516 

Cotton  v.  Boston  (161  Mass.  8)  091 

v.  Ilallowav  (96  Ala.  544)  1035 

v.  Jones  (37  Tex.  34  833,  845 

v.  Smithwick  (CO  Me.  300)  894 

v.  Tavlor  (4  B  Mon.  357)  530,  531 

v.  Ulmer  (45  Ala.  378)  34,  36 

Cottrell  v.  Woodson  (11  Heisk.  681)  836 

Couch  v.  Eastham  (29  W.  Va.  784)     871,  884 

v.  Gentry  (113  Mo.  248).  31 

Con-'ert  V.  Coudert  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  407)  109 
Coughanour  v.  Hoffman  (13  Pac.  231)  215 
Coulam  v.  Doull  (113  U.  S.  210)  110,  111 

Coulson's  Estate  (95  Iowa  696)  197,  208 

Coulson  v.  Holmes  (5  Sawv.  279)  102 

v.  Wing  (42  Kans.  507)  1044 

Coulter's  Case  (5  Co.  30)  422,  426 

Council  v.  Averett  95  N.  C.  131)  718 

County  Court  v.  Bissell  (2  Jones,  387)  571 
Court  "of  Probate  v.  Smith  (16  R.  I.  444)  747 
Courtenay  v.  Williams  (3  Hare,  539)  150,  976, 

1237 
Courtney  v.  Hunter  (1  Cr.  C.  C.  265)  373 
Cousins  v.  Jackson  (52  Ala.  262)  835 

v.  Paddons  (2  Cr.  M.  &.  R.  547)         7.2 

Lxi 


TABLE   OP  CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Coutant  v.  Schuyler  (1  Pai.  316)  122 

Couts,  In  re  (87  Cal.  480)  1039,  1146 

Covell  v.  Weston  (20  John.  414)  1271 

Coveny  v.  McLaughlin  (148  Mass.  576)     896 
Cover  v.  Stem  (67  Md.  449)  61,  62 

Coverdale  v.  Aldrich  (19  Pick.  391)  655 

Covert  v.  Sebern  (73  Iowa  564)  351,  874 

Covin's  Estate  (20  S.  C.  471)  976 

Covington  v.  Lattimore  (88  N.  C.  407)        710 
Cowan's  Estate  (184  Pa.  St.  339)  847 

Cowan  v.  Musgrave  (73  Iowa  384)      829,  831 
Cowden  ».  Dobyns  (5  S.  &  M.  82)  341 

t'.  Jacobson  (105  Mass.  240)       375,  1042 

Cowdin  v.  Perrv  (11  Pick.  503)  1153 

Cowdrev  v.  Cowdrey  (131  Mass.  186)  205 

v.  Hitchcock  (103  111.  262)     175,  269,  270 

Cowell  v.  Roberts  (79  Mo.  218)  824 

v.  Watts  (6  East,  405)  734 

Cowen  v.  Adams,  (78  Fed.  C  C.  A.  536)  430, 

1236 
Cowgill  v.  Dinwiddie  (98  Cal.  481)  812 

v.  Linville  (20  Mo.  App.  138)  744 

Cowins  v.  Tool  (36  Iowa,  82)  1122,  1124 

Cowles  v.  Cowles  (56  Conn.  240)  980 

v.  Hayes  (71  N.  C.  230)  539,  753 

Cowling  t'.'Nansemond  Justices  (6  Rand. 

349)  552 

Cowman  r.  Rogers  (73  Md.  403)  447 

Cox  t'.Bank  (119  N.  C.  302)  693 

v.  Brown  (5  Ired.  L.  194)  178,  186 

v.  Brower  (114  N.  C.  422)  1247 

v.  Clark  (93  Ala.  400)  145 

v.  Cody  (75  Ga.  175)  183 

v.  Corkendall  (13  N.  J.  Eq.  138)       1104 

v.  Cox  (44  Ind.  3G8)  149 

v.  Cox  (101  Mo.  168)  485,  502 

v.  Cox  (84  N.  C.  138)  842 

v.  Curwen  (118  Mass.  198)  906 

v.  Grubb  (47  Kans.  435)  431 

v.  Harris  (17  Md.  23)  943 

v.  Harvey  (1  Tex.  Unr.  Cas.  268)        200 

v.  Ingleston  (30  Vt.  258)  714,  1246 

v.  John  (32  Oh.  St.  532)  1129,  1157 

v.  McBurney  (2  Sandf.  561)  596 

i'.  McKinnev  (32  Ala.  461)  941 

v.  Rogers  (77  Pa.  St.  160)  1016 

v.  Roome  (38  N.  J.  Eq.  259)  711 

v.  Schermerhorn  (18  Hun,  16)  1167 

v.  Scott  (9  Baxt.  305)  639,  641 

v.  Thomas  (9  Grat.  323)  328 

v.  Yeazel  (49  Neb.  343)  432,  433 

Coye  v.  Leach  (8  Met.  371)  447 

Coyle  v.  Creevy  (34  La.  An.  539)  196 

Cozart  v.  Lvon  (91  N.  C.  282)  354 

Cozzens's  Will  (61  Pa.  St.  196)  65 

Cozzens  v.  Jamison  (12  Mo.  App.  452)       103 
Crabb  v.  Atwood  (10  Ind.  322)  825 

v.  Young  (92  N.  Y.  56)  708 

Craddock  v.  Riddlesbarger  (2  Dana,  205)   597, 

598 

v.  Turner  (6  Leigh.  116)  548 

Craft's  Estate  (164  Pa.  520)  108 

Crafts,  Ex  parte  (28  S.  C.  281)  568 

Cragg  v.  Riggs  (5  Retlf.  82)  1004 

Craig  v.  Beatty  (11  S.  C.  375)  500 

v.  Craitf  (3  Barb.  Cli.  70)  121 

v.  Leslie  (i  Wh.at.  563)      555,  728,  1233 

v.  McGel (16  Ala.  41)  1034 

v.  Secrist  (54  Ind.  419)  921 

v.  Southard  (lis  III.  37)  31,  37,  47 

. r.  Walthall  (14  Grat.  518)  271 

lxii 


Craig  v.  Wroth  (47  Md.  281)  337 

Craige  v.  Morris  (25  N.  J.  Eq.  467)  257 

Crain  v.  Crain  (21  Tex.  790)  61 

Cram  v.  Cram  (33  Vt.  15)  42 

v.  Green  (6  Ohio,  429)  1124 

Cramer  v.  Crumbaugh  (3  Md.  491)  50 

v.  Sharp  (49  N.  J.  Eq.  558)  533 

Cramp's  Appeal  (81  Pa.  St.  90)  1131 

Cramp  v.  Playfoot  (4  K.  &  J.  479)  910 

Crandall's  Appeal  (63  Conn.  365)  42 

Crandall  v.  Gallup  (3  Conn.  365)  794 

Crane  v.  Cavana  (36  Barb.  410)  265 

v.  Crane  (31  Iowa,  296)  157 

v.  Crane  (17  Pick.  422)        167,  169,  170 

v.  Fipps  (29  Kans.  585)  220 

v.  Guthrie  (47  Iowa,  542)  636 

v.  Hopkins  (6  Ind.  44)  793 

v.  Moses  (13  S.  C.  561)  1242 

v.  Reeder  (21  Mich.  24)  305 

Cranmer  v.  McSwords  (24  W.  Va.  594)    1094, 

1109,  1111 
Cranson  v.  Cranson  (4  Mich.  230)       127,  245 

v.  Wilson  (71  Mich.  356)  126 

Crapo  v.  Armstrong  (61  Iowa,  697)   761,  1144 
Craslin  v.  Baker  (8  Mo.  437)  418,  432 

Cravath  v.  Plympton  (13  Mass.  454)   618,  626 
Craven  v.  Winter  (38  Iowa,  471)  261 

Cravens  v.  Faulconer  (28  Mo.  19)  68 

v.  Logan  (7  Ark.  103)  751 

Crawford  v.  Blackburn  (19  Md.  40)  1198 

v.  Bradv  (35  Ga.  184)  641 

v.  Forshaw  (L.  R.  43  Ch.  D.  643)        721 

v.  Graves  (15  La.  An.  243)  366 

v.  Liddel  (101  Iowa  148)  1151 

v.  McDonald  (88  Tex.  626)       1047,  1089 

v.  Redus  (54  Miss.  700)     '       1127,  1189 

v.  Thompson  (91  Ind.  266)  964 

v.  Tvson  (46  Ala.  299)  575.  576 

v.  Ward  (49  Ga.  40)  1208 

Cray  v.  Willis  (2  P.  Wins.  529)  991 

v.  Wright  (16  Ind.  App.  258)  631 

Creagh  v.  Blood  (2  Jones  &  La  T.  509)         39 
Creamer  v.  Holbrook  (99  Ala.  52)  346,  504,  721 

v.  Ingalls  (89  Wis.  112)  1131 

Creath  v.  Brent  (3  Dana,  129)  395,  572 

Crecelius  v.  Horst  (78  Mo.  566)  937 

v.  Horst  (89  Mo.  356)  188,  231 

v.  Horst  (4  Mo.  App.  419)  248 

v.  Horst  (9  Mo.  App.  51)  937 

v.  Horst  (11  Mo.  App.  304)  246,  247 

Credle  v.  Credle  (Busb.  L.  225)  1217 

Creech  v.  Granger  (106  N.  C.  213)  722 

Creed  v.  Creed  (11  CI.  &  Fin.  491)  988 

Creely  v.  Ostrander  (3  Bradf.  107)  43,  47 

Creesy  v.  Willis  (159  Mass.  249)  1105 

Cregin  v.  Brooklvn  Co.  (75  N.  Y.  192)       620 

v.  Brooklvn  Co.  (83  N.  Y.  595)    615,  621 

Crenshaw  v.  Bentlev  (31  Mo.  App.  75)      1167 

v.  Carpenter  (69  Ala.  572)  271 

v.  Crenshaw  (2  H.  &  M.  22)  602 

v.  Johnson  (120  N.  C.  271)  500 

Crerar  v.  Williams  (145  111.  625)        920,  927, 
929  931   944 
Cresse,  Matter  of  (28  N.  J.  Eq.  236)'       '  533 
Cresson's  Appeal  (30  Pa.  St.  437)  928 

Cresswell's  Succession  (8  La.  An.  122)        706 
Creswell  v.  Lawson  (7  G.  &  J.  227)  952 

v.  Slack  (68  Iowa,  110)         360.  361,  1026 

Creveling  v.  Jones  (21  N.  J.  L.  517)  880 

Crew  v.  Pratt  (119  Cal.  131)  189, 916,  995, 

1002,  1011 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Crew  v.  Pratt  (119  Cal.  139) 


•Page 

350,  351,  473, 

499 


Crews  v.  Hatcher  (91  Va.  378)  881 

Cribben  v.  Cribben  (136  111.  009)  271 

Crickard  v.  Crickard  (25  Grat.  410)  710 

Crickett  v.  Dolby  (3  Ves.  10)  1007 

Crilev  v.  Chamberlain  (30  Pa.  St.  161)        949 
Crippen  v.  Crippen  (1  Head,  128)     1035,  1036 

493 

50 

425 

874 

612 

990 

71 

254 

156 

1228 

477,  490 

60 

1264 

640 

737 

493 

59, 187 

42 

494 

1130 

899 


332 


v.  Dexter  (13  Grav,  330) 
Crispell  v.  Dubois  (4  Barb.  393) 
Crispin  v.  Winkleman  (57  Iowa,  523) 
Crissman  v.  Crissman  (45  Ired.  498) 

v.  Crissman  (23  Mich.  217) 

Crist  v.  Crist  (1  Ind.  570) 
Crittenden's  Estate  (Myr.  50) 
Croade  v.  Ingraham  (13  Pick.  33) 
Croan  v.  Phelps  (94  Kv.  213) 
Crocker,  In  re,  (105  Cal.  368) 

v.  Chase  (57  Vt.  413) 

v.  Smith  (94  Ala.  295) 

v.  Smith  (10  111.  App.  376) 

Crof  v.  B«.lton  (31  Mo.  355) 

v.  Williams  (88  N.  Y.  384) 

Crofton  v.  Ilsley  (4  Me.  134) 
Crofert  v.  Lavton  (68  Conn.  91) 
Crolius  v.  Stark  (64  Barb.  112) 
Crolly  v.  Clark  (20  Fla.  849) 
Crombie  v.  Engle  (19  N.  J.  L.  82) 
Cromer  v.  Pinckney  (3  Barb.  Ch.  466) 
Cromptou's  Estate  (29  Week.  Notes  Cas. 

36)  6910a 

Cronan  v.  Cotting  (99  Mass.  334)        656,  795 
Crone's  Appeal  (103  Pa.  St.  571)  989 

C:onin's  Estate  (Mvr.  352)  1240 

Croninger  v.  Marthcn  (83  Kv.  662)  865 

Cronise  v.  Hardt  (47  Md.  433)         1070,  1233 
Crook  v.  Bank  (83  Wis.  31)  119 

v.  Whitlev  (7  DeG.  M.  &  G.  490)       899 

Crooke  v.  Coimtv  (97  N.  Y.  431)  650 

v.  Watt  (2  Vem.  124)  145 

Crooker  v.  Jewell  (31  Me.  306)  387 

Crooks's  Estate  (Mvr.  247)  324 

Crosbie  v.  McDoual  (4  Ves.  610)  86,  113 

Crosby's  Estate  (55  Cal.  574)  1028 

Crosbv  v.  Crosbv  (64  N.  H.  77)  941 

v.  Dowd  (61  Cal.  557)  713,  844 

v.  Farmers  Bank  (107  Mo.  436)  242,  244 

■  v.  Mason  (32  Conn.  482)  354,  892 

v.  McWillie  (11  Tex.  94)  808 

Crosgrove  v.  Crosgrove  (69  Conn.  416)  905, 906 
Cross  v.  Basket  (17  Oreg.  84)  1126 

v.  Brown  (51  N.  H.  481)  631,  032 

v.  Johnson  (82  Ga.  67)  713 

v.  Maltby  (L.  R.  20  Eq.  378)  881 

v.  U.  S.  T.  Co.  (131  N.  Y.  330)         1238 

Crossan  v.  McCrary  (37  Iowa,  684)  1129, 

1185,  1258 
Crossby  v.  Geering  (cited  2  Ld.   Raym. 

972)  797 

Grossman  v.  Crossman  (95  N.  Y.  145)  94 

Crosson's  Appeal  (125  Pa.  St.  380)  1057 

Crotty  v.  Eagle  (35  W.  Va.  143)  679 

Crouch  v.  Circuit  Judges  (52  Mich.  596)     854 

v.  Davis  (23  Grat.  62)  975,  976 

v.  Edwards  (52  Ark.  499)  231 

v.  Eveleth  (12  Mass.  503)  1058 

v.  Happer  (5  Lea,  171)  675 

Crow  v.  Conant  (90  Mich.  247)  652,  1141 

v.  Dav  (60  Wis.  637)  861 

v.  Hubard  (62  Md.  560)  164 

■ v.  Wddner  (36  Mo.  412)  299 


*  Page 
Crowder  v.  Shackelford  (35  Miss.  321)    1139, 
1142,  1147,  1207 
Crowe  v.  Peters  (63  Mo.  429)  41 

Crowey,  In  re  (71  Cal.  300)  199,  200 

Crowley  v.  Hicks  (72  Wis.  535)  728 

v.  McCrarv  (45  Mo.  App.  350)  1132 

v.  Mellon  (52  Ark.  1)  231 

Crowninshield  v.  Crowninshield  (2  Gray, 


524) 


36 
1233 

395 

270 

96 

870 

401,  1204 

176,  187 

1139 

915 


Croxall  v.  Shererd  (5  Wall.  268) 
Croxton  v.  Premier  (103  Ind.  223) 
Crozier's  Appeal  (90  Pa.  St.  384) 
Crozier  v.  Brav  (120  N.  Y.  366) 

v.  Cundall  (99  Kv.  202) 

v.  Goodwin  (1  Lea,  368) 

Cruce  v.  Cruce  (21  111.  46) 

v.  Cruce  (81  Mo.  676) 

Cruger  v.  Heyward  (2  Des.  94) 

Cruikshank  v.  Home  (113  N.  Y.  337)  946 

v.  Luttrell  (67  Ala.  318)  1047,  1056, 

1059,  1061,  1064,  1065 
Cruize  v.  Billmire  (69  Iowa,  397)  233,  275 
Crum  v.  Bliss  (47  Conn.  592) 

V.  Meeks  (128  Ind.  360) 

v.  Sawver  (132  111.  443) 

Crumley  v.  Deake  (8  Baxt.  361) 
Crump  v.  Faucett  (70  N.  C.  345) 

v.  Morgan  (3  Ired.  Eq.  91) 

Crunkleton  v.  Wilson  (1  Browne,  361) 


936 

1072 

1221 

276 

149 

224 

414, 

417 

494 

78 

1038 

211 

952 


Crusoe  v.  Butler  (36  Miss.  150) 
Crutcher  v.  Crutcher  (11  Humph.  377) 
Culbertson  v.  Coleman  (47  Wis.  193) 

v.  Cox.  (29  Minn.  209) 

Culin's  Appeal  (20  Pa.  St.  243) 
Cullen  v.  O'Hara  (4  Mich.  132)  418,  427,  672 
Cullerton  v.  Mead  (22  Cal.  95)  807,  846 

Cullum's  Estate  (145  N.  Y.  593)  691  a 

Culpv.  Gulp  (142  Ind.  159)  109 

■  v.  Wilson  (133  Ind.  294)  1218 

Culver  v.  Hardenbergh  (37  Minn.  225)      395, 
569,  1029,  1072 

v.  Haslam  (7  Barb.  314)  41 

Culvert  v.  Yundt  (112  Ind.  401)  339 

Cumberland  v.  Codrington  (3  John.  Ch 


229) 
Cumming's  Appeal  (11  Mont.  196) 

Estate  (153  Pa.  397) 

Cummings  v.  Allen  (34  N.  H.  194) 


1093 

402 

1016 

164,  169, 

189 

699,  1151 

876 

326 


v.  Bradley  (57  Ala.  224) 

v.  Corey  (58  Mich.  494) 

v.  Cummings  (123  Mass.  270) 

v.  Cummings  (143  Mass.  340)  1122,  1230 

v.  Cummings  (146  Mass.  501)  902 

v.  Cummings  (51  Mo.  261)         162,  177, 

187,  231 

390 

1077 

897 

Cas. 

214,  215 

499 

96,  98, 

484 

1031,  1049, 

1059,  1080 

v.  Cauthen  (37  S.  C.  123)  701,  1157 

v.  Cauthen  (44  S.  C.  95)  1157 

v.  Cunningham  (18  B.  Mon.  19)  945 

v.  Parker  (146  N.  Y.  29)  1028,  1268 

L.::i 


v.  Garvin  (65  Me.  301) 

v.  Johnson  (65  Miss.  342) 

v.  Plummer  (94  Ind.  403) 

Cummins  v.  Denton  (1  Tex   Unr. 

181) 
Cunningham's  Estate  (54  Cal.  556) 
Cunningham,  In  re  (3S  Minn.  169) 

v.  Anderson  (107  Mo.  371) 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Cunningham  v.  Souza  (1  Redf.  462)  410,  543 
Cuppy  V.  Coffman  (82  Iowa  214) 
Curd  v.  Benner  (4  Coldw.  632) 

v.  Curd  (9  Humph.  171) 

Curdy  v.  Berton  (79  Cal.  420) 
Curie  v.  Curie  (9  B.  Mon.  309) 

r.  Moore  (1  Dana,  445) 

Curley's  Succession  (18  La.  An.  728) 


Curlev  v.  Hand  (53  Vt.  524) 

v.  Tomlinson  (5  Daly,  283) 

Curling  v.  Curling  (8  Dana,  38) 

v.  Hvde  (10  Mo.  374) 

Curran  t>."Kuby  (37  Minn.  330) 
Curren  v.  Taylor  (19  Oh.  36) 
Currey,  Goods  of  (5  Not.  Cas.  54) 

v.  Warrington  (5  Harr.  147) 

Currie  v.  Currie  (90  N.  C.  553) 

v.  McNeill  (83  N.  C.  176) 

v.  Steele  (2  Sandf .  542) 

v.  Stewart  (26  Miss.  646) 

Currier  v.  Green  (2  N.  H.  225) 

v.  Lowell  (16  Pick.  170) 

Curry  v.  Am.  M.  Co.  (107 'Ala.  429) 

v.  Bratnev  (29  Ind.  195) 

v.  Bryant"  (7  Bush,  301) 

v.  Curry  (10  Hun,  366) 

v.  Currv  (114  Pa.  St.  367) 

v.  Fulkinson  (14  Oh.  100) 

v.  Peebles  (83  Ala.  225) 

v.  People  (54  HI.  263) 

v.  Spencer  (61  N.  H.  624) 

Curser's  Administration  (89  N.  Y.  401) 
Curtis  v.  Bailey  (1  Pick.  199) 

v.  Burt  (34  Ala.  729) 

v.  Curtis  (3  Add.  33) 

v.  Fowler  (66  Mich.  696) 

v.  Fulbrook  (8  Hare,  278) 

V.  Hobart  (41  Me.  230) 

v.  Lukin  (5  Beav.  147) 

v.  National  Bank  (39  Oh.  St.  579) 

v.  Probate  Judge  (35  Mich.  220) 

v.  Stilwell  (32  Barb.  354) 

v.  Sutter  (15  Cal.  259) 

v.  Williams  (33  Ala.  570) 

Curtiss  v.  Beardsley  (15  Conn.  518) 


1149 

1125 

173 

895 

774 

363,  369 

1051, 

1054 

820 

333 

922,  931 

390 

1089 

154 

530 

287 

423 

699 

118 

1046 

1058 

670 

237 

499 

809 

264 

824,  830 

642 

1271 

1064 

691  a 

529 

1182 

530,  582 

486 

131,  1239 

716 


Daball  t>.  Field  (9  R.  I.  266) 


*  Page 
939,  1123 


Curts  v.  Brooks  (71  111.  125) 
Cushing's  Will  (58  Vt.  393) 
Cushing  v.  Avlwin  (12  Met.  169) 

v.  Blake"  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  689)  236,  276,  277, 

1233 

V.  Burrell  (137  Mass.  21)  971 

Cushman  r.  Ilorton  (59  N.  Y.  149)  902 

Cushney  v.  Henry  (4  Pai.  345)  903 

Cusick*i>.  Hammer  (25  Oreg.  472)  523 

Custis  v.  Potter  (1  Houst.  382)  1006,  1008 
Cutcbin  v.  Wilkinson  (1  Call,  1)  516,  535 

Cuthbert  v.  Purrier  (2  Phill.  C.  C.  199)  1015 
Cuihbertson'3  Appeal  (97  Pa.  St.  103)  43,  49 
Cutlar  v.  Quince  (2  Havw.  60)  522,  539 

Cutler  v.  Howard  (9  Wis.  309)  505,  577 

Cutliff  v.  Boyd  (72  Ga.  302)  1219,  1223, 

1242 

1229,  12G6 

625 

656 

117,123,  324 

625 


Cutright  v.  Stanford  (81  111.  240) 
Cutter  v.  Hamlen  (1  17  Mass.  471) 
Cutting?'.  Cutting (86  X.  Y.  522) 

v.  Gilman  Ml  N.  II.  l  17) 

Tower  (14  Gray,  183) 


Cutto  v.  Gilbert  (9  Moo.  P.  C.  131) 

1  \  i  v 


Dabney's  Appeal  (120  Pa.  St.  344)  707 

Daby  v.  Erickson  (45  N.  Y.  786)  283 

Dado  v.  Maguire  (71  Mo.  App.  641)  995 

Dailey  v.  City  (60  Conn.  314)  913,  923 

Daily  v.  Daily  (66  Ala.  266)  757 

Daingerfield  v.  Smith  (83  Va.  67)  651 

Dakin  v.  Dakin  (97  Mich.  284)  268 

v.  Hudson  (6  Cow.  221)  325 

Dale  u.  Gower  (24  Me.  563)  825 

v.  Hanover  (155  Mass.  141)         164,  169 

v.  Hays  (14  B.  Mon.  315)  499 

v.  Lincoln  (62  111.  22)  611 

v.  R.  R.  Co.  (57  Kans.  601)  629 

Daley  v.  Francis  (153  Mass.  8)  1049 

Dallam  v.  Dallam  (7  Harr.  &  J.  220)  950 

Dalrymple  v.  Dalrymple  (2  Hagg.  Cons. 
R.  54)  222 

v.  Gamble  (66  Md.  298)        516,  536,  571 

r.  Gamble  (68  Md.  156)  1149,  1150 

Dalv's  Appeal  (47  Mich.  443)  1049 

Estate  (Tuck.  95)  737 

Daly  v.  Pennie  (86  Cal.  552)  1230 

Daiiieron  v.  Dameron  (19  Mo.  317)  681 

Dammert  17.  Osborn  (140  N.  Y.  30)    375,  925, 

1238 

v.  Osborn  (141  N.  Y.  564)  1239 

Damon  v.  Damon  (8  Allen,  192)  54 

Damouth  v.  Klock  (29  Mich.  289)  414 

Dampier  v.  Trust  Co.  (46  Minn.  526)  759 

Damrell  v.  Hartt  (137  Mass.  218)  878 

Dan  17.  Brown  (4  Cow.  483).,  481 

Dana's  Case  (Tuck.  113)  667 

Danby  u.  Dawes  (81  Me.  30)  436 

Dancy  v.  Pope  (68  N.  C  147)  798 

Dandridge  v.  Minge  (4  Rand.  397)  1105 

Danforth's  Estate  (66  Mo.  App.  586)  761,  1337 
Danforth  v.  Smith  (23  Vt.  247)  260 

Daniel  v.  Board  of  Com'rs  (74  N.  C.  494)  846 

17.  Daniel  (39  Pa.  St.  191 )  43 

v.  Hutcheson  (86  Tex.  51)  373 

17.  Jackson  (53  Ga.  87)  1007,  1064 

v.  Smith  (75  Ark.  548)  123 

17.  Smith  (64  Cal.  340)  122 

v.  Stough  (73  Ala.  379)  1083 

Daniels  v.  Pond  (21  Pick.  367)  604 

17.  Richardson  (22  Pick.  565)  594 

Danielson,  In  re  (88  Cal.  480)  1201 

Danzey  17.  Smith  (4  Tex.  411)  632 

17.  Swinney  (7  Tex.  617)  861 

Darby  17.  Mayer  (10  Wheat.  465)  496,  501 
Darden  17.  Harrill  (10  Lea,  421)  939,  940 

Darke,  Goods  of  (1  Sw.  &  Tr.  516)  509 

Darland  v.  Taylor  (52  Iowa,  503)  124 

Darne  i\  Llovd  (82  Va.  859)  1214,  1216,  1220 
Darnell  17.  Busbv  (50  N.  J.  Eq.  725)  70,  476 
Darrah  17.  Baird"(101  Pa.  St.  265)  606 

Darrel  17.  Eden  (3  Des.  241)  1159 

Darrington  17.  Borland  (3  Port.  9)  1095 

Darrow  17.  Calkins  (154  N.  Y.  503)  289,  290 
Darston  17.  Orford  (Pr.  Ch.  188)  786 

D'Arusment  v.  Jones  (4  Lea,  251)  45  L 

Dascomb  17.  Marston  (80  Me.  223)      922,  1103 
Dashiell  17.  Attorney  General  (5  Harr.  & 
J.  392)  928,  932 

17.  Attorney  General  (6  H.  &  J.  1)      925 

Daudt  v.  Musick  (9  Mo.  App.  109)  212,  271 
Daugherty  17.  Daughertv  (69  Iowa,  677)     267 

17.  Daugherty  (82  Md.  229)  344 

97;  <j8,  v.  Rogers  (119  Ind.  254)      892,  893 

484  Dauser  17.  Jeremiah  (3  Redf.  130)       351 


261 
995 
757 
188 
867 
713 
530 
1202, 
1204 
1202 
1102 
885 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


.  *  Page 
416 
814 
186 
347,  1244 
577 
726 
1187 
654 


Davego,  Ex  parte,  (31  S.  C.  413) 
Davenport's  Estate  (85  Iowa,  293) 
Davenport  v.  Brooks  (92  Ala.  627) 

v.  Caldwell  (10  S.  C.  317) 

t'.  Irvine  (4  J.  J.  Marsh.  60) 

v.  Kirkland  (156  111.  169) 

v.  Lawrence  (19  Tex.  317) 

v.  Richards  (16  Conn.  310) 

v.  Sargent  (63  N.  H.  538)  986, 1098, 1099 

Davers  v.  Dewes  (3  P.  Wms.  40)  1019 

Davey  v.  Turner  (1  Dall.  11)  248 

David  v.  David  (56  Ala.  49)  198 

Davidson  v.  Coon  (125  Ind.  497)  1100 

v.  Davidson  (28  La.  An.  269)  1048,  1083 

v.  Davis  (86  Mo.  440)  201,  212 

v.  Moore  (14  S.  C.  251)  1164 

v.  Potts  (7  Ired.  Eq.  272)  432 

Davie  v.  Briggs  (97  U.  S.  628)  445 

v.  McDaniel  (47  Ga.  195)  325,  1030,  1037 

v.  Stevens  (10  La.  An.  496) 

Davies,  Goods  of  (2  Curt.  628) 

v.  Bush  (1  Younge,  341) 

v.  Hodgson  (25  Beav.  177) 

v.  Hughes  (86  Va.  909) 

v.  Steele  (38  N.  J.  Eq.  168) 

v.  Topp  (1  Bro.  Ch.  524) 

v.  Wattier  (1  Sim.  &.  Stu.  463) 

Davis's  Appeal  (23  Pa.  St.  206) 

Appeal  (34  Pa.  St.  256) 

Estate  (65  Cal.  309) 

Estate  (36  Iowa,  24) 

Estate  (1  Phila.  360) 

Davis,  In  re  (69  Cal.  468) 

In  re  (106  Cal.  453) 

la  re  (120  N.  C.  9) 

—  In  re  (62  Mo.  450) 

Succession  of  (12  La.  An.  399) 

- — -  v.  Bartholomew  (3  Ind.  485) 

■ v.  Ballard  (7  T.  B.  Mon.  603) 

v.  Brandon  (1  How.  Miss.  154) 

v.  Callahan  (78  Me.  313) 

v.  Calvert  (5  G.  &  J.  269) 

v.  Chapman  (83  Va.  67) 

v.  Christian  (15  Grat.  11) 

v.  Clark  (58  Kans.  454) 

v.  Connellv  (4  B.  Mon.  136) 

v.  Crandal'l  (101  N.  Y.  311) 

v.  Davis  (2  Addams,  223) 

v.  Davis  (6  Ala.  611) 

v.  Davis  (96  Ga.  136) 

Davis  (31  L.  J.,  P.  M.  &  A.  216)   510 


566 

520 

986 

292 

1222 

916 

1272 

996 

1180 

190 

1172 

229,  231 

1170 

212 

516,  517 

57 

1137,  1138 

542 

250 

336 

1068 

1018 

31,  45 

651 

281,  282 

748 

371,  416 

966,  1012, 

1014,  1128 

481 

1128,  1231 

390 


249. 


v.  Davis  (123  Mass.  590)  47 

v.  Davis  (5  Mo.  183)  128 

—  v.  Davis  (8  Mo.  56)  892 

v.  Davis  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  13)  901,  1008 

v.  Dunn  (74  Ga.  36)  201 

v.  Durgin  (64  N.  H.  51)  1244 

v.  Eastman  (66  Vt.  651)  1129 

v.  Eastman  (68  Vt.  225)  1129 

■  v.  Estey  (8  Pick.  475)  375,  377 

v.  Fogle  (124  Ind.  41)  112 

v.  Ford  (15  Wash.  107)  1079 

v.  Francisco  (11  Mo.  573)  686 

■  v.  French  (20  Me.  21)     '  795 

v.  Gallagher  (124  N.  Y.  487)  794 

v.  Gowner  (85  Me.  167)  183,  192 

v.  Harwood  (70  Tex.  71)  1255 

v.  Hoover  (112  Ind.  423)    718,  719,  1023 

v.  Howard  (56  Ga.  430)  1030 

v.  Inscoe  (84  N.  C.  396)  513 

VOL.  I.  —  e 


Davis  v.  King  (89  N.  C.  441) 

v.  Krug  (95  Ind.  1) 

v.  Logan  (9  Dana,  185) 

v.  Marcum  (4  Jones  Eq.  189) 

v.  Mason  (1  Pet.  503) 

v.  Milligan  (88  Ala.  523) 


•Pag© 
95,  112 
141 
233 
698 
276,  277 
789 


v.  Miller  (106  Ala.  154)        525,  562,  572 

v.  Newman  (2  Kob.  Va.  664)  1229 

v.  Newton  (6  Met.  Mass.  537)  1015 

v.  N.  Y.  etc.  (143  Mass.  301)  630 

v.  Nichols  (45  Ark.  358)  628 

v.  Perrv  (96  N.  C.  260)  1029 

v.  Phillips  (32  Tex.  564)  363 

v.  Railway  (53  Ark.  117)  628 

v.  Rowe  (6  Rand.  355)  131 

r.  Rogers  (1  Houst.  44)  52,  76 

v.  Rogers  (1  Houst.  183)  468 

v.  Semmis  (51  Ark.  48)  71 

v.  Shuler  (14  Fla.  438)  397,  566,  567 

v.  Sigournev  (8  Met.  Mass.  487)  482,  484 

v.  Smith  (82  Ala.  198)  290 

v.  Smith  (5  Ga.  274)  673,  678,  775,  777, 

779,  791 

v.  Smith  (75  Mo.  219)  340,  816,  817 

v.  Smith  (58  N.  H.  16)  531,  564 

v.  Stewart  (4  Tex.  223)  1061,  1062,  1194 

v.  Stinson  (53  Me.  493)  147 

— -  v.  Swanson  (54  Ala.  277)  631 

v.  Taul  (6  Dana,  51)  883,  936 

v.  Touchstone  (45  Tex.  490)    1037,  1047, 

1062 

v.  Vansands  (45  Conn.  600)      1228,  1271 

v.  Walford  (2  Ind.  88)  558,  738 

v.  Walker  (2  Harr.  125)  1146 

—  v.  Whittaker  (38  Ark.  435)  978 

v.  Williams  (85  Tenn.  646)        917,  1102 

v.  Wright  (2  Hill  S.  C.  560)  1138 

r;.  Yerby  (1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  508) 

Davison's  Will  (Tuck.  479) 
Davison  v.  Rake  (44  N.  J.  Eq.  506) 

v.  Rake  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  767) 

v.  Whittelsey  (  1  McArth.  163) 

Davisson  v.  Burgess  (31  Oh.  St.  78) 
Davoue  v.  Fanning  (2  John.  Ch.  252) 

Davys  v.  Boucher  (3  Y.  &  Coll.  397) 
Dawdy  v.  Nelson  (12  111.  App.  74) 
Dawes  v.  Bovlston  (9  Mass.  337) 

v.  Head  (3  Pick.  128) 

v.  Shed  (15  Mass.  6) 


697, 
1064 
494 
1005 
1006 
255 
1033 
700, 
701,  718 
978 
823 
375,  387 
375,  376,  377 
841,  866 
—  v.  Winship  (5  Pick.  96,  note)  692 

Dawkins  v.  Dawkins  (104  N.  C.  301)        1080 
Dawson  v.  Dawson  (Rice  Eq.  243)  61 

v.  Dawson  (2  Strobh.  Eq.  34)  61 

v.  Eustice  (148  111.  346)  1206 

v.  Godfrey  (4  Cra.  321)  22 

v.  Macknet  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  633)  1219 

v.  Parham  (47  Ark.  215)  1067 

v.  Small  (L.  R.  18  Eq.  114)  934 

v.  Smith  (3  Houst.  335)  91,  98 

Day,  Ex  parte  (1  Bradf.  476)  57 

Day's  Succession  (3  La.  An.  624)  1173 

Day  v.  Adams  (42  Vt.  510)  197,  205 

v.  Brown  (2  Ohio,  345)  1066 

v.  Cochran  (24  Miss.  261)  277 

v.  Dav  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  549)  52,  484 

v.  Graham  (97  Mo.  398)  859,  1031 

v.  Micou  (18  Wall.  156)  337 

v.  Wallace  (144  111.  256)  874 

Dayhuff  v.  Dayhuff  (27  Ind.  158)  828 

Ixv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*Page 
Dayton  v.  Bartlett  (38  Oh.  St.  357)  286 

v.  Donart  (22  Kan.  256)  195,  206 

■ r.  Fisher  (34  Ind.  356)  612 

v.  Mintzer  (22  Minn.  393)  326,  1052 

v.  Wilkes  (17  How.  Pr.  510)  292 

Deadenck  v.  Cantrell  (10  Yerg.  263)  738 

Deake,  Appellant  (80  Me.  50)  466 

Deakins  v.  Hollis  (7  Gill  &  J.  311)         71,  75 
Dean's  Appeal  (87  Pa.  St.  24)  1031,  1033 

Estate  (62  Gal.  613)  1197 

Succession  (33  La.  An.  867)  669 

Dean  v.  Bisjgers  (27  Ga.  73)  393,  406 

—  v.  Central  Press  Co.  (64  Ga.  670)      1022 


v.  Dean  (3  Mass.  25 

v.  Dean  (7  T.  B.  Mon.  304) 

v.  Dean  (27  Vt.  746) 

v.  Dean  (43  Vt.  337) 

v.  Duffield  (8  Tex.  235) 

o.  Hart  (62  Ala.  308) 

v.  Mumford  (102  Mich.  510) 

o.  Xe^lev  (41  Pa.  St.  312) 

v.  Flunked  (136  Mass.  195) 

v.  Rounds  (18  R.  L  436) 

v.  Superior  Court  (03  Cal.  473) 

v.  Wade  (8  La.  An.  85) 

v.  Warnock  (98  Pa.  St.  565) 

Deane  v.  Shaughnessv  (128  Mass.  242) 
Deans  t;.  Wilcoxson  (25  Fla.  980)        356 


1038 

741,  742 

37,  70 

124 

806,  812 

267,  273 

273 

48 

288 

1105 

1258 

1044 

830 

818 

,  845 


965 


Dearborn  v.  Preston  (7  Allen,  192)  150,  1237, 

1246 

v.  Taylor  (18  N.  H.  153)  249 

Deardsley"?;.  Fleming  (Cas.  Temp.  Lee, 

98)  51 

Dearing,  Matter  of  (4  Dem.  81)  589 

Dearman  v.  Dearman  (4  Ala.  521)  695 

Deas  v.  Spann  (Harp.  Ch.  176)  1167 

Dease  v.  Cooper  (40  Miss.  114)  190 

De  Bar  v.  Priest  (6  Mo.  App.  531)  250 

De  Barante  v.  Gott  (6  Barb.  492)  608 

Deberry  v.  Ivey  (2  Jones  Eq.  370)  651,  708 
Debesse  v.  Napier  (1  McCord,  106)  419 

Debinson  v.  Emmons  (158  Mass.  592)  123 

De  Boisblanc's  Succession  (32  La.  An.  17)  180 
De  Bruler  v.  Ferguson  (54  Ind.  549)  922 

De  (amp  v.  Dobbins  (29  N.  J.  Eq.  36)  934 
De  ( lastro  v.  Barrv  (18  Cal.  96)  1244 

v.  Richardson  (25  Cal.  49)  336 

Deck  v.  Gerke  (12  Cal.  433)  357,  1123 

v.  Gherke  (6  Cal.  666)  1155 

Decker  v.  Decker  (121  111.  341)  889,  893,  894, 

1018,  1096 

v.  Decker  (74  Me.  465)     1084, 1089, 1091 

v.  Fisher  (4  Barb.  592)  596 

v.  Morton  (1  Redf.  477)  345 

De  <  lonncillio  v.  Brownrigg  (51  N.  J.  Eq. 

532)  1039 

Deco8ter  o.  Wing  (76  Me.  450  146 

Decrow  v.  Moodv  (73  Me.  100)  1012 

Decuir'a  Succession  (23  La.  An.  166)  577,  581 
De  Diemar  v.  Van  Wagenen  (7  John. 

404)  683 

Deeka  v.  Strutt  (5  Term  R.  690)  993 

I  li  i  m  v.  Millikin  (6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  357)  131 
Deen  v.  Cozzena  (7  Robt.  178)  575 

Deere  v.  Chapman  (25  111.  610)  200 

Deenng  v.  Adame  (34  Me.  41)  1194 

r.  Beard  (48  fans.  L6)  200 

v.  Kerfool  (89  Va.  491)  769 

Deery  o.  Hamilton  (41  [owa,  6)  731,  732, 
v.  Tildon  (2  La.  An.  412)        437,1063, 

1078 
Ixvi 


De  Flechier's  Succession  (1  La.  An.  20)    401, 

577 
Deford  v.  Deford  (36  Md.  168)  917,  943 

De  France  v.  Johnson  (26  Fed.  R.  891)       223 
Defreese  v.  Lake  (109  Mich.  4,  5)       891,  900, 

916 
Defriez  v.  Coffin  (155  Mass.  203)  1242 

De  Graff  v.  Went  (164  111.  485)  20 

De  Greaver  v.  Super.  Ct.  (117  Cal.  640)     704 
De  Groff  v.  Terpenning  (14  Hun,  301)       978, 

981 
De  Harn  v.  Railway  (80  Tex.  68)  630 

Dehart  v.  Dehart  (i5  Ind.  167)  340,  815 

De  Haven's  Appeal  (106  Pa.  St.  112)        1057 
Deichman's  Appeal  (2  Whart.  395)  775 

Deichman  v.  Arndt  (49  N.  J.  Eq.  106)        975 
Deig  v.  Morehead  (110  Ind.  451)  469 

Deihl  v.  King  (6  Serg.  &  R.  29)  950 

Delabigarre  v.  Second  Municipality  (3  La. 

An.  230)  684 

Delalield  v.  Barlow  (107  N.  Y.  535)  727 

v.  Parish  (25  N.  Y.  9)  31,  32,  44,  89 

v.  Parish  (1  Redf.  1)  105 

v.  Schuchardt  (2  Dem.  435)  711 

v.  Shipman  (34  Hun,  514)  937 

De  La  Guerra  v.  Packard  (17  Cal.  182)       427 
De  Lane's  Case  (2  Brev.  167)  549,  581 

Delanev's  Estate  (49  Cal.  76)  1023 

Delaney  v.  Salina  (34  Kan.  532)  31 

v.  Von  Aulen  (84  N.  Y.  16)  1102 

Delano  v.  Bruerton  (148  Mass.  619)  141 

Delanv  v.  Noble  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  441)  1234 

Delaplaine,  In  re  (5  Dem.  398)  482 

v.  Lawrence  (3  N.  Y.  301)        1060, 1061 


De  La  Salle  v.  Moorat  (L.  R.  11  Eq.  8) 
De  La  Saussaye,  In  re  (L.  R.  3  P.  &  D. 

(42) 
De  Laurencel  v.  De  Boom  (67  Cal   362) 
Delaware,  &c.  R.  R.  v.  Gilbert  (44  Hun, 

201) 
Delay  v.  Vinal  (1  Met.  Mass.  57) 
De  Leon  v.  Barrett  (22  S.  C.  412) 
Delmotte  v.  Taylor  (1  Redf.  417) 
Deltzer  ».  Scheiister  (37  111.  301) 
Demarest's  Estate  (1  Civ.  Pr.  R. 


1118 

101 

902 

689 
271 
1146 
116,  120 
171,  187 
302)        541 
Demarest  v.  Wvnkoop  (3  John.  Ch.  129)   595 
Dement  v.  Harth  (45  Miss.  388)  1125 

Demill  v.  Reid  (71  Md.  175)  896 

Deming's  Appeal  (34  Conn.  201)  857 

Demniert  V.  Schnell  (4  Redf.  409)  47 

Demond  v.  Boston  (7  Grav,  544)  622 

Dempscv's  Will  (Tuck.  51)  513 

Dempse'v  r.  McNallv  (73  Md.  433)  385 

Den  v.  Combs  (18  N.  J.  L.  27)  880 

o.  Dodd  (6  N.  J.  L.  367)  254 

v.  English  (17  N.  J.  L.  280)  881 

v.  Gibbons  (22  N.  J.  L.  117)      34,  37,  47 

v.  Hance  (11  N.  J.  L.  244)  952 

v.  Hunt  (11  N.  J.  L.  1)  1045 

v.  Jaques  (10  N.  J.  L.  259)       1268,  1271 

v.  Johnson  (5  N.  J.  L.  454)  43 

v.  Johnson  (17  N.  J.  L.  87)  247 

o.  Mugwav  (15  N.  J.  L.  330)  881 

v.  McMurtrie  (15  N.  J.  L.  276)  880 

v.  Messenger  (33  N.  J.  L.  499)  953 

v.  Vancleve  (5  N.  J.  L.  589)  43 

Deneale  v.  Morgan  (5  Call,  407)  724 

Denegre  V.  Demure  (33  La.  An.  689)  350 

Denholm  v.  McKav  (148  Mass.  434)  285, 

291,  1087 
Deni  v.  Pa.  R.  R.  (181  Pa.  St.  525)  627 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Denise  v.  Denise  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  163) 


Page 
940, 
1236 
490 
896 
719 
722 
883 
599 
684 
629 


Denison's  Appeal  (29  Conn.  399) 
Denlinger's  Estate  (170  Pa.  St.  104) 
Denn  v.  King  (1  N.  J.  L.  432) 
Denne  o.  Judge  (11  East,  288) 
Dennett  v.  Dennett  (40  N.  H.  498) 

v.  Hopkinson  (63  Me.  350) 

Dennev  v.  Parker  (10  Wash.  218) 
Dennick  v.  Railroad  (103  U.  S.  11) 
Denning  v.  Butcher  (91  Iowa,  425)    41,  49,  76 

v.  Tod  (91  Term.  422)  407 

Dennis's  Estate  (67  Iowa,  110)  178 

Dennis  v.  Warder  (3  B.  Mon.  173)  890 

v.  Winter  (63  Cal.  10)  1089 

Dennison  v.  Talmage  (29  Oh.  St.  433)       499, 

1192,  1199 
Dennistoun  v.  Hubbell  (10  Bosw.  155)  779 
Denny  v.  Denny  (113  Ind.  22)  177 

v.  Faulkner  (22  Kan.  89)  366 

v  Moore  (13  Ind-  418)  828 

v.  Pinnev  (60  Vt.  524)       48,  69,  70,  474 

v.  Turner  (2  Mo.  App.  52)  286,  300 

Densler  v.  Edwards  (5  Ala.  31)  419 

Denson  v.  Beazlev  (34  Tex.  191)  34,  42 

v.  Mitchell  (26  Ala.  360)  874,  884 

Dent  v.  Ashlev  (Hemps.  54)  360,  361 

Denton,  In  re  (33  Hun,  317)  1012 

In  re  (102  N.  Y.  200)  1000.  1012 

v.  Clark  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  534)  719,  720,  884 

—  v.  Franklin  (9  B.  Mon.  28)  48 

v.  Sandford  (103  N.  Y.  607)      711,  1126 

v.  Tyson  (118  N.  C  542)  176,186, 

1039 
Deobold  v.  Oppermann  (111  N.  Y.  531)    547, 

693 
De  Pevster  v.  Clarkson  (2  Wend.  77)        1177 

v.  Clendining  (8  Pai.  295)  512,  885 

Depriest  v.  Patterson  (92  N.  C.  399)  700 

Dequindre  v.  Williams  (31  Ind.  444)  329, 

1089 
Deraismes  r.  Deraismes  (72  N.  Y.  154)  1151 
Derbv  v.  Derby  (4  K.  I.  414)  96,  1005 

"v.  Jackman  (89  Cal.  1)  805 

Derickson  v.  Garden  (5  Del.  Ch.  323)         950 
Deringer  v.  Deringer  (5  Houst.  416)    368,  509 

v.  Deringer  (6  Houst.   64)  809 

De  Rosa  v.  De  Pinna  (2  Cas.  Temp.  Lee, 

390) 
Derrv's  Estate  (Myr.  202) 
De  Saussure  v.  Lyons  (9  S.  C.  492) 
Desesbats  v.  Berquier  (1  Binn.  336) 
Desnoyer  v.  Jordan  (27  Minn.  295) 
Despa'rd  v.  Churchill  (53  N.  Y.  192) 


507 
71 
718 
495 
608,  642 
375, 
379,  1238 
Destrehan  v.  Destrehan  (4  Mart.  n.  s 
557) 

v.  Destrehan  (16  Mart.  557) 

Desverges  v.  Desverges  (31  Ga.  753) 
Detweiler's  Appeal  (44  Pa.  St.  243) 
Detwiller  v.  Hartman  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  347)  917, 

934 
Deupree  v.  Deupree  (45  Ga.  414)  107 

De  Valengin  v.  Duffy  (14  Pet.  282)     394,  645 
Devaughn  v.  Devaughn  (19  Grat.  556)       260 
De  Vaughn  v.  Hutchinson  (165  U.  S. 
566) 

v.  McLeroy  (82  Ga.  687) 

Devaynes  v.  Robinson  (24  Beav.  86) 
De  Veaux  v.  De  Veaux  (1  Strobh.Eq. 
283) 


1216 

150 

1242 

1S7 


901 
726 
732 

896 


♦Page 
Devecmon  v.  Devecmon  (43  Md.  335)  77 

v.  Shaw  (70  Md.  219)  944,  1001 

Devereaux  v.  Devereaux  (78  N.  C.  386)  1097 
Devincinzi  v.  Figone  (119  Cal.  498)  1036, 

1049 
Devlin  v.  Commonwealth  (101  Pa.  St. 

273)  451 

Devling  v.  Little  26  Pa.  St.  502)  734 

Devol  v.  Dye  (123  Ind.  321)  116,  118 

Dew  v.  Barnes  (1  Jones  Eq.  149)  880 

v.  Clark  (3  Add.  Eccl.  R.  79)     33,  34,  35 

v.  Reed  (52  Ohio.  fct.  519)  500 

Dewar's  Estate  (10  Mont.  422)  1195 

Dewar's  Estate  (10  Mont.  426)  1176 

Dewey,  Matter  (153  N.  Y.  63)  1002 

v.  Dewev  (1  Met.  Kv.  349)  68 

v.  Van  Deusen  (4  Pick.  19)  595 

De  Witt  v.  Barlev  (13  Barb.  314)  41 

v.  Brands  (10  Atl.  181)  1220 

v.  Sewing  Machine  Co.  (17  Neb. 

533) 
Dewitt  v.  Yates  (10  Johns.  156) 
De  Wolf  v.  Lawsou  (61  Wis.  469) 


201 
969,  970 
727,  917, 

920 
237,  242 


1255 
1208 
1195 

876 
923,  934 

636 

638 
1052" 

199 


975 

333 

1130 

1130 

284 


v.  Murphy  (11  R.  I.  630) 

Dexheimer  v.  Gautier  (5  Rob.  N.  Y.  216)  120, 

121 
Dexter  v.  Arnold  (3  Mason,  284) 

v.  Brown  (3  Mass.  32) 

v.  Codman  (148  Mass.  421) 

v.  Evans  (63  Conn.  58) 

v.  Gardner  (7  Allen,  243) 

v.  Haves  (88  Iowa,  493) 

v.  Phillips  (121  Mass.  178) 

v.  Shepard  (117  Mass.  480) 

v.  Strobach  (56  Ala.  233) 

Dev  v.  Codman  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  258)    731,  1145, 

1151 

v.  Williams  (2  D.  &  B.  Eq.  66) 

Dev  Ermand,  Matter  of  (24  Hun,  1) 
Deyo,  In  re  (36  Hun,  512) 

In  re  (102  N.  Y.  724) 

Dial  v.  Agnew  (28  S.  C.  454) 

v.  Gary  (14  S.  C.  573)  358,  360,  368 

Diament  v.  Lore  (31  N.  J.  L.  220)  1102,  1244 
Diamond  v.  Shell  (15  Ark.  26)  384,  410 

Dice  v.  Irvin  (110  Ind.  561)  610 

Dick  v.  Harbv  (48  S.  C.  516)  718 

Dicken  v.  McKinlev  (163  111.  318)  59 

Dickens  v.  Bush  (23  Ala.  849)  336 

v.  Miller  (12  Mo.  App.  408)  444 

Dickenson  v.  Stewart  (1  Mur.  99)  499 

Dickerman  v.  Eddinger  (168  Pa.  St.  240)  1097 
Dickerson's  Appeal  (55  Conn.  223)  886,  1193 
Dickeschied  v.  Bank  (28  W.  Va.  340)  117,  120 
Dickey  v.  Dickev  (8  Colo.  App.  141)  827 

v.  Malechi  (0  Mo.  177)  74,  483,  484 

v.  Vann  (81  Ala.  425)  337,  493,  502 

Dickhaut  v.  State  (85  Md.  451)  456 
Dickie  v.  Carter  (42  111.  376)  70 
r.  Dickie  (80  Ala.  57)        789,  1140,  1153 

1188 
Dickinson's  Appeal  (42  Conn.  491)  157 

Appeal  (54  Conn.  224)  434 

Estate  (148  Pa.  St.  142)  123a 

Dickinson  v.  Calahan  (19  Pa.  St.  227)        688 

v.  Dickinson  (29  Conn.  601)  291 

v.  Dickinson  (61  Pa.  St.  401)  28,  72 

v.  Dutcher  (Bravt.  104)  685 

v.  Haves  (31  Conn.  417)     326,  329,  1254 

v.  McGraw  (4  Rand.  158)  359 

lxvii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Dickinson  v.  Purvis  (8  S.  &  R.  71)  936 

Dickison  v.  Dickisou  (138  111.  541)  874 

Dicknian  v.  Birkhauser  (16  Neb.  686)         204 
Dickson,  Ex  parte  (1  Sim.  n.  s.  37)  958 

v.  Crawlev  (112  N.  C.  629)  696 

v.  Field  (77  Wis.  439)  952 

v.  Montgomery  (1  Swan,  348)  930 

v.  United  States  (125  Mass.  31 1)         913 

v.  Wilkinson  (3  How.  U.  S.  57)  792 

Diehls  Appeal  (33  Pa.  St.  406)  104;J 

Diehl  v.  Miller  (56  Iowa,  313)  1258 

Dietrick  ».  Dieirick  (6  Serg.  &  R.  207)  45 
Diez,  In  res  (50  N.  Y.  88)  57 

Digby  v.  Howard  (8  Bligh,  n.  s.  224)         613 

v.  Howard  (4  Sim.  488)  613 

Dilbone  v.  Moorer  (14  Ala.  426)  805 

Dildine  ».  Dildine  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  78)  935,  938 
Dillabaugh's  Estate  (4  Watts,  177)  697 

Dillard  b.  Dillard  (77  Va.  820)  1151 

c.  Dillard  (76  Va.  208)  409 

v.  Harris  (2  Tenn.  Ch.  196)  370 

Dille  v.  Webb  (61  Ind.  85)  1223 

Dillev  v.  Love  (61  Md.  603)  1218,  1219,  1223, 

1224 
Dillinger  v.  Kellev  (84  Mo.  561)  1085 

Dillingbam  v.  We'ston  (21  Me.  263)  855 

Dill  man  v.  Barber  (114  Ind.  403)  1130 

Dillon,  In  re  (L.  R.  44  Ch.  D.  76)  119 

v.  Parker  (1  Swanst.  359)  1016 

Dilworth  v.  Mavfield  (36  Miss.  40)  290 

v.  Rice  (48  Mo.  124)  724 

Dimes  v.  Grand  Junction  Canal  (3  H.  L. 

Cas.  759)  1085 

Dingle  v.  Pollick  (49  Mo.  App.  479)  342,  802 
Uingman  v.  Dingman  (39  Oh.  St.  172)  241 
Dinsmoor  v.  Bressler  (164  111.  211)     347,  681. 

682 
Diocese  v.  Diocese  (102  N.  C.  442)  888 

Disbrow  v.  Durand  (54  N.  J.  L.  343)  824 

Dirmever  v.  O'Hern  (39  La.  An.  961)  1206 
Ditch  v.  Sennott  (117  111.  362)  1016 

Ditmar  v.  BoSle  (53  Ala.  169)  704 

Ditsche's  Estate  (13  Phila.  288)  345 

Ditson  v.  Ditson  (85  Iowa,  276)  206 

Diversev  v.  Johnson  (93  111.  547)  1255 

v.  Smith  (103  111.  378)  626 

Dix  v.  Morris  (66  Mo.  514)  1142 

Dixon's  Appeal  (55  Pa.  St.  424)  93 

Dixon  p.  Aldrich  (127  Ind.  296)  176 

v.  Buell  (21  111.  203)  815 

v.  Cassell  (5  Oh.  533)  429 

v.  Cooper  (88  Tenn.  177)  939 

v.  D'Armond  (23  La.  An.  200)  492 

v.  Dixon  (4  La.  188)  1239 

v.  Dixon  (18  Oh.  R.  113)  640,  642 

v.  Marston  (64  N.  H.  433)  1222 

v.  Mason  (68  Ga.  478)  336 

v.  McCue  (14  Grat.  540)  267 

v.  Ramsav  (3  <  !r.  319)  358,  374,  410 

v.  Storm  (5  Kcdf.  419)  1236 

Doak's  Estate  (46  Cal.  573)  399 

Doarj  v.  ilit.lv  (40  Oh.  St.  588)  1033,  1073 
Doane  v.  Doane  (40  Vt.  485)  201 

v.  Hadlock  (42  Me.  72)  92,  93 

Dobard  '••  Bayhi  (36  La.  An.  134)  1057 

Dobbentein  r.  Murphy  (64  Minn.  127)  254 
Dobbina  >•.  Balfacre  (52  Miss.  661)  1231 

Dobba  v.  Cockerbam  (2  Port.  328)  1158 

v.  Prothro  (55  I  la.  71)  828 

Dobaon,  <;<>„ds  of  (L  It.  1  P.  &  D.  88)        55 

V.  Butler  (17  Mo.  87)  182,  184,  520 

lxviii 


•Page 

Dobvns  v.  McGovern  (15  Mo.  662)  559 

Dochersperger  v.  Drake  (167  111.  122)  691  a 

Doehrel  v.  Hillmer  (102  Iowa,  171)  23 
Dockerv  v.  McDowell  (40  Ala.  476)  699,  1170 

Dockrav  v.  Milliken  (76  Me.  517)  265 

Dockstader,  In  re  (6  Dem.  106)  472 

Dockum  v.  Robinson  (26  N.  H.  372)  84 

Dodd  v.  Winship  (144  Mass.  461)  1154 

Dodds  v.  Dodds  (26  Iowa,  311)  203 

t>.  Walker  (9  111.  App.  37)  1268 

Dodge's  Appeal  (106  Pa.  St.  216)  902 

Dodge  v.  Aycrigg  (12  N.  J.  Eq.  82)  249 

v.  Dodge  (31  Barb.  413)  268 

v.  Manning  (1  N.  Y.  298)  1099 

v.  McNeil  (62  N.  H.  168)  680 

- —  v.  Pond  (23  X.  Y.  69)  726 

v.  Williams  (46  Wis.  70)  726 

Dodgson,  Goods  of  (1  Sw.  &  Tr.  259)  407 

Dodson  v.  Ball  (60  Pa.  St.  492)  608 

v.  McKelvev  (93  Mich.  263  774 

v.  Nevitt  (5  Mont.  518)  757 

v.  Sevars  (53  N.  J.  Eq.  347)  1268 

v.  Simpson  (2  Hand.  294)  693 

v.  Tavlor  (53  N.  J.  L.  200)  1268 

Doe  v.  Anderson  (5  Ind.  33)  1030,  1038 

v.  Barford  (4  M.  &  Sel.  10)  105 

v.  Bernard  (7  Sin.  &  M.  319)  257 

v.  Cassidv  (9  Ind.  63)  1066 

u.  Clarke  (2  H.  Black.  399)  155 

v.  Gallini  (5  B.  &  Ad.  621)  877 

v.  Gwillim  (5  B.  &  Ad.  621)  871 

v.  Hardy  (52  Ala.  291)  338 

v.  Harvey  (3  Ind.  104)  1089 

v.  Hileman  (2  111.  323)  1048 

v.  Robertson  (11  Wheat.  332)  22 

v.  Koe  (30  Ga.  961)  329 

v.  Sheffield  (13  East,  526)  943 

v.  Stuigis  (7  Taunt.  217)  991 

Doebler's  Appeal  (64  Pa.  St.  9)  881,  955 

Doerge  v.  Heimeuz  (1  Mo.  App.  238)        805, 
841,  842,  1051 


Dogan  v.  Brown  (44  Miss.  235) 
Domett  v.  Dill  (108  111.  560) 
Dohertv  v.  Choate  (16  Lea,  192) 
Dohs  v.  Dohs  (60  Cal.  255) 
Dolan,  In  re  (88  N.  Y.  309) 

v.  Dolan  (91  Ala.  152) 

Dole  v.  Irish  (2  Barb.  639) 
v.  Lincoln  (31  Me.  422) 


1128 

287 

1042 

841,  1257 

1047,  1048 

357 

443 

117,  118,  120, 

122 

Dolfield  v.  Kroh  (quoted  66  Md.  495)        1172 
Domestic,  &c.  Soc.  v.  Reynolds  (9  Md. 

341)  893 

Donahav  v.  Hall  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  720)  516 

Donald  "v.  MtWhorter  (44  Miss.  124)  761 

Donaldson,  Goods  of  (2  Curt.  386)  85 

v.  Lewis  (7  Mo.  App.  403)  399,  444,  571, 

581,  1198 

v.  Raborg  (26  Md.  312)  394 

Donegan  v.  Wade  (70  Ala.  501)  960 

Doney  v.  Clark  (55  Ohio  St.  294)  631 

Donnell  v.  Braden  (70  Iowa,  551)  835 

Donnelly's  Estate  (3  Phila.  18)  1146 

Wi'll  (68  Iowa,  126)  48,  470,  1208 

Donnelly  v.  Donnelly  (8  B.  Mon.  113)        223 
Donnerberg  v.  Oppenheimer   (15  Wash. 

290)  841 

Donnington  v.  Mitchell  (2  N.  J.  Eq.  243)  516, 

642 
Donnor  v.  Quartermas  (90  Ala.  164)  1245 

Douohoo  i'.  Lea  (I  Swan,  119)  103 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Donohue  v.  Donohue  (54  Kans.  136) 
Donovan's  Appeal  (41  Conn.  551) 
Doo  v.  Brabant  (4  T.  R.  706) 
Doogan  v.  Elliott  (43  Iowa,  342) 
Doo'lan  v.  McCnrlev  (66  Cal.  476) 
Doolittle  v.  Holton"(28  Vt.  819) 


Page 
1099 
340 
937 
866 
714 
330,  1089 


v.  Lewis  (7  John.  Ch.  45)     359,  364,  375 
Dooly  v.  Russell  (10  Wash.  195)  1073 

Dorah  t;.  Dorah  (4  Oh.  St.  292)  177 

Doran  v.  Doran  (99  Cal.  311)  121 

v.  Mullen  (78  III.  342)  469,  472 

Doremus,  In  re  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  234)  1138 

Dorman.  In  re  (5  Dem.  112)  34 

v.  Lane  (6  111.  143)  1025 

Dornick  v.  Reichenback  (10  S.  &  R.  84)       42 
Dorr  v.  Commonwealth  (1  Mass.  293)       1252 

v.  Wainwright  (13  Pick.  328)       383,  391 

Dorrance  v  Raynsford  (67  Conn.  1)  1030 

Dorries's  Succession  (37  La.  An.  833)        489 
Dorris,  In  re  (93  Cal.  611)  532 

Dorsett  v.  Frith  (25  Ga.  537)  424 

Dorsev  v.  Dorsev  (5  J.  J.  Marsh.  280)        358 

v.  Sheppard  (12  Gill  &  J.  192)      83,  489 

v.  Smithson  (6  H.  &  J.  61)  417,  420,  632 

v.  Warfield  (7  Md.  65)  76,  1194 

Dorsheimer  v.  Rorback  (23  N.  J.  Eq.  46)  1231. 

1246 
Dortch  v.  Dortch  (71  N.  C.  224)  652 

Dossev  v.  Pitman  (81  Ala.  381)  195,  197,  201, 

215 
Douce,  Goods  of  (2  Sw.  &.  Tr.  593)  63 

Dougherty  v.  Barnes  (64  Mo.  159)       268,  270 

v.  Bartlett  (100  Cal.  496)  346 

v.  Dougherty  (4  Met.  Kv.  25)  55 

v.  Stephenson  (20  Pa.  St.  210)  686 

v.  Van  Nostrand  (1  Hoff.  Ch.  68)        292 

Doughten  v.  Vandever  (5  Del.  Ch.  51)      923, 

928  932 
Doughty  v.  Stillwell  (1  Bmdf.  300)  '  '  '  883 
Douglas  v.  Cameron  (47  Neb.  358)  147 

v.  James  (66  Vt.  21)  897 

Douglass  v.  Boylston  (69  Ga.  186)  210 

v.  Douglass  (11  Rich.  417)  238 

v.  Folsom  (21  New  441)       327,  804,  805 

i'.  Folsom  (21  Nev.  217)  805 

v.  Forrest  (4  Bing.  686)  510 

v.  Frazer  (2  McCord  Ch.  105)  796 

v.  Low  (36  Hun,  497)  333 

v.  McDill  (1  Spears,  139)  262 

v.  Saterlee  (11  John.  16)  733,  739 

Douthitt  v.  Douthitt  (1  Ala.  594)  1158 

Dow  v.  Dow  (36  Me.  211)  229,  872,  880 


v.  Merrill  (65  N.  H.  107) 

Dowd  v.  Watson  (105  N.  C.  476) 
Dowdale's  Case  (6  Co.  47) 
Dowdy  v.  Graham  (41  Miss.  451) 
Doweil  v.  Tucker  (46  Ark.  438) 
Dower  v.  Seeds  (28  W.  Va.  113) 


835 

444,  446 

649 

578,  663 

470 

90,  92,  95, 

470,  498 

1015 

705,  1013 

344 


Dowlev  v.  Winfield  (14  Sim.  277) 
Dowllng  v.  Feeley  (72  Ga.  557) 
Downer  v.  Downer  (9  Watts,  60) 

v.  Smith  (24  Cal.  114)  443 

Downev  v.  Murphv  (1  Dev.  &  B.  L.  82)  52 
Downie  t>.  Knowles  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  513)  1136 
Downing  v.  Bain  (24  Ga.  372)  883 

■  v.  Marshall  (23  N.  Y.  366)  924,  925 

Downman  ».  Rust  (6  Rand.  587)  1095 

Dowtv  v.  Hall  (83  Ala.  165)  507 

Doyal  v.  Doyal  (31  Ga.  193)  274 

Doyle's  Estate  (68  Cal.  132)  1199 


Doyle's  Estate  (Mvr  68)  575 

Doyle  v.  Blake  (2Sch.  &  Lef.  231)  510 

v.  Wade  (23  Fla.  90)  713 

Drake's  Appeal  (45  Conn.  9)  49,  50 

Drake  v.  Cloonan  (99  Mich.  121)  692 

v.  Curtis  (88  Mo.  644)  494 

v.  Drake  (134  N.  Y.  220)  903 

v.  Green  (10  Allen,  124)  578 

v.  Heiken  (61  Cal.  346)  119 

v.  Kinsell  (38  Mich.  232)  206 

v.  Lanning  (49  N.  J.  Eq.  452)  58 

v.  Merrill  (2  Jones,  368)  492,  494 

v.  Pell  (3  Edw.  Ch.  251)  906 

Drane  v.  Bayliss  (1  Humph.  174)  411,  545 

Draper  v.  Barnes  (12  R.  I.  156)  715 

v.  Jackson  (16  Mass.  480)  612 

v.  Morris  (137  Ind.  169)  271 

Dray  v.  Bloch  (29  Oreg.  347)  1237 

Drayton's  Appeal  (61  Pa.  St.  172)  69la 

Will  (4  McCord,  46)  512.  513,  743 

Drayton  v.  Dravton  (1  Des.  557)  701 

v.  Grimke"(Rich.  Eq.  Cas.  321)  953,  960 

Drenkle  v.  Sharman  (9  Watts,  485)  748 
Dresden  v.  Bridge  (90  Me.  489)  691a 
Dresel  v.  Jordan  (104  Mass.  407)  1055 
Dresser  v.  Dresser  (46  Me.  48)  116,  118 
Drew's  Appeal  (58  N.  H.  319) 
v.  Gordon  (13  Allen,  120)    164, 

v.  Hagertv  (81  Me.  231) 

v.  McDamel  (60  N.  H.  480) 

v.  Wakefield  (54  Me.  291)    355,  904,  946 

Drewry  v.  Thacker  (3  Swanst.  529)  799 

Drexef  v.  Bernev  (1  Dem.  163)  563 

Drexler  v.  McG'lvnn  (99  Cal.  143)  410,  686 
Dreyfoos  v.  Giles  (79  Cal.  409)  861 

Drinkwater  v.  Drinkwater  (4  Mass.  354)  631, 

1038 
Driskell  v.  Hanks  (18  B.  Mon.  855)  256 

Driver  v.  Riddle  (8  Port.  343)  582,  583 

Drowne,  In  re  (1  Connolv,  163)  529 

Drowry  v.  Bauer  (68  Mo".  155)  186 

Drucker  v.  Rosenstein  (19  Fla.  191)  199 

Druid  Park  v.  Ottinger  (53  Md.  46)  717 

Drumgoole  v.  Smith  (78  Va.  665)  700 

Drumheeler  v.  Haff  (23  Mo.  App.  161)  110U 
Drummond  v.  Crane  (159  Mass.  577)  686 

v.  Drummond  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  234)        950 

v.  Parish  (3  Curt.  522)  85 

Drury  v.  Natick  (10  Allen,  169)  409 

Duane,  Goods  of  (2  Sw.  &  Tr.  590)  485 

Dublin  v.  Chadhourn  (16  Mass.  433)  384,  493, 

502 
Du  Bois'  Appeal  (121  Pa.  St.  368)  691a 

Du  Bois  v.  Brown  (1  Dem.  317)  351,  1202 
Dubois  v.  McLean  (4  McLean,  486)  1025,  1038 
Du  Bois  v.  Ray  (35  N.  Y.  162)  880 

Dubs  v.  Dubs  (31  Pa.  St.  149)  277 

Dubuch  v.  Wildermuth  (3  La.  An.  407)    1031 


529 
178,  187, 

664 
116,  124 

859 


Ducker  v.  Burnham  (146  111.  9) 
Duckworth  v.  Co.  (98  Ga.  193) 

v.  Duckworth  (35  Ala.  70) 

v.  Vaughan  (27  La.  An.  599) 

Duclolange's  Succession  (1  La.  An.  181) 
Dudley  v.  Bosworth  (1  Hun,  9) 

o.  Davenport  (85  Mo.  462) 

v.  Falkner  (49  Ala.  148) 

v.  Foote  (63  N.  H.  57) 

v.  Mallerv  (4  Ga.  52) 

v.  Mavhew  (3  N.  Y.  9) 

v.  Pigg  (149  Ind.  363) 


942 
391 
1133 
329 
437 
1217,  1218 
265 
390,  1160 
603 
61 
634 
269 
lxix. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Pudlev  v.  Sanborn  (159  Mass.  185) 

v.  Weinhart  (93  Kv.  401) 

Duffield  v.  Morris  (2  Harr.  375) 


1158 

88 

34,  39,  40, 

41,  479 

341,  1033 

610,  642 

631 

1185,  1255 

57 

1144 

1214,  1218 

978 

692,  1110 

246 


v.  Walden  (102  Iowa,  676) 

Duffv  v.  Ins.  Co.  (8  W.  &  S.  413) 

"v.  Rogers  (115  Ind.  351) 

Dufour  v.  Duiour  (28  Ind.  421) 

v.  Pereira  (1  Dick.  419) 

Dugan's  Estate  (Tuck.  338) 
Dugan  v.  Gittings  (3  Gill,  138) 

v.  Hollins  (4  Md.  Ch.  139) 

v.  Hollins  (11  Md.  41) 

v.  Massey  (0  Bush,  82) 

Dugger  v.  Dugger  (84  Va.  130)  277 

v.  Oglesbv  (99  111.  405)  820 

v.  Tayloe"(60  Ala.  504)  431,  433 

Duhme  v.  Young  (3  Bush,  343)  577 

Duhr.ng  v.  Duhring  (20  Mo.  174)  289 

Duke  v.  Brandt  (51  Mo.  221)  236,  1074 

v.  Duke  (26  Ala.  673)  1124 

v.  Duke  (81  Kv.  308)  607,  608 

v.  Fuller  (9  N.  H.  536)  933 

■ v.  Reed  (64  Tex.  705)  204 

Dulanv  v.  Middleton  (72  Md.  67)  880 

Dull's*Estate  (137  Fa.  St.  116)  1236 

Dull  v.  Drake  (68  Tex.  205)  407 

Dullard  v.  Hardv  (47  Mo.  403)  863,  1155 

Dulles  v.  Reed  (6  Yerg.  53)  1123 
Dulwitch  College  v.  Johnson  (2  Vera.  49)  798 

Dumev  v.  Sasse  (24  Mo.  177)  963 

v.  Schoeffler  (24  Mo.  170)  963 

Dummerston  v.  Newfane  (37  Vt.  9)     235,  254 
Dunaway  v.  Campbell  (59  111.  App.  665)  1255 

Dunb:ir  v.  Dunbar  (80  Me.  152)  122 

v.  Williams  (10  John.  249)  823 

Duncan,  In  re  (3  Redf .  153)  402 

v.  Armant  (3  La.  An.  84)  1064 

v.  Davison  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  535)  738 

v.  Dent  (5  Rich.  Eq.  7)  1138 

v.  Duncan  (23  111.  364)  469 

v.  Eaton  (17  N.  H.  441)       165,  169,  180 

v.  Franklin  Township  (43  N.  J.  Eq 


143) 
V.  Gainey  (108  Ind.  579) 


985,  986 
1023,  1045, 
1071,  1096 
1221,  1245 


tvHenrv  (125  Ind.  10) 

v.  Mizner  (4  J   J.  Marsh.  443)  1227 

o.  Philips  (3  Head,  415)  962 

■ v.  Stewart  (25  Ala.  408)  448 

v.  Terre  Haute  (85  Ind.  104)  239 

■ v.  Thomas  (81  Cal.  56)  826 

V.  Tobin  (Cheves  Eq.  143)  1187 

v.  Veal  (49  Tex.  603)  1043 

t>.  Wallace  (114  Ind.  169)  1097,  1098 

v.  Watson  (28  Miss.  187)  686,  751 

v.  Watts  (16  Beav.  204)  986 

Duncommun's  Appeal  (17  Pa.  St.  268)     1180 

I  (undas's  Appeal  (73  Pa.  St.  474)  340,  344 


Dundas'v.  Carson  (27  Neb.  634) 

v.  Chrisman  (25  Neb.  495) 

—  v.  Hitchcock  (12  How.  256) 
Dnngaix  v.  Lansford  (112  Ala.  403) 
Dunham's  Appeal  (27  Conn.  192) 
Dunham  v.  Avcrill  (46  Conn,  61) 
v.  Dunham  (16  Gray,  577) 


v,  Elford  (18  Rich.  Eq.  190) 
/■.  Hatcher  (31  Ala.  183) 
r   <  >-liorn  (1  Pai.  634) 
lxx 


1235 

714 

70 

249,  275 

1249 

41,  477 

979 

1202. 

1204 

993 

1207 

232 


588 


*  Page 
Dunham  v.  Roberts  (27  Ala.  701)  571 

Dunlap's  Appeal  (116  Pa.  St.  500)  905 

Dunlap  v.  Dunlap  (4  Des.  305)  935,  1104 

v.  Fant  (74  Miss.  197)  903 

v.  Hendley  (92  N.  C   115)  844 

v.  Mitchell  (10  Oh.  117)  703 

v.  Robinson  (28  Ala.  100)  36 

v.  Robinson  (12  Oh.  St.  530)  1056,  1066 

v.  Thomas  (69  Iowa,  358)     249,  253,  275 

Dunn,  Ex  parte  (63  N.  C.  137)  178 

In  re  (5  Dem.  124)  795,844 

Dunn's  Estate  (Mvr.  122)  340,  344 

Estate  (13  Phila.  395)  720 

Dunn  v.  Aniev  (1  Leigh,  465)  1093 

v.  Bank  (109  Mo.  90)    121,  127,  128,  397 

v.  Deery  (40  Iowa,  251)  832 

v.  Peterson  (4  Wash.  170)  713 

v.  Renick  (33  W.  Va.  476)  730 

v.  Renick  (40  \V.  Va.  349)  724,  988 

v.  Stevens  (62  Minn.  380)  201 

Dunne's  Estate  (65  Cal.  378)  997,  1242 

Dunne  v.  Dunne  (66  Cal.  157)  1099 

Dunnigan  v.  Stevens  (122  111.  396)  817,  818 
Dunning  v.  Driver  (25  Ind.  269)  1038 

v.  Ocean  Bank  (6  Lans.  296)  510 

v.  Ocean  Bank  (61  N.  Y.  497)      393,  596 

Dunscomb  v.   Dunsconib   (1  John.    Ch. 

508)  1137 

Dunseth  v.  Bank  of  United  States  (6  Oh. 

76) 


481, 


Dunson  v.  Pavne  (44  Tex.  539) 
Dunton  v.  Robins  (2  Munf.  341) 
Dupey  v.  Greffin  (1  Mart.  N.  s.  198) 
Duplex  v.  De  Roren  (2  Vern.  540) 
Dupree  v.  Adkins  (43  Ga.  475) 
Dupuv's  Succession  (4  La.  An.  570) 
Dupuv  v.  Wurz  (53  N.  Y.  556) 
Durando  v.  Durando  (23  N.  Y.  331) 
Durant  v.  Ashmore  (2  Rich.  184) 
Durfee,  Petitioner  (14  R.  I.  47) 
Durfee  v.  Durfee  (8  Met.  Mass.  490) 

v.  Joslvn  (92  Mich.  211) 

v.  Pomerov  (154  N.  Y.  583) 

Durham's  Estate  (49  Cal.  490) 
Durham  v.  Angier  (20  Me.  242) 

v.  Field  (30  III.  App.  122) 

v.  Rhodes  (23  Md.  233) 

v.  Williams  (32  La.  An.  968) 

Durie  v.  Blauvelt  (49  N.  J.  L.  114) 
Durkin  v.  Langlev  (167  Mass.  577) 
Durland  v.  Seiler"(27  Neb.  33) 
Durnford's  Succession  (1  La.  An.  92) 
Durston  v.  Pollock  (91  Iowa  668) 
Duryea  v.  Duryea  (85  111.  41) 

v.  Granger  (66  Mich.  593) 

v.  Mackey  (74  Hun,  638) 

v.  Mackev  (151  N.  Y.  204)  401,731,  1079 

Duson  v.  Dupfe  (32  La.  An.  896)  439 

Dutch's  Appeal  (57  Pa.  St.  461)  1213 

Dutch  Church  v.  Ackerman  (1  N.  J.  Eq. 

40)  1007 

Dutcher  v.  Culver  (23  Minn.  415)  1206 

v.  Wright  (94  U.  S.  553)  807 

Dutton  v.  Stuart  (41  Ark.  101)  248 

Duty's  Estate  (27  Mo.  43)  469 

Duval  v.  Bank  (10  Ala.  636)  1061 

v.  Hunt  (34  Fla.  85)  627 

Duvall's  Estate  (146  Pa.  St.  176)  1097 
Duvall  v.  Snowden  (7  G.  &  J.  480)  434,  435 
Dwight  v.  Blackmar  (2  Mich.  330)  702 
v.  Carson  (2  La.  An.  459)         828 


261 

1131 

1201 

1122 

776 

1071 

537 

495 

232 

482 

260 

484 

1046 

1102 

1023 

229,  274 

1198 

268,  1109 

1129 

363 

757,  760 

197 

865 

376 

107 

834 

731 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Dwight  v.  Newall  (15  III.  333)  734 

v.  Overton  (35  Tex.  390)  847 

v.  Simon  (4  La.  An.  490)  578 

Dwinel  v.  Stone  (30  Me.  384)  284,  285 

Dwver  v.  Garlough  (31  Oh.  St.  158)  242 

v.  Kalteyer  (68  Tex.  554)    407,  689,  749, 

1169 
Dye  v.  Church  (48  S-  C.  444)  922,  924 

Dve  v.  Young  (55  Iowa,  433)  48,  490 

Dyer  v.  Brannock  (66  Mo.  391)  158 

v.  Clark  (5  Met.  Mass.  562)  234,  289,  290 

v.  Drew  (14  La.  An.  657)  287 

v.  Dyer  (17  R.  I.  547)  1205 

v.  Erving  (2  Dem.  160)  485 

v.  Jacowav  (50  Ark.  217)  1132 

i'.  Morse  HO  Wash.  492)  295,  301 

v.  Stanwood  (7  N.  H  261)  856 

v.  Walls  (84  Me.  143)  802 

Dykes  v.  Woodhouse  (3  Band.  287)  752 


Eads  v.  Mason  (16  111.  App.  545)  631 

Eager  v.  Eager  (8  111.  App.  356)  1193 

Eagle  v.  Emmet  (4  Bradf.  117)  444 

Eagleton  v.  Homer  (L.   E.  37  Ch.  Div. 

695)  898,  906 

Ealer  v.  Lodge  (36  La.  An.  115)  1266 

Eames  v.  Brattleboro  (54  Vt.  471)  622 

Ean  v.  Snvder  (46  Barb.  230)  37 

Eans  v.  Eans  (79  Mo.  53)  189,  681 

Earl  i>.  Grim  (Uohn.  Ch.  494)  1102 

Earle  v.  Earle  (93  N.  Y.  104)       678,  721,  738 
Early  v.  Earlv(5Bedf.  376)  482 

Earnest  v.  Earnest  (5  Bawle,  213)  150,  1215, 

1216 
Earp's  Appeal  (28  Pa.  St.  368)  638,  1004 

£ast  v.  Garret  (84  Va.  523)  881 

v.  Wood  (62  Ala.  313)  1080 

Easterly  v.  Kenev  (36  Conn.  18)  956 

Eastham  v.  Landon  (17  Wash.  48)       391.  693 

v.  Powell  (51  Ark.  530)  1218 

East  India  Co.  v.  Skinner  (Comb.  342)       763 
Eastis  v.  Montgomery  (93  Ala.  293)    293,  484 

v.  Montgomery  "(95  Ala.  486)  36 

Eastman  v.  Association  (62  N.  H.  555)       647 
Easton  v.  Courtwright  (84  Mo.  27)    298,  300, 

301 

v.  Huott  (95  Iowa,  473)  23 

East   Tennessee   Co.  v.  Gaskell  (2  Lea, 

742)  757,  795 

Eatman  v.  Eatman  (83  Ala.  478)  153,  195 

Eaton  v.  Benton  (2  Hill,  576)  975 

v.  Cole  (10  Me.  137)  685 

v.  Bobbins  (29  Minn.  327)  212 

v.  Straw  (18  N.  H.  320)  950 

v.  Walsh  (42  Mo.  272)  651,  653 

v.  Watts  (L.  B.  4  Eq.  Cas.  151)  876 

Eaves  v.  Harbin  (12  Bush,  445)  835 

Ebelmesser  v.  Ebelmesser   (99  111.   541) 

1087,  1088 
Eberhardt  v.  Perolin  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  592)  876 
Eberle  v.  Fisher  (13  Pa.  St.  526)  240 

Ebersole  v.  Schiller  (50  Oh.  St.  701)  1197 

Ebersteinv.  Camp  (37  Mich.  176)         992,  993 

1113 
Eberts  v.  Eberts  (42  Mich.  404)  895,  939 

Ebev  v.  Adams  (135  111.  80)  593,  882 

Ebv's  Appeal  (50  Pa.  St.  311)  902 

— -  Appeal  (84  Pa.  241)  902 

Estate  (164  Pa.  249)  557,  1145 

Echols  v.  Barrett  (6  Ga.  443)       384,  410,  545 


*Page 
Eckert  v.  Myers  (45  Oh.  St.  525)        588,  589 

v.  Triplet  (48  Ind.  174)  795 

Eddey's  Appeal  (109  Pa.  St.  406)  32 

Eddins  v.  Buck  (23  Ark.  507)  611 

v.  Graddv  (28  Ark.  500)  775,  805 

Eddy's  Case  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  701)  44,  47 

"Estate  (12  Phila.  17)  187 

Estate  (13  Phila.  262)  1151 

Eddv  v.  Adams  (145  Mass.  489)  842,  845 

'v.  Moulton  (13  B.  I.  105)  260 

Edelen  v.  Dent  (2  G.  &  J.  185)  975 

v.  Edelen  (10  Md.  52)  571 

v.  Edelen  (11  Md.  415)   1144,  1149,  1154 

v.  Hardev  (7  Harr.  &  J.  61)  68 

Eden  v.  Smvth  (5  Ves   341)  976 

v.  Bail'road  (14  B.  Mon.  204)  620 

Edgar  v.  Cook  (4  Ala.  588)  283 

Edgerly  v.  Barker  (66  N.  H.  434)       878,  b84 
Edmonds  v.  Crenshaw  (1  Harp.  Ch.  224) 

737,  H64 

v.  Crenshaw  (1  McCord  Ch.  252)        701 

v.  Crenshaw  (14  Pet.  166)  737 

Edmondson's  Estate  (L.  B.  5  Eq.  389)        881 
Edmondson  v.  Carroll  (2  Sneed,  678)  469 

Edmunds  v.  Bockwell  (125  Mass.  363)      1026 

v.  Scott  (78  Va.  720)         987,  1179,  1228 

Edmundson  v.  Boberts  (1  How.  Miss.  322)  581 
—  v.  Boberts  (2  How.  Miss.  822)  660 

Edney  v.  Bryson  (2  Jones  L.  365)  991 

Edson  v.  Parsons  (155  N.  Y.  555)  56,  57 

Edward's  Appeal  (47  Pa.  St.  144)  113 

Estate  (32  N.  Y.  Supp.  901)  6919 

Estate  (12  Phila.  85)  504,  578 

Succession  (34  La.  An.  216)  1170 

Edwards  v.  Baker  (145  Ind.  281)  731 

v.  Bibb  (43  Ala.  666)  903 

v.  Bibb  (54  Ala.  475)  232 

— -  v.  Bruce  (8  Md.  387)  582 

v.  Cobb  (95  N.  C.  4)  324,  575 

v.  Crenshaw  (Harp.  Eq.  224)  1148 

v.  Edwards  (2  C.  &  M.  612)  763 

v.  Ela  (5  Allen,  87)  1150 

v.  Freeman  (2  P.  Wms.  435)     130, 1213, 

1219 

v.  Gibbs  (11  Ala.  292)  855 

v.  Harben  (2  T.  E.  5S7)  415 

v.  Hill  (19  U.  S.  A.  493)  357,  800 

v.  Kearzev  (96  U.  S.  595)  201,  1076 

v.  Love  (9*4  N.  C.  365)  758 

v.  McGee  (27  Miss.  92)  185 

v.  Mounts  (61  Tex.  398)  344 

v.  Pike  (1  Ed.  267)  910 

v.  Baguet  (19  Tex.  164)  1046 

v.  Smith  (35  Miss.  197)  61 

v.  Sullivan  (20  Iowa,  502)  251 

v.  Thomas  (06  Mo.  468)  281 

v.  Warren  (90  N.  C.  604)  890 

Eells  v.  Holder  (2  McCrary,  622)        358,  362, 

368,  442 

v.  Lynch  (8  Bosw.  465)  888 

Effinger  v.  Hall  (81  Va.  94)  877 

v.  Richards  (35  Miss.  540)  1173 

Efland  v.  Efland  (96  N.  C.  488)  236,  260 

Egberts  v.  Wood  (3  Pai.  517)  286 

Ege  v.  Kille  (84  Pa.  St.  333)  603 

Egerton  v.  Egerton  (17  N.  J.  Eq.  419)  121, 

811 
Eggleston  v.  Eggleston  (72  111.  24)  203 

Ehle's  Will  (73  Wis.  445)  447 

Ehlen  v.  Ehlen  (64  Md.  360)  526,  532 

Ehrman  v.  Haskins  (67  Miss.  192)  892 

lxxi 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Eichelberger's  Estate  (135  Pa.  St.  160)  1216 
Eichelberger  v.  Hawthorne  (33  Md.  588)     348 

v.  Morris  (6  Watts,  42)  652 

Einbecker  v.  Einbecker  (162  111.  267)  1002 
Eisenbise  t>.  Eisenbise  (4  Watts,  134)  674 

Eisenlord  v.  Clum  (126  N.  Y.  552)  834 

v.  Eisenlord  (17  N.  Y.  State  Rep. 

449)  834 

Ela  v.  Edwards  (13  Allen.  48)  361 

v.  Edwards  (16  Gray,  91)  65,  71 

v.  Edwards  (97  Mass.  318)  835 

Elbert  v.  O'Neil  (102  Fa.  302)  269 

Elcock's  Will  (4  McCord,  39)  72 

Elder  v.  Lantz  (49  Md.  186)  883 

v.  Littler  (15  Iowa,  65)  414,  421,  423 

v.  Whittemore  (51  111.  App.  662)      1190. 

1191, 1208 
Eldredge  v.  Bell  (64  Iowa,  125)  1063 

Eldridge  v.  Pierce  (90  III.  474)  197,  206,  207 
Election,  In  re  (51  X.  J.  L.  78)  368,  690 

Elector  of  Hesse,  Goods  of  (1  Hagg.  93)  407 
Elfe  v.  Cole  (26  Ga.  197)  175 

Eliason  v.  Eliason  (3  Del.  Ch.  260)  259 

Eliot  v.  Carter  (12  Pick.  436)  878 

v.  Eliot  (10  Allen,  357)  1194 

Eliott  v.  Sparrell  (114  Mass.  404)  1137 

Elkinton  v.  Brick  (44  N.  J.  Eq.  154)  37 

Ellensburgh   v.   Ellensburgh   (13   Wash. 

554)  831 

Eller  r.  Richardson  (89  Tenn.  575)  439,  566 
Ellerson  v.  Westcott  (148  N.  Y.  149)  89,  131 
Ellett  v.  Reid  (25  W.  Va.  550)  1057,  1063 

Ellicott  v.  Chamberlain  (38  N.  J.  Eq.  604)  533 

609 
73 

939 
1214 

770 
42 

695 


Ellinger  v.  Crowl  (17  Md.  361) 
Elliot  v.  Brent  (6  Mack.  98) 

v.  Fessendon  (83  Me.  197) 

Elliott's  Estate  (98  Mo.  379) 

Succession  (31  La.  An.  31) 

Will  (2  J.  J.  Marsh.  340) 

Elliott  v.  Branch  Bank  (20  Ala.  345) 

v.  Carter  (9  Grat.  541)     1094,  1104,  1108 

v.  Drayton  (3  Des.  29)  1123 

v.  Elliott  (117  Ind.  380)  876,  898 

v.  Elliott  (9  M.  &  W.  23)  990,  992 

v.  George  (23  Grat.  780)  1040,  1042 

v.  Gurr  (2  Phill.  16)  516,  518 

v.  Kemp  (7  M.  &  W.  306)  389 

v.  Lewis  (3  Edw.  Ch.  40)  1246 

v.  Shuler  (50  Fed.  Rep.  454)      357,  1022 

u.  Topp  (63  Miss.  138)  871,884 

v.  Welbv  (13  Mo.  App.  19)       31,  37,  476 

i7.  Wilson  (27  Mo.  App.  218)  1213 

Ellis  v.  Carv  (74  Wis.  176)  59,  824 

i7.  Darden  (86  Ga.  368)  107 

v.  Davis  (90  Ky.  183)  203 

17.  Davis  (109  U.  S.  485)        357,  497.  502 

17.  Ellis  (133  Mass.  469)  479 

r.  Gosnev  (7  J.  .!.  Marsh.  109) 

17.  Johnson  (83  Wis.  3114) 

17.  Kvtfar  (!)()  Mo.  600) 

v.  McBride  (27  Mis^.  L55) 

v.  McGee  (63  Miss.  168) 

17.  Secor  (31  Mich.  185) 


v.  Smith  (38  Me.  114) 

v.  Witty  (63  Mi-.  117) 

Ellison  v.  Aflen  (8  Fla.  206) 

v.  Andrews  (\-i  [red.  ixh) 

El  (maker's  Estate  (4  Watts,  34) 


Ellsworth  v.  Thayer  (4  Pick.  122) 
lxxii 


12(15 

(itii) 

232 

546 

414 

116,  119,  123, 

125 

827 

555,  556 

807 

752 

401,  507. 

533,  535,  752 

854 


*Page 
Elmendorf  v.  Lansing  (4  John.  Ch.  562)    740 
Lockwood  (57  N.  Y.  322)         249,  275 

526 
905 
620 
1128 
1087 
270 


Elmer  r.  Kechele  (1  Redf.  472) 
Elmsley  v.  Young  (2  Myl.  &  K.  780) 
Elrod  17.  Alexander  (4  Heisk.  342) 

i".  Lancaster  (2  Head,  571) 

Elting  17.  F.  N.  Bank  (173  111.  368) 

Eltzroth  v.  Binford  (71  Ind.  455) 

Elwell  17.  Universalist  Church  (63  Tex. 

220)  580 

Elwes  17.  Maw  (3  East,  38)  605 

EI vi.'.  Dix  (118  111.  477)  724 

— ^-  v.  Ely  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  43)  881 

17.  Horine  (5  Dana,  398)  286,  702 

Emanuel  v.  Norcum  (7  How.  Miss.  150)  767 
Embrv  v.  Millar  (1  A.  K.  Marsh.  300)  443 
Emeric  17.  Penniman  (26  Cal.  119)  622 

Emerick's  Estate  (172  Pa.  St.  191)  1029 

Emerson  v.  Amell  (Freem.  22)  617 

v.  Boville  (1  Phillim.  324)  107 

17.  Bowers  (14  N.  Y.  449)      508,  526,  576 


17.  Marks  (24  111.  App.  642) 

17.  Ross  (17  Fla.  122) 

v.  Senter  (118  U.  S.  3) 

17.  Thompson  (16  Mass.  429) 


956 
1078 
286 
736,  796, 
841,  843 
104,  108 
894,  988 


Emerv,  Appellant  (81  Me.  275) 
Emerv  v.  Batchelder  (78  Me.  233) 

o.  Berry  (28  N.  H.  473)        414,  415^  426 

v.  Burbank  (163  Mass  326)  59 

17.  Clough  (63  N.  II.  552)     118,  121,  122, 

125,  126,  127 

v.  Hildreth  (2  Grav.  228)  440,  568 

17.  Union  Society  (79  Me.  334)  103 

Emmerson  t7.  Hughes  (110  Mo.  627) 
Emmett  17.  Emmett  (14  Lea,  369) 
Emmons  v.  Barton  (109  Cal.  662) 

t7.  Garnett  (7  Mackev,  53) 

17.  Gordon  (125  Mo.  636) 

v.  Gordon  (140  Mo.  490) 


900 

201,  226 

631 

502 

1183 

358,  362, 

1184 

598 

535 

840 

727 

198,  199, 

217 

968,  969 

1008 

475 


Empson  17.  Soden  (4  B.  &  Ad.  655) 
Emslev  v.  Young  (19  R.  I.  65) 
Emson  v.  Ivins  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  277) 
Eneberg  v.  Carter  (98  Mo.  647) 
Engelhardt  17.  Yung  (76  Ala.  534) 

England  17.  Vestry  (53  Md.  466) 

Engles'  Estate  (167  Pa.  St.  463) 

Engles  i).  Bruington  (4  Yeates,  345) 

English  v.  English  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  504)  269,  271 

17.  McNair  (34  Ala.  40)  507 

17.  Newell  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  76)  738 

Enicks  v.  Powell  (2  Strobh.  Eq.  196)  391,  550 

464 

904 

1240 

845 

300 

643 

31 

842 

326,  329, 

368,  452, 

Eppinger  17.  Canepa  (20  Fla.  262)      799,  1 137, 
1142,  1146,  1164 
Eproson  17.  Wheal  (53  Cal.  715)  212 

Equitable  Co.  17.  Christ  (2  Flip.  599)  602 

Equitable  Life  Soc.  17.   Vogel  (76   Ala. 

441)  360,364,367 

Erickson  t>.  Willard  (1  N.  H.  217)  876 


Enloe  17.  Sherrill  (6  Ired.  212) 
Ennis  v.  Pentz  (3  Bradf.  382) 
Ensign's  Estate  (103  N.  Y.  284) 
Ensign  V.  Patterson  (68  Conn.  298) 
Ensworth  v.  Curd  (68  Mo.  282) 
Epes  17.  Dudley  (5  Hand.  437) 
Epiingw.  Hutron  (121  111.  555) 
Epperson  ».  Hostetter  (95  Ind.  583) 
Epping  17.  Robinson  (21  Fla.  36) 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Erie  Savings  Co.  v.  Vincent  (105  Pa.  St. 

315) 
Erlacher,  Matter  of  (3  Redf.  8) 
Erie  v.  Lane  (22  Colo.  273  ) 
Erskine  v.  Henry  (6  Leigh,  378) 

v.  Whitehead  (84  Ind.  357) 

Erving  v.  Peters  (3  Durnf.  &  E.   1 

685) 
Erwin  v.  Carroll  (1  Yerg.  145) 

v.  Humner  (27  Ala.  296) 

o.  Loper  (43  N.  Y.  521) 

v.  Lowry  (1  La.  An.  276) 

v.  Turner  (6  Ark.  14) 

Escarraguell's    Succession    (36   La. 

156) 
Eshleman's  Appeal  (74  Pa.  St.  42) 
Eshleman  v.  Bolenius  (144  Pa.  St.  269) 
Eskridge  v.  Farrar  (34  La.  An.  709) 


Page 


346,  722 

764 

859 

1201 

928,  931 

,  K. 

792 

795 

80 

1112 

323,  324 

846 

An. 

1072 

1163 

711 

1099, 

1102 

251 

1010 


Eslava  v.  Lepretre  (21  Ala.  504) 

Esmond  v.  Brown  (18  K.  I.  48) 

Espv  v.  Comer  (76  Ala.  501)        281,  289,  290 

Ess'y.  Griffith  (139  Mo.  322)  834,  835 

Essex's  Case  (cited  in  1  Show.  69)  65 

Estate  of .     For  cases  under  "  Estate 

of,"  see  names  of  parties. 
Estep  v.  Armstrong  (91  Cal.  659)  727 

v.  Morris  (38  Md.  418)  76 

Esterly's  Appeal  (109  Pa.  St.  222)    444,  1216 
Estes  v.  Howland  (15  R.  I.  127)  632 

Estill  v.  McClintick  (11  W.  Va.  399)         699, 

1158 

v.  Rogers  (1  Bush,  62)  223 

Esty  v.  Clark  (101  Mass.  36)  904,  939 

Etchison  v.  Etchison  (53  Md.  348)  68,  70 

Ethell  v.  Nichols  (1  Idaho,  n.  s.  741)        1047 
Etter  v.  Armstrong  (46  Ind.  197)  469 

v.  Finn  (12  Ark.  632)  842 

v.  Greenawalt  (98  Pa.  St.  422)  1098 

Eubank's  Succession  (9  La.  An.  147)  470,  488, 

489 
Eubank  v.  Clark  (78  Ala.  73) 

v.  Landram  (59  Tex.  247) 

Eubanks  v.  Dobbs  (4  Ark.  173) 
Euper  v.  Alkire  (37  Ark.  283) 
Eure  v.  Eure  (3  Dev.  206) 

v.  Pittman  (3  Hawks,  364) 

Eustace  v.  Jahns  (38  Cal.  3) 
Eustache  v.  Rodaquest  (11  Bush,  42) 


745,  748, 1137 
198 
620,  631 
200 
539 
481 
757,  803 
201 
Euston,  Matter  of"(113  N.  Y.  174)  691  n 

Evan's  Appeal  (51  Conn.  435)  22,  947 

Appeal  (58  Pa.  St.  238)  94 

Evans's  Estate  (150  Pa.  St.  212)  273 

Estate  (11  Phila.  113)  1134,  1137 

Will  (29  N.  J.  Eq.  571)  465 

Evans  v.  Anderson  (15  Oh.  St.  324)  109 

i?.  Arnold  (52  Ga.  169)  37,  38 

v.  Beaumont  (4  Lea,  599)  977,  978 

v.  Beaumont  (16  Lea,  713) 

v.  Blackiston  (66  Mo.  437) 

v.  Buchanan  (15  Ind.  438) 

v.  Chew  (71  Pa.  St.  47) 

v.  Enloe  (70  Wis.  345) 

v.  Evans  (13  Bush,  587) 

v.  Evans  (1  Des.  515) 

v.  Evans  (9  Pai.  178) 

v.  Evans  (9  Pa.  St.  190) 

v.  Evans  (29  Pa.  St.  277) 

v.  Fisher  (40  Miss.  643) 

v.  Folks  (135  Mo.  397) 

v.  Foster  (80  Wis.  509) 


722, 
200, 


1099 

724 

581 

723 

596 

214 

789 

284,  291 

232 

350 

9,  1041 

949 

1100 


•  Pape 
Evans  v.  Gerken  (105  Cal.  311)  1045 

v.  Godbold  (6  Rich.  Eq.  26)         872,  902 

v.  Gordon  (8  Port.  346)  643 

v.  Halleck  (83  Mo.  376)  1039,  1156 

v.  Hardeman  (15  Tex.  480)  804 

v.  Harllee  (9  Rich.  L.  501)  902 

».  Hunter  (86  Iowa,  413)  964 

i'.  Igiehart  (6  G.  &  J.  171)  597,  598,  994, 

998,  999,  1000,  1167 

v.  Kingsberrv  (2  Rand.  120)  727 

v.  Pierson  (9'Rich.  L.  9)  270 

v.  Pierson  (1  Wend.  30)  793 

v.  Price  (118  111.  593)  159 

v.  Reed  (78  Pa.  St.  415)  836 

v.  Roberts  (5  B.  &  C.  829)  598 

v.  Singletary  (63  N.  C.  205)  1062 

v.  Smith  (28  Ga.  98)  57 

v.  Snvder  (64  Mo.  516)  1087 

v.  Stewart  (81  Va.  724)  445 

v.  Tatem  (9  S.  &  R.  252)       363,  374,  649 

v.  Tripp  (6  Madd.  64)  965 

Evarts  v.  Allen  (12  John.  352)  823 

v.  Nason  (11  Vt.  122)  1159 

Eveleth  v.  Crouch  (15  Mass.  293)  342 

Evelyn,  Ex  parte  (2  M.  &  K.  3)  406 

Everett  v.  Averv  (19  Md.  136)  780 

v.  Carr  (59  Me.  325)  888,  894,  988 

y.  Mount  (22  Ga.  323)  942 

Everitt  v.  Everitt  (41  Barb.  385)  480 

v.  Everitt  (71  Iowa,  221)  247 

v.  Lane  (2  I  red.  Eq.  548)  964 

Everroad  v.  Lewis  (16  Ind.  App.  65)  867 

Everstield  v.  Eversfield  (4  Har.  &  J.  12)  1167 
Everson  v.  Pitnev  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  539)  1175 
Everston  v.  Booth  (19  John.  486)  859 

Everts  v.  Everts  (62  Barb.  577)  1140 

Evey  v.  Mex.  Cent.  (81  Fed.  R.  294)        629, 

630 
Ewell  v.  Tidwell  (20  Ark.  136)  497 

Ewin  v.  Perrine  (5  Redf.  640)  47 

Ewing  v.  Ewing  (38  Ind.  390)  505 

v.  Ewing  (44  Mo.  23)  270 

v.  Griswold  (43  Vt.  400)  829 

v.  Highy  (7  Oh.,  pt.  1,  p.  198)  1031,  1068 

v.  Hollister  (7  Oh.,  pt.  2,  p.  138)       1031, 

1034 

v.  King  (169  Mass.  97)  847 

v.  Maury  (3  Lea,  381)  853 

v.  Moses  (50  Ga.  264)  401,  1123 

v.  Taylor  (70  Mo.  394)  775,  826 

Ex  parte.      For  cases  "Ex  parte,"  see 

names  of  parties. 
Exchange  Bank  v.  Stone  (80  Ky.  109) 


v.  Tracy  (77  Mo.  594) 

Exendine  u.'Morris  (8  Mo.  App.  383) 
Ever  v.  Beck  (70  Mich.  179) 
Eyles  v.  Carv  (1  Vern.  457) 
Eyre's  Appeal  (106  Pa.  St.  184) 
Eyres'  Estate  (7  Wash.  291) 
Eyre  v.  Golding  (5  Binn.  472) 

v.  Jacob  (14  Grat.  422) 

Evrich  v.  Capital  Bank  (67  Miss.  60) 
Evster  v.  Hathewav  (50  111.  521) 
Ezell  v.  Head  (99  Ga.  560) 


268, 
271 
281 

1055 
902 

1095 

1099 

198 

995 

691a 

1249 
253 

1221 


Fabens  v.  Fabens  (141  Mass.  395)  902 

Fagan  v.  Fagan  (15  Ala.  335)  1146,  1147 

v.  Jones  (2  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  69)  966 

v.  McWhirter  (71  Tex.  567)  198 

Ixxiii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Fahnenstock  v.  Fahnenstock  (152  Pa.  St. 

56)  727 

Fairbairn  v.  Fisher  (4  Jones  Eq.  390)  544 

Fairbairu  ».  Fisher  (5  Jones  Eq.  385)         1140 


671 


518 

1149 

176 

42,  480 

895,  911 

369 

873 

542 


Falkner  v.  Hendv  (107  Cal.  49) 
Falley  v.  Gribhng  (128  Intl.  110) 


Fairbanks  v.  Hill  (3  Lea,  732) 

v.  Mann  (19  R.  I.  499) 

v.  Robinson  (64  Cal.  250) 

Fairchild  v.  Bascom  (35  Vt.  398) 

v.  Edsom  (154  N.  Y.  199) 

v.  Hagel  (45  Ark.  61) 

Fairfax  v.  Brown  (60  Md.  50) 

v.  Fairfax  (7  Grat.  36) 

v.  Hunter  (7  Cr.  603)      22,  225,  303,  304 

Fairfield  v.  Lawson  (50  Conn.  501)  892 

v.  Woodman  (76  Me.  549)  691 

Fairman's  Appeal  (30  Conn.  205)        761,  764, 

1135 
805 
1026,  1038, 

1110 

Faloon  v.  Mclntvre  (118  111.  292)  823 

Fambro  v.  Gantt  (12  Ala.  298)  695,  1055 

Famulener  v.  Anderson  (15  Oh.  St.  473)     553 
Fant  v.  Talbot  (81  Kv.  23)  199 

Faran  v.  Robinson  (17  Oh.  St.  242)    1041, 1045 
Fargo  v.  Miller  (150  Mass.  225)  905 

Farish  V.  Cook  (78  Mo.  213)  871,  883 

■ v,  Wavman  (91  Va.  430)  949 

Farlev  v.  Dunklin  (76  Ala.  530)         329,  1089 

"v.  Lisev  (55  Oh.  St.  627)  835 

v.  McConnell  (7  Lans.  428)  554 

v.  Moog  (79  Ala.  148)  284,  288,  293 

v.  Riorden  (72  Ala.  128)  216 

Farmer  v.  Simpson  (6  Tex.  303)  209 

Farmers  v.  Murrell  (119  N.  C.  124)  813 

&   Merchants    Bank   v.   Tappan   (5 

Sm.  &  M.  112)  332 

etc.  Bank  v.  Creveling  (84  Iowa,  677)  814 

Farnam  v.  Brooks  (9  Pick   212)  702 

v.  Farnam  (53  Conn.  261)  906 

Farnan  v.  Borders  (119  III.  228)  199 

Farnham  v.  Thompson  (34  Minn.  330)       345, 

1246 
Farnsworth's  Will  (62  Wis.  474)  31,  44,  45,  46 
Farnsworth  v.  Lemons  (11  Humph.  140)  1015 
Farnum's  Estate  (176  Pa.  St.  366)  1222 

Farnum  v.  Bascom  (122  Mass.  282)        968,  985 

1113 
Farquharson  v.  Cave  (2  Coll.  356)  123 

Farr  v.  Thompson  (Cheves,  37)  48 

Farrance  v.  Vilev  (21  L.  J.  Ch.  313)  1232 

Farrar  v.  Dean  (24  Mo.  16)  1038 

v.  McCue  (89  N.  Y.  139)  719 

v.  Parker  (3  Allen,  556)  1194 

p   St.  Catharine's   College  (L.  R.  1 

Ch.  D.  234)  101 

v.  Winterton  (5  Beav.  1)  103 

Farrellv  v.  Ladd  (Allen,  127)  655 


Farrington  v.  King  (1  Bradf.  182)  1031,  1036 

v.  Putnam  (90  Me.  405) 

Karris  v.  Battle  (80  Ga.  187) 

v.  Coleman  (130  Mo.  352) 

v.  Stoutz  (78  Ala.  130) 

Farrow  v.  Farrow  (1  Del.  Ch.  457) 


914 
185 
274 
805,  841 
246,  259, 
264 


v.  Farrow  (13  Lea,  120)  200 

Farwell  v  Jacobs  (4  Mass.  634)  393 

Farvs  v.  Farvs  (Harp.  Ch.  261)  653 

t  ,-.  McMahan  (86  Tex.  652)  210 

Fatheree  v.  Lawrence  (38  Mist.  585)  71 
Faulds  v.  Jackson  (6  Notes  Cas.  Sup.  1)      70 
lxxiv 


Faulkner  v.  Davis  (18  Grat.  651) 

v.  Faulkner  (73  Mo.  327) 

Favill  v.  Roberts  (50  N.  Y.  222) 
Favorite  v.  Booher  (17  Ch.  St.  548) 
Faxon  v.  Dvson  (1  Cr.  C.  C.  441) 
Fay  v.  Chenev  (14  Pick.  399) 

v.  Fay  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  438) 

V.  Haven  (3  Met.  Mass.  189) 

v.  Holloran  (35  Barb.  295) 

v.  Muzzev  (13  Gray,  53) 

v.  Reagef  (2  Sneed,  200) 

v.  Taylor  (2  Gray,  154) 

v.  Wenzell  (8  Ciish.  315) 

Favorweather,  Matter  of  (143  N.  Y.  114)   691  a 


*  Page 

155 

741 

1079 

820 

795 

595 

759 

374,  375, 

649 

638 

603,  744,  751 

410 

435,  1070 

336 


Fealev  v.  Fealey  (104  Cal.  354)  215 

Feanv.  Brooks  (12  Ga.  195)  607 

Fearv  v.  Hamilton  (140  Ind.  45)  619 

Feit  v.  Vanatta  (21  N.  J.  Eq.  84)  897 

Felch  v.  Finch  (52  Iowa,  563)  258,  261 

Fell's  Estate  (13  Phila.  289)  1151 

Fellows  v.  Allen  (60  M.  H.  439)  104,  108 

v.  Lewis  (65  Ala.  343)  855 

v.  Little  (46  N.  H.  27)  1213,  1214 

v.  Smith  (130  Mass.  376)  189 

-  v.  Smith,(130  Mass.  378)  825 
v.  Tann  (9  Ala.  999)                             607 

v.  Sawver  (41  N.  H.  202)  995 

Felton  v.  Sowles  (57  Vt.  382)     542,  543,  545, 

1197 
Feltz  v.  Clark  (4  Humph.  79)  545 

Female  Acad.  v.  Sullivan  (116  111.  375)      913 
Femings  v.  Jarrat  (1  Esp.  335)  419 

Fenix  v.  Fenix  (80  Mo.  27)  1033,  1061 

Fenn  v.  Bolles  (7  Abb.  Pr.  202)  293 

Fennell  v.  Henrv  (70  Ala.  484)         1219,  1223 
Fenner  v.  Manchester  (6  R.  I.  140)  821 

Fennimore  v.  Fennimore  (3  N.J.  Eq.  292)  738 
Fenton's  Will  (97  Iowa,  192)  37 

Fenton  v.  Reed  (4  John.  52)  223 

Fenwick  t>.  Chapman  (9  Pet.  461)  1096 

v.  Sears  (1  Cranch,  259)  358,  373 

Ferav's  Succession  (31  La.  An.  727)  555 

Ferebee  v.  Doxev  (6  lied.  L.  448)  652 

Ferguson's  Estate  (138  Pa.  St.  208)  950 

Ferguson  v.  Barnes  (58  Ind.  169)  421 

v.  Broome  (1  Bradf.  10)  1271 

i".  Carson  (86  Mo.  673)    1032,  1049,  1198 

v.  Carson  (9  Mo.  App.  497)       1045,  1133 

v.  Carson  (13  Mo.  App.  29)  1198 

v.  Collins  (8  Ark.  241)  526 

v.  Hedges  (1  Harr.  524)  943 

v.  Mason  (2  Sneed,  618)  898 

v.  Mason  (60  Wis.  377)  212 

t).  Miller  (1  Cow.  243)  597 

v.  Scott  (49  Miss.  500)  1026,  1030 

v.  Thomason  (87  Kv.  519)  896 

r.  Yard  (164  Pa.  St.  586)  1228 

Fern  v.  Leuthold  (39  Minn.  212)  777 

Fernandez'  Estate  (119  Cal.  579)      669,  1124, 

1154,  1167 
Fernbacher  v.  Fernbacher  (4  Dem.  227; 

8.  c.  17  Abb.  N.  C.  339)  576,  1000 

Fernie,  In  re  (6  Notes  Cas.  657)  510 

Ferre  v.  Amer.  Board  (53  Vt.  162)  720 

Ferrers  v.  Ferrers  (Cas.  Temp.  Talb.  2)    1010 
Ferrie  v.  Atherton  (28  E.  L.  &.  Eq.  1)        227 

v.  Public  Adm'r  (3  Bradf.  249)  400 

Ferrin  v.  Mvrick  (41  N.  Y.  315)  757,  760 

Ferris's  Will  (Tuck.  15)  565 

Ferris  v.  Ferris  (89  III.  452)  581 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Ferris  V.  Higlev  (20  Wall.  375)  347 

v.  Van  Vechten  (9  Hun,  12)  1151 

Ferrv's  Appeal  (102  Pa.  St.  207)  880,  883 
Ferry  v.  Laible  (31  N.  J.  bq.  566)  732 

Ferse  &  Hembling's  Case  (4  Co.  61  b)  56 

Ferson  v.  Dodge  (23  Pick.  287)  950 

Fesmire  v.  Shannon  (143  Pa.  St.  201)  733,  734 
Fessenden,  Appellant  (77  Me.  98)  1073,1151 
Fessenden's  Estate  (170  Pa.  St.  631)  1098 
Festorazzi  ».  St.  Joseph  Church  (104  Ala. 

327)  909 

Fetrow's  Estate  (58  Pa.  St.  424)  872 

Fetrow  v.  Fetrow  (50  Pa.  St.  222)  599 

Fetters  v.  Baird  (72  Mo.  389)  332 

Feuchter  i>.  Kehl  (48  Oh.  St.  371)  469 

Feurth  v.  Anderson  (87  Mo.  354)  1199 

Fickes  v.  Wiseman  (2  Watts,  314)  1222 

Fickle  v.  Snepp  (97  Ind.  289)  813,  863,  1250 
Fidelity  Ins.  Co.'s  Appeal  (99   Pa.   St. 

443)"  1149 

Fidelity  Trust  Co.'s  Appeal  (108  Pa.  St. 

492)  888,  889,  964 

Appeal  (121  Pa.  St.  1)  112 

Fidelity  Trust  Co.  v.  Preston  (96  Ky.  277)  443 
Fidler  "v.  Lash  (125  Pa.  St.  87)  720 

Field's  Appeal  (36  Pa.  St.  11)  1097 

Field  v.  Andrada  (100  Cal.  107)  632 

v.  Field  (77  N.  Y.  294)  807 

v.  Gamble  (47  Ala.  443)  1061 

v.  Gibson  (20  Hun,  274)  428 

v.  Hitchcock  (14  Pick.  405)      1125,  1129 

v.  Hitchcock  (17  Pick.  182)  998 

v.  Pelot  (1  McMull.  369)  550 

v.  Schieffelin  (7  John.  Ch.  150)  387 

Fielder  v.  Rose  (61  Mo.  App.  189)  721 

Fields  o.  Carlton  (75  Ga.  554)  503,  515 

v.  Wheatlev  (1  Sneed,  351)  773,  859 

Fiester  v.  Shepard  (92  N.  Y.  251)  1209,  1249 
Fitield  v.  Van  VVyck  (94  Va.  557)  728,  920, 
922,  928,  959,  1017 
Fight  v.  Holt  (80  111.  84)  203 

Fike  y.  Green  (64  N.  C.  665)  715,  1045,  1142 
Filbeck  v.  Davies  (8  Col.  App.  320)  1146 

Filhour  v.  Gibson  (4  Ired.  Eq.  455)  426 

Filley  v.  Register  (4  Minn.  391)  609 

Fill  van  v.  Lavertv  (3  Fla.  72)  287,  802 

Filmore  v.  Reithman  (6  Col.  120)     715,  1055, 


Finch  v.  Edmonson  (9  Tex.  504) 

v.  Finch  (14  Ga.  362) 

v.  Finch  (28  S.  C.  164) 

v.  Garrett  (102  Iowa,  381) 

v.  Ragland  (2  Dev.  Eq.  137) 


1079,  1086 

1021,  1031 

341,  464 

701 

1223,  1224 

669,  1137. 

1189 

991,  993 

1032 

440 

1155 

264 


■ v.  Rogers  (11  Humph.  559) 

5.  Sink  (46  111.  169) 

Findlav  v.  R.  R.  (106  Mich.  700) 

v.  Trigg  (83  Va.  539) 

Findley  v.  Find  lev  (11  Grat.  434) 

i?.  Tavlor  (97  Iowa,  420)      691,  804,  1151 

Fine  v.  King  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  108)  1075 

Finegan  v.  Theisen  (92  Mich.  173)  49 

Finger  v.  Finger  C64  N.  C.  183)  357 

Fink's  Succession  (13  La.  An.  103)  1174 

Fink  v.  Berg  (50  Hun,  211)  1268 

v.  Fink  (12  La.  An.  301)  922,  929 

Finlav  v.  Chirnev  (L.  R.  20  Q.  B.  D.  494)  617 

v.  King  (3  Pet.  346)  951,  952,  954 

Finley  v.  Bent  (95  N.  Y.  364)  952 

Finn  v.  Hempstend  (24  Ark.  Ill)  537 

Finnegan  v.  Finnegan  (125  Ind.  262)  433 


*Pago 
Finnev's  Appeal  (37  Pa.  St.  323)  1159 

Appeal  (113  Pa.  St.  11)  884 

Finney  v.  State  (9  Mo.  227)  819,  1269 

Finucane  i>.  Gavfere  (3  Phill.  405)  471 

Firestone  v.  Firestone  (2  Oh.  St.  415)  244 

First  Baptist  Church  v.  Robberson  (71  Mo. 

326)  353 

v.  Syms  (51  N.  J.  Eq.  363)        357, 1029 

First  National  Bank  v.  Balcom  (35  Conn. 

351)  120 

v.  Collins  (17  Mont.  433)  757 

v.  Hummel  (14  Colo.  259)  645 

v.  Parsons  (128  Ind.  147)  286 

v.  Payne  (111  Mo.  291)  836 

v.  Shuber  (153  N.  Y.  163)  643 

First  Parish  v.  Cole  (3  Pick.  232)  913 

First    Universalist    Societv  v.   Fitch   (8 

Grav,  421) 
Fiscus  i>.  Fiscus  (127  Ind.  283) 

v.  Moore  (121  Ind.  547) 

Fish  v.  Coster  (28  Hun,  64) 

y.  DeLarcy  (8  So.  Dak.  320) 

v.  Fish  (1  Conn.  559) 

v.  Lightner  (44  Mo.  268) 

v.  Morse  (8  Mich.  34) 

Fisher,  In  re  (75  Cal.  523) 

In  re  (4  Wis.  254) 

v.  Banta  (66  N.  Y.  468) 

v.  Bassett  (9  Leigh,  119) 


922 

1236 

1237 

718 

860 

236 

1129,  1254 

854 

1200 

97 

726 

325,  330,  568, 

1089 

v.  Bovce  (81  Md.  46)  500 

v.  Bush  (133  Ind.  316)    1085,  1086,  1088 

v.  Fisher  (1  Bradf.  335)    655,  1168,  1170 

v.  Fisher  (5  Pa.  L.  J.  R.  178)  •  638 

v.  Grimes  (1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  107)         232 

v.  Hill  (7  Mass.  86)  939 

v.  Kiethlev  (43  S.  W.  R.  650)  978 

v.  Skillman  (18  N.  J.  Eq.  229)  737 

v.  Spence  (150  III.  253)  72,  75 

v.  Tavlor  (2  Rawle,  33)  956 

v.  Tuller  (122  Ind.  31)  1261,  1269 

v.  Williams  (56  Vt.  586)  609 

v.  Wood  (65  Tex.  199)  1083,  1123 

Fisk  v.  Attorney  General    (L.  R.  4  Eq. 
521)  934 

v.  Eastman  (5  N.  H.  240) 

v.  Jenewinn  (75  Wis.  254) 

v.  Keene  (35  Me.  349) 

v.  Norvel  (9  Tex.  13) 

v.  Wilson  (15  Tex.  430) 

Fiske  v.  Cobb  (6  Grav,  144) 

v.  Kellogg  (3  Ofeg.  503) 

Fitch  v.  Peckham  (16  Vt.  150) 

v.  Randall  (163  Mass.  381) 

17.  Witbeck  (2  Barb.  Ch.  161) 

Fitchett  v.  Dolbee  (3  Harring.  267) 
Fite  v.  Beaslev  (12  Lea,  328) 


232 
1029 

915 

402 
1034 

994 
1031 

824 
1248 
1038 

399 

934,  944 

1197,  1201 

284 
1153,  114 


«.  Black  (85  Ga.  413) 
Fithian  o  Jones  (12  Phila.  2011 
Fitzgerald's  Estate  (57  Wis.  508) 

Fitzgerald  v.  Fernandez  (71  Cal.  504)  201 

«.  Glancv  (49  III.  465)  564 

Fitzimmons'  Appeal  (40  Pa.  St.  422)  1043 
Fitzpatrick  v.  Fitzpatrick  (36  Iowa,  674)    892 

Fitzsimmons  y.  Johnson  (90  Tenn.  416)  361. 

1127 

Flanagan  v.  Nash  (185  Pa.  St.  41)  831 

Flanders  v.  Flanders  (23  Ga.  249)  702 

17.  Lane  (54  N.  H.  390)  1254 

Flash  v.  Gresham  (36  Ark.  529)  431 

Flatt  v.  Stadler  (16  Lea,  371)  214 
lxxv 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Fleece  v.  Jones  (71  Ind.  340)  1230 

Fleet  v.  Hegeman  (14  Wend.  42)  596 

v.  Simmons  (3  Dem.  542)  576 

Fleetwood  v.  Fleetwood  (2  Dev.  Eq.  222)     896 
Fleming  v.  Bale  (23  Kan.  88)  1030 

v.  Boiling  (3  Call,  75)  652 

v.  Carr  (47  N.  J.  Eq.  549)  965 

».  Foran  (12  Ga.  594)  702 

v.  McKesson  (3  Jones  Eq.  316)  357 

v.  Talliafer  (4  Heisk.  352)  853 

Fletcher  v.  Ashburner  (1  Bro.  C.  C.  497)    726 

v.  Fletcher  (29  Vt.  719)      569,  588,  1204 

v.  Stevenson  (3  Hare,  360)  790 

v.  Wier  (7  Dana.  345)  329,  359,  752 

Flickwir's  Estate  (136  Pa   St.  374)  1006 

Flinn  ».  Barber  (64  Ala.  193)  238 

v.  Chase  (4  Den.  85)  568,  582,  1254 

v.  Davis  (18  Ala.  132)  872,  879 

r.  Flinn  (4  Del.  Ch.  44)  1007,  1012 

v.  Owen  (58  111.  Ill)  68 

v.  Shackleford  (42  Ala.  202)  339,  803 

Flint  u.  Pattee  (33  N.  H.  520)  121 

v.  Yalpev  (130  Mass.  385)  852 

Flintham's  Appeal  (11  S.  &  K.  16)  761 

Flmtham  v.  Bradford  (10  Pa.  St.  82)  100 

Flitner  v.  Hanlv  (18  Me.  270)  858 

v.  Hanly  (19  Me.  261)  858 

Flood  v.  Grownev  (126  Mo.  262)  444 

v.  Pilgrim  (32  Wis.  376)  714 

v.  Pragoff  (79  Kv.  607)  36,  64,  71 

Flora  v.  Mennice  (12  Ala.  83G)  401 

Florence  v.  Sands  (4  Redf.  206)  988 

Florentine  v.  Barton  (2  Wall.  210)  1088 

Florey  v.  Florey  (24  Ala.  241)  34,  51,  484 

Flournov  v.  Flournov  (1  Bush,  515)  890 

Flovd  v.  Calvert  (53*Miss.  37)  223 

v.  Flovd  (29  S.  C  102)  967 

—  v.  Herring:  (64  N.  C.  409)  715 

v.  Miller  (61  Ind.  224)  802 

v.  Priester  (8  Rich.  Eq.  248)  1173 

v.  Rust  58  Tex.  503)  1064 

r.  Wallace  (31  Ga.  688) 

Flummerfelt  v.  Flummerfelt  (51  N.  J.  Eq. 


432) 

Flvnn  v.  Morean  (55  Conn.  130) 
Fogg  v.  Blair~(133  U.  S.  534) 

v.  Holbrook  (88  Me.  169) 

Foley  v.  Bushwnv  (71  111.  386) 

V.  Harrison' (84  Va.  847) 

v.  McDonald  (46  Miss.  238) 

v.  Wallace  (2  Ind.  174) 

Folsom  P.  Howell  (94  Ga.  112) 
Foltz  v.  Peters  (16  Ind.  244) 

v.  Prouse  (17  Til.  487) 

v.  Wert  (103  Ind.  404) 

Fonereau  v.  Fonereau  (3  Atk.  645) 
Fontain  v.  Kavenel  (17  How.  369) 


1007 

863 

646 

759 

760,  765 

1242 

1032,  1040 

825 

1078 

1072 

576,  636 

1217 

942 

720,  921, 

930 

244 


Fontaine  v.  Dunlap  (82  Ky.  321) 

v.  Boatman's     Savings     Institution 

(57  Mo.  552)  238 

Fonte  v.  Horton  (36  Miss.  350)  738 

Fontelieu's  Succession  (28  La.  An.  638)  1057. 

1166 
Fontenet  v.  !>'■  Baillon  (8  La  An.  509)  1055 
Foosr.  S-arf  (55  ,\H.  301)  949 
Foote,  Appellant  (22  Pick.  299)  638 
v.  Foote  (61  Mich.  181)        433,406.81i;, 

1241 

v.  Overman  (22  111.  App.  181)    599,  1056 

v.  Sander*  (72  Mo   016)  729 

;      : 


*  Page 
Forbes  v.  Darling  (94  Mich.  621)  111 

v.  Gordon  (3  Phillim.  614)  79 

v.  Halsev  (26  N.  Y.  53)     330,  1087, 1089 

v.  McHugh  (152  Mass.  412)  660 

v.  Peacock  (11  Sim.    152,  12    Sim. 

528)  716 

v.  Sweesv  (8  Neb.  520)  276 

Forbing  v.  Weber  (99  Ind.  588)  89 

Ford  v.  Adams  (43  Ga.  340)  559 

v.  Blount  (3  Ired.  516)  702 

v.  Erskine  (50  Me.  227)  229,  230 

v.  Ford  (7  Humph.  92)  71,  89,  464 

v.  Ford  (91  Kv.  572)  929,  934 

v.  Ford  (23  N ."  H.  212)  967,  974,  980 

v.  Ford  (70  Wis.  19)  727 

v.  Ford  (80  Wis.  565)  193 

v.  Ford  (88  Wis.  122)  1169 

v.  Gregory  (10  B.  Mon.  175)  249 

v.  Hennessev  (70  Mo.  580)  49 

v.  O'Donnel'l  (40  Mo.  App.  51)  1236 

v.  Porter  (11  Rich.  Eq.  238)  877 

v.  Smith  (60  Wis.  222)  860 

0.  Talmage  (36  Mo.  App.  65)  1238 

v.  Thornton  (3  Leigh,  695)  827 

v.  Travis  (MS.,  S.  C.)  405 

o.  Walsworth  (15  Wend.  449)    561,  1035 

Forde  r.  Exempt  Fire  Co.  (50  Cal.  299)      631 
Fore  v.  McKenzie  (58  Ala.  115)  1078 

Forester  v.  Watford  (67  Ga.  508)  271 

Forket  ?•.  Wolf  (19  111.  App.  33)  863 

Forman's  Will  (54  Barb.  274)  33,  34,  89 

Forman  v.  Marsh  (UN.  Y.  544) 

v.  Swift  (7  Lans.  443) 

Forney  v.  Ferrell  (4  W.  Ya.  729) 
Forniquet  v.  Forstall  (34  Miss.  87) 


Forrester  v.  Forrester  (37  Ala.  398) 

v.  Forrester  (40  Ala.  557) 

Forster  v.  Winfield  (142  N.  Y.  327) 
Forsvth's  Succession  (20  La.  An.  33) 
Forsyth  r.  Burr  (37  Barb.  540) 

v.  Ganson  (5  Wend.  558) 

Forsythe  v.  Forsythe  (108  Pa.  St.  129) 


1233 
43 

46 

746,  749, 

751 

530,  531 

1207 

906 

1201 

662,  663 

736 


729, 
948 
132 

1228 
517 
332 


Fort's  Estate  (14  Wash.  10) 

Fort  v.  Battle  (13  Sm.  &  M.  133) 

Fortre  v.  Fortre  (1  Show.  351) 

Fortron  v.  Alford  (62  Tex.  576) 

Fortune,  Matter  of  (14  Abb.  N.  C.  415)    1235 

v.  Buck  (23  Conn.  1)  74 

Forward  v.  Forward  (6  Allen,  494)  1146,1152, 

1159 
Forwood  v.  Forwood  (86  Ky.  114) 


265,  608, 
642 
140 

896,  917 
913 


Fosburgh  v.  Rogers  (114  Mo.  122) 
Fosdick  v.  Fosdick  (6  Allen,  41) 

r.  Town  (125  N.  Y.  581) 

Fosher  r.  Guillianes  (120  Ind.  172)  270 

Foskett  r.  Wolf  (19  111.  App.  33)  1155 

Fuss  r.  Sowles  (62  Yt.  221)  346 

Fosselman  v.  Elder  (98  Pa.  St.  159)  60 

Foster's  Appeal  (74  Pa.  St.  391)  234 

Appeal  (87  Pa.  St.  07)  92,  481,  482 

Will  (76  Iowa,  364)  264 

Will  (13  Phila.  567)  481 

Foster  v.  Bailev  (157  Mass.  160)  744,  745 

r.  Birch  (14  Ind.  445)  1040 

v.  Colluer  (107  Pa.  St.  305)  832 

v.  Cook  (3  Bro   C.  C.  346)  889 

r.  Craipe  (2  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  209)  722 
V.  Crenshaw  (3  Munf.  514)  1266 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Foster  v.  Davis  (46  Mo.  268)  1158 

v.  Dickerson  (64  Vt.  233)        42,  47,  477 

v.  Fifield  (20  Pick.  67)  646,  1239 

■ — -  v.  Foster  (36  N.  H.  437)  161,  168 

—  v.  Foster  (7  Pai.  48)  1200,  1201 

v.  Means  (1  Speers  Eq.  569)  224 

v.  Nowlin  (4  Mo.  18)  414,  420 

o.  Stone  (67  Vt.  336)  679,  1164 

v.  Thomas  (21  Conn.  285)  697,  1048 

v.  Wise  (40  Oh.  St.  20)  548 

Fotheree  v.  Lawrence  (30  Miss.  416)  502 

Foubert  v.  DeCresseron  (Show.  P.  C.  194)  60 
Fouke  v.  Kemp  (6  Hai  r.  &  J.  135)  898 

Foulkes's  Snccession  (12  La.  An.  537)     1167, 

1187 
Fournier  v.  Chisholm  (45  Mich.  417)  209 

Fourniquet  v.  Perkins  (7  How.  U.  S.  160)  347 
Fourth  Eccl.  Soc.  v.  Mather  (15  Conn. 

587)  639 

Fowled.  Coe  (63  Me.  245)  1046 

Fowler  v.  Duhme  (143  Ind.  248)  951 

v.  In^ersoil  (127  N.  Y.  472)  951 

v.  Kell  (14  Sm.  &  M.  68)  517 

v.  Lockwood  (3  Redf.  465)  324,  349, 1189 

v.  Mickley  (39  Minn.  28)  861 

v.  Poor  (93  N.  C  466)  1078 

v.  Rice  (31  Ind.  258)  612 

v.  Stagner  (55  Tex.  393)  69,  73 

v.  True  (76  Me.  43)  646,  848,  1267 

Fowlkes  v.  Nashville  R.  R.  (9  Heisk.  829)  627 
Fox's  Appeal  (125  Pa,  St.  518)  1148 

Estate  (92  N.  Y.  93)  774 

Will  (52  N.  Y.  530)     593,  912,  913,  1096 

Fox  v.  Carr  (16  Hun,  434)  442 

v.  Fox  (L.  R.  11  Eq.  142)  1215 

v.  Garrett  (28  Beav.  16)  788 

v.  Gibbs  (88  Me.  87)  933 

v.  Probate  Judge  (48  Mich.  643)        1199 

v.  Southack  (12  Mass.  143)  22 

v.  Tav  (89  Cal.  339)  363 

v.  Van  Norman  (11  Kan.  214)  429 

v.  Waters  (12  Ad.  &  E.  43)  794 

Foxworth  v.  White  (72  Ala.  224)  723 

Fraenznick  v.  Miller  (1  Dem.  136)  352 

Fraley  v.  Thomas  (98  Ga.  375)  684 

Frampton  v.  Blume  (129  Mass.  152)  1097 

France's  Estate  (75  Pa.  St.  220)  759,  872,  883, 

1102 
Francez's  Succession  (49  La.  An.  1732)  1142 
Francis  v.  Francis  (180  Pa.  St.  644)  444 
Frank's  Appeal  (59  Pa.  St.  190)  608 
Frank  v.  Frank  (71  Iowa,  646)  966 
v.  The  People  (147  111.  105)       547,  1127, 

1249 
Frankenfield's  Appeal  (127  Pa.  St.  369)  711 
Franklin's  Estate  (150  Pa.  St.  437)  913 

Franklin  v.  Armtield  (2  Sneed,  305)  1039 

v.  Coffee  (18  Tex.  413)  194,  200 

1".  Franklin  (90  Tenn.  44)  77,  78 

v.  Franklin  (91  Tenn.  119)  568,  587 

Franks  v.  Chapman  (64  Tex.  159)  69 

v.  Cooper  (4  Ves.  763)  787,  788 

Frary  v.  Gusha  (59  Vt.  257)  39 

Eraser  v.  Alexander  (2  Dev.  Eq.  348)       1104 

v.  Citv  Council  (23  S.  C  373)  863 

v.  Dillon  (78  Ga.  474)  899 

v.  Trustees  (124  N.  Y.  479)  726 

Fratt  v.  Hunt  (108  Cal.  288)  803,  819 
Fravzer  v.  Dameron  (6  Mo.  App.  153)  686 
Fra'zer,  In  re  (92  N.  Y.  239)  267,  1155 
v.  Bevill  (11  Grat.  9)  992 


*  Paga 
Frazer  v.  Fulcher  (17  Oh.  260)  463 

Frazier  v.  Barnum  (19  N.  J.  Eq.  316)         163 

v.  Boggs  (37  Fla.  307)  887 

v.  Frazier  (2  Leigh,  642)  552,  944 

v.  Pankey  (1  Swan,  75)     853,  1022,  1035 

v.  Steenrod  (7  Iowa,  339)  1021,  1037 

Frederick  v.  Grav  (10  S.  &  R.  182)  960 

Fredericks  v.  Ise'nman  (41  N.  J.  L.  212)   1265 
Freeland  v.  Dazev  (25  111.  294)         1122,  1124 

v.  Freeland  (128  Mass.  509)  265 

Freeman's  Appeal  (68  Pa.  St.  151)  360 

Freeman  v.  Anderson  (11  Mass.  190)  665 

v.  Burnham  (36  Conn.  469)  609,  631 

v.  Campbell  (109  Cal.  300)  861 

v.  Coit  (27  Hun,  447)  762 

v.  Coit  (96  N.  Y.  63)  1209 

v.  Cook  (6  Ired.  Eq.  373)  651 

v.  Freeman  (136  Mass.  260)  284,  291 

v.  Freeman  (142  Mass.  98)  284 

v.  Kellogg  (4  Redf.  218)  543,  578 

v.  Probate  Judge  (79  Mich.  390)  189,  193 

v.  Rahm  (58  Cal.  Ill)  1235 

v.  Reagan  (26  Ark.  373)  357,  1123 

v.  Stewart  (41  Miss.  138)  287 

v.  Worrill  (42  Ga.  401)  523 

Freke  v.  Carbery  (L.  R.  16  Eq.  461)  379 

French's  Petition  (17  N.  H.  472)  1200 

French  v.  Crosbv  (23  Me.  276)  259 

v.  Currier  (47  N.  H.  88)  694 

v.  French  (91  Iowa,  140)  414,  421 

v.  French  (14  W.  Va.  458)  54 

v.  Hovt  (6  N.  H.  370)  1031 

v.  Lord  (69  Me.  537)  239,  249 

v.  Lovejov  (12  N.  H.  458)  286 

v.  Merrill  (6  N.  H.  465)  643 

v.  Peters  (33  Me.  396)  249 

v.  Raymond  (39  Vt.  623)  124 

v.  Stratton  (79  Mo.  560)  179,  215 

v.  Winsor  (24  Vt.  402)  331,  1186 

Erere  v.  Peacocke  (1  Rob.  Eccl.  R.  442)  34,  35 
Freret  v.  Freret  (31  La.  An.  506)  1230 

Fretwell  v.  McLemore  (52  Ala.  124)    375,  432, 

433,  819 
Freud,  In  re  (73  Cal.  555)  500 

Freund  v.  McCall  (73  Mo.  343)  215 

Frew  v.  Clarke  (80  Pa.  St.  170)  66,  67,  76 

Frey  v.  Demarest  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  236)  1123, 1231 

v.  Frey  (17  N.  J.  Eq.  71)  1163 

v.  Heydt  (116  Pa.  601)  1223 

v.  Thompson  (66  Ala.  287)  961 

Frick's  Appeal  (114  Pa.  St.  29)  526,  533,  576, 

582 
Frick  v.  Frick  (82  Md.  218)  888,  893 

Fridge  v.  Buhler  (6  La.  An.  272)  684 

Fridley  v.  Murphy  (25  111.  146)        1035,  1037 
Frierson  v.  Beall  (7  Ga.  438)  84 

v.  General  Assembly  (7  Heisk.  183)    908 

v.  Wesberrv  (11  Rich.  L.  353)  189 

Frink  v.  Frink  (43  N.  H.  508)  336 

v.  Pond  (46  N.  H.  125)  72 

Fripp  v.  Talbird  (1  Hill  Ch.  142)  1270 

Frisbie  v.  Preston  (67  Conn.  448)  857 

Frisby  v.  Withers  (61  Tex.  134)  505,  719 

Fristoe  v.  Burke  (5  La.  An.  657)  1083 

Fritz's  Estate  (160  Pa.  156)  1221 

Estate  (14  Phila.  260)  1062 

Fritz  v.  Fritz,  (93  Iowa,  27)  825 

v.  McGill  (31  Minn.  536)  1056 

Froelich  v.  Trading  Co.  (120  N.  C.  39)       690 
Froneberger  v.  Lewis  (70  N.  C.  456)  1087 

v.  Lewis  (79  N.  C.  426)  702 

lxxvii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Fross's  Appeal  (105  Pa.  St.  258)  124,  730, 1124 
Frost  v.  Atwood  (73  Mich.  67)  1114 

v.  Courtis  (167  Mass.  251)  938 

V.  Deering  (21  Me.  156)  251 

v.  Denmau  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  47)  1137 

v.  Libbv  (79  Me.  56)  631 

Frothingham  v.  March  (1  Mass.  247)        1052 
Froust  v.  Bruton  (10  Mo.  619)  621 

Fry's  Estate  (163  Pa.  30)  972 

Will  (2  R.  I.  88)  71,  472 

Frve  v.  Crockett  (77  Me.  157)       552,  553,  554 
Fuchs  v.  Fuchs  (48  Mo.  App.  19)  59 

Fudge  V.  Hum  (51  Mo.  264)  708,  711 

v.  Fudge  (23  Kaiis.  416)  1034,  1054,  1076 

Fugate  v.  Moore  (86  Va.  1045)  363 

Fuhrer  v.  State  (55  hid.  150)  30G 

Fulford  v.  Hancock  (Busb.  Eq.  55)  881 

Fulleck  v.  Allinson  (3  Hae;g.  527)  34 

Fullenwider  v.  Watson  (113  Ind.  18)  877,  948 
Euller,  Ex  parte  (2  Sto.  327)  409 

Fuller's  Will  (75  Wis.  437)  921,  925,  932 

Fuller  v.  Fuller  (83  Kv.  345)  72 

v.  Little  (59  Ga.  338)  702,  1087 

v.  McEwen  (17  Oh.  St.  288)  1099 

v.  Rust  (153  Mass.  46)  259 

v.  Wason  (7  N.  H.  341)  229,  230 

v.  Winthrop  (3  Allen,  51)  943 

v.  Young  (10  Me.  365)  636 

Fulton  v.  Moore  (25  Pa.  St.  468)  500 

v.  Nicholson  (7  Md.  104)  1071,  1074 

Funk  v.  Davis  (103  Ind.  281)  891,  892 

v.  Eggleston  (92  111.  515)  1097,  1099 

Fuqua  v.  Chaffe  (26  La.  An.  148)  210 

v.  Dinwiddie  (6  Lea.  645)  833 

Furenes  v.  Mickelson  (86  Iowa,  508)     23,  159 
Furlong  v.  (Riley  103  III.  628)  1027 

Furman  v.  Coe  (1  Cai.  Cas.  96) 

v.  Furman  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  744) 

Furness  v.  Bank  (147  111.    570) 
Furth  v.  U.  S.  M.  Co.  (13  W;ish.  73) 


v.  Wyatt  (17  Nev.  180) 

Fuselier  v".  Babine-.ui  (11  La.  An.  393) 
Fussev  v.  White  (113  III.  637) 
Fvffe  V.  Beers  (18  Iowa,  4) 
Fyock's  Estate  (135  Pa.  St.  522) 


1158 
1048 
859 
1030, 
1059 
1157 
654 
884 
201 
520 


Gable's  Appeal  (36  Pa.  St.  395)  1163 

Estate  (79  Iowa,  178)  360,  375 

Gable  v.  Daub  (40  Pa.  St.  217)  887 

Gadsden  v.  Jonea  (1  Fla.  332)  1258 

Gafford  v.  Dickenson  (37  Kan.  287)  357,  1133 
Gafney  v.  Kenison  (10  Atl.  R.,N.  H.  706)  354 
Gage  v.  Acton  (1  Salk.  325)  390 

v.  Gage  (29  N.  H.  533)  1244,  1246 

v.  Schroder  (73  111.  44)  1034 

Gager  v.  Prout  (48  Oh.  St.  89)  691,  772,  804 
Gainer  v.  Gates  (73  Iowa  149)  273 

Gaines's  Succession  (38  La.  An.  123)         488 

Succession  (45  La.  An.  1238)  492 

Succession  (46  La.  An.  252)  375 

Gaines  v.  Alexander  (7  Grat,  257)  794 

v.  Chew  (2  (low.  U.  S.  619)        470,  497 

v.  Da  La  Croix  (6  Wall.  719)  695 

r.  Pender  (82  Mo.  497)  494 

v.  Fucntes  (92  I'.  S.  L0)  357,  500 

t\  Gaines  (9  B  Mon.  295)  214 

v.  Hammond  (2  McCrary,  432)  844 

v.  Hennen  (24  How.  I'.S.  553)  780,  498 

v.  Kennedy  (53  Mi    ,  L08)         330,  1090 

Ixxviii 


*  Page 
Gaines  v.  Wilder  (13  U.  S.  A.  180)  357 

Gainey  v.  Sexton  (29  Mo.  449)  777 

Gains' i>.  Gains  (2  A.  K.  Marsh  190)  89,  90 
Gainus  v.  Cannon  (42  Ark.  503)  612 

Gaither  v.  Gaither  (20  Ga.  709)  46 

v.  Gaither  (23  Ga.  521)  501 

v.  Welch  (3  Gill.  &  J.  259)  1022 

Galbraith  v.  Fleming  (60  Mich.  408)  254,  255 
— -  v.  McLain  (84  111.  379)  1221 

v.  Tracy  (173  111.  54)  286 

v.  Zimmerman  (100  Pa.  St.  374)  836 

Gale  v.  Drake  (51  N.  H.  78)  873 

v.  Gale  (21  Beav.  249)  103 

V.  Kinzie  (80  111.  132)  230 

v.  Nickerson  (144  Mass.  415)  1203 

v.  Ward  (14  Mass.  352)  603 

Gall,  In  re  (5  Dem.  374)  109 

Gallagher's  Appeal  (48  Pa.  St.  121)  1104 

Gallagher,  In  re  (153  N.  Y.  364)  825 

v.  Crooks  (132  N.  Y.  338)  882,  904 

v.  Holland  (20  Nev.  164)  567 

Galland,  In  re  (92  Cal.  293)  765,  860,  861 

Galligar  v.  Pavne  (34  La.  An.  1057)  195 

Gallini  v.  Gallini  (5  B.  &  Ad.  621)  881 

Gallivan  v.  Evans  (1  Ball  &  Beattv,  191)  401 
Gallman  v.  Gallman  (5  Strobh.  L.'207)  324 
Gallowav  v.  Bradfield  (86  N.  C.  163)  776 

D.  Carter  (100  N.  C.  Ill)  870 

v.  McPherson  (67  Mich.  546)  762 

v.  McPherson  (76  Mich.  318)  1137 

v.  Trout  (2  G.  Greene,  595)  803 

Gallup  v.  Gallup  (11  Met.  Mass.  445)  674 

Galton  v.  Hancock  (2  Atk.  424)  1093,  1106 
Gamache  v.  Gambs  (52  Mo.  287)  477 

Gamage  v.  Bushell  (1  Mo.  App.  416)  1142 
Gamble  v.  Butchee  (87  Tex.  643)  75 

v.  Gamble  (11  Ala.  966)  387 

v.  Gibson  (59  Mo.  585)  1142,  1143, 1168 

v.  Kellum  (97  Ala.  677)       172,  177 

v.  Watterson  (83  N.  C.  573)  1076 

Gambrill  v.  Forest  Lodge  (66  Md.  17)  901,  916 
Gammon  v.  Gammon  (153  III.  41)  718 

Gambs  v.  Gov.  Mut.  (50  Mo.  48)  647 

Gann  v.  Gregory  (3  DeG.  M.  &  G.  777)  486 
Gano  v.  Fisk  (43  Oh.  St.  462)  116 

Gans  v.  Dabergott  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  184)  531 

Gansevoort  v.  Nelson  (6  Hill,  389)  805 

Gant  v.  Henlv  (64  Mo.  162)  270 

Gantert,  Matter  of  (03  Hun,  280)  1023 

,  Matter  of  (136  N.  Y.  106)  1023 

Garaty  v.  Du  Bose  (5  S.  C.  493)  181,  201 

Garber's  Estate  (74  Cal.  338)  525 

Garber  v.  Commonwealth  (7  Pa.  St.  265)  654, 

866 
Garbut  v.  Bowling  (81  Mo.  214)  265 

Garcelon,  In  re  (104  Cal.  570)  960,  1220 

Garden  v.  Hunt  (Cheves,  42,  Pt.  II.)  363 

Gardener  v.  Woodvear  (1  Oh.  170)  552 

Garden ville  v.  Walker  (52  Md.  452)  1098 

Gardere's  Succession  (48  La.  An.  289)       646, 

1129 
Gardiner  v.  Gardiner  (65  N.  H.  230)       62,  93 

v.  Gardiner  (34  N.  Y.  155)  32,  46 

y.  Guild  (106  Mass.  25)  942 

Gardner  v.  Baker  (25  Iowa,  343)  609 

v.  Callaghan  (61  Wis.  91)  841 

v.  Clarke  (20  1).  C.  261)  646 

v.  Collins  (2  Pet.  58)     '  154 

v.  Frieze  (16  R.  I.  640)  490 

v.  Gantt  (19  Ala.  666)  384,  410,  545,  994 

v.  Gardner  (42  Ala.  161)  342 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  aide  pagas.] 


Gardner  v.  Gardner  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  487)         89 

v.  Gardner  (7  Pai.  112)  678,  1191 

v.  Gardner  (10  R.  I.  211)  200 

v.  Gardner  (17  R.  I.  751)  858 

v.  Gardner  (22  Wend.  526)     39,  40,  118, 

124 

v.  Gillihan  (20  Ores-  599)    347,  680,  681 

o.  Greene  (5  R.  I.  104)  232 

v.  Heyer  (2  Pai.  11)  898 

v.  Ladue  (47  111.  211)  494 

!>.  Lamback  (47  Ga.  133)  34,  43 

o.  Printup  (2  Barb.  83)  967,  974 

Garvsche  v.  Lewis  (93  Mo.  197)  817 

Garesche"  v.  Priest  (78  Mo.  120)  705,  709 

v.  Priest  (9  Mo.  App.  270)         705,  1139 

Garibaldi  v.  Jones  (48  Ark.  230)  196, 199,  200, 

206 
Garland  v.  Garland  (84  Va.  181)  360 

v.  Garland  (87  Va.  758)  956 

v.  Harrison  (8  Lei^h,  308)  156 

v.  Smiley  (51  N.  J.  Eq.  198)  941 

v.  Smith  (127  Mo.  583)  497 

r.  Smith  (127  Mo.  567)  469,  500 

v.  Watt  (4  Ired.  L.  287)  949 

Garlick  v.  I'atterson  (2  Chev.  27)  596 

Garlock  v.  Vandervort  (128  N.  Y.  374)  352 
Garn  v.  Garn  (135  Ind.  687)  269 

Garner  v.  Bond  (61  Ala.  84)  211,  212 

v.  Lyles  (35  Miss.  176)  417 

v.  Tucker  (61  Mo.  427)  1160,  1256 

v.  Wood  (71  Md.  37)  153,  1070 

Garnett  v.  Carson  (11  Mo.  App.  290)  767 

Garr  v.  Harding  (37  Mo.  App.  24)  1155 

v.  Harding  (45  Mo.  App.  618)  1149 

Garrard  v.  Garrard  (7  Bush,  436)  264 

Garraud's  Estate  (35  Cal.  330)  110 

Garrett  v.  Bean  (51  Ark.  52)  149 

v.  Boling  (37  U.  S.  App.  42)       439,  504 

v.  Bruner  (59  Ala.  513)  1030 

v.  Garrett  (2  Strobb.  Eq.  272)  1145 

v.  Heflin  (98  Ala.  615)  50 

v.  Trabue  (82  Ala.  227)  833 

Garrison  v.  Cox  (95  N.  C.  353)  530,  531,  577 
- —  v.  Garrison  (2  N.  J.  Eq.  266)  41 

v.  Garrison  (29  N.  J.  L.  153)  890 

v.  Hill  (81  Md.  200)  1155 

v.  Hill  (81  Md.  551)  468 

Garrity,  In  re  (108  Cal.  463)  1000,  1234 

Garrow  v.  Carpenter  (1  Port.  359)  805 

Garth  v.  Garth  (139  Mo.  456)  871,  878 

v.  Tavlor  (1  Freem.  261)  416 

Garthwaite  v.  Lewis  (25  N.  J.  Eq.  351)  944 
Garton,  In  re  (L.  R.  40  Ch.  D.  536)  689 

Garvev  v.  McCue  (3  Redf.  313)  762 

Garvin  v.  Williams  (44  Mo.  465)  49 

—  v.  Williams  (50  Mo.  206)  477 

Garwood  v.  Garw.iod  (29  Cal.  514)  1190, 1254 
Gaskell  v.  Case  (18  Iowa,  147)  183 

v.  Marshall  (1  Mood.  &  Rob.  132)      389 

Gaskill  v.  Gaskill  (7  It.  I.  478)  385 

Gaskins  v.  Hunter  (92  Va.  528)  878 

Gasque  v.  Moodv  (12  Sm.  &  M.  153)  574 

Gass  v.  Gass  (3  Humph.  278)  34,  65 

Gass  v.  Simpson  (4  Coldw.  288)  116, 120, 121 

v.  Wilhite  (2  Dana,  170)  908 

Gassman's  Estate  (10  W.  N.  Cas.  275)  986 
Gaston  v.  Bovd  (52  Tex.  282)  861 

v.  McKnight  (43  Tex.  619)  805,  812 

Gates  v.  Shugrue  (35  Minn.  392)      1029,  1090 

o.  Steele  (48  Ark.  539)  200 

v.  Treat  (17  Conn.  388)  1244 


*Page 
Gates  v.  Whetstone  (8  S.  C.  244)  677,  738 
Gatlield  v.  Hanson  (57  How.  Pr.  331)  411 
Gaultney  v.  Nolan  (33  Miss.  509)  738 

Gaunt  v.  Tucker,  18  Ala.  27  1155 

Gaut  v.  Reed  (24  Tex.  46)  287 

Gautier's  Succession  (8  La.  An.  451)  810 

Gaven  v.  Allen  (100  Mo.  293)  493 

Gavin  v.  Gravdon  (41  Ind.  559)  1033 

Gaw  v.  Huffman  (12  Grat.  628)  1095 

Gay's  Appeal  (61  Conn.  445)  819,  845 

Gay,  Ex  parte  (5  Mass.  419)  593 

— -  v.  Gay  (84  Ala.  38)  109 

v.  Gav  (123  111.  221)  227 

v.  Gav  (60  Iowa,  415)  90,  94 

V.  Gillilan  (92  Mo.  250)  48 

v.  Grant  (101  N.  C.  206)  722,  1158 

v.  Hanks  (81  Ky.  552)  202 

v.  Lemle  (32  Miss.  309)  424 

v.  Louisville  (93  Ky.  349)  810 

v.  Minot  (3  Cush.  352)  410 

Gayle's  Succession  (27  La.  An.  547)  1189 
Gaylor's  Appeal  (43  Conn.  82)  68 

Gavlor  v.  McHenrv  (15  Ind.  383  227 

Gearv  v.  Gearv  (67  Wis.  248)  824 

Geddis  v.  Hawk  (1  Watts,  280)  1005 

Geddv  v.  Butler  (3  Munf.  345)  534 

Geige'r  v.  Worth  (17  Oh.  St.  564)  1099 

Geisler's  Succession  (32  La.  An.  1289)  188 
Gelbach  v.  Shively  (07  Md.  498)  965,  966,  988 
Gelsthorpe  r.  Furnell  (20  Mont.  299)  691  a 
Gelston  v.  Shields  (78  N.  Y.  275)  882 

Gelstrop  v.  Moore  (20  Miss.  200)  1021,  1047 
Gemmill  v.  Richardson  (4  Del.  Ch.  599)  236 
Genet  v.  Talhnndge  (1  John.  Ch.  3)  1012 

Genobles  v.  West  (23  S.  C.  154)  237 

Gent  v.  Grav  (29  Me.  402)  626 

Gentili,  Goods  of  (Ir.  R.  9  Eq.  541)  379 

Gentry,  Guods  of  (L.  R.  3  P.  &  D.  80)         96 

v.  Gentry  (122  Mo.  202)  257,  258 

v.  McRevnolds  (12  Mo.  533)  611 

v.  Woodson  (10  Mo.  224)  260 

Geoffrey  v.  Riggs  (18  D.  C.  331)  22 

v.  Riggs  (133  U.  S.  258)  22 

George  v.  Baker  (3  Allen,  326,  note)  734 

V  Braddock  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  757)  927 

v.  Bussing  (15  B.  Mon.  558)        28,  1016 

v.  Cooper  (15  W.  Va.  555)  237 

v.  Dawson  (18  Mo.  407)  432 

v.  Elms  (46  Ark.  260)  548,  1239 

v.  George  (47  N.  H.  27)  485,  952 

v.  Goldsbv  (23  Ala.  320)  992,  1120 

v.  Johnson  (45  N.  Y.  456)  433 

v.  Spencer  (9  Md.  Ch.  353)  612 

«.  Van  Horn  (9  Barb.  523)  624 

—  v.  Walson  (19  Tex.  354)  443,  1031 

■  v.  Williamson  (26  Mo.  90)  632 

Georgia  Home  Ins.   Co.  v.    Kinnier  (28 

Grat.  88)  647 

Georgia  Infirmarv  v.  Jones  (37  Fed.  R. 

750)  973,  974,  967 

Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Winn  (42  Ga.  331)  628 
Gerard,  Matter  of  (1  Dem.  244)  1174 

German  Bank  v.  Leyser  (50  Wis.  258)  1022 
Germania  Bank  v.  Michoud  (62  Minn. 

459)  757,  795 

Gerould  v.  Wilson  (81  N.  Y.  573)      548,  552, 

1123 
Gerrish  v.  Nason  (22  Me.  438)  37 

Gerrv,  In  re  (103  N.  Y.  445)  1002 

'v.  Post  (13  How.  Pr.  118)  445 

Gerz  v.  Demarra  (162  Pa.  St.  530)  824 

lxxix 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.} 


I  Page 

1197 
903 

1014 
255 

1149 
964 
687 
734 
884 

1037 
638 

1111 
Gibbon  v.  Gibbon  (40  Ga.  562)     887,  902,  936 


Gesell's  Appeal  (84  Pa.  St.  238) 
Gest  v.  Way  (2  Whart.  445) 

v.  Williams  (4  Del.  Ch.  55) 

Getchell  v.  McGuire  (70  Iowa,  71) 
Getman  v.  Beardslev  (2  Johns.  274) 

v.  McMahon  (30  Hun,  531) 

Getz's  Estate  (12  Phila.  143) 
Gever  v.  Snvder  (140  N.  Y.  394) 
— -  v.  Wentzel  (68  Pa.  St.  84) 
Gharkv  v.  Werner  (66  Cal.  388) 
Gheen'v.  Osborn  (17  S.  &  R.  171) 
Gibbins  v.  Evden  (L.  R.  7  Eq.  371) 


1133 

691a 

798, 1117 

906 

1003,  1005 

927 

1234 

258 

330,  1031 


Gibbonev  v.  Kent  (82  Va.  383) 
Gibbons^  Estate  of  (16  Phila.  218) 

v.  Dawlev  (2  Ch.  Cas.  198) 

v.  Fairlamb  (26  Pa.  St.  217) 

v.  Mahon  (136  U.  S.  549) 

v.  Maltvard  (Poph.  6) 

v.  Skepard  (2  Dem.  247) 

Gibbs  v.  Estv  (22  Hun,  266) 

v.  Shaw  (17  Wis.  197) 

Giberson  v.  Giberson  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  116  (720, 

722 
Gibson  v.  Bailev  (9  N.  H.  168) 

v.  Bott  (7  Yes.  89) 

v.  Brennan  (46  Minn.  92) 

v.Cook  (62  Md.  256) 

v.  Dowell  (42  Ark.  164) 

v.  Farley  (16  Mass.  280) 

v.  Foster  (2  La.  An.  503) 

v.  Gibson  (17  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  349) 

v.  Gibson  (4  Jones,  425) 

17.  Gibson  (15  Mass.  106) 

v.  Gibson  (Walk.  364) 

v.  Gibson  (9  Yerg.  329) 

0.  Hale  (17  Sim.  129) 

v.  Herriott  (55  Ark.  85) 

v.  Hibbard  (13  Mich.  214) 

v.  Jeyes  (6  Ves.  266) 

v.  Jones  (13  Lea,  684) 

v.  Land  (27  Ala.  117) 

v.  Lane  (9  Yerg.  475) 

v.  Lyon  (115  U.  S.  439) 


595 

995 

807,  841 

347,  681 

375 

636, 1143 

1030 

267 

878 

265 

82 

42 

1019 

1084,  1087 

119 

332 

1045 

951 

469 

1073 

v.  McCormick  (10  G.  &  J.  65)   272, 1110 

v.  Pitts  (69  N.  C.  155)  1032 

v.  Ponder  (40  Ark.  195)  362,  673 

v.  Roll  (27  111.  88)  1034 

Giddinga  v.  Butler  (47  Tex.  535)  1068 

v.  Crosby  (24  Tex.  295)  175 

v.  Giddings  (65  Conn.  149)  96 

o.  Green  (48  Fed.  R.  489)  367 

v.  Seward  (16  N.  Y.  365)  966 

v.  Turgeon  (58  Vt.)  106  73,  75 

Giesecke  v.  Seevers  (85  Iowa,  685)  831 

Giffin  v.  Brooks  (48  Oh.  St.  211)  93 

Gifford  v.  Choate  (100  Mass.  343)  948 

v.  Thompson  (115  Mass.  478)  1003 

v.  Thorn  (9  N.  J.  Eq.  702)  942 

rt'a  Appeal  (78  Pa.  St.  266)  739 

I !,  Matter  of  (104  N.  Y.  200)  1197 

v.  Bartlett  (9  Bush,  49)  766,  1149 

v.  Brashear  (12  Ala.  191)  856 

v.  Gilbert  (22  Ala.  529)  76,  476 

v.  Hardwick  (11  Ga.  599)  744 

v.  Little  (2  Oh.  St.  L56)  802 

v.  Reynolds  (51  111.  513)  274 

v.  Welscb  (75  [nd.  557)  708 

Gilbraith  v.  Gedpe  Mi;  P.  Mon.  631)         290 

r.  Winter  (10  Oh.  64)  960,  !>:::,  980 

G'khrist  v.  Cannon  (1  Coldw.  581)     375,  853 

lxxx 


*  Page 
1039,  1040 
1267 
1037,  1047 
979 
1182 
729.  949 


Gilchrist  v.  Rea  (9  Pai.  66) 

v.  Filyan  (2  Fla.  94) 

v.  Shackelford  (72  Ala.  7) 

v.  Stevenson  (3  Barb.  9) 

Giles  v.  Brown  (60  Ga.  658) 

v.  Little  (104  D.  S.  291) 

v.  Moore  (4  Gray,  600)     250,  1056,  1074 

v.  Warren  (L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  401)  89 

V.  Wright  (26  Ark.  476)  831 

Gilkev  v.  Hamilton  (22  Mich.  283)  385,  411 

Gill,  Goods  of  (1  Hagg.  341)  516 

v.  Given  (4  Met.  Kv.  197)  1056 

v.  Middleton  (60  Ark.  213)  390 

Gillan  v.  Gillan  (55  Pa.  St.  430)  646 

Gillenwaters  v.  Scott  (62  Tex.  670)  1089 
Gillespie  v.  Hauenstein  (72  Miss.  838)      1271 

v.  Hvmans  (4  Dev.  119)  189 

v.  Wright  (93  Cal.  169)  838 

Gilliam  v.  Brown  (43  Miss.  641)  975,  9PT 

v.  Chancellor  (43  Miss.  437  981 

v.  McJunken  (2  S.  C.  442)  549,  550 

v.  Willey  (1  Jones  Eq.  128)  841 

Gilligan  v.  Lord  (51  Conn.  562)  125,  609,  610 

Gillilan  v.  Swift  (14  Hun,  574)  248,  251 

Gilliland  v.  Caldwell  (1  S.  C.  194)  1270 

v.  Sellers  (2  Oh.  St.  223)  340 

Gillis  v.  Brown  (5  Cow.  388)  232 

v.  Gillis  (96  Ga.  1)  71 

Gilman,  Matter  of  (41  Hun,  561)  705 

v.  Gilman  (52  Me.  165)  442 

v.  Gilman  (53  Me.  184)  164,  169 

v.  Gilman  (54  Me.  531)  187 

v.  Gilman  (54  Me.  453)  362 

v.  Oilman  (1  Redf.  354)  64 

v.  Gilman  (6  Th.  &  C.  211)  1146 

v.  Hamilton  (16  111.  225)  931 

v.  Healv  (55  Me.  120)  733 

v.  Reddlngton  (24  N.  Y.  9)  918 

v.  Wilbur  (1  Dem.  517)  687 

Gilmer  v.  Baker  (24  W.  Va.  72)  391,  551 

v.  Gilmer  (42  Ala.  9)  965 

v.  Purgason  (50  Ala.  370)  373 

v.  Stone  (120  U.  S.  586)  893,  914 

v.  Weir  (8  Ala.  72)  757 

Gilmore,  In  re  (81  Cal.  240)  1016 

Gilmore's  Estate  (154  Pa.  523)  882,  893 

Gilmore  v.  Dunson  (35  Tex.  435)  808 

v.  Gilmore  (7  Oreg.  374)  276 

Gilpin's  Estate  (138  Pa".  St.  143)  1163 

Gilruth  v.  Gilruth  (40  Iowa,  346)  470 

Gilson  v.  Hutchinson  (120  Mass.  27)  246 

Cinders  v.  Ginders  (21  111.  App.  522)  824 

Gingrich  v.  Gingrich  (140  Ind.  227)  942 

Girard  v.  Wilson  (57  Pa.  St.  182)  1216 

Girod's  Succession  (4  La.  An.  386)  1166 

Gist  v.  Cockey  (7  II.  &  J.  134)  1039 

v.  Gans  (30  Ark.  285)  804 

Githens  v.  Goodwin  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  286)     1127 

Gittings  v.  McDermott  (2  Mvl.  &  K.  69)  882, 

936 
Givens  v.  Higgins  (4  McCord,  286) 
Glacius  v.  Fogel  (88  N.  Y.  434) 
Gladson  v.  Wliitnev  (9  Iowa,  267) 
Olancey  v.  Glancey  (17  Oh.  St.  134) 
Olancv  v.  Murrav  (49  111.  465) 
Olann,  Ex  parte  (2  Redf.  75) 
Glasgow  v.  Lipse  (117  U.  S.  327) 


v.  Sands  (3  G.  &  J.  96) 

Glass  Co.  v.  Ludlum  (8  Kan.  40) 
Glassell  v.  Wilson  (4  Wash.  59) 


417 

637 

715 

64 

1038 

1036 

699,710, 

1116 

642 

295,  301 

368 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Gleason  v.  Fayerweather  (4  Gray,  348)      954 

v.  White  (34  Cal.  258)  807,  819 

Gleaton  v.  Lewis  (24  Ga.  209)  417 

Gleespin's  Will  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  523)  47 

Glen  v.  Fisher  (G  John.  Ch.  33)      1010,  1015, 

1099 
Glenn's  Estate  (74  Cal.  567)  865 

Glenn,  In  re  (20  S.  C.  64)       1137,  1157,  1222 

v.  Belt  (7  Gill  &  J.  362)  940 

v.  Clark  (53  Md.  580)  236,  237 

v.  Glenn  (41  Ala.  571)  699,  788 

v.  Kimbrough  (70  Tex.  147)     1201,  1203 

v.  Maguire  (3  Terra.  Ch.  695)  792 

v.  Reid  (74  Md.  238)  523,  531 

v.  Smith  (2  Gill.  &  J.  493)  422,  423,  424 

v.  Sothoran  (4.  D.  C.  App.  125)         1264 

Glessmer  v.  Clark  (140  Ind.  427)    1125,  1153, 

1230 
Glidden  v.  Bennett  (43  N.  H.  306)  604 

Glines  v.  Weeks  (137  Mass.  547)  576 

Glover,  Goods  of  (5  Notes  of  Cas.  553)  63 


v.  Condell  (163  111.  566) 


,  937,  947, 
1221 
1013 
202 
1129,  1145 
430,  975, 1219 
351 


v.  Hill  (85  Ala.  41) 

v.  Hill  (57  Miss.  240) 

v.  Hollev  (2  Bradf.  291) 

v.  Patten  (165  U.  S.  394) 

v.  Reid  (80  Mich.  228) 

&  Shepley's  Estate  (127  Mo.  153)      672, 

1183,  1190 
Glovd's  Estate  (93  Iowa,  303)  1138, 1169,1175 
Goad  v.  iMontgomery  (119  Cal.  552)  351, 1230 
Goate  v.  Fryer  (3  Bro.  C.  C.  23)  786 

Goblet  v.  Beechey  (2  Russ.  &  Mvl.  624)       98 
Godard  v.  Wagner  (2  Strobh.  Eq.  1)  969,  974 


Godbold  v.  Godbold  (13  S.  C.  601) 
Goddard's  Estate  (94  N.  Y.  544) 
Goddard  v.  Bolster  (6  Me.  427) 

v.  Brown  (12  R.  I.  31) 

v.  Goddard  (10  Pa.  St.  79) 

v.  Goddard  (3  Phill.  637) 

v.  Johnson  (14  Pick.  352) 

v.  Public  Adm'r  (1  Dem.  480) 

Godden  v.  Burke  (35  Ln.  An.  160) 
Godfrey's  Estate  (4  Mich.  308) 
Godfrey  v.  Getchell  (46  Me.  537) 

v.  Templeton  (86  Tenn.  161) 

Godley  v.  Taylor  (3  Dev.  178) 
Godman  v.  Converse  (43  Neb.  463) 
Godwin  v.  Hooper  (45  Ala.  613) 

v.  King  (31  Fla.  525) 

Goebel  v.  Foster  (8  Mo.  App.  443) 
Goeppner  v.  Leitzelmann  ('J8  111.  409) 

Goerke  v.  Goerke  (80  Wis.  516) 
Goff  v.  Cook  (73  Ind.  351) 

v.  Kellogg  (18  Pick.  256) 

v.  Robinson  (60  Vt.  633) 

Goforth  v.  Longworth  (4  Oh.  129) 
Gold's  Case  (Kirbv,  100) 
Gold  v.  Judson  (2i  Conn.  616) 
Golder  v.  Littlejohn  (30  Wis.  344) 
Golding  v.  Golding  (24  Ala.  122) 
Goldsmith's  Estate  (13  Phila.  387) 
Goldthorp's  Estate  (94  Iowa,  336) 


1236 
400 
675 
354 
950 
519 
639 
400 
39 

1026 
664 
831 

1066 
170 
574 
205 

1253 

1029, 

1032 
477 
423 
854 
816 

1047 

667 

888,  889 

1120 
622 

1230 

477,  490, 

831 

351 

498 


Goldtree  v.  Allison  (119  Cal.  344) 

v.  McAlister  (86  Cal.  93) 

Gollain's  Succession  (31  La.  An.  173)       1166 
Gombault  v.  Public  Adm'r  (4  Bradf.  226)  37, 

52 

VOL.  l.—f 


Pag« 

900 

1153 

878 

833 


Gonzales  v.  Barton  (45  Ind.  295) 
Good's  Estate  (150  Pa.  St.  307) 
Good  v.  Fichthoin  (144  Pa.  St.  287) 

v.  Martin  (2  Col.  218) 

v.  Norley  (28  Iowa,  188)  1030,  1034 

Goodale  v.  Mooney  (60  N.  H.  528)  925,  929 
Goodall  v.  Boardman  (53  Vt.  92)  199 

v.  McLean  (2  Bradf.  306)  937 

v.  Marshall  (11  N.  H.  88)  360,  374 

v.  Tucker  (13  How.  U.  S.  469)    360,  676 

Goodbear  v.  Garv  (1  La.  An.  240)  690,  691 
Goodbody  v.  Goodbodv  (95  111.  456)  329, 1089 
Goodbub  v.  Hornung  (127  Ind.  181)  863 

Goodburn  v.  Stevens  (1  Md.  Ch.  420)  284,  290 
Goode  v.  Lewis  (118  Mo.  357)  199 

Goodhue  v.  Clark  (37  N.  H.  525)  892 

Goodlett  v.  Anderson  (7  Lea,  286)  441 

Goodman's  Trust  (Law  R.  17  Ch.  D.  266)  157 
Goodman  v.  Kopperl  (67  111.  App.  42)        509 

v.  Kopperl  (169  111.  136)  509 

v.  Russ  (14  Conn.  210)  466 

v.  Winter  (64  Ala.  410)  386,  494 

Goodnow  v.  Warren  (122  Mass.  79)  410,  686 
Goodrich  v.  Adams  (138  Mass.  552)  146 

v.  Brown  (63  Iowa,  247)  212 

v.  Conrad  (24  Iowa,  254)  782 

v.  Fritz  (9  Ark.  440)  809 

v.  Jones  (2  Hill,  142)  604 

v.  Pendleton  (4  John.  Ch.  549)  440 

t>.  Thompson  (4  Dav,  215)  1142 

v.  Treat  (3  Col.  408)  518 

Goodright  v.  Glazier  (4  Burr.  2512)  99 

Goodrum  v.  Goodrum  (56  Ark.  532)  269 

Goods  of .     For  cases  under  "  Goods 

of,"  see  the  names  of  the  parties. 
Goodsell's  Appeal  (55  Conn.  171) 
Goodsou  v.  Goodson  (140  Mo.  206) 


107 

281,  300, 

301 

939 

231 

1125 

375,  649,  673 

646 


Goodwin  v.  Colby  (64  N.  H.  401) 

v.  Goodwin  (33  Conn.  314) 

v.  Goodwin  (48  Ind.  584) 

v.  Jones  (3  Mass.  514) 

v.  Milton  (25  N.  H.  458) 

v.  Moore  (4  Humph.  221)  639 

Goodwyn  v.  Hightower  (30  Ga.  249)  849 
Goodvearr.  Hullihen  (3  Fish.  Pat.  Cas. 

251)  367 

Gookin  v.  Sanborn  (3  N.  H.  491)  866 

Gordon's  Case  (50  N.  J.  Eq.  397)  495 
Gordon  v.  Burris  (141  Mo.  602)    891,  894,  895 

v.  Clark  (10  Fla.  179)  370 

v.  Dickison  (131  111.  141)  228 

v.  Eans  (97  Mo.  587)  607,  681,  682 

v.  Gibbs  (3  Sm.  &  M.  473)  697 

v.  Gilfoil  (94  U.  S.  168)  1271 

v.  Gordon  (55  N.  H.  399)  330,  1089 

v.  Goule  (39  La.  An.  138)  344 

v.  Howell  (35  Ark.  381)  1022 

V.  Justices  (1  Munf.  1)  793 

v.  LordReay  (5  Sim.  274)  101 

t\  McEachin  (57  Miss.  834)  835 

v.  Tweedv  (74  Ala.  232)  262 

v.  West  ("8  N.  H.  444)  1163 

v.  Whitlock  (92  Va.  723)  97 

Gore  v.  Brazier  (3  Mass.  523)  435,  1025 

v.  Howard  (94  Tenn.  577)  1220 

v.  Dickinson  (98  Ala.  363)  1244 

v.  Stevens  (1  Dana,  201)  935 

v.  Townsend  (105  N.  C.  228)  242 

Goree  v.  Walthall  (44  Ala.  161)  611 

Gorham  v.  Daniels  (23  Vt.  600)  254 
lxxxi 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
1016 
391 
793 
716 
1236,  1237 
188 


Gorham  v.  Dodge  (122  111.  528) 

v.  Meacham  (63  Vt.  231) 

Gorton  v.  Gregory  (3  B.  &  S.  90) 

Gosling  v.  Carter  (1  Colly.  644) 

Gosnell  v.  Flack  (76  Md.  423) 

Goss  v.  Greenaway  (70  Ga.  130) 

Gossage  v.  Crown  Point  Co.  (14Nev.  153)  713 

Gottberg  p.  Bank  (131  N.  Y.  595)  693 

Gottsberger  v.  Taylor  (19  N.  Y.  150)  391 

Gotzian,  In  re  (34  Minn.  159)  268,  985 

Goudv  v.  Hall  (36  111.  313)  1032 

Gough  v.  Manning  (26  Md.  347)  268,  963 

Gould  v.  Camp  (157  Mass.  358)  849 

v.  Crow  (57  Mo.  200)  228 

o.  Mansfield  (103  Mass.  408)  57 

i:  Moulahan  (53  N.  J.  Eq.  341)  762 

v.  Safford  (39  Vt.  498)  85 

v.  Tingley  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  501) 

v.  Whitmore  (79  Me.  383) 

r.  Winthrop  (5  R.  I.  319) 

v.  Womack  (2  Ala.  83) 

Goulding  v.  Horbury  (85  Me.  227) 
Gourlev  v.  Linsenbigler  (51  Pa.  St.  345) 
Gouroud's  Will  (95  N.  Y.  256) 
Govane  v.  Govane  (1  H.  &  M.  346) 
Gove  v.  Cather  (23  111.  634) 

v.  Gove  (64  N.  H.  503) 

Governor  v.  Hooker  (19  Fla.  163) 


856 
803 

1105 

264 

123 

120 

499 

517 

239 

368 

655,  774, 

842 

686 

573,  578 

474 

63 

1258 

1130 
548 
245 

1242 
714 
358 
693 
337 


Gower  v.  Moore  (25  Me.  16) 
Graber.  In  re  (111  Cal.  432) 
Graber  v.  Haaz  (2  Dem.  216) 
Grabill  v.  Barr  (5  Pa.  St.  441) 
Grady's  Estate  (14  Phila.  259) 
Grady  v.  Hughes  (64  Mich.  540) 

v.  Hughes  (80  Mich.  184) 

v.  McCorkle  (57  Mo.  172) 

v.  Porter  (53  Cal.  680) 

v.  Warrell  (105  Mich.  310) 

Graeme  v.  Harris  (1  Dall.  450) 
Graff  v.  Castleman  (5  Rand.  195) 

v.  Transportation  Co.  (18  Md.  364) 

Graffenreid  v.  Kundert  (34  111.  App.  483)  1228 
Grafton  v.  Smith  (66  Miss.  408)  177 

Gragg,  In  re  (32  Minn.  142)  331 

v.  Gragg  (65  Mo.  343)  205 

Graham,  Goods  of  (3  Sw.  &  Tr.)  69,  97 

■ v.  Abercrombie  (8  Ala.  552)  1235 

v.  Burch  (47  Minn.  171)        89,  103,  502, 

1208 

v.  Davidson  (2  D.  &  B.  Eq.  155)         669 

v.  De  Yam  pert  (106  Ala.  279)      880,  902 

V.  Dewitt  (3  Bradf.  180)  727 

v.  Dickinson  (3  Barb.  Ch.  169)  1103 

v.  Graham  (10  Ircd.  L.  219)  08 

v.  Graham  (143  N.  Y.  573)  2G4 

v.  Graham  (23  \V.  Va.  36)  880 

r.  Hawkins  (38  Tex.  628)  1037, 1047,  1059 

y.  King  (50  Mo.  22)  1051,  1058 

v.  Law  (0  U.  C.  C.  P.  310)  226 

v.  Londonderry  (3  Atk.  393)  614 

v.  O'Fallon  (3Mo.  507)  480,  482 

v.  O'Fallon  (4  Mo.)  601  74 

v.  State  (7  End.  470)  748 

v.  Stewart  (68  Cal.  374)  207 

v.  Stall  (92  Penn.  673)  184 

v.  Vining  (1  Tex.  639)  861 

v.  Vining  (2  'IVx.  433)  861 

v.  Whitelv  (26  N.  J.  L.  254)  493 

Granberry  v.  Granberry  (1  Wash.  240)      700 
Granbery  v.  Mhoon  (1  bev.  L.  450)  326 

lxxxii 


Grande  v.  Chaves  (15  Tex.  550)  395 

Grandy  v.  Sawyer  (Phill.  Eq.  8)  878 

Granger  v.  Bassett  (98  Mass.  462)      638,  833, 

1153,  1186 

v.  Granger  (147  Ind.  95)  901 

v.  Reid  (36  La.  An.  84)  749 

Grange  Warehouse  Assoc,  v.  Owen  (7  S. 

W.  R.  457)  836 

Grant"?;.  Bodwell  (78  Me.  460)  646, 1231, 1239 

i'.  Brotherton  (7  Mo.  458)  554 

v.  Edwards  (92  N.  C.  442)  1140 

v.  Grant  (63  Conn.  530)  59,  803 

v.  Grant  (1  Sandf.  Ch.  235)  481 

v.  Hughes  (94  N.  C.  231)  1125,  1127 

v.  Reese  (94  N.  C.  720)  359,  360,  363,  669, 

748,  1164 

v.  Spann  (34  Miss.  294)  503,  582 

v.  Thompson  (4  Conn.  203)  479 

Grantham  v.  Williams  (1  Ark.  270)    530,  531 
Grantland  v.  Wite  (5  Munf.  295)  1066 

Granville  v.  McNeile  (7  Hare,  156)  722 

Grass  v.  Howard  (52  Me.  192)  1021 

Grasso  v.  Del.  R.  (50  N.  J.  L.  317)  621 

Gratacap  v.  Phvfe  (1  Barb.  Ch.  485)  663 

Grattan  v.  Appleton  (3  Sto.  755)  117,  495 

v.  Grattan  (18  111.  167)  1213,  1214,  1215, 

1217 
Gratz  v.  Bayard  (11  S.  &  R.  41) 
Gravely  v.  Gravely  (25  S.  C  1) 


Graves'  Estate  (134  Pa.  St.  377) 
Graves  v.  Barnes  (7  La.  An.  69) 


281 
360,  376, 
442,  1008 
176,  187 
1138 


v.  Cochran  (68  Mo.  74)  211,  258,262, 1074 

v.  Dolphin  (1  Sim.  66)  956 

v.  Edwards  (32  Miss.  305)  468 

v.  Flowers  (51  Ala.  402)  752 

v.  Graves  (10  B.  Mon.  31)  177 

v.  Graves  (58  N.  H.  24)  840 

v.  Howard  (3  Jones,  Eq.  302)  1109 

v.  Mitchell  (90  Wis.  316)  971 

v.  Poa^e  (17  Mo.  91)  418 

v.  Spedden  (46  Md.  527)  1222 

Gravillon  v.  Richard  (13  La.  293)  375 

Gray's  Appeal  (116  Pa.  St.  256)  364,  371 

Estate  (147  Pa.  St.  67)  944 

Gray  v.  Armistead  (6  Ired.  74)  387,  693 

v.  Brignardello  (1  Wall.  627)  334 

v.  Ferguson  (86  Mich.  383)  369 

v.  Gardner  (3  Mass.  399)  1046 

v.  Gray  (60  N.  H.  28)     '  500 

v.  Gray  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  332)  576 

v.  Hawkins  (8  Oh.  St.  449)  686 

v.  Henderson  (71  Pa.  St.  368)  593 

v.  Holmes  (57  Kans.  217)  141 

v.  Kauffman  (82  Tex.  65)  23 

v.  McCune  (23  Pa.  St.  447)  248 

v.  Myrick  (38  N.  J.  Eq.  210)  1127 

v.  Palmer  (9  Cal.  616)  283 

v.  Patton  (2  B.  Mon.  12)  373 

v.  Smith  (3  Watts,  289)  555 

v.  Swain  (2  Hawks,  15)  646,  651 

v.  West  (93  N.  C.  442)  1097,  1102 

Gravbill  v.  Warren  (4  Ga.  528)  1006 

Gravdon  v.  Graydon  (23  N.  J.  Eq.  229)  963 
Gravsbrook  v.  Fox  (1  Plowd.  275)  316,  383 
426,  585,  586 
Grayson  v.  Weddle  (63  Mo.  523)  394,  1027, 
1036,  1000,  1008 
Greathead's  Appeal  (42  Conn.  374)    254,  255, 

259 
Grebill's  Appeal  (87  Pa.  St.  105)  641 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Grece  v.  Helm  (91  Mich.  450)  407,  684 

Greeley  v.  Hendricks  (23  Fla,  366)    713,  1245 
Greelv  V.  Nashua  (62  N.  H.)  354 

Green's  Appeal  (42  Pa.  St.  25)  81*9 

Green,  Ex  parte  (1  Jac.  &  VV.  253)  1012 

In  re  (2  DeG.  P.  &  J.  121)  790 

v.  Allen  (5  Humph.  170)  932 

v.  Armstrong  (1  Den.  550)  597 

v.  Baptist  Church  (27  La.  An.  563)     329 

v.  Barbee  (84  N.  C.  69)  1165,  1166 

v.  Belcher  (1  Atk.  505)  878 

v.  Blackwell  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  768)        1000 

o.  Brooks  (25  Ark.  318)  774,  808 

v.  Bvrne  (40  Ark.  453)  745,  1182 

B.  Clark  (24  Vt.  136)  1202 

v.  Collins  (6  Ired.  139) 

— -  b.  Creighton  (23  How.  90) 

v.  Outright  (Wright,  738) 

v.  Davidson  (4  Baxt.  488) 

V.  Demoss  (10  Humph.  371) 

».  Green  (126  Mo.  17) 

c.  Green  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  451) 

B.  Green  (86  N.  C.  546) 

B.  Hardv  (24  Me.  453) 

v.  Hathaway  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  471) 

o.  Hewitt  (97  [11.  113) 

?>.  Hamberry  (2  Brock.  403) 

v.  Hotran  (153  Mass.  462) 

v.  Howell  (6  W.  &  S  203) 

o.  Hudson  R.  K.  (32  Barb.  25) 

v.  May  (75  Ala.  162) 

y.  Phillips  (26  Grat.  752) 

v.  Probate  Judsre  (40  Mich.  244) 

v.  Rugelv  (23  Tex.  539) 

o.  Russeil  (132  Mass.  536) 

v.  Russell  (103  Mich.  638) 

v.  Sanders  (18  Hun,  308) 

b.  Sargeant  (23  Vt.  466) 

u.  Saulsburv  (6  Del.  Ch.  371) 

b.  Sutton  (50  Mo.  186) 

b.  Taney  (16  Colo.  398) 

B.  Thompson  (26  Minn.  500) 

Thompson  (84  Va.  376) 


655 

374 

599 

725 

333 

158 

1006 

941 

1244 

1220 

729,  949 

558 

353,  934 

1216 

517 

1169 

602 

827 

360,  429 

821 

719,  723 

1163,  1167 

702,  1131 

272,  340 

874 

863,  123i 

628 

1132 


Greenwood  v.  Cline  (7  Or.  17) 
v.  Taylor  (1  Uuss.  &  M. 


-  r.  Tittman  (124  Mo.  372)      357,  397,  432 

e.  Tribe  (L.  R.  9  Ch.  D.  231)  101 

B.  Tunstall  (5  How.  Miss.  638)  1197 

o.  Virden  (22  Mo   506)  299 

v.  Weever  (78  Ind.  494)  172 

G  eeuabaum  v.  Elliott  (60  Mo.  25)  819 

Greenbauni  v.  Austrian  (70  111.  591)  238 

Greene  ;•.  Btitterworth  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  738)  287 

r.  Dav  (1  Dem.  45)  349 

B.  Dv'er  (32  Me.  460)  819 

B.  Greene  (145  111.  234)  30,  43 

i).  Greene  (1  Ohio.  535)  235,  289 

v.  Holt  (76  Mo.  677)  1047,  1068 

v.  Spei-r  (37  Ala.  532)  1215 

o.  Wilbur  (15  R.  I.  251)  1102 

Givenia  b.  Greenia  (14  Mo.  526)  22 

Greenland  v.  Waddoll  (116  N.  Y.  234)      721, 

724,  726 
Greenleaf  b.  Allen  (127  Mass.  248)  622 

Greenough's  Appeal  (9  Pa.  St.  18)  782 

Greeuousjh  v.  Greonough  (11  Pa.  St.  489)    63 

v.  Small  (137  Pa.  St.  132)  1067 

Greenside  B.  Benson  (3  Atk.  248)       763,  11 15 
Greentn-e's  Estate  (12  Pliila.  10)  573 

Green  wait  v  McClure  (7  III.  App.  152)     1064 
Greonwav  v.  Greenwav  (2  DeG.  F.  &  J. 

128)     '  881 

Greenwell  B.  Heritage  (71  Mo.  459)  859,  1072 


•  Page 
45 

_.  185)  859 

B.  Woodworth  (18  Tex.  1)  809 

Greer  v.  Ferguson  (56  Ark.  324)  358,  361,  363, 

369 

v.  Major  (114  Mo.  145)  213 

■•  v.  McBeth  (13  Rich.  L.  &  Eq.  254)     354 

v.  Nutt  (54  Mo.  App.  4)  533 

v.  Boude  (9  Dana,  343)  785 

v.  Currier  (36  N.  H.  200)  1142 

v.  Mvatt  (78  Iowa,  703)  499 

v.  Wilson  (24  Ind.  227)  524,  579 

Gregory  v.  Bailey  (4  Hair.  256) 

v.  Cowgill  (19  Mo.  415) 

v.  Ellis  (82  N.  C.  225) 

v.  Ellis  (86  N.  C.  579) 

v.  Forrester  (1  McCord  Ch.  318) 

B.  Harrison  (4  Fla.  56) 

v.  Hooker  (I  Hawks,  394) 

v.  McCormick  (120  Mo.  657) 

■  v.  McPherson  (13  Cal.  562) 


729 

440 

195 

421 

744 

759,  760 

31  i  2 

735,  1023, 

1035 

284 

28 

1128 

1028 

■    1035 

1056 

271 

1045 

1193 


401, 


v.  Menefee  (83  Mo.  413) 

v.  Oates  (92  Kv.  532) 

v.  Orr  (61  Miss".  307) 

v.  Rhoden  (24  S.  C  90) 

v.  Taber  (19  Cal.  397) 

Gregson  v.  Tuson  ( 153  Mass.  325) 
Greiner's  Appeal  (103  Pa.  St.  89) 
Grena wait's  Appeal  (37  Pa.  St.  95) 
Gresham  v.  Pyron  (17  Ga.  203) 
Gress  Limib.  Co.  v.  Leitner  (91  Ga.  810)   1051 
Grev  v.  Lewis  ("9  Ky.  453)  841 

Grice's  Estate  (11  Pliila.  107)  1038 

Grice  v.  Randall  (23  Vt.  249)  1244 

Grider  v.  Apperson  (38  Ark.  388)    1034,  1209 

v.  Eubanks  (12  Bush,  510)  269,  270 

v.  McClay  (11  S  &  R.  224)  1233 

Gridley  v.  Andrews  (8  Conn.  1)  989 

v.  Phillips  (5  Kan.  349)     '  1068 

o.  Watson  (53  111    186)  610 

Grier's  Appeal  (25  Pa.  St.  352)  828 

Griesemer  v.  Bover  (13  Wash.  171)    172,  180, 

185 

Grieve's  Estate  (165  Pa.  St.  126)  184 

Griffie  v.  Maxie  (58  Tex.  210)  211 

Griffin  v.  Bonham  (9  Rich.  Eq.  71)    391,  653, 

654,  1168,  1173 

v   Graham  (1  Hawks,  96)  930 

o.  Griffin  (3  Ala.  623)  1037 

ii.  Griffin  (125  HI.  430)  832.  834 

v.  Griffin  (141  111.  373)  730,  1021 

v.  Maxey  (58  Tex.  210)  195 

v.  Parclier  (48  Me.  406)  857 

B.  Samuel  (6  Mo.  50)  287 

v.  Warner  (48  Cal.  383)  1081 

Griffith.  In  re  (84  Cal.  107)  439,  440 

v.  Beecher  (10  Barb.  432)  1142 

v.  Chew  (8  S.  &  R.  17)  OW 

r.  Coleman  (01  M<1.  250)  522 

v.  Diffendorffer  (50  Md.  466)  47,  4  t 

v.  Frazier  (8  Cr.  9)        405.  448,  449,  572 

v.  Godev  (113  U.  S.  89)    333,  1129,  1131 

v.  Philips  (9  Lea,  417)  1048,  1000 

v.  Railroad  (23  S.  C.  25)  591 

r.  Townlev  (69  Mo.  13)  1072 

Griffiths  v.  Robins  (3  Madd.  191)  43 

Griggs  v.  Clark  (23  Cal.  427)  281 

v.  Dodffe  (2  Dav,  28)  1001 

v.  Smith  (12  N'  J.  L.  22)  238 

v.  Veghte  (47  N.  J.  Eq.  179)       268,  761 

lxxxiii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Grignon  v.  Astor  (2  How.  319)    325,  329,  337, 

1030,  1031,  1088,  1089 

Grigsby  v.  Cocke  (g5  Ky.  314)  543 

v.  Simpson  (28  Grat.  348)  833 

v.  Wilkinson  (9  Bush,  91)        1138,  1228 

Grims  Appeal  (1  Grant  Cas.  209)  1034 

Appeal  (89  Pa.  St.  333)  987 

Appeal  (105  Pa.  St.  375)    284,  291,  703, 

1083 

Appeal  (109  Pa.  St.  391)  918,  1242 

Estate  (147  Pa.  St.  190)  1242 

Grimes  v.  Booth  (19  Ark.  224)  805 

v.  Harmon  (35  Ind.  198)      873,  921,  931 

v.  Talbert  (14  Md.  169)  565 

v.  Wilson  (4  Blackf.  331)  257 

Grimm's  Estate  (81  Pa.  St.  233)  648 

Grimm  v.  Tittman  (113  Mo.  56)  70,  73,  75 
Grinnell  v.  Baxter  (17  Pick.  383)  1208 

v.  Lawrence  (1  Blatch.  346)  670 

Grinstead  v.  Fonte  (32  Miss.  120)  733 

Griscom  v.  Evens  (40  N.  J.  L.  402)  892 

Grissom  v.  Hill  (17  Ark.  483)  929 

Grist  v.  Hodges  (3  Dev.  L.  198)  621 

Griswold  ».  Chandler  (5  N.  H.  492)  664,  679, 

692,  702,  761,  1137,  1145 

r.  Frink  (22  Oh.  St.  579)  1070 

v.  Mattix  (21  Mo.  App.  282)  189 

v.  Met.  R.  R.  (122  N.  Y.  102)  621 

r.  Sawver  (125  N.  Y.  411)  647 

Groce  v.  Field  (13  Ga.  24)  1259 

v.  Rittenberrv  (14  Ga.  232)  895 

Grogan  v.  Garrison  (27  Oh.  St.  50)  264 

Groot  O.  Hitz  (3  Mackev,  247)  1111 

Groover  v.  Brown  (69  Ga.  60)  202 

Gross  v.  Delaware  R.  R.  (50  N.  J.  L.  317)  621 

v.  Howard  (52  Me.  192)  1038 

Grossman  v.  Hancock  (58  N.  J.  L.  139)  691  a 
Grotenkemper  v.  Brvson  (79  Ky.  353)  1096 
Groth  v.  Gyger  (31  Pa.  St.  271)  086 

Groton  v.  Ruggles  (17  Me.  137)  383 

Grout,  In  re  (15  Hun.  T61)  H46 

v.  Chamberlin  (4  Mass.  613)  751 

Grove  v.  Spiker  (72  Md.  300)  46 

GroveFs  Estate  (34  N.  Y.  Supp.  474)  691  a 
Grover  r.  Boon  (144  Pa.  St.  399)         777,  864 

v.  Hawlev  (5  Cal.  485)  1044 

Grow  v.  Dobbins  (128  Mass.  271)  1267 

Grubb's  Estate  (174  Pa.  St.  187)  27 

Grubbs  b.  McDonald  (91  Pa.  St.  236)  37 

Gruwell  v.  Seybolt  (82  Cal.  7)  196,  201 

Grymes  v.  Boweren  (6  Bing.  437)  605 

—  r.  Hone  (49  N.  Y.  17)  116,  117,  120 
Guenther  r.  Birkicht  (22  Mo.  439)  824 
Guerin  v.  Moore  (25  Minn.  462)  222,  243 
Guernsev  v.  Guernsey  (36  N.  Y.  267)  949 
Guien's  Estate  (1  Ashm.  317)  1174 
Guier  v.  Kelly  (2  Binn.  21)4)  340 
Guild  r.  Guild  (15  Pick.  129)  824 
Guilford  v.  Love  (49  Tex.  715)           330,  1089 

r.  Maddon  (45  Ala.  290)  1246 

Guion  v.  Anderson  (8  Humph.  298)  277 

Guitar  v.  Gordon  (17  Mo.  408)  111 

Guldin'a  Estate  (81  *  Pa.  St.  362)  533 

Gulick  r.  Gulick  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  498)  1103 

Gulledge  o.  lierrv  (31  Miss.  346)  733 

Gulley  v.  Prather  (7  Bush,  167)  724 

Gully*.  Hull  (31  Mi^  20)  607 

1>.  Bay  (18  B.  Mon.  107)  244 

Gum  v,  Capeharl  (5  Jones  Eq.  242)  994 
Gunbv  v.  Brown  (Hi;  Mo.  253)  1028 

Gum.  v.  Barry  (44  Ga.  351)  201 

lxxxiv 


•Page 
Gunn  v.  Barry  (15  Wall.  610)  201 

v.  Howell  (35  Ala.  144)  675 

v.  Thruston  (130  Mo.  339)        1223,  1224 

Gunning  v.  Lockman  (3  Redf.  278)  1128 

Gunnison  v.  Twitchel  (38  N.  H.  62)  195,  212 
Gunter  v.  Fox  (51  Tex.  383)  622,  713 

v.  Janes  (9  Cal.  643)  646,  804,  848 

v.  Texas  (82  Tex.  496)  23 

Gurley  v.  Butler  (83  Ind.  501)  573 

v.  Park  (135  Ind.  440)  35 

Gumee  v.  Maloney  (38  Cal.  85)  757 

Guthman  v.  Guthman  (18  Neb.  98)  205,  215 
Guthmann  v.  Vallerv  (51  Neb.  824)  1142, 1143 
Guthrie's  Appeal  (37  Pa.  St.  9)  901 

Guthrie  v.  Guthrie  (17  Tex.  541)  828 

v.  Jones  (108  Mass.  191)  604 

v.  Owen  (2  Humph.  202)  77 

v.  Price  (23  Ark.  396)  52 

v.  Wheeler  (51  Conn.  207)  707,  1159 

Gutzweiler  v.  Lackmann  (39  Mo.  91)  593 

Guy  v.  Pierson  (21  Ind.  18)  1035,  1037 


v.  Sharp  (1  Mvl.  &  K.  589) 
G win's  Will  (1  Tuck.  44) 
Gwin,  In  re  (77  Cal.  313) 

v.  Hicks  (1  Bay,  503) 

v.  Latimer  (4  Yerg.  22) 

Gwinn  v.  Williams  (30  Ind.  374) 
Gwynn  v.  Dorsey  (4  G.  &  J.  453) 
Gwynne  v.  Cincinnati  (3  Ohio,  24) 

v.  Estes  (14  Lea,  662) 

Gyger's  Estate  (65  Pa.  St.  311) 


972 

85 

271 

598 

797 

1080 

1137 

239 

281,  288 

519,  525 


f,98 


Haag  v.  Sparks  (27  Ark.  594)  1123 

Haas,  In  re  (97  Cal.  232)  344 

v.  Childs  (4  Dem.  137)  402 

Habergham  v.  Vincent  (2  Ves.  Jr.  204)       60 
Habermann's  Appeal  (101  Pa.  St.  329)      705, 

1135 
Habershon  v.  Varden  (7  E.  L.  &  Eq.  228)  907 
Habig  v.  Dodge  (127  Ind.  31)  1221 

Hacknev  v.  Vrooman  (62  Barb.  650)  119 

Hadden  v.  Dawdv  (51  N.  J.  Eq.  154)         924 
Haddock  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  (146 

Mass.  155)  466 

Haden  v.  Haden  (7  J.  J.  Marsh.  168)       1213, 

1242 
Hadley  v.  Kendrick  (10  Lea,  525)  387,  692,  693 
Hadlock  v.  Grav  (104  Ind.  596)  900 

Hafer  v.  Hafer  (33  Kans.  449)  213 

v.  Hafer  (36  Kans.  524)  213 

Haffey,  In  re  (10  Mo.  App.  232)  1158 

Hagadorn  v.  Hart  (62  Hun,  94)  1237 

Hagan  v.  Patterson  (10  Bush,  441)  1265 

17.  Piatt  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  206)  1003 

Hagenmeyer  v.  Hanselman  (2  Dem.  87)     908 
Hager  v.  Kixon  (69  N.  C.  108)  203 

Hagerty  ».  State  (55  Ohio  St.  613)  691  a 

Ilagcmtt  v.  Wade  (10  Sm.  &  M.  143)        1065 
Hagler  v.  Mercer  (6  Fla.  271)  337 

Hagthorp  ».  Hook  (1  G.  cS:  J.  270)     432,  704, 

1182 
Hahn  r.  Kelly  (34  Cal.  391)  325,  329,  331 

1107 
809 
311 
815 
580 
708 
621 
277 


Mosely  (119  N.  C.  73) 
Hahnlin's  Appeal  (45  Pa.  St.  343) 
Haigh  17.  Haigh  (9  R.  I.  26) 
Haight  v.  Bergh  (15  N.  J.  L.  183) 

v.  Brisbin  (96  N.  Y.  132) 

v.  Brisbin  (100  N.  Y.  219) 

v.  Green  (19  Cal.  113) 

V.  Hall  (74  Wis.  152) 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  Bide  pagea.] 


*  Page 
Haieht  v.  Havt  (10  N.  Y.  464)  625 

Haigood  v.  Wells  (1  Hill  Ch.  59)  512, 582, 1254 
Haile's  Succession  (40  La.  An.  334)  1221 

Haile  v.  Hill  (13  xMo.  612)  4'J4 

Haine's  Accounting  (8  N.  J.  Eq.  506) 


Haines  v.  Haines  (2  Vern.  441) 

v.  Havden  (95  Mich.  332) 

v.  Hay  (169  111.  93) 

v.  Peo'ple  (97  111.  161) 

v.  Price  (20  N.  J.  L.  480) 


92 

48,  490 

1149,  1166 

1249 

715, 1142, 

1143 

639 


Hair  v.  Avery  (28  Ala.  267) 

Hairston  v.  Hairston  (2  Jones  Eq.  123)       641 

v.  Hairston  (30  Miss.  276)         90,  91,  95 

v.  Randolphs  (12  Leigh,  445)  252 

Hait  v.  Houle  (19  Wis.  472)  212 

Hake  v.  Stott  (5  Col.  140)  575,  576 

Haldane  v.  Eckford  (L.  K.  8  Eq.  631)  443 
Haldeman  v.  Haldeman  (40  Pa.  St.  29)  898 
Haldenbv  v.  Spofforth  (1  Beav.  390)  732 

Hale  v.  Audsley  (122  Mo.  316)  887 

r.  Hale  (137  Mass.  168)  718 

v.  Hale  (1  Gray,  518)  186, 191, 1200 

v.  Hale  (125  111.  399)  917 

v.  Hale  (146  111.  227)  718 

v.  Hale  (90  Va.  728)  59 

v.  Hallon  (90  Tex.  427)  1221 

v.  Marquette  (69  Iowa,  376)     1066,  1077 

—  v.  Meegan  (39  Mo.  272)  834 

v.  Munn  (4  Gray,  132)  235 

v.  Plummer  (6  Ind.  121)  290 

v.  Stone  (14  Ala.  803)  607 

Hales  v.  Holland(92  111.  494)  340,  825 

Haley  v.  Boston  (108  Mass.  576)  901 

"v.  Thames  (30  S.  C.  270)  421 

Halfman  v.  Ellison  (51  Ala.  543)  803 

Hall,  Goods  of  (L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  256)  62 

In  re  (2  Dem.  112)  906 

Succession  of  (28  La.  An.  57)  72 

v.  Allen  (31  Wis.  691)  480 

v.  Armor  (68  Ga.  449)  1044 

v.  Bank  (145  Mo.  418)  622,  715 

v.  Bovd  (6  Pa.  St.  267)  736,  826 

v.  Bramble  (2  Dak.  189)  667 

v.  Browder  (4  How.  Miss.  224)  600 

v.  Bumstead  <20  Pick.  2)  1267 

v.  Burgess  (5  Gray,  12)  432 

v.  Carter  (8  Ga.  388)  737,  739 

v.  Chaffee  (14  N.  H.  215)  915,  949 

v.  Chapman  (35  All.  553)  691,  694 

v.  Cowles  (15  Colo.  343)  431 

v.  Cushing  (9  Pick.  395)  391,  553 

v.  Darrington  (9  Ala.  502)  736 

v.  Davis  (3  Pick.  450)  1215 

•  v.  Denckla  (28  Ark.  506)  860 

v.  Doughertv  (5  Houst.  435)  32 

v.  Elliot  (Peake  N.  P.  C.  86)  420 

v.  Fields  (81  Tex.  553)  200,  204,  210,  212 


i'.  Finch  (29  Wis.  278) 

v.  Gilbert  (31  Wis.  691) 

v.  Gittings  (2  H.  &  J.  112) 

v.  Grovier  (25  Mich.  428) 


v.  Hall  (38  Ala.  131) 
v.  Hall  (47  Ala.  290) 
v.  Hall  (18  Ga.  40) 
v.  Hall  (37  L.  J.  P.  40) 
v.  Hall  (L.  R.  1  Prob.  &  D.  481) 


823,  824 

470 

309 

1121,  1129, 

1134 

34 


v.  Hall  (2  McCord  Ch.  269) 

v.  Hall  (1  Mass.  101) 


469 
71 
45 
46 
269,  653, 
1094 
1187 


Hall  v.  Hall  (123  Mass.  120)  880 

v.  Hall  (27  Miss.  458)  389,  992 

o.  Hall  (78  N.  Y.  535)  1175 

v.  Hall  (11  Tex.  526)  828 

v.  Hallett  (1  Cox  Ch.  134)  1085 

v.  Hancock  (15  Pick.  255)  155 

v.  Harrell  (92  Ind.  408)  254 

v.  Harris  (113  111.  410)  212 

v.  Harrison  (21  Mo.  227)  366,  673 

v.  Irwin  (7  111.  176)  719 

v.  Martin  (46  N.  II.  337)  820,  1261,  1264 

v.  Monroe  (27  Tex.  700)  576 

v.  Pearman  (20  Tex.  168)  588 

v.  Pierson  (63  Conn.  332)  259 

v.  Pegram  (85  Ala.  522)  1131 

v.  Pratt  (5  Oh.  72)  789,  821 

v.  Price  (141  Ind.  576)  1072 

v.  Priest  (6  Gray,  18)  878 

o.  Richardson  (22  Hun,  444)  836 

v.  Savage  (4  Mas.  273)  249 

v.  Sayre  (10  B.  Mon.  46)  1040 

v.  Sims  (2  J.  J.  Marsh.  509)  473 

v.  Smith  (103  Mo.  289)  268 

v.  Smith  (64  N.  H.  144)  873 

v.  Superior  Court  (69  Cal.  79)  808 

v.  Thayer  (105  Mass.  219)  527 

0.  Tryon  (1  Dem.  296)  1168 

v.  Tufts  (18  lick.  455)  955 

v.  Wilson  (6  Wis.  433)  856 

v.  Woodman  (49  N.  H.  295)  1026 

Halleck's  Estate  (49  Cal.  Ill)  1190 

Halleck  v.  Guv  (9  Cal.  181)  1067 

v.  Mixer "(16  Cal.  574)  620,  621 

v.  Moss  (17  Cal.  339)  697 

Hallett  v.  Allen  (13  Ala.  554)  994 

v.  Bassett  (100  Mass.  167)  443 

v.  Thompson  (5  Pai.  583)  956 

Halley  v.  Haney  (3  T.  B.  Mon.  141)  532 

v.  Webster  (21  Me.  461)  479 

Halliburton  v.  Carson  (100  N.  C.  99)        1155 

v.  Sumner  (27  Ark.  460)  1059 

Halliday  v.  Du  Bose  (59  Ga.  268)  533 

Hallock  v.  Rumsev  (22  Hun,  89)  536 

v.  Teller  (2  Dem.  206)  823 

Halsev's  Estate  (93  N.  Y.  48)  1198 

Halsev  ».  Convention  (75  Md.  275)  906,  939 

v.  Patterson  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  445)  906 

v.  Van  Amringe  (4  Pai.  279)  1202 

v.  Van  Amringe  (6  Pai.  12)  1164 

Halstead  v.  Westervelt  (41  N.   J.  Eq. 

100)  1098 

Halyburton  v.  Dobson  (65  N.  C  88)  830 

Ham  v.  Henderson  (50  Cal.  367)  643 

v.  Kornegay  (85  N.  C.  118)        749, 1230 

Hamaker's  Estate  (5  Watts,  204)  1183 

Hamberlin  v.  Terry  (1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  589) 

331,  572 
Hamblett  v.  Hamblett  (6  N.  H.  332)     41,  501 

Hamblin  v.  Hook  (6  La.  73)  803 
Hambrooke  v.  Simmons  (4  Russ.  C.  C. 

25)  118 

Hamden  v.  Rice  (24  Conn.  350)  928 
Hamer  v.  Hamer  (4  Strobh.  Eq.  124)  1214 
Hamersley  v.  Lambert  (2  John.  Ch.  508)    287 

v.  Lockman  (2  Dem.  524)  92,  490 

v.  Smith  (4  Whart.  126)  608 

Hamilton's  Estate  (34  Cal.  464)  395,  397,  428 

Estate  (66  Cal.  576)  183 

Estate  (13  N.  Y.  Law  J.  1384)  691  a 

Hamilton,  Matter  of  (148  N.  Y.  310)        691  a 

Succession  (35  La.  An.  640)  958 

Lxxxv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 

Hamilton  v.  Brown  (161  U.  S.  256)    302,  303, 

306,  310 

718,  719 

885,  880 

38 

630 

628 

577 

1046 

1005 

1098 

1018 

621 

1247 

903 

25 

949 

966 


v.  Clarke  (3  Mackey,  428) 

v.  Flinn  (21  Tex.  713) 

v.  Hamilton  (10  R.  I.  538) 

v.  Han.  R.  R.  (39  Kans.  56) 

v.  Jones  (125  Ind.  176) 

v.  Levy  (41  S.  C.  374) 

v.  Lockhart  (41  Miss.  460) 

v.  McQuillan  (82  Me.  204) 

v.  Porter  (63  Pa.  St.  332) 

v.  Serra  (6  Mack.  168) 

v.  Wilson  (4  John.  72) 

Hamlin  t>.  Mebane  (1  Jones  Eq.  18) 

v.  Osgood  (1  Redf.  409) 

v.  Stevenson  (4  Dana,  597) 

v.  U.  S.  Express  Co.  (107  111.  443) 

Hammer's  Estate  (158  Pa.  632) 
Hammett  v.  Starkweather  (47  Conn.  439)  803 
Hammon  v.  Huntlev  (4  Cow.  493)  494,  736 
Hammond  v.  Dike  (42  Minn.  273)  490 

v.  Hammond  (2  Bl.  Ch.  306)     994,  1123 

v.  Hammond  (55  Md.  575)  891,  952 

v.  Inloes  (4  Md.  138)  307 

v.  Putnam  (110  Mass.  232)  726 

v.  Wood  (15  R.  I.  566)  505,  507 

Hammonds,  Goods  of  (3  Sw.  &  Tr.  90)  69 
Hammons  v.  Renfrow  (84  Mo.  332)  611,  815 
Hamner  v.  Hamner  (3  Head,  398)  822 

Hampden  v.  Harder  (88  N.  C.  592)  477 

Hampstead  v.  Plaistow  (49  N.  H.  84)  224 
Hampton  v.  Phvsick  (24  Ark.  561)  189 

Hanbest's  Appe'al  (92  Pa.  St.  482)  710 

Hance  v.  McKnight  (11  N.  J.  L.  385)  703 
Hancock's  Appeal  (112  Pa.  St.  532)  : 

Hancock  v.  American  L.  I.  Co.  (62  Mo. 
26) 

V.  Hubbard  (19  Pick.  167) 

V.  Minot  (8  Pick.  29) 

v.  Podmore  (1  B.  &  Ad.  260) 

Hancocke  v.  Prowd  (1  Saund.  328) 
Hand  v.  Marcy  (28  N.  J.  Eq.  59) 
v.  Molter  (73  Mo.  457) 


445 

150,  1238 

1103 

763 

787,  793 

936 

1043,  1047 

Handberry  v.  Doolittle  (38  111.  202)  896 

Handlev  v.  Fitzhugh  (3  A.  K.  Marsh.  561)  797 

993 

904 

1164,  1165, 

1168,  1174 

847 

574,  578 

646,  1142 

1122,  1123 

214 

215 

1103 


■v.  Handlev  (84  Ala.  600) 
—  v.  Wright'son  (60  Md.  198) 
Handy  v.  Collins  (60  Md.  229) 


Hanger  v.  Abbott  (6  Wall.  532) 
Hanifan  v.  Needles  (108  111.  403) 
Hankins  v.  Kimball  (57  Ind.  42) 

v.  Lavne  (48  Ark.  544) 

Hanks  v.  Crosby  (64  Tex.  483) 

Hanley  v.  Hanley  (114  Cal.  690) 

Hanna's  Appeal  (31  Pa.  St.  53) 

Hanna  v.  Dunham  (10  Ind.  App.  611)        679 

v.  Palmer  (6  Col.  156)  221,  272 

v.  Wrav  (77  Pa.  St.  27)  283 

Hannah  v.  Hannah  (109  Mo.  236)  214 

v.  Peak  (2  A.  K.  Marsh.  133)  488 

v.  Railroad  Co.  (87  N.  C.  351)  623 

Hanner  v.  Moulton  (23  Fed.  Rep.  5)   892,  894 
Hannineton  v.  True   (L.  R.  33  Ch.  D. 

195)  mi 

Hannum  v.  Curtis  (13  Ind.  206)  808 

r.  Day  (105  Mass.  33)        546,  735,  1023, 

1024,  1046 

v.  Spear  (2  Dull.  291)  1045 

Bansbrongfa  v.  Hooe  (12  Leigh,  316)  978 

Uanscom  v.  Marston  (82  Me.  288)  352 

lxxxvi 


*Page 

856 

809 

414,  421 

1108 

914 


Hansell  v.  Forbes  (33  Miss.  42) 

v.  Gregg  (7  Tex.  223) 

Hansford  v.  Elliott  (9  Eeigh,  79) 
Hanson  v.  Hanson  (70  Me.  508) 

v.  Little  Sisters  (79  Md.  434) 

v.  Metcalf  (46  Minn.  25)       283,  288,  289 

Hautzch  v.  Mossolt  (61  Minn.  361)    817,  818, 

819 
Hapgood  v.  Houghton  (10  Pick.  154)  759,  760, 

793 

V.  Houghton  (22  Pick.  480)  639.  960 

v.  Jennison  (2  Vt.  294)  1144 

Happy's  Will  (4  Bibb,  553)  480 

Haraden  v.  Larrabee  (113  Mass.  430)  156,  905 
Harbison  v.  James  (90  Mo.  411)  948 

Harbster's  Appeal  (125  Pa.  St.  1)  28! 

Harcum  v.  Hudnall  (14  Grat.  369)  727,  728 
Hard  v.  Ashley  (88  Hun,  103)  48  i 

v.  Ashlev  (117  N.  Y.  606)  873,  944 

v.  Turnure  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  121)  941 

Hardage  v.  Stroope  (58  Ark.  303)  901 

Hardaway  v.  Parham  (27  Miss.  103)  574.  581 
Harden  v.  Haves  (9  Pa.  St.  151)  38,  39 

Hardenbergh  "v.  Rav(151  U.  S.  112)  887,  889 
Hardenburg  v.  Blafr  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  645)  956 
Hardestv  v.  Campbell  (29  Md.  533)  390 

Hardin  v.  Jamison  (60  Minn.  112)  505 

v.  Pullev  (79  Ala.  381)  '  177 

v.  St.  Claire  (115  Cal.  460)  804 

v.  Smith  (7  B.  Mon.  390)  642 

Harding  v.  Alden  (9  Me.  140)  228 

v.  Le  Moyne  (114  111.  65)    715, 1030, 1033, 

1035 

v.  Littledale  (150  Mass.  100)  647 

v.  Presbj'terian  Church  (20  Ind.  71)   274 

v.  Smith  (11  Pick.  478)  856 

Hardinge,  Goods  of  (2  Curt.  640)  531 

Hardt  v.  Birelv  (72  Md.  134)  1168 

Hardwick's  Estate  (59  Cal.  292)  214 

Hardv  v.  Ames  (47  Barb.  413)  805,  841 

v.  Call  (16  Mass.  530)  1149 

v.  Harbin  (4  Sawy.  536)  443 

v.  Hardv  (26  Ala.  524)  498 

v.  Merri'll  (56  N.  H  227)  41 

v.  Miles  (91  N.  C.  131)  748 

v.  Overman  (36  Ind.  549)  287 

v.  Thomas  (23  Miss.  544)  525 

Yarmouth  (6  Allen,  277)  691 

Harecourt  v.  Bishop  (Cro.  Eliz.  497)  336 

Hargadine  v.  Gibbons  (114  Mo.  561)  301 

v.  Gibbons  (45  Mo.  App.  460)  301 

Hargis  v.  Sewell  (87  Ky.  62)  1014,  1248,  1249 
Hargrove  v.  Lilly  (69  Ga.  326)  773 

Hargroves  v.  Redd  (43  Ga.  142)  357 

Harker  v.  Clark  (57  Cal.  245)  623 

v.  Irick  (10  N.  J.  Eq.  269)  654 

v.  Rielly  (4  Del.  Ch.  72)  944,  988 

Harkins's  Succession  (2  La.  An.  829)  810 
Harkness  v.  Bailey  (Prec.  Ch.  514)        .     103 

t\  Sears  (26  Ala.  493)  601 

Harlan's  Estate  (24  Cal.  182)  439 

Harland  V.  Person  (93  Ala.  273)  346,  357, 1110 
Harleston  v.  Corbett  (12  Rich.  604)  76 

Harley  v.  Harley  (57  Md.  340)  1214 

Harlin  v.  Stevenson  (30  Iowa,  371)  1124 

Harlow  v.  Harlow  (05  Me.  448)  1254 

Harman  v.  Ilarman  (2  Show.  492)  769 

Harmon  v.  Bvnum  (40  Tex.  324)  185,  208 

v.  Harmon  (63  111.  512)  631 

v.  Smith  (38  Fed.  R.  482)  1095 

v.  Wagener  (33  S.  C.  487)  670 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Harness  v.  Green  (20  Mo.  31G)  777 

v.  Harness  (49  Ind.  384)  1223 

Harney  v.  Donohue  (97  Mo.  141)  22,  1087 

v.  Dutcher  (15  Mo.  89)  745,  1183 

v.  Scott  (28  Mo,  333)  1205 

Harp  v.  Parr  (168  111.  459)        69,  73,  490,  500 

Harpending  r.  Wvlie  (13  Bush,  158)  210 

Harper's  Appeal  (111  Pa.  St.  243)  986 

Harper  v.  Archer  (28  Miss.  212)  648 

v.  Butler  (2  Put.  239)  367,  387 

r.  Clayton  (81  Md.  346)  254,  255 

V.  Harper  (92  N.  C.  300)  1218,  1223 

v.  Harper  (1  Th.  &  C.  351)  476 

17.  Lamping  (33  Cal.  641)  291 

v.  McVeigh  (82  Va.  751)  834 

v.  Phelps  (21  Conn.  257)  905 

v.  Smith  (9  Ga.  461)  393 

v.  Strutz  (53  Cal.  655)  713 

Harrell  v.  Davenport  (5  Jones  Eq.  4)        1006 

v.  Hamilton  (6  Ga.  37)  465 

Harriet  v.  Swan  (18  Ark.  495)  1247 

Harriman  v.  Gray  (49  Me.  537)  253 

Harring  v.  Allen"(25  Mich.  505)  490,  491 

Harrington  v.  Brown  (5  Pick.  519)  703 

v.  Keteltas  (92  N.  Y.  40)   677,  679,  1153 

v.  La  Rocque  (13  Or.  344)  345,  390 

v.  Rich  (6  Vt.  666)  811 

v.  Samples  (36  Minn.  200)  831,  834 

v.  Steer  (82  III.  50)  82 

Harriot,  Matter  of  (154  N.  Y.  540)  671,  1149 

Harris's  Estate  (74  Pa.  St.  452)  905 

Harris'  Estate  (10  Wash.  555)  481,  482 

Petition  (14  R.  I.  637)  1052 

Harris,  Matter  of  (4  Dem.  463)  1171 

v.  Anderson  (9  Humph.  779)  494 

v.  Angell  (16  R.  I.  347)  855 

v.    Bank   of    Jacksonville  (22   Fla. 

501 )  830,  834 

v.  Burton  (4  Harr.  66)  249 

v.  Cable  (104  Mich.  365)  674 

v.  Calvert  (2  Kans.  App.  749)  672 

v.  Chipman  (9  Utah,  101)  546,  506 

v.  Clark  (3  N.  Y.  93)  121 

v.  Davis  (1  Coll.  416)  881 

v.  Dillard  (31  Ala.  191)  576 

v.  Douglas  (64  111.  466)  816,  1095 

v.  Ely  (25  N.  Y.  138)  1 120 

v.  Fly  (7  Pai^e.  421)  1097 

v.  Foster  (6  Ark.  388)  1153 

v.  Harris  (36  Barb.  88)  481 

v,  Harris  (3  Eq.  Irish  R.  610)  88 

v.  Han-is  (61  Ind.  117)  493 

v.  Harris  (85  Kv.  49)  158 

v.  Harris  (153  Mass.  439)  290 

v.  Hayes  (53  Mo.  90)  37,  477,  500 

v.  Hutcheson  (3  South.  R.  34)  818 

v.  Knapp  (21  Pick.  412) 

v.  Lester  (80  111.  307) 

v.  Martin  (9  Ala.  895) 

v.  Milburn  (2  Hagg.  62) 

v.  Orr  (42  \V.  Va.  745) 

v.  Parker  (41  Ala.  604) 


v.  Potts  (3  Yeates,  141) 

v.  Rice  (66  Ind.  267) 

v.  Seals  (29  Ga.  585) 

v.  Tisereau  (52  Ga.  153) 

Harrison's  Appeal  (48  Conn.  202) 

Appeal  (100  Pa.  St.  458) 

Will  (1  B.  Mon.  351) 

Harrison  v.  Bishop  (131  Ind.  161) 


1000 

1047 

1109 

407 

1228 

651,  691,  695, 

1146 

950 

842 

578 

470 

51,  484 

49 

47 

38 


Page 

909 

79 

246 

236 


Harrison  v.  Brophv  (51  Pac.  R.  883) 

v.  Burgess  (f  Hawks,  384) 

v.  Eldridge  (7  N.  J.  L.  392) 

v.  Griffith  (4  Bush,  146) 

v.  Harrison  (9  Ala.  470)    351,  1229,  1231 

v.  Harrison  106  N.  C.  282)  1031 

v.  Henderson  (7  Heisk.  315)  725,  787,  789 

v.  McMahon  (1  Bradf.  283)  508 

v.  Moselev  (31  Tex.  608)  623 

v.  Rowan"(3  Wash.  C.  C.  580)  32,  42,  43, 

52,  479 

v.  Rowley  (4  Ves.  212)  418 

v.  Turbeville  (2  Humph.  242)  549 

V.  White  (38  Miss.  178)  1155 

Harrow  v.  Johnson  (3  Mete.  (Kv.)  578)      236 
llarshaw  v.  Harshaw  (184  Pa.  St.  401)      103, 

973 
Harshman  v.  Slonaker  (53  Iowa,  467)  164 
Harstel  v.  People  (21  Colo.  296)  1129 

Hart  v.  Auger  (38  La.  An.  341)  232 

v.  Bostwick  (14  Fla.  162)  568 

o.  Burch  (130  111.  426)  233,  254 

v.  Dunbar  (4  Sm.  &  M.  273)      263,  1074 

v.  Hart  (70  Ga.  704)  111 

v.  Hart  (39  Miss.  221)  704 

0.  Hart  (41  Mo.  441)  824 

v.  Hart  (31  W.  Va.  688)  293,  1033 

v.  Hoss  (22  La.  An.  517)  356 

v.  Jewett  (11  Iowa,  276)  863,866 

v.  Leete  (104  Mo.  315)  607,  1014 

v.  Logan  (49  Mo.  47)  236 

v.  McCollum  (28  Ga.  478)  220,  241 

v.  Marks  (4  Brad.  161)  893 

v.  Smith  (20  Fla.  58)  513,  741,  743 

v.  Soward  (12  B.  Mon.  391)  517 

v.  Stover  (164  Pa.  523)  873 

v.  Ten  Evck  (2  John.  Ch.  62)  661 

v.  Thompson  (3  B.  Mon.  482")  949 

v.  Tulk  (2  DeG.  M.  &  G.  300)  881 

v.  Williams  (77  N.  C.  426)  1007 

Harter  v.  Sanger  (138  Ind.  161)  286,  430 

v.  Taggart  (14  Oh.  St.  122)  812 

Hartford  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Andrews  (36  Conn. 

213)  440,  630 

Hartley  v.  Croze  (38  Minn.  324)  1052 

Hartman  v.  Dowdel  (1  Rawle,  279)  640 

v.  Munch  (21  Minn.  107)  201 

v.  Schultz  (101  111.  437)  197,  215 

Hartnett  v.  Fegan  (3  Mo.  App.  1)     715,  1142 

v.  Wandell  (60  N.  Y.  346)  383,  503 

Hartsfield  v.  Harvoley  (71  Ala.  231)   196,  199 
Hartwell  v.  De  Vault  (159  111.  325)  234 

Hartwig  v.  Schiefer  (147  Ind.  64)  1016 

Hartzell's  Estate  (187  Pa.  St.  286)  1099 

Hartzell  v.  Commonwealth  (42  Pa.  St. 

453)  553 

Harvard  v.  Amory  (9  Pick.  440)  710 

Harvard  College  v.  Balch  (171  111.  275)      949 

v.  Quinn  (3  Redf.  514)  987 

Harvey,  Matter  of  (3  Redf.  214)  525 

v.  Chouteau  (14  Mo.  587)  86 

v.  Harvey  (25  S.  C.  2S3)  308 

v.  Harvey  (2  Stra.  1141)  601 

v.  McDonnell  (113  N.  Y.  526)  631 

v.  Richards  (1  Mas.  381)      360,  375,  377 

v.  Skillman  (22  Wend.  571)  802 

v.  Sullens  (46  Mo.  147)  44.  49 

v.  Wait  (10  Oreg.  117)  1196 

Harvill  v.  Logan  (9  Dana,  185)  233 

Harward  v.  Robinson  (14  111.  App.  560)     704 
Harwood  v.  Andrews  (71  Ga.  784)      421,  823 
lxxxvii 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Harwood  v.  Goodright  (1  Cowp.  87)  99 

r.  Marye  (8  Cal.  580)  431,  713 

Hasbrouck  v.  Hasbrouck  (27  N.  Y.  182)     697 
Hascall  v.  Cox  (49  Mich.  435)  872,  902 

Haselden  v.  Whitesides  (2  Strobh.  353)     411 
Haselwood  v.  Webster  (82  Ky.  409)  983 

Hasenritter  v.  Hasenritter  (77  Mo.  162)      172 
Haskell  v.  Bowen  (44  Vt.  579)  643 

v.  Farrar  (56  Mo.  497)  548 

Haskill  v.  Sevier  (25  Ark.  152)  860 

Haskin  v.  Teller  (3  Redf.  316)  1236 

Haskins  v.  Hawkes  (108  Mass.  379)    416,  595 

v.  Spiller  (1  Dana,  170)  1240 

v.  Tate  (25  Pa.  St.  249)  896 

Haslage  v.  Krugh  (25  Pa.  St.  97)       636, 1142 
Haslam  v.  Campbell  (60  Ga.  650)  195 

Hasler  v.  Hasler  (1  Bradf.  248)  761 

Haslett  v.  Glenn  (7  H.  &  J.  17)  600 

Hasluck  v.  Pedley  (L.  R.  19  Eq.  271)         886 
Hassey  v.  Keller  (1  Dem.  577)  579 

Hastings,  In  re  (26  L.  T.  R.  n.  s.  715)        101 

v.  Clifford  (32  Me.  132)  268 

v.  Crunkleton  (3  Yeates,  261)  230 

v.  Dickinson  (7  Mass.  153)  265 

v.  Mace  (157  Mass.  499)  274 

v.  Meyer  (21  Mo.  519)  162,  177, 178,  231, 

432 

v.  Rider  (99  Mass.  622)  478,  479 

Hasty  v.  Johnson  (3  Me.  282)  1046,  1048 

Hatch's  Estate  (62  Vt.  300)  212,  267 

Hatch  v.  Atkinson  (56  Me.  324)  116,  123 

v.  Bassett  (52  N.  Y.  359)  1102 

v.  Hatch  (21  Vt.  450)  147 

v.  Hatch  (60  Vt.  160)  828 

v.  Kelly  (63  N.  H.  29)  1028 

v.  Proctor  (102  Mass.  351)  385,  426 

v.  Sigman  (1  Dem.  519)  481 

v.  Straight  (3  Conn.  31)  1218 

Hatcher  v.  Buford  (60  Ark.  169)  117,  126 

v.  Clifton  (33  Ala.  301)  694 

v.  Millard  (2  Coldw.  30)  82 

v.  Robertson  (4  Strobh.  Eq.  179)         935 

Hatfield  v.  Sneden  (54  N.  Y.  280)  232 

v.  Thorpe  (5  B.  &  Aid.  589)  75 

Hathaway's  Appeal  (46  Mich.  326)  472 

Will  (4  Oh.  St.  383)  469 

Hathaway  v.  Weeks  (34  Mich.  237)  435 

Hathewav's  Appeal  (52  Mich.  112)  854 

Hathorn  v.  Eaton  (70  Me.  219)   384,  410,  411, 

599 

v.  King  (8  Mass.  371)  480 

Hathornthwaite  v.  Russell  (2  Atk.  126)  509 
Hatorfi  v.  Well  ford  (27  Grat.  356)  199 

II.itta.tt  v.  Hattatt  (4  Ilagg.  211 )  62 

Hatterslev  v.  Bissett  (51  N.  J.  Eq.  597)  1218, 

1223 

v.  Bissett  (52  N.  J.  Eq.  693)  735 

Hauenstein  v.  Lynham  (100  U.  S.  483)  22,  308 
Hauensteins  v.  Lynham  (28  Grat.  62)  308 
Haugt).  Primean"  (98  Mich.  91)  561 

Hans  v.  Palmer  (21  Pa.  St.  296) 
Hause  v.  Hause  (57  Ala  262) 
Hauselt  v.  Patterson  (124  N.  Y.  349) 


75,  83 
259 
859, 
1112 
738 
1051 


Hauser  v.  Lehman  (2  [red.  Eq.  594) 
Hauteau's  Succession  (32  I. a.  An.  54) 
Havard  v.  Davis  (2  Binn.  406)       86,  98,  112, 

481 
Havelick  v.  Havelick  (18  Iowa,  414)  499 

Haven's  Appeal  (69  Conn.  684)   162,  180,  186 
Haven  v.  Foster  (II  Pick,  534)  86,  114 


•Page 
Haven  t>.  Hilliard  (23  Pick.  10)  72 

Havens  v.  Havens  (1  Sandf.  Ch.  324)         974 

v.  Sherman  (42  Barb.  636)  1031 

v.  Thompson  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  383)        1220 

v.  Van  den  Burgh  (1  Denio,  27)  106 

v.  Sackett  (15  N.  Y.  365)  1016 

v.  Sherman  (42  Barb.  636)  1034 

Haverhill  v.  Cronin  (4  Allen,  141)  856,  859 
Haverstick's  Appeal  (103  Pa.  St.  394)  901 
Haverstick  v.  Trudel  (51  Cal.  431)  346 

Hawarden  v.  Dunlop  (2  Sw.  &  Tr.  614)  407 
Hawes  v.  Humphrey  (9  Pick.  350)       103,  485 

v.  Nicholas  (72  Tex.  481)  61,  100 

Hawhe  v.  R.  R.  (105  111.  561)  110 

Hawk  v.  Geddis  (10  Serg.  &  R.  23)  1065 

Hawke  v.  Envort  (30  Neb.  149)  113,  958 

Hawkins  v.  Blewitt  (2  Esp.  663)  123 

v.  Capron  (17  R.  I.  679)  286 

v.  Cunningham  (67  Mo.  415)  1164,  1166, 

1173 

v.  Day  (1  Amb.  160)  790 

v.  Hawkins  (54  Iowa,  443)  75 

v.  Hewitt  (56  Vt.  430)  730 

v.  Johnson  (4  Blackf.  21)  415, 1044 

v.  Robinson  (3  T.  B.  Mon.  143)  532 

v.  Skeggs  (10  Humph.  31)  963 

Hawley,  Matter  of  (36  Hun,  258)  332 

In  re  (100  N.  Y.  206)  1130,  1132 

Matter  of  (104  N.  Y.  250)    332,  346,  504 

v.  Botsford  (27  Conn.  80)  858,  1271 

t\  Brown  (1  Root,  494)  76 

v.  James  (5  Pai.  318)    235,  236,  271,  728 

v.  Northampton  (8  Mass.  3)  878 

v.  Singer  (3  Dem.  589)  1145,  1146 

357 

891 

1098 

1077 

522 


v.  Tesch  (72  Wis.  299) 

Hawman  v.  Thomas  (44  Md.  30) 
Haworth's  Appeal  (105  Pa.  St.  362) 
Hawpe  v.  Smith  (*25  Tex.  448) 
Haxall  v.  Lee  (2  Leigh,  267) 
Haxtun,  In  re  (102  N.  Y.  157)         838,  1029, 
1033,  1035,  1038 

Havack  v.  Will  (169  111.  145)  214 

Havdel  v.  Hurck  (72  Mo.  253)  878,  1101 

Hayden  v.  Burch  (9  Gill,  79)  1213 

v.  Hospital  (64  Conn.  320)  937 

v.  Pierce  (144  N.  Y.  512)  845 

v.  Weser  (1  Mackev,  457)  254 

Haydock  v.  Haydock  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  494)      47 

Haydon  v.  Rose  (L.  R.  10  Eq.  224)  881 

Hayes,  Ex  parte  (88  Ind.  1)  326 

— -  Goods  of  (2  Curt.  338)  85 

In  re  (112  N.  C.  76)  190 

v.  Collier  (47  Ala.  726)  527 

v.  Hayes  (75  Ind.  395)  522,  1203 

v.  Hayes  (48  N.  H.  219)  342 

v.  Hayes  (21  N.  J.  Eq.  265)  96 

v.  Hayes  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  461)  966 

v.  Lienlokken  (48  Wis.  509)  494 

v.  Pratt  (147  U.  S.  557)  357,  375 

V.  Svkes  (120  Ind.  180)  1099 

Havgood's  Will  (101  N.  C.  574) 
llavmore  v.  Commissioners  (85  N 


C 


Hayner  v.  Trott  (46  Kans.  70) 
Havnes  v.  Bourn  (42  Vt.  686) 

v.  Colvin  (19  Oh.  392) 

v.  Harris  (33  Iowa,  516) 

v.  Matthews  (1  Sw.  &  Tr.  460) 

v.  Meeks  (10  Cal.  110) 

v.  Meeks  (20  Cal.  288) 

v.  Semmes  (39  Ark.  399) 


83 

268) 

846 

339 

276 

1267 

431 

522 

583 

330,  1090 

505.  57ft 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Haynes  v.  Swann  (6  Heisk.  5G0)  10G2 

Haynie  v.  Dickens  (08  111.  267)  271 

Havs's  Estate  (183  Pa.  St.  296)  1174 

Hays  v.  Ahlrichs  (115  Ala.  239)  324 

v.  Buflington  (2  Ind.  369;  173 

v.  Cecil  (16  Lea,  160)  376,  377 

v.  Cockrell  (41  Ala.  75)  356,  1128 

v.  Ernest  (32  Fla.  18)  477 

v.  Harden  (6  Pa.  St.  409)  64 

v.  Hebbard  (3  Kedf.  28)  978 

v.  Jackson  (6  Mass.  149)  393 

v.  Miles  (9  Gill  &  J.  193)  1071 

v.  Worsham  (9  Lea,  591)  1082 

Hayt  v.  Parks  (39  Conn.  357)  612 

Havward  v.  Burke  (151  111.  121)  284,  288 

v.  Havward  (20  Pick.  517)  639 

v.  Loper  (49  111.  App.  53)  883 

v.  Place  (4  Dem.  487)  394 

Havwood  v.  Havwood  (80  N.  C.  42)         1021 

Hazard  v.  Duraiit  (14  R.  I.  25)  1139 

v.  Engs  (14  R.  I.  5)  1149 

Hazel  v.  Tavlor  (1  Head.  594)  500 

Hazelton  ».*Bog  irdus  (8  Wash.  102)  713 

Hazelett  v.  Farthing  (94  Kv.  421)  208 

Hazen  v.  Darling  (2  N.  J.  Eq.  133)  1133 

Hazleton  v.  Reed  (46  Kans.  73)  59 
Hazlett  v.  Burge  (22  Iowa,  532)       1132,  1133 

Head's  Succession  (28  La.  An.  800)  578 

Head  v.  Bridges  (67  Ga.  227)  584 

v.  Sutton  (31  Kan.  618)  1142 

Headlee  v.  Cloud  (51  Mo.  301)     301,  397,  398 
Headley  v.  Kirby  (18  Pa.  St.  326)     116,  118, 

Headrick  v.  Yount  (22  Kan.  344) 
Heald's  Appeal  (22  N.  H.  205) 
Healey  v.  Simpson  (113  Mo.  340) 

v.  Toppan  (45  N.  H.  243)    968,  998,  999, 

1000 
Healy  v.  Eastlake  ( 152  111.  424)  948 

v.  Reed  (153  Mass.  197)  911,  912 

Heard  t;.  Downer  (47  Ga.  629)  196,  208 

v.  Drake  (4  Grav,  514)  1155 

v.  Sturgis  (146  Mass.  545)  646 

Hearfield  v.  Bridge  (44  U.  S.  A.  574)         713 
Hearle  v.  Greenbank  (3  Atk.  695)  1009 

Hearn  v.  Roberts  (9  Lea,  365)  856 

Hearne  v.  Kevan  (2  Ired.  Eq.  34)  991 

Heater  v.  Van  Auken  (14  N.  J.  Eq.  159)    81)8 
H  ath's  Estate  (58  Iowa,  36)  1 125,  1149 

Heath  v.  Allin  (1  A.  K.  Marsh.  442)  738 

v.  Belk  (12  S.  C.  582)  779 

v.  Bishop  (4  Rich.  Eq.  46)  957 

v.  Garrett  (46  Tex.  23)  809 

v.  Lavne  (62  Tex.  686)  1031, 1055 

v.  Waters  (40  Mich.  457)  284 

v.  Wells  (5  Pick.  140)  1026,  1039 

v.  W.ite  (5  Conn.  228)  157 

He  therington   v.  Lewenberg  (61   Miss. 

372)  989 

Heavenridge  v.  Nelson  (56  Ind.  90)  270 

Hebb  v.  Ilebb  (5  Gill.  500)  1197 

Hebden's  Will  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  473)  84 

Hebert's  Succession  (33  La.  An.  1099)        564 
Hubert  v.  Jackson  (28  La.  An.  377)  577 

Hecht  v.  R.  R.  (132  Ind.  507)  629 

Heck  v.  Clippenger  (5  Pa.  St.  385)  906 

v.  Heck  (34  Oh.  St.  369)  189 

Heckert's  Appeal  (13  S.  &  R.  48)  1199 

Hector  v.  Knox  (63  Tex.  613)  204 

Hedderich  v.  Smith  (103  Ind.  203)  600 

Hedding  Church,  Matter  of  (35  Hun,  313)    310 


129 

1077 

175 

59 


*  Pag* 
Hedenberg  v.  Hedenberg  (46  Conn.  30)  363 
Hedgepeth  v.  Rose  (95  N.  C.  41)  1220 

Hedges  v.  Hedges  (Prec.  Ch.  209)  117 

v.  Norris  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  193)       991.  1247 

Heed  v.  Ford  (16  B.  Mon.  114)  236 

Heermans  v.  Robertson  (04  N.  Y.  332)     1096 
Heffleiinger  v.  George  (14  Tex.  569)  1 131 

Heffner's  Succession  (49  La.  An.  407)        509, 

1149,  1150 

79 

485,  502, 

1038 


Heffner  v.  Heffner  (48  La.  An.  1038) 
Hegarty's  Appeal  (75  Pa.  St.  503) 


Hegeman  v.  Moon  (131  N  Y.  462)  61 

Hegerich  v.  Keddie  (99  N.  Y.  208)  628 

Hegney  v.  Head  (126  Mo.  619)  49 

Heidenheimer  v.  Bauman  (81  Tex.  174)  895 
Heidlebaugh  v.  Wagner  (72  Iowa,  601)  873 
Heilman  v.  Heilmau  (129  Ind.  59)       942,  943 

v.  Jones  (5  RedC  398)  499 

Heise  v.  Heise  (31  Pa.  St.  246)  96 

Ileisen  v.  Heisen  (145  111.  658)  275,  276 

Heiskell  v.  Chickasaw  (87  Tenn.  688)  914,  924 
Heisler  v.  Knife  (1  Browne,  319)  826 

v.  Sharp  (44  N.  J   Eq.  107)        975, 1209 

Heiss  v.  Murphy  (40  Wis.  276)  932 

Heist  v.  Convention  (76  Tex.  514)  466 

Heister's  Appeal  (7  Pa.  St.  455)  1148 

Heitkamp  v.   Biedensteiu   (3    Mo.   App. 

450)  ]051,  1127,  1133 

Heizer  v.  Heizer,  (71  Ind.  520)  638 

Heller's  Appeal  (116  Pa.  St.  534)  275 

Heller  v.  Leisse  (13  Mo.  App.  180)  189 

Hellerman's  Appeal  (115  Pa.  St.  120)  880 
Hellier  v.  Lord  (55  N.  J.  L.  307)  757 

Hellmann  v.  Merz  (112  Cal.  601)     1052,  1053 

v.  Wellenkamp  (71  Mo.  407)        651,  674 

Helm  v.  Helm  (30  Grat.  404)  200 

v.  Rookesby  (1  Met.  Kv.  49)  492 

Helme  v.  Sanders  (3  Hawks^  563)      303,  494, 

673 
Helms  v.  Elliott  (89  Tenn.  446)  140 

v.  Love  (41  Ind.  210)  1030,  1075 

Helphenstein  v.  Meredith  (84  Ind.  1)  242 

Ilelsop  v.  Gattan  (71  111.  528)  1098 

Helyar  v.  Helyar  (1  Cas.  Temp.  Lee,  472)  98, 

107,  484 
Hemenway  v.  Gates  (5  Pick.  321)  845 

Hemiup,  In  re  (2  Pai.  316)  1002 

Hemmenway  v.  Lynde  (79  Me.  299)  595 

Hemming  v".  Gurrey  (2  Sim.  &  Stu.  311)  971 
Hemphill  v.  Lewis  (7  Bush,  214)  774 

v.  Moody  (64  Ala.  408)  992 

Hendershot  v.  Shields  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  317)    873 


Henderson  v.  Avers  (23  Tex.  96) 

v.  Blackburn  (104  111.  227) 

v.  Buston  (3  Ired.  Eq.  359) 

v.  Clarke  (4  Litt.  277) 

v.  Clarke  (27  Miss.  430) 

v.  Henderson  (1  Jnnes  L.  221) 

v.  Henderson  (64  Md.  185) 

v.  Henderson  (21  Mo.  379) 

v.  Ilsley  (11  Sm.  &  M.  9) 

v.  Kenfro  (31  Ala.  101) 

v.  Sherman  (47  Mich.  207) 

v.  Simmons  (33  Ala.  291) 


v.  Whitinger  (56  Ind.  131) 

v.  Winchester  (31  Miss.  131) 

Hendren  v.  Colgin  (4  Munf.  231) 


787 

729,  730 

1009 

300,  536 

1241 

902 

901 

1254 

807,  844 

1207 

154 

1141,  1145, 

1149,  1151 

1074 

1255 

518,  525, 


535,  642 
Hendrick  v.  Cleaveland  (2  Vt.  329)  324 

lxxxix 


TABLE   OF   CARES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


•Page 
Hendrick  v.  Mavfield  (74  N.  C.  626)  1248 
Hendrick's  Estate  (3  N.  Y.  Supp.  281)  691  a 
Hendricks  v.  Huddleston  (5  Sin.  &  M. 


422) 

v.  Keesee  (32  Ark.  714) 

v.  Pugh  (57  Miss.  157) 

v.  Snodgrass  (Walk.  86) 

r.  Thornton  (45  Ala.  299) 


332 

1268,  1271 

1032 

394 

'40 


Hendricksou  v.  Hendrickson  (41 N.  J.  Eq. 

375) 
Hendrix  v.  Dickson  (09  Mo.  App.  197) 

v.  Hendrix  (46  Tex.  6) 

v.  Seaborn  (25  S.  C.  481) 

Hendrv  v.  Hollingdrake  (16  R.  I.  477) 
HenfreV  v.  Henfrev  (4  Moo.  P.  C.  29) 
Hengst's  Appeal  (24  1'a.  St.  413) 

Appeal  (6  Watts,  86) 

Hennessey  v.  Woulfe  (49  La.  An.  1376) 
Henry's  Estate  (05  Wis.  551) 

"Succession  (31  La.  An.  555) 

Henry  v.  Estey  (13  Gray,  330) 


1043 
021 
199 
212 

1246 
504 
738 

1222 

81 

191 

400 

1195 


Groffis"(89  Iowa," 543)   1100, 1104, 1110 


Hall  (106  Ala.  84) 
v.  Henry  (103  Ala.  582) 
•v.  Henry  (81  Kv.  342) 
v.  Keavs(12  La.  214) 
v.  McKerlie  (78  Mo.  416) 


477 
570 
893 
346 
1059,  1060, 
1067,  1089,  1198 

v.  Roe  (83  Tex.  446)  369,  466 

v.  State  (9  Mo.  778)  559,  1231 

v.  Superior  Ct.  (93  Cal.  569)       348,  401, 

1150 
Henrv  Co.  v.  Winnebago  (52  111.  454)  931 
Henschel  v.  Maurer  (34  N.  W.  920)  117 

Henshaw  v.  Blood  (1  Ma<s.  35)  665 

v.  Miller  (17  How.  212)  618,  625 

Henslev  v.  Dodge  (7  Mo.  470)  506 

Henslo'e's  Case  (9  Co.  37)  314,  316,  409 

Henszy  v.  Gross  (185  Pa.  St.  353)  153 

Hepburn's  Appeal  (65  Pa.  St.  408)  008 

Hepburn  v.  Hepburn  (2  Bradf.  74)    679,  1002 
Herald  v.  Harper  (8  Biackf.  170)  733 

Herbert  v.  Berrier  (81  Ind.  1)  65 

v.  Wren  (7  Crancb,  370)      239,  258,  207, 

500 
Herd  v.  Catron  (97  Tenn.  002) 
Herkimer  v.  McGregor  (126  Ind.  247) 


962 

1214, 

1220 

597 

516,  525 

980 

1023 

612 


Herlakenden's  Case  (4  Co.  62  o) 

Heron's  Estate  (6  Phila.  87) 

Heron  v.  Heron  (2  Atk.  171) 

Herov,  Matter  of  (67  Hun,  13) 

Herr'"s  Appeal  (5  W.  &  S.  494) 

Herrick  v.  Belknap  (27  Vt.  673)  80/ 

v.  Big  Rapids  (53  Mich.  554)  691 

v.  Carpenter  (92  Mich.  440)  723 

v.  Grow  (5  Wend.  579)  1047,  1055 

v.  Minneapolis  R.  K.  (31  Minn.  11)    629 

Herriman  v.  Janney  (31  La.  An.  276)  556 
Herring  v.  Wellons  (5  Sm.  &  M.  354)  855 
Herrmann  v.  Fontelieu  (29  La.  An.  502)  1054 


Berrold  v.  Reen  (58  Cal.  443) 
Herron'a  Succession  (32  La.  An.  835) 
Bershey  v.  'lark  (35  Ark.  17) 
Bereteinv.  Walker  (85  Ala.  37) 
Herster  v.  Herster  (116  Pa.  St.  612) 
v.  Herster  (122  Pa.  St.  239) 


198 

699 

50 

858 

32,  48 

32,  40,  48, 

500 

II.rt.-ll  v.  Bogerl  (9  Pai.  52)  387,  734 
Hesketb  >•.  Murphy  (35  X.  J.  Eq.  23)  922 
v.  Murphv  ( --'A  N.  .1.  Eq.  304)  922 


Hess'  Will  (48  Minn.  504)  47,  490 

Hess  v.  Gale  (93  Va.  407)  251 

v.  Lowrv  (122  Ind.  225)  625 

v.  Reynolds  (113  U.  S.  73)  357 

Hester  v.  Hester  (4  Dev.  228)  491 

v.  Hester  (2  Ired.  Eq.  330)  392,  938 

v.  Wesson  (6  Ala.  415)  795 

Hestt-rberg  v.  Clark  (160  111.  241)        94,  1194 
Iletfield  v.  Fowler  (00  111.  45)  999 

Hethrington  v.   Graham   (6    Bing.    135, 

s.  c.  19  Eng.  C.  L.  31)  226 

Hettrick  v.  Ilettrick  (55  Pa.  St.  290)  184 

Ileuser  v.  Harris  (42  111.  425)  921,  931 

Heustis  v.  Johnson  (84  111.  61)  1122 

Heward  v.  Slagle  (52  III.  336)  356,  525 

Ilewes  v.  Dehon  (3  Grav,  205)  1093,  1105 

Hewett  v.  Bronson  (5  Dalv,  1)  760,  823 

Hewitt's  Appeal  (53  Conn.  24)  340,  345 

Will  (91  N.Y.  201)  69 

Appeal  (58  Conn.  223)  440 

Hewitt,  In  re  (94  Cal.  376)  911 

—  v.  Cox  (55  Ark.  225)  231,  237 

v.  Hewitt  (3  Bradf.  265)  1033 

v.  Hewitt  (5  Redf.  271)  69 

Hewlett  v .  Wood  (55  N.  Y.  634)  42,  479 

Heydenfeldt,  In  re  (117  Cal.  551)    1194,  1195 

v.  Jacobs  (107  Cal.  373)  647 

v.  Super.  Ct.  (117  Cal.  348)         323,  342 

Hevdock  v.  Duncan  (43  N.  H.  95)  435 

Heyer's  Appeal  (34  Pa.  St.  183)  1180 

Ileyne  v.  Doeifler  (124  N.  Y.  505)  832 

Hevwood  v.  Hevwood  (10  Allen,  105)         825 
Hibbard  v.  Kent  (15  N.  H.  516)  433 

Hibbits  v.  Jack  (97  Ind.  570)  963,  964 

Hibbs'  Estate  (143  Pa.  St.  217)  918 

Ilibbs  v.  Insurance  Co.  (40  Oh.  St.  543)     208 
Hibernia  Savings  Society  v.  Conlin  (67 

Cal.  178)  819 

Hibernia  Sav.   S.  v.  Wackenrender  (99 

Cal.  503)  805,  861 

Hibernia  S.  &  L.  v.  Thornton  (109  Cal. 

427)  861 

Hibler  v.  Hibler  (104  Mich.  274)  1099 

Hickev  v.  Hickev  (26  Conn.  261)  266 

Hickman,  In  re  (101  Cal.  609)  503 

v.  Hickman  (74  Ga.  401)  1201 

v.  Irvine  (3  Dunn,  121)  230 

v.  Kamp  (3  Bush,  205)  669 

Ilickox  v.  Frank  (102  111.  600)  358 

Dicks  u.  Burnett  (40  Ala.  291)  628 

v.  Chouteau  (12  Mo.  341)  556 

v.  Forrest  (6  Ired.  Eq.  528)  1223 

v.  Gildersleeve  (4  Abb.  Pr.  1)  1214 

v.  Hicks  (12  Barb.  322)  1203 

v.  Jamison  (10  Mo.  App.  35)       782,  861 

v.  Pepper  (1  Baxt.  42)  195,  196,  199 

v.  Willis  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  515)  1058 

Hicky  v.  Dallmeyer  (44  Mo.  237)  674 

Hidden,  In  re  (23  Cal.  362)  810,  803 

Hiers  v.  Gooding  (43  S.  C.  428)  267 

llieschler,  In  re  (13  Iowa,  597)  173 

Higbie  v.  Morris  (53  N.  J.  Eq.  173)  1105 

v.  We-tlake  (14  N.  Y„  281)  1194 

Biggins'  Estate  (15  Mont.  474)  391,  432,  434, 

661,713,  1120 

Higgins's  Trust  (2  Gift.  562)  792 

Higgins  v.  Breen  (9  Mo.  497)       223,  618,  625 

v.  Butler  (78  Mc.  520)  837 

v.  Carlton  (28  Md.  115)        35,  46,  70,  72 

v.  Deven  (100  111.  554)  883 

v.  Higgins  (4  Hagg.  242)  790 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Higgins  v.  R.  R.  (155  Mass.  176)  629 

— - v.  Reed  (48  Kans.  272)     369,  1046,  1089 

v.  Scott  (2  B.  &  Ad.  413)  1237 

High's  Appeal  (21  Pa.  St.  283)  1219 

Higham  v.  Vanosdol  (125  End.  74)  1218,  1220 
Highland  o.  Highland  (109  111.  306)  66 

Highsmith  v.  Whitehurst  (120  N.  C.  123)  1087 
Hignutt  v.  Cranor  (62  Md.  216)  666,  680 

Hildebrand's  Appeal  (39  Pa.  St.  133)         176 
Hildebrandt,  In  re  (92  Cal.  433)  822 

Hildebrant  v.  Crawford  (65  N.  Y.  107)      832, 

836 
Hill's  Case  (55  N.  J.  Eq.  764)  529 

Hill's  Estate  (67  Cal.  238)  1156 

Estate  (6  Wash.  285)  280 

Hill,  Goods  of  (1  Robert,  276)  85 

v.  Alford  (46  Ga.  247)  892 

v.  Barge  (12  Ala.  687)  68 

v.  Bell  (Phillips  L.  122)  79 

v.  Billingslv  (53  Miss.  Ill)        330,  1090 

v.  Bloom  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  276)  1236 

v.  Bowman  (7  Leigh,  650)  905 

v.  Brvant  (61  Ark.  203)  676 

v.  Bu'ckminster  (5  Pick.  391)  794 

v.  Buford  (9  Mo.  869)  796,  1155 

v.  Burger  (10  How.  Pr.  264)  485 

v.  Franklin  (54  Miss.  632)  195 

v.  Gomme  (1  Beav.  540)  790 

v.  Harding  (92  Kv.  76)  58 

v.  Hardv  (34  Miss.  289)  345 

v.  Helton  (80  Ala.  528)  833 

v.  Henderson  (13  Sm.  &  M.  688)         423 

v.  Hill  (88  Ga.  612)  269 

v.  Hill  (32  Pa.  St.  511)  173 

v.  Hill  (42  Pa.  St.  198)  175 

v.  Hill  (74  Pa.  St.  173)  949 

v.  Hill  (7  Wash.  409)  111 

v.  Mitchell  (5  Ark.  608)  218,  259 

v.  Moore  (1  Murph.  233)  155 

v.  Nelson  (1  Dem.  357)  1166 

v.  Nichols  (47  Minn.  382)  1267 

v.  Rockingham  Bank  (45  N.  H.  270)  896 

v.  Sewald  (53  Pa.  St.  271)  602 

v.  Stevenson  (63  Me.  364)  119,  122 

v.  Toms  (87  N.  C.  492)  1099 

v.  Townley  (45  Minn.  167)  714,  859 

v.  Townsend  (24  Tex.  575)  640 

v.  Treat  (67  Me.  501)  294 

v.  Tucker  (13  How.  458)  360,  676 

v.  Walker  (4  Kav  &  J.  166)  788 

v.  Wentwortb  (28  Vt.  428)  603 

Hillearv  v.  Hilleary  (26  Md.  274)       254,  950 
Hillebnmt  v.  Burton  (17  Tex.  138)  810 

Hillens  v.  Brinstield  (108  Ala.  605)  1243 

Hitler  v.  Ladd  (85  Fed.  R.  703)  695,  740 

Hillgartner  v.  Gebhart  (25  Oh.  St.  557)      262 
Hilliard,  Ex  parte  (50  Ark.  34)  259 

v.  Binford  (10  Ala.  977)  502 

Hillis  v.  Hillis  (16  Hun,  76)  946 

Hillman  v.  Stephens  (16  N.  Y.  278)  715 

Hills  v.  Barnard  (152  Mass.  67)  903 

v.  Mills  (1  Salk.  36)  406 

Hillyard  v.  Miller  (10  Pa.  St.  326)  917 

Hilton  v.  Briggs  (54  Mich.  265)  1125 

Hilyard's  Estate  (5  Watts  &  S.  30)  1006 

Himes's  Appeal  (94  Pa.  St.  381)  186 

Hincbcliffe  r.  Hinchcliffe  (3  Ves.  516)        975 

ii.  Shea  (103  N.  Y.  153)  237,  247 

Hinckley's  Estate  (58  Cal.  457)  911,  919,  928, 

929,  930,  931 

Estate  (Mvr.  18:1)  324,  350 


Hincklev  v.  Harriman  (45  Mich.  353)       1232 

v.  Hinckley  (79  Me.  320)  837 

v.  Probate  Judge  (45  Mich.  343)        1012 

v.  Thatcher  (139  Mass.  477)  895 

Hinde  v.  Whitehouse  (7  East,  558)  1082 

Hinds  i'.  Hinds  (85  Ind.  312)  560 

Hine  v.  Hine  (39  Barb.  507)  974 

v.  Hu^sy  (45  Ala.  496)  527 

Hiner  v.  Fond  du  Lac  (71  Wis.  74)  623 

Hines  v.  Spruill  (2  D.  &  B.  Eq.  93)  1104 

Hinkle  v.  Shadden  (2  Swan,  46)  308 

Hinklev  o.  House  of  Refuge  (40  Md.  461)  950 
Hinsdale  v.  Williams  (75  N.  C.  430)  215 

Hinson  r.  Bush  (4  South.  R.  410)  229 

v.  Hinson  (81  Kv.  363)  988 

v.  Williamson  (74  Ala.  180)         723,  738 

Hinton  v.  Bland  (81  Va.  588)  744 

v.  Hinton  (6  Ired.  L.  274)  270 

v.  Milburn  (23  W.  Va.  166)         873,  901 

v.  Whittaker  (101  Ind.  344)  134 

Hiscock  v.  Jaycox  (12  N.  Bankr.  R.  507)  234 
Hiscocks  v.  Hiscocks  (5  M.  &  W.  363)  893 
Hise  v.  Fincher  (10  Ired.  L.  139)  89 

Hitch  v.  Davis  (3  Md.  Ch.  206)  1005 

Hitchcock  i>.  Hitchcock  (35  Pa.  St.  393)   878, 

883 

v.  Judge  (99  Mich.  128)  331 

v.  Marshall  (2  Redf.  174)  867 

v.  Mosher  (106  Mo.  578)  1166 

Hitchin  v.  Hitchin  (Pr.  Ch.  133)  266 

Hite's  Estate  (Mvr.  232)  1235 

H.te  v.  Hite  (1  B.  Mon.  177)  284 

v.  Hite  (93  Ky.  257)  1004 

v.  Sims  (94  Ind.  333)  34 

Hix  v.  Hix  (25  W.  Va.  481)  1157 

Hoag  v.  Hoag  (55  N.  H.  172)  390 

Hoagland  v.  Schenck  (16  N.  J.  L.  370)      994 

v.  See  (40  N.  J    Eq.  469)  1132 

Hoak  v.  Hoak  (5  Watts,  80)  1216,  1223 

Hoard  v.  Clum  (31  Minn.  186)  281 

Hoare  v.  Osborne  (L.  R   1  Eq.  580)  934 

Hoback  v.  Hoback  (32  Ark.  399)  199,  2i)4 

Hoban  v.  Piquette  (52  Mich.  346)  44,  47 

Hobart  v.  Herrick  (28  Vt.  627)  8">4 

v.  Hobart  (62  N.  Y.  80)  833 

v.  Hobart  (154  111.  610)  69 

v.  Turnpike  Co.  (15  Conn.  125)  358,  369, 

674 
Hobbs  v.  Craige  (1  Ired.  L.  335)       1158,  1229 

v.  Middleton  (1  J.  J.  Marsh.  176)       866 

v.  Russell  (79  Kv.  61)  835 

Hobson,  Matter  of  (61  Hun,  584)  645 

v.  Blackburn  (1  Add.  274)  56 

v.  Ewan  (62  111.  146)  1030 

v.  Hale  (95  N.  Y.  588)  726 

v.  Pavne  (45  111.  158)  1036 

Hochstedler  v.  Hochstedler  (108  Ind.  506)  878, 

900,  902 
Hockensmith  v.  Slusher  (26  Mo.  237)  111,  893 
Hocker's  Estate  (14  Phila.  659)  776 

Hocker  v.  Gentry  (3  Met.  Ky.  463)  896,  983 
Hodgdon  v.  White  (11  N.  H.  208)  841,  843 
Hodge  v.  Hawkins  ( 1  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  564)  1170 

v.  Hodge  (90  Me.  505)  652,  745,  847 

v.  Hodge  (72  N.  C.  616)  1000 

Hodges'  Estate  (63  Vt.  661)  1129 

Hodges  v.  Hodges  (2  Cush.  455)  825 

v.  Phelps  (65  Vt.  303)  1100 

v.  Powell  (96  N.  C.  64)  275 

v.  Thacher  (23  Vt.  455)      854,  855, 1197 

Hodgin  v.  Toler  (70  Iowa,  21)     719,  721,  726 
xci 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


•Page 
Hodgman,  Matter  of  (140  N.  Y.  421)       1008, 

Hodnett  v.  Smith  (2  Sweeney,  401)  475 

Hodsden  v.  Lloyd  (2  Br.  C.  C.  534)      26.  104 
Hoe  v.  Wilson  (9  Wall.  501)  1062 

Hoeffer  v.  Clogan  (171  111.  462)    908,  909,  923 
Hoell  v.  Blanchard  (4  Des.  21)  559 

Hoes  v.  Halsev  (2  Dem.  577)  327,  348 

HofFs  Appeal "(24  Pa.  St.  200)  1105 

Hoffer's  Estate  (156  Pa.  473)  822, 1067 

Hoffman,  Matter  of  (143  N.  Y.  327)        691  a 

v.  Gold  (8  G.  &  J.  79)  522 

v.  Hoffman  (26  Ala.  535)  68 

v.  Hoffman  (126  Mo.  486)  815,  817 

v.  Wheelock  (62  Wis.  434)       1029,  1089 

v.  Wilding  (85  111.  453)  1265 

Hoffmann's  Estate  (185  Pa.  St.  315)         1142 
Hoffner's  Estate  (161  Pa.  331)  58,  911 

Hogan  r.  Calvert  (21  Ala.  194)  856 

v.  Cavanaugh  (138  N.  Y.  417)  1099 

v.  Curtin  (88  N.  Y.  162)  963 

v.  Thompson  (2  La.  An.  538)  691 

v.  Wvman  (2  Oreg.  302)        76,  411,  545 

Hoge  v.  Hollister  (2  Tenn.  Ch.  606)  212 

v.  Junkin  (79  Va.  220)  1071 

Hogeboom  v.  Hall  (24  Wend.  146)  952 

Hoghton  v.  Hoghton  (15  Beav.  278)  49 

Hohman,  In  re  (37  Hun,  250)  957 

Hoilin  v.  Struttin  (71  Mo.  App.  399)  126,  344, 

681,  682 
Hoit  v.  Hoit  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  478)  959 

v.  Hoit  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  388)  959,  960 

Hoitt  v.  Hoitt  (36  N.  H.  475)  89,  103, 109,  491 

v.  Webb  (36  N.  H.  158)  1087 

Hoke  v.  Fleming  (10  Ired.  263)  733 

v.  Hernan  (21  Pa.  St.  301)  973,  980 

P.  Hoke  (12  W.  Va.  427)    699,  939,  1158 

Hoi!  ert's  Succession  (3  La.  An.  436)         761, 

1146 
Holbrook  v.  Bentlev  (32  Conn.  502)  553 

o.  Campan  (22  Mich.  288)  570 

v.  McClearv  (79  Ind.  167)  944 

v.  White  (13  Wend.  591)  620,  643 

v.  Wightman  (31  Minn.  168)  207 

Holcomb  v.  Holcomb  (11  N.  J.  Eq.  281)  1191 

v.  Holcomb  (95  N.  Y.  316)  832 

v.  Lake  (24  N.  J.  L.  686)  881 

v.  Lake  (25  N.  J.  L.  605)  881 

v.  Phelps  (16  Conn.  127)  650 

v.  Sherwood  (29  Conn.  418)       345,  1245 

Holcombe  v.  Holcombe  (13  N.  J.  Eq.  413)  738 

v.  Holcombe  (29  N.  J.  Eq.  597)         1002 

v.  Richards  (38  Minn.  38)  442 

Holdefer  v.  Terfel  (51  Ind.  343)  873 

Holden  v.  Currv  (85  Wis.  504)  547 

v.  Dunn  (144  111.  413)  237 

v.  Fletcher  (6  Cusli.  235)  1258 

v.  Meadows  (31  Wis.  284)  42 

r.  Pinnev  (6  Cal.  234)  216 

v.  Piper "(5  Colo.  App.  71)    387,  693,  748 

Bolder  v.  Railroad  (92  Tenn.  141)  628 

Holderbaum's  F.state  (82  Iowa,  69)    543,  1124 
Holdfast  v.  Dowsing  (2  Stra.  1253)  72 

Holdsombeck  v.  Fancher  (112  Ala.  469)     685 
Hole  v.  Bobbins  (53  Wis.  514)  141 

Holi field  v.  Robinson  (79  Ala.  419)  913 

Holladay'a  Estate  (18  Oreg.  168)  573,  576,  691 
Holladay  o.  Holladay  (16  Oreg.  147)         503 

v.  Land  Co.  (6  C.  C.  A.  560)       290,  291 

Holla.,.!  g.  Ali !0(  k  (108  N.  Y.  312)     908,  809, 
920,  928,  932 


1219 

857 

34 


Holland  v.  Cruft  (3  Gray,  162)  1070 

v.  Crupt  (20  Pick.  321)       127,  631,  1258 

v.  Ferris  (2  Bradf.  334)  91 

v.  Fuller  (13  Ind.  195)  283 

V.  Peck  (2  Ired.  Eq.  255)  930 

v.  Smyth  (40  Hun,  372)  909 

Hollenbeck  v.  Pixley  (3  Gray,  521)    165, 179, 

768 
Hollev  v.  Adams  (16  Vt.  206)  121 

Hollidav  v.  Holliday  (38  La.  An.  175)      1232 

v.  McKinne  (22  Fla.  153)  631,  852 

v.  Wingfield  (59  Ga.  206)        1217, 1218, 

Hollinger  v.  Hollv  (8  Ala.  454) 

v.  Syms  (37' N.  J.  Eq.  221) 

Hollingshead  v.  Stnrges  (16  La.  An.  334)  470 

v.  Sturgis  (21  La.  An.  450)  96 

Hollingsworth's  Appeal  (51  Pa.  St.  518)    112 

Hollis  v.  Hollis  (4  Baxt.  524)  238 

Hollister  r.  Cordero  (76  Cal.  649)  279,  446 

v.  District  Court  (8  Oh.  St.  201)         336 

v.  Shaw  (46  Conn.  248)  879 

Hollman  v.  Bennett  (44  Miss.  322)  1038, 1040 

—  v.  Tigges  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  127)  718 
Hollmann  v.  Lange  (143  Mo.  100)  835 
Hollowav  v.  Holloway  (86  Ga.  576)  205 

o.  Stuart  (19  Oh   St.  472)  1073 

Holman  r.  Fisher  (49  Miss.  472)  390 

v.  Hopkins  (27  Tex.  38)  494 

v.  Nance  (84  Mo.  474)  231 

v.  Sims  (39  Ala.  709)  1149 

Holmes,  Petitioner  (33  Me.  577)  394 
o.  Beal  (9  Cush.  223)  1034 

v.  Bridgman  (37  Vt.  28)  678 

r.  Coates  (159  Mass.  226)  927 

v.  Cock  (2  Barb.  Ch.  426)  543,  545 

v.  Field  (12  111.424)  962 

v.  Holmes  (28  Vt.  765)  642, 1147 

v.  Holmes  (36  Vt.  525)  892 

v.  Johns  (56  Tex.  41)  407 

v.  Kring  (93  Mo.  452)  256 

v.  McPheeters  (149  Ind.  587)  1237 

v.  Mead  (52  N.  Y.  332)  920,  928 

v.  Mitchell  (2  Murphv,  228)  868 

v.  Oregon  R.  R.  (7  Sawv.  380)  439,  563 

v.  Remsen  (20  John.  229)  377 

v.  Winchester  (138  Mass.  542)  201 

Holsen  v.  Rockhouse  (83  Ky.  233)  949 

Holt's  Will  (56  Minn   33)  75 

Holt  v.  Anderson  (98  Ga.  220)  712,  714 

v.  Hogan  (5  Jones  Eq.  82)  1008 

v.  Lamb  (17  Oh.  St.  347)  500 

».  Libbv  (80  Me.  329)  1238,  1249 


622 

290 
883 
1200 
330,  439, 
569 
330 


Holt  Manfg.'Co.  v.  Ewing  (109  Cal.  353)    816 
Holton  v.  Dalv  (106  111.  131) 

r.  Grimm  (65  Fed.  R.  450) 

v.  White  (23  N.  J.  L.  330) 

Holtzclaw  v.  Ware  (34  Ala.  307) 
Holyoke  v.  Haskins  (5  Pick.  20) 

v.  Haskins  (9  Pick.  259) 

Holvoker  v.  Mutual  L.  Ins  Co.  (22  Hun, 

75)  441 

Holzman  v.  Hibben  (100  Ind.  338)  433 

Home  ?;.  Noble  (172  IJ.  S.  383)    878,  880,  882 

v.  Pringle  (8  Clark  &  Fin.  264)         1100 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Field  (42  111.  App.  392)  217 
Homer's  Appeal  (35  Conn.  113)  344 

Appeal  (55  Pa.  St.  337)  1033 

Homer  v.  Shelton  (2  Met.  194)  999,  1000 

Homestead  Assoc,  v.  Ensloe  (7  S.  C.  1)      211 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Homfrav,  Goods  of  (L.  R.  12  Prob.  D. 

138,  note)  26 

Hondayer,  Matter  of  (150  N.  Y.  37)         691  a 
Hone  v.  Lockman  (4  Kedf.  61)  1187 

v.  Van  Schaick  (3  N.  Y.  538)      878,  8'J9 

Honeywood,  Goods  of  (L.  K.  2  P.  &  D. 

251)  486 

Hood,  In  re  (104  N.  Y.  103)      589,  1209,  1252 
Hood's  Estate  (21  Pa.  St.  106)  691  a 

Succession  (33  La.  An.  466)  1054 

Hood  v.  Boardman  (148  Mass.  330)  938 

v.  Bramlett  (105  Ala.  660)  949 

v.  Haden  (82  Va.  588)  900,  965,  967,  973 

v.  Hood  (85  N.  Y.  561)  719,  1069 

Hook  v.  Bixby  (13  Kan.  164)  831 

v.  Dyer  (47  Mo.  214)  681 

v.  Hook  (13  B.  Mon.  528)         1218,  1221 

v.  McCune  (184  Pa.  St.  292)  1029 

v.  Payne  (14  Wall.  252)  1138 

Hooker  v.  Bancroft  (4  Pick.  50)  663 

v.  Hooker  (10  Sm.  &  M.  593)  332 

v.  Olmstead  (6  Pick.  481)  374 

Hooper's  Estate  (185  Pa.  St.  172)  1200 

Hooper  v.  Bryant  (3  Yerg.  1)  842 

v.  Gorham  (45  Me.  209)  618,622 

v.  Hardie  (80  Ala.  114)  1037 

v.  Hooper  (29  W.  Va.  276)  363,  551,  558, 

688, 1184 

v.  Hooper  (32  W.  Va.  526) 

v.  McQuary  (5  Coldw.  129) 

v.  Moore  (5  Jones,  130) 

v.  Rossiter  (McClel.  527) 

v.  Smith  (57  Ala.  557) 

v.  Summersett  (Wightw.  16) 

Hoopes  v.  Dundas  (10  Pa.  St.  75) 
Hooton  v.  Head  (3  Phillim.  26) 

v.  Ranisom  (6  Mo.  App.  19) 

Hoover  v.  Malen  (83  Ind.  195) 

v.  Miller  (6  Jones  79) 

Hope  v.  Brewer  (136  N.  Y.  126) 

v.  Jones  (24  Cal.  89) 

v.  Wilkinson  (14  Lea,  21) 


234) 


Hopf  v.  State  (72  Tex.  281) 
Hopkins,  In  re  (32  Hun,  618) 

v.  Clavbrook  (5  J.  J.  Marsh 

v.  De  Graffenreid  (2  Bay,  187) 

v.  Faeber  (86  Kv.  223) 

v.  Grimshaw  (165  U.  S.  342) 

v.  Keazer  (89  Me.  347) 

v.  Ladd  (12  R.  1.279) 

v.  Long  (9  Ga.  261) 

i).  McCann  (19  111.  113) 

v.  Miller  (92  Ala.  513) 

v.  Stout  (6  Bush,  375) 

v.  Thompson  (73  Mo.  App.  401) 


551 

78 

506 

1003 

1123 

415,  423 

963 

99 

817 

1085 

669,  1116 

1238 

1170 

1094,  1108, 

1109 

72,  475 

1172 


v.  Towns  (4  B.  Mon.  124) 

v.  Van  Valkenburgh  (16  Hun,  3) 

Hopkinson  v.  Dumas  (42  N.  H.  296) 
Hoppe  v.  Fountain  (104  Cal.  94) 
Hopper  v.  Fisher  (2  Head,  253) 

v.  Hopper  (125  N.  Y.  400) 

v.  McWhorter  (18  Ala.  229) 

v.  Steele  (18  Ala.  828) 

Hoppin  v.  Hoppin  (96  111.  265) 

Hoppiss  v.  Eskridge  (2  Ired.  Eq.  54) 

Hopple's  Estate  (13  Phila.  259) 

Hoppock  v.  Tucker  (59  N.  Y.  202) 

Hopton  v.  Drvden  (Pr.  Ch.  179) 

Hopwood  v.  Hopwood  (7  H.  L.  Cas.  728)     87 


1234 

474 

834 

920 

1103 

1272 

173 

1030 

433 

1029 

1236, 

1237 

417 

1030 

235 

198,  208 

330,  1090 

360 

607 

695 

263 

518 

44 

938 

787,7 


•Page 

736,  796 

710 


Hord  v.  Lee  (4  T.  B.  Mon.  36) 
Horn  v.  Lockhart  (17  Wall.  570) 
Hornbeck  v.  Westbrook  (9  John.  73)  913 

Hornberger  v.   Hornberger    (12    Heisk. 

635)  934 

Hornby,  Ex  parte  (2  Bradf.  420)  880 

Home  v.  Home  (9  Ired.  Eq.  99)  478 

Horner's  Estate  (66  Mo.  App.  531)  704 

Horner  v.  Hasbrouck  (41  Pa.  St.  169)       1045 

v.  Nicholson  (56  Mo.  220)  675 

Horr  v.  French  (90  Iowa,  73)  1079 

Horry  v.  Glover  (2  Hill  Ch.  515)  1001 

Horsev  v.  Heath  (5  Oh.  353)  287 

Horsfall  v.  Kovles  (20  Mont.  495)  858 

Horskins  v.  Morel  (T.  U.  P.  Charlt.  69)     528 
Horton  v.  Barts  (17  Wash.  675)        669,  1167, 

1234 

v.  Cantwell  (108  N.  Y.  255)  353 

v.  Carlisle  (2  Disn.  184)  686 

v.  Earle  (162  Mass.  448)  939 

v.  Hilliard  (58  Ark.  298)  205 

v.  Horton  (2  Bradf.  200)  1061 

v.  Jack  (115  Cal.  29)  674 

v.  Kelley  (40  Minn.  193)  214,  245 

Hosack  v.  Rogers  (6  Pai.  415)  787 

v.  Rogers  (9  Pai.  461)  1176 

v.  Rogers  (11  Pai.  603)  570 

Hosford  v.  Wvnn  (22  S.  C.  309)  201 

Hoshauer  v.  Hoshauer  (26  Pa.  St.  406)        48 
Hoskins  v.  Miller  (2  Dev.  360)  516,  566 

Hosmer  v.  Baer  (5  La.  An.  35)  740 

Hoss'  Succession  (42  La.  An.  1022)  1085 

Hoss  v.  Hoss  (140  Ind.  551)  952 

Hosser's  Succession  (37  La.  An.  839)  140 

Hostetter's  Appeal  (6  Watts,  244)  574 

Hostetter  v.  Schalk  (85  Pa.  St.  220)  836 

Hostler  v.  Scull  (2  Havw.  179)  424 

Hotchkiss  v.  Beach  (10  Conn.  232)  855 

v.  Brooks  (93  111.  386)  197 

v.  Ladd  (62  Vt.  209)  331,  498 

Hottell  v.  Browder  (13  L^a,  676)  951 

Hottenstein's  Appeal  (2  Grant  Cas.  301)   811, 

1156 
Houck's  Estate  (23  Oreg  10)  840,  1033 

Houck  v.  Houck  (5  Pa.  St.  273)  722 

Hough  v.  Bailev  (32  Conn.  288)  693 

v.  Harvey "(71  111.  72)  1137,  1146 

Houghton  v.  Houghton  (34  Hun,  212)        125 

v.  Kendall  (7  Allen,  72)  897 

v.  Watson  (1  Dem.  299)  1014 

House  v.  Fowle  (22  Oreg.  303)  1074 

v.  House  (10  Pai.  158)  603 

v.  Woodard  (5  Coldw.  196)  1219 

Houston  v.  Deloach  (43  Ala.  364)  710 

v.  Killough  (80  Tex.  296)  350,  1080 

v.  Lane  (62  Iowa,  291)  271 

Houts  v.  McClunev  (102  Mo.  13)  762 

Hover  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  (25  Oh.   St. 

667)  630 

Hovev  v.  Chase  (52  Me.  304)  43 

v.  Darv  (154  Mass.  7)  1070 

v.  Hovrv  (61  N.  H.  599)  271 

v.  Page "(55  Me.  142)  624 

Howard   v.   American   Society   (49   Me. 

288)  882,  929 

v.  Carusi  (109  U.  S.  725)  948 

v.  Francis  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  444)      272,  731, 

985,  1007,  1151 

v.  Johnson  (70  Tex.  655)  407,  845 

v.  Leavell  (10  Bush,  481)  809 

v.  Menifee  (5  Ark.  668)  118 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  atar  or  side  pages.] 


Howard  v.  Moffatt  (2  John.  Ch.  206)        1015 

V.  Moore  (2  Mich.  226)  1050 

v.  Moot  (64  N.  Y.  262)  22 

v.  Patrick  (38  Mich.  795)    713,  834, 1143 

v.  Pearlv  (128  111.  430)  727 

v.  Priest  (5  Met.  Miss.  582)         234,  289 

v.  Watson  (76  Iowa,  229)  267,  271 

v.  Wofford  (16  S.  C.  148)  1098 

v.  Worrill  (72  Ga.  397)  546 

Howcott  v.  Coffield  (7  Ired.  L.  24)  621 

v.  Warren  (7  Ired.  L.  20)  621 

Howe's  Appeal  (126  Pa.  St.  233)  882 

Howe,  Matter  of  (112  N.  Y.  100)  691  a 

v.  Dartmouth  (7  Ves.  137)  998 

v.  Hodge  (152  111.  252)         878,  917,  950 

v.  McGivern  (25  Wis.  525)  330 

v.  Merrick  (11  Gray,  129)  835 

v.  Peabodv  (2  Gray,  556)  554 

v.  Pratt  (11  Vt.  255)  499 

v.  Searing  (10  Abb.  Pr.  264)       292,  293 

v.  Smith  (78  Iowa,  73)  884 

v.  Wilson  (91  Mo.  45)  922,  928 

Howell's  Estate  (185  Pa.  St.  350)  726 

Will  (5  T.  B.  Mon.  199)  475 

Howell  v.  Ackerman  (89  Kv.  22)  950 

v.  Ashmore  (22  N.  J.  L.  261)  252 

v.  Barden  (3  Dev.  442)  490 

v.  Blodgett  (1  Redf.  323)  684 

v.  Budd  (91  Cal.  342)  527,  1234 

v.  Frv  (19  Oh.  St.  556)  682 

v.  Hooks  (4  Ired.  Eq.  188)  967 

v.  Howell  (37  Mo.  124)  681 

v.  Jones  (91  Tenn.  402)  200 

v.  Jump  (140  Mo.  441)    394,  1028,  1038, 

1043 

v.  Metcalfe  (2  Add.  348)  406 

v.  Morelan  (78  111.  162)  334 

v.  Potts  (20  N.  J.  L.  1)  852 

v.  Troutman  (8  Jones  L.  304)  45 

v.  Tvler  (91  N.  C.  207)  1083 

v.  Whitchurch  (4  Hayw.  49)       497,  500 

Howland  v.  Dews  (R.  M.  Charlt.  383)        420 

v.  Green  (108  Mass.  277)  355 

v.  Heckscher  (3  Sandf.  Ch.  519)        1236 

v.  Howland  (11  Grav,  469)  878,  896 

v.  Stade  (155  Mass.  415)  940 

Howie  v.  Edwards  (113  Ala.  187)  436 

Howze  v.  Howze  (2  S.  C.  229)  215 

Hoxie  v.  Carr  (1  Sumn.  173)  290 

Hovsrodt  v.  Kingman  (22  N.  Y.  372)  68 

Hovt  v.  Bonnett  (50  N.  Y.  53S)  812 

— -  v.  Christie  (51  Vt.  48)  390 

v.  Davis  (21  Mo.  App.  235)  231 

v.  Davis  (30  Mo.  App.  309)  834 

v.  Day  (32  Oh.  St.  101)  718 

v.  Hoyt  (85  N.  Y.  142)       988,  989,  1098 

v.  Jaques  (129  Mass.  286)  732 

v.  Newbold  (45  N.  J.  L.  219)      445,  462 

v.  Sprague  (103  U.  S.  613)  285 

Hubbard  v.  Alexander  (L.  R.  3  Ch.  D. 
738)  970 

v.  Barcus  (38  Md.  175)  518 

v.  Bugbee  (58  Vt.  172)  607 

v.  Co.  (53  Kans.  637)  645,  848 

v.  Goodwin  (3  Leigh,  492)  302,  305 

v.  Hubbard  (Hi  [nd.  25)  787 

v.  Hubbard  (8  N.  Y.  196)  85 

v.  Hubbard  (7  Oreg.  42)  35,  47,  499 

V.  Hubbard  (15  Q.  B.  227)  894 

v.  Llovd  (6  Cunh.  522)  896 

r.  Smith  (45  Ala.  516)  576 


Hubbard  v.  Urton  (67  Fed.  R.  419)  749 

v.  Wood  (15  N.  H.  74)  161,  189 

Hubbell  v.  Fogartie  (1  Hill,  S.  C,  L.  167)   422 
Hubble  v.  Fogartie  (3  Rich.  413)  414,  415 

Huber  v.  Mohn  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  432)  937 

Huckabee  v.  Swoope  (20  Ala.  491)  952 

Huckstep's  Estate  (5  Mo.  App.  581)  571 

Huddleston  v.  Kempner  (87  Tex.  372)      1166 
Hudgens  v.  Cameron  (50  Ala.  379)  1063 

Hudgins  v.  Leggett  (84  Tex.  207)       350,  997 
Hudnall  v.  Hasn  (172  111.  76)  132,  568 

Hudson  v.  Breeding  (7  Ark.  445)  803 

v.  Houser  (123  Ind.  309)  829 

v.  Hudson  (20  Ala.  364)  336 

v.  Hudson  (87  Ga.  678)  59 

v.  Stewart  (48  Ala.  204)  208,  216 

Huebner  v.  Sesseman  (38  Neb.  78)  1156 

Huff  v.  Latimer  (33  S.  C.  255)  599 

v.  Watkins  (20  S.  C.  477)  617,  624 

Huffman  v.  Wyrick  (5  Ind.  App.  183)        829 

v.  Young  (170  111.  290)  894 

Hufman's  Appeal  (81  Pa.  St.  329)  190 

Hufschmidt  v.  Gross  (112  Mo.  405)     195.  200 
Huggins  v.  Huggins  (71  Ga.  66)  1215 

v.  Toler  (1  Bush,  192)  623 

Hughes's  Appeal  (57  Pa.  St.  179)  1213,  1216, 

1220 

Succession  (14  La.  An.  863)  1148 

Hughes,  In  re  (95  N.  Y.  55)        362,  375,  376 

v.  Bovd  (2  Sneed,  512)  962 

v.  Burriss  (85  Mo.  660)  500,  501 

v.  Daly  (49  Conn.  34)  928 

v.  Empson  (22  Beav.  181)  692 

v.  Knowlton  (37  Conn.  429)  808 

v.  Murtha  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  288)  46 

v.  Nicklas  (70  Md.  484)  901 

v.  Watson  (10  Oh.  127)  251 

Hughev  v.  Eichelberger  (11  S.  C.  36)        1222 

v'.  Sid  well  (18  B.  Mon.  259)         469,  499 

Hughston  v.  Nail  (73  Miss.  284)  844 

Hugo,  Goods  of  (L.  R.  2  P.  D.  73)  58 

v.  Mueller  (50  Minn.  105)  1046 

Huhleim  v.  Huhleim  (87  Kv.  247)'  268 

Huie  v.  McConnell  (2  Jones  L.  455)  76 

Huling  v.  Fenner  (9  R.  I.  410)  904,  906 

Hulitt  v.  Carey  (66  Minn.  328)  108,  J09 

Hull  v.  Cortledge  (18  N.  Y.  App.  D.  54)    291 

v.  Glover  (126  111.  122)  253 

v.  Hull  (24  N.  Y.  647)  918 

v.  Hull  (35  W.  Va.  155)  1040,  1071 

v.  Jones  (10  Lea,  100)  847 

v.  Rawls  (27  Miss.  471)  224 

Hullett  v.  Hood  (109  Ala.  345)   767,  835,  855, 

858,  863 
Hulse's  Estate  (12  Phila.  130)  1230 

Will  (52  Iowa,  662)  70 

Humbert  v.  Wurster  (22  Hun,  405)  410 

Humes  v.  Scruggs  (64  Ala.  40)  246,  259 

».  Wood  (8  Pick.  478)  986 

Hummel  v.  Bank  (2  Colo.  App.  571)  672 

Humfreville,  In  re  (154  N.  Y.  115)  1250 

Ilumphrev's  Will  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  513)      43,  47 
Humphrey  r.  Bullen  (1  Atk.  458)  516 

v.  Merritt  (51  Ind.  197)  599 

v.  Robinson  (52  Hun,  200)  966 

Ilumphrcvs  v.  Humphrevs  (2  Cox,  184)     980 

v.  Keith  (11  Kan.  108)  1248 

v.  Tavlor  (5  Or.  260)  714 

Humphries  v.  Davis  (100  Ind.  274)  141 

Hun,  Matter  of  (144  N.  Y.  472)     '  1152 

Hundley  v.  Farris  (103  Mo.  78)  288,  293 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Hunkypillar  v.  Harrison  (59  Ark.  453) 
Hunt's  Appeal  (100  Pa.  St.  590) 

Appeal  (105  Pa.  St.  128) 

Estate  (15  Phila.  511) 

Estate  (133  Pa.  St.  260) 

Hunt.  In  re  (100  N.  Y.  278) 

Petitioner  (19  R.  I.  139) 

v.  Butterworth  (21  Tex.  133) 

v.  Danforth  (2  Curt,  592) 

v.  Drane  (32  Miss.  243) 

v.  Evans  (134  111.  496) 

v.  Fowler  (121  111.  269) 


i'.  Grant  (19  Wend.  90) 

• v.  Hamilton  (9  Dana  90) 

• v.  Hapgood  (4  Mass.  117) 

r.  Hunt  (119  Mass.  474) 

■ v.  Hunt  (11  Met.  (Mass.)  88) 

v.  Hunt  (3  B.  Mon.  575) 

v.  Hunt  (4  N.  H.  434) 

v.  Johnson  (10  B.  Mon.  342) 

r.  Johnson  (44  N.  Y.  27) 

v.  Lucas  (68  Mo.  App.  518) 

v.  Russ  (7  Mackev,  527) 

v.  Sneed  (64  N.  C.  176) 

v.  Williams  (126  Ind.  537) 

Hunter's  Succession  (13  La.  An.  257) 


1099 

825 

727 

825 

897 

70 

1105 

632 

856 

414,  419 

485,  884 

919,  921,  923, 

929,  931 

337 


Hunter  v.  Bryson  (5  G.  &  J.  483) 


466 

1245 

124 

881 

41 

61 

880 

609 

903 

1029 

1123 

1102 

212 

359,  370, 

406 

1033 

483 

642 

740 

206 

1217 

810 

163 

387 

427 

609 

331 

369 

340 

1015 

1009 


v.  French  (86  Ind.  320) 

v.  Gardenhire  (13  Lea,  658) 

, v.  Hallett  (1  Edw.  Ch.  388) 

ii.  Hunter  (19  Barb.  631) 

v.  Hunter  (95  Iowa,  728) 

v.  Husted  (Busb.  Eq.  97) 

v.  Lanins  (82  Tex.  677) 

v.  Law  (68  Ala.  365) 

v.  Lawrence  (11  Grat.  Ill) 

v.  Wallace  (13  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  385) 

Hunters  v.  Waite  (3  Grat.  26) 
Huntington  v.  Finch  (3  Oh.  St.  445) 
Hurd,  in  re  (9  Wend.  465) 

v.  Slaten  (43  HI.  348) 

Hurdle  v.  Stocklev  (6  Houst.  447) 

Hurford  v.  Haines  (67  Md.  240) 

Hurlburt  v.  Wheeler  (40  N.  H.  73)  1123,  1136 

Hurlbut  v.  Hutton  (44  N.  J.  Eq.  302)       1158 

Hurleman  v.  Hazlett  (55  Iowa,  256) 

Hurley's  Estate  (12  Phila.  47) 

Hurlev  v.  Barnard  (48  Tex.  83) 

v.  Mclver  (119  Ind.  53) 

v.  O'Sullivan  (137  Mass.  86) 

Hurst  v.  Beach  (5  Madd.  351) 

Hurst  v.  Dulaney  (87  Va.  444) 

Hurste  v.  Hotaling  (20  Neb.  178) 

Hurt  v.  Brooks  (89  Va.  496)  878 

v.  Fisher  (96  Tenn.  570)  434 

Husbands  v.  Bullock  (1  Duv.  21)  185 

Huson  v.  Wallace  (1  Rich.  Eq.  1)  691 

Huss,  Matter  of  (126  N.  Y.  537)  712 

Hussev  v.  Coffin  (1  Allen,  354)  578 

V.  Southard  (90  Me.  296)  526 

v.  White  (10  Serg.  &  R.  346)  792 

Husson  v.  Neil  (41  Ind.  504)  289 

Husted's  Appeal  (34  Conn.  488)  1198 

Huston's  Appeal  (9  Watts,  472)  1007 

Huston  v.  Becker  (15  Wash.  586)      348,  1234 
Hutchcraft  v.  Gentry  (2  J.  J.  Marsh.  499)  1149 

v.  Tilford  (5  Dana,  353)  678,  791 

Hutoherson  v.  Pigg  (8  Grat.  220)  1142 

Hutcheson  v.  Priddy  (12  Grat.  85)  396 


27ti 

mo 

330 

171 
110 
971,  972,  981 
238 

258 


Page 
620 

1077 
695 

1135 
989 

1074 


Hutching  v.  Adams  (3  Me.  174) 

v.  Brooks  (31  Miss.  430) 

v.  Smith  (31  Miss.  430) 

Hutchinson's  Appeal  (34  Conn.  300) 
Hutchinson  v.  Gilbert  (86  Tenn.  464) 

v.  Lemcke  (107  Ind.  121) 

v.  Reed  (1  Hoffm.  Ch.  N.  Y.  316)  645,  655 

v.  Roberts  (67  N.  C.  223)  1123 

v.  Shelley  (133  Mo.  400)  1031,  1059 

v.  Stiles  (3  N.  H.  404)  1267 

Hutson  v.  Sawyer  (104  N.  C.  1)  499,  500 

Hutton  v.  Hutton  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  461)         1238 

v.  Hutton  (3  Pa.  St.  100)  265,  611 

v.  Williams  (60  Ala.  107)  1128 

Huxford  v.  Milligan  (50  Ind.  542)  915 

Hyatt  v.  Lunnin  (1  Dem.  14)  43 

v.  McBurnev  (18  S.  C.  199)         700,  733 

v.  Vanneck"(82  Md.  465)  1016 

Hvde's  Estate  (64  Cal.  228)  400 

Hyde,  In  re,  (47  Kas.  277)  357 

v.  Baldwin  (17  Pick.  303)  500,  960 

v.  Easter  (4  Md.  Ch.  80)  285 

v.  Heller  (10  Wash.  586)  593 

v.  Hvde  (1  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  409)  90 

v.  Hvde  (Prec.  Ch.  316)  24 

Hyer  v.  Morehouse  (20  N.  J.  L.  125)        1130 
Hyland'v.  Baxter  (98  N.  Y.  610)       324,  340, 

1153 
Hylton  v.  Hvlton  (1  Grat.  161)  98 

Hvman  v.  Gaskins  (5  Ired.  L.  267)    440,  494, 

495 

r.  Jarnigan  (65  N.  C.  96)         1034,  1062 

Hyneman's  Estate  (11  Phila.  135)  1144 

Hynes  v.  McCreery  (2  Dem.  158)  1199 

Hvzer  v.  Stoker  (3  B.  Mon.  117)  257 


Iaege  v.  Bossieux  (15  Grat.  83)  239 

Icelv  v.  Grew  (6  Nev.  &  Man.  467)  424 

Idlev  v.  Bowen  (11  Wend.  227)     90,  480,  481 
Itdehart  v.  Kirwan  (10  Md.  559)  873 

Ihmsen's  Appeal  (43  Pa.  St.  431)  707 

Ihrie's  Estate  (162  Pa.  369)  872 

limos  v.  Neidt  (101  Iowa,  348)  878 

Ikelheimer  v.  Chapman  (32  Ala.  676)  694 

Ilchester,  Ex  parte  (7  Ves.  348)  106 

Ilgenfritz's  Appeal  (5  Watts,  25)  149 

Illinois  C.  R.  R.  v.  Cragin  (71  111.  177)     369, 
398,  441,  565 
Indianapolis  v.  Grand  Master  (25  Ind. 

518)  933 

Inge  v.  Murphv  (14  Ala.  289)  256 

Ingham  v.  White  (4  Allen.  412)  609 

Ingle  v.  Jones  (9  Wall.  486)  393 

Inglis  v.  Sailors'  Snug  Harbor  (3  Pet.  99) 

920,  923 
Ingraham  v.  Ingraham  (169  III.  432)  919,  920, 

924 

v.  Rogers  (2  Tex.  464)  1125 

Ingram.  In  re,  (78  Cal.  586)  133 

v.  Ingram  (5  Heisk.  541)  1039 

v.  Morris  (4  Harr.  Ill)  239,  245 

v.  Strong  (2  Phillim.  294)  55 

Ingrem  v.  Mnckev  (5  Redf.  357)  727 

Inheritance  Tax,  "In  re  (23  Colo.  492)      691  a 
Inman  v.  Foster  (69  Ga.  385)  1084 

In  re .    For  cases  under  "  In  re,  "  see 

the  names  of  the  parties. 
Insley  v.  Shire  (54  Kans.  793)  283,  643 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Camp  (71  Tex.  503)         284 

v.  Lewis  (97  U.  S.  682)  397 

xcv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


International  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Timmermann 

(61  Tex.  660)  217 

Ions  v.  Harbison  (112  Cal.  260)  215,  545,  1079 
Iowa  L.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Holderbaum  (86  Iowa, 

1)  1023,  1045 

Iowa  State  Assu.  v.  Moore  (34  n.  s.  App. 

670)  647 

Ipswich  Co.  v.  Storv  (5  Met.  Mass.  310)    652 
Irby  v.  Graham  (46  Miss.  425)  287 

v.  Kitchell  (42  Ala.  438)  705 

Iredalew.  Ford  (1  Sw.  &  T.  305)  529 

Ireland  v.  Foust  (3  Jones  Eq.  498)  1019 

v.  Ireland  (12  Atl.  184)  253 

Irish  v.  Nutting  (47  Barb.  370)  120 

V.  Smith  (8  Serg.  &  R.  573)  479 

Ironmongers'  Co.  o.  Attorney  General  (10 

CI.  &  Fin.  908)  927,  931 

Irons  v.  Irons  (5  R.  I.  264)  828 

v.  Smallpiece  (2  B.  &  Aid.  551)  124 

Irvin  v.  Bond  (41  Ga.  630)  356 

v.  Newlin  (63  Miss.  192)  902 

Irwin's  Appeal  (33  Conn.  128)  494 

Appeal  (35  Pa.  St.  294)  738 

Succession  (33  La.  An.  63)  974,  983 

Irwin  v.  Backus  (25  Cal.  214)  548,  866 

v.  Brooks  (19  S.  C.  96)  260 

v.  Patchen  (164  Pa.  51)  831 

v.  Wollpert  (128  111.  528)  1102 

v.  Zane  (15  W.  Va.  646)  882 

Isaacs's  Estate  (30  Cal.  105)  1167 

Isenhart  v.  Brown  (1  Edw.  Ch.  411)  272 

v.  Brown  (2  Edw.  Ch.  341)  1006 

Isham  r.  Gibbons  (1  Bradf.  69)  374 

Isler  v.  Isler  (88  N.  C.  581)  1016 

Ison  v.  Ison  (5  Rich.  Eq.  15)  1218,  1219 

Israeli  v.  Rodon  (2  Moore  P.  C.  51)  106 

Ivers  i).  Ivers  (61  Iowa,  921)  835 

Iverson  v.  Loberg  (26  111   179)  329 

Ives  v.  Allvn  (12  Vt.  589)  492 

v.  Caiibv  (48  Fed.  Rep.  718)  967 

v.  Piers'on  (1  Freem.  Ch.  220)  1078 

v.  Salisbury  (56  Vt.  565)  493 

Ivey  v.  Coleman  (42  Ala.  409)  699,  704 

Ivins's  Appeal  (106  Pa.  St.  176)  903,  905 

Izard  v.  Izard  (Bailev  Eq.  228)  610 

v.  Izard  (2  Desaus.  308)  897 

v.  Middleton  (1  Desaus.  116)  57 

Izon  v.  Butler  (2  Price,  34)  936 


Jack's  Apneal  (94  Pa.  St.  367)  708 
Jack  v.  Schoenberger  (22  Pa.  St.  416)         112 

Jackman's  Will  (26  Wis.  104)  46,  48 
Jacks  v.  Bridewell  (51  Miss.  881)        829,  834 

v.  Dyer  (31  Ark.  334)  254 

v.  Henderson  (1  Desaus.  543)  54,  55 

Jackson  v.  Alsop  (67  Conn.  249)  883 

v.  Betts  (6  Cow.  377)  481 

r.  Billinger  (18  John.  368)  949 

v.  Boneham  (15  John.  226)  446 

V.  Burtis  (14  John.  391)  716 

v.  Chase  (98  Mass.  286)  700 

v.  Chew  (12  Wheat.  153)  949 

v   Claw  (18  John.  346)  223 

v.  Coggin  (29  Ga.  403)  897 

r.  Dewitt  (6  Cow.  316)  244 

v.  Durland  (2  John.  Caa.  314)  75 

-■.  Edwarda  (7  Pai.  386)  242 

v.  Itz  (5  Cow.  314)  446 

v   Perm  (16  John.  346)  393 

r.  Gilchrist  (15  John.  89)  248 


Jackson  v.  Given  (16  John.  107) 

v.  Green  (7  Wend.  333) 

V.  Hallidav  (3  Redf.  379) 

v.  Hardin  (83  Mo.  175) 

v.  Hartwell  (8  John.  422) 

v.  Hollowav  (7  John.  394) 

v.  Hurlock  (1  Amb.  487) 

v.  Jackson  (144  111.  274) 

v.  Jackson  (153  Mass.  374) 

V.  Jackson  (28  Miss.  674) 


v.  Jackson  (4  Mo.  210) 

v.  Jackson  (39  N.  Y.  153) 

v.  Jeffries  (1  A   K.  Marsh.  8 

v.  Johnson  (5  Cow.  74) 

v.  Kip  (8  N.J.  L.  241) 

v.  Kniffen  (2  John.  31) 

v.  Le  Grange  (19  John.  386) 

«.  Lunn  (3  Johns.  Cas.  109) 

v.  McNabb  (39  Ark.  Ill) 

v.  Magruder  (51  Mo.  55) 

v.  Malin  (15  John.  293) 

v.  Paulet  (2  Rob.  Ecc.  344) 

v.  Phillips  (14  Allen,  539)  919,  926,  927, 

930,  931 

v.  Potter  (9  John.  312) 

v.  Reid  (32  Oh.  St.  443) 

v.  Reynolds  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  313) 


•Page 

516 

159 

1040 

31,  37,  46 

913 

93 

112 

276 

903 

1214,  1217, 

1221,  1222 

484 

68 

I)  392 

276 

951 

90,  491 

473,  501 

159 

863 

1043 

92 

503 


102,  113 

211 

1125, 

1130 

937,  938 

647 

874 

735,  1024 

369 


o.  Roberts  (14  Gray,  546) 

v.  Roberts  (95  Kv.  410) 

v.  Robins  (16  John.  537) 

v.  Robinson  (4  Wend.  436) 

v.  Scanlan  (65  Miss.  481) 

v.  Schauber  (7  Cow.  187)  882 

v.  Sellick  (8  John.  262)  277 

v.  Sheffield  (107  Ala.  358)  216 

v.  State  (8  Tex.  App.  60)  260 

v.  Vanderhevden  (17  John.  167)         254 

v.  Vickorv  (1  Wend.  406)  473 

v.  Walsh '(14  John.  407)  703 

v.  Walsworth  (1  Johns.  Cas.  372)       815 

v.  Weaver  (98  Ind.  307)  1029 

v.  Westerfield  (61  How.  Pr.  399)        959 

v.  Wood  (108  Ala.  209)  1155 

v.  Woods  (1  John.  Cas.  163)  75 

Jacksonville  Co.  v.  Chappell  (22  Fla.  616)  622 
Jacob's  Appeal  (23  Pa.  St.  477)  697 

Jacobs'  Estate  (140  Pa.  St.  268)        883,  1018 
Jacobs  v.  Bradley  (36  Conn.  365)  954 

v.  Jacobs  (99  Mo.  427)      684,  1145,  1146, 

1167 

v.  Malonev  (64  Mo.  App.  270)  432 

v.  Morrow"  (21  Neb.  233)  653,  1208 

v.  Pou  (18  Ga.  346)  1247 

v.  Woodside  (6  S.  C.  490)    391,  653,  654 

Jacobson  v.  Bunker  Hill  Co.  (2  Idaho,  363)  280 

v.  Le  Grange  (3  John.  199)  824 

Jacobus  v.  Jacobus  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  49)  355 

v.  Jacobus  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  17)  711 

Jacoby  v.  McMahon  (174  Pa.  St.  133)     1079, 


Jncot  v.  Emmet  (11  Pai.  142) 
Jacquin  V.  Buisson  (11  How.  Pr.  385) 

v.  Davidson  (49  111.  82) 

Jaggers  v.  Estes  (2  Strobh.  Eq.  343) 
Jahier  v.  Hascoe  (62  Miss.  699) 
Jahna  v.  Nolting  (29  Cal.  507) 
Jakolete  v.  DanieUon  (13  Atl.  850) 
Jalliffe  v.  Fanning  (10  Rich.  186) 


1080 

1137 

282, 

283 

836 

61 

379 

620 

1218 

502 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


James's  Estate  (23  Cal.  415)  214,  1075 

Estate  (65  Cal.  25)  1008,  1010 

James,  Matter  of  (140  N.  Y.  78)  1000 

v.  Adams  (22  How.  Pr.  409)        564,  568 

V.  Christy  (18  Mo.  162)  620 

V.  Dixon" (21  Mo.  538)  231,  559 

t>.  Dunstan  (38  Kan.  289)  209 

v.  Faulk  (54  Ala.  184)  1055 

v.  Hacklev  (16  John.  273)  736 

v.  James  (55  Ala.  525)  1083 

o.  James  (76  N.  C.  331)  1217 

v.  Marcus  (18  Ark.  421)  231 

v.  Marvin  (3  Conn.  576)  100 

r.  Matthews  (5  lied.  Eq.  28)  1132 

v.  Richmond  R.  R.  (92  Ala.  231)        628 

v.  Wingo  (7  Lea,  148)  677 

H.  Withinton  (7  Mo.  App.  575)  1132 

Jameson  v.  Hall  (37  Md.  221)  468 

v.  Martin  (3  J.  J.  Marsh.  330)  792 

Jamison  v.  Co.  (59  Ark.  548)  859,  1195 

v.  Jamison  (3  Houst.  108)  30 

v.  Li  Hard  (12  Lea,  090)  1180 

v.  Mav  (13  Ark.  000)  607 

i\  Snyder  (79  Wis.  280)  1200 

v.  Wickham  (07  Mo.  App.  575)  816 

Janes  v.  Brown  (48  Iowa,  568)  1267 

v.  Throckmorton  (57  Cal.  368)  727 

v.  Williams  (31  Ark.  175)  501 

Janin  v.  Browne  (59  Cal.  37)  686,  687 

Jansen  v.  Bury  (Bumb.  157)  148 

Janssen  v.  Wemple  (3  Redf.  229)  332 

Jaques  v.  Horton  (76  Ala.  238)     92,  480,  483, 

495 

v.  Swasey  (153  Mass.  596)  979 

Jarboe  v.  Hev  (122  Mo.  341)  903 

Jarman  v.  Jarman  (4  Lea,  671)  196,  205,  212, 

208 

u.  Vye  (Li  R.  2  Eq.  784)  881 

Jarnigan  v.  Jarnignan  (12  Lea,  292)  128 

Jarvis  v.  Quigley  (10  B.  Mon.  104)  901 

v.  Russick  (12  Mo.  63)  1057 

Jasper  v.  Jasper  (17  Oreg.  590)  346 

Jauncev  v.  Thorne  (2  Barb.  Ch.  40)  473 

Jaudon  v.  Ducker  (27  S.  C.  295)  989, 1098 
Jayne  v.  Boisgerard  (39  Miss.  796)  1080 

Jefferies  v.  Allen  (29  S.  C.  501)  205 

Jeffers  v.  Jeffers  (139  111.  308)  1236 

Jefferson,  In  re  (35  Minn.  215)  691,  773 

v.  Edrington  (53  Ark.  545)     1121,  1123, 

1109 
Jeffersonville  R.  R.  Co.  i>.  Hendricks  (41 
Ind.  48)  630 

v.  Swayne  (26  Ind.  477)  440,  581 

Jeffries  v.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  (110  U.  S.  305)  684 
Jeffs  v.  Wood  (2  P.  Wms.  128)  1237 

Jele  v.  Lemberger  (163  111.  338)  499 

Jelke  v.  Goldsmith  (52  Oh.  St.  499)  692,  751 
Jelks  v.  Barrett  (52  Miss.  315)  724, 1067,  1082 
Jelly  v.  Elliott  (1  Ind.  119)  186 

Jemison  v.  Gaston  (31  Ark.  74)  1047 

Jenckes  v.  Smithfield  (2  R.  I.  255)  34 

Jenison  v.  Hapgood  (7  Pick.  1)  1122 

Jenkins's  Will  (43  Wis.  610)  475 

Jenkins  v.  Cain  (72  Tex.  88)  804 

v.  Drane  (121  111.  217)  156 

v.  French  (58  N.  H.  532)  617,  625 

v.  Frever  (4  Pai.  47)  896 

v.  Gaisford  (3  Sw.  &  Tr.  93)  63 

v.  G.  T.  Co.  (53  N.  J.  Eq.  194)  1238 

v.  Hall  (4  Jones  Eq.  334)  898 

v.  Hanahan  (2  Cheves,  129)  966 

VOL.  I.  —  q 


*Page 
Jenkins  v.  Holt  (109  Mass.  261)  264 

v.  Jenkins  (2  Dana,  102)  224 

v.  Jenkins  (63  Ind.  120)       821,  863,  865 

v.  Long  (23  Ind.  460)  336 

v.  Stetson  (9  Allen,  128)  59 

v.  Tucker  (1  H.  Bl.  90)  762 

v.  Wood  (134  Mass.  115)  435 

v.  Wood  (140  Mass.  66)  435 

v.  Wood  (144  Mass.  238)  435 

v.  Young  (35  Hun,  569)  1029, 1031,  1037 

Jenks  v.  Howland  (3  Grav,  536)  1245 

v.  Jackson  (127  111.  341)  873 

v.  Terrell  (73  Ala.  238)  1152,  1155 

v.  Trowbridge  (48  Mich.  94)  154 

Jenness  v.  Carleton  (40  Mich.  343)  281 

v.  Robinson  (ION.  H.  215)  1033 

Jennings  v.  Copeland  (90  N.  C.  572)         1143 

v.  Davis  (31  Conn.  134)  612 

v.  Jenkins  (9  Ala.  285)  1043 

i?.  Jennings  (21  Oh.  St.  56)  273 

17.  Monks  (4  Met.  Kv.  103)  622 

i'.  Teague  ( 1 4  S.  C.  229)  719 

17.  Wright  (54  Ga.  537)  643 

Jennison  v.  Hapgood  (10  Pick.  77)    761,  1151 
1152,  1159,  1163,  1164 


R.   (91    N.   Y 


Jermain   v.  Lake   S.   R 

483) 
Jerome  v.  Wood  (21  Colo.  322) 
Jesse  v.  Parker  (6  Grat.  57) 
Jessup's  Estate  (80  Cal.  625) 
Jessup  17.  Jessup  (17  Ind.  App.  177) 

17.  Smuch  (16  Pa.  St.  327) 

Jeter  17.  Barnard  (42  Ga.  43) 

v.  Tucker  (1  S.  C.  245) 

Jettr.  Bernard  (3  Call,  11) 

Jewell  v.  Knettle  (39  Mo.  App.  202) 

Jewett  v.  Jewett  (10  Grav,  31) 

v.  Weaver  (10  Mo.  234) 

Jex  v.  Turend  (19  La.  An.  64) 
Jiggitts  17.  Bennett  (31  Miss.  610) 

v.  Jiggitts  (40  Miss.  718) 

Jinkins  v.  Sapp  (3  Jones,  510) 
Jocelyn  v.  Nott  (44  Conn.  55) 
Jochilmsen  17.  Suffolk  Sav.  Bank  (3  Allen, 

87)  448,  450,  453 

Johannes  v.  Youngs  (45  Wis.  445)  1120 

Johanson  v.  Hoff  (63  Minn.  290)  679,  794 

John  v.  Bradburv  (97  Ind.  263) 

17.  John  (122  Pa.  St.  167) 

17.  Tate  (7  Humph.  388) 

Johnes  ».  Beers  (57  Conn.  295) 

17.  Jackson  (67  Conn.  81) 

Johns  17.  Caldwell  (60  Md.  259) 

u.  Fenton  (88  Mo.  04) 

17.  Hodges  (69  Md.  215) 

17.  Hodges  (62  Md.  525) 

v.  Norris  (22  N.  J.  Eq.  102) 

17.  Norris  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  485) 

Johnson's  Appeal  (88  Pa.  St.  346) 

Estate  (57  Cal.  529) 

Estate  (Mvr.  5) 

Estate  (19"N.  Y.  Supp.  963) 

Estate  (159  Pa.  630) 

Estate  (11  Phila.  83) 

Will  (40  Conn.  587) 

Johnson  v.  Ames  (6  Pick.  330) 

17.  Ames  (11  Pick.  173) 

17.  Armstrong  (97  Ala.  731) 

v.  Baker  (2  Car.  &  P.  207) 

17.  Baker  (3  Murphy,  318) 

17.  Beardslee  (15  John.  3) 

xcvii 


1004 

834 

71 

1148 

824 

950 

356 

42 

988 

186 

1050 

620,  815 

686 

347 

247,259 

579 

920 


948,  949 

1172 

1149 

951 

383,  390,  500 

1195 

258,  274 

350 

468 

1085 

1085 

140 

38,  40 

79 

691a 

48 

1189 

90,  481,  491 

286 

646 

39 

761 

941 

736 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 

[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


•Page 

Johnson  v.  Beazley  (65  Mo.  250)       325,  330, 
439,  1054,  1089 

v.  Belden  (20  Conn.  322)  1216, 1218,  1223 

v.  Bradv  (24  Ga.  131)  641,  774 

v.  Brailsford  (2  Nott  &  McC.  272)        90 

»\,  Bridgewater  Manuf .  Co.  (14  Grav, 

274)  633 

■ v.  Brown  (25*  Tex.  120)  811 

V.  Clark  (18  Kan.  157)  556,  1030 

v.  Collins  (12  Ala.  322)  1044 

v.  Conover  (54  N.  J.  Eq.  333)  966 

v.  Corbett  (11  Pai.  265)       173,  183,  186, 

738,  1156,  1158 

v.  Corpenning  (4  Ired.  Eq.  216) 

v.  Cushing  (15  N.  H.  298) 

V.  Davidson  (162  111.  232) 

v.  Dunn  (6  Grat.  625) 

v.  Farmer  (89  Tex.  610) 

o.  Farrell  (64  N.  C.  266) 

v.  Fry  (1  Coldw.  101) 

v .  Fuquay  (1  Dana,  514) 

v.  Gaither  (Harp.  6) 

v.  Gaylord  (41  Iowa,  362) 

v.  Gillett  (52  111.  358) 

v.  Goss  (128  Mass.  433) 

v.  Hamilton  (2  La.  An.  206) 

r.  Harrison  (41  Wis.  381) 

v.  Hart  (3  Johns.  Cas.  322) 

■ v.  Henagan  (11  S.  C.  93) 

v.  Henry  (12  Heisk.  696) 

v.  Hicks  (97  Kv.  116) 

v.  Hogan  (37  Tex.  77) 

v.  Holifield  (79  Ala.  423) 

v.  Holifield  (82  Ala.  123) 

r.  Hoyle  (3  Head,  56) 

v.  Hubbell  (10  N.  J.  Eq.  332) 

v.  Jackson  (56  Ga.  326) 

V.  Johnson  (40  Ala.  247) 

v.  Johnson  (4  Beav.  318) 

v.  Johnson  (2  Harr.  273) 

v.  Johnson  (63  Hun,  1) 

v.  Johnson  (106  Ind.  475) 

v.  Johnson  (1  McM.  Eq.  345) 

v.  Johnson  (66  Mich.  525) 

v.  Johnson  (23  Mo.  561) 

v.  Johnson  (30  Mo.  72) 

v.  Johnson  (72  Mo.  App.  386) 

v.  Johnson  (26  Oh.  St.  357)  331,  332, 1130 

v.  Johnson  (15  R.  I.  109)  516 

v.  Johnson  (5  S.  E.  R.  620)  713 

r.  Johnson  (92  Tenn.  559)  922,  925 

v.  Johnson  (41  Vt.  467)  177,  178 

v.  Johnstone  (12  Rich.  Eq.  259)  905 

v.  Jones  (47  Mo.  App.  237)        345,  1235 

v.  Lawrence  (95  N.  Y.  154)  1175 

v.  Longmire  (39  Ala.  143)  351 

v.  Mayne  (4  Iowa,  180)  929 

v.  Merithew  (80  Me.  Ill)     445,  447,  832 

v.  Miller  (33  Miss.  553)  1139 

v.  N.  Y.  etc.  (56  Conn.  172)  675 

v.  Oregon  (2  Oreg.  327)  691 

v.  Parker  (51  Ark.  419)  248 

v.  Patterson  (13  Lea,  626)        1214, 1218 

v.  Perkins  (1  Baxt.  367)  1079 

v.  1'owers  (139  U.  S.  150)  361 

v.  Roberts  (63  Ga.  167)  195 

. v.  Robertson  (7  Blackf.  425)  190 

r.  Sharp  M  Coldw.  45)  28 

v.  Smith  (I  Ves.  Sen.  314)  125,  126 

r.  Valentine  (1  San. If.  36)  949 

v.  Van  Epps  (110  111.  551)  647 

xcviii 


571 

656 

731 

472 

628 

1104 

472 

549,  554 

419 

200,  1077 

789,  821 

966 

1054 

203,  211 

159 

1145,  1148 

187 

653 

745,  749 

921,  934 

728,  944,  946 

1218 

58 

371 

1034 

883 

1190 

361 

68 

897 

568 

264 

224 

1141 


331, 


•Page 
Johnson  v.  Van  Velsor  (43  Mich.  208)       253, 

275 

866,  1249- 

367 


v.  Von  Kettler  (66  111.  63) 

v.  Wallis  (112  N.  Y.  230) 

v.  Warren  (74  Mich.  491) 

v.  Waters  (111  U.  S.  640) 

v.  Wells  (2  Hagg.  561) 

Johnston's  Estate  (185  Pa.  St.  179) 

Estate  (9  W.  &  S.  107) 

Johnston  v.  Davenport  (42  Ala.  317) 

v.  Duncan  (67  Ga.  61) 

v.  Fort  (30  Ala.  78) 

v.  Glasscock  (2  Ala.  218) 

v.  Johnston  (1  Phillim.  447) 

v.  Lewis  (Rice  Eq.  40) 

1'.  Morrow  (28  N.  J.  Eq.  327) 

v.  Shafner  (23  Oreg.  Ill) 

v.  Smith  (25  Hun,  171) 

V.  Spicer  (107  N.  Y.  185) 

v.  Tatum  (20  Ga.  775) 

v.  Thompson  (5  Call,  248) 

v.  Turner  (29  Ark.  280) 

v.  Vandyke  (6  McLean,  422) 


Jollv  v.  Lofton  (61  Ga.  154) 
Jones's  Accounting  (103  N.  Y.  621) 

Appeal  (3  Grant  Cas.  169) 

Appeal  (8  W.  &  S.l  43) 

Jones,  In  re  (1  Redf.  263) 

Matter  of  (5  Dem.  30) 

v.  Bacon  (68  Me.  34) 

v.  Bank  (71  Miss.  1023) 

v.  Barrett  (30  Tex.  637) 

v.  Bigstaff  (95  Ky.  395) 

v.  Bittinger  (110"lnd.  476) 

v.  Brown  (34  N.  H.  439) 


953 

845 

106 

917 

698 

180 

269 

1197 

499 

105 

750 

768 

340,  815,  816 

441,  461 

608,  642 

396 

724 

208 

241,  242, 

261 

215 

689 

878 

738 

867,  1135 

691a 

948 

818 

140 

1110 

531 

118  121   123 

—  v.  Caperton  (15  La.  An.  475)    '        '  287 

v.  Custer  (139  Ind.  382)  482,  484 

V.  Chase  (55  N.  H.  234)  654 

v.  Ches.  &  O.  R.  R.  (14  W.  Va.  514)  953 

v.  Clifton  (101  U.  S.  225)  610 

v.  Cole  (2  Bai.  330)  816 

v.  Commercial  Bank  (78  Ky.  413)     1267 

v.  Coon  (5  Sm.  &  M.  751)  326,  330 

v.  Creveling  (19  N.  J.  L.  127)    969,  970, 

971 

v.  Davies  (5  H.  &  N.  766)  390 

v.  Davis  (37  Mo.  App.  69)  806 

v.  Detchon  (91  Ind.  154)  460 

v.  Dexter  (8  Fla.  276)  1239 

v.  Deyer  (16  Ala.  221)        122,  685,  1149 

1208 

96 

833 

336 

242,  253 

1062,  1080 

720 

v.  Gilbert  (135  111.  27)  205,  211 

v.  Gordon  (2  Jones  Eq.  352)  546 

v.  Graham  (36  Ark.  383)  699,  1126,  1132 

v.  Graham  (80  Wis.  6)  714 

•  v.  Grogan  (98  Ga.  552)  112 
v.  Habersham  (107  U.  S.  174)  911,  920 
e.  Hanna  (81  Cal.  507)                          703 

•  v.  Hart  (62  Miss.  13)  200 
■v.  Hartlev  (2  Whart.  103)  86 

■  v.  Head  (1  La.  An.  200)  1077 

•  v.  Hooper  (2  Dem.  14)  349 
v.  Bughes  (27  Grat.  550)  232 

■  v.  Jones  (37  Ala.  646)  940 


v.  Dver  (20  Ala.  373) 
—  v.  Earle  (1  Gill,  395) 

v.  East  Soc.  (21  Barb.  161) 

v.  Field  (80  Iowa,  286) 

v.  Fleming  (104  N.  Y.  418) 

v.  Frencir(92  Ind.  138) 

v.  Fulghum  (3  Tenn.  Ch.  193) 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


87 

1120 

78 

873 

1213 

385 

829 

898 

840 

526,  556 

363,  375,  1160, 

1168,  1169 

907,  1247 

245 


Jones  v.  Jones  (42  Ala.  218)  1049,  1197 

v.  Jones  (28  Ark.  19)  223,  259,  260,  1247 

v.  Jones  (2  Dev.  Eq.  387) 

v.  Jones  (41  Md.  354) 

v.  Jones  (3  Met.  Kv.  266) 

v.  Jones  (25  Mich.  401) 

v.  Jones  (2  Murphy,  150) 

v.  Jones  (118  N.  C.  440) 

v.  Jones  (21  N.  H.  219) 

v.  Jones  (13  N.  J.  Eq.  236) 

v.  Jones  (41  Oh.  St.  417) 

v.  Jones  (12  Rich.  623) 

v.  Jones  (39  S.  C.  247) 

v.  Jones  (92  Va.  590) 

v.  Jones  (64  Wis.  301) 

v.  Jones  (66  Wis.  310)  729 

v.  Jukes  (2  Ves.  518)  786 

v.  Keep  (23  Wis.  45)  842 

v.  Knappen  (63  Vt.  391)  273 

v.  Lackland  (2  Giat.  81)  647 

o.  Le  Baron  (3  Dem.  37)  1151 

v.  Lightfoot  (10  Ala.  17)  805 

v.  Lock  (L.  R.  1  Ch.  App.  25)  122 

v.  McLellan  (76  Me.  49)  490 

. v.  Manlv  (58  Mo.  559)  257,  1060 

v.  Mason  (5  Rand.  577)  978,  980 

v.  Mitchell  (1  Sim.  &  Stu.  290)  944 

v.  Morgan  (6  La.  An.  630)  609 

v.  Murphy  (8  Watts  &  S.  275)  98, 481,  483 

v.  Oliver  (3  Ired.  Eq.  369)  904 

v.  Pattv  (73  Miss.  179)  647 

r.  Part*.  H.  Co.  (171  111.  502)  955 

v.  Perry  (10  Yen?.  59)  1038 

v.  Price  (3  Des.  165)  942 

v.  Reid  (12  W.  Va.  350)  611 

v.  Richardson  (5  Met.  247)  435,  664 

i>.  Ritter  (56  Ala.  270)  549 

v.  Roberts  (37  Mo.  App.  163)  37,  47,  49 

v.  Roberts  (84  Wis.  465)  435 

v.  Robinson  (78  N.  C.  396)  878,  884 

v.  Rountree  (96  Ga.  230)  439 

v.  Selbv  (Prec.  Ch.  300)  123,  126 

v.  Shewmaker  (35  Ga.  151)  86 

v.  Stites  (19  N.  J.  Eq.  324)  999 

v.  Strong  (142  Pa.  St.  496)  873 

v.  Swift  (12  Ala.  144)  1241 

v.  Tavlor  (7  Tex.  240)  1067 

V.  Tibbetts  (75  Me.  572)  76 

v.  Treadwell  (169  Mass.  430)  1237 

v.  Walker  (103  U.  S.  444)  689 

v.  Ward  (10  Yerg.  160)  1139,  1153 

v.  Warnock  (67  Ga.  484)  1077 

o.  Webb  (5  Del.  Ch.  132)  951 

v.  Whitworth  (94  Tenn.  602)  844 

v.  Wilkinson  (3  Stew.  44)  791 

v.  Williams  (Amb.  651)  919 

v.  Williams  (2  Call,  102)  1159 

Jordan's  Estate  (161  Pa.  St.  393)  76 
Jordan  v.  Ball  (44  Miss.  194)       516,  530,  531 

v.  Brown  (72  Ga.  495)  844 

v.  Cin.  etc.  R.  R.  (89  Kv.  41)  627 

y.  Clark  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  243)  1009 

v.  Hunnell  (96  Iowa,  334)  394,  1258 

v.  Jordan  (65  Ala.  301)  60 

v.  Polk  (1  Sneed,  430)  406 

v.  Pollock  (14  Ga.  145)  672 

—  v.  Spiers  (113  N.  C.  344)  733 

v.  Strickland  (42  Ala.  315)  216 

Joseph,  Goods  of  (1  Curt.  907)  406 
v.  Mott  (Prec.  Ch.  79)  785 


*Pag« 
Joslin  v.  Coughlin  (26  Miss.  134)         694,  696 

v.  Wheeler  (62  N.  H.  169)  816 

Jourdan  v.  Jourdan  (9  S.  &  R.  268)  252 

Jovce  v.  Hamilton  (111  Ind.  163)    1214,  1219, 

1224 
Joyner  v.  Cooper  (2  Bai.  199)  550,  553 

Judd  v.  Ross  (146  111.  40)  564,  1033 

Judge  v.  Couch  (59  N.  H.  506)  815 

Judge  of  Probate  v.  Claggett  (36  N.  H. 

381)  553 

Judge  of  Probate  v.  Quimby  (89  Me.  574)  547 
Judson  v.  Connollv  (4  La.  An.  169)  631 

v.  Gibbons  (5"  Wend.  224)     512,  513,  720 

v.  Lake  (3  Dav,  318)  329 

Judy  i'.  Gilbert  (77"  Ind.  96)  892 

v.  Kelley  (11  111.211)  361,849 

Julian  v.  Abbott  (73  Mo.  580)  1158 

v.  Eeynolds  (8  Ala.  680)  371 

v.  Wrightsman  (73  Mo.  568)       177, 187, 

293   1139 
Julke  v.  Adam  (1  Redf.  454)  40 

Junk  v.  Canon  (34  Pa.  St.  286)  236 

Justice  v.  Lee  (1  T.  B.  Mon.  247)  1071 

Justices  v.  Sloan  (7  Ga.  31)  793 


Kaes  v.  Gross  (92  Mo.  647)  195,  212,  268 

Kahn's  Estate  (18  Mo.  App.  426)  297 

Kahn  v.  Tinder  (77  Ind.  147)  423 

Kaime  v.  Harty  (73  Mo.  316)  730 

Kain  v.  Fisher  (6  N.  Y.  597)        597,  598,  599 

v.  Gibboney  (101  U.  S.  362)         920,  932 

v.  Masterson  (16  N.  Y.  174)  1061 

Kaiser's  Succession  (48  La.  An.  973)  695 

Kaimer  v.  Hope  (9  S.  C.  253)  401 

Kane,  Matter  of  (2  Barb.  Ch.  375)  1013 

Matter  of  (2  Conollv  249)  472 

v.  Bloodgood  (7  John.  Ch.  89)  1247 

v.  Desmond  (63  Cal.  464)  609 

?'.  Gott.  (24  Wend.  641)  884 

Kanouse  v.  Shockbower  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  42)   894 
Kansas  City  v.  Clark  (68  Mo.  588)  1199 

Kansas  Pacific  R.  R.  v.  Cutter  (16  Kan. 

568)  368, 630 

Kapp  v.  Public  Administrator  (2  Bradf. 

258)  167,  184,  768 

Karl  v.  Black  (2  Pittsb.  19)  826 

Karr  v.  Karr  (6  Dana,  3)  1137 

Karrick  v.  Pratt  (4  Greene,  Iowa,  144)      369, 

492 
758 
481 
1066 
237 


Kasson's  Estate  (119  Cal.  489) 
Kaster  v.  Kaster  (52  Ind.  531) 
Kauffelt  v.  Leber  (9  Watts  &  S.  93) 
Kauffman  v.  Peacock  (115  111.  212) 
Kaufman's  Appeal  (112  Pa.  St.  645)   176,  177 
Kaufman,  In  re  (117  Cal.  288)         46,  47,  500 

Matter  of  (131  N.  Y.  620)  108 

v.  Breckenridge  (117  111.  305)  729 

v.  Caughman  (49  S.  C.  159)  68 

Kauss  v.  Rohner  (172  Pa.  481)  59 

Kauz  v.  Order  of  Red  Men  (13  Mo.  App. 

341)  445 

Kavanagh's  Will  (125  N.  Y.  418)  911 

Kavanagh  v.  Wilson  (5  Redf.  43)  1038 

Kavanaugh  v.  Thompson  (16  Ala.  817)     577, 

695  792 
Kavenaugh  v.  Thacker  (2  Dana,  137)  1235 
Kavser  v.  Hodopp  (116  Ind.  428)  272 

Kean  v.  Welch  (1  Grat.  403)  1221 

Keane's  Estate  (56  Cal.  407)  531,  1197 

Kearney  v.  Cruikshank  (117  N.  Y.  95)      63S 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Kearnev  v.  Sascer  (37  Md.  264)  797 

. v.  "Turner  (28  Md.  408)  538 

Reams  v.  Cunniff  (138  Mass.  434)  259 

o.  Reams  (4  Harr.  83)  98,  480,  483 

Reaton  v.  Campbell  (2  Humph.  224)  360 

Ree  v.  Ree  (2  Grat.  116)  684,  1120 

v.  Vasser  (2  Ired.  Eq.  553) 

Reefer  v.  Schwartz  (47  Pa.  St.  503) 
Reegan  v.  Geraghty  (101  111.  26) 
Reehln  v.  Fries  (5  Jones  Eq.  273) 
Reeler  v.  Trueman  (15  Colo.  143) 
Reen  v.  Watson  (39  Mo.  App.  165) 
Reenan's  Estate  (5  N.  Y.  Supp.  200) 
Reenan  v.  Saxton  (13  Oh.  41) 
Reene's  Appeal  (60  Pa.  St.  504) 
Reene  v.  Munn  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  398) 


Reep,  In  re  (1  Connollj-,  104) 
Reeper's  r.  Fidelity  Co.  (56  N 


611 
722 
140 
1008 
715 
1260 
691  a 
804 
1190 
1105 
57 
Reeper's  v.  Fidelity  Co". '(56  N.  J.  L.  302)  123 
Reese  v.  Coleman  (72  Ga.  658)  288,  293 

Reesee  v.  Beckwith  (32  Tex.  731)  812 

Reigwin  v.  Reigwin  (3  Curt.  607)  70 

Reim's  Appeal  (125  Pa.  St.  480)  897 

Reim  v.  Muhlenberg  (7  Watts,  79)  1236 

Reiper's  Appeal  (124  Pa.  St.  193)  974 

Reith  v.  Ault  (144  Ind.  626)  140 

v.  Eaton  (58  Rans.  732)  1238 

v.  Jolly  (26  Miss.  131)  1228 

v.  Reith  (97  Mo.  223)  494,  496 

v.  Molineux  (160  Mass.  499)      794,  1072 

v.  Parks  (31  Ark.  664)  775,  781 

v.  Proctor  (114  Ala.  676)       505,  511,  531 

Reithley  v.  Stafford  (126  111.  507)         41,  834 
Rell  o.  Charmer  (23  Beav.  195)  62 

Rellar  v.  Beelor  (5  T.  B.  Mon.  573)     639,  64S 
Rellberg's  Appeal  (86  Pa.  St.  129)  573 

Relleher  v.  Reman  (60  Md.  440)  54 

Reller  v.  Amos  (31  Nebr.  438)  1059 

v.  Harper  (64  Md.  94)  726,  727 

Rellett  v.  Rathbun  (4  Pai.  102)        1126,  1128 

v.  Shepard  (139  111.  433)      902,  905,  942 

Relley's  Estate  (1  Abb.  New  Cas.  1U2)    1021, 

1059 
Relley  v.  Rellev  (41  N.  H.  501)  1246 

o.  Mann  (56  Iowa,  025)  647 

v.  Meins  (135  Mass.  231)  951 

v.  Riley  (106  Mass.  339)  675 

v.  Vigas  (112  111.  242)  902 

Rellogg,  In  re  (104  N.  Y.  648)         1155,  1209 

Matter  of  (7  Pai.  265)  1176 

V.  Graves  (5  Ind.  609)  177 

v.  Malin  (62  Mo.  429)  621 

v.  Mix  (37  Conn.  243)  880 

v.  Wilcocks  (2  John.  1)  621 

v.  Wilson  (89  111.  357)  1058 

Rellow  v.  Central  Railway  (68  Iowa,  470)  622 
Kells  v.  Lewis  (91  Iowa,  128)  806 

Rellum's  Will  (50  N.  V.  298)  499 

Kellum,  In  re  (52  N.  Y.  517)  475 

Kelh-'s  Estate  (57  Cal.  81)  399 

"Estate  ( 11  Phila.  100)  1041 

Kelly  v.  Alfred  (65  Miss.  495)  27,  213 

V.  Rarsner  (72  Ala.  106)  1218 

v.  McGrath  (70  Ala.  75)  245 

r.  McGuire  (15  Ark.  557)  154 

v.  Miller  (39  Miss.  17)  76 

v.  Nichols  (17  H.  I.  300)  934 

v.  Reynolds  (39  Mich.  464)  871 

o.  Richardson  (100  Ala.  584)      964,  967, 

968,  987 

v.  Sette^ast  (08  Tex.  13)  50,  1208 

■ v.  Stinson  (8  lilackf.  387)  883 


Relly  v.  West  (80  N.  Y.  139)  531,  564 

Relsey  v.  Deyo  (3  Cow.  133)  1098 

v.  Hardy  (20  N.  H.  479)  151 

v.  Jewett  (34  Hun,  11)  676 

v.  Relsey  (57  Iowa,  383)  499 

v.  Smith  (1  How.  Miss.  68)  744 

v.  Welch  (8  So.  Dak.  255)  713,  860 

Relso's  Appeal  (102  Pa.  St.  7)  240 

Relton  r.  Hill  (58  Me.  114)  830,  832 

Remp  r.  Cook  (IS  Md.  130)  336 

v.  Remp  (42  Ga.  523)  203 

v.  Rennedy  (Pet.  C.  C.  30)  324 

Remper  v.  Remper  (1  Duv.  401)  125 

Rempsey  v.  McGinniss  (21  Mich.  123)  42,  480 
Rempton,  Appellant  (23  Pick.  163)  273 

v.  Swift  (2  Met.  70)  394 

Rendall  v.  Bates  (35  Me.  357)  685,  811 

v.  Rendall  (5  Munf.  272)  87,  113 

v.  Mondell  (67  Md.  444)  149,  1216 

v.  New     England     Co.    (13    Conn. 

383)  ,  1163 

v.  Powers  (4  Met.  Mass.  553)  336 

v.  Powers  (96  Mo.  142)  203 

v.  Russell  (3  Sim.  424)  996 

Rendrick,  In  re  (107  N.  Y.  104)  844 

Renebel  v.  Scrafton  (2  East.  530)  106 

Reniston  v.  Adams  (80  Me.  290)        464,  904, 

936,  939 
Renley  v.  Bryan  (110  111.  652)  1043,  1072 

Kennedy,  In  re  (94  Cal.  22)  865 

In're  (2  S.  C.  216)  195 

v.  Johnston  (65  Pa.  St.  451)       270,  271, 

351 

v.  Rennedy  (8  Ala.  391)  374 

v.  Porter  (16  N   Y.  St.  613)  281 

v.  Wachsmuth  (12  S.  &  R.  171)  331 

Rennerly  v.  Mo.  Ins.  Co.  (11  Mo.  204)       242 

v.  Wilson  (1  Md.  102)  621 

Kennev  v.  Public  Adm'r  (2  Bradf.  319)     124 
Renny'r.  Howard  (67  Vt.  375)  827 

v.  Udall  (5  John.  Ch.  464)  1015 

Renrick  v.  Burges  (Moore,  126)  416 

v.  Cole  (46  Mo.  85)  469,  502 

V.  Cole  (61  Mo.  572)  485 

Rent  v.  Bothwell  (152  Mass.  341)  643 

v.  Dunham  (106  Mass.  580)     1005,  1008, 

1010,  1012,  1014,  1247 

v.  Dunham  (142  Mass.  216)         921,  922 

v.  Mansel  (101  Ala.  334)  1089 

—  v.  Waters  (1  Md.  53)  1036 

Renyon  v.  Probate  Court  (17  R.  I.  652)    1200 

'v.  Saunders  (18  R.  I.  590)  518 

v.  Stewart  (44  Pa.  St.  179)  502 

Keplinccer  v.  Maccubbin  (58  Md.  203)  718 

Ker  v.  Ruxton  (16  Jur.  491)  1232 

Kernochan,  In  re  (104  N.  Y.  618)  1004,  1138, 

1174 

v.  Murray  (111  N.  Y.  306)  686 

Rerns'  Appeal  (120  Pa.  St.  523)  190 

Rerns  v.  Soxman  (16  Serg.  &  R.  315)  75 

v.  Wallace  (64  N.  C.  187)  699 

Rerr  v.  Bosler  (62  Pa.  St.  183)  1008 

v.  Dougherty  79  N.  Y.  327)  273,  944 

v.  Hill  (3  Desaus.  279)  1154 

v.  Rerr  (41  N.  Y.  272)  571 

v.  Rirkpatrick  (8  Ired.  Eq.  137)  738 

v.  Lunsford  (31  W.  Va.  609)     42,  43,  46, 

477 

v.  Moore  (9  Wheat.  565)      358,  378,  502 

v.  Waters  (19  Ga.  136)  738 

v.  Wimer  (40  Mo.  544)  775,  776 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*Page 
Kerrick  v.  Bransby  (2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  421, 

pi.  4)  587 

Kersey  v.  Bailey  (52  Me.  198)  165 

Kershaw  v.  Kershaw  (102  111.  307)  1220, 1223 
Kertchem  v.  George  (78  Cal.  597)  1035,  1355 
Kessinger  v.  Kessinger  (37  Ind.  341)  48 

v.  Wilson  (53  Ark.  400)  195 

Kester  v.  Lvon  (40  W.  Va.  161)  1167 

Ketchum  r.  Corse  (65  Conn.  85)  916 

v.  Stearns  (8  Mo.  App.  66)        64 

Kevil  v.  Kevil  (2  Bush.  614)  48 

Key  v.  Hollowav  (7  Baxt.  575)        39 
v.  Hughes "(32  W.  Va.  181)       707 
'  1166,  1213,  1215, 
1246 
199 
202 
202 
204,  213 
842,  845 
676 
803 
203 
555 
1126 
635 
195 
274 
480 
482 
814 
1017 
393 
599 
117 
1219, 
1224 
122 
433,  1131 
1207 
22 
883,  899 
580 


v.  Jones  (52  Ala.  238) 


Kcves  v.  Bump  (59  Vt.  391) 
— -  v.  Cvrus  (100  Cal.  322) 

v.  Hill  (30  Vt.  759) 

v.  Scanlan  (63  Wis.  345) 

Keyser's  Appeal  (124  Pa.  St.  80) 
Kevser  v.  Fendall  (5  Mackey,  47) 
— -  v.  Kelly  (11  J.  &  S.  22) 
Kevte  v.  Perry  (25  Mo.  App.  394) 
Kidd's  Estate  (Mvr.  239) 
Kidd  v.  Guibar  (63  Mo.  342) 

v.  Johnson  (100  U.  S.  617) 

v.  Lester  (46  Ga.  231) 

Kiddall  v.  Trimble  (1  Md.  Ch.  143) 
Kidder's  Estate  (57  Cal.  282) 

Estate  (66  Cal.  487) 

Estate  (53  Minn.  529) 

Kidney  v.  Coussmaker  (12  Ves.  136) 
Kidwell  v.  Brummagim  (32  Cal.  436) 

v.  Kidwell  (84  Ind.  224) 

Kiff  v.  Weaver  (94  N.  C.  274) 

Kiger  v.  Terry  (119  N.  C.  456)       1217 


Kilby  v.  Godwin  (2  Del.  Ch.  61) 
Kilcrease  v.  Shelbv  (23  Miss.  161) 
Kile's  Estate  (72  Cal.  131) 
Kilfoy  v.  Powers  (3  Dem.  198) 
Kilgore  v.  Kilgore  (127  Ind.  276) 
Killam  v.  Costley  (52  Ala.  85) 
Killcrease   v.  Killcrease    (7    How.  Miss. 

311)  546, 639 

Killebrew  v.  Murphv  (3  Heisk.  546)  410 

Killigrew  v.  Killigrew  (1  Vern.  184)  509 

Killinger  v.  Reidenhauer  (6  Serg.  &  R. 

531)  247 

Killmer  v.  Wuchner  (74  Iowa,  359)  874 

Killough  v.  Hinton  (54  Ark.  65)  1025,  1027 
Killpatrick  v.  Helston  (25  111.  App.  127)  824 
Kilpatrick  v.  Bush  (23  Miss.  199)  366 

v.  Johnson  (15  N.  Y.  322)  918 

Kilton  v.  Anderson  (18  R.  I.  136)  393,  512 
Kimball's  Appeal  (45  Wis.  391)  573 

Kimball  v.  Adams  (52  Wis.  554)  604 

v.  Bible  Soc.  (65  N.  H.  139)  355 

v.  Deming  (5  Ired.  L.  418)  170,  178,  186 

v.  Fisk  (39  N.  H.  110)        330,  342,  1089 

v.  Kimball  (19  Vt.  579)  682 

v.  Lincoln  (99  111.  578)  291 

v.  Penhallow  (60  N.  H.  448)  916 

v.  Story  (108  Mass.  382)  936 

v.  Sumner  (62  Me.  305)  636,  1143,  1151, 

1152 
Kimberlv's  Appeal  (68  Conn.  428)  33 

Kimbroilgh  v.  Mitchell  (1  Head,  539)  623 

Kimm  v.  Osgood  (19  Mo.  60)  807 

Kimmell  v.  Burns  (84  Ind.  370)  861 

Kinard  v.  Riddlehoover  (3  Rich.  258)  468,  500 


1064 

184 

726,  727,  728 

1208 

416 

259,  274 

817 

776 

679 

933 


*  Page 
Kinard  v.  Young  (2  Rich.  Eq.  247)  422,  423 
Kincade  v.  Conlev  (64  N.  C.  387)  738 

Kincaid,  In  re  (l"Drew.  326)  1015 

Kincheloe  v.  Gorman  (29  Mo.  421)  809 

Kine  v.  Becker  (82  Ga.  563)  911 

King's  Appeal  (84  Pa.  St.  345)  164 

Estate  (150  Pa.  St.  143)  59 

Will  (13  Phila.  379)  1194 

King  v.  Anderson  (20  Ind.  385)  637 

v.  Beck  (15  Ohio,  599)  901 

v.  Bennett  (4  M.  &  W.  36)  889 

v.  Bovd  (4  Oreg.  326)  714 

v.  Brown  (108  Ala.  68)  1014 

v.  Buslmell  (121  111.  656)  235 

v.  Cabiness  ( 12  Ala.  598)  1186 

v.  Clarke  (2  Hill  Ch.  611)     360,  361,  632 

V.  Collins  (21  Ala.  363)  1127 

v.  Cooper  (Walk.  Miss.  359)  990 

v.  Davis  (91  N.  C.  142)  112 

v.  Foscue  (91  N.  C.  116)  599 

v.  Gridley  (69  Mich.  84)  1193,  1201 

v.  J<  hnson  (96  Ga.  497)  689 

v.  Kent  (29  Ala.  542)       694,  1030,  1041, 

1045 

v.  King  (3  John.  Ch.  552) 

v.  King  (64  Mo.  App.  301) 

v.  King  (13  R.  I.  501) 

v.  Lacey  (8  Conn.  499) 

v.  Lvman  (1  Root,  104) 

v.  Merritt  (67  Mich.  194) 

v.  Mittalberger  (50  Mo.  182) 

v.  Morris  (40  Ga.  63) 

v.  Morrison  (1  Pa.  188) 

v.  Parker  (9  Cush.  71) 

v.  Rockhill  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  273)  1197, 1198 

v.  St.  Dunstan  (4  B.  &  C  486)  602 

v.  Shackleford  (13  Ala.  435)  1180 

v.  'I  albeit  (36  Miss.  367)  392,  393 

v.  Talbot  (40  N.  Y.  76)  1007 

y.  Thorn  (1  T.  R.  487)  734 

v.  United  States  (27  Ct.  CI.  529)  440,  441 

v.  Whiton  (\5  Wis.  384)  1153 

Kingman  v.  Higgins  (100  111.  319)  199 

v.  Kingman  (31  N.  H.  182)  169,  189 

v.  Soule  (132  Mass.  285) 

Kingsburv  v.  Love  (95  Ga.  543) 

v.  Mattocks  (81  Me.  310) 

v.  Scoville  (26  Conn.  349) 

v.  Whittaker  (32  La.  An.  1055) 

v.  Wild  (3  N.  H.  30) 

v.  Wilmarth  (2  Allen,  310) 

Kingsland  v.  Murray  (133  N.  Y.  170) 

v.  Rapelye  (3  Edw.  Ch.  1) 

v.  Scudder  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  224) 

Kinike's  Estate  (155  Pa.  101) 
Kinkele  v.  Wilson  (151  N.  Y.  269) 
Kinleside  v.  Harrison  (2  Puillim.  449)  40,  46, 

476 
Kinmonth  v.  Brigham  (5  Allen,  270)  706 

Kinnan  v.  Wight  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  501)  808,  810, 

1155 
Kinne  v.  Kinne  (9  Conn.  102)  32,  43 

Kinnemon  v.  Miller  (2  Md.  Ch.  407)  632 

Kinney  v.  Ensign  (18  Pick.  232)  1141 

v.  Keplmger  (172  111.  449)  394,  504 

t\  Kinnev  (86  Kv.  610)  914,  922,  929,  931 

Kinsey  r.  Rhem.  (2  Ired.  192)  893 

v.  Woodward  (3  Harr.  459)  267 

Kinsler  v.  Holmes  (2  S.  C.  483)  1142 

Kinsolving  v.  Pierce  (18  B.  Mon.  782)        274 
Kinter's  Appeal  (62  Pa.  St.  318) 

ci 


57 

1078 

646 

1239 

34 

1047,  1067 

176,  177 

1040 

903 

1148 

922 


1130 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


1218 
113 
609 

1220 

62 

469 

844 


Kintz  v.  Friday  (4  Dem.  540) 
Kip  v.  Van  Cortland  (7  Hill,  346) 
Kipp  v.  Hanna  (2  Bland  Ch.  26) 
Kirby's  Appeal  (109  Pa.  St.  41) 
Kirbv,  Goods  of  (1  Rob.  709) 

v.  Kirbv  (84  Va.  627) 

v.  Lake  S.  R-  K.  (120  U.  S.  130) 

v.  State  (51  Md.  383)  391,  1179 

v.  Turner  (Hopkins  Ch.  309)  558 

v.  Vantree  (26  Ark.  368)  236 

v.  Wilson  (98  111.  240)  645 

Kircudbright  v.  Kircudbright  (8  Ves.  51)  1217 
Kirk  v.  Bowling  (20  Neb.  260)  498 

v.  Carr  (54  Pa.  St.  285)  475 

v.  Cashman  (3  Dem.  242)  897 

v.  Du  Bois  (28  Fed.  R.  460)  635 

v.  Eddowes  (3  Hare,  509)  981 

v.  King  (3  Pa.  St.  436)  923 

Kirkendall's  Estate  (43  Wis.  167)  145,  1260 
Kirkland  v.  Conwav  (116  111.  438)  895 

v.  Cox  (94  111 ."400)  878 

v.  Narramore  (105  Mass.  31)  906 

Kirkman  v.  Benham  (28  Ala.  501)  704 

Kirkpatrick's  Will  (22  N.  J.  Eq.  463)  93, 509, 

516 
Kirkpatrick  v.  Chesnut  (5  S.  C.  216)        1099 

v.  Gibson  (2  Br.  ck.  388)  1228 

■ v.  Jenkins  (96  Tenn.  85)  490,  491 

v.  Kirkpatrick  (6  Houst.  569)  61 

. v.  Rogers  (6  Ired.  Eq.  130)  898 

v.  Rogers  (7  Ired.  Eq.  44)  1103 

Kirksev  v.  Kirksev  (30  Ga.  156)  608 

Kirsch'i).  Derbv  (93  Cal.  573)  1201 

Kirtland  v.  Davis  (43  Ga.  318)  1208 

Kinvan  v.  Cullen  (4  Ir.  Ch.  n.s.  322)  49 

Kissel  v.  Eaton  (64  Ind.  248)  237 

Kitchell  v.  Beach  (35  N.  J.  Eq.  446)     48,  490 

v.  Burgwin  (21  111.  40)  181 

v.  Jackson  (44  Ala.  302)  1063 

Kitchens  i>.  Kitchens  (39  Ga.  168)  480 

Kittera's  Estate  (17  Pa.  St.  416)  344,  843,  859 
Kitterlin  v.  Milwaukee  Ins.  Co.  (134  111. 

647)  107,  212 

Kittredge  v.  Folsom  (8  N.  H.  98)  410,508,  571, 

804 

v.  Nicholes  (162  111.  410)  860 

. v.  Woods  (3  N.  H.  503)  597,  603 

Kittson,  In  re  (45  Minn.  197)  357 

Kitziniller  v.  Van  Rensselaer  (10  Oh.  St. 

63)  249 

Kleberg  v.  Bonds  (31  Tex.  611)  699 

Kleimann  v.  Gieselmann  (114  Mo.  437)  212 
Klein  v.  French  (57  Miss.  662)  363,  366,  367 
Kleppner  v.  Lavertv  (70  Pa.  St.  70)  901,  903 
Kline's  Appeal  (39  Pa.  St.  463)  1033 

v.  Appeal  (117  Pa.  St.  139)  269,985, 1102 

Kline  v.  Kline  (57  Pa.  St.  120)  264 

v.  Moulton  (11  Mich.  370)  715 

Kling  v.  Connell  (105  Ala.  590)  439,  508 

Klostennann,  In  re  (6  Mo.  App.  314)  172 

Klotz  v.  Macready  (39  La.  An.  638)  284,  291 
Knabe  v.  Rice  (106  Ala.  516)  329 

Knapp  v.  Lee  (42  Mich.  41)  367 

v.  McBride  (7  Ala.  19)  281 

v.  Reilly  (3  Dem.  427)  66 

Knatfhbull  v.  Fearnhead  (3  Mvl.  &  Cr. 

122)  790 

Knecht  v.  United  States  Sav.  Inst.  (2  Mo. 

App.  563)  827 

Knight's  Estate  (159  Pa.  500)  908,  911 

Knight  r.  Cunningham  (160  Mass.  580)      847 
cii 


*  Page 
Knight  v.  Davis  (3  Myl.  &  K.  358)  1106 

v.  Godbolt  (7  Ala.  304)  788,  822 

v.  Havnie  (74  Ala.  542)  739 

v.  Knight  (27  Ga.  633)  439 

v.  Knight  (75  Ga.  386)  645 

v.  Knight  (3  Jones  Eq.  167)  902 

v.  Knight  (2  Sim.  &  St.  490)  1009 

v.  Lasseter  (16  Ga.  151)  748 

v.  Loomis  (30  Me.  204)  393,  504 

v.  Mahoney  (152  Mass.  522)  962 

v.  Oliver  (12  Grat.  33)    1213,  1215,  1217 

v.  Russ  (77  Cal.  410)  831,  832 

v.  Wall  (2  Dev.  &  B.  125)  896 

v.  Yarborough  (4  Rand.  566)  693 

Knippenberg  v.  Morris  (80  Ind.  540)  842 

Knobeloch  v.  Bank  (43  S.  C.  233)  746 

Knoedler,  Matter  of  (140  N.  Y.  377)        G91  a 
Knorr  v.  Millard  (57  Mich.  265)  895 

Knott  v.  Hogan  (4  Met.  Kv.  99)  120 

v.  Stephens  (3  Oreg.  269)  294 

Knotts  v.  Bailev  (54  Miss.  235)  989 

v.  Stearns' (91  U.  S.  638)  155,  1034 

Knowles  V.  Blodgett  (15  R.  I.  463)  1044,  1045 

v.  Dodge  (1  Mackev,  66) 

v.  Murphy  (107  Cal.  107) 

v.  Whaley  (15  R.  I.  97)        802, 

Knowlton  v.  Johnson  (46  Me.  489) 
Knox's  Appeal  (26  Conn.  20) 

Estate  (131  Pa.  St.  220) 

Knox  r.  Bates  (79  Ga.  425) 

v.  Higginbotham  (75  Ga.  699) 

V.  Jenks  (7  Mass.  488) 

v.  Jones  (47  N.  Y.  389) 

v.  Knox  (59  Wis.  172) 

v.  Knox  (95  Ala.  495) 

v.  Nobel  (77  Hun,  230) 

v.  Paull  (95  Ala.  505) 

Knudson  v.  Hamburg  (8  Utah,  203)    196,  203 
Koch's  Estate  (148  Pa.  St.  159)  1172 

Koch  v.  Hebel  (32  Mo.  App.  103)  59,  824,  825 

In  re  (3  Dem  282)  1251 

Kochersberger  v.   Drake  (167  111.  122)   691  a 

59 
572 
711 
650 
276 
267 


841, 


656 
713 
842 
345 
37 
63 
287 
275 
1021 
379 
876 
46 
525 
469,  499 


527 


Kofka  v.  Rosicky  (41  Neb.  328) 
Koger  v.  Franklin  (79  Ala.  505) 
Kohler's  Estate  (15  Wash.  613) 
Kohler  v.  Knapp  (1  Bradf.  241) 
Koltenbrock  v.  Cracraft  (36  Oh.  St.  584) 
Konvalinka  v.  Schlegel  (104  N.  Y.  125) 
Koon's  Appeal  (113  Pa.  St.  621)       1005,  1010 
Koon  v.  Munro  (11  S.  C  139)  700,  1138 

Koons  v.  Millett  (121  Ind.  585)  1237 

Kopp  v.  Herrman  (82  Md.  339)  992 

Koppenhaffer  v.  Isaacs  (7  Watts,  170)      1150 
Kopper  v.  Coerver  (57  Mo.  App.  71)  531 

Kort's  Appeal  (107  Pa.  St.  143)  1155 

Kothman  v.  Markson  (34  Kan.  542)  357,  816, 

1142 
Kramer  v.  Weinert  (81  Ala.  414)  31 

Kraushaar  v.  Meyer  (72  N.  Y.  602)  832 

Kreamer  v.  Kreamer  (52  Kans.  597)  435 

Krebs  v.  Krebs  (35  Ala.  293)  1216,  1222 

Krell  v   Oodman  (154  Mass.  454)  61 

Kroh  v.  Heins  (48  Nebr.  691)  831,  832 

Kropff  v.  Poth  (19  Fed.  R.  200)  362 

Krueger  v.  Ferrv  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  432)         1106 
Krug  v.  Davis  (87  Ind.  590)  140 

Kruse  v.  Steffens  (47  111.  112)  1084 

Krutz  v.  Stewart  (76  Ind.  9)  1179 

Kuhlman's  Estate  (178  Pa.  St.  43)  822 

Estate  (180  Pa.  St.  109)  822 

Kuhn's  Appeal  (4  Wash.  534)  1146 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Kuhn  v.  Stansfield  (28  Md.  210)  600 
Kulin  v.  Ins.  Co.  (71  Mo.  App.  305)  830,  836 

Kumpe  v.  Coons  (63  Ala.  448)  73,  830 

Kunkel  v.  Macgill  (56  Md.  120)  967 

Kunnen  v.  Zurline  (2  Cin.  440)  58 

Kurtz  v.  Hibner  (55  111.  514)  892 

Kurz,  Ex  parte  (24  S.  C.  468)  201 

Kuvkendall  v.  Devecmon  (78  Md.  537)    1232 

Kydd  v.  Dalrvmple  (2  Deni.  630)  822,  825 

JKyle  v.  Barnett  (17  Ala.  306)  1139 

— —  v.  Conrad  (25  W.  Va.  760)  1213,  1222 

V.  Kyle  (15  Oh.  St.  15)  804 

v.  Wells  (166  111.  501)  197 

Kyles  v.  Kyle  (25  W.  Va.  376)  1125 


Labar  v.  Nichols  (23  Mich.  310)  1195 

Labarre  v.  Hopkins  (10  La.  An.  466)  961 

LaBau  v.  Vanderbilt  (3  Redf.  384)  34 

Labauve's  Succession  (38  La.  An.  235)  1197 
Laberge  v.  McCausland  (3  Mo.  585)  621 

Labranche  v.  Trepagnier  (4  La.  An.  558)  517 
Lacey  v.  Clements  (36  Tex.  661)  205 

Lackawanna  Co.'s  Case  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  26)  638 
Lacock  v.  Commonwealth  (99  Pa.  St.  207)  834 
Lacompte  v.  Seargent  (7  Mo.  351)  367 

Lacoste  v.  Splivalo  (64  Cal.  35)  548 

Lacy  v.  Lockett  (82  Tex.  190)  196 

Ladd,  In  re  (94  Cal.  670)  86,  96.  873 

Ladd's  Will  (60  Wis.  187)  89,  96 

Ladd  v.  Ladd  (14  Vt.  185)  247 

v.  Stephens  (48  So.  W.  (Mo.)  915,)  1145, 

1167,  1176,1221,  1222 

v.  Weiskopf  (62  Minn.  29)         337,  1230 

v.  Wiggin  (35  N.  H.  421)  387,  595 

Lafferty  v.  Lafferty  (10  Ark.  268)  808 

v.  People's  Bank  (76  Mich.  35)   435,  436 

v.  Turlev  (3  Sneed,  157)  1247 

Lafiton  v.  Doiron  (12  La.  An.  164)  1058 

La  Foy  v.  La  Fov  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  206)  1237 
La  Framboise  u.'Grow  (56  III.  197)  254 

Lagarde's  Succession  (20  La.  An.  148)       699 

208,  1071, 

1086,  1088 

715 


Lagger  v.  Ass'n  (146  111.  283) 


Laidley  v.  Kline  (8  W.  Va.  218) 

Lake  v.  Albert  (37  Minn.  453)  1199 

v.  Copeland  (82  Tex.  464)  966 

v.  Page  (63  N.  H.  318)  195 

Lake  Phalen  v.  Lindeke  (66  Minn.  209)     818, 
819,  1264,  1265 

Lake  Roland  Co.  v.  Frick  (86  Md.  259)      621 

Lakin  v.  Lakin  (2  Allen,  45)  227 

Lamar  v.  Micou  (112  U.  S.  452)  710 

v.  Scott  (4  Rich.  L.  510)  255 

v.  Scott  (3  Strobh.  562)  229 

v.  Sheffield  (66  Ga.  710)  713 

Lamb  v.  Carroll  (6  Ired.  4)  1221 

v.  Gatlin  (2  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  37)  679 

v.  Girtman  (33  Ga.  289)  68 

i'.  Helm  (56  Mo.  420)  402.  539 

v.  Lamb  (105  Ind.  456)  35,  44,  469 

v.  Lamb  (131  N.  Y.  227)  880,  1018 

v.  Lamb  (1  Speers  Eq.  289)  697 

v.  Wagon  (27  Neb.  236)  204 

Lambe  v.  Eames  (L.  R.  6  Ch.  App.  597)     905 

Lambell  v.  Lambell  (3  Hagg.  568)  520 

Lambert  v.  Craft  (98  N.  Y.  342)  349,  826 

v.  Merrill  (56  Vt.  464)  1199 

v.  Moore  (1  New  344)  1201 

Lamberts  v.  Cooper  (29  Grat.  61)  475 

Lambie's  Estate  (97  Mich.  49)  483,  731 


Pag« 
160 

1037 
956 
956 

1196 

1165 


Lambson,  In  re  (2  Hughes,  233) 
Lamkin  v.  Reese  (7  Ala.  170) 
Lampert  v.  Haydel  (20  Mo.  App.  616) 

v.  Haydel  (96  Mo.  439) 

Lancaster's  Appeal  (47  Conn.  248) 

Estate  (14  Phila.  237) 

Lancaster  v.  McBryde  (5  Ired.  421)    494,  740 

v.  Washington  Life  Ins.  Co.  (62  Mo. 

121)  445 

Lancefield  v.  Iggulden  (10  Ch.  App.  136)  1094 
Land  Co.  v.  Hill  (87  Tenn.  589)  896 

Landers  v.  Stone  (45  Ind.  404)    393,  503,  534 
Landford  v.  Dunklin  (71  Ala.  594)  396,  1047, 

1089 
Landie  v.  Simms  (1  App.  D.  C.  507)  903 

Landis's  Estate  (13  Phila.  305)  1120 

Landis  v.  Landis  (1  Grant,  248)  37 

Landreth  v.  Landreth  (9  Ala.  430)  1156 

Landwehr's  Estate  (147  Pa.  St.  121)  895 

Lane's  Appeal  (57  Conn.  182)  72 

Lane  v.  Courtnay  (1  Heisk.  331)  238 

v.  Dorman  (4  111.  238)  1038 

v.  Eggleston  (2  Pat.  &  H.  225)  1132 

v.  Lane  (8  Allen,  350)  955 

v.  Lane  (95  N.  Y.  494)  70 

v.  Thompson  (43  N.  H.  320)        385,  715 

Laney,  In  re  (50  Hun,  15)  281 

Lang's  Estate  (65  Cal.  19)  40,  89 

Lang,  Matter  of  (144  N.  Y.  275)  1229 

Lang  v.  Hitchcock  (99  111.  550)  277 

v.  Pettres  (11  Ala.  37)  1012 

Langan  v.  Bowman  (12  Sin.  &  M.  715)       516 
Langdon  v.  Astor  (3  Duer,  477)  973 

v.  Astor  (16  N.  Y.  9)    974,  977,  979,  980 

v.  Blackburn  (109  Cal.  19)  497 

v.  Ingram  (28  Ind.  360)  955 

v.  Strong  (2  Vt.  234)  1007 

Langford's  Estate  (108  Cal.  608)  46 

Langford  v.  Commissioners  (75  Ga.  502)    836 

v.  Langford  (82  Ga.  202)  401 

Langham  v.  Baker  (5  Baxt.  701)  841 

Langhorne  v.  Hobson  (4  Leigh,  224)  249 

Langley  v.  Farmington  (66  N.  H.  431)       434 

v.  Harris  (23  Tex.  564)  542 

v.  Langlev  (18  R.  I.  638)  72 

v.  Mayhew  (107  Ind.  198)  170 

Langmaid  v.  Hurd  (64  N.  H.  526)  906 

Langstroch  v.  Golding  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  49)   987, 

989 
Langton  v.  Higgs  (5  Sim.  228)  787 

Langworthy  v.  Chadwick  (13  Conn.  42)   1000 
Lanier  v.  Griffin  (11  S.  C.  565)  1270 

v.  Irvine  (21  Minn.  447)  553 

Lank  v.  Kinder  (4  Harr.  457)  734 

Lankford  v.  Barrett  (29  Ala.  700)  629 

Lanning  v.  Sisters  of  St.  Francis  (35  N.  J. 

Eq.  392)  720 
Lansing  v.  Haynes  (95  Mich.  16)  108 
v.  Lansing  (45  Barb.  182)       1138,  1168, 

1176 
Lant  v.  Manley  (75  Fed.  Rep.  627)  863 

Lantz  v.  Bover  (81  Pa.  St.  325)  719 

v.  Moff'att  (102  Ind.  23)  1089 

Lapene  v.  Badeaux  (36  La.  An.  194)        1063 
Lapham  v.  Martin  (33  Oh.  St.  99)  994 

v.  Norton  (71  Me.  83)  603 

La  Plante  v.  Converv  (98  Ind.  499)    859,  861 
Laporte  v.  Bishop  (23  Pa.  St.  152)  1008 

Lappiu  v.  Mumford  (14  Kan.  9)  387,  693 

Lapsley  v.  Goldsby  (14  Ala.  73)  856 

Large's  Appeal  (54  Pa.  St.  383)  1233 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Lavge  f.  Large  (29  Wis.  60) 
Lark  v.  Linstead  (2  M<1.  Ch.  162) 
Larkin  v.  McMullin  (49  Pa.  St.  29) 

v.  Salmon  (3  Dem.  270) 

Laroe  v.  Douglass  (13  N.  J.  Eq.  308) 
Larrabee  v.  Hascall  (88  Me.  511) 

v.  Larrabee  (28  Vt.  274) 

■ v.  Palmer  (101  Iowa,  132) 

Larrowe  v.  Beam  (10  Oh.  498) 
Larson  v.  Chase  (47  Minn.  307) 
La  Rue  V.  Gilbert  (18  Kan.  220) 
Larue  v.  Van  Horn  (25  La.  An.  445) 


024) 


499,  500 

140,  159 

861 

603 

632 

1149,  1150 

685 

1037 


Lasak's  Will  (131  N.  Y 
Lash  v.  Lash  (57  lown,  88) 
Lass  v.  Sternberg  (50  Mo.  124) 
Lassell  v.  Reed  (6  Me.  222) 
Lassiter  v.  Cole  (8  Humph.  621) 

v.  Travis  (98  Tenn.  330) 

v.  Upchurch  (107  N.  C.  411) 

Lasure  v.  Carter  (5  Ind.  498) 
Latham  v.  Barney  (14  Fed.  R.  433)  1086,  1087, 

1088 

. v.  McLane  (G4  Ga.  320) 

. v.  Moore  (6  Jones  Eq.  167) 

v.  Udell  (38  Mich.  238) 

Lathrop  v.  Bompton  (31  Cal.  17) 

i'.  Smith  (35  Barb.  64) 

v.  Smith  (24  N.  Y.  417) 

Latimer  v.  Sayre  (45  Ga.  468)' 

Lattimer  v.  Newman  (69  Mo.  App.  76)       301 

v.  Sullivan  (30  S.  C.  Ill)  828 

Lattimer  v.  Waddell  (119  N.  C.  370)  955 

Latourette  v.  Williams  (1  Barb.  9)      640,  641 
Latta  v.  Brown  (96  Tenn.  343)  273,  950 

v.  Russ  (9  Jones  L.  Ill)  1153 

Lattimore  v.  Simmons  (13  S.  &  R.  183)      624 

v.  Williams  (8  Ala.  428) 

Laudrv,  In  re  (148  N.  Y.  403) 
Laughlin  v.  Heer  (89  111.  119) 
—  v.  Lorenz  (48  Pa.  St.  275) 
v.  Solomon  (180  Pa.  177) 


235,  238 

693 

46 

848 

399 

399,  532 
774 


3 

70 

1265 

281,  285 

359,  363,  369 


Laughman   v.  Thompson  (6  Sm.    &  M. 

259)  1080 

Laurence  v.  Laurence  (164  111.  367)  834 

Laurens  v.  Lucas  (6  Rich.  Eq.  217)  952 

v.  Read  (14  Rich.  Eq.  245)  967,  989 

Lautenshlager  v.  Lautenshlager  (80  Mich. 

285)  60 

Lavin   v.   Emigrant    Industrial    Savings 

Bank  (18  Blatchf.  1)  451,  453,  461 

Law's  Estate  (144  Pa.  St.  499)  711 

Law  v.  Law  (83  Ala.  432)  90,  93 

v.  Smith  (2  R.  I.  244)      1215,  1221,  1226 

Lawall  v.  Kreidler  (3  Kawle,  300)  702 

Lawhom  v.  Carter  (11  Bush,  7)  830 

Lawley'a  Appeal  (9  Atl.  R.  327)  190 

Lawrence's  Appeal  (49  Conn.  411)     273,  564, 

1042,  1051 

Will  (7  N.  J   Eq.  215)  468,  497 

Lawrence,  In  re  (1  Redf.  310)  1050 

v.  Cranse  (158  Mass.  392)  902 

v.  Elmendorf  (5  Barb.  73)  377 

V.  Embree  (3  Bradf.  364)    994,  995,  1006 

.-.  Englesbv  (24  Vt.  42)  1254 

v.  Hebbard  (1  Bradf.  252)  899 

v.  Lawrence  (3  Barb.  Ch.  71)  366 

v.  Lawrence  (Lit.  Sel.  ('as.  128)         740 

v.  Lawrence  M  Redf.  278)  1220 

v.  Lawrence  (2  Vera.  365)  266 

r.  Miller  (2  N.  Y.  245)  243 

civ 


•Page 
243 

1215 

357,  369 

842 

401 

1213 

1006 
884 
478 
432 
499 

1220 
404 
253 

1155 
713 


385, 


Lawrence  v.  Miller  (Sandf.  516) 

v.  Mitchell  (3  Jones,  190) 

v.  Nelson  (143  U.  S.  215) 

v.  Norfleet  (90  N.  C.  533) 

v.  Parsons  (27  How.  Pr.  26) 

v.  Rayner  (Busb.  L.  113) 

v.  Security  Co.  (56  Conn.  423) 

v.  Smith  (163  111.  149) 

v.  Steel  (66  N.  C.  584) 

v.  Wright  (23  Pick.  128) 

Lawrie  v.  Lawrie  (39  Kans.  480) 
Lawson's  Appeal  (23  Pa.  St.  85) 
Lawson  v.  Crofts  (1  Sid.  57) 

v.  De  Bolt  (78  Ind.  563) 

v.  Hansborough  (10  B.  Mon.  147) 

v.  Kellev  (82  Tex.  457) 

v.  Morrison  (2  Dallas,  286)  483 

v.  Moselv  (6  La.  An.  700)  565 

v.  Powefl  (31  Ga.  681)  794 

v.  Ripley  (17  La.  238)  323 

Lawton  v.  Corlies  (127  N.  Y.  100)  902 

v.  Fish  (51  Ga.  647)  688 

v.  Lawton  (3  Atk.  13)  600 

Lawver  v.  Smith  (8  Mich.  411)  90 

Lay  'v.  Clark  (31  Ala.  409)  808 

— -  v.  Lawson  (23  Ala.  377)  698 

v.  Lav  (10  S.  C.  208)   513,  741, 1164, 1242 

v.  Mechanics'  Bank  (61  Mo.  72)  829 

Lavman's  Will  (40  Minn.  371)  37,  41 

Lavman  v.  Conrey  (60  Md.  286)  -  46 

Lavtin  v.  Davidson  (95  N.  Y.  263)  1175 

Layton  v.  Butler  (4  llarr.  507)  259 

v.  Hogue  (5  Or.  93)  702 

Lazear  v.  Porter  (87  Pa.  St.  513)  240 

Lazell  v.  Lazell  (8  Allen,  575)  346 

Leach  v.  Buckner  (19  W.  Va.  36)  1184 

v.  House  (1  Bai.  42)  423 

v.  Jones  (86  N.  C.  404)  1179 

v.  Leach  (21  Hun,  381)  276 

v.    Leach  (51  Vt.  440)  164 

v.  Milburn  (14  Neb.  106)  287 

v.  Pierce  (93  Cal.  614)  188 

v.  Pillsbury  (15  N.  H.  137)  415,  421 

v.  Prebster  (39  Ind.  492)  41 

Leaf's  Appeal  (105  Pa.  St.  505)  281,  289,  290 
Leake  v.  Ferguson  (2  Grat.  419)  773 

v.  Gilchrist  (2  Dev.  L.  73)  367,  439 

v.  Leake  (75  Va.  792)      1125,  1267,  1270 

v.  Watson  (60  Conn.  498)   273,  900,  902, 

916 
Leakey  v.  Maupin  (10  Mo.  368)  639 

Leamon  v.  McCubbin  (82  111.  263)  431 

Learned  v.  Cutler  (18  Pick.  9)  248 

v.  Matthews  (40  Miss.  210)        330,  1090 

Leather  Cloth  Co.  v.  Amer.  Co.  (11  H.  L. 

523)  635 

Leathers  v.  Gray  (96  N.  C.  548)  901 

v.  Grav  (101  N.  C.  162)  901 

v.  Greenacre  (53  Me.  561)  60,  85 

t\  Meglasson  (2  T.  B.  Mon.  63)  1272 

Leatherwood  v.  Sullivan  (81  Ala.  458)  546,  714 
Leaven's  Estate  (65  Wis.  440)  1131 

Leavenworth  r.  Marshall  (19  Conn.  408)  171 
Leavins  v.  Ewin  (67  Vt.  256)  331 

Leavitt's  Estate  (4  N.  Y.  Supp.  179)  691  a 
Lea v itt  v.  Beirne  (21  Conn.  1)  956 

v.  Leavitt  (47  N.  II.  329)  609 

v.  Wooster  (14  N.  H.  550)  1097 

Leavcraft  v.  Simmons  (''  Bradf.  35)  71,  89 
Lebanon  v.  Sav.  Bank  (65  N.  II.  88)  1023 
Lebeau  v.  Trudcau  (10  La.  An.  164)  873 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Leber  i>.  Kauffelt  (5  W.  &  S.  440) 
Le  Breton  v.  Cook  (107  Cal.  410) 
Lebroke  v.  Damon  (89  Me.  113) 
Leckey  v.  Cunningham  (56  Pa.  St.  370) 
Ledbetter  v.  Loftan  (1  Murph.  224) 
Leddel  v.  Starr  (19  N.  J.  Eq.  159) 
Ledyard  v.  Bull  (119  N.  Y.  62) 
Ledoux  v.  Breaux  (27  La.  An.  190) 
Lee's  Appeal  (53  Conn.  363) 

Succession  (28  La.  An.  23) 

Lee,  Appellant  (18  Pick.  285) 

v.  Beaman  (101  N.  C.  294) 

v.  Boak(ll  G rat.  182) 

v.  Chase  (58  Me.  432) 

v.  Eure  (82  N.  C.  428) 

v.  Eure  (93  N.  C.  5) 

v.  Gardiner  (26  Miss.  521) 

v.  Gause  (2  Ired.  440) 

v.  Gibbons  (14  S.  &  R.  105) 


385 

883 

1026 

40 

570 

355,  570 

1241 

863 
59 

568 
1104 
1041 

119 

421,  427,  632 

1238 

1238 

1079 

674 

421 
v.  Hester  (20  Ga.  588)  1056 

—  v.  Lee  (6  Gill  &  J.  316)   1144,  1169,  1170 

v.  Lee  (4  McCord,  183)  32 

v.  Lee  (21  Mo.  531)  828 

v.  Lee  (88  Va.  805)  1099 

v.  McKav  (118  N.  C.  518)  844, 1267, 1270 

17.  Pain  (4  Hare,  201)  971 

v.  Patrick  (9  Ired.  135)  802 

v.  Price  (12  Md.  253)  753 

v.  Tower  ( 124  N.  Y.  370)  270 

v.  Turner  (71  Tex.  264)  432 

r.  Wheeler  (4  Ga.  541)  642 

v.  AVhite  (4  St.  &  P.  178)  1078 

».  Williams  (85  Ala.  189)  332, 1062 

v.  Wright  (1  Rawle,  149)  421 

Leech's  Appeal  (44  Pa.  St.  140)  1007 

Leech  v.  Leech  (1  Phila.  244)  34,  35 

Leeke  v.  Beanes  (2  Ilarr.  &  J.  373)  661 

Leeper  v.  Taylor  (111  Mo.  312)  398 

Lees  v.  Wetmore  (58  Iowa,  170)  442 

Leese,  Goods  of  (2  Sw.  &  Tr.  442)  97 

Lefever  v.  Hasbrouck  (2  Dem.  567)  709 

Lefevre  v.  Lefevre  (59  N.  Y.  434)  893,  911 
Le  Fevre  v.  Toole  (84  N.  Y.  95)  1097 

Lefler  v.  Rowland  (1  Phil.  Eq.  N.  C.  143)  939 
Legare  v.  Ashe  (1  Bay,  464)  91,  98 

Legg  v.  Britton  (64  Vt.  652)  629 

Leggatt.  In  re  (4  Redf.  148)  1171 

Leggett  v.  Firth  (53  Hun,  152)  948 

v.  Glover  (71  N.  C.  211)  830 

Le  Grand  v.  Fitch  (79  Va.  635)  708 

Lehman  v.  Robertson  (84  Ala.  489)     708,  711 

v.  Rogers  (81  Ala.  303)  258,  259 

Lehr's  Appeal  (98  Pa.  St.  25)  1131 

Lehr  v.  Tarball  (2  How.  Miss.  905)  578 

Leible  v.  Ferry  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  791)  689 

Leigh  v.  Harrison  (69  Miss.  923)  956 

v.  Smith  (3  Ired.  Eq.  442)  28 

Leighton  v.  Leighton  (58  Me.  63)  942 

v.  Orr  (44  Iowa,  679)  499 

Leinkauf,  In  re  (4  Dem.  1)  1175 

Leiper's  Appeal  (35  Pa.  St.  420)  1233 

Leitz,  In  re  (6  Mo.  App.  250)  348 

Leland  v.  Felton  (1  Aden,  531)  653 

v.  Havden  (102  Mass.  542)  1003 

v.  Whitaker  (23  Mich.  324)  612 

Lemage  v.  G  >odban  (L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  57)  97 
Leman  v.  Sherman  (117  111.  657)  323 

v.  Sherman  (18  111.  368)  323 

Lemmon  v.  Hall  (20  Md.  106)  1173 

v.  Lincoln  (68  Mo.  App.  76)  1045 

Lemon  v.  Lemon  (8  Yin.  Abr.  366,  pi.  45)  266 


*  Page 
Le  Moyne  v.  Harding  (132  111.  23)    636,  1073 

v.  Quimby  (70  111.  399)  715 

Lenderman  v.  Lenderman  (1  Houst.  523)  639 
Lenfers  v.  Henke  (73  111.  405)  229,  258,  262 
Lenk  Wine  Co.  v.  Caspari  (11  Mo.  App. 

382)  808,  826 

Lenning's  Estate  (52  Pa.  St.  185)  1105 

Lenig's  Estate  (154  Pa.  209)  920 

Estate  (182  Pa.  St.  485)  1221 

Lenoir  v.  Winn  (4  Desaus.  65)    738,  772,  787, 

859 
Lenow  v.  Fones  (48  Ark.  557)  231,  244 

Lenox  v.  Harrison  (88  Mo.  491)  1127, 1132 
Lent  v.  Howard  (89  N.  Y.  169)  726,  1137 

Lentz  v.  Pilert  (60  Md.  290)  522,  523 

Leonard  v.  Blair  (59  Ind.  510)  421,  431,  1205, 

1269 

v.  Braswell  (99-Kv.  528)  158 

v.  Cameron  (39  Miss.  419)  1002 

v.  Columbia  Co.  (84  N.  Y.  48)  630 

v.  Leonard  (107  N.  C.  171)  184 

v.  Leonard  (67  Vt.  318)     '  340 

v.  Lining  (57  Iowa,  648)  140 

v.  Morris  (9  Pai.  90)  861 

v.  Simpson  (2  Bing.  1ST.  C.  176)  797 

Lepage  v.  McNamara  (5  Iowa.  124)  884,  925, 

932 
Le  Rougetel  v.  Mann  (63  N.  H.  472)  969, 1097 
Lesher  v.  Wirth  (14  111.  39)  186 

Leshey  v.  Gardner  (3  W.  &  S.  314)  1063 

Leslie's  Estate  (118  Cal.  72)  436 

Leslie  v.  Sims  (39  Ala.  161)  74,  477 

Lessassier's_  Estate  (34  La.  An.  1066)  196,  200 

386 

814 

577 

524 

46 

516,  528 

574,  576 

396 

346,  867 

1240 


Lessing  v.  Vertrees  (32  Mo.  431) 
Lester  v.  Lester  (70  Ind.  201) 
Lett  v.  Eminett  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  535) 
Levan's  Appeal  (112  Pa.  St.  294) 
Leverettv.  Carlisle  (19  Ala.  80) 

v.  Dismukes  (10  Ga.  98) 

Levering  v.  Levering  (04  Md.  399) 

Levi  v.  Huggins  (14  Rich.  100) 

Leviness  v.  Cassebeer  (3  Redf.  491) 

Levins  v.  Stevens  (7  Mo.  90) 

Levinson,  In  re  (108  Cal.  450)  348, 1146,  1149 

Levy's  Estate  (Tuck.  148)  1142 

Levy  v.  Levy  (28  Md.  25)  350 

v.  Levy  (33  N.  Y.  97)  923 

v.  McCartee  (6  Pet.  102)  159 

v.  Riley  (4  Or.  392)  1079 

v.  Stewart  (11  Wall.  244)  847 

V.  Succession  (38  La.  An.  9)  369 

v.  Superior  Court  (105  Cal.  600)  681 

Lewes's  Trust  (L.  R.  11  Eq.  236)  1015 

Lewes  v.  Lewes  (6  Sim.  304)  956 

Lewin  v.  Lewin  (2  Yes.  Sr.  415)  988 

Lewis's  Case  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  219)  35 

Estate  (39  Cal.  300)  1067 

Estate  (152  Pa.  St.  477)  927 

Will  (51  Wis.  101)  37 

Lewis  v.  Adams  (70  Cal.  403)  362,  366 

v.  Bakewell  (6  La.  An.  359)  686 

v.  Bolitho  (6  Gray,  137)  127,  1195 

v.  Brooks  (6  Yerg.  167)  395 

v.  Carson  (93  Mo.  587)  1143 

v.  Champion  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  59)    806,  846 

v.  County  (65  Pa.  St.  325)  691 

v.  Coxe  (5  Harr.  401 )  250 

v.  Darling  (16  How.  1)  989,  1104 

v.  Douglass  (14  R.  I.  604)  892 

v.  Ford  (67  Ala.  143)  844 

v.  Gambs  (6  Mo.  App.  138)  549 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Lewis  v.  Gorman  (5  Pa.  St.  164)  154 

v.  Johnston  (69  N.  C.  392)  794 

v.  Jones  (50  Barb.  645)  40 

v.  Labauve  (13  La.  An.  382)  1054 

v.  Langdon  (7  Sim.  421)  292 

v.  Lewis  (13  Barb.  17)  69,  71 

v.  Lewis  (7  Ired.  L.  72)  270,  351 

v.  Lewis  (11  N.  Y.  220)  476 

v.  Lewis  (6  S.  &  R.  489)  483 

v.  Lichte  (3  Wash.  213)  1079 

v.  Lundv  (9  Atl.  883)  1216 

v.  Lusk"(35  Miss.  696)  661 

v.  Lyons  (13  111.  117)  386,  434 

v.  McCabe  (76  Mo.  307)  397 

v.  McFarland  (9  Cr.  151)  367 

v.  McGraw  (19  111.  App.  313)  214 

v.  Mason  (109  Mass.  169)  48 

v.  Merritt  (113  N.  Y.  386)  116 

v.  Overby  (31  Grat.  601)  1266 

v.  Pitman  (101  Mo.  282)  948 

v.  Ringo  (3  A.  K.  Marsh.  247)  593 

v.  St.  Louis  (69  Mo.  595)  494 

v.  St.  Louis  Railroad  (59  Mo.  495)      676 

v.  Scofield  (26  Conn.  452)  57 

v.  Smith  (9  N.  Y.  502)  267 

v.  Soper  (44  Me.  72)  675 

v.  United  States  (92  U.  S.  618)  287 

u.  Watson  (3  Redf .  43)  549 

v.  Welch  (47  Minn.  193)  1085,  1088 

V.  Williams  (54  Mo.  200)  1132 

Lex's  Appeal  (97  Pa.  St.  289)  344,  1235 

Leyson  v.  Davis  (17  Mont.  220)  117,  119,  120 
L'Fit  V.  L'Batt  (1  P.  Wins.  526)  486 

Libby  v.  Cobb  (76  Me.  471)  401,  752 

Lichtenberg   v.  Herdif elder  (103  N.  Y. 
302)  631,  1045 

v.  McGlvnn  (105  Cal.  45)  811 

Liddel  v.  McVickar  (11  N.  J.  L.  44)        1025, 

'     1125,  1135,  1149,  1159 

Lidderdale  v.  Robinson  (2  Brock.  159)      797, 

1187 
Lide  v.  Lide  (2  Brev.  403) 
Ligare  v.  Semple  (32  Mich.  438) 
Liggat  v.  Hart  (23  Mo.  127) 
Light's  Estate  (136  Pa.  St.  211) 
Light  v.  Kennard  (11  Neb.  129) 


341 

225 

887,  890 

1238 

1221 

827 

269 

1158 

1104 

1120 

1258 

356 

333 

54 

265 

933 


v.  Leininger  (8  Pa.  St.  403) 

v.  Light  (21  Pa.  St.  407) 

Lightcap's  Appeal  (95  Pa.  St.  455) 
Lightfoot  v.  Lightfoot  (27  Ala.  351) 
Lightner's  Appeal  (144  Pa.  St.  273) 
Ligon  v.  Ligon  (84  Ala.  555) 

v.  Ligon  (105  Ala.  460) 

v.  Rogers  (11  Ga.  281) 

Likefield  v.  Likefield  (82  Ky.  589) 

Liles  v.  Fleming  (1  Dev.  Eq.  185) 

Lileyw.  Hev  (1  Hare,  580) 

Lillard  v.  Noble  (159  111.  311)      815,  861,  779 

v.  Reynolds  (3  Ired.  L.  366)  991, 992,  993 

Lillie  v.  Lillie  (56  Vt.  714)  1200 

Lilly's  Estate  (181  Pa.  St.  478)  1163 

Lilly  v.  Curry  (6  Bush,  590)  983 

v.  Griffin  (71  Ga.  535)  1148 

v.  Mcnke  (126  Mo.  190)  431,  1230 

v.  T.»l)l>«in  i  UK!  Mo.  477)      499,  502,  924 

v.  Wooley  (94  N.  C.  412)  1041 

LimekUIer  v.    Hannibal    R.  R.  Co.  (33 

Kan.  83)  630 

Lin.,, In  v.  Perry  (149  Mass.  368)  133,902,  903 
Lindley  v.  O'Reilly  (50  N.  J.  L.  636)  494,  593, 

718 


•Page 
Lindley  v.  Wells  (116  Ind.  235)  697 

Lindner  v.  Bank  (49  Neb.  735)  286 

Lindsay,  Ex  parte  (2  Bradf .  204)  54 

v.  Cooper  (94  Ala.  170)  1077,  1078 

v.  Harrison  (8  Ark.  302)  608 

v.  Howertson  (2  Hen.  &  M.  9)  1147 

v.  Jaftray  (55  Tex.  626)  1081 

v.  Lindsav  (1  Des.  150)  507 

v.  McCormack  (2  A.  K.  Marsh.  229)  439, 

472 

v.  Pleasants  (4  Ired.  Eq.  320)  940 

Lindsey  v.  Austin  (60  Vt.  627)  215 

v.  Lindsey  (45  Ind.  552)  952 

Lingan  v.  Carroll  (3  H.  &  McH.  333,  S.  C 

338)  943 

Lingen  v.  Lingen  (45  Ala.  410)  157,  379 

Linginfetter  v.  Linginfetter  (Hardin,  119)  100 
Lingle  v.  Cook  (32  Grat.  262)  550,  551,  710 
Link  v.  Edmondson  (19  Mo.  487)  244 

v.  Link  (48  Mo.  App.  345)  822 

Linman  v.  Riggins  (40  La.  An.  761)  1078, 1083 
Linnard's  Appeal  (93  Pa.  St.  313)  94 

Linnville  v.  Darby  (1  Baxt.  306)  330,  1090 
Linsenbigler  v.  Gourley  (56  Pa.  St.  166)  344, 

356 
Linstead  v.  Green  (7  Md.  82)  880 

Linton's  Appeal  (104  Pa.  St.  228)  50 

Succession  (31  La.  An.  130)  1187 

Linton  v.  Crosby  (56  Iowa,  386)  184 

Lipe  v.  Fox  (21  Colo.  140)  189 

v.  Mitchell  (2  Yerg.  400)  325 

Li  Po  Tai,  In  re  (108  Cal.  484)  535 

Lippincott  v.  Davis  (59  N.  J.  L.  241)  900,  901 

v.  Lippincott  (19  N.  J.  Eq.  121)  717 

Lipse  v.  Spears  (4  Hughes,  535)  1116 

Liptrot  v.  Holmes  (1  Ga.  381)  816,  817 

Lisk  v.  Lisk  (155  Mass.  153)  190 

Lisle  v.  Tribble  (92  Ky.  304)  975 

Litchfield  v.  Cudworth  (15  Pick.  23)  164,  703, 

1056 
Littel  v.  Ring  (56  Ark.  139)  195 

Littig  v.  Hance  (81  Md.  416)  966,  974 

Little's  Appeal  (117  Pa.  St.  14)  943 

Little  v.  Berry  (94  N.  C.  433)  532,  535 

v.  Birdw'ell  (21  Tex.  597)    669,  961,  1123 

v.  Birdwell  (27  Tex.  688)     170,  191,  215 

v.  Dawson  (4  Dall.  Ill)  824 

v.  Knox  (15  Ala.  576)  559 

v.  Little  (36  N.  H.  224)  805 

v.  McPherson  (76  Ala.  532)  177, 182, 188, 

284 

v.  Reid  (75  Mo.  App.  266)  844 

V.  Sinnett  (7  Iowa,  324)  1036 

v.  Thorne  (93  N.  C.  69)  354 

v.  Willford  (31  Minn.  173)  920,  928,  932 

v.  Williams  (7  111.  App.  67)  762 

v.  Woodward  (14  Bush,  585)  208 

Littletield  v.  Eaton  (74  Me.  516)  648,841,1070 

v.  Tinsley  (26  Tex.  353)  1059 

Little   Rock   Co.  v.  Townsend   (41  Ark. 

382)  626,  628 

Littleton  v.  Addington  (59  Mo.  275)    718,  724 

735,  1024 

v.  Christy  (ll  Mo.  390)  397 

v.  Littleton  (1  Dev.  &  B.  L.  327)  245,  247 

v.  Patterson  (32  Mo.  357)  274 

Littlewood  v.  Mavor  (132  Ind.  507)  629 
I.ive's  Appeal  (155  Pa.  St.  378)  691  a 
Lively  v.  Harwell  (29  Ga.  509)  100 
Livermore  v.  Bemis  (2  Allen,  394)  1194 
v.  Haven  (23  Pick.  116)                     1042 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Livermore  v.  Rand  (26  N.  H.  85) 

v.  Wortman  (25  Hun,  341) 

Livingston's  Appeal  (63  Conn.  68) 
Livingston  v.  Cochran  (33  Ark.  294) 


■  Page 
1146 
705 
50 
1060, 
1085 
1255 
161 


v.  Combs  (1  N.  J.  L.  42) 

v.  Langlev  (3  S.  E.  R.  909) 

v.  Newkifk  (3  John.  Ch.  312)  744,  1039, 

1094 

v.  Noe  (1  Lea,  55)  1079 

Lloyd's  Estate  (93  Iowa  303)  1168 

-  Estate  (44  Mo.  A  pp.  670)  186 

Estate  (82  Pa.  St.  143)  1137 

Estate  (174  Pa.  St.  184)  1098 

Lloyd  v.  Connover  (25  N.  J.  L.  47)  233 

v.  Fulton  (91  U.  S.  479)  608,611 

v.  Llovd  (1  Redf.  399)  669 

v.  Raiiibo  (35  Ala.  709)  879 

v.  Wayne  Cir.  Judge  (56  Mich.  236)  464 

Loane  v.  Casey  (2  W.  Bl.  965)  788 

Lobeck  v.  Lee"  (37  Neb.  158)  292 

Lobit  v.  Castille  (14  La.  An.  779)  1119 

Lockart  v.  Forsyth  (49  Mo.  App.  654)        687 

v.  Northington  (1  Sneed,  318)  718 

Locke  v.  Barbour  (62  Ind.  577)  900 

v.  Locke  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  97)  904 

v.  Rowell  (47  N.  H.  46)  200 

Lockett  v.  James  (8  Bush,  28)  246 

Lockhart  v.  Bell  (86  N.  C.  443)  831 

v.  Cameron  (29  Ala.  355)  639 

v.  White  (18  Tex.  102)  204,  1154 

Lockman  v.  Reilly  (95  N.  Y.  64)  647 

Lockwood  o.  Gilson  (12  Oh.  St.  526)         1066 

v.  Stockholm  (11  Pai.  87)  642 

v.  Sturdevant  (6  Conn.  373)    1050,  1067, 

1090 
Loeb  v.  McMahon  (89  111.  487)  195,  208 

v.  Richardson  (74  Ala.  311)  176 

Loebenthal  v.  Raleigh  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  169)  732 
Loeschigk  v.  Hatfield  (51  N.  Y.  660)  286 

Loftin  v.  Loftin  (96  N.  C.  24)  831 

Loftis  v.  Loftis  (94  Tenn.  232)  186 

Logan,  Matter  of  (131  N.  Y.  456)  899 

v.  Barclay  (3  Ala.  361)  626 

v.  Caldwell  (23  Mo.  372)  637 

v.  Dixon  (73  Wis.  533)       286,  818,  1268 

v.  Giglev  (9  Ga.  114)  1047,  1055 

v.  Hall  (19  Iowa,  491)  609 

v.  Logan  (13  Ala.  653)  1217 

v.  Logan  (11  Colo.  44)  868,  1113 

v.  Phillips  (18  Mo.  22)  264 

v.  Troutman  (3  A.  K.  Marsh.  66)      1160 

j;.  Williams  (76  III.  175)  329 

Lomas  v.  Wright  (2  Myl.  &  K.  769)  782 

Lombard  v.  Bovden  C5"Allen,  249)  902 

v.  Kinzie  (73  111.  446)  230 

v.  Willis  (147  Mass.  13)  896 

Lomerson  v.  Vroom  (11  Atl.  R.,  N.  J.  13)  355 
Lommen  v.  Tobiason  (52  Iowa,  665)  1137 

Lones,  In  re  (108  Cal.  688)  101 

Long's  Estate  (6  Watts,  46)  677 

Long  v.  Burnett  (13  Iowa,  28)  1023 

v.  Easly  (13  Ala.  239)  522,  1191 

v.  Foust  (109  N.  C.  114)  82 

v.  Hitchcock  (3  Ohio,  274)  624 

v.  Huggins  (72  Ga.  776)       507,  516,  533 

v.  Joplin  Min.  Co.  (68  Mo.  422)         394, 

1068,  1081 

v.  Long  (118  111.  638;  s.  c.  19  111. 

App.  383)  1221,  1226 

* v.  Long  (132  111.  72)  1226 


•Page 
Long  v.  Long  (42  N.  Y.  545)  1021,  1029 

v.  Long  (3  Ves.  286,  note)  1009 

v.  Magestre  (1  John.  Ch.  305)  433 

v.  Mitchell  (63  Ga.  769)  1259 

v.  Morrison  (14  Ind.  595)  625 

v.  O'Fallon  (19  How.  116)  595 

v.  Patton  (154  U.  S.  573)  494 

v.  Read  (9  Lea,  538)  1098,  1102 

v.  Rodman  (58  Ind.  58)  758 

v.  Short  (1  P.  Wms.  403)  968 

v.  Thompson  (60  111.  27)  1125,  1127 

v.  Walker  (105  N.  C.  90)  201 

v.  Wortham  (4  Tex.  381)  570,  576 

Longstaff  v.  Rennison  (1  Drew.  28)  61 

Longuefosse's  Succession  (34  La.  An.  583)  400 
Longwell  v.  Ridinger  (1  Gill,  57)  779 

Longwith  v.  Riggs  (123  111.  258)  1102 

Longworth  v.  Goforth  (Wright,  192)        1079 

v.  Wolfington  (6  Oh.  9)  1080 

Loocock  v.  Clarkson  (1  Des.  471)  985 

Looker  v.  Davis  (47  Mo.  140)  833 

Loomis  v.  Armstrong  (49  Mich.  521)  284, 

1156,  1169 

v.  Armstrong  (63  Mich.  355)        281,  708 

v.  Kellogg  (17  Pa.  St.  60)  473 

Lord  v.  Bourne  (63  Me.  368)  902 

v.  Brooks  (52  N.  H.  72)  1004 

v.  Lancev  (21  Me.  468)  553 

v.  Lord  (23  Conn.  327)  266,  272,  985 

Lorieux  v.  Keller  (5  Iowa,  196)     70,  110,  502, 

885 
Lorimer,  Goods  of  (2  Sw.  &  Tr.  471)  510 

Loring  v.  Craft  (16  Ind.  110)  171 

v.  Cunningham  (9  Cush.  87)  646 

v.  Oakev  (98  Mass.  267)  481 

v.  Steinemann  (1  Met.  Mass.  204)    1015, 

1231,  1254 
v.  Woodward  (41  N.  H.  391)    967,  1006, 

1008 
Lorings  v.  Marsh  (6  Wall.  337)  110,  922 

Lorton  v.  Woodward  (5  Del.  Ch.  505)  1103 
Lothrop's  Case  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  246)  407 

Lothrop  v.  Foster  (51  Me.  367)  250 

Lott  v.  Meacham  (4  Fla.  144)  990,  993 

v.  Thompson  (36  S.  C.  38)  902 

Louaillier  v.  Castille  (14  La.  An.  777)  437 
Loubat  v.  Nourse  (5  Fla.  350)  289 

Loudon  v.  Martindale  (109  Mich.  235)       208, 

1086 
Longheed  v.  Church  (129  N.  Y.  211)  912 

Loughnev  v.  Loughney  (87  Wis.  92)  475 

Louis  v.  Easton  (50  Ala.  470)  834 

Louisiana  Bank  v.  Kenner  (1  La.  384)  243 
Louisville  R.  R.  v.  Brantlev  (96  Kv.  297)  369 
Louisville  Railroad  v.  Burke  (6  Coldw.  45)  629 

v.  McCov  (81  Kv.  40.3)  627 

v.  Thompson  (9  N.  East.  357)  832 

Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  v.  Williams  (113 

Ala.  402)  630 

Lourev  v.  Herbert  (25  Miss.  101)  166,  173 
Love  v.  Berry  (22  Tex.  371)  1078 

v.  Johnston  (12  Ired.  L.  355)        86,  113 

v.  Love  (3  Havw.  13)  1024 

Lovegrove,  Goods  of  (2  Sw.  &  Tr.  453)  57 
Lovejov  v.  Irelan  (19  Md.  56)  337 

v.  Raymond  (58  Vt.  509)  1098 

Lovell  v.  Minot  (20  Pick.  116)  706 

v.  Nelson  (11  Allen,  101)  821 

v.  Quitman  (25  Hun,  537)  93 

v.  Quitman  (88  N.  Y.  377)  93 

Loveren  v.  Lamprey  (22  N.  H.  434)  883 

cvii 


TABLE    OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Levering  v.  King  (97  Ind.  130) 

v.  Covering  (129  Mass.  97) 

V.  Minot  (9  Gush.  151) 

Lovett  v.  Gillender  (35  N.  Y.  617) 


861 

946 

1006 

883,  918, 

955 

702 

361 

790 

979 

1237 

337 

44 


v.  Morey  (66  N.  H.  273) 

Low  v.  Bartlett  (8  Allen,  259) 

v.  Carter  (1  Beav.  426)  . 

v.  Low  (77  Me.  37) 

v.  Low  (77  Me.  171) 

Lowber  r.  Beauchamp  (2  Harr.  139) 

Lowder  v.  Lowder  (58  Ind.  538) 

Lowe  v.  Guice  (69  Ala.  80)  1034,  1061 

v.  Jones  (15  Ala.  545)  844,  845 

v.  Williamson  (2  N.  J.  Eq.  82)  41,  47 

Lower  v.  Segal  (59  N.  J.  L.  66)  830 

Lowery  v.  Daniel  (98  Ala.  451)  643 

v.  Lowery  (64  N.  C.  110)  1195 

v.  Perry  (85  N.  C.  131)  1229 

Lowndes  v.  Dickerson  (34  Barb.  586)  596 

Lowry  v.  Mountjov  (6  (Jail,  55)  991 

v.  Newsom  (51  Ala.  570)  1231 

Loxlev's  Estate  (14  Phila.  317)  578 

Lov  v.  Kennedy  (1  N.  &  S.  396)  70 

LoVd  v.  Lovd  (9  Bax.  406)  842 

— -  v.  Walker  (41  U.  S.  App.  381)  1060 

Lovless  v.  Rhodes  (9  Ga.  547)  1259 

Lu'brans  v.  Mills  (19  R.  I.  129)  627 

Lucas  v.  Donaldson  (117  Ind.  139)  672,  748 

p.  Goff  (33  Miss.  629)  82,  83 

v.  Morse  (139  Mass.  59)  351 

v.  N.  Y.  C  R.  (21  Barb.  245)  517 

v.  Pitman  (94  Ala.  616)  643 

v.  Price  (4  Ala.  679)  392 

v.  Sawyer  (17  Iowa,  -517)  242 

Luce  v.  Railroad  (03  N.  H.  588)  365,  366,  368 

Lucht  v.  Behrens  (28  Oh.  St.  231)  688.  758 
Lucich  v.  Medin  (3  Nev.  93)   576,  1129,  1130, 

1170 
Luckenbach's  Estate  (170  Pa.  St 
Luckey,  Matter  of  (4  Redf.  95) 
Lucv  v.  Lucv  (55  N.  H.  9) 
Ludlam's  Estate  (13  Pa.  St.  188; 


580) 


1099 

765 

636,  1142 

967,  973, 

974 

290 

410 

1048, 1051 

68.  70 

1048 


*  Page 
Luther's  Estate  (67  Cal.  319)  192 

Luther  v.  Luther  (122  111.  558)  497 

Lutheran  Congregation's  Appeal  (113  Pa. 

St.  32)  911 

Lutkins  v.  Leigh  (Cas.  Temp.  Talb.  53)   1105 
Lutz  v.  Christy  (67  Cal.  457)  1 197 

r.  Gates  (62  Iowa,  513)  761 

v  Mahan  (80  Md.  233)  531,  572 

Lux,  In  re  (100  Cal.  606)  189 

In  re  (100  Cal   593)       164,  180,  192,  662 

In  re  (114  Cal.  73)       170,  171,  177,  178, 

180 

In  re  (114  Cal.  89)  189 

Lyendecker  v.  Eisemann  (3  Dem.  72)      1137, 

1173 
Lyle  v.  Richards  (9  Serg.  &  R.  322)  17 

u.  Rodgers  (5  Wheat.  394)  685 

v.  Siler  (103  N.  C.  261)  1229 

v.  Williams  (65  Wis.  231)  1153 

Lyles  17.  Caldwell  (3  McC.  225)  548 

Lvman  r.  Lyman  (2  Paine,  11)  291 

Lynch  v.  Baxter  (4  Tex.  431)  330,  1030 

17.  Clements  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  431)  46 

v.  Divan  (66  Wis.  490)  1140 

17.  Hickey  (13  111.  App.  139)    1021, 1032, 

1036 

i'.  Hill  (6  Muni.  114) 

v.  Livingston  (6  N.  Y.  422) 

v.  Miller  (54  Iowa,  516) 

».  Rotan  (39  111.  14) 

17.  Webster  (17  R.  I.  513) 

Lynde  v.  Wakefield  (19  Mont.  23) 

Lvne  v.  Guardian  (1  Mo.  410) 

-1—  v.  Sanford  (82  Tex.  58)    439,  1031, 1089 

Lvnes  v.  Havden  (119  Mass.  4S2)        350,  356 

-^—  v.  Townsend  (33  N.  Y.  558) 

Lynn  17.  Gephart  (27  Md.  547) 

17.  Lynn  (160  111.  307) 

Lyon,  Ex  parte  (60  Ala.  650) 
— - —  In  re  (70  Iowa,  375) 

i'.  Allison  (1  Watts,  161) 

17.  Church  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  389) 

v.  Havs  (30  Ala.  430) 


Ludlow  v.  Cooper  (4  Oh.  St.  1) 

v.  Flournov  (34  Ark.  451) 

17.  Johnston  (3  Oh.  553)     336. 

v.  Ludlow  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  597) 

v.  Park  (4  Oh.  5) 

17.  Wade  (5  Oh.  494)  1051 

Ludwig  v.  Blackinton  (24  Me.  25)  858 

Luebbe's  Estate  (179  Pa.  St.  447)  911 

Luffberrv's  Appeal  (125  Pa.  St.  518)  728 

Lufkin  v.  Curtis  (13  Mass.  223)  250 

Luhrs  v.  Eimer  (80  N.  Y.  171)  159 

Luigart  v.  Ripley  (19  Oh.  St.  24)  962 

Lumb  17.  Jenkins  (100  Mass.  527)  22 

Lumpkin  v.  Smith  (62  Tex.  249)  436 

Lunay  v.  Vantvne  (40  Vt.  501)  140 

Lund  v.  Lund  (41  N.  II.  355)  761,  765,  1186 
Lunsford  p.  Jarrett  (2  Lea,  579)  214,  1123 
I. urn  r.  l.uni  (108  111.  307)  917 

Luper  v.  Werts  (lO.Oretf.  122)  70 

Lnpton  v.  Lupton  (2  John.  Ch.  614)  989, 1007, 

1095,  1008 
Lurie  <••  Rodnitzer  (100  111.  609)  110,  884 

Luscomb  v.  Ballard  (.'.  Grav,  403)  410 

Lusk  i\  Anderson  (1  Met.  Kv.  420)  843,  1148 

r.  Benton  (80  La.  An.  086)  356 

V.  Lewil  (32  Miss.  207)  502,  957 

n.  Patterson  (2  Colo.  App.  307)  757 

cviii 


880 
252 
500 
432 
1149 
274 
497 


882,  890 

727 

1049,  1206 

407 

1215,  1216 

792 

1103 

767 


17.  Industrial  School  (1^7  N.  Y.  402)  1007 

1?.  Lyon  (8  Ired.  Eq.  201)  702,  703 

17.  Lyon  (88  Me.  395)  899 

v.  Macragnos  (7  Grat.  377)  1010 

17.  Ogden  (85  Me.  374)  494 

17.  Osgood  (58  Vt.  707)  654 

v.  Smith  (11  Barb.  124)  67 

v.  Snvder  (61  Barb.  172)  833,  834 

v.  Vick  (6  Yerg.  42)  993 

Lvons,  Ex  parte  (2  Leigh,  761)  440 

-^-  v.  Campbell  (88  Ala.  462)  499,  500 

».  Hamner  (84  Ala.  197)  337,  1030 

17.  Murrav  (95  Mo.  23)  293,  863 

r.  Yerex(HH)  Mich.  214)  902 

Lvtle  v.  Beveridge  (58  N.  Y.  592)  702 

Lyttleton  i?.  Cross  (3  B.  &  C.  317)  785 


Maas   17.  Sheffield  (1  Rob.  364 ;  10  Jur. 

417) 
Mabie  »•.  Matteson  (17  Wis.  1)  1066 

Mabry  t>.  Harrison  (44  Tex.  286)  210 

Macarty's  Succession  (3  La.  An.  517)       1146 

Succession  (5  La.  An.  434)       1166,  1180 

Mncaulev  V.  Dismal  Swamp  Co.  (2  Rob. 

Va.  507)  230 

Maccubbin  17.  Cromwell  (2  Harr.  &  G. 

443)  255 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Macey  v.  Stark  (110  Mo.  481)     330,  395,  398. 
534,  505,  584,  1028,  1089 
Macgill  v.  Hyatt  (80  Md.  253)  1022 

Machemer's  "Appeal  (140  Pa.  St.  544)         190 
Macias's  Succession  (31  La.  An.  52)  1089 

Mack  v.  Heiss  (90  Mo.  578)  20G,  207,  213 

Macknv,  In  re  (107  Cal.  303)  1011 

v.  Church  (15  R.  I.  121)  _  367,  374 

Mackenzie  v.  Handasvde  (2  Hagg.  Ec.  li. 

211)  43 

Mackev,  Matter  of  (44  Hun,  571)  70 

In  re  (HON.  Y.  611)  70 

v.  Ballou  (112  Iud.  198)  1149,  1195 

v.  Bowles  (98  Ga.  730)  1086 

v.  Coxe  (18  How.  100)  375,  651 

v.  Proctor  (12  B.  Mon.  433)         276,  277 

Mackie  v.  Alston  (2  Des.  362)  942 

v.  Howland  (3  D.  (J.  App.  461) 

Mackintosh  v.  Barber  (1  Bing.  50) 
Macknet  v.  Macknet  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  277) 


Mackreth  v.  Jackson  (note  in  1  Mau.  & 

Sel.  409) 
Maclean  v.  Dawson  (1  Sw.  &  Tr.  425) 
Macmanus  v.  Campbell  (37  Tex.  267) 
Macoleta  v.  Packard  (14  Cal.  178) 
Macy  v.  Raymond  (9  Pick.  285) 

v.  Sawyer  (66  How.  Pr.  381) 

Maddock  v/Russell  (109  Cal.  417) 


1146 
722 

761, 
950 


4U7 

201 

809 

1050 

883 

757,  819, 

829 

679 

958,  963 

817 

43,  47,  48 

415 

Maeck  v.  Sinclear  (10  Vt.  103)         1035,  1036 


Maddox  v.  Apperson  (14  Lea,  596) 

v.  Maddox  (11  Grat.  804) 

v.  Maddox  (97  Ind.  537) 

v.  Maddox  (114  Mo.  35) 

Madison  v.  Shockley  (41  Iowa,  451) 


Magarell  v.  Magarell  (74  Iowa,  378)  824 

Magee's  Estate  (63  Cal.  414)  158 

Magee  v.  Mellon  (23  Miss.  585)  275 

v.  O'Neil  (19  S.  C.  170)  958 

v.  Vedder  (6  Barb.  352)  346 

Mager  v.  Grima  (8  How.  (U.  S.)  490)      691  a 
Magers  v.  Edwards  (13  W.  Va.  822)  355 

Magill  v.  Brown  (Brightly,  373,  note)       908, 

927,  928 
Maginn  v.  Green  (67  Mo.  App.  616)  340 

Magner  v.  Rvan  (19  Mo.  196)  417,  426 

Magniac  v.  Thompson  (7  Pet.  348)  608 

Magoffin  v.  Patton  (4  Rawle,  113)  1009 

Magoohan's  Appeal  (117  Pa.  St.  238)  96 

Magoun  v.  Illinois  (170  U.  S.  283)  691  a 

Magraw  y.  Irwin  (87  Pa.  St.  139)        363,  374 

v.  McGlynn  (26  Cal.  420)  810,  863,  1134 

Maunder  v.  Union  Bank  (3  Pet.  (u.  s) 


87) 


Maguire  v,  Kennedy  (91  Iowa,  272) 

v.  Moore  (108  Mo.  267) 

Magwood  v.  Johnston  (1  Hill  Ch.  228) 

v.  Legge  (Harp.  116) 

Mahaffy  v.  Mahaft'v  (63  Iowa,  55) 
Mahan,  In  re  (98  N.  Y.  372) 

v.  Owen  (23  Ark.  347) 

Maher  v.  Phil.  Co.  (181  Pa.  St.  391) 
Mahon  v.  Bower  (1  How.  Miss.  275) 
Mahone  v.  Central  Bank  (17  Ga.  Ill) 

v.  Haddock  (44  Ala.  92) 

Mahoney,  Matter  of  (34  Hun,  501)  1021, 1033, 

1034 

v.  Young  (3  Dana,  588)  234 

Mahorner  v.  Hooe  (9  Sm.  &  M.  247)         1239 
Main  v.  Brown  (72  Tex.  505)  1120 


686 
197 
899 
767 
411 
213 
942 
809 
619 
1237 
773 
860 


Main  v.  Ryder  (84  Pa.  St.  217)  48,  65 

Main  v.  Schwarzwaelder  (4  E.  D.  Smith, 


F3) 


602 
1138 

31 
936 
999 
101 
631 
335,  336 
693 
878 

84 


Mairs,  Matter  of  (4  Redf.  160) 

v.  Freeman  (3  Redf.  181) 

Maitland  o.  Adair  (3  Ves.  231) 
Major  v.  Herndon  (78  Ky.  123) 

v.  Williams  (3  Curt'.  432) 

Majorowiez  v.  Pay  son  (153  111.  484) 
Makepeace  v.  Lukens  (27  Ind.  435) 

V.  Moore  (10  III.  474) 

Malcolm  v.  Malcolm  (3  Cush.  472) 
Male's  Case  (49  N.  J.  Eq.  267) 
Male  v.  Williams  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  33)  895,  1008 
Malin  v.  Malin  (1  Wend.  625)  92 

Malinda  &  Sarah  v.  Gardner  (24  Ala.  719)  672 
Mallard  v.  Patterson  (108  N.  C.  255)  840 

Mallet  v.  Smith  (6  Rich.  Eq.  12)  959 

Mallett  v.  Dexter  (1  Curt.  178)  1123,  1124 
Malloney  v.  Horan  (12  Abb.  Pr.  N.  s.  289)  246 
— -  v.  Horan  (49  N.  Y.  Ill)  246 

Mallory's  Appeal  (02  Conn.  218)  394,  1208 
Mallory  v.  Craige  (15  N.  J.  Eq.  73)  357 

177 


571,  581,  1201 
290 
490 
112 
805 

1219,  1224 
277 

139)  579 
199 
842 
248 
242 
951 


v.  Mallory  (92  Ky.  316) 

v.  R.  R.  (53  Kans.  557) 

— -  v.  Russell  (71  Iowa,  63) 

v.  Young  (94  Ga.  804) 

v.  Young  (98  Ga.  728) 

Malone  v.  Hundley  (52  Ala.  147) 

v.  Malone  (106  Ala.  567) 

v.  McLauriu  (40  Miss.  161) 

Maloney's  Estate  (5  Pa.  Law  J.  R, 
Malonev  v.  Hefer  (17  Pac.  R.  539) 

v.  Wilson  (9  Baxt.  403) 

Manchester  v.  Hough  (5  Mas.  07) 
Mandel  v.  McClare  (46  Oh.  St.  407) 
Manderson  v.  Lukens  (23  Pa.  St.  31) 
Mandeville  v.  Mandeville  (35  Ga.  243)  529,  532 

■  v.  Mandeville  (8  Pai   475)  543,  544 

Mandlebauin  v.  McDonell  (29  Mich.  78)    955 
Mangum  v.  Biester  (10  S.  C  310)  917 

Manhattan  Co.  v.  Evertson  (6  Paige,  457)  247 
Manice,  In  re  (31  Hun,  119)  1171 

v.  Manice  (43  N.  Y.  303)  918 

Manier  v.  Phelps  (15  Abb.  N.  C.  123)         937 
Manifold's  Appeal  (126  Pa.  St.  508) 
Manigle's  Estate  (11  Phila.  39) 
Manion  v.  Titsworth  (18  B.  Mon.  582) 
Man  kin  v.  Chandler  (2  Brock.  125) 
Manley  v.  Staples  (62  Vt.  153) 
Manly  v.  Turnipseed  (37  Ala.  522) 
Mann  v.  Copland  (2  Madd.  457) 

v.  Edson  (39  Me.  45) 

v.  Everts  (64  Wis.  372) 

v.  Hvde  (71  Mich.  278) 

v.  Ja"ckson  (84  Me.  400) 

v.  Lawrence  (3  Bradf.  424) 

v.  Mann  (12  Heisk.  245) 

v.  Mann  (14  John.  1) 

v.  Mann  (1  John.  Ch.  231) 

v.  Mann  (53  Vt.  48) 

Manners  v.  Library  Co.  (93  Pa.  St.  165)   907, 

908 
Manning  v.  Laboree  (33  Me.  343)  250 

v.  Leighton  (65  Vt.  84)         360,  646,  651 

v.  Manning  (12  Rich.  Eq.  410)  1214, 1216, 

1222 

v.  Pippen  (86  Ala.  357) 

v.  Purcell  (7  DeG.  M.  &  G.  55) 

v.  Randolph  (4  N.  J.  L.  144) 

v.  Thurston  (59  Md.  218) 

cix 


970 

1120 

371 

337 

38 

368,  673 

968 

232 

819,  1269 

939.  944 

963 

1159 

1219,  1237 

892 

895 

340 


59 

486 

638 

1216 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*Page 
Manning  v.  Williams  (2  Mich.  105)  287 

Mannv  v.  Rixford  (44  111.  129)  612 

Mansfield  v.  Lvnch  (59  Conn.  320)  1155 

v.  Shelton  (67  Conn.  390)  948 

v.  Turpin  (32  Ga.  260)  369,  492 

Manson  v.  Uemcanson  (166  U.  S.  533)     1034, 

1035,  1089 
Manuel  t>.  Manuel  (13  Oh.  St.  458)  495 

Manwaring  17.  Jenison  (61  Mich.  117)  602 

Manwell  v.  Briggs  (17  Vt.  176)    385,  620,  643 
Maples  v.  Howe  (3  Barb.  Ch.  611)  1075 

r.  Millon  (31  Conn.  598)  597,  598 

Mara  v.  Quin  (6  T.  R.  1)  794 

March  v.  Huvter  (50  Tex.  243)  57 

Marcy  v.  HoWard  (91  Ala.  133)  621 

v.  Marcv  (32  Conn.  308)  364,  371 

v.  Marcv  (6  Met.  Mass.  360)  473 

Marden,  Estate  of  (Myr.  184)  1043 

Margary  v.   Robinson    (L.  R.    12  Prob. 

D.  8)  64 

Market  St.  v.  Hilman  (109  Cal.  571)  690 

Markham  v.  Merrett  (7  How.  Miss.  437)  235, 

251   290 
Markland  v.  Albes  (81  Ala.  433)  '  579 

Markover  v.  Krauss  (132  Ind.  294)  140 

Marks,  Succession  of  (35  La.  An.  1054)    888, 

889,  890 

v.  Marks  (35  La.  An.  993)  20 

v.  Rvan  (63  Cal.  107)  606 

Marlatt  v.  Scantland  (19  Ark.  443)  283 

Marler  v.  Marler  (6  Ala.  367)  631 

Marlett  v.  Jackman  (3  Allen,  287)  288 

Marlow  v.  Marlow  (48  Iowa,  639)  867 

Marnell  v.  Walton  (T.  T.  1796)  60 

Marr,  Ex  parte  (12  Ark.  84)  1032 

v.  Boothbv  (19  Me.  150)  1050 

v.  McCulfough  (6  Port.  507)  942 

v.  Marr  (2  Head,  303)  78 

v.  Peay  (2  Murphy,  84)  512 

v.  Rucker  (1  Humph.  348)  632,  1116 

Marre  v.  Ginochio  (2  Bradf.  165)     1136,  1189 
Marrett  v.  Babb  (91  Ky.  88)  369,  718 

Marrev's  Estate  (65  Cal   287)  1148,  1195 

Marriott  v.  Thompson  (Willes,  186)  787 

Marsden  v.  Kent  (L.  R.  5  Ch.  D.  598)        710 
Marsellis  v.  Thalhimer  (2  Pai.  35)  276 

Marsh,  In  re  (45  Hun,  107)  481,  491 

v.  Berry  (7  Cow.  344)  336 

v.  Board,  &c  (38  Wis.  250)  713 

v.  Dooley  (52  Cal.  232)  846 

v.  Hague  (1  Edw.  Ch.  174)       1009,  1010 

r.  Harrington  (18  Vt.  150)  740 

v.  Lazenbv  (41  Ga.  153)  181 

v.  Marsh  ("10  B.  Mon.  360)  1103 

v.  Marsh  (3  Jones  L.  77)  100 

v.  Marsh  (1  Sw.  &  Tr.  528)  486 

v.  Mitchell  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  497)  253 

v.  Oliver  (14  X    J.  Eq.  259)  740 

v.  People  (15  111.  284)    576,  583,  588,  749 

v.  Tavlor  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  1)        1006,  1007 

Marshal's  Estate  (118  Cal.  379)  1124 

Marshall's  Estate  (138  Pa.  St.  285)  693 

Marshall  r.  Berry  (13  Allen,  43)   117,  126,  127 

v.  Blass  (82  Mich.  518)  1034 

v.  Broadhurst  (1  Tyrwh.  348)  687 

v.  Conrad  (5  Call,  364)  22 

v.  Flinn  (4  Jones  L  199)  46 

v.  Gavle  (58  Ala.  2H4)  433 

v.  Hadlev  (50  N.  J.  Eq.  547)  880 

v.  Hudson  (9  Ferg.  57)  819 

v.  King  (24  Miss.  85)  432,  1239 

cx 


•Page 
Marshall  v.  Marshall  (86  Ala.  383)  1213, 1246 

v.  Marshall  (42  S.  C.  436)  502 

v.  Perkins  (72  Me.  343)  803 

v.  Rench  (3  Del.  Ch.  239)  978,  1215, 1224, 

1225 

v.  Rose  (86  111.  374)  1030 

v.  Wysong  (3  Dem.  173)  1174 

Marshall  Co.  v.  Hanna  (57  Iowa,  372)  387,  693 
Marsteller  v.  Marsteller  (93  Pa.  St.  350)  844 
Marston,  Petitioner  (79  Me.  25)   76,  527,  1200 

v.  Carter  (12  N.  H.  159)  1001 

v.  Lord  (65  N.  H.  4)  1214 

v.  Roe  ex  dem.  Fox  (8  Ad.  &  El.  14)  106 

v.  Paulding  (10  Pai.  40)  346 

v.  Wilcox  (2  111.  60)  331,  572 

Martel  v.  Meehan  (63  Cal.  47)  815 

Marten  v.  Van  Schaick  (4  Pai.  479)  292 

Martien  v.  Norris  (91  Mo.  465)  268,  275 

Martins  Appeal  (33  Pa.  St.  395)  780 

Estate  (58  Cal.  530)  71 

Estate  (56  Minn.  420)  814,  815 

Martin,  Goods  of  (L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  380)       55 

In  re  (98  N.  Y.  193)  47 

v.  Atkinson  (108  Ala.  314)  356 

v.  Ballou  (13  Barb.  119)  953 

v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.  (151  U.  S.  674)  619,  622 

v.  Bolton  (75  Ind.  295)  631 

v.  Campbell  (35  Ark.  137)  1153 

v.  Clapp  (99  Mass   470)  680 

v.  Prv  Dock  Co.  (92  N.  Y.  70)    407,  539 

v.  Pupre"  (1  La.  An.  239)  437 

v.  Ellerbe  (70  Ala.  326)        547,  748,  750 

v.  Gage  (147  Mass.  204)  362,  1194 

v.  Hamlin  (4  Strobh.  188)  65 

v.  Jones  (59  Mo.  181)  831 

v.  Lachasse  (47  Mo.  591)  935 

v.  Lapham  (38  Oh.  St.  538)  994 

v.  Lincoln  (4  Lea,  289)  236 

v.  Martin  (22  Ala.  86)  259,  265 

v.  Martin  (74  111.  App.  215)  341 

17.  Martin  (170  111.  18)  679,  682 

v.  Martin  (131  Mass.  547)  952 

v.  Martin  (69  Miss.  315)  1000 

».  Martin  (13  Mo.  36)  739 

v.  Martin  (56  Oh.  St.  333)  150,  1216 

17.  Martin  (1  Vt.  91)  631 

17.  Martin  (6  Watts,  67)  1010 

1?.  Mitchell  (28  Ga.  382)  52 

r.  Morris  (62  Wis.  418)  289,  290 

17.  Neal  (125  Ind.  547)  1030 

v.  Nichols  (63  Mo.  App.  342)  816 

v.  Osborne  (85  Tern;.  420)  965 

v.  Peck  (2  Yerg.  298)  385,  410 

17.  Pepall  (6  R.  I.  92)  277 

i'.  Perkins  (56  Miss.  204)  472,  474 

v.  Reed  (30  Ind.  218)  1241 

17.  Rellehan  (3  W.  Va.  480)  1040 

v.  Roach  (1  Hairing.  477)  355 

v.  Robinson  (67  Tex.  368)     325,  330,  452 

o.  Root  (17  Mass.  222)        631,  632,  1070 

v.  Starr  (7  Ind.  224)  1035,  1038 

v.  Swanton  (65  N.  II.  10)  276 

v.  Tally  (72  Ala.  23)  547 

v.  Trustees  (98  Ga.  320)  895,  939 

v.  White  (58  Vt.  398)  827 

17.  Williams  (18  Ala.  190)  714 

v.  Wyncoop  (12  Ind.  266)  702 

Martindale  v.  Smith  (31  Kan.  270)      212,  268 

v.  Warner  (15  Pa.  St.  471)  871 

Martineau  v.  Rogers  (8  PeG.  M.   &  G. 
328)  881 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Marvel  v.  Babbitt  (143  Mass.  226) 


Page 


386,  704, 

744 

687 

1173 

440,  630 

834 

229 

952 

1045 

46,  49,  491 

1174,  1176 

903 

1029 

859 

809 

84 

991 

553 

1050,  1066 

1223 

890 

J.    Eq. 

923 

173 

1059 

792,  1266 

972 


v.  Phillips  (162  Mass.  399) 

Marvin's  Estate  (Myr.  163) 
Marvin  v.  Co.  (49  Fed.  R.  436) 

v.  Butcher  (26  Minn.  391) 

0.  Marvin  (59  Iowa,  699) 

Marwick  v.  Andrews  (25  Me.  525) 
Marx  v.  Bloch  (21  Oreg.  86) 

v.  McGlvnn  (88  N.  Y.  357) 

Mason,  In  re '(98  N.  Y.  527) 

v.  Bailev  (6  Del.  Ch.  129) 

v.  Bair  (33  111.  194) 

v.  Bogg  (2  Mvl.  &.  Cr.  443) 

• v.  Bull  (26  Ark.  164) 

v.  Dunnian  (1  Munf.  456) 

v.  Farnell  (12  M.  &  \V.  674) 

v.  Fuller  (12  La.  An.  68) 

v  Ham  (36  Me.  573) 

v.  Holman  (10  Lea,  315) 

v.  Mason  (3  Bibb.  448) 

v.  M.    E.    Church    (27    N 

47) 

v.  O'Brien  (42  Miss.  420) 

v.  Osgood  (64  N.  C.  467) 

v.  Peter  (1  Munf.  437) 

v.  Smith  (49  Ala.  71) 

v.  Sargent  (104  U.  S.  689) 

v.  Trustees  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  47) 

v.  White  (8  Jones  L.  421) 

Masonic  Assn.  v.  Bunch  (109  Mo.  560) 

Bank  v.  Bangs  (84  Ky.  135) 

Maspero  v.  Pedesclaux  (22  La.  An.  227) 
Massachusetts  Bank  v.  Oliver  (10  Cush. 

557) 
Mass.  Mut.  Co.  v.  Elliott  (24  Minn 
Massev's  Appeal  (88  Pa.  St.  470) 

Succession  (46  La.  An.  126) 

Massey  v.  Jerauld  (101  Ind.  270) 

v.  Modawell  (73  Ala.  421) 

Massie  v.  Hiatt  (82  Ky.  314)  1240, 1264, 1265 
Massingale  v.  Meredith  (3  Hayw.  36)  793 
Master  v.  Fuller  (4  Bro.  C.  C.  15)  879 

Masterman  v.  Maberly  (2  Hagg.  235)  57,  60 
Masters  v.  Bienker  (87  Ky.  1) 

v.  Masters  (1  P.  Wins.  421) 

Masterson  v.  Girard  (10  Ala.  60) 

v.  Townshend  (123  N.  Y.  458) 

Matheney  v.  Guess  (2  Hill  S.  C.  Ch. 
Mathes  v.  Bennett  (21  N.  H.  188) 

v.  Jackson  (6  N.  H.  105) 

Mathews  v.  Am.  Cen.  Co.  (154  N.  Y. 


691  a 
1103 
895 
647 
859 
686 

686 

841 
944,  946 
1051 
1072 

727 


134) 


v.  Mathews  (1  Edw.  Ch.  565) 

v.  Mathews  (66  Miss.  239) 

v.  Mathews  (2  Ves.  Sr.  635) 

v.  Patterson  (42  Me.  257) 

Mathewson's  Petition  (12  R.  I.  145) 
Mathewson  v.  Strafford  Bank  (45  N.  H, 


329 

987 

713 

883 

63)     642 

165,  189, 

1202 

804 

449)  402, 

647 

1246 

822 

975 

559 

989 


104) 

Mathey  v.  Smart  (51  N.  H.  438) 
Mathis  v.  Mathis  (18  N.  J.  L.  59) 


v.  Pitman  (32  Neb.  191) 

Matney  v.  Graham  (50  Mo.  559) 
Matoon  v.  Clapp  (8  Oh.  248) 
Matson  v.  Magrath  (1  Robert.  680) 

v.  Swenson  (5  S.  I).  191) 

Matthews  v.  Douthitt  (27  Ala.  273)  395,  1255 
v.  Duryee  (4  Keyes,  525)  237 


410.  686 

878 

966,  1137, 

1187 

1149,  1150 

257 

794 

106 

330 


Page 
1200 
974 
289 
809 
136 


Matthews  v.  Fogg  (35  N.  H.  289) 

v.  Foulsham  (L.  R.  2  Eq.  669) 

v.  Hunter  (67  Mo.  293) 

v.  Jones  (2  Met.  Ky.  204) 

v.  Pate  (93  Ind.  443) 

v.  Studlev  (17  App.  Div.  N.  Y.  303) 

1119,  1124 

v.  Turner  (64  Md.  109)  993 

v.  Ward  (10  G.  &  J.  443)  302,  305 

Matthis  v.  Hammond  (6  Rich.  Eq.  399)  916 
Mattill  v.  Baas  (89  Ind.  220)  240 

Mattison  v.  Childs  (5  Colo.  78)  863 

v.  Farnham  (44  Minn.  95)  283 

Mattocks  v.  Moulton  (84  Me.  545)  709 

Mauck  v.  Melton  (64  Iud.  414)  59 

Maul  v.Hellman  (39  Neb.  322)        1022,  1057, 

1064,  1072 
Maurer  v.  Bowman  (65  111.  App.  261) 

v.  Bowman  (169  111.  586) 

v.  Naill  (5  Md.  324) 

Maverick  v.  Reynolds  (2  Bradf.  360) 
Mawson  v.  Mawson  (50  Cal.  539) 
Maxon  v.  Gray  (14  R.  I.  641) 
Maxwell,  Ex  parte  (37  Ala.  362) 

Matter  of  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  611) 

v.  Featherston  (83  Ind.  339) 

v.  McClintock  (10  Pa.  St.  237) 

v.  Maxwell  (3  Met.  Kv.  101) 

v.  Smith  (86  Tenn.  539) 

May's  Appeal  (41  Pa.  St.  512) 
May  v.  Bennett  (1  Russ.  Ch.  370) 

v.  Bradlee  (127  Mass.  414) 

v.  Fletcher  (40  Ind.  575) 

v.  Green  (75  Ala.  162) 

v.  Jones  (87  Iowa,  188) 

v.  May  (28  Ala.  141) 

v.  Parham  (68  Ala.  253) 

v.  Rumnev  (1  Mich.  1) 

v.  Taylor  (27  Tex.  125) 

v.  Vann  (15  Fla.  553) 

Mavall,  Appellant  (29  Me.  474) 
Mayberry's  Appeal  (33  Pa.  St.  258) 
Mavberrv  v.  McClurg  (51  Mo.  256) 
Mayburiy  v.  Brien  (15  Pet.  21) 
Mavburv  v.  Gradv  (67  Ala.  147) 
Maves  v    Blanton  (67  Tex.  245) 

v   Houston  (61  Tex.  690) 

v.  Jones  (62  Tex.  365) 

Mavfield  v.  Kilgour  (31  Md.  240) 

Mavnard  v.  Mavnnrd  (36  Hun,  227)      22,  305 

v.  Richards  (166  111.  466)      284,  285,  291 

v.  Vinton  (59  Mich.  139)  46,  48,  68 

Mavo  v.  Assur.  Soc.  (71  Miss.  590)  379 

v.  Bland  (4  Md.  Ch   484)  965 

v.  Clancy  (57  Miss.  674)  1132 

v.  Hamlin  (73  Me.  182)  244 

v.  Jones  (78  N.  ('.  402)  35,  37 

r.  Whitson  (2  Jones  L   231)  336 

Mayor  v.  Alexander  (10  Lea,  475)  691 

v.  Brown  (99  Ga    772)  712 

v.  Johnson  (3  Lev.  35)  416 

Mavs  v.  Mavs  (114  Mo.  536)  42,  475 

v.  Rogers  (37  Ark.  155)  1026,  1028 

v.  Rogers  (52  Ark.  320)  1038 

Mavsville  Co.  v.  Wilson  (16  U.  S.  App. 

236)  630 

Mazvck  v.  Vanderhorst  (Bai  Eq.  48)  879,  915 
McAdoo  v.  Thompson  (72  N.  C.  408)  1129 
McAfee  v  Bettis  (72  N.  O.  28)  206 

v.  Phillips  (25  Oh.  St.  374)  1129 

McAlister  v.  Butterfield  (31  Ind.  25)  892 

cxi 


976 

976 

517 

43 

215 

255 

546 

513 

93G 

1187 

54,  55 

1041,  1228 

937 

996 

4S 

221 

1137,  1148,  1167 
134 
351,  980 
1041 
235 
1057 
802 
953 
1167 
815 
233,  261 
964,  987 
1079 
579 
1264,  1272 
609 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


McAlister  v.  Novenger  (54  Mo.  251)  227 

McAllister  v.  McAllister  (46  Vt.  7)  893,  923 
McAlpine  o.  Potter  (126  N.  Y.  285)  1173,  1175 
McAnnulty  v.  McAnnuIty  (120  III.  26)  107 
McAnultv  o.  Hodges  (33  Miss.  579)  1087 

v.  McClay  (16  Neb.  418)  362 

McArthur  v.  Carrie  (32  Ala.  75)  794 

v.  Franklin  (15  Oh.  St.  485)  237 

v.  Scott  (113  U.  S.  340)       407,  469,  500, 

502,  942 
McAtee  v.  McAfee  (23  Oreg.  469)  163 

McAulev's  Estate  (184  Pa.  St.  124)  895 

McAuley  v.  Wilson  (1  Dev.  Eq.  276)  930,  932 
McBain  v.  Wimbish  (27  Ga.  259)  439 

McBeth  v.  Hunt  (2  Strob.  355)  529,  533 

v.  McBeth  (11  Ala.  598)  482 

McBride's  Appeal  (72  Pa.  St.  480)  346 

17.  Mclntvre  (91  Mich.  406)  346 

v.  Smyth  (54  Pa.  St.  245)  880 

McBrien  v" Martin  (87  Term.  13)  833 

McCaa  v.  Woolf  (42  Ala.  389)  1241 

McCabe's  Estate  (68  Cal.  519)  60 

McCabe  v.  Fowler  (84  N.  Y.  314)        707,  708 

v.  Lewis  (76  Mo.  296)    331,  372,  398,  571 

v.  Mazzuchelli  (13  Wis.  478)  201 

McCaffrey's  Estate  (38  Pa.  St.  331)  571 

McCaleb v.  Burnett  (55  Miss.  83)  214 

McCall  v.  Lee  (120  111.  261)  815,  826, 827, 863, 

947 

v.  Hampton  (98  Kv.  166)  1221 

v.  McCall  (15  La.  An.  527)  196 

v.  Peachy  (3  Munf.  288)  1158,  1165 

r.  Pixlev  (48  Oh.  St.  379)  631,  632 

o.  Vallandingham  (9  B.  Mon.  233)      499 

— -  v. Wilson  (101  N.  C.  598)  831 

McCallam  v.  Pleasants  (67  Ind.  542)  860 

McCallev  v.  Wilburn  (77  Ala.  549)  757 

McCallister  v.  Bethel  (97  Ky.  1)  948 

v.  Brand  (11  B.  Mon.  370)  273 

McCammon  v.  Detroit  (66  Mich.  442)  254 

McCampbell  v.  Gilbert  (6  J.  J.  Marsh. 
592)  439 

v.  McCampbell  (5  Litt.  92)  1109 

McCan's  Succession  (48  La.  An.  145)         428 

Succession  (49  La.  An.  968)  1168 

McCandless's  Appeal  (61  Pa.  St.  9)  842 

McCandlish  v.  Hopkins  (6  Cal.  208)  523 

McCann  v.  Heald  (25  Md.  575)  736 

v.  Pennie  (100  Cal.  847)  686,  807 

McCants  v.  Bee  (1  McCord  Ch.  383)  737 

McCarthy  v.  Chicago  K.  R.  (18  Kan.  46)   630 

v.  Van  der  Mey  (42  Minn.  189)  195,  207, 

214 
McCartney  V.  Calhoun  (17  Ala.  301)  702 

v.  Garneau  (4  Mo.  App.  567)      300,  548, 

866,  1194 

v.  Osburn  (118  III.  403)       361,  496,  895, 

896,  899,  937,  941 

v.  Osburn  (121  111.  408)  361,  496 

McCarty's  Estate  (58  Cal.  335)  1207 

Estate  (9  Phila.  318)  824 

McCartv,  In  re  (81  Mich.  460)  565 

—  v.  Frazer  (62  Mo.  263)        653,  654,  1140 

v.  Hall  (13  Mo.  480)  368 

v.  Kernan  (86  111.  291)  125 

—  v.  McCartv  (8  Bush.  504)  498 
McCaughal  v.  Ryan  (27  Barb.  376)  310 
McCaufey'a  Estate  (50  Cal.  544)  211,  215 
McCauley  v.  Buckner  (87  Ky  191)  891 
McCaullcy  V.  MoCaullev  (7  Houst.  102)    259, 

340 


McCaw  v.  Blewit  (2  McCord  Ch.  90)        1172, 

1219  1221 
McChord  i>.  Fisher  (13  B.  Mon.  193)  431,  554 
McClanahan  v.  Davis  (8  How.  170)     991,  992 

v.  McClanahan  (12  Heisk.  379)  1193 

v.  Porter  (10  Mo.  746)  261 

McClarv  v.  Steele  (44  Neb.  175)  34 

McClaskey  v.  Barr  (79  Fed.  R.  408)    804,  818 

v.  Barr  (54  Fed.  R.  781)  889 

McClay  v.  Foxworthv  (18  Neb.  295)        1034, 

1046 
McClead  v.  Davis  (83  Ind.  263)        636,  1142, 

1143 
McClean  v.  McBean  (74  111.  134)  1264 

McClearv  v.  Menke  (109  111.  294)  432,  433 
McCleland  r.  Bideman  (5  La.  An.  563)  578 
McClellan's  Appeal  (16  Pa.  St.  110)  519,  529, 

530,  533 
McClellan  v.  Downey  (63  Cal.  520)   547,  1239 

v.  Filson  (44  Oh.  St.  184)     759,  760,  762 

McClendon  v.  Gomillon  (Dudley,  48)  1137 
McClintock's  Appeal  (58  Mich.  152)  1223,  1224 

Appeal  (29  Pa.  St   360)  842 

McClintock  v.  Dana  (106  Pa.  St.  386)       1002 

v.  Graham  (3  McCord,  553)  602 

McCloskey  v.  Gleason  (56  Vt.  264)  678,  1138 
McClov  v.  Arnett  (47  Ark.  445)  214 

v.  Trotter  (47  Ark.  445)  215 

McClure  v.  Bates  (12  Iowa,  77)  358 

v.  Colclough  (5  Ala.  65)  560 

o.  La  Plata  (23  Colo.  130)  849 

v.  McClure  (86  Tenn.  173)  48,  100 

v.  Miller  (4  Hawks,  133)  624 

v.  Owens  (32  Ark.  443)  230 

v.  People  (19  111.  App.  105)  411,414,  426 

v.  Raben  (125  Ind.  139)  1221 

v.  Williams  (58  Ga.  494)  1064 

McClurg  r.  Schwartz  (87  Pa.  St.  521)         247 

v.  Turner  (74  Mo.  45)  257 

McClurken  v.  McClurken  (46  111.  327)  200 
McCollister  v.  Bank  (171  111.  G08)    1196,  1198 

v.  Yard  (90  Iowa,  621)  140 

McCollom  v.  Hinckley  (9  Vt.  143)  857 

McComas  v.  Amas  (29  Md.  132)  148 

McComb.  Ex  parte  (4  Bradf.  151)  1002 

In  re  (117  N.  Y.  378)  1023 

McCommon  v.  McCommon  (151  111.  428)  49 
McConkev  v.  McConkev  (9  Watts,  352)  150 
McConnel  v.  Smith  (39  111.  279)  1030,  1072 
McConnell  v.  McConnel]  (94  111.  295)         424 

v.  Wildes  (153  Mass.  487)  41,  48 

McConville  v.  Howard  (17  Fed.  R.  104)  22 
McCook  v.  Pond  (72  Ga.  150)  357 

McCord  v.  McCord  (77  Mo.  166)         122,  124 

v.  McKinlev  (92  111.  11)  172 

v.  Ochiltree  (8  Blackf.  15)  921 

v.  Thompson  (92  Ind.  565)  360,  362 

McCormack  v.  Kimmel  (4  111.  App.  121)    199, 

329,  1089 
McCormick  v.  Jernigan  (110  N.  C.  406)     466 

v.  McCormick  (40  Miss.  760)  691 

-  v.  McNeel  (53  Tex.  15)  212 

325,  378. 

494,  496 

333,  337 

738 


v.  Sullivant  (10  Wheat.  192) 


v.  Wheeler  (36  111.  114) 

v.  Wright  (79  Va.  524) 

McCormick  Harv.  Co.  v.  Gates  (75  Iowa, 

343)  956 

McCorn  v.  McCorn  (100  N.  Y.  511)  989,  1098 

McConn  v.  Sperb  (53  Hun,  165)  559 

McCown  v.  Foster  (33  Tex.  241)  1079 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


228 
159 
703 
217 
205,  216 
702 
260 
112 
277 


McCown  v.  Terrell  (9  Tex.  Civ.  App.  66)  720 
McCoy  v.  Hyatt  (80  Mo.  130)  612 

v.  McCoy  (4  Kedf.  54)  47 

v.  Morrow  (18  111.  519)  1025 

v.  Payne  (08  Ind.  327)  421 

e.  Scott  (2  liawle,  222)  1142 

McCracken  v.  Hall  (7  Ind.  30)  605 

v.  McCaslin  (50  Mo.  App.  85)  433 

v.  McCracken  (6  T.  B.  Mon.  342)     1105 

McCrae  v.  Hollis  (4  Des.  122)  1131 

McCrary  v.  Tasker  (41  Iowa,  255)  1026 

McCraw  t\  Fleming  (5  Ired.  Eq.  348)  1247 
McCrca  v.  Harazthy  (51  Cal.  146)      408,  841, 

1257 
McCrearv  v.  Bomberger  (151  Pa.  St.  323)  732 

v.  Taylor  (38  Ark.  393)  505 

v.  Topper  (10  Fa.  St.  419)  390 

McCredy's  Appeal  (47  Pa.  St.  442)  1097 

McCreery  v.  A 1  lender  (4  H.  &  McII.  409)    22 

v.  Davis  (44  S.  C.  195) 

v.  Somerville  (9  Wheat.  354) 

McCrubb  v.  Bray  (36  Wis.  333) 
McCuan  v.  Tanner  (54  Cal.  84) 

v.  Turrentine  (48  Ala.  08) 

McCue  v,  Garvev  (14  Hun,  562) 
McCullei-s  i'.  Haines  (39  Ga.  195) 
McCulloch's  Appeal  (113  Pa.  St.  247) 
McCulloch  v.  Valentine  (24  Neb.  215) 
McCullogh  v.  Campbell  (49  Ark.  367)  36,  40, 

47 

v.  Weaver  (14  La.  An.  33)  1081 

McCullom  v.  Chidester  (63  II.  477)  1103 

McCullough's  Estate  (Mvr.  76)  64 

McCuIlough  v.  Copeland*(40  Ch.  St.  329)  1097 

v.  Wise  (57  Ala.  623)  714 

McCullum  v.  McKenzie  (26  Iowa,  510)  110 
McCully's  Estate  (13  Phila.  296)  522 

McCullv  v.  Chapman  (58  Ala.  325)  1055 

v.  Cooper  (114  Cal.  258)       363,  365,  371 

v.  Lum  (49  N.  J.  Eq.  552)  1158 

McCune's  Estate  (70  Mo.  200)  859,  865,  1195 
McCurdy's  Appeal  (124  Pa.  St.  99)  1233 

McCurdv  v.  Middleton  (82  Ala.  131)  238 

v.  Neall  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  333)  8G 

McCurlev  v.  McCurlev  (GO  Md.  185)  624 

McCustmn  v.  Ramev  (33  Ark.  141)    431,  645, 

674,  844 
McCutchen  v.  McCutchen  (8  Port.  151)  674 
McDade  v.  Burch  (7  Ga.  559)  329 

McDaniel  v.  Crosbv  (19  Ark-  533)  36,  47 

v.  Douglas  (6 "Humph.  220)  209 

v.  Grace  (15  Ark.  405)  276 

v.  Johns  (8  Jones,  414)  696 

v.  King  (90  N.  C.  597)  892 

v.  McDaniel  (91  Kv.  157)  950 

v.  McDaniel  (80  Md.  623)  408 

v.  Pattison  (98  Cal.  86)  470 

McDearman  v.  Hodnett  (83  Va.  281)  1223 
McDearmon  v.  Maxtield  (38  Ark.  631)  410,  412 
McDermott's  Appeal  (106  Pa.  St.  358)  612 
McDermott  v.  Haves  (GO  N.  H.  9)  332 

McDevitt,  In  re  (95  Cal.  17)  48,  490 

McDonald's  Estate  (118  Cal.  277)  527 

McDonald  v.  Aten  (1  Oh.  St.  293)   1123,  1124 

v.  Berrv  (90  Ala.  464)  215 

v.  Burton  (08  Cal.  445)  1043 

v.  Carries  (90  Ala.  147)  1155,  1189 

v.  Crandall  (43  111.  231)  206 

v.  Hutton  (8  N.  J.  Eq.  473)  1031 

v.  McDonald  (76  Iowa,  137)  271 

v.  McDonald  (68  Miss.  689)  832 

vol.  i. —  h 


McDonald  v.  McDonald  (142  Ind.  55)        477, 

481,  483 

v.  McDonald  (8  Yerg.  145) 

v.  OHara  (144  N.  Y.  566) 

v.  Webster  (2  Mass.  498) 

v.  White  (130  111.  493) 

v.  Williams  (16  Ark.  36) 

McDonnell,  Ex  parte  (2  Bradf.  32) 


1247 
728 
829,  854 
499 
643 
503 


McDonogh's  Succession  (7  La.  An.  472)  505, 
542,  576,  1166 
McDonogh  v.  Murdoch  (15  How.  367)  913 
McDonough  v.  Loughlin  (20  Barb.  238)  76 
McDougal,  Matter  of  (141  N.  Y.  21)  998 

v.  Hepburn  (5  Fla.  508)  230 

McDowell  v.  Branham  (2   Nott  &  McC. 
572)  794 

v.  Caldwell  (2  McC.  Ch.  43)  774 

v.  Hendrix  (07  Ind.  513)  637 

v.  Hendrix  (71  Ind.  280)  637 

v.  Murdock  (1  Nott  &  McC.  237)  122,  123 

r.  Peyton  (2  Des.  313)  497 

McElhaney  v.  Crawford  (96  Ga.  174)  436 

McElmovue  v.  Cohen  (13  Pet.  312)  776 

McEhnurray  v.  Loomis  (31  Fed.  Rep.  395)  188 
McElroy's  Case  (0  W.  &  S.  451)  33 

McElroy  v.  Thompson  (42  Ala.  050)  705 

McElwain,  Ex  parte  (29  111.  442)  251 

McElwaine,  In  re  (18  N.  J.  Eq.  499)  66 

McElwee  v.  Ferguson  (43  Md.  479)  39 

McEndree  v.  Morgan  (31  W.  Va.  521)  1229 
McFadden  v.  Herley  (28  S.  C.  317)    904,  907, 

987 

v.  Hewett  (78  Me.  24)  553 

v.  Ross  (93  Ind.  134)  573,  575,  576 

McFadgen  v.  Council  (81  N.  C.  195)  578,  580 
McFadin  v.  Catron  (120  Mo.  252)  48 
v.  Catron  (138  Mo.  197)      31,  45,  40,  47, 

500 
McFait's  Appeal  (8  Pa.  St.  290)  1104 

McFall  v.  Sullivan  (17  S.  C.  504)  1215 

McFarland  v.  Baze  (24  Mo.  15G)  162,  177 

v.  Bush  (94  Turn.  538)  71 

v.  Febigers  (7  Oh.  194)  250 

v.  Stone  (17  Vt.  165)  622 

McFarlane  v.  Kandle  (41  Miss.  411)  1187 

McFeeley's  Estate  (2  Kedf.  541)  1052,  1059 
McFeelv  v.  Scott  (128  Mass.  16)  439,  450 

McGahey  v.  Forrest  (109  Cal.  63)  861 

McGarvev  v.  Darnall  (134  111.  367)   361,  1029 

1036,  1040 
McGaughey  v.  Henry  (15  B.  Mon.  383)    1239 

v.  Jacoby  (54  Oh.  St.  487)  654 

McGeary's  Appeal  (6  Atl.  763)  1139 

McGee  v.  Ford  (5  Sin.  &  M.  769)  1237 

v.  McGee  (91  III.  548)  213 

v.  McGee  (4  Ired.  L.  105)  247 

v.  McNeil  (41  Miss.  17)  55 

v.  Walker  (106  Mich.  521)  598 

McGehee  v.  Jones  (41  Ga.  123)  830 

v.  McGehee  (74  Miss.  386)  873,  878 

v.  Polk  (24  Ga.  406)  374 

v.  Ragan  (9  Ga.  135)  565 

McGhee  v.  Hoyt  (106  Pa.  St.  516)  1067 

McGill  v.  Dem'ing  (44  Oh.  St.  645)  228 

McGinity  v.  McGinity  (19  R.  I.  510)  669, 1136 
McGinnis  v.  Kempsey  (27  Mich.  363)  37 

v.  Loring  (126  Mo.  404)  775,  826 

McGirr  v.  Aaron  (1  Pa.  49)  923 

McGlawn  v.  Lowe  (74  Ga.  34)  992 

McGlinsey's  Appeal  (14  S.  &  R.  64)  761 

McGooch  v.  McGooch  (4  Mass.  348)    519,  528 
cxiii 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Page 
552 


McGovney  v.  State  (20  Oh.  93)  552 

McGowan,  Matter  of  (124  N.  Y.  526)        1005 

v.  Balwin  (46  Minn.  477)     211,  212,  217 

v.  McGowan  (48  Miss.  553) 

McGrath  v.  Carroll  (110  Cal.  79) 
v.  Reynolds  (116  Mass.  566) 


702 

848 
121,  123, 

125 

v.  Sinclair  (55  Miss.  89)  200 

McGraw,  In  re  (111  N.  Y.  66)  22,  910,  914 
McGreevy  v.  McGrath  (152  Mass.  24)  937 
McGregor  v.  Buel  (24  N.  Y.  166)  514 

v.  Comstock  (3  N.  Y.  408)  159 

v.  McGregor  (33  How.  Pr.  456)  506,  508 

v.  McGregor  (35  N.  Y.  218)  740 

v.  Vaupel  (24  Iowa,  436)  691 

McGuinness  v.  Whalen  (16  It.  I.  558)       1004 

v.  Whalen  (17  E.  I.  619)  752 

McGuire  v.  Bucklev  (58  Ala.  120)  523 

v.  McGowan  (4  Des.  48G)  901 

v.  Roirers  (71  Mil.  587)  532 

v.  Rogers  (74  Md.  192)  679 

McHugh  v.  Dowd  (86  Mich.  412)  826,  834,  845 
v.  McCole  (72  N.  \V.  R.  631)     909,  928, 

932 
Mcllvaine  v.  Gethan  (3  Whart.  575)  963 

Mclntire  v.  Conrad  (93  Mich.  526)  368 

v.  McConn  '28  Iowa,  480)  47 

v.  Mclntire  (64  N.  H.  609)  111 

v.  Morris  (14  Wend.  90)  736 

v.  Zanesville  (17  Oh.  St.  352)  931 

Mcintosh  v.  Greenwood  (15  Tex.  116)        809 

v.  Wheeler  (58  Kans.  324)  1202 

Mclntvre  v.  Clark  (43  Hun,  352)  262 

v.  Mclntvre  (123  Pa.  St.  329)  877 

v.  Meldrfm  (40  Ga.  490)  835 

r.  Zanesville  (9  Oh.  203)  923 

McKamie  v.  Baskerville  (7  S.  W.  R.  194)  157 
McKamv  v.  MeNabb  (97  Tenn.  236)  407,  753 
McKavi'.  Coleman  (85  Mich.  60)  1080 

v.  Donald  (8  Rich.  331)  549 

v.  Giurkin  (102  N.  C.  21)  992 

v.  Green  (3  John.  Ch.  56)  798,  1117 

v.  Riley  (135  111.  586)  830, 1149 

McKean  v.  Brown  (83  Kv.  208)  229 

v.  Vick  (108  111.  373)  281,  288,  1027 

McKee's  Appeal  (96  Pa.  St.  277)  918 

Appeal  (104  Pa.  St.  571)  902 

McKee  r.  Cottle  (6  Mo.  App.  416)  277 

v.  Howe  (17  Colo.  538)  594,  714 

v.  McKee  (3  B.  Mon.  461)  1152 

v.  Reynolds  (26  Iowa,  578)  249 

v.  White  (50  Pa.  St.  354)  475 

v.  Wilcox  (11  Mich.  358)  201 

McKeegan  v.  O'Neill  (22  S.  C.  454)  58 

McKeehan  v.  Wilson  (53  Pa.  St.  74)  880 

McKeen  v.  Frost  (46  Me.  239)  384,  410, 473,  476 

v.  Oliphant  (18  N.  J.  L.  442)  811 

r.  Waldron  (25  Minn.  466)         819,  1269 

McKellar  v.  P.owell  (4  Hawks,  34)  548 

McKenna's  Estate  (1  Leg.  Gaz.  Rep.  12)  765 
McKennan's  Appeal  (27  Pa.  St.  237)  545 

McKenzie's  Appeal  (41  Conn.  607)  948 

McKenzie  v.  Donald  (61  Miss.  452)  255 

t>.  Pendleton  (1  Bush,  164)  423 

McKeown  v.  Harvey  (40  Mich.  226)  686 

U.K.  v  r.  V.ning  (4  H.  &  M.  430)  702 

McKie  r.  (lark  (3  Dem.  380)  1175 

McKim  v.  Aulbach  (130  Mass.  481)    737,  738 

v.  Blake  (132  Mass.  343)  551 

v.  Duncan  (4  Gill,  72)  1108,  1174 

v.  Thompson  (1  Bland,  150)  799 


McKinlev's  Estate  (49  Cal.  152)  814 

McKinley  v.  Lamb  (04  Barb.  199)  69 

v.  McGregor  (10  Iowa,  111)  623 

McKinney,  In  re  (112  Cal.  447)       1149,  1150 
McKinney  v.  Abbott  (49  Tex.  371)  14a 

McKinster  v.  Smith  (27  Conn.  628)  955 

McKinzie  v.  Hill  (51  Mo.  303)     842,  844,  847 
McKnight  v.  Morgan  (2  Barb.  171)     631,  658 

v.  Walsh  (23  N.  J.  Eq.  136)  1012 

McLachlan  v.  McLachlan  (9  Pai.  534)        952 
McLain  v.  Carson  (4  Ark.  164)  287 

McLane  v.  Belvin  (47  Tex.  493)  806,  811 

v.  Cropper  (5  Dist.  Col.  App.  276)     346, 

1238,  1242. 

v.  Johnson  (43  Vt.  48)  631,  658 

v.  Paschal  (47  Tex.  365)  210,  210 

v.  Piaggio  (24  Fla.  71)  248 

v.  Spence  (6  Ala.  894)  672, 

Spence  (11  Ala.  172) 

McLaren  v.  Clark  (62  Ga.  106) 
McLarnev,  Matter  of  (153  N.  Y.  416) 
McLaughlin's  Will  (Tuck.  79) 
McLaughlin,  In  re  (103  Cal.  429) 


02 

672 

274 

108 

502 

396,  400, 

406 

1237,  1249 

1050 

48 

231,  632 


o.  Barnes  (12  Wash.  373) 

v.  Janney  (6  Grat.  609) 

v.  McDevitt  (63  N.  Y.  213) 

v.  McLaughlin  (16  Mo.  242) 

v.  McLaughlin  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  190)      257, 

258   262 

V.  McLaughlin  (22  N.  J.  Eq.  505)    '  257 

v.  McLaughlin  (4  Oh.  St.  508)  326 

v.  Newton  (53  N.  H.  531)  821,  822 

v.  Winner  (63  Wis.  120)  767 

McLaurin  v.  Thompson  (Dud.  335)  574 

McLean,  Succession  of  (12  La.  An.  222)  1045 

v.  Bergner  (80  Mo.  414)  1051,  1127 

r.  Leach  (68  N.  C.  95)  79S 

v.  McLean  (88  N.  C.  394)  757 

v.  Meek  (18  How.  16)  360,  361 

v.  Robertson  (126  Mass.  537)  98& 

v.  Wade  (53  Pa.  St.  146)  356 

v.  Webster  (45  Kans.  644)  433,  1267 

».  Weeks  (61  Me.  277)        631,  632,  107a 

McLeary  v.  Doran  (79  Iowa,  210)  826 

McLeerV  v.  McLeerv  (65  Me.  172)  265- 

McLellan's  Appeal  (76  Pa.  St.  235)  1126 

McLellan  v.  Lunt  (14  Me.  254)  675 

McLemore  v.  Blocker  (Harp.  Eq.  272)        638 
McLeod  v.  Dell  (9  Fla.  427)  916,  917 

v.  Dell  (9  Fla.  451)  80 

v.  Griffis  (45  Ark.  505)  1122,  1123 

v.  Griffis  (51  Ark.  1)  1133 

McLeran  v.  Benton  (73  Cal.  329)  713 

McLoskev  v.  Reid  (4  Bradf.  334)  1012 

McLure  v.  Steele  (14  Rich.  Eq.  105)  1217, 1222 
McMahan's  Estate  (19  Nev.  241)  1252 

McMahan  v.  Harbert  (35  Tex.  451)  689 

McMahill  v.  McMahill  (105  111.  596)  213 

v.  McMahill  (69  Iowa,  115)      1214,  1220 

McMahon  t;.  Bank  (67  Conn.  78)  122 

v.  Gray  (150  Mass.  289)  255 

v.  Harrison  (6  N.  Y.  443)  408 

v.  McMahon  (100  Mo.  97)  469,  500 

v.  Russell  (17  Fla.  698)  235,  237 

v.  Ryan  (20  Pa.  St.  329)  47 

McManusr's  Estate  (14  Phila.  660)  170 

McManus  v.  McDowell  (11  Mo.  App.  436)  339, 

1183 
McMaster  r.  Scriven  (85  Wis.  162)  47 

McMasters  v.  Blair  (29  Pa.  St.  298)     39,  1195 


TABLE   OP  CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*Page 

McMechen   v.   McMechen   (17   W.   Va. 

683)  37, 65 

McMeekin  v.  Hvnes  (80  Ky.  343)  423 

v.  McMeekin  (2  Bush,  79)  71 

McMenamin's  Estate  (12  Phila.  510)  1168 
McMillan  v.  Hayward  (94  Cal.  357)  507,  802, 

842 

v.  Rushing  (80  Ala.  402)  1083 

v.  Toombs  (79  Ga.  143)  991 

v.  Wacker  (57  Mo.  App.  220)  432 

McMorine  v.  Storev  (4  D.  &  B.  189)  418,  420 
McMullen  v.  Brazelton  (81  Ala.  442)  1230 
McMullin  v.  Brown  (2  Hill  Ch.  457)  493, 1239 
McMurrav  v.  Shuck  (6  Bush,  111)  181 

McMurrv  v.  Stanley  (69  Tex.  227)  877,  948 
McMurtrie  v.  McMiirtrie  (15  N.  J.  L.  276)  871 

836 
669 
737 
566 
697 
408 
482 
1078 
338, 


McNab  v.  Stewart  (12  Minn.  407) 
McNabb  v.  Wixom  (7  Nev.  163) 
McNair's  Appeal  (4  Rawle,  148) 
McNair  v.  Dodge  (7  Mo.  404) 

v.  Hunt  (5  Mo.  301) 

McNairv  v.  Bell  (6  Yerg.  302) 
McNallv  v.  Brown  (5  Redf.  372) 

v.  Havnes  (59  Tex.  583) 

McNamara  v.  Casserly  (61  Minn.  335) 

1230,  1234 

v.  Dwyer  (7  Pai.  239)  371,  1184 

v.  McNamara  (62  Ga.  200)  363,  366 

McNaughton  v.  McNaughton  (34  N.  Y. 

201)  946 

McNeel's  Estate  (68  Pa.  St.  412)  661 

McNeer  v.  McNeer  (142  111.  388)  276 

McNeil  v.  Smith  (55  Ga.  313)  396 

McNeilledge  v.  Barclay  (11  S.  &  R.)  103,  904 

v.  Galbraith  (8  S"  &  R.  43)  904 

McNitt  v.  Turner  (16  Wall.  352)      329,  1037, 

1089 
McNultv  v.  Hurd  (72  N.  Y.  518)  349,  803,  826 

v.  Lewis  (8  Sm.  &  M.  520)   173, 187,  190 

McNutt  v.  McNutt  (116  Ind.  545)  265 

McPaxton  v.  Dickson  (15  Ark.  9?)  1148 

McPherson's  Appeal  (11  Atl.  R.  205)  40 

McPherson,  Matter  of  (104  N.  Y.  306)     691  a 

v.  Clark  (3  Bradf.  92)  93 

v.  Cunliff  (11  S  &  R.  422)  323,  325,  330, 

338,  448,  1030,  1089 

v.  Israel  (5  Gill  &  J.  60)  1165,  1173 

v.  McPherson  (70  Mo.  App.  330)         442 

McPike  v.  McPike  (111  Mo.  216)     650,  1125, 

1155,  1186 
McQueen's  Estate  (44  Cal.  584)  1137 

McQueen  v.  Lilly  (131  Mo.  9)  1098 

v.  Turner  (91  Ala.  273)  1244 

McQuerrv  v.  Gilliland  (89  Ky.  434)  1016 

McRae  v.  McRae  (3  Bradf.  199)  1216 

v.  McRae  (11  La.  571)  375 

McRea  v.  Central  Bank  (66  N.  Y.  489)  606 
McRearv  v.  Robinson  (12  Sm.  &  M.  318)  166, 

170 
McRee  v.  Means  (34  Ala.  349)  948,  949 

McReynold's  Estate  (61  Iowa,  585)  187 

McRevnolds  v.  Counts  (9  Grat.  242)  273 

McSoirlev  v.  McSorley  (2  Bradf.  188)  40 

McSwean  v.  Faulks  (46  Ala.  610)  1062 

McTaggart  v.  Thompson  (14  Pa.  St.  149)  42, 43 
McTaggert  v.  Smith  (14  Bush,  414)  211,  214 
McVaughters  v.  Elder  (2  Brev.  307)  385 

McVey  v.  McVev  (51  Mo.  406)  1054,  1060 
McWhirter  v.  Jackson  (10  Humph.  209)     846 

v.  Roberts  (40  Ark.  283)  241 

McWhorter  v.  Benson  (Hopk.  28)   1145,  1165 


McWhorter  v.  Donald  (39  Miss.  779) 
McWilliams's  Appeal  (117  Pa.  St.  Ill) 

McWilliams  v.  Hopkins  (4  Rawle,  382) 


809 
806, 
844 
546, 
552 

McWillie  v.  Van  Vacter  (35  Miss.  428)  349 
Meach  v.  Meach  (24  Vt.  591)  118,  120,  125 
Meacham  v.  Edmonson  (54  Miss.  746)        208 


v.  Graham  (98  Tenn.  190) 
Mead's  Estate  (118  Cal.  428) 
Mead  v.  Byington  (10  Vt.  116) 

v.  Kifdav  (2  Watts,  110) 

v.  Langdon  (22  Vt.  50) 

v.  Maben  (131  N.  Y.  255) 

v.  Mitchell  (17  N.  Y.  210) 

v.  Orrery  (3  Atk.  235) 

v.  Sherwood  (4  Redf.  352) 

v.  Willoughby  (4  Dem.  364) 

Meadows  v.  Meadows  (73  Ala.  356) 


950 

61 

387,  1153 

797 

1246 

951 

1244 

990 

1037 

1181 

1036, 

1037, 1061 

1096 

887 

89 

38 

780,  821 


Meakin  v.  Duvall  (43  Md.  372) 
Means  v.  Evans  (4  Des.  242) 

v.  Moore  (3  McCord,  282) 

Mears  v.  Mears  (15  Oh.  St.  90) 

Meason,  Ex  parte  (5  Binn.  167) 

Mebane  v.  Mebane  (4  Ired.  Eq.  131)  957 

Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Harrison  (68  Ga.  463)  353 

v.  Waite  (150  Mass.  234)  390 

Meck's  Appeal  (97  Pa.  St.  313)  58,  60 

Meckel's  Appeal  (112  Pa.  St.  554)  1130 

Medley  v.  Dunlap  (90  N.  C.  527)  184 

Medomak  Bank  v.  Curtis  (24  Me.  36)         827 
Medsker  v.  Bonebrake  (108  U.  S.  66) 


212, 


610 

1202 

171 

71 

956 

49 

1149, 

1189,  1191 

30 

41,  44,  1149 


Meech  v.  Meech  (37  Vt.  414) 

v.  Weston  (33  Vt.  561) 

Meehan  v.  Rourke  (2  Bradf.  385) 
Meek  v.  Briggs  (87  Iowa,  610) 

v.  Perry  (36  Miss.  190) 

Meeker's  Estate  (45  Mo.  App.  186) 

Meeker  v.  Meeker  (75  111.  260) 

v.  Meeker  (74  Iowa,  352) 

v.  Vanderveer  (15  N.  J.  L.  392)         687 

Meeks  v.  Hahn  (20  Cal.  620)  713 

v.  Olpherta  (100  U.  S.  564)  713 

Megarv  v.  Shipley  (72  Md.  33)  1197 

Megee'v.  Beirne  (39  Pa.  St.  50)  337 

Megrath  v.  Gilmore  (15  Wash,  558)  805 

Meier  v.  Thieman  (90  Mo.  433)  830,  834 

v.  Thieman  (15  Mo.  App.  307)  834 

Meinzer  v.  Berington  (42  Oh.  St  325)  680,  682 
Meisenhelter's  Will  (15  Phila.  651)  82 

Melcher  v.  Stevens  (1  Dem.  123)  332 

Melia  v.  Simmons  (45  Wis.  334)  448,  451 

Melizet's  Appeal  (17  Pa.  St.  449)        243,  269 
Mellen  v.  Boarman  (13  Sm.  &  M.  100)    1056, 

1077 
Mellon's  Appeal  (114  Pa.  St.  564) 
Mellon  v.  Mellon  (139  N.  Y.  210) 


691a 
353,  354, 
728 
727,  728 
1087 
735,  1024 
485 
1248 
1047,  1060, 
1256 
Melvin  v.  Bullard  (82  N.  C.  33)  1217 

v.  Martin  (18  R.  I.   650)  141 

v.  McVev  (48  Mo.  App.  421)  623 

Memphis  Co.  'v.  Rickey  (142  Ind.  304)        630 
cxv 


v.  Reed  (123  Pa.  St.  1) 

Melms  v.  Pabst  Co.  (93  Wis.  153) 

v.  Pfister  (59  Wis.  186) 

Melrish  v.  Milton  (L.  R.  3  Ch.  D.  27) 
Melone  v.  Davis  (67  Cal.  279) 
Melton  v.  Fitch  (125  Mo.  281) 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


808 
809 


Memphis  v.  Womack  (84  Ala.  149)  526 

Mendenhall  v.  Burnette  (58  Kans.  355)       864 

v.  Mendenhall  (8  Jones  L.  287)  271 

v.  Mower  (16  S.  C.  303)  916 

Mengel's  Appeal  (116  Pa.  St.  292)  1222 

Menifee  v.  Menifee  (8  Ark.  9)  714 

Mentney  v.  Pettv  (Free.  Ch.  593)  131 

Mercein  ».  Smith  (2  Hill,  N.  Y.  210)  827 

Mercer's  Succession  (28  La.  An.  564)  97 

Mercer  v.  Hogan  (4  Mackey,  520)     326,  1124 

v.  Mackin  (14  Bush,  434)  482 

v.  Neweom  (23  Ga.  151)  702,  703 

Merchant's  Case  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  506)  648,  1136 

Case  (41  M.  J.  Eq.  349)  648,  1136 

Will  (Tuck.  17)  543 

Merchant  v.  Driver  (1  Sandf.  303)  797 

v.  Merchant  (2  Bradf.  432)  120,  126 

Merchants'  Bank  v.  Birch  (17  Johns.  25)    686 

v.  McGee  (108  Ala.  364)  858 

v.  Rawls  (21  Ga.  334)  685 

v.  Ward  (45  Mo.  310) 

Merchants'   Ins.  Co.  v.  Linchey  (3  Mo. 

App.  587) 
Mercier  v.   West  Kansas  Land  Co.  (72 

Mo.  473)  905 

Meredith's  Estate  (1  Pars.  Sel.  C.  433)  722 
Meredith  v.  Scallion  (51  Ark.  361)  797,  863 
Meriwether  v.  Morrison  (78  Kv.  572)  122 

Merkel's  Appeal  (109  Pa.  St.  235)  880 

Estate  (131  Pa.  St   584)  636,  1105 

Estate  (154  Pa.  285)  1029 

Merkle  v.  Benington  (68  Mich.  133)  627 

Merklein  v.  Trapnell  (34  Pa.  St.  42)  1244 

Merriam's  Will  (136  N.  Y.  58)  469,  352 

Merriam,  Matter  of  (141  N.  Y.  479)  691  a 
Merrick's  Estate  (8  Watts  &  S.  402)  346,  655 
Merrick  v.  Kenrick  (46  Neh.  264)    1195,  1230 

v.  North  (28  La.  An.  878)  1078 

Merrvtield  r.  Longmire  (66  Cal.  180)       1138, 

1195 
Merrill  v.  Bickford  (65  Me.  118)  1097 

v.  Emery  (10  Pick.  507)  952 

v.  Harris  (26  N.  H.  142)  330,  1031,  1048, 

1089 

v.  Moore  (7  How.  Miss.  271)  1167 

v.  National  Bank  (19  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 

360) 

v.  N.  E.  Tns.  Co.  (103  Mass.  245) 

v.  Rolston  (5  Redf.  220) 

v.  Sherburne  (1  N.  H.  199) 

v.  Wisconsin  College  (74  Wis.  415) 

v.  Woodbury  (64  N.  H.  504) 

Merrils  v.  Adams"  (Kirby,  247) 
Merriman  v.  Lacefield  (4  Heisk.  209) 


859 

361 

34 

243 

953 

675 

1200 

205, 

1219 

1097 

920 

713 

1244 

611 

211 


Merritt  v.  Buchanon  (78  Me.  504) 

v.  Bucknam  (77  Me.  253) 

v.  Daffin  (24  Fla.  320) 

v.  Hughes  (36  W.  Va.  356) 

v.  Lyon  (3  barb.  110) 

v.  Merritt  (97  111.  243) 

v.  Merritt  (62  Mo.  150)      651,  708,  1040, 

1041 

v.  Merritt  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  11)       988,  1002 

v.  Merritt  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  1)  349,  988,  1002 

v.  Richardson  (14  Allen,  239)  995 

Merselia  p.  Merselia  (7  X.  J.  Eq.  557)  1123 
Mersman  v.  Mersman  (136  Mo.  244)  873,  878 
Meseberg's  Estate  (91  Wis.  899)  1201 

Meserve  v.  Meserve  (63  Me.  518)  27,  885 

v.  Meserve  (19  N.  II.  240)  258 

cxvi 


*  Page 
Mesick  v.  Mesick  (7  Barb.  120)  1150 

Messer  v.  Jones  (88  Me.  349)  156 

v.  Messer  (59  N.  H.  375)  289 

Messimer  v.  McCray  (113  Mo.  382)  830 

Metcalf  v.  Framingham  (128  Mass.  370)     966 

v.  Metcalf  (19  Ala.  319)  33G 

Metcalfe,  Goods  of  (1  Add.  343)  40b 

v.  Colles  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  148)     1167,  1214 

Methodist  Church  v.  Clark  (41  Mich.  730) 

920,  928,  932 

v.  Remington  (1  Watts,  218)  908 

Metteer  v.  Wilev  (34  Iowa,  214)  267 

Metts's  Appeaf(l  Whart.  7)  851 

Metzger  v.  Metzger  (1  Bradf.  265)  1189 

Meurer's  Will  (44  Wis.  392)  71 

Mever's  Estate  (177  Pa.  450)  1083 

Meyer  v.  Cahen  (111  N.  Y.  270)  1112 

v.  Fogg  (7  Fla.  292)  24,  76 

v.  Garthwaite  (92  Wis.  571)         356,  680 

v.  Gossett  (38  Ark.  377)  248,  249 

v.  Meyer  (7  Fla.  292)  24,  76,  468 

v.  Mever  (23  Iowa.  359)  183,  203 

v.  Mohr  (19  Abb.  Pr.  299)  247,  275 

v.  Quartermous  (28  Ark.  45)  803 

v.  Steuart  (48  Md.  423)  1192,  1196 

Meyers,  In  re  (113  N.  C.  549)  535 

Mevrick  v.  Anderson  (14  A.  &  E.  719)  421 
Michael  v.  Baker  (12  Md.  158)  352 

Michel's  Succession  (20  La.  An.  233)  696 

Michener  v.  Dale  (23  Pa.  St.  59)  117, 126, 127, 

129 
Michoud  v.  Girod  (4  How.  U.  S.  503)  700 
Mickel  r.  Brown  (4  Baxt.  468)  707 

v.  Hicks  (19  Kan.  578)  1030 

Micken  v  Maxent  (6  La.  An.  213)  1196 

Middlebrook  v.  Merchants'  Bank  (3  Abb. 

App.  Dec.  295)  367 

v.  Merchants'  Bank  (41  Barb.  481)     367 

r.  Merchants'  Bank  (27  How.  Pr. 

474)  367 

Middledich  v.  Williams  (45  N.  J  Eq.  726)  34,  35 
Middleton's  Appeal  (133  Pa.  St.  92)  1002 

Middleton,  Ex  parte  (42  S.  C.  178)  1218 

Goods  of  (L.  R.  14  Prob.  D.  23)  519 

u.  Middleton  (15  Beav.  450)  1106 

Milan  r.  Pemberton  (12  Mo  598)  326,  331 
Milbum  v.  Milburn  (60  Iowa,  411)  110,  157 
Mildred  v.  Morriss  (9  Heisk.  814)  1223 

Miles'  Appeal  (68  Conn.  237)  93 

Miles's  Will  (4  Dana,  1)  65 

Miles  v.  Bovden  (3  Pick.  213)  113,  1012 

v.  Fisher  (10  Ohio,  1)  233 

v.  Peabodv  (64  Ga.  729)  353 

v.  Strong  (60  Conn.  393)  354 

v.  Wheeler  (43  111.  123)  702,  1088 

i\  Wister  (5  Binn.  477)  1009 

Millard's  Estate  (27  N.  Y.  Supp.  286)  691  a 
Millard  v.  Harris  (119  111.  185)  340,  1155 

V.  Ramsdell  (Harr.  Ch.  373)  285 

Milledge  v.  Lamar  (4  Desaus.  617)  232 

Milieu  v.  Guerrard  (67  Ga.  284)  1004 

Millenovich's  Estate  (5  Nev.  161)  765 

Miller's  Appeal  (7  Atl.  190)  1163 

Appeal  (31  Pa.  St.  337)  1213,  1214,  1222 

Appeal  (40  Pa.  St.  57)  1219 

Appeal  52  Pa.  St.  113)  903 

Appeal  (60  Pa.  St.  404)  727 

Appeal  (107  Pa.  St.  221)  1219,  1223 

Estate  (48  Cal.  165)  1018 

Estate  (82  Pa.  St.  113)  859 

Estate  (136  Pa.  St.  239)  59 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 

Miller's  Estate  (145  Pa.  St.  5G1)  916 

Estate  (159  Pa.  562)  499,  500 

Estate  (166  Pa.  St.  97)  499 

Estate  (182  Pa.  St.  157)  691  a 

Estate  (3  Rawle,  312)  377,  1239 

Succession  (27  La.  An.  574)        397,  399 

Will  (73  Iowa,  118)  1214, 1217 

Miller,  In  re  (32  Neb.  480)  562 

In  re  (4  Kedf.  302)  1144,  1149 

In  re  (92  Iowa,  741)  505,511 

V.  Atkinson  (63  N.  C.  537)  929 

v.  Bingham  (1  Ired.  Eq.  423) 

v.  Brown  (2  Hagg.  209) 

v.  Buell  (92  Ind.  482) 

v.  Cannon  (84  Ala.  59) 

v.  Carlisle  (90  Ky.  205) 

v.  Carothers  (6  S.  &  R.  215) 

v.  Chittenden  (2  Iowa,  315) 

v.  Chittenden  (4  Iowa,  252) 

v.  Commonwealth  (2  Cent.  Rep.  830)  1 123 

v.  Commonwealth  (27  Grat.  110)     691  a 

v.  Commonwealth  (111  Pa.  St.  321)  691  a, 

728 

v.  Congdon  (14  Gray,  114) 

v.  Cooch  (5  Del.  Ch.  161) 

v.  Defoor  (50  Ga.  566) 

v.  Dorsev  (9  Md.  317) 

■v.  Eldrid'ge  (126  Ind.  461) 


608 
63 

272 
831 
897 
474 
932 
929 


391 

1097 

187,  1039 

348,  867 

59 


v.  Farmer's  Bank  (27  S.  E.  R.  (S.  C.) 

514)  236 

v.  Finnegan  (26  Fla.  29)  196 

v.  Gee  (4  Ala.  359)  560 

V.  Goodwin  (8  Grav,  542)  608 

v.  Greenham  (11  Oh.  St.  486)  1073 

v.  Harrison  (34  N.  J.  Eq.  374)  855 

V.  Helm  (2  Sm.  &  M.  687)  745,  860 

v.  Holt  (68  Mo.  584)  60 

v.  Hulme  (126  Pa.  St.  277)  1229 

v.  Hurt  (12  Ga.  357)  898 

v.  Irby  (63  Ala.  477)  787,  788,  789 

V.  Iron  Countv  (29  Mo.  122)  320,  326 

v.  Jeffress  (4  Grat.  472)  123,  124 

v.  Jones  (26  Ala.  247)  440 

v.  Jones  (39  111.  54)  281 

v.  Beeper  (120  Mo.  466)  214 

v.  Lux  (100  Cal.  609)  1139 

v.  McNeill  (35  Pa.  St.  217)  68,  70 

v.  Major  (67  Mo.  247)  1132 

v.  Marckle  (27  III.  402)  208 

v.  Meetch  (8  Pa.  St.  417)  511 

v.  Miller  (5  Heisk.  723)  469,  499 

v.  Miller  (82  111.  463)  191,  192, 1209 

v.  Miller  (91  N.  Y.  315)  157 

v.  Miller  (3  Serg.  &  R.  267)  47 

v.  Miller  (10  Tex.  319)  1023 

v.  Montgomery  (78  N.  Y.  282)  834 

v.  Northern  Bank  (34  Miss.  412)  287 

v.  Palmer  (55  Miss.  323)  1081 

v.  Pettit  (16  N.  J.  L.  421)  864 

v.  Philip  (5  Pai.  573)  994 

v.  Phillips  (9  R.  I.  141)  108,  481 

v.  Potterrield  (86  Va.  876)  729 

v.  Redwine  (75  Ga.  130)  732 

v.  Reitjne  (2  Hill,  S.  C.  592)  385 

17.  Schnebly  (103  Mo.  368)  206 

17.  Shoaf  (109  N.  C.  319)  1266,  1270 

17.  Simpson  (2  S.  W.  R.  171)    1148,  1234 

17.  Speer  (38  N.  J.  Eq.  567)  153 

17.  Springer  (70  Pa   St.  269)  892 

v.  Stark  (29  S.  C.  325)  1229 

v.  Steele  (64  Ind.  79)  1131 


Miller  17.  Stepper  (32  Mich.  194) 

17.  Stump  (3  Gill,  304) 

o.  Swan  (91  Kv.  36) 

v.  Talley  (48  Mo.  503) 

17.  Teachout  (24  Oh.  St.  525) 


Page 
245 

236 

439 

256 

913,  922 


v.  Towles  (4  J.  J.  Marsh.  255)  794,  1157 
—  t'.  Tracv  (86  Wis.  330)  757 

17.  Trustees  (5  Sm.  &  M.  651)  860 

17.  Umbehower  (10  S.  &  R.  31)  623 

v.  Williamson  (5  Md.  219)  611,  613,  1001 

17.  Wilson  (126  Mo.  48)  836 

17.  Wilson  (24  Pa.  St.  114)  625 

17.  Wohlford  (119  Ind.  30e)  598 

17.  Woodward  (8  Mo.  169)         1123,  1269 

Millett  17.  Ford  (109  Ind.  159)  901 

17.  Millett  (72  Me.  117)  803 

Milligan's  Appeal  (82  Pa.  St.  389)  1245 

Millikin  t7.  Martin  (66  111.  13)  94 

v.  Welliver  (37  Oh.  St.  460)  269 

Million  v.  Ohnsorg  (10  Mo.  App.  432)        809 
Mill's  Estate  (22  Oreg.  210)  525,  580 

Mills,  In  re  (34  Minn.  296)  841 

i>.  Banks  (3  P.  Wms.  1)  732 

17.  Britton  (64  Conn.  4)  1003 

v.  Carter  (3  Blackf.  203)  571 

17.  Franklin  (128  Ind.  444)  883 

17.  Herndon  (77  Tex.  89)  568 

v.  Humes  (22  Md.  346)  468 

17.  Joiner  (20  Fla.  479)  824 

».  Jones  (2  Rich.  393)  777 

17.  Smith  (141  N.  Y.  256)  1153 

v.  Van  Voorhies  (20  N.  Y.  412)  237 

17.  Wildman  (18  Conn.  124)  856 

Millsap  17.  Stanley  (50  Ala.  319)  1123 

Millward's  Estate  (27  N.  Y.  Supp.  286)  691a 
Milne's  Appeal  (99  Pa.  St.  483)  332 

Succession  (1  Rob.  La.  400)  1173 

Milne  v.  Milne  (17  La.  46)  924 

Milnes,  Goods  of  (3  Add.  55)  406 

v.  Slater  (8  Ves.  295)  1106 

Miltenberger  v.  Knox  (21  La.  An.  399)      440 

17.  Miltenberger  (78  Mo.  27)  477 

17.  Miltenberger  (8  Mo.  App.  306)       477 

Milton  v.  Hunter  (13  Bush,  163)  36,  476 

r.  Milton  (14  Fla.  369)  259 

Milwaukee  Home  v.  Becher  (87  Wis.  409)   911 
Miner,  Matter  of  (146  N.  Y.  121)  1018 

17.  Atherton  (35  Pa.  St.  528)  980 

17.  Aylesworth  (18  Fed.  R.  199)  845 

Minear  v.  Hogg  (94  Iowa  641)  1244,  1246 

Ming,  In  re  (15  Mont.  79)  400,  1188 

Minkler  v.  Minkler  (14  Vt.  125)  91,  480 

v.  Simonds  (172  111.  323)  354,  883 

Minor  v.  Cardwell  (37  Mo.  350)  358 

17.  Dabnev  (3  Rand.  191)  969 

17.  Guthrie  (4  S.  W.  R.  179)  91 

17.  Mead  (3  Conn.  289)  576,  631,  666 

827 

122 

931 

893 

749 

1003 

691a 

940 

1105 

874 

1141 

817 

344, 

1023,  104(» 

cxvii 


v.  Minor  (8  Grat.  1) 

17.  Rogers  (40  Conn.  412) 

Minot  v.  Baker  (147  Mass.  348) 

17.  Boston  Asylum  (7  Met.  416) 

17.  Norcross  (143  Mass.  326) 

17.  Paine  (99  Mass.  101) 

17.  Winthrop  (162  Mass.  113) 

Minter's  Appeal  (40  Pa.  St.  Ill) 
Minter  17.  Burnett  (90  Tex.  245) 
Mintz  17.  Md.  Bible  Soc.  (86  Md.  102) 
Misamore,  In  re  (90  Cal.  169) 
Miskimen  17.  Culbertson  (162  111.  236) 
Miskimins's  Appeal  (114  Pa.  St.  530) 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


597 

986 

1059 

1091 

GO 

250,  274 

626 


*  Page 
Missionary  Soc.  v.  Eells  (G8  Vt.  497)  470 

v.  Ely  (56  Oh.  St.  405)  469 

v.  Mead  (131  111.  338)  890,  893 

Missouri  Historical  Societv  v.  Academy 

(94  Mo.  459)  929,  931 

Missouri  P.  K.  Co.  v.  Bradley  (51  Neb. 

59G)  330,  385,  440,  5G8 

Missouri  Pac.  R.  v.  Lewis  (24  Neb.  846)     629 
Mitcham  v.  Moore  (73  Ala.  542)  177,  190 

Mitchel  v.  Lunt  (4  Mass.  654)      414,  416,  522 
Mitchell's  Appeal  (60  Pa.  St.  502)  1196 

Estate  (182  Pa.  St.  530)  1096 

Mitchell  v.  Ad  ims  (1  Ired.  29S)  511,  582 

v.  Billingsley  (17  Ala.  391) 

v.  Blain  (5  Pai.  588) 

V.  Bliss  (47  Mo.  353) 

v.  Campbell  (19  Oreg.  198) 

v.  Donohue  (100  Cal.  202) 

v.  Farish  (69  Md.  235) 

v.  Hotchkiss  (43  Conn.  9) 

v.  Kimbrough  (98  Tenn.  535)  72 

v.  Kirk  (3  Sneed,  319)  414,  417,  427 

v.  Martin  (63  Mo.  App.  560)  827 

r.  McMullen  (59  Mo.  252)         1078,  1086 

v.  Miller  (6  Dana,  79)  258 

v.  Mitchell  (8  Ala.  414)  1219, 1223,  1231 

v.  Mitchell  (143  1ml.  113)  876 

v.  Mitchell  (18  Md.  405)  958 

17.  Mitchell  (21  Md.  244)  1094 

v.  Mitchell  (43  Minn.  73)  40 

v.  Mitchell  (54  Minn.  301)  672 

v.  Morse  (77  Me.  423)  948 

v.  Overman  (13  Otto,  62)  333,  334 

v.  Pease  (7  Cush.  350)  127,  854 

v.  Pvron  (17  Ga.  416)  1194,  1195 

v.  Rice  (6  J.  J.  Marsh.  623)         410,  653 

V.  Savings  Institution  (5G  Miss.  444)  836 

v.  Schoonover  (16  Oreg.  211)  075 

v.  Spcnce  (62  Ala.  450)  721 

v.  Thomson  (7  Mackev,  130)  721 

v.  Trotter  (7  Grat.  136)  673 

i:  Vickers  (20  Tex.  377)  83 

v.  Word  (GO  Ga.  525)  254,  2G5 

v.  Word  (64  Ga.  208)  185,  375,  380 

Mitchelson  v.  Piper  (8  Sim.  64)  788 

Mitchener  v.  Atkinson  (63  N.  C.  585)        1102 

v.  Robins  (73  Miss.  383) 

Mitcheson's  Estate  (19  Phila.  32) 
Mitford  v.  Reynolds  (1  Phillips,  185) 
Mix's  Appeal  (35  Conn.  121) 
Moale  v.  Cutting  (21  Mo.  347) 
Mobley  v.  Cureton  (2  S.  C.  140) 

v.  Moblev  (9  Ga.  247) 

v.  Nare  (67  Mo.  54G) 

Mochring,  In  re  (154  N.  Y.  423) 
Mock  v.  Pleasants  (34  Ark.  G3) 


780 
946 
92S 
1125 
1222 
1270 
331,  1259 
1080 
742,  1182 
1087,  1131, 
1132,  1152 
Modawell  v.  Holmes  (40  Ala.  391)  1256 

v.  Hudson  (80  Ala.  265)  550 

Moe  v.  Smiley  (125  Pa.  St.  136)  628 

Moffat  v.  Loughridge  (51  Miss.  211)  1167 

Moffett  v.  Elmendorf  (152  N.  Y.  475)         938 

v.  Moffett  (G7  Tex.  642)  81 

Moffitt  v.  Moffitt  (69  111.  641)  1037, 1048 

Mogan'B  Kstate  (Mvr.  80)  1144 

Mohr  v.  Tulip  (40  Wis.  66)  328 

Moise  r.  I. if-  Ass'n  (45  La.  An.  736)  441 

Mole  »■.  Mole  (l  Dick.  310)  1009 

Molineaus  »•.  Reynolds  (55  N.  J.  Eq.  187)  946 
Mollan  v.  Griffith  (3  Paige,  402)  1105 

Mollison  v.  Mills  (25  N.  W.  631)  841 

cxviii 


*Page 
1021 

981 

1079 

40,43 

737 
1037 

924 

210 
1037 


Monahon  v.  Vandyke  (27  111.  154) 
Monck  v.  Monck  (1  Ball  &  Beat.  298) 
Moncrief  v.  Moncrief  (73  Lid.  587) 
Mondorf,  In  re  (110  N.  Y.  450) 
Monell  v.  Monell  (5  John.  Ch.  283) 
Money  v.  Turnipseed  (50  Ala.  499) 
Mong"v.  Kousch  (29  Yv.  Va.  119) 
Moninger  v.  Ramsey  (48  Iowa,  368) 
Monk  v.  Home  (38  Miss.  100) 
Monongahela  Bank  v.  Jacobus  (109  U.  S. 

275)  834 

Monroe,  Matter  of  (142  N.  Y.  484)    316.  1085 

c.  James  (4  Munf.  194)  385,  410 

r.  Napier  (52  Ga.  385)  836 

v.  Van  Meter  (100  III.  347)  276,  277 

v.  Wilson  (6  T.  B.  Mon.  122)  1069 

Montague  v.  Allen  (78  Va.  592)  44 

v.  Self  (100  111.  49)  215 

Montalvan  v.  Clover  (32  Barb.  190)  37  I 

Montefiore  v.  Guedalla  (1  DeG.  F.  &  J.  93)  978 
Monteith  v.   Baltimore  Assoc.   (21  Md. 

426)  1137 

Montgomery's  Appeal  (92  Pa.  St.  202)      122J 
Montgomery  v.  Armstrong  (5  J.  J .  Marsh. 

175)  045 

v.  Cloud  (27  S.  C.  188)  1186. 1247 

o.  Dorion  (7  N.  II.  475)  22,  306 

v.  Foster  (91  Ala.  613)  499 

v.  Gordon  (51  Ala.  337)  1245 

v.  Johnson  (31  Ark.  74)    329,  1047,  1089 

v.  Perkins  (2  Met.  Kv.  448)  71 

v.  Robertson  (57  Ga.*258)  1234 

v.  Williamson  (37  Md.  421)  332 

Montignan  v.  Blade  (145  N.  Y.  Ill)  902 

Montmollin  v.  Gaunt  (5  Dana,  405)  698 

Moody  v.  Butler  (63  Tex.  210)  1060 

v.  Fry  (3  Humph.  507)  632 

r.  Grant  (41  Miss.  565)  336 

v.  Hemphill  (71  Ala.  169)         1138,  1139 

v.  Hemphill  (75  Ala.  268)  639 

v,  Hutchinson  (44  Me.  57)  1208 

v.  Moody  (29  Ga.  519)        525,  528,  12U8 

v.  Moody  (11  Me.  247)  1046 

v.  Peyton  (135  Mo.  482)  1029 

■  v.  Vandyke  (4  Binn.  31)  393 

Mooers  v.  White  (G  John.  Ch.  360)      22,  305, 

1025,  1033 
Moon  r.  Evans  (C9  Wis.  667)  111 

v.  Stone  (19  Grat.  130)  897 

Moonev  r.  Hinds  (160  Mass.  469)  361 

Moor  v.  Raisbeck  (12  Sim.  123)  103 

Moore's  Appeal  (84  Mich.  474)  1093 

Estate  (57  Cal.  437)  195 

Estate  (57  Cal.  44G)  1G2 

Estate  (68  Cal.  394)  1192 

Estate  (Tuck.  41)  677 

Moore,  Ex  parte  (7  How.  Miss.  665)  271 

In  re  (72  Cal.  335)  1146, 1148,  1152,  1189 

In  re  (86  Cal.  72)  588,  1204 

In  re  (88  Cal.  1)  1163 

In  re  (96  Cal.  522)  340,  052,  1153 

Moore's  Succession  (40  La.  An.  531)        1226 
Moore  v.  Amer.  Co.  (115  N.  Y.  65)  693 

v.  Alden  (80  Me.  301)  985 

v.  Beauchamp  (4  B.  Mon.  71)  1137 

v.  Beckwith  (14  Oh.  St.  129)      988,  989, 

1104 

v.  Brown  (14  Mo.  165)  815 

v.  Campbell  (102  Ala.  445)  837,  895 

v.  Campbell  (113  Ala.  587)  895 

v.  Cottingham  (113  Ala.  148)  1089 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Page 

99 

939 

859 

835 

1025,  1027 

711 

705 

3G8 

214 

793 

1241 

1239 

254 

879 

660,  603 

359,  362,  308, 

375,  441,  442 

243,  201 

792 

1229 

949 

48 

342 

1042 

871 

31 

968 

921,  931 

333,  571 

825 

1155 

1074 

41 

561 

984 

99 

1246 

329,  1059 

239 

239,  242 

609,  610 

202 

248 

1149,  1173 

229 

567 

815 

955 

833 

1272 

602 

465 

450 

844 

68.  1202 

558  559 

'.  Steele \l0  Humph.'s62) 24,  77,  472, 473 

v.  Stephens  (97  Ind.  271)  61 

v.  Thornton  (7  Grat.  99)  641,  642 

v.  Waller  (2  Rand.  418)  258 

v.  Ware  (51  Miss.  206)  1038 

v.  Weaver  (16  Gray,  305)  896 

v.  Weaver  (53  Iowa,  11)  140 

v.  Willett  (2  Hilt.  522)  739 

v.  Wingate  (53  Mo.  398)  1054 

Moores's  Appeals  (34  Pa.  St.  411)  287 

Moores  v.  Moores  (41  N.  J.  L.  440)  720 

Moorman  v.  Crockett  (90  Va.  185)  1164 

v.  Smoot  (28  Grat.  80)  1002 

Mootrie  v.  Hunt  (4  Bradf.  173)  402 

Moran  v.  Dillehay  (8  Bush,  434)  874 


Moore  v.  De  La  Torre  (1  Phillim.  375) 

v.  Dimond  (5  R.  I.  121) 

v.  Dunn  (92  N.  C.  63) 

v.  Dutson  (79  Ga.  456) 

v.  Ellsworth  (51  111.  308) 

v.  Eure  (101  N.  C.  11) 

v.  Felkel  (7  Fla.  44) 

v.  Fields  (42  Pa.  St.  467) 

v.  Flynn  (135  111.  74) 

v.  Foster  (1  Bai.  370) 

v.  Gleaton  (23  Ga.  142) 

v.  Gordon  (24  Iowa,  158) 

v.  Harris  (91  Mo.  616) 

v.  Hegeman  (72  N.  Y.  376) 

v.  Holmes  (32  Conn.  553) 

v.  Jordan  (36  Kan.  271) 

v.  Kent  (37  Iowa,  20) 

V.  Kerr  (10  Serg.  &  R.  348) 

v.  Lesueur  (33  Ala.  237) 

v.  Lyons  (25  Wend.  119) 

v.  McDonald  (08  Md.  321) 

v.  Maguire  (26  Ala.  461) 

v.  Moore  (14  Barb.  27) 

v.  Moore  (12  B.  Mon.  G51) 

v.  Moore  (2  Bradf.  201) 

v.  Moore  (1  Bro.  C.  C.  127) 

V.  Moore  (4  Dana,  354) 

v.  Moore  (1  Dev.  L.  352) 

v.  Moore  (21  How.  Pr.  211) 

v.  Moore  (88  Ky.  683) 

v.  Moore  (22  La.  An.  226) 

v.  Moore  (67  Mo.  192) 

v.  Moore  (33  Nebr.  509) 

v.  Moore  (50  N.  J.  Fq.  554) 

v.  Moore  (1  Phillim.  406) 

v.  Moore  (89  Tex.  29) 

v.  Neil  (39  111.256) 

v.  New  York  (8  N.  Y.  110) 

v.  New  York  (4  Sandf.  456) 

v.  Page  (111  U.  S.  117) 

v.  Parker  (13  S.  C.  486) 

v.  Rake  (26  N.  J.  L.  574) 

v.  Randolph  (70  Ala.  575) 

v.  Rawlins  (45  Me.  493) 

v.  Ridgewav  (1  B.  Mon.  234) 

v.  Rogers  (19  111.  347) 

v.  Sanders  (15  S.  C.  440) 

v.  Schofield  (96  Cal.  480) 

v.  Shields  (68  N.  C.  327) 

v.  Smith  (24  111.  512) 

v.  Smith  (5  Me.  490) 

v.  Smith  (11  Rich.  569) 

v.  Smith  (29  S.  C.  254) 

v.  Spier  (80  Ala.  129) 

v.  State  (49  Intl.  558) 


*  Page 
Moran  v.  Gardemever  (82  Cal.  96)  861 

v.  Stewart  (122  Mo.  295)  140 

v.  Stewart  (132  Mo.  73)  140 

Mordecai  v.  Bovlan  (6  Jones  Eq.  365)  375,  898 
Morehouse  v.  Cotheal  (21  N.  J.  L.  480)      949 

v.  Ware  (78  Mo.  100)  748,  749 

Moreland  v.  Brady  (8  Or.  303)  894 

v.  Gilliam  (21  Ark.  507)  1208 

Moren  v.  McCown  (23  Ark.  93)  357 

Morey  v.  Sohier  (63  N.  II.  507)  104,  109 

Morford  v.  Dieffenbacker  (54  Mich.  593)    328 
Morgan's  Appeal  (4  Atl.  506)  1089 

Estate  (53  Cal.  243)  399 

Succession  (23  La.  290)  150,  1216 

Morgan,  Matter  of  (104  N.  Y.  74)    1217,  1239 

Matter  of  (150  N.  Y.  35)  691  a 

v.  Darden  (3  Dem.  203)  956 

v.  Davenport  (60  Tex.  230)  111 

v.  Dodge  (44  N.  H.  255)    313,  342,  435, 

448,  550,  560,  572,  892 

v.  Fisher  (82  Va.  417)  1083 

v.  Gaines  (3  A.  K.  Marsh.  613)  373 

v.  Hamlet  (113  U.  S.  449)  846 

v.  Locke  (28  La.  An.  806)  568 

v.  Long  (29  Iowa,  434)  866 

v.  Moore  (3  Grav,  319)  816 

v.  Morgan  (5  Day,  517)  915 

v.  Morgan  (83  111.  196)  762,  1202 

v.  Morgan  (36  Miss.  348  188 

v.  Perrv  (5  Iowa,  196)  885 

v.  Rotch  (97  Mass.  396)  1122 

v.  Smith  (25  S.  C.  337)  236,  260 

v  Stevens  (78  111.  287)  82,  83 

v.  Wattles  (09  Ind.  260)  1086,  1087 

Moriarta  v.  McRea  (45  Hun,  564)  233 

Moritz  v.  Hoffman  (35  111.  553)  609 

Morningstar  v.  Selbv  (15  Oh.  345)  470 

Morrell  v.  Dickey  (1  John.  Ch.  153)     61,  355, 

1012 

v.  Morrell  (1  Hagg.  51)  85 

Morrice  v.  Bank  of  England  (Talb.  Cas. 

218)  785 

Morrill  v.  Carr  (2  La.  An.  807)  693 

Morrill  v.  Foster  (33  N.  H.  379)  669 

—  v.  Morrill  (1  Allen,  132)  362,  650 

v.  Morrill  (13  Me.  415)  416,  419 

v.  Phillips  (142  Mass.  240)  899 

Morris's  Appeal  (88  Pa.  St.  368)  603 

Morris  v.  Bolles  (65  Conn.  45)  937 

v.   Chic,  R.  I 

727) 


&  P.  R.  (65  Iowa, 
440,  545,  552,  567,  630 
v.  Hoyle  (37  111.  150)  1032 

v.  Kent  (2  Edw.  Ch.  175)  906 

v.  Morris  (9  Heisk.  814)  177,  551 

v.  Morris  (3  Houst.  568)  823,  976 

u.  Morris  (12  111.  App.  68)  1206 

v.  Morris  (1  Jones  Eq.  326)      1168,  1170 

17.  Morris  (27  Miss.  847)  495 

v.  Mowatt  (2  Paige,  586)  1109 

v.  Murphy  (95  Ga.  307)  430,  679 

v.  Norton"  (21  C.  C.  A.  553)  831 

r.  Porter  (87  Me.  510)  1155 

v.  Potter  (10  R.  I.  58)  154,  949 

v.  Sickly  (133  N.  Y.  456)  893,  1097 

v.  Stokes  (21  Ga.  552)  31,  49,  484 

v.  Swaney  (7  Heisk.  591)  480 

v.  Underdown  (Willes,  293)  943 

v.Virden  (57  Ark.  232)  1230 

Morrisett  v.  Ferebee  (120  N.  C.  6)  209 

Morrison  t7.  Cones  (7  Blackf.  593)  588 

v.  Dapman  (3  Cal.  255)  336 

cxix 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 
*  Page 


547 
269 
243 
39 
9G6 
462 
54 

1147,  1149 
846,  847 


414,  421 
689 

552,  508 

155 

1192,  1199 

839,  842 
744 
397 


554 

354 

1234 

888,  896 
109 


33 
893 

236 


Morrison  V.  Lavell  (81  Va.  519) 

v.  Morrison  (2  Dana,  13) 

v.  Rice  (35  Minn.  436) 

v.  Smith  (3  Bradf.  209) 

Morriss  v.  Garland  (78  Va.  215) 

Morrissev  v.  Mulhern  (168  Mass.  412) 

Morrow's  Appeal  (116  Pa.  St.  440) 

Morrow  v.  Allison  (39  Ala.  70) 

v.  Barker  (119  Cal.  65) 

o.  Bright  (20  Mo.  298) 

».  Cloud  (77  Ga.  114) 

v.  Morrow  (2  Tenn.  Ch.  549) 

v.  Pevton  (8  Leigh,  54) 

r.  Scott  (7  Ga.  535) 

v.  Walker  (10  Ark.  569) 

Morse  v.  Clark  (10  Col.  216) 

v.  Clavton  (13  Sm.  &  M.  373) 

v.  Griffith  (25  La.  An.  213) 

v.  Hackensack  Bank  (47  N.  J.  Eq. 

279)  727 

o.  Havden  (82  Me.  227)        939,  952,  985 

v.  Hodsdon  (5  Mass.  314) 

o.  Lvman  (64  Vt.  167) 

v.  Macrum  (22  Oreg.  229) 

v.  Mason  (11  Allen,  36) 

v.  Morse  (42  Ind.  365) 

v.  Scott  (4  Dem.  507) 

v.  Stearns  (131  Mass.  389) 

v.  Thorsell  (78  111.  600) 

Mortgage  etc.  Co.  v.  Jackman  (77  Tex. 
622)  810 

Mortimer  v.  Moffatt  (4  H.  &  M.  503)        1000 

v.  Paull  (L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  85)  402 

Morton,  Goods  of  (L.  R.  12  Prob.  D.  141)    94 

v.  Barrett  (22  Me.  257)  902 

v.  Hatch  (54  Mo.  408)  367,  368 

Morton  v.  Heidorn  (135  Mo.  608)  475 

v.  Ingram  (11  Ired.  L.  368)        72,  75,  76 

v.  Murrell  (68  Ga.  142)  967 

v.  Onion  (45  Vt.  145)  104 

v.  Preston  <18  Mich.  60)  427 

v.  Woodbury  (153  N.  Y.  243)    884,  1018 

Moselin  v.  Martin  (37  Ala.  216)  395 

Moselv's  Estate  (12  Phila.  50)  590 

Mosel'v  r.  Floyd  (31  Ga.  564)  736 

v.  Tavlor  (4  Dana,  542)  795 

Moses  i'.  Allen  (81  Me.  268)  939,  940 

v.  Moses  (50  Ga.  9)  661,  1147 

v.  Murgatroyd  (1  John.  Ch.  119)       596, 

645 

v.  Ranlet  (2  N.  H.  488)  859 

Mosher  v.  Mosher  (15  Me.  371)  230 

v.  Mosher  (32  Me.  412)  233,  234 

v.  Yost  (33  Barb.  277)  574 

Mosier  V.  Zimmerman  (5  Humph.  62)         792 
Moslevv.  Mnfg.  Co.  (4  Okla.  492)      675,  815 
Moss's  Appeal  (83  Pa.  St.  264) 
Moss  v.  Helslev  (60  Tex.  426) 

r.  Lane  (50  N.  J.  Eq.  295) 

v.  Moorman  (24  Grat.  97) 

v.  Rowland  (3  Bush,  505) 

V.  Sandefur  (15  Ark.  381) 

Mosser  v.  Mosser  (32  Ala.  551) 
Motier's  Estate  (7  Mo.  A  pp.  514) 


*Page 
Moulton's  Estate  (9  Utah  159)  356 

Petition  (50  N.  H.  532)  1200 

Moulton,  In  re  (48  Cal.  191)  1113 

v.  Holmes  (57  Cal.  337)  684 

v.  Moulton  (76  Me.  85)  227 

r.  Smith  (16  R.  I.  126)  761,  762 

Moultrie  v.  Hunt  (23  N.  Y.  394)  492,  495 

Mount  v.  Brown  (33  Miss.  566)  1064 

v.  Mitchell  (31  N.  Y.  356)  863 

v.  Mitchell  (32  N.  Y.  702)  332 

i'.  Slack  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  230)     1170,  1171, 

1200 

v.  Valle  (19  Mo.  621)  1036 

v.  Van  Ness  (34  N.  J.  Eq.  523)  1200 

Mountain  v.  Bennet  (1  Cox  Ch.  C.  353)        44 
Mountford  v.  Gibson  (4  East,  441)     415,  417, 

424,  427 
Mourain  v.  Poydras  (6  La.  An.  151)  375 

Mousseau  ».  Mousseau  (40  Minn.  236)        344 
Mouton's  Succession  (3  La.  An.  561)  414 

Mower's  Appeal  (48  Mich.  441)        1165,  1194 
Mowrey  v.  Adams  (14  Mass.  327)  366 

Mowry  v.  Bradley  (11  R.  I.  370) 

v.  Harris  (18  R.  I.  519) 

v.  Latham  (17  R.  I.  480) 

v.  Peck  (2  R.  I.  00) 

v.  Robinson  (12  R.  I.  152) 


v.  Smith  (12  R.  I.  255) 

Mowser  v.  Mowser  87  Mo.  437) 


234 

1205 

526 

805 

1028,  1045, 

1194 

1225 

175,  184,  264 


Mott  v.  Ackennan  (92  N.  Y.  539) 

v.  Fowler  (85  Md.  676) 

v.  Newark  (66  N.  J.  Eq.  722) 

Monillerat'e  Estate  (14  Mont.  245) 


1004 

944,  945 

502 

1157 

369 

681 

28 

186,  1151, 

1152 

718,  720. 

724 

1172 

1029 

sir,, 

845 


814 


Move  r.  Albritton  (7  Ired.  Eq.  62)  1155 

MoVer's  Appeal  (112  Pa.  St.  290)  824 

Moyer  v.  Swygart  (125  HI.  262)  1149 

Muckleston  v.  Brown  (6  Ves.  52)  910 

Mueller's  Estate  (159  Pa.  590)  825 

Muersing,  In  re  (103  Cal.  585)  400,  533 

Muni's  Succession  (35  La.  An.  394)  94 

Muir  v.  Thomson  (28  S.  C.  499)  306 

v.  Trustees  (3  Barb.  Ch.  477)  421 

Muirhead  v.  Muirhead  (6  Sm.  &  M.  451)   527 
530,  533,  574 

r.  Muirhead  (3  Sm.  &  M.  211)  588,  1203 

Muldoon  v.  Crawford  (14  Bush,  125)  774 

v.  Moore  (55  N.  J.  L.  410)        1261,  1268 

v.  Muldoon  (133  Mass.  Ill)  354 

Mulford  v.  Mulford  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  163)       645, 

666 

v.  Mulford  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  68)      503,  1003 

Mullanphy  v.  County  Court  (6  Mo.  563)  331, 
530,  571,  1205 
Mullarky  v.  Sullivan  (136  N.  Y.  227)  951 
Mulledv's  Succession  (47  La.  An.  1580)  646 
Muller,"  Matter  of  (29  Hun,  418)  1013 

v.  Leeds  (52  N.  J.  L   366)  815 

Muller  v.  St.  Louis  Hospital  (73  Mo.  242)   32, 

37 

v.  St.  Louis  Hospital  (5  Mo.  App. 

390)  32,  37 

Mulligan's  Estate  (157  Pa.  St.  98)  1160,  1176 
Mulligan  v.  Leonard  (46  Iowa,  692)       80,  82, 

489 
Mullin,  In  re  (HOCal.  252)  76 

Mullon,  Matter  of  (145  N.  Y.  98)  640,  669,  688 
Molloy  v.  Kvle  (26  Neb.  313)  593 

Mulvane  v.  Rude  (146  Ind.  476)  948,  950 

Mulvev  r.  Johnson  (90  111.  457)  861 

Mulvil'le  v.  Ins.  Co. (19  Mont.  95)  684 

Mumford  V.  Hall  (25  Minn.  347)  556 

Mumm  v.  Owens  (2  Dill.  475)  836 

Mumper's  Appeal  (3  Watts  &  S.  441)      1149 
Munchus  v.  Harris  (09  Ala.  506)  201 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*Page 
Munday  v.  Leeper  (120  Mo.  417)         816,  841 

Mundell  v.  Green  (108  Mass.  277)  355 

Munden  v.  Bailev  (70  Ala.  63)  77,  1146,  1147, 
1152,  1154,  1158 

Mundv's  Appeal  (123  Pa.  St.  464)  38 

Mundy  i>.  Mundy  (15  N.  J.  Eq.  200)  89 

Munford  v.  Overseer  (2  Hand.  313)  548 

Munger  V.  Perkins  (62  Wis.  499)  246 
Municipal  Court  v.  Henrv  (UK.  I.  563)  1249 

v.  McElroy  (18  K.  i".  749)  853 

MunnikhausenY  Magraw  (57  Md.  172)  401 

Munnikhuysen  v.  Magraw  (35  Md.  280)  52 

Munro  v.  Dredging  Co.  (84  Cal.  513)  628 

v.  Jeter  (24  S.  C.  29)  201 

Munroe  v.  Barclay  (17  Oh.  St.  302)  46 

17.  Holmes  (9  Allen,  244)  1182 

r.  James  (4  Munf.  194)  567 

v.  People  (102  111.  406)  395 

Munsev  v.  AVebster  (24  X.  H.  126)  530 

Munteith  v.  Rahn  (14  Wis.  210)  693 

Murchison  r.  Whitted  (87  N.  C.  ^65)  1029 

Murdock  v.  Hunt  (68  Ga.  164)  529 

v.  Ratcliff  (7  Oh.  119)  593 

Murff  v.  Frazier  (41  Miss.  408)         1230,  1232 

Murfield's  Estate  (74  Iowa,  479)  86 
Murgitroyde  v.  Cleary  (16  Lea,  539) 


Murphree  v.  Singleton  (37  Ala.  412) 

Murphy's  Appeal  (8  W.  &  S.  165) 

. Estate  (Mvr.  185) 

Estate  (104  Cal.  554) 

Estate  (184  Pa.  St.  310) 

Murphv,  Matter  of  (144  N.  Y.  557) 

t>."  Black  (41  Iowa,  488) 

v.  Carlin  (113  Mo.  112) 

v.  Carter  (23  Grat.  477) 

v.  Clavton  (113  Cal.  153) 

v.  Clayton  (114  Cal.  526) 

v.  Creighton  (15  Iowa,  179) 

v.  De  France  (105  Mo.  53) 

v.  Hanrahan  (50  Wis.  485) 

v.  Marcellus  (1  Dem.  288) 

v.  McKean  (53  N.  J.  Eq.  406) 

v.  Menard  (11  Tex.  673) 

v.  Menard  (14  Tex.  62) 

v.  Murphv  (SO  Iowa,  740) 

v.  Murphv  (24  Mo.  526) 


1228 

1246 

389, 

991,  992 

796 

400 

502 

922,  933 

111,  503 

470 

876 

1045 

646 

631 

441 

1062 

432 

1006 

939 

749 

395,  749 

434 

76,  536 


1061 


v.  Murphv  (2  Mo.  App.  156)    1126,  1193 

v.  New  York  R.  R.  Co.  (29  Conn. 

496)  629 

v.  Rav  (73  N.  C.  588)  835 

v.  Rulh  (24  La.  An.  74)  187 

v.  Teter  (56  Ind.  545)  1085,  l687 

v.  Vaugban  (55  Ga.  361)  175 

v.  Walker  (131  Mass.  341)  1207 

Murrav  v.  Angell  (16  R.  I.  692)  580 

v.  Barlee"(3  M.  &  K.  209)  25 

».  Luna  (86  Tenn.  326)  654 

v.  Mumford  (6  Cow.  441)  283 

v.  Norwood  (77  Wis.  405)  369 

v.  Oliver  (3  B.  Mon.  1)  574 

P.  Oliver  (6  Ired.  Eq.  55)  86,  113 

o.  Ridlev  (3  H.  &  McH.  171)  773 

v.  Strong  (28  111.  App.  608)         647,  906 

Murry  v.  Hennessey  (48  Nebr.  608)  37,  65 
Musgrave  v.  Down  (2  Hagg.  247)  61 

Musick  v.  Beebe  (17  Kan.  47)  1122 

Muskingum  v.  Carpenter  (7  Oh.  21)  1073 

Mussault's  Executor  (T.  U.   P.  Charlt. 

259)  512,  582,  1254 


Pare 
363 

1223 
113 

1150 


Musselman's  Appeal  (101  Pa.  St.  165) 

Estate  (5  Watts,  9) 

Musser  v.  Currv  (3  Wash.  C.  C.  481) 

v.  Good  (11  S.  &  R.  247) 

v.  Oliver  (21  Pa.  St.  362)         1228,  1229 

Mussleman's  Appeal  (65  Pa.  St.  480)         350 

Mutual  Benefit  Co.  v.  Howell  (32  N.  J. 
Eq.  146)  861 

Mutual   Benefit  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tisdale 
(91  U.  S.  238)  449 

Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hopper  (43  N.  J. 
Eq.  387)  1268,  1271 

Mutual   Life  Ins.  v.  Shipman  (50  Hun. 
578)  254 

I v.  Watson  (30  Fed.  R.  653)  834 

Mutual  Sav.  Inst.  v.  Euslin  (37  Mo.  453)  231 

Myatt  v.  Mvatt  (44  111.  473)  582 

Mver  v.  Cole  (12  John.  349)  795 

Myers,  Matter  of  (131  N.  Y.  409)  1138 

' v.  Boyd  (144  Ind.  496)  1079 

v.  Cann  (95  Ga.  383)  522,  523,  535 

v.  Daviess  (10  B.  Mon. 

v.  Davis  (47  Iowa.  325) 

v.  Eddv  (47  Barb.'  263) 

v.  Hauger  (98  Mo.  433) 

v.  Horwitz  (74  Md.  355) 

v.  Myers  (89  Kv.  442) 

r.  Myers  (98  Mo.  262) 


v.  Pierce  (86  Ga.  789) 

v.  Vanderbelt  (84  Pa.  St.  510) 

Myrick's  Estate  (33  La.  An.  611) 


394)  503 

329 

1099 

47,  48 

1246 

195,  214 

677,  1126,  1139, 

1158 

.1045 

62 

1144 


Nabers  v.  Meredith  (67  Ala.  333) 
Naftel  v.  Osborn  (96  Ala.  623) 
Nagle's  Appeal  (13  Pa.  St.  260) 
Nagle  v.  Hall  (71  Miss.  330) 
Nalle  o.  Fenwick  (4  Rand.  585) 
Nallv  r.  Long  (56  Md.  567) 

v.  McDonald  (66  Cal   530) 

Nancy  r.  Snell  (6  Dana,  148) 
Nanfan  v.  Legh  (7  Taunt.  85) 
Nanz  v.  Oakley  (37  Hun,  495) 

v.  Oaklev  (120  N.  Y.  84)    558,  559,  737, 

738 
Napfle's  Estate  (134  Pa.  St.  492) 
Napier,  In  re  (1  Phillim.  83) 
Napton  v.  Leaton  (71  Mo.  358) 
Nash  v.  Cutler  (16  Pick.  491) 

v.  Hunt  (116  Mass.  237) 

v.  Morlev  (5  Reav.  177) 

Nash  v.  Simpson  (78  Me.  142) 

v.  Young  (31  Miss.  134) 

Nashville  Railroad  v.  Prince  (2  Heisk. 

580) 
Nason  v.  Smalley  (8  Vt.  118) 
Nass  v.  Van  Swearingen  (7  S.  &  R.  92) 
Nat  v.  Coons  (10  Mo.  543) 
Natchez  v.  Mullins  (67  Miss.  672) 
National    Bank    v.   Bohne   (8    Fed.    R. 

115)  1264 

Nat'l  Bank  v.  Levy  (127  N.  Y.  550)  631 

v.  Lewis  (12  Utah,  84)  371,  414,  416,  421, 

423 

v.  Stanton  (116  Mass.  435)   435,546.589, 

655,  676,  793,  1046 

i\  WTeeks  (53  Vt.  115)  757 

Nau"dorf  v.  Schumann  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  14)  720 
Naylor  v.  Moffat  (29  Mo.  126)  359,  536 
v.  Moody  (2  Blackf.  247)              358,  369 


337 
599 
727 

845,  846,  849 

473 

1196 

810 

991,  992,  993 
879 
559 


43 
452 
103 
145 
478 
934 
354 
213 

629 
736 
416 
496 
628 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


1199 
833 
789 

1084 
604 


*  Page 
Nazareth  Institution  v.  Lowe  (1  B.  Mon. 

257)  239 

Neagle  v.  Hall  (115  N.  C.  415)  748 

Neal  v.  Baker  (2  N.  H.  477)  425 

v.  Charlton  (52  Md.  495)  537 

v.  Cosden  (34  Md.  421)  881 

v.  Knox  &  Lincoln  K.  R.  (61  Me.  293)  64fJ 

v.  Robertson  (55  Ark.  81)  1230 

Neale's  Appeal  (104  Pa.  St.  214)  886 

Neale  v.  Hagthrop  (3  Bland.  Ch  551)        387, 

414,  745 

v.  Peav  (21  Ark.  93) 

Nearpass  v.  Gilman  (104  N.  Y.  506) 
Nector  v.  Gennett  (Cro.  Eliz.  466) 
Neda  v.  Fontenot  (2  La.  An.  782) 
Needham  v.  Allison  (24  N.  H.  355) 

v.  Belote  (39  Mich.  487)  263,  1074,  1075, 

1152 

v.  Gillett  (39  Mich.  574)  433 

v.  Grand  Trunk  Co.  (38  Vt.  294)  628,  630 

v.  Ide  (5  Pick.  510)  41 

v.  Salt  Lake  Citv  (7  Utah,  319)  1035 

Needles  v.  Martin  (33  Md.  609)  920,  925 

Neel's  Appeal  (88  Pa.  St.  94)  350 

Neel  v.  Potter  (40  Pa.  St.  483)  490 

Neelv  v.  Baird  (157  Pa.  St.  417)  757 

v.  Butler  (10  B.  Mon.  48)  277 

Neer  v.  Cowhick  (4  Wvo.  49)  79 

Neff's  Appeal  (48  Pa.  St.  501)  87,  101 

Appeal  (57  Pa.  St.  91)  678 

Neglev  v.  Gard  (20  Oh.  310)  1129 

Negus"  v.  Negus  (46  Iowa,  487)  110 

Nehbe  v.  Price  (2  Nott  &  McC.  328)  795 

Neibert  v.  Withera  (Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  599)     852 
Neidig's  Estate  (183  Pa.  St.  492)  571 

Neighbors  v.  Hamlin  (78  N.  C.  42)  580 

Neil  v.  Cunningham  (2  Port.  171)     819,  1268 
Neill  v.  Codv  (26  Tex.  286)  1059,  1060 

Neilson  v.  Bishop  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  473)  942 

v.  Cook  (40  Ala.  498)  699 

Neis  v.  Farquharson  (9  Wash.  508)  804 

Neistrath's  Estate  (66  Cal.  330)  986 

Nellons  v.  Truax  (6  Oh.  St.  97)  1097 

Nelson,  Matter  of  (141  N.  Y.  152)  475 

Nelson's  Estate  (147  Pa.  St.  160)  97 

Nelson's  Will  (39  Minn.  204)  32,  47,  48 

Nelson  v.  Barrett  (123  Mo.  564)       1128,  1132 

v.  Becker  (63  Minn.  61)  691 

Nelson  v.  Carrington  (4  Munf.  332)  534 

v.  Cornwell  (11  Grat.  724)  685,  991,  993, 

1247 

v.  Haeberle  (26  Mo.  App.  1)  846 

o.  Hall  (5  Jones  Eq.  32)  708 

v.  Havner  (66  111.  487)  291,  295 

v.  Herkel  (30  Kan.  456)  844 

v.  Hill  (5  How.  127)  287 

v.  Hollins  (9  Baxt.  553)  611 

v.  Jaques  (1  Me.  139)  1045 

v.  Kownslar  (79  Va.  469)  1133 

v  McDonald  (61  Hun,  406)  63 

v.  McGifford  (3  Barb.  Ch.  158)  71,  96,  98, 

484 

v.  Murfree  (69  Ala.  598)  1236,  1237 

r.  Nelson  (90  Mo.  460)  1222,  1223 

v.  Potter  (50  N.  J.  L.  324)    492,  494,  496 

v.  Russell  '  15  Mo.  356)  787 

v.  Russell  (135  X.  Y.  137)  951 

v.  Smith  (12  Sm.  &  M.  318)  166 

v.  Tenney  (36  Hun,  327)  286 

v.  Wilson  (61  [nd.  255)  170 

v.  Wvan  (21  Mo.  347)  1216,  1222 


•Page 
Nesbit  v.  Brvan  (1  Swan,  468)  154 

v.  Tavlor  (1  Rice,  296)  419 

Nesbitt  v.  Richardson  (14  Tex.  656)  1081 

Nesmith  v.  Dinsmore  (17  N.  H.  515)         1220 
Xess  v.  Wood  (42  Minn.  427)  757 

Nettles  ».  Cummings  (9  Rich.  Eq.  440)      310 

v.  El  kins  (2  McCord  Ch.  182)  751 

Nettleton  v.  Dinehart  (5  Cush.  543)  624 

v.  Dixon  (2  Ind.  446)  1026,  1041 

Nettman  v.  Schramm  (23  Iowa,  521)  737 

Nevin's  Appeal  (47  Pa.  St.  230)  183 

Nevins  v.  Gourlev  (95  111.  206)  953,  1014 

New  v.  Bass  (92  Va.  383)  1036 

v.  New  (172  Ind.  576)  1237 

v.  Nicoll  (73  N.  Y.  127)  757 

Newans  v.  Newans  (79  Iowa,  32)  187 

Newberrv  v.  Hinman  (49  Conn.  130)  942 

Newbold*  Goods  of  (L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  285)  519 

v.  Fenimore  (53  N.  J.  Eq.  307)  806 

Newcastle   Banking  Co.  v.  Hvmers  (22 

Beav.  367)  790 

Newcomb  v.  Goss  (1  Met.  Mass.  333)        792, 

797,  852 

v.  Newcomb  (96  Ky.  120)  41 

v.  Smith  (5  Ohio,  447)  1024 

v.  Stebbins  (9  Met.  Mass.  540)  1142 

v.  Williams  (9  Met.  Mass.  525)  391,  558, 

576,  1011,  1012 
Newcomers.  Wallace  (30 Ind.  216)  1040,  1105 
Newell  v.  Anderson  (7  Oh.  St.  12)  249 

v.  Nichols  (75  N.  Y.  78)  447 

New   England   Co.   v.   Woodworth   (111 

U.  S.  138)  441,  650 

New   England   Hospital   v.   Sohier   (115 

Mass.  50)  1052 

New   England  Trust  Co.  v.  Eaton  (140 

Mass.  532)  346 

Newhall  v.  Lynn  (101  Mass.  428)  237 

v.  TurneV  (14  111.  338)  745 

Newhouse  v.  Gale  (1  Redf.  217)  499,  581 

v.  Godwin  (17  Barb.  236)  475 

v.  Redwood  (7  Ala.  598)  750 

New  Jersey  v.  Meeker  (37  N.  J.  L.  282)  1261 
Newkerk  v.  Newkerk  (2  Caines,  345)  954 

Newland   v.   Attorney   General   (3   Mer. 

683)  928 

Newman's  Appeal  (35  Pa.  St.  339)  1097 

Estate  (75  Cal.  213)  140 

Newman  v.  Jenkins  (20  Pick.  515)  444 

v.  Schwerin  (72  U.  S.  App.  393)    407,  821 

v.  Willetts  (52  111.  98)  494 

v.  Winlock  (3  Bush,  241)  183 

New  Orleans  v.  Baltimore  (15  La.  An. 

625)  1110,  1168 

Newport  v.  Newport  (5  Wash.  114)  436 

v.  Sisson  (18  R.  I.  411)  593 

Newsom  v.  Carlton  (59  Ga.  516)  1072 

v.  Jackson  (29  Ga.  61)  625 

v.  Thornton  (S2  Ala.  402)  990,  1097 

v.  Tucker  (36  Ga.  71)  468 

Newson  v.  Starke  (46  Ga.  88)  921 

Newsum  v.  Xewsum  (1  Leigh,  86)  645 

Xewton  v.  Beckam  (33  Ga.  163)  1068 

v.  Bennett  (1  Bro.  Ch.  359)  1139 

v.  Cocke  (10  Ark.  169)  368,  512 

v.  Cox  (76  Mo.  352)  553 

0.  Marsden  (2  J.  &  Hem.  356)  962 

v.  Newton  (12  Ir.  Ch.  118)  96 

v.  Newton  (46  Minn.  88)  58,  59 

v.  Poole  (12  Leigh,  112)  690,  1125 

v.  Seaman's  Fr.  Soc.  (130  Mass.  91)  485 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Newton  v.  Snider  (44  Ark.  42)  122 

New  York  Conference  v.  Clarkson  (8  N. 

J.  Eq.  541)  893 

New  York,  L.  &c.  K.  Co.,  In  re  (105  N.  Y. 

89)  949,  951 

New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Smith  (G7  Fed. 

C.  C. A.  694)  441 

Niccolls  v.  Esterly  (16  Kan.  32)  835 

Nicewander  v.  Nicewander  (151  111.  156)     35, 

48 
Nicholas  v.  Adams  (2  Whart.  17)       117,  120, 

126 

v.  Kershner  (20  W.  Va.  251)  35 

v.  Purczell  (21  Iowa,  265)  203 

Nicholls  v.  Gee  (30  Ark.  135)  860 

v.  Hodges  (1  Pet.  562)  821,  1165 

Nicholls  Co.  v.  Donovan  (67  Mo.  App. 

286)  826 

Nichols'  Appeal  (128  Pa.  St.  428)  647 

Nichols,  In  re  (40  Hun,  387)  92 

v.  Allen  (87  Tenn.  131)  889 

v.  Boswell  (103  Mo.  151)  880 

v.  Chapman  (9  Wend.  452)  777 

v.  Day  (32  N.  H.  133)  1029 

v.  Eaton  (91  U.  S.  716)  956 

v.  Emery  (109  Cal.  323)  61,  62 

v.  Gladden  (117  N.  C.  497)  900,  901 

v.  Lee  (16  Colo.  147)       1030,  1037,  1045 

v.  Nichols  (136  Mass.  256)  242 

v.  Nichols  (61  Vt.  426)  248 

v.  Revburn  (55  Mo.  App.  1)  758 

v.  Shearon  (49  Ark.  75)      215,  848,  1030 

i'.  Shepard  (63  N.  H.  391)  149 

Nicholson's  Estate  (1  Nev.  518)       1150,  1160 

Succession  (37  La.  An.  346)  932 

Nicholson  v.  Showerman  (6  Wend.  554)    793 
Nickals,  In  re  (21  Nev.  462)  404,  527 

Nickell  v.  Handly  (10  Grat.  336)  956 

v.  Tomlinson  (27  W.  Va.  697)  232 

Nickelson  v.  Ingram  (24  Tex.  630)  526 

Nickerson  v.  Bowly  (8  Met.  424)      1233,  1239 
Nicolas's  Succession  (2  La.  An.  97)  532 

Nicole  v.  Mumford  (Kirbv,  270)  362,  369 

Nicoll  v.  Ogden  (29  111.  323)  290 

v.  Scott  (99  111.  529)  719 

v.  Todd  (70  111.  295)  236 

Nicrosi  v.  Giulv  (85  Ala.  365)  310,  412 

v.  Phillipf  (91  Ala.  299)  23 

Nieman's  Estate  (131  Pa.  St.  346)  691  a 

Nightingale  v.  Burrell  (15  Pick.  104)  897,  915 

v.  Gouldbourn  (2  Phillips,  594)  928 

Niles,  In  re  (113  N.  Y.  547)  340,  738 

Niller  v.  Johnson  (27  Md.  6)  609 

Nimmo  v.  Commonwealth  (4  H.  &  M.  57) 

773,  777,  1144 
Nisbet  v.  Stewart  (2  Dev.  &  B.  24)  365,  419 
Nisbett  v.  Murrav  (5  Ves.  149)  968 

Nix  v.  Bradley  (6  Rich.  Eq.  43)  607 

v.  French  (10  Heisk.  377)  1265 

Nixon  v.  Armstrong  (38  Tex.  296)  75 

v.  Bullock  (9  Yerg.  414)  792 

v.  Williams  (95  N.  C  103)  276,  277 

Noah,  In  re  (73  Cal.  583)  175,  184 

In  re  (88  Cal.  468)  175 

Noble's  Will  (124  111.  266)  72.474 

Noble  v.  Burnett  (10  Rich.  505)  72,  76 

v.  Enos  (19  Ind.  72) 

v.  McGinnis  (55  Ind.  528)  339 

v.  Morrev  (19  Iowa,  509)  782 

Nock  v.  Nock  (10  Grat.  106)  68 

Noddings,  Goods  of  (2  Sw.  &  Tr.  15)         510 


•  Page 
Noe  v.  Kern  (93  Mo.  367)  876 

v.  Moutray  (170  111.  169)  715,  863,  1029, 

1043 
Noel  v.  Ewing  (9  Ind.  37)  242,  243 

v.  Harvey  (29  Miss.  72)  1147 

Noell  v.  Nelson  (2  Saund.  226)  793 

Nolan  v.  Bolton  (25  Ga.  352)  1216 

v.  Gardner  (7  IItii.sk.  215)  82 

Noland  v.  Barrett  (122  Mo.  181)      1022,  1053, 
1054,  1058,  1059 

v.  Calvin  (12  Sm.  &  M.  273)  738 

v.  Turner  (5  J.  J.  Marsh.  179)  1230 

Nolasco  v.  Lurtz  (13  La.  An.  100)  1247 

Nooe  ?;.  Vanno}'  (6  Jones  Eq.  185)  974 

Noon  v.  Finnegan  (59  Minn.  418)      621,  714, 

731 

v.  Finnegan  (32  Minn.  81)    622,  714,  731 

Noonan  v.  Bradley  (9  Wall.  394)  358 

Norfleet  v.  Riddick  (3  Dev.  221)  418 

Norman's  Will  (72  Iowa,  84)  41,  480 

Norman  v.  Baldrv  (6  Sim.  621)  790 

v.  Norman  (3  Ala.  389)  1255 

v.  Olnev  (64  Mich.  553)  1046,  1067 

Norris's  App'eal  (71  Pa.  St.  106)  703 

Norris  v.  Callahan  (59  Miss.  140)  213 

v.  Chambers  (29  Beav.  246)  29 

v.  Clark  (10  N.  J.  Eq.  51)  268 

v.  Howe  (15  Mass.  175)  1058 

v.  Judge  (100  Mich.  256)  625 

v.  Morrison  (45  N.  H.  490)  211 

v.  Moulton  (34  N.  H.  392)  210,  212 

v.  Towle  (54  N.  H.  290)  654 

North's  Estate  (48  Conn.  583)  145 

North  v.  Priest  (81  Mo.  561)    1125,  1152,  1197 

v.  Priest  (9  Mo.  App.  586)  1153 

v.  Probate  Judge  (84  Mich.  69)  857 

v.  Walker  (66  Mo.  453)  757,  846 

v.  Walker  (2  Mo.  App.  174)  846 

Northampton  v.  Smith  (11  Met.  390)  499,  1194 
Northcraft  v.  Oliver  (74  Tex.  162)  434 

Northcut  v.  Wilkinson  (12  B.  Mon.  408)  736, 

796 
Northcutt  v.  Northcutt  (20  Mo.  266) 
- —  v.  Whipp  (12  B.  Mon.  65) 
Northern  Bank  of  Kentucky  v.  Roosa  (13 

Oh.  334) 

Northern  Railway  v.  Canton  (30  Md.  347)  603 
North  Georgia  Mining  Co.  v.  Latimer  (51 

Ga.  47)  830 

North  River  Meadow  Co.  v.  Shrewsbury 

Church  (22  N.  J.  L.  424)  94 

Northrop  v.  Marquan  (16  Oreg.  173)  111, 

1023,  1240 
North  Shore  Co.,  In  re  (63  Barb.  556)  690 
Northwestern  Conference  v.  Meyers  (36 

Ind.  375)  421,  431 

Northwestern  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stevens   (36 

U.  S.  App. 401)  445 

Norton's  Succession  (18  La.  An.  36)  205 

Appeal  (46  Conn.  527)  1195 

Norton   v.  Citizens'   Bank  (28   La.   An. 
354)  1048 

v.  Clark  (18  Nev.  247)  390 

v.  Craig  (68  Me.  275)  603 

v.  Edwards  (66  N.  C.  367)  1063 

v.  Frecker  (1  Atk.  524)  843 

v.  Norton  (5  Cush.  524)  609,  1031 

o.  Norton  (94  Ala.  481)  205 

v.  Palmer  (7  Cush.  523)  363,  649 

v.  Paxton  (110  Mo.  456)         37,  469,  500 

v.  Sewall  (106  Mass.  143)  625 


66 
232 


231 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Norton  v.  Thompson  (68  Mo.  143)  432 

v.  Walsh  (94  Cal.  564)  786 

Norwalk  Bank  v.  Sawver  (38  Oh.  St.  339)  293 


Norwood  v.  Harness  (98  I  ml.  134) 

v.  Marrow  (4  Dev.  &  B.  442) 

Nosworthy  v.  Blizzard  (53  Ga.  668) 


711 

247 

1056, 

1065 

176 

59 

1182 

1026 

359,  1081 

95 

538 

811 

104,  108 

1098,  1102 

441 

693 

232 

399 


Nottes's  Appeal  (45  Pa.  St.  361) 
Nowack  v.  Berger  (113  Mo.  25) 
Nowell  v.  Nowell  (2  Me.  75) 

v.  Nowell  (8  Me.  220) 

Nowlerw.  Coit  (1  Ohio.  519) 
Noyes'  Will  (61  Vt.  14) 
Noyes  v.  Kramer  (54  Iowa,  22) 

v.  Phillips  (57  Vt.  229) 

v.  Southworth  (55  Mich.  173) 

Nudd  v.  Powers  (136  Mass.  273) 

Nugent's  Estate  (77  Mich.  500) 

Nugent  v.  Laduke  (87  Ind.  482) 

Null  v.  Howell  (111  Mo.  273) 

Nunan's  Estate  (Mvr.  238) 

Nunn  v.  Barlow  (1  Sim.  &  Stu.  588)  786,  787 

v.  Owens  (2  Strobh.  101)  503 

Nurnberger,  Ex  parte  (40  S.  C.  334)  525 

Nusz  v.  Grove  (27  Md.  391)  519,  520,  524 

Nutall  v.  Brannin  (5  Bush,  11)  808 

Nutt  v.  Norton  (142  Mass.  242)  106.  109 

Nutter  v.  Vickery  (64  Me.  490)  871,  901,  940, 

995 
Nutting  v.  Goodridge  (46  Me.  82)  624 

Nye  v.  Taunton  R.  R.  Co.  (113  Mass.  277) 

240 


Oakes  v.  Bucklev  (49  Wis.  592)  1231 

Oaklev  v.  Oakley  (111  Ala.  506)  1170,  1171 
Oberle  v.  Lerch  (18  N.  J.  Eq.  346)  1233 

Obert  v.  Hammel  (18  N.  J.  L.  73)  320,  324, 
325   326   330 

v.  Obert  (12  N.  J.  Eq.  423)      1086,  1087 

O'Brien's  Estate  (3  Dem.  156;  67  How. 

Pr.  503)  526 

Estate  (63  Iowa,  622)  527 

O'Brien,  Matter  of  (45  Hun,  284)  646 

Matter  of  (145  N.  Y.  379)  1147 

v.  Galagher  (25  Conn.  229)  68 

O' Bryan  w.Allen  (95  Mo.  68)  832 

O'Bvrne  v.  Feely  (61  Ga.  77)  24 

Ochiltree  v.  Wright  (1  Dev.  &  B.  Eq. 

336)  738 

Ochoa  v.  Miller  (59  Tex.  460)  466,  502 

O'Conner  v.  Flvnn  (57  Cal.  293)      1084,  1088 

v.  Gifford"(117  N.  Y.  275)  678,1158 

v.  Harris  (81  N.  C  279)  640 

v.  O'Conner  (88  Tenn.  76)  1105 

O'Connor  v.  Huggins  (113  N.  Y.  511)  330,  454 

v.  Madison  (98  Mich.  183)  41 

O'Dee  o.  McCrate  (7  Me.  467)  680 

Odell  v.  Odell  (10  Allen,  1)  919,  920 

O'Dell  v.  Rogers  (44  Wis.  136)  470,  1085 

Oden  v.  Dupuy  (99  Ala.  36)  1079 

Odenwaelder  t>.  Schorr  (8  Mo.  App.  458)  70 
Odiorne'a  Appeal  (54  Pa.  St.  175)  184,  520 
O'Docherty  v.  McGloin  (25  Tex.  67)  214,  487 
O'Donnelfv.  Hermann  (42  Iowa,  60)         805 

v.  Rodiger  (76  Ala.  222)     28,  31,  36,  39 

CDriscol]  v.  Coger  (2  Desaus.  295)  269 

Oertle,  In  re  (34  Minn.  173)  1000 

Oettingeru.  Specht  (162  111.  179)  215 

Officer  v.  Board  of  Missions  (47  Hun,  352)  718 
Offley  v.  oilley  (Pr.  Ch.  26)  705 


520 

274 

608 

291 

965 

823 

1146 

120,  1137 

718 

1097 

748 

576,  677 

727 

475 

306,  715 

306 

895 

533,  1172 

631 


*  Page 
Offutt  v.  Gott  (12  G.  &  J.  385)  588,  1203 

v.  Offutt  (3  B.  Mon.  162)  84 

O'Flynn  v.  Powers  (136  N.  Y.  412)  822,  1023, 

1028, 1029 
O'Gara  v.  Eisenlohr  (38  N.  Y.  296) 

v.  Nevlon  (161  Mass.  140) 

Ogden's  Appeal  (70  Pa.  St.  501) 
Ogden  v.  Astor  (4  Sandf.  311) 

v.  Pattee  (149  Mass.  82) 

v.  Saunders  (12  Wheat.  213) 

Ogier.  In  re  (101  Cal.  381) 
Ogilvie  v.  Ogilvie  (1  Bradf.  356) 
Ogle  v.  Reynolds  (75  Md.  145) 

v.  Tayloe  (49  Md.  158) 

Oglesbv  v.  Gilmore  (5  Ga.  56) 

^"Howard  (43  Ala.  144) 

Ogsburv  v.  Ogsbury  (115  N.  Y.  290) 
O'HagaVs  Will  (73  Wis.  78) 
O'Hanlin  v.  Den  (20  N.  J.  L.  31) 

v.  Den  (21  N.J.  L.  582) 

O'Hara,  In  re  (95  N.  Y.  413) 
Ohlendorf  v.  Kanne  (66  Md.  495) 
Ohm  v.  Superior  Court  (85  Cal.  545) 
O'Keefe  0.  Foster  (5  Wvom.  343)        804,  845 
Okeson's  Appeal  (2  Grant  Cas.  303)  1247 

Old  v.  Little  (3  Cal.  287)  1173 

Old  South  v.  Crocker  (119  Mass.  1)  923 

Olerick  v.  Ross  (146  Ind.  282)  70 

Oliveira  v.  University  (Phill.  Eq.  69)         307 
Oliver  v.  Forrester  (96  111.  315)  284 

- —  v.  Vance  (34  Ark.  564)  154 

Olliffe  v.  Wells  (130  Mass.  221)  895 

Olmstead's  Appeal  (43  Conn.  110)  439 

Olmstead  v.  Brush  (27  Conn.  530)  1100 

Olmsted  v.  Bhiir  (45  Iowa,  42)  259 

v.  Clark  (30  Conn.  108)  422,  426 

v.  Keves  (85  N.  Y.  593)  516,  642 

Olwine's  Appeal  (4  W  &  S.  492)  392 

Ommaney  v.  Butcher  (1  Turn.  &  Russ. 

260)  934 

O'Mulcahev  V.  Gracjg  (45  Minn.  112)         845 
Oneal  v.  Mead  (1  P.  Wms.  963)  1105 

O'Neal  v.  Tisdale  (12  Tex.  40)  545 

O'Neale  v.  Ward  (3  Harr.  &  McH.  93)      962 
O'Neall  v.  Abney  (2  Bai.  317)  751 

v.  Boozer  (4  Rich.  Eq.  22)  880 

r.  Farr  (1  Rich.  80)  48 

O'Neil's  Appeal  (55  Conn.  409)       1198,  1235 
O'Neil,  In  're  (27  Hun,  130)  64. 

In  re  (91  N.  Y.  516)  64,  485 

v.  Farr  (1  Rich.  80)  47,  114 

v.  Freeman  (45  N.  J.  L.  208)  849 

O'Neill's  Estate  (90  Wis.  480)  1260 

O'Neill  v.  Duff  (11  Phila.  244)  284 

r.  Smith  (33  Md.  569)  82 

Onev  r.  Balch  (154  Mass.  318)  656 

"v.  Ferguson  (41  W.  Va.  568)  359 

O'Niel,  Matter  of  (2  Redf.  544)  525 

( mions  v.  Tvrer  (2  Vern.  741)  90 

Opel  i>.  Shoup  (100  Iowa,  407)  23 

Opening  of  Beekman  Street  (4  Bradf.  503)  591 
Opie  v.  Castleman  (32  Fed.  Rep.  511)         710 
Orchardson  v.  Cofield  (171  111.  14) 
Orcutt's  Appeal  (61  Conn.  378) 

Appeal  (97  Pa.  St.  179) 

Orcutt  v.  Gould  (117  Cal.  315) 

v.  Onus  (3  Pai.  459) 

Ordinary  v.  Condv  (2  Hill.  313) 

v.  Cooley  (30  N.  J.  L.  179) 

v.  Matthews  (7  Rich.  L.  26) 

v.  Smith  (15  N.  J.  L.  92) 


34 

1200 

691  a 

646,  848 

362,  794 

548 

552,  553 

345 

1230 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


360 

810 

,  518 

284 

419 

1147 

1204 

277 

709,  711 


*Page 
Ordinary  v.  White  (43  N.  J.L.  22)  1114,  1227 
Ordronaux  v.  Helie  (3  Sandf.  Ch.  512) 
Ordwav  v.  Phelps  (45  Iowa,  279) 
O'Reaf  v.  Crum  (135  111.  294)  517 

O'Reilly  v.  Bradv  (28  Ala.  530) 

v.  Hendricks  (2  Sm.  &  M.  388) 

v.  Mever  (4  Dem.  161) 

Orford,  Ex  parte  (102  Cal.  656) 

v.  Benton  (36  N.  H.  395) 

Ormi.ston  v.  Olcott  (84  N.  Y.  339) 
Orndorf  v   Hummer  (12  B.  Mon.  619)  76 

Orr's  Estate  (29  Cal.  101)  214 

Orr  v.  Kaine  (2  Ves.  Sr.  294)  661 

v.  Moses  (52  Me.  287)  873,  996 

v.  Sanford  (74  Mo.  App.  187,  191)    1172 

Orrick  v  Boehm  (49  Md.  72)  728, 884,  943,  971 

257 

301 

1188 

476 

266 

157 

363 

868, 

985 

618 

249 

110 

971 

967 

420,  658 

423 

70 

523 

1052 

1214,  1218 

1 222 

718 

283 


■  v.  Robbins  (34  Mo.  226) 

v.  Vahey  (49  Mo.  428) 

Orser  v.  Orser  (5  Dem.  21) 

v.  Orser  (24  N.  Y.  51) 

Orth  v.  Orth  (69  Mich.  158) 
Orthwein  v.  Thomas  (127  111.  554) 
Ortiz,  In  re  (86  Cal.  306) 
Orton  v.  Ortou  (3  Abb.  App.  Dec.  411) 


Osbom  v.  Bell  (5  Denio,  370) 

v.  Horine  (19  111.  124) 

v.  Jefferson  Bank  (116  111.  130) 

Osborne  v.  Leeds  (5  Ves.  369) 

o.  McAlpine-  (4  Redf.  1) 

v.  Moss  (7  John.  161) 

v.  Rogers  (I  Saund.  265) 

Osburn  v.  Cook  (11  Cush.  532) 
Osdendorff,  Ex  parte  (17  S.  C.  22) 
Osgood's  Estate  (Myr.  153) 
Osgood  v.  Breed  (17  Mass.  355) 


v.  Franklin  (2  John.  Ch.  1) 

v.  Spencer  (2  H.  &  G.  133) 

Osman  v.  Traphagen  (23  Mich.  80)    330,  735, 

1024,  1050,  1059,  1089 

Osmond  v.  Fitzroy  (3  P.  Wins.  129)  42 

Osmun  v.  Judge  (107  Mich.  27)  817 

v.  Porter  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  141)  269 

Osterhout  v.  Hardeubergh  (19  John.  266)  793 
O'Sullivan,  In  re  (84  Cal.  444)  1052 

Oswald  v.  McCaullev  (6  Dak.  289)  201 

v.  Pillsburv  (61  Minn.  520)  819 

Oswalt  v.  Moore  (19  Ark.  257)  816 

Otis's  Estate  (Myr.  222)  1078 

Otis  v.  Kennedy  (107  Mich.  312)      702,  1086, 

1087 

v.  Prince  (10  Grav,  581)  961 

Ott  o.  Kaufman  (68  Md.  56)  620 

Otterback  v.  Bohrer  (87  Va.  548)  897 

Otterson  v.  Gallagher  (88  Pa.  St.  355) 

Otto  »'.  Dotv  (61  Iowa,  23) 

Ouchita  v.  Scott  (64  Ark.  349) 

Ould  v.  Washington  Hospital  (95  U.  S. 

303)  920,  928 

Ourv  v.  Duffield  (1  Ariz.  509)  622,  713 

Outcalt  v.  Appleby  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  73)        1002 
Outlaw  v.  Farmer  (71  N.  C.  31)  411,  554 

Overbury  v.  Overburv  (2  Show.  242)  105 

Overdeer  v.  Updegraff  (69  Pa.  St.  110)    1057, 

1063 
Overfield  v.  Bullitt  (1  Mo.  749)  387,  693 

Overly  v.  Overly  (I  Met.  Kv.  117)     685,  809 
Overman  v.  Sasser  (107  N.  C.  432)  605 

Oraan  v.  Gullifer  (49    Me.  36  0)  325 


345, 

1235 

34 

470 


Page 

330, 

1089 

355 

119 

1034 

676 

204 

791,  826 

593,  1096 

230 


Overton  v.  Cranford  (7  Jones  L.  415) 

v.  McFarland  (15  Mo.  312) 

v.  Sawyer  (7  Jones  L.  6) 

— -  v.  Woodson  (17  Mo.  442) 
Owen  v.  Blanchard  (2  Cr.  C.  C.  418) 

v.  Bracket  (7  Lea,  448) 

V.  Brown  (2  Ala.  126) 

v.  Ellis  (64  Mo.  77) 

v.  Hyde  (6  Yerg.  334) 

v.  Miller  (10  Ohio  St.  136)  650 

Owens  v.  Bloomer  (14  Hun,  296)  1038 

v.  Childs  (58  Ala.  113)  1038 

v.  Clavton  (56  Md.  129)  1098 

V.  Collinson  (3  Gil.  &  J.  25)  1154 

v.  Cowan  (7  B.  Mon.  152)  589 

v.  Link  (48  Mo.  App.  534)  576, 1197 

v.  Owens  (100  N.  C.  240)  131,227 

v.  Thurmond  (40  Ala.  289)  1190 

v.  Walker  (2  Strobh.  Eq.  289)  549 

Owings  v.  Bates  (9  Gill,  463)  516,  525,  529, 531 

v.  Owings  (1  H.  &  G.  484)  533 

v.  State  (22  Md.  116)  691  a 

Oxenham  v.  Clapp  (1  B.  &  Ad.  313)  427 

v.  Clapp  (2  B.  &  Ad.  309)  423 

Oxley  v.  Lane  (35  N.  Y.  340)  884 
Oxsheer  v.  Nave  (90  Tex.  568)        1236,  1237 

Ovster  v.  Oyster  (1  S.  &  R.  422)  1221 


Pace  v.  Oppenheim  (12  Ind.  533)  436 

Pacheco's  Estate  (23  Cal.  476)  524,  579 

Packer  v.  Owens  (164  Pa.  St.  185)  534,  734 

v.  Packer  (179  Pa.  580)  72 

Packman's  Case  (6  Co.  19)  404,  587 

Packwood  v.  Elliott  (43  Miss.  504)  1228 

Padfield  v.  Padtield  (78  111.  16)  188 

Padget  v.  Priest  (2  T.  R.  97)  415,  417 

Padgett  v.  State  (45  Ark.  495)  846 

Paff  v.  Kinney  (1  Bradf.  1)  740,  1255 

Page's  Appeal  (71  Pa.  St.  402)  1007,  1008 

Estate  (57  Cal.  238)  757 

Estate  (75  Pa.  St.  87)  727 

Page,  In  re  (118  111.  576)  431,  482,  483 

v.  Bartlett  (101  Ala.  193)  439,  806 

v.  Cook  (26  Ark.  122)  373 

v.  Culver  (55  Mo.  App.  606)  599 

v.  Foust(89N.  C.  447)  880, 

v.  Frazer  (14  Bush,  205)  952,  954 

v.  Gilbert  (32  Hun,  301)  937 

v.  Leapingwell  (18  Ves.  463)  968,  987 

v.  Matthews  (41  Ala.  719)  1037 

v.  Page  (2  Rob.  Va.  424)  489 

v.  Patton  (5  Pet.  304)  789 

v.  Ralph  (55  Ark.  52)  357 

v.  Thomas  (43  Oh.  St.  38)  293 

v.  Tucker  (54  Cal.  121)        622,  672,  713 

v.  Whidden  (59  N.  H.  507)  954 

Paice  v.   Archbishop  of  Canterbury  (14 

Ves.  364)  761 

Paige,  Matter  of  (62  Barb.  476)  499 

v.  Paige  (71  Iowa,  318)  234 

Paine  v.  Barnes  (100  Mass.  470)  730 

v.  Forsaith  (84  Me.  66)  192 

v.  Fox  (16  Mass.  129)  1048,  1052 

v.  Goodwin  (56  Me.  411)  1194 

v.  Hall  (18  Ves.  475)  910 

v.  Hollister  (139  Mass.  144)  175 

v.  Nichols  (15  Mass.  253)  855 

v.  Parsons  (14  Pick.  318)  978,  979 

v.  Paulk  (39  Me.  15)  186 

cxxv 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Paine  v.  Pendleton  (32  Miss.  320)    1032,  1040 

v.  Ulmer  (7  Mass.  317)  C20 

Painter,  In  re  (115  Cal.  635)  1228,  1242 

v.  Henderson  (7  Pa.  St.  48)  1080 

Palmer's  Appeal  (181  Pa.  St.  339)  691  a 

Will  (117  N.  C.  133)  463 

Palmer,  Appellant  (1  Doug.  Mich.  422)    1065 

v.  Circuit  Judge  (90  Mich.  1)  682 

v.  Culbertson  (143  N.  Y.  213)  1218,  1221, 

1223 

r.  Halford  (4  Russ.  403)  915 

v.  Horn  (84  N.  Y.  515)  916 

v.  Litherland  (Latch,  160)  404 

v.  Maxwell  (11  Neb.  598)  419 

v.  Mikell  (2  Des.  342)  497 

v.  Noves  (45  N.  H.  174)  390 

v.  Palmer  (13  Grav,  326)  1026 

v.  Palmer  (55  Mich.  293)  646 

v.  Pollock  (26  Minn.  433)  748 

v.  Simpson  (69  Ga.  792)  209 

V.  Stevens  (11  Cush.  147)  648,  731 

r.  Waller  (1  M.  &  W.  689)  797 

v.  Whitnev  (166  Mass.  306)     1153,  1154 

Palmerton  v.  Hoop  (131  Ind.  23)  1030 

Palmes  r.  Stephens  (R  M.  Charlt.  56)  759 
Palms  v.  Palms  (68  Mich.  355)  917 

v.  Probate  Judge  (39  Mich.  302)       1204 

Palomare's  Estate  (63  Cal.  402)  189 

Panaud  v.  Jones  (1  Cal.  488)  36 

Pancoast  v.  Graham  (15  N.  J.  Eq.  294)  38 
Parcell  ».  McRevnolds  (71  Iowa,  623)  834 
Parcher  v.  Bussell  (11  Cush.  107)  1254 

v.  Savings  Inst.  (78  Me.  470)      116,  120 

Parchman  v.  Charlton  (1  Coldw.  381)        308, 

309 
Pardue  v.  Girens  (1  Jones  Eq.  306)  954 

Parham  v.  Parham  (6  Humph.  287)  265 

V.  Stith  (56  Miss.  465)  693,  699 

v.  Thompson  (2  J.  J.  Marsh.  159)       600 

Parish  v.  Stone  (14  Pick.  198) 

v.  Weed  (79  Ga.  682) 

Parisat  v.  Tucker  (65  Miss.  439) 
Park's  Estate  (173  Pa.  St.  190) 
Park  r.  Lock  (48  Ark.  133) 

v.  Marshall  (4  Watts,  382) 

Parker's  Appeal  (44  Pa.  St.  309) 
Appeal  (61  Pa.  St.  4T" 


121,  125 

836 

198 

1002 

836 

752 

518,  520 

375,  1130 

Parker V.  Allen  (4  Atl.  300)'  1048,  1070,  1233 

798 

622 

887 

502 

992 

637 

607 

924,  1154 

829 

757,  1145 

786,  794 


■v.  Atfeildd  Salk.  311) 

v.  Bernal  (66  Cal.  113) 

r.  Bogardus  (5  N.  Y.  309) 

v.  Brown  (6  Grat.  554) 

v.  Chambers  (24  Ga.  518) 

v.  Chestnutt  (80  Ga.  12) 

v.  Converse  (5  Grav,  336) 

v.  Cowell  (16  N.  H.  149) 

v.  Daughlrv  (111  Ala.  529) 

v.  Dav  (155  N.  Y.  383) 

v.  Dee  (3  Swanst.  529,  note) 

v.  Edwards  (4  South.  R.  Ala.  612)     830 


Gainer  (17  Wend.  559)  777 

■ v.  Glover  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  559)  710,  937 

v.  Grant  (91  N.  C.  338)  1238 

v.  Gregg  (23  N.  II.  416)  857 

r.  Gwvnn  (4  Md.  423)  1173 

i'.  Harden  (84  Iowa,  493)  267 

v.  [aeigi  (188  Mass.  416)  878 

v.  Kett  (1  Ld.  Raym.  661;  12  Mod. 

471)  426 

v.  Lambert  (31  Ala.  89)  816 

■ v.  Lewis  (2  Dev.  L.  21)  760 


•Page 
Parker  v.  Linden  (113  N.  Y.  28)  728 

v.  McGaha  (11  Ala.  521)  1153 

v.  Marston  (27  Me.  196)  125 

v.  Moore  (25  N.  J.  Eq.  228)  1103 

v.  Nichols  (7  Pick.  Ill)  1046 

v.  Parker  (11  Cush.  519)       470,  473,  493 

v.  Parker  (123  Mass.  548)  952 

v.  Parker  (5  Met.  134)  949 

v.  Parker  (17  Pick.  236)  230 

v.  Prov.  S.  Co.  (17  R.  I.  376)  628 

i).  Reynolds  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  290)  1195 

v.  Robinson  (71  Fed.  C.  C.  A.  256)     691 

i'.  Small  (55  Iowa,  732)  242 

v.  Thompson  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  311)  414 

v.  Waslev  (9  Grat.  477)  873 

V.  Whiting  (6  How.  Miss.  352)  852 

Parkhurst  v.  Harrower  (142  Pa.  St.  432)  903 
Parkinson  v.  Jacobson  (18  Hun,  353)  1028 
Parkison  v.  Parkison  (12  Sm.  &  M.  672)  82 
Parkman  v.  Bowdoin  (1  Sumn.  359)  897 

Parks  v.  Am.  Soc.  (62  Vt.  19)  949,  999 

v.  Hardey  (4  Bradf.  15)  259 

v.  Johnson  (5  S.  E.  R.  243)  188 

r.  Kimes  (100  Ind.  148)  157,  879 

v.  Norris  (101  Mich.  71)  844 

v.  Perry  (2  Blackf.  74)  1102 

Parramore  v.  Taylor  (11  Grat.  220)  46,  68 
Parrish  v.  Parrish  (88  Va.  529)  235 

v.  Vaughan  (12  Bush,  97)  881 

Parrott  v.  Dubignon  (T.  U.  P.  Charlt. 

261)  620 

Parsell  v.  Strvker  (41  N.  Y.  480)  58,  59 

Parson's  Estate  (65  Cal.  240)  1150 

Estate  (13  Phila.  406)  1015 

Parsons  v.  Bovd  (20  Ala.  112)  232 

v.  Hancock  (1  Moody  &  Malk.  330)    792 

v.  Lanoe  (1  Ves.  Sr.  189)  55 

v.  Lyman  (4  Biadf.  268)  371 

v.  Lvman  (20  N.  Y.  103)  365,  371 

v.  Mills  (1  Mass.  431)  855 

v.  Parsons  (66  Iowa,  754)         41,  48,  490 

v.  Parsons  (L.  R.  8  Eq.  Cas.  260)        633 

v.  Parsons  (52  Oh.  St.  470)       1216 

v.  Parsons  (2  Me.  298)  83 

v.  Spaulding  (130  Mass.  83)  564 

v.  Winslow  (6  Mass.  169)  963 

Partee  v.  Caughran  (9  Yerg.  460)  422 

Partridge  v.  Cavender  (96  Mo.  452)  956 

v.  Partridge  (2  H.  &  J.  63)  975 

Paschal  v.  Acklin  (27  Tex.  173)  922 

Paschall  v.  Hailman  (9  111.  285)  786,  821 

v.  Hall  (5  Jones  Eq.  108)  609 

Pass  v.  Pass  (98  Ga.  791)  1259 

Passmore  v.  Passmore  (1  Phillim.  216)  57 
Pastine  v.  Bnnini  (166  Mass.  85)  888 

Patch  v.  White  (117  U.  S.  210)  893,  894 

Patchen  v.  Wilson  (4  Hill,  57)  643 

Patee  v.  Mowrv  (59  Mo.  161)  1031 

Paterson  v.  Schmidt  (HI  Cal.  457)  807,  839 
Patillo  v.  Barksdale  (22  Ga.  356)  440 

Paton,  In  re  (111  N.  Y.  480)  883,  897 

Patrick  r.  Petty  (83  Ala.  420)  829 

Pattee  v.  Lowe' (36  Me.  138)  854 

Patten's  Estate  (7  Mackey  392)  574,  578,  663 
Patten,  Goods  of  (Tuck.  56)     '  684 

v.  Herring  (9  Tex.  Civ.  App.  640)      718 

v.  Tallman  (27  Me.  17)  72,  474 

Patterson's  Appeal  (128  Pa.  St.  269)        1218, 

1222 
Patterson,  Ex  parte  (4  How.  Pr.  34)  40 
Matter  of  (146  N.  Y.  327)                  1234 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  atar  or  side  pages.] 


370 

1129 

140 

845 

707 

837 

62 

90 

432,  518,  533, 

1001 

154 

329,  1089 

848 

1220 

358,  302 

431 

203 

609 

759,  702 

1153 

776 

940 

708 

895 

672 

401,  571 

767 


Patterson  v.  Allen  (50  Tex.  23)  434,  1241 

v.  Bell  (25  Iowa,  149)        564,  1122,  1124 

i'.  Blanchard  (98  Ga.  518) 

v.  Booth  (103  Mo.  402) 

v.  Browning  (146  lud.  160) 

v.  Cobb  (4  Fla.  481) 

v.  Craig  (1  Baxt.  291) 

v.  Dushane  (115  Pa.  St.  334) 

v.  English  (71  Pa.  St.  454) 

v.  Hickey  32  Ga.  156) 

v.  High  (8  Ired.  Eq.  52) 

v.  Lamson  (45  Oh.  St.  77) 

o.  Lemon  (50  Ga.  231) 

v.  McCann  (39  Ark.  577) 

D.  Mills  (69  Iowa,  755) 

v.  Pagan  (18  S.  C.  584) 

v.  Patterson  (74  111.  App.  321) 

v.  Patterson  (49  Mich.  176) 

v.  Patterson  (45  N.  H.  164) 

v.  Patterson  (59  N.  Y.  574) 

v.  Phillips  (Hemp.  69) 

v.  Ramsev  (1  Binn.  221) 

v.  Swallow  (44  Pa.  St.  487) 

v.  Wadsworth  (89  N.  C.  407) 

v.  Wilson  (101  N.  C.  594) 

Pattison  r.  Coons  (56  Mo.  169) 
Patton's  Appeal  (31  Pa.  St.  465) 

Estate  (Myr.  241) 

Patton  v.  Asheville  (109  N.  C.  685)  243 

v.  Bostwick  (39  Mich.  218)  854 

v.  Farmer  (87  N.  C.  337)  710 

i).  Glover  (1  App.  D.  C.  466)  838 

e.  Gregory  (21  Tex.  513)  713 

v.  Overton  (8  Humph.  192)  371 

v.  Patton  (2  Jones  Eq.  294)  974 

v.  Williams  (74  Mo.  App.  451)  1193 

Pattv  v.  Goolsbv  (51  Ark.  61)      729,  730,  887 

Patullo's  Case  (Tuck.  140)  552 

Paul  o.  Davis  (100  Ind.  422)  141 

v.  Grimm  (183  Pa.  St.  330)  1029 

v.  Paul  (136  Mass.  286)  199 

v.  Stone  (112  Mass.  27)  807 

Paup  v.  Sylvester  (22  Iowa,  371)  183 
Paving  Co.  v.  Prather  (48  Mo.  App.  487)    818 

Pawlet  v.  Clark  (9  Cr.  292)  923 

Pawling  v.  Speed  (5  T.  B.  Mon.  580)  440 

Pawtucket  v.  Ballou  (15  R.  I.  58)  67 

Paxson  o.  Potts  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  313)  272 

Pavne  v.  Banks  (32  Miss.  292)  37 

■ v.  Becker  (22  Hun,  28)  254 

v.  Becker  (87  N.  Y.  153)  255 

o  Dotson  (81  Mo.  145)  227 

v.  Harris  (3  Strobh.  Eq.  39)  593 

v.  Hook  (7  Wall.  425)  357,  1269 

r.  Pavne  (11  B.  Mon.  138)  517 

v.  Pavne  ( 18  Cal.  291)  86,  206 

v.  Pippev  (49  Ala.  549)  1055 

v.  Pusev  (8  Bush,  564)  788,  843 

Pavson  v.  Hadduck  (8  Biss.  293)       856,  1264 

Payton  v.  Bowen  (14  R.  I.  375)  269 

Pea  v.  Waggoner  (5  Hayw.  242)  1039 

Peabodv's  Petition  (40  N.  H.  342)  857 

PeabodV  r.  Mattocks  (88  Me.  164)  1149 

Peacock  v.  Albin  (39  Ind.  25)  902 

v.  Harris  (85  N.  C.  146)  707 

v.  Haven  (22  III.  23)  849 

v.  Wilson  (9  Lea,  398)  815 

Peake  v.  Jenkins  (80  Va.  293)  69,  70 

v.  Redd  (14  Mo.  79)  333 

Peale  v.  White  (7  La.  Au.  449)  546,  579 


*Page 
Pearce,  Ex  parte  (44  Ark.  509)  1120 

v.  Calhoun  (59  Mo.  271)      340,  355,  658, 

850,  1027,  1107,  1263 

v.  Castrix  (8  Jones,  71)  523 

v.  Goddard  (2  Brev.  360)  734 

Pearcy  V.  Greenwell  (80  Ky.  616)  952 

Pearson,  Ex  parte  (76  Ala.  521)  184 

In  re,  (99  Cal.  30)  888 

v.  Carlton  (18  S.  C.  47)  156 

v.  Dairington  (32  Ala.  227)         170,  348, 

1153,  1155,  1159,  1188,  1191 

v.  Wartman  (80  Aid.  528)  989 

Pearsons,  In  re  (102  Cal.  569)  1022 

In  re  (110  Cal.  524)  154 

Pease  v.  Allis  (110  Mass.  157)  72 

Peaslee,  Matter  of  (73  Hun,  113)  501 

v.  Barney  (1  Chip.  331)  631 

v.  Kellev  (38  N.  H.  372)  797 

».  Peaslee  (147  Mass.  171)  264 

Peck's  Appeal  (50  Conn.  562)  99,  100 

Peck  v.  Botsford  (7  Conn.  172)  845 

v.  Brummagim  (31  Cal.  440)  611 

v.  Carv  (27  N.  Y.  9)  40 

v.  Henderson  (7  Yerg.  18)  622 

v.  McKean  (45  Iowa.  18)  831 

v.  Mead  (2  Wend.  470)  665 

v.  Sturges  (11  Conn.  420)  855 

v.  Wheaton  (1  Mart.  &  Y.  353)         1270 

Peckard  v.  Price  (5  Del.  Ch.  239)  1124,  1132 
Peckham  v.  Lego  (57  Conn.  553)  883 

v.  Newton  (15  R.  I.  321)       710,  936,  944 

v.  O'Hara  (74  Mich.  287)  863 

Peebles'  Appeal  (15  S.  &  R.  39)  421,  448,  568 

Estate  (157  Pa.  605)  171 

Peebles  v.  Acker  (70  Miss.  356)  1100 

v.  Case  (2  Bradf.  226)  475 

v.  North  Carolina  (63  N.  C.  238)        622 

v.  Watts  (9  Dana,  102)        534,  553,  562, 

1043 
Peele  v.  Chever  (8  Allen,  89)  1082 

Peeler  v.  Peeler  (08  Miss.  141)  197 

Peeples  v.  Smith  (8  Rich.  90)  1208 

Peerv  o.  Peerv  (94  Tenn.  328)  490 

Peet's  Estate "(79  Iowa,  185)  165,171 

Peet  v.  Railroad  (70  Tex.  522)  895 

Peiffer  v.  Lvtle  (58  Pa.  St.  386)  610 

Peirce  v.  O'Brien  (29  Fed.  R.  402)      242,  261 

v.  Whittemore  (8  Mass.  282)  857 

Pierson  v.  Fisk  (99  Mich.  43)  1064 

Peisch  r.  Dickson  (1  Mason,  9)  893 

Pelamourges  v.  Clark  (9  Iowa,  1)  41 

Pelham  v.  Murray  (64  Tex.  477)         323,  330 

v.  Wilson  (4  Ark.  289)  1044 

Pell  v.  Ball  (1  Speers  Ch.  48)  966,  1104 

v.  Farquar  (3  Blackf.  331)  1079 

v.  Mercer  (14  R.  I.  412)      893,  929,  931, 

1006 
Pelton  v.  Johnson  (52  Vt.  138)  1156 

Pemberton  r.  Conv  (Cro.  Eliz.  164)  504 

Pence  v.  Waugh  (135  Ind.  143)  76 

Pendarvis  i\  Wall  (14  La.  An.  449)  698 

Pendergast  v.  Tibbetts  (104  Mass.  270)  96 
Pendergrass  v.  Pendergrass  (26  S.  C.  19) 

1039 
Pendill  v  Neuberger  (64  Mich.  220)  829 

v.  Neuberger  (67  Mich.  562)  832 

Pendleton  v.  Kinnev  (65  Conn.  222)  936 

v.  Pendleton  (6  Sm.  &  M.  448)  527 

v.  Phelps  (4  Dav,  476)  1268 

Penhallow  v.  Dwight  (7  Mass.  34)  600 
v.  Kimball  (61  N.  H.  596)  271 

cxxvii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Penn  v.  Guggenheimer  (76  Va.    836)        1016 

v.  Oglesby  (89  111.  110)  825 

Pennel  v.  Weyaut  (2  Harr.  501)  494,  500 

Penuell's  Appeal  (50  Pa.  St.  515)  1070,  1233 
Pennie  v.  Roach  (94  Cal.  515)  1146 

Pennington  v.  Gibson  (6  Ark.  447)  826 

Penuissun  v.  Penaisson  (22  La.  An.  131)  323 
Penuision's  Succession  (18  La.  An.  281)  12U1 
Penuock's  Appeal  (14  Pa.  St.  446)  1057 

Estate  (20  Pa.  St.  268)  876 

Pennock  v.  Eagles  (102  Pa.  St.  290)  941 

Pennoyer  v.  \\  adhams  (20  Oreg.  274)  924 
Pennsylvania   (Jo.'s  Appeal  (83  Pa.  St. 

312)  1103 

v.  Appeal  (109  Pa.  St.  479)  988 

v.  Appeal  (168  Pa.  St.  431)  1023 

Pennsylvania   Co.   v.   Bauerle   (143    111. 

459)  509,  724 

v.  Price  (7  Phila.  465)  917 

Penny's  Appeal  (109  Pa.  St.  323)  1098 

Succession  (13  La.  An.  94)  567 

Penny  v.  Crowl  (87  Mich.  15)  833 

v.  Jackson  (85  Ala.  67)  1083 

Penton  v.  Robart  (2  East,  88)  598 

People  v.  Abbott  (105  111.  588)  431 

v.  Admire  (39  111.  251)  1228 

v.  Barker  (150  N.  Y.  52)      384,  386,  691 

v.  Barton  (16  Colo.  75)  356 

v.  Brooks  (123  111.  246)   1261,  1262,  1265 

v.  Brooks  (22  111.  A  pp.  594)  819,  849, 1267 

v.  Chapin  (101  N.  Y.  682)  1251 

v.  Conklin  (2  Hill,  N.  Y.  67)       22,  304, 

305,  309 

v.  Corlies  (1  Sandf .  228)  324 

v.  Curry  (59  111.  35)  549,  550,  551 

v.  Folsom  (5  Cal.  373)  303 

v.  Gibbs  (9  Wend.  29)  618 

v.  Gray  (72  111.  343)  325 

v.  Hartman  (2  Sweeney,  576)  581 

i'.  Judges  of  Erie  (4  Cow.  445)     792, 796 

v.  Kohlsaat  (168  111.  37)  1193 

v.  Lott  (27  111.  215)  550,  551,  556 

v.  Marine  Court  (2  Abb.  Pr.  126)      1192 

v.  Marshall  (7  Abb.  N.  Cas.  380)        326 

v.  Olvera  (43  Cal.  492)  1144 

v.  Open  B.  Co.  (92  N.  Y.  98)  1087 

V.  Phelps  (78  111.  147)  1155 

v.  Powers  (147  N.  Y.  104)  922,  925,  932, 

933 

V.  Roach  (76  Cal.  294)  23,  306 

v.  Siinonson  (126  N.  Y.  299)  912 

v.  Stacy  (11  111.  App.  506)  547,  548 

v.  White  (11  111.  341)  440 

People's  Bank  v.  Wilcox  (15  R.  I.  258)  324, 
325,  327,  439 
Pepoon's  Will  (91  N.  Y.  255)  475 

Pepper's  Estate  (148  Pa.  St.  5)  97 

Pepper  v.  Sidwell  (36  Oh.  St.  454)  804 

v.  Thomas  (85  Kv.  539)  261 

v.  Zahnsinger  (94  Ind.  88)         263, 1075 

Peppercorn  r.  Wagman  (5  DeG.  &  Sin. 

230)  721 

Peralta  v.  Castro  (6  Cal.  354)  76 

v.  Castro  (15  Cal.  511)  1192 

I'ercival  v.  Herbemonl  (1  McMull.  59)       690 

v.  McVoy  (Dudley  L.  337)  765 

Perdue  v   Bradshaw  (18  Ga.  287)  333 

Perego,  Matter  of  (65  Hun,  478)  52 

Perin  v.  Carey  (24  Bow.  465)      919,  922,  929 

v.  Megibben  (6  1'.  S.  App.  348)  286,  290 

Perkes  V.  Perkes  (3  B.  tk  Aid.  489)  90 

cxxviii 


•Page 
Perkins  v.  Brown  (29  Ga.  412)  992 

v.  Cartmell  (4  Harr.  270)  1247 

v.  Emory  (55  Md.  27)  noo 

v.  George  (45  N.  H.  453)  885 

v.  Gridley  (50  Cal.  97)    1023,  1061,  1002 

v.  Hasbrowck  (155  Pa.  St.  494)  824 

v.  Hollister  (59  Vt.  348)  705,  1139 

v.  Jones  (84  Va.  358)  79 

v.  Ladd  (114  Mass.  420)  417 

v.  Mathes  (49  N.  H.  107)     871,  966,  986 

v.  Micklethwaite  (1  P.  Wms.  275)      889 

v.  Onyett  (86  Cal.  348)         808,  809,  861 

v.  Perkins  (27  Ala.  479)  334 

v.  Perkins  (39  N.  H.  163)  37 

v.  Perkins  (46  N.  H.  110)  646 

v.  Perkins  (58  N.  H.  405)  835 

v.  Se  Ipsam  (11  R.  I.  270)  786 

v.  Stone  (18  Conn.  270)  375 

v.  Williams  (2  Root,  462)  362,  369 

Perley  v.  Sands  (3  Edw.  Ch.  325)  331 

Perot's  Appeal  (102  Pa.  St.  235)         147,  153 
Perret's  Succession  (20  La.  An.  86)  1207 

Perrin  v.  Lepper  (40  N.  W.  R.  859)  1137,  1138 
Perrine  v.  Pettv  (34  N.  J.  Eq.  193)     707,  709 

v.  Vreeland  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  102) 

v.  Vreeland  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  596) 

Perrott  v.  Perrott  (14  East,  423) 
Perrv  v.  Bowman  (151  111.  25) 

'v.  Carmicbael  (95  111.  519) 

v.  Clarkson  (16  Oh.  571) 

v.  Cunningham  (40  Ark.  185) 

v.  De  Wolf  (2  R.  I.  103) 

v.  Dixon  (4  Des.  504) 

v.  Field  (40  Ark.  175) 

v.  Hale  (44  N.  H.  363) 

v.  Maxwell  (2  Dev.  Eq.  488) 


708 

708 

91 

893 

628 

1050 

757 

513,  525 

701 

846 

994,  1103 

965,  975, 

1168,  1172 

785 


v.  Phelips  (10  Ves.  34) 

v.  St.  Joseph  R.  R.  Co.  (29  Kan.  420)  440, 

628 

v.  Smoot  (23  Grat.  241)  708 

v.  Sweeny  (11  D.  C.  404)  501 

v.  West  (40  Miss.  233)  805 

v.  Wooten  (5  Humph.  524)  677,  679 

Perrvman  v.  Greer  (39  Ala.  133)  1239 

Person's  Appeal  (74  Pa.  St.  121)  1216 

Person  v.  Montgomery  (120  N.  C.  Ill)      842, 

844,  1036 

Personette  v.  Johnson  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  173)  735, 

1023,  1038,  1209 

v.  Personette  (35  N.  J.  Eq.  472)  787 

Peter's  Appeal  (2  Cent.  Rep.  528)  976 

Peter  v.  Beverly  (10  Peters,  532)        718,  727, 

738,  796 

r.  King  (13  Mo.  143)  809 

Peters's  Appeal  (38  Pa.  St.  239)  685 

Peters  v.  Breckenridge  (2  Cr.  C.  C.  518)  414, 

422 

p.  Carr  (2  Dem.  22)  348 

v.  Carr  (16  Mo.  54)  878 

v.  Clendenin  (12  Mo.  App.  521)         1234 

V.  Leeder  (L.  J.  47  Q.  B.  573)  419 

v.  Lvnchburg  (76  Va.  927)  691  a 

v.  Pub.  Adm'r  (1  Bradf.  200)  531 

v.  West  (70  Ga.  343)  258 

Peterson's  Appeal  (88  Pi.  St.  397)  727 

Peterson  v.  Chemical  Bank  (32  N.  Y.  21)  367, 

387 
Petigru  v.  Ferguson  (6  Rich.  Eq.  378)  395 
Pe.tit's  Succession  (9  La.  An.  207)  532 

Pettee  v.  Wilmarth  (5  Allen,  144)  193 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Fetters  v.  Fetters  (4  McCord,  151)  874 

Pettes  v.  Bingham  (10  N.  H.  514)  37 

Pettifer  v.  James  (Bunb.  16)  520 

Pettingill  v.  Pettingill  (60  Me.  411)  553, 

1159,  1193 
Pettus  v.  Clawson  (4  Rich.  Eq.  92)  1189 


199,  215 
238 
210 
470 
245 
1231 
821 


v.  McKinney  (56  Ala.  41) 

v.  McKinnev  (74  Ala.  108) 

Petty  v.  Barrett  (37  Tex.  84) 

v.  Ducker  (51  Ark.  281) 

v.  Petty  (4  B.  Mon.  215) 

v.  Wafford  (11  Ala.  143) 

v.  Young  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  654) 

Pettyjohn  v.  Woodroof  (77  Va.  507)  1001, 1002 

323 

913 

1236 

1187 

286 

81 

781,  804 

804 

1193 

59 

938,  939 

416 

750 

1040 

858 


Pew  v.  Hastings  (1  Barb.  Ch.  452) 
Peynado  v.  Pevnado  (82  Kv.  5) 
Peyser  v.  Wen'dt  (2  Dem.  221) 
Peyton  v.  Smith  (2  D.  &  B.  Eq.  325) 

v.  Stratton  (7  Grat.  380) 

Pfarr  v.  Belmont  (39  La.  An.  294) 
Pfeiffer  v.  Suss  (73  Mo.  245) 

v.  Suss  (5  Mo.  App.  590) 

Pfirshing  v.  Falsh  (87  III.  200) 
Pflugar  v.  Pultz  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  440) 
Pfuelb's  Estate  (48  Cal.  643) 
Phallon  v.  Houseal  (3  McC.  Ch.  423) 
Pharis  v.  Leachman  (20  Ala.  662) 
Phelan  v.  Bird  (20  La.  An.  355) 

v.  Phelan  (13  Ala.  679) 

Phelen  v.  Smith  (100  Cal.  158)  195, 198,  208, 

215,662 
Phelps  v.  Bates  (54  Conn.  11)  878,  881 

v.  Culver  (6  Vt.  430)  634 

v.  Daniel  (86  Ga.  363)  186 

v.  Funkhouser  (39  111.  401)  715 

v.  Greenbaum  (87  Iowa,  347)       782,  825 

v.  Jepson  (1  Root,  48)  233 

v.  Martin  (74  Ind.  339)  575 

v.  Miles  (1  Root,  162)  1267 

v.  Morrison  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  195)  609 

v.  Phelps  (72  111.  545)  175,  186,  213 

v.  Phelps  (143  Mass.  570)  1102 

v.  Phelps  (143  N.  Y.  197)  236 

v.  Phelps  (20  Pick.  556)  612 

v.  Rice  (10  Met.  128)  827 

v.  Robbins  (40  Conn.  250)  1018 

Phene's  Trust  (L.  R.  5  Ch.  App.  139)  445 
Philadelphia's  Appeal  (112  Pa.  St.  470)  726 
Philadelphia  v.  Fox  (64  Pa.  St.  169)  933 

v.  Girard  (45  Pa.  St.  9)  930,  931 

Philadelphia  Trust  Co.  v.  Lippincott  (106 

Pa.  St.  295)  722 

Philbrick  v.  Spangler  (15  La.  An.  46)  62 

Philips's  Will  (1  How.  Pr.  n.  s.  291)  71 

Will  (98  N.  Y.  267)  71 

Philips  v.  Gray  (1  Ala.  226)  712 

v.  Philips  (2  Bro.  Ch.  273)  1106 

v.  Stewart  (59  Mo.  491)  511 

Philipson  v.  Harvev  (2  Lee,  344)  1115 

Phillips'  Estate  (133  Pa.  St.  426)  1005, 1008 
Phillips,  Goods  of  (2  Add.  336,  note  b)       406 

Estate  of  (18  Mont.  311)  1195 

In  re  (71  Cal.  285)  345/1235 

v.  Allegheny  R.  R.  (107  Pa,  St.  465)  815 

v.  Beal  (32  Beav.  25)  1001 

v.  Bignell  (1  Phillim.  239)  662 

v.  Carpenter  (79  Iowa,  600)  903 

v.  Chappell  (16  Ga.  16)  1223 

v.  Chater  (1  Dem.  533)  34 

v.  Co.  (94  Kv.  445)  62 

- —  v.  Clark  (18"R.  I.  627)  1099 

vol.  i.  —  i 


•  Page 

Phillips  v.  Ferguson  (85  Va.  597)  728,  963 

v.  Graves  (20  Oh.  St.  371)  606 

v.  Harrow  (93  Iowa,  92)  913,  917 

v.  McCombs  (53  N.  Y.  494  975,  981 

v.  McLaughlin  (26  Miss.  596)  1214 

v.  Medbury  (7  Conn.  568)  962 

v.  Overfield  (100  Mo.  466)  646 

v.  Parrv  (22  Beav.  279)  1106 

v.  Phillips  (90  Iowa,  541)  1218,  1224 

v.  Phillips  (81  Ky.  328)  1149 

i'.  Phillips  (93  Kv.  498)  882 

v.  Phillips  (87  Me.  324)  828 

v.  Phillips  (18  Mont.  305)  786,  821 

v.  Phillips  (112  N.  Y.  197)  875,  877 

v.  Phillips  (1  Stew.  71)  741 

v.  Richardson  (4  J.  J.  Marsh.  212)    1170 

v.  Sanchez  (35  Fla.  187)  793,  824 

v.  Stewart  (59  Mo.  491)  534,  723 

v.  Wood  (16  R.  I.  274)  953 

v.  Wooster  (36  N.  Y.  412)  610 

Phillipsburgh  v.  Burch  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  482)  888 

Phillipse  v.  Higdon  (Busb.  L.  380)  336 

Philson  v.  Bampfield  (1  Brev.  202)  287 

Phinnev  v.  Johnson  (13  S.  C.  25)  1075 

v. "Johnson  (15  S.  C.  158)  261 

v.  Warren  (52  Iowa,  332)  434,  564 

Phipps,  Matter  of  (143  N.  Y.  641)  691  a 

v.  Acton  (12  Bush,  375)  200 

v.  Addison  (7  Blackf.  75)  793 

v.  Alford  (95  Ga.  215)  792 

v.  Annesley  (2  Atk.  57)  995 

v.  Earl  of  Anglesey  (7  Br.  P.  C.  443)    72 

v.  Hope  (16  Oh.  St.  586)  82,  121 

Phoebe  v.  Boggers  (1  Grat.  129)  84 
Phoenix  v.  Livingston  (101  N.  Y.  451)      1175 

Phyfe  v.  Phvfe  (3  Bradf.  45)  906 

Piatt  v.  St.  Clair  (6  Ohio,  227)  659 
Picard's  Succession  (33  La.  An.  1135)        566 

Pickar  r.  Harlan  (75  Mo.  678)  686 

Pickenbrock's  Estate  (102  Iowa,  81)  1219 

Pickens  v.  Davis  (134  Mass.  252)  100 

v.  Dorris  (20  Mo.  Ap.  1)  956 

—  v.  Miller  (83  N.  C.  543)  1138 

Pickering  v.  Coleman  (12  N.  H.  148)  427 

v.  Langdon  (22  Me.  413)  97,  877 

v.  Pendexter  (46  N.  H.  69)  525 

v.  Pickering  (50  N.  H.  349)  893 

v.  Shotwell  (10  Pa.  St.  23)  922 

v.  Towers  (2  Lee,  401)  504 

Pickett  o.  Everett  (11  Mo.  568)  639 

Pico's  Estate  (56  Cal.  413)  538 

Pico  v.  De  La  Guerra  (18  Cal.  422)  803,  819 

Picot  v.  Bates  (47  Mo.  390)  1132 

v.  Biddle  ( 35  Mo.  29)  1 122 

Picquet,  Appellant  (5  Pick.  65)    360,  546,  552 

v.  Swan  (4  Mason,  443)  609,  642 

Pidcock  v.  Potter  (68  Pa.  St.  342)  42 

Pierce  v.  Allen  (12  R.  I.  510)  853 

V.  Batten  (3  Kans.  App.  396)  692 

v.  Boston  Savings  Bank  (129  Mass. 

425)  118,  119 

v.  Pierce  (38  Mich.  412)  39,  40,  46 

v.  Proprietors  (10  R.  I.  227)  591 

v.  Stidworthv  (81  Me.  50)  1000 

v.  Trigg  (10  Leigh,  406)  235,  290 

Pierson  v.  Archdeaken  (1  Ale.  &  Nap.  23)  790 

v.  Armstrong  (1  Iowa,  282)  250 

v.  Gillenwaters  (99  Tenn.  446)  451 

v.  Post  (3  Cai.  175)  596 

Piester  v.  Piester  (22  S.  C.  139)  861 

Pifer  v.  Ward  (8  Blackf.  252)  '  239 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 
*  Page 


150 

1221,  1246 

401,  506 

577,  582 

941 
347,  757 


Piflett's  Succession  (39  La.  556) 
Pigg  r.  Carroll  (89  111.  205) 
Piggot's  Case  (5  Rep.  29) 
Pike's  Estate  (45  Wis.  391) 
Pike  r.  Stephenson  (99  Mass.  188) 

v.  Thomas  (62  Ark.  223) 

v.  Thomas  (47  So.  W.  (Ark.)  110)    758 

1146 

b.  Thorp  (44  Conn.  450) 

v.  VValley  (15  Gray,  345) 

Pilkington  v.  Boughey  (12  Sim.  114) 
Pillow  v.  Hardeman  (3  Hum.  538) 
Pirrian  v.  Insall  (1  Mac.  &  G.  449) 
Pimb's  Case  (Moore,  196) 
Pinckard  v.  Pinckard  (24  Ala.  250)  1145, 1146, 

1148, 1149 
Pincknev  v.  Pinckney  (2  Rich.  Eq.  218)  209, 

1104 
Pingee,  In  re  (100  Cal.  78)  396 

Pinkard  v.  Smith  (Little's  Sel.  Cas.  331)    639 
Pinkerton  v.  Sargent  (102  Mass.  568) 


803 
972 
910 
686 
659 
308 


•Page 
184,  380 
1030 
905 
292,  1232 


1248 

915,  949 

259 

426 

548 


r.  Sargent  (112  Mass.  110) 

Pinkham  v.  Blair  (57  N.  11.  226) 

v.  Gear  (3  N.  H.  163) 

i>.  Grant  (78  Me.  158) 

Pinkstaff  v.  People  (59  111.  148) 
Pinneo  v.  Goodspeed  (120  111.  524)  1151, 1156, 

1157 
Pinnev's  Will  (27  Minn.  280)  41 

PinneV  v.  Bissell  (7  Conn.  21)  1244 

v.  Fellows  (15  Vt.  525)  611 

„.  McGregorv  (102  Mass.  186)     361,  442 

v.  Orth  (88  N.  Y.  447)  831 

Piper's  Estate  (15  Pa.  St.  533)  654 

Piper  v.  Clark  (18  N.  H.  415)  822 

v.  Goodwin  (23  Me.  251)  '93 

v.  Moulton  (72  Me.  155)         76,  921,  934 

v.  Piper  (34  N.  H.  563) 

v.  Smith  (1  Head,  93) 

Pirtle  v.  Cowan  (4  Dana,  302) 
Pistole  v.  Street  (5  Port.  64) 
Pistorius's  Appeal  (53  Mich.  350) 
Pitcher  v.  Armat  (5  How.  Miss.  288) 


164 

284,  290 
992 

526,  696 
761 
404 


283,  1122 

810 


Pitkin  r.  Pitkin  (7  Conn.  307) 
Pitner  v.  Flanagan  (17  Tex.  7) 
Pitney  «.  Everson  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  361) 
Pitt  r.  Petwav(12  Ired.  69) 

v.  I'oole  (91  Tenn.  70) 

Pittard  V.  Foster  (12  111.  App.  132) 

Pitte  v.  Shiplev  (46  Cal.  154). 

Pittenger  v.  Pittenger  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  156)    1037 

Pittman's  Estate  (182  Pa.  St.  355)    969,  1018 

Pittman  v.  Johnson  (35  Hun,  38) 

v.  Pittman  (59  Miss.  203) 

Pitts  o.  .lame-on  (15  Barb.  310) 

. v.  Melser  (72  Ind.  469) 

V.  Singleton  (44  Ala.  363) 

v.  Wooten  (24  Ala.  474) 

Pixlev  v.  Bennett  (11  Mass.  298) 
Pizzala  v.  Campbell  (46  Ala.  35) 
Place.  In  iv  (1  Kedf.  276) 

b.  Oldham  (10  B.  Mon.  400) 

PI  Lisance'a  Estate  (Myr.  117) 
Planters'  Bank  v.  Davis  (31  Ala.  626) 

v.  Neal  (74  Ga.  576) 

r.  White  (2  Hum.  112) 

Phuket  '•.  Beeby  (4  East,  485) 
Plate's  Appeal  (148  Pa.  St.  55) 
Plat h' 8  Estate  (56  1 1  nil,  223) 
Platner  v.  Sherwood  iO  John.  Ch.  118) 
Platt'8  Appeal  (50  Conn.  572) 

CXJtX 


Piatt's  Appeal  (80  Pa.  St.  501) 
Piatt  v.  Bricklev  (119  Ind.  333) 

v.  Mickle  (137  N.  Y.  106) 

v.  Piatt  (42  Conn.  330) 

v.  Piatt  (105  N.  Y.  488)   757,  1028, 1270, 

1271 
Pleasants  v.  Dunkin  (47  Tex.  343)      502,  568 

v.  Flood  (89  Va.  96)  1093 

v.  Glasscock  (1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  17)      421 

Plenty  v.  West  (1  Rob.  Ecc.  264)  97,  98 

Plimpton  ».  Chamberlain  (4  Grav,  320)      825 

v.  Fuller  (11  Allen,  139)  1100 

Plowman  v.  Henderson  (59  Ala.  559)  527 

Plume  v.  Beale  (1  P.  Wins.  388)  484 

v.  Howard  Savings  Inst.  (40  N.  J.  L. 

211)  324,  325,  330,  455,  468 

Plumer  v.  Marchant  (3  Burr.  1380)  787 

v.  Plumer  (30  N.  H.  558)  003 

Plummer  v.  Brandon  (5  Ired.  Eq.  190)       362 

v.  White  (101  111.  474)  207 

Plunket  v.  Penson  (2  Atk.  290)  657 

Pocock  v.  Redinger  (108  Ind.  573)       894,  895 
Poe  v.  Domic  (54  Mo.  119)  832 

Poindexter  v.  Blackburn  (1  Ired.  Eq.  286)  598 

v.  Gibson  (1  Jones  Eq.  44)  1146 

Poland  ».  Vesper  (67  Mo.  727)  214 

Pole  v.  Simmons  (49  Md.  14)  796,  820 

v.  Somers  (6  Ves.  309)  976 

Polhemus   v.  Middleton    (37   N.  J.   Eq. 

240  1149,  1151 

Polk  v.  Allen  (19  Mo.  467)  385 

v.  Schulenburg  (4  Mo.  App.  592)      1256 

Pollard  v.  Barklev  (117  Ind.  40)      1132,  1164 

v.  Mohler  (55  Md.  284)  531 

v.  Pollard  (1  Allen,  490)  985,  1007 

v.  Scears  (28  Ala.  484)  843 

v.  Slaughter  (92  N.  C.  72)  232 

Pollev  b.  Polley  (82  Kv.  64)  1220 

Pollock,  Matter  of  (3  Redf.  100)  1187 

v.  Buie  (43  Miss.  140)  1255 

v.  Farmers  L.  &  T.  Co.  (157  U.  S. 

429)  691  a 

v.  Glassell  (2  Grat.  439)  474,  475 

v.  Learned  (102  Mass.  49)  995 


1175 
1083 

631 
38 

801 


1006 

1057 
635 
502 

1157 

736 

253 

200,  257 

1134 
775 
508 
277 
794 
680 

1201 

03 

402 

403 

236 


Pomerov  v.  Bailev  (43  N.  H.  118)  609 
v.  Mills  (37  'N.  J.  Eq.  528)      1129,  1105, 


1107,  1108 
1171 
1226 
1100 


v.  Mills  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  517) 

v.  Pomerov  (93  Wis.  262) 

Pond  b.  Allen  (15  R.  I.  171) 

■  v.  Bergh  (10  Pai.  140)  880,  881,  890,  946 

v.  Irvin  (113  Ind.  243)  145 

v.  Kimball  (101  Mass.  105)  293,  294 

r.  Makepeace  (2  Met.  Mass.  114)300,537 

Ponsford  v.  Hartley  (2  John.  &  H.  736)  1118 
Pool's  Succession  (1 1  La.  An.  677)  669,  078 
Pool  v.  Docker  (92  111.  501 )  1241 

v.  Ellis  (64  Miss.  555)     1058, 1059,  1071 

v.  Hodnett  (18  Ala.  752)  1078 

Poole  b.  Brown  (12  S.  C  556)  346 

1'.  Burnham  (99  Iowa,  493)  663 

b.  McLeod  (1  Sm.  &  M.  391)  337 

?'.  Mundav  (103  Mass.  174)  690 

v.  Richardson  (3  Mass.  330)  41 

Pooler  b.  Cristman  (145  111.  405)  43,  48 

Pooley,  In  re  (L.  R.  40  Ch.  D.  1)  76 

Poor  v.  Larrabee  (58  Me.  543)  1050 

v.  Robinson  (10  Mass.  131)  1044 

Pope  r.  Boyd  (22  Ark.  535)  843,  848,  860 

v.  Cutler  (34  Mich.  150)  492 

v.  Delavon  (1  Wend.  68)  794 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Pope  v.  Elliott  (8  B.  Mon.  56)  956 

v.  Hays  (30  Ga.  539)  164 

v.  Matthews  (18  S.  C.  444)  708 

v.  Mead  (99  N.  Y.  201)  238,  254 

■ v.  Pope  (95  Ga.  87)  86 

Porche  v.  Banks  (8  La.  An.  65)        1146,  1188 
Porschet  v.  Porschet  (82  Ky.  93)  48 

Porter's  Appeal  (45  Pa.  St.  201)  902 

Appeal  (94  Pa.  St.  332)  872,  1215,  1221, 

1222 

Estate  (77  Pa.  St.  43)  761 

Porter,  In  re  (20  D.  O.  493)  70 

v.  Ford  (82  Kv.  191)  28 

v.  Hevdock  (6  Vt.  374)  375 

o.  Hornsby  (32  La.  An.  337)  499 

v.  Jackson  (»5  Ind.  210)  1097,  1099 

n.  Johnson  (96  Ga.  145)  648 

v.  Jones  (52  Mo.  399)  533 

■  v.  Lazear  (109  U.  S.  84)  240 

V.  Porter  (7  How.  Miss.  106)  1231 

v.  Porter  (165  Mass.  157)  190 

v.  Porter  (51  Me.  376)  1226 

v.  Sweeney  (61  Tex.  213)  863 

v.  Trail  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  100)  509 

Portevant  v.  Neylans  (38  Miss.  104)  345 

Portia  V.  Cole  (11  Tex.  157)  758,  1146 

Portman  v.  Klemish  (54  Iowa,  198)  419 

Portsmouth  v.  Shackford  (40  N.  H.  423)    904 
Portsmouth  Ins.  Co.  v.  Reynolds  (32  Grat, 

613) 
Portwood  v.  Hunter  (6  B.  Mon.  538) 
Portz  v.  Schantz  (70  Wis.  497) 
Posegate  v.  South  (46  Oh.  St.  391) 
Posey  v.  Decatur  Bank  (12  Ala.  802) 

v.  Hanson  (10  App.  D.  C.  496) 

Post  y.  Caulk  (3  Mo.  35) 

v.  Ca vender  (12  Mo.  App.  20) 

v.  Herbert  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  540) 

v.  Love  (19  Fla.  634) 

v.  Mackall  (3  Bland.  Ch.  486) 

v.  Mason  (26  Hun,  187) 

o.  Mason  (91  N.  Y.  539) 

Postlewait  v.  Howes  (3  Iowa,  355) 
Postley  v.  Cheyne  (4  Dem.  492) 
Postmaster  v.  Robbins  (1  Ware,  165) 
Postmaster  General  v.  Early  (12  Wheat. 

136)  554 

Potter's  Appeal  (56  Conn.  1)  340,  1125 

Appeal  (53  Mich.  106)  46 

Potter  v.  Baldwin  (133  Mass.  427)         48,  490 

v.  Brown  (11  R.  I.  332)  111 

v.  Couch  (141  U.  S.  296)  728,  955 

v.  Cromwell  (40  N.  Y.  287)  603 

v.  Oummings  (18  Me.  55)  684 

v.  Dolan  (19  R.  I.  514)  715 

v.  Everett  (7  Ired.  Eq.  152)  255 

v.  Jones  (20  Oreg.  239)  33,  34 

v.  McAlpiue  (3  Dem.  108)  661,  958 

v.  McDowell  (31  Mo.  62)  609 

v.  National  Bank  (102  U.  S.  163)        833 

v.  Ogden  (136  N.  Y.  384)  551 

v.  Smith  (36  Ind.  231)  703, 1087 

v.  Titcomb  (7  Me.  302)  1140 

v.  Titcomb  (10  Me.  53)  654 

v.  Wheeler  (13  Mass.  104)  233 

Potts  v.  Brenehan  (182  Pa.  St.  295)  723 

v.  House  (6  Ga.  324)     31,  41,  43,  46,  479 

v.  Smith  (3  Rawle,  361)        745,  746,  752 

Potwine's  Appeal  (31  Conn   381)  324,  325 

Poulson  v.  Bank  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  618)  1190 

Povall,  Ex  parte  (3  Leigh,  816)  492 


647 

83 

330,  502 

1000 

844 

1015 

506 

1002 

943 

390 

1107 

497,  499 

50 

1265 

578 

772 


•Page 

Powel  v.  Thompson  (4  Des.  162)  545 
Powell's  Succession  (14  La.  An.  425)         1166 

Powell,  Matter  of  (5  Dem.  281)  536 

■  v.  Boon  (43  Ala.  459)  710 

v.  Burrus  (35  Miss.  605)  1165 

v.  Drake  (19  D.  C.  334)  1005 

v.  Hatch  (100  Mo.  592)  922 

v.  Hurt  (108  Mo.  507)  677 

v.  Koehler  (52  Oh.  St.  103)  469,  500 

v.  Monson  Co.  (3  Ma>s.  347)  248,  250 

v.  North  (3  Ind.  392)  281,  340 

v.  Palmer  (45  Mo.  App.  236)  434,  828 

v.  Powell  (10  Ala.  900)  1164 

v.  Powell  (30  Ala.  697)  103 

v.  Powell  (80  Ala.  11)  1157 

v.  Powell  (5  Dana,  1C8)  1214 

v.  Powell  (18  Kan.  371)  224 

v.  Powell  (23  Mo.  App.  365)  689,  757 

v.  Powell  (84  Va.  415)  627 

v.  Rich  (41  111.  466)  599 

i'.  Stratton  (11  Grat.  792)  371 

Power's  Estate  (92  Mich.  106)  164,  193 

Estate  (14  Phil.  289)  421 

Power  v.  Cassidv  (147  N.  Y.  104)  925 

v.  Davis  (3"MacArthur,  153)  1099 

v.  Dougherty  (83  Ky.  187)  146 

v.  Hafley  (85  Ky.  til  l )  141 

v.  Power  (91  Mich.  587)  1224,  1226 

Powers,  In  re  (25  Vt.  261)  131 

Matter  of,  (124  N.  Y.  301)  822,  1096 

17.  Blakev  (16  Mo.  437)  682,  1123 

v.  Douglass  (53  Vt.  471)  685,  811 

v.  Kite  (83  N.  C  156)  158 

v.  Powers  (57  Vt.  49)  815,  851,  852. 

v.  Powers  (28  Wis.  659)  1097 

Powys  v.  Mansfield  (3  Myl.  &  Cr.  359)       981 

Prater  v.  Prater  (87  Tenn.  78)  204,  205- 

v.  Whittle  (16  S.  C.  40)  1206 

Prat  her  v.  Prather  (58  Ind.  141)  939 
Pratt's  Appeal  (117  Pa.  St.  401)  635 
Pratt  v.  Atwood  (108  Mass.  40)  156 
v.  Douglass  (38  N.  J.  Eq.  516)  266,  1016 


Elkins  (80  N.  Y.  198) 
v.  I'lamer  (5  Har.  &  J.  10) 
v.  Houghtaling  (45  Mich.  457) 


v.  Kitterell  (4  Dev.  168) 

i\  Leadbetter  (38  Me.  9) 

v.  McGhee  (17  S.  C.  428) 

v.  Northam  (5  Mason,  95) 

v.  Patterson  (81  Pa.  St.  114) 

v.  Pond  (5  Allen,  59) 

v.  Pratt  (161  Mass.  276) 

v.  Pratt  (22  Minn.  148) 

v.  Skolfield  (45  Me.  386) 

v.  Stewart  (49  Conn.  339) 

v.  Tefft  (14  Mich.  191) 

Pray  v.  Fleming  (2  Hill  Ch.  97) 

v.  Hegeman  (92  N.  Y.  508) 

Preachers'  Aid  Society  v.  Rich  (45  Me. 

552)  893,  923 

Preble  v.  Preble  (73  Me.  362)  835 

Prefontaine  v.  McMicken  (16  Wash.  16) 

1234,  126T 
Prendergast,  Re  (5  Notes  oiCas.  92)  ^85 

Prentice  v.  Janssen  (79  N.  Y.  478)  728 

Prentis  v.  Bates  (88  Mich.  567)      '  3L 

v.  Bates  (93  Mich.  234)  31,  41 

Prentiss  v.  Prentiss  (11  Allen,  47)  110 

Presbury  v.  Pickett  (1  Kans.  App.  631)    431, 

433 


836 

898 

1027, 

1028 

1198 

879 

938 

1247 

836 

354 

200 

1248 

244 

723 

225 

697 

918 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*Page 
Presbyterian  Church  v.  McElhinney  (61 

Mo.  540)  340,  348,  1038 

Prescott's  Estate  (Tuck.  430)  688 

Prescott  v.  Durfee  (131  Mass.  477)  442 

v.  Prescott  (7  Met.  141)  937,  946 

■ v.  Tarbell  (1  Mass.  204)  665 

v.  Walker  (16  N.  H.  340)         1045,  1048 

v.  Ward  (10  Allen,  203)  655 

President,  &c.  v.  Browne  (34  Md.  450)      509, 

533 
Presley  v.  Davis  (7  Rich.  Eq.  105)  915 

Pressley  v.  Robinson  (57  Tex.  458)  196,  209 
Preston  v.  Brant  (96  Mo.  552)  878,  902 

v.  Colby  (117  111.  477)  293 

v.  Cole  (64  N.  H.  459)  149 

v.  Cutter  (64  N.  H.  461)      631,  796,  822, 

841,  842,  843 

v.  Knapp  (85  Cal.  559)  803 

v.  Jones  (9  Pa.  St.  456)  500 

v.  Palmer  (42  Hun.  368)  89 

v.  Trust  Co.  (94  Kv.  295)  499 

Prevo  t>.  Walters  (5  Ill.*35)  1043 

Prewet  v.  Wilson  (103  U.  S.  22)  608 

v.  Goodlett  (98  Tenn.  82)     840,  845,  846 

857 
Price's  Estate  (81  Pa.  St.  263)  1149 

Price,  Goods  of  (L.  R.  12  Prob.  D.  137)  26,  27 

Matter  of  (67  N.  Y.  231 )  1233 

V.  Brayton  (19  Iowa,  309)  597 

v.  Cole  (83  Va.  343)  873 

v.  Courtney  (87  Mo.  387)  732 

v.  Dietrich  (12  Wis.  626)  865 

v.  Hobbs  (47  Md.  359)  261 

v.  Likens  (23  Tex.  335)  336 

v.  Mace  (47  Wis.  23)  361 

v.  Mathews  (14  La.  An.  11)  288 

v.  Maxwell  (23  Pa.  St.  23)  97,  98 

v.  Mitchell  (10  Sm.  &  M.  179)  1153 

v.  Morris  (5  McLean,  4)  368 

v.  Nesbitt  (1  Hill  Ch.  445)  568,  693 

v.  North  (1  Phillips,  Eng.  85)  1095 

v.  Pickett  (21  Ala.  741)  638 

v.  Price  (6  Dana,  107)  230 

v.  Price  (75  N.  Y.  244)  625 

v.  Price  (124  N.  Y.  596)  223 

v.  Price  (156  Pa.  617)  442,  443 

v.  Springfield  R.  E.  Ass'n.  (101  Mo. 

107)  1067 

v.  Winter  (15  Fla.  66)  1030 

v.  Woodford  (43  Mo.  247)  270 

Priddv  v.  Griffith  (150  111.  560)  229 

Pride  v.  Watson  (7  Heisk.  232)  173 

Pridgen  v.  Pridgen  (13  Ired  L.  259)  71 

Priest  v.  Cumniings  (20  Wend.  338)  251 

v.  McMaster  (52  Mo.  60)  336 

v.  Spier  (96  Mo.  Ill)  1023 

v.  Watkins  (2  Hill,  225)  412,  426 

Priestley's  Appeal  (127  Pa.  St.  420)  1130 

Primm  v.  Stewart  (7  Tex.  178)  446 

Primmer  v.  Primmer  (75  Iowa,  415)  48 

Prince  v.  Guillemot  (1  Rich.  Eq.  187)         775 

v.  Hazelton  (20  John.  502)  82,  489 

v.  Nicholson  (5  Taunt.  665)  785 

v.  Prince  (47  Ala.  283)  768 

Princeton  v.  Adams  (10  Cush.  129)  954 

l'ringle  v.  Dorsey  (3  S.  C.  502)  932 

v.  Dunkley  (14  Sm.  &  M.  16)  962 

v.  Gaw  (5  S.  &  R.  530)  254 

v.  Mcl'herson  (2  Brev.  279)  90 

v.  McPher.son  (2  Des.  524)  686 

r.  JJringle  (59  Pa.  St.  281)  631 

exxxii 


Pringle  v.  Pringle  (130  Pa.  St.  565) 
Printup  v.  Patton  (91  Ga.  422) 
Prior  v.  Talbot  (10  Cush.  1) 
Pritchard  v.  Norwood  (155  Mass.  539) 


733 
534 
391 
432, 
439 


v.  Pritchard  (69  Wis.  373)  824,  825,  831 

v.  State  (34  Ind.  137)  558,  559 

t;.  Thompson  (95  N.  Y.  76)  921 

Pritchett's  Estate  (51  Cal.  568)        1229,  1230 
Pritchett  v.  Nashville  Co.  (96  Tenn.  472) 

1004 
Probate  Court  v.  Angell  (14  R.  I.  495)       391, 

551 

v.  Chapin  (31  Vt.  373) 

v.  Hazard  (13  R.  I.  1) 

v.  Kent  (49  Vt.  380) 

v.  Merriam  (8  Vt.  234) 

v.  Strong  (27  Vt.  202) 

v.  Van  Duzer  (13  Vt.  135) 

Probate  Judge  v.  Abbott  (50  Mich.  278) 

v.  Ellis  (63  N.  H.  366) 

v.  Mathes  (60  N.  H.  433) 

Procter  v.  Newhall  (17  Mass.  81) 


865 
391,  560 

865 
1255 

553 

855 

435 
806,  846 

709 
150,  1238, 
1245 
Proctor  v.  Atkyns  (1  Mass.  321)  344 

v.  Clark  (154  Mass.  45)  902 

17.  Dicklow  (57  Kas.  119)     349,  356,  357, 

1234 

v.  Proctor  (105  N.  C.  222)  844,  1029 

v.  Robinson  (35  Mich.  284)  992 

v.  Wanmaker  (1  Barb.  Ch.  302)  399,  571 

Proprietors,  &c.  v.  Mussey  (48  Me.  307)     554 
Proseus  v.  Mclntyre  (5  Barb.  424)  1218 

Prosser  v.  Leatherman  (4  How.  Miss.  237) 

745 
Protestant  Epis.  Soc.  v.  Churchman  (80 

Va.  718)  913,  929 

Proud  v.  Turner  (2  P.  Wms.  560)  1216 

Prout's  Estate  (6  N.  Y.  Supp.  457)  691  a 

Prout,  In  re  (52  Hun,  109)  1120 

In  re  (128  N.  Y.  70)  555 

Proutv  v.  Mather  (49  Vt.  415)  1066 

Provenchere's  Appeal  (67  Pa.  St.  463)        942 
Providence  Gas  Co.  v.  Thurber  (2  R.  I. 

15)  602 

Pruden  v.  Pruden  (14  Oh.  St.  251)  877,  890, 

946 
Pruyn,  Matter  of  (141  N.  Y.  544)  1120 

Pry's  Appeal  (8  Watts,  253)  1041 

Pryor  r.  Coggin  (17  Ga.  444)  93 

v.  Davis  (109  Ala.  117)       646,  691,  801, 

1072,  1151 

v.  Downey  (50  Cal.  088)  428,  1023,  1038 

v.  Morgan  (170  Pa.  St.  568)  645 

Public   Administrator  v.  Llias  (4  Dem. 
139)  680 

v.  Peters  (1  Bradf.  100)  399,571 

v.  Watts  (1  Pai.  347)  400 

Public  Works  v.   Columbia  College  (17 

Wall.  521)  496,  1027,  1263,  1269 

Puckett  v.  James  (2  Humph.  565)     805,  1239 

v.  McCall  (30  Tex.  457)  821 

Pugh  V.  Jones  (6  Leigh,  299)  364,  1201 

v.  Ottenkirk  (3  W.  &  S.  170)  1201 

f.  Pugh  (105  Ind.  552)  899 

V.  Russell  (27  Grat.  789)  1110 

Pullen  v.  Pullen  (52  N.  J.  Eq.  9)  229 

v.  Wake  (06  N.  C.  361)  691  a 

Pulitzer  v.  Livingston  (89  Me.  359)  917 

Pulliam  v.  Byrd  (2  Strobh.  Eq.  134)  693 

Pulling's  Estate  (93  Mich.  274)  264 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 

rulling  v.  Durfee  (85  Mich.  34)  161,  171,  175 

v.  Probate  Judge  (88  Mich.  387)  192 

Pullman  v.  Willets  (4  Dem.  536)      1148,  1170 
Pumpelly  v.  Tinkham  (23  Barb.  321)  562 

Purcell  v.  Lang  (97  Iowa,  610)  242 

Purcelly  v.  Carter  (45  Ark.  299)       1015,  1239 
Purdew  v.  Jackson  (1  Russ.  Ch.  1)  641 

Purdv  v.  Hall  (134  III.  298)  50 

V.  Purdv  (3  Md.  Ch.  547)  236 

Purnell  v.  Dudley  (4  Jones  Eq.  203)  878 

Purple  v.  Whithed  (49  Vt.  187)  366 

Pursel  v.  Pursel  (14  N.  J.  Eq.  514)    668, 1149, 

1154 
Purviance  v.  Schultz  (16  Ind.  App.  94)  59 
Purvear  v.  Heard  (14  Ala.  121)  494 

-v.  Purvear  (5  Baxt.  640)  220 

v.  Reese  (6  Coldw.  21)  37,  42 

Pusev  v.  Clemson  (9  Serg.  &  R.  204)  684, 1103 
—  'v.  Wathen  (90  Kv.  473)  1113 

Putnam  v.  Osgood  (52  N.  H.  148)  610 

v.  Parker  (55  Me.  235)  294 

v.  Pitnev  (45  Minn.  242)  366 

v.  Putnam  (8  Pick.  433)  224,  225 

v.  So.  Pac.  Co.  (21  Oreg.  230)     627,  628 

v.  Storv  (132  Mass.  205)  719 

v.  Young  (57  Tex.  461)  209 

Putnam  Free  School  v.   Fisher  (30  Me. 

523)  718 

Putney  v.  Fletcher  (140  Mass.  596)  1195 

v.  Fletcher  (148  Mass.  247)  631 

Pyatt  v.  Brockman  (6  Cal.  418)  1251 

— —  v.  Waldo  (85  Fed.  R.  399)       1267,  1268, 

1270,  1271 
Pve,  Matter  of  (18  N.  Y.  App.  D.  306)  993 
Pyle's  Appeal  (102  Pa.  St.  317)  941 

Pvm  v.  Lockyer  (5  Mvl.  &  Cr.  29)  977 

Pyne  v.  Woolland  (2  Ventr.  179)  426 


Quackenboss  v.  Southwick  (41  N.  Y.  117)  536, 

721 
Quackenbush   v.   Campbell   (Walk.   Ch. 
525)  852 

v.  Quackenbush  (42  Hun,  329)  1099 

Quain's  Appeal  (22  Pa.  St.  510)  688 

Quarles  v.  Campbell  (72  Ala.  64)     1035,  1038 

v.  Capell  (2  Dver,  204  6)  1093 

v.  Garrett  (4  Desaus.  145)  270 

v.  Lacev  (4  Munf.  251)  242 

v.  Quarles  (4  Mass.  680)  1216,  1220 

Queen  v.  Millis  (10  CI.  &  F.  534)  222 

Quick  v.  Durham  (115  Ind.  302) 

v.  Ludburrow  (3  Bulst.  29) 

v.  Quick  (1  N.  J.  Eq.  4) 

v.  Quick  (3  Sw.  &  Tr.  442) 

v.  Staines  (1  Bos.  &  Pull.  293) 

Quicksall  v.  Quieksall  (2  N.  J.  L.  457) 
Quidort  v.  Pcrgeaux  (18  N.  J.  Eq.  472) 


827 
686 

1097 
483 
389 
793 

565, 
5(58 
863 
140 
885,  886 

1096 


804. 


Quigg  v.  Kittredge  (18  N.  H.  137) 
Quiglev  y.  Mitchell  (41  Oh.  St.  375) 
Quin's" Estate  (144  Pa.  St.  444)     72 
Quinbv  v.  Frost  (61  Me.  77) 

v.  Manhattan  Co.  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  260)    602 

Quincy  v.  Rogers  (9  Cush.  291)    870,  873,  884 
Quinlan  v.  Fitzpatrick  (25  Ark.  471)  864 

Quinn,  Estate  of  (13  Phila.  340)  691  a 

Quinn's  Succession  (34  La.  An.  879)  1054,1064 
Quinn  v.  Butler  (L.  R.  6  Eq.  Cas.  225)        96 

v.  Hardenbrook  (54  N.  Y.  83)      883,  890 

v.  Madigan  (65  N.  H.  8)  638 


Quinn  v.  McGoyern  (97  Mich.  114)  829 

v.  Moss  (12  Sin.  &  M.  365)  1012 

v.  Quinn  (5  So.  Dak.  328)  59 

v.  Shields  (62  Iowa,  129)  922 

v.  Stockton  (2  Lit.  343)  733,  1213 

Quintard  v.  Morgan  (4  Dem.  168)  528 

Quiyev  r.  Hall  (19  Cal.  97)  809,  844 


Raab's  Estate  (16  Oh.  St.  273)        1129,  1139, 

1186 
Kabasse,  Succession  of  (49  La.  An.  1405)  691  a 
Rabbitt  v.  Gaither  (67  Mil.  94)  248 

Raber  v.  Gund  (110  111.  581)  211 

Bacouillat  v.  Sansevain  (32  Cal.  376)  863 

Rader  v.  Yeargin  (85  Term.  486)         653,  654 

571 

527 

1048 

589 

1087 

68 

774 

395 

357 

268 

1131 

1045 

1215 

628 

603 

627 


Radlbrd  v.  Gaskill  (20  Mont.  293) 

v.  Radford  (5  Dana,  150) 

v.  Westcott  (1  Des.  596) 

Radovitch,  In  re  (74  Cal.  536) 
Rafferty  v.  Mallory  (3  Biss.  362) 
Ragland  v.  Huntington  (1  Ired.  L.  561) 

v.  Justices  (10  Ga.  65) 

v.  King  (37  Ala.  80) 

Ragsdale  v.  Holmes  (1  S.  C.  91) 

v.  Parrish  (74  Ind.  191) 

v.  Stuart  (8  Ark.  268) 

Raht  v.  Meek  (89  Tenn.  274) 
Raiford  v.  Raiford  (6  Ired.  Eq.  490) 
Railroad  v.  Acuff  (92  Tenn.  26) 

v.  Deal  (90  N.  C.  110) 

v.  Johnson  (97  Tenn.  667) 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Gorman  (7  D.  C.  App.  913)  439 

v.  Knapp  (51  Tex.  592)  217 

v.  Pendergrass  (69  Miss.  425)  629 

Railway  Co.  v.  Kennedy  (90  Tenn.  185)  176, 

177 

v.  Lilly  (90  Tenn.  563) 

v.  Richards  (68  Tex.  375) 

Raine,  Goods  of  (1  Sw.  &  Tr.  144) 
Raines  v.  Barker  (13  Grat.  128) 
Raine}'  v.  Biggart  (4  Lea,  501) 
Rains  v.  Hayes  (6  Lea,  303) 
Rainsford  v"  Taynton  (7  Ves.  460) 
Rainwater  v.  Harris  (51  Ark.  401) 
Raleigh  v.  Rogers  (25  N.  J.  Eq.  506) 
Ralston's  Estate  (158  Pa.  St.  645) 
Ralston  v.  Ralston  (3  G.  Green,  533) 

v.  Thornton  (36  Ga.  546) 

v.  Wood  (15  111.  159) 

Rambler  v.  Trvon  (7  Serg.  &  R.  90)  479, 
Rambo  v.  Bell  (3  Ga.  207) 

v.  Rumer  (4  Del.  Ch.  9)    989,  1023,  1094 

v.  Wvatt  (32  Ala.  363)  395 

Barney  v.  Green  (18  Ala.  771)  440 

Ramires  v.  Kent  (2  Cal.  558)  22 

Rammelsberg  v.  Mitchell  (29  Oh.  St.  22)  292, 

296 
Ramp  i'.  McDaniel  (12  Oreg.  108) 
Hamsav  v.  Abrams  (58  Iowa,  512) 

t>."Ellis  (3  Des.  78) 

v.  Richardson  (Rilev  Ch.  271) 

Ramsdell  v.  Ramsdell  (21  Me.  288) 
Hamsden  v.  Jackson  (1  Atk.  292) 
Ramsey's  Appeal  (2  Watts,  228) 

Appeal  (4  Watts,  71) 

Ramsey  v.  Fonts  (67  Ind.  78) 

v.  Hicks  (S3  Mo.  App.  190) 

v.  Ramsey  (4  T.  B.  Mon.  151) 

v.  Welby  (63  Md.  584) 

Ramsour  v.  Thompson  (65  N.  C.  628) 
cxxxiii 


628 

631) 

57 

890 

1074 

1218 
405 
385 

1195 
512 
230 

1239 
866 
490 
256 


531 

1223 

1164 

642 

874 

792 

307,  859 

776 

339 

1155 

1165 

352 

1237 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Rand's  Estate  (61  Cal.  468)  79,  488 

Rand  v.  Hubbard  (4  Met.  Mass.  252)         384, 

409,  410 

i\  Hubbell  (115  Mass.  461)  1003 

Randal  v.  Elder  (12  Kan.  257)  200 

Randall,  Matter  of  (152  N.  Y.  508)    345,  1235 

v.  Beattv  (31  N.  J.  Eq.  643)  100 

v.  Kreiger  (23  Wall.  137)  243 

v.  Marble  (69  Me.  310)  963 

v.  Northwestern  Co.  (54  Wis.  140)      623 

r.  Randall  (135  111.  398) 

c  Randall  (85  Md.  430) 

v.  Shrader  (17  Ala.  333) 

Randebaugh  v.  Shellev  (6  Oh.  St.  307) 
Randell,  Matter  of  (2  Connoly,  29)  293,  766 
Randfield  v.  Randtield  (8  H  L.  Cas.  225)  885 
Randle  v.  Carter  (62  Ala.  95)  570,  1079 

Randolph's  Appeal  (5  Pa.  St.  242)  1056 

Randolph  r.  Billing  (115  Ala.  683) 

v.  Brown  (115  Ala.  677) 

o.  Hughes  (89  N.  C.  428) 

r.  Randolph  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  73) 

v.  Randolph  (6  Rand.  194) 

v.  Ward  (29  Ark.  238) 

Rands  v.  Kendall  (15  Oh.  671) 
Rank's  Estate  (12  Phila.  67) 
Eank  v.  Camp  (3  Dem.  278) 

v.  Rank  (3  Atl.  R.  827) 

Ranken  v.  Patton  (65  Mo.  378) 
Rankin  v.  Anderson  (8  Baxt.  240) 
v.  Hannan  (38  Oh.  St.  438) 


877 
950 

518 
70 


324 

324 

469 

995 

993 

812 

236,  244 

190 

959 

277 

50 

1123 

835 


v.  Newman  (114  Cal.  635)    291,  293,  694 

t>.  Rankin  (9  Ired.  156)  489 

v.  Rankin  (61  Mo.  295)  46 

Ranking  r.  Barnard  (5  Madd.  32)  1236 
Rannells  v.  Gerner  (80  Mo.  474)  252 
i'.  Gerner  (9  Mo.  App.  506)  252 

i'.  Isgrigg  (99  Mo.  19)  234 

Ransom,  In  re  (17  Fed.  R.  331)  236 

v.  Counellv  (93  Kv.  63)  107 

v.  Quarles"(16  Ala".  437)  856 

Ransome  v.  Bearden  (50  Tex.  119)  500 

Rapalve  v.  Rapalve  (27  Barb.  610)  1105 

RappV.  Matthias' (35  Ind.  332)  370,  1035 

Rappelvea  v.  Russell  (1  Dalv,  214)  759 

Rash  t>.  Purnel  (2  Harr.  448)  473 

Ratcliff  v.  Davis  (64  Iowa,  467)  213 

Rattoon  v.  Overacker  (8  John.  126)  412 

Raubitschek  v.  Blank  (80  N.  Y.  478)  834 

Raugh  v.  Weis  (138  Ind.  42)  10,  1063 

Rausch,  In  re  (35  Minn.  291)  235 

v.  Moore  (48  Iowa,  611)  254 

Raverty  ».  Fridge  (3  McLean,  230)  252 

Ravolskv  v.  Brown  (92  Ala.  522)  290 

Rawlings  v.  Adams  (7  Md.  26)  276 

Rawlins  v.  Buttel  (1  Houst.  224)  227 

v.  Rawlins  (2  Cox,  425)  1009 

Rawson  v.  Copland  (3  Barb.  Ch.  166)         828 

. v.  Knight  (71  Me.  99)  803,  805 

v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  (2  Abb. 

P.  R.  n.  s.  220)  611,  613 

Rav  v.  Doughty  (4  Blackf.  115)  558,  648,  738 

v.  Hill  (8Strobb.  1..  297)  52 

v.  Honeycutt  (119  N.  C.  510)       759,  760 

v.  Lister  (Andrews,  351)  336 

i'.  Lopet  (65  Mo.  470;     1214,  1218,  1221, 

1223 

r.  Rav  (Coop.  Ch.  Cas.  264)  389 

v.  Rav  (98  N.  C.  566)  480 

v.  Walton  (2  A.  K.  Marsh.  71)  70 

Ravburn  v.  Ravburn  (31  \V.  Va.  400)         565 


Raymond  v.  Sellick  (10  Conn.  480)  121 

Ravnor  v.  Capehart  (2  Hawks,  375)  271 

— -  r.  Lee  (20  Mich.  384)  254 

v.  Robinson  (36  B;irb.  128)  825 

Rea  v.  Engk-sing  (56  Miss.  463)  525 

v.  McEachron  (13  Wend.  465)  1059 

v.  Rea  (63  Mich   257)  253 

v.  Rhodes  (5  Ired.  Eq.  148)  992,  993 

Read's  Case  (5  Co.  34)  415,420 

Read  v.  Bostick  (6  Humph.  321)  1070 

v.  Hatch  (19  Pick.  47)  025 

o.  Hodgens  (7  Ir.  Eq.  17)  909 

v.  Howe  (13  Iowa,  50)  528 

v.  Howe  (39  Iowa,  553)      329,  1023,  1089 

v.  Knell  (143  N.  Y.  485)  692,  703 

v.  Watkins  ( 11  Lea.  158)  948 

v.  Williams  (125  N.  Y.  500)  353,  728. 

922  925 
Reade  t\  Livingston  (3  John.  Ch.  481)  '  609 
Reading  v.  Wier  (29  Kan.  429)  730,  1151 

Ready  v.  Stephenson  (7  J.  J.  Marsh.  351)  1272 

v.  Thompson  (4  St.  &  P.  452)  826 

Reagan  v.  Long  (21  Ind.  264)  424 

i'.  Stanlev  (11  Lea,  316)  62,  488 

Reaves  v.  Garrett  (34  Ala.  558)  269 

Reavis,  Ex  parte  (50  Ala.  210)  187 

Reber's  Appeal  (125  Pa.  St.  80)  845 

Rebhan  v.  Mueller  (114  111.  343)  466 

Reek's  Estate  (Myr.  59)  1166 

Recker  v.  Kilgore  (62  Ind.  10)  176 

Record  v.  Howard  (58  Me.  225)  329,  429,  451, 
568,  1089,  1091 

Rector  v.  Langham  (1  Mo.  568)  367 

Redd  v.  Dure  (40  Ga.  389)  1198 

Redell  v.  Dobell  (10  Sim.  244)  123 

Redtield  v.  Redfield  (126  N.  Y.  466)  873 

Redford  v.  Peggy  (6  Rand.  316)  488 

Redmond  v.  Burroughs  (63  N.  C.  24  904 

v.  Pippim  (113  N.  C.  90)  842 

Red  River  Co.  B'k  v.  Higgins  (72  Tex. 

66)  804 

Reed's  Appeal  (118  Pa.  Si.  215)  942 

Estate  (82  Pa.  St.  428)  1232 

Will  (2  B.  Mon.  79)  42 

Reed  v.  Ash  (30  Ark.  775)  254 

v.  Bucklev  (5  Watts  &  S.  517)  941 

v.  Colbv  (89  111.  104)  1025 

v.  Criss'ev  (03  Mo.  App.  184)  839 

v.  Crocker  (12  La.  An.  445)  581 

r.  Cruikshank  (46  Hun,  219)  638 

r.  Dickerman  (12  Pick.  146)  271 

v.  Gilbert  (32  Me.  519)  669 

v.  Hazleton  (37  Kan.  321)  61,  62 

v.  Jourdan  (109  Mich.  128)  631 

r.  Reed  (31  Fed.  R.  49)  357 

r.  Reed  (68  Ga.  589)  982 

v.  Reed  (3  Head,  491)  277 

v.  Reed  (44  Ind.  429)  1130 

r.  Reed  (91  Kv.  267)  568 

v.  Reed  (52  N.  Y.  651)  1146 

v.  Reed  (56  Vt.  492)  1241 

v.  Union  Bank  (29  Grat.  719)  212 

v.  Whitney  (7  Grav,  533)  235 

v.  Wiley  (5  Sm.  &  M.  394)  811 

t\  Wilson  (73  Wis.  497)  742 

v.  Woodward  (11  Phila.  541)  62 

Reedy  v.  Mill  (155  111.636)  444 

Reel  V.  Elder  (62  Pa.  St.  308)  228 

v.  Reel  (1  Hawks,  248)  491 

Rees  v.  Morgan  (5  B.  &  Ad.  1035)  792 

Reese's  Appeal  (116  Pa.  St.  272)  669 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Reese  v.  Hawthorn  (10  Grat.  548)  84 

v.  Probate  Court  (9  It.  I.  434)  95 

Reeves  v.  Brooks  (80  Ala.  26)      255,  257,  275 

v.  Craig  (1  Winst.  209)  953 

v.  McMillan  (101  N.  C.  479)  1151 

v.  Pattv  (43  Miss.  338)  1182 

v.  Petty  (44  Tex.  249)  210 

v.  Reeves  (5  Lea,  653)  946 

v.  Tappen  (21  S.  C.  1)  513,  741 

v.  Ward  (2  Scott,  390)  763 

Refeld  v.  Bellette  (14  Ark.  148)  990 

Regan  v.  Stone  (7  Sm.  &  M.  104)  811 
Regina  v.  Chadwick  (11  Ad.  it  Ell.  N.  s 


205) 


v.  Stewart  (12  Ad.  &  Ell.  773) 

Register  v.  Hensley  (70  Mo.  189) 
Reich  v.  Berdel  (120  111.  499) 
Reichard's  Appeal  (116  Pa.  St.  232) 
Reichenbach   v.   Ruddach    (127    Pa. 

564) 
Reicke  v.  Saunders  (3  Mo.  App.  566) 
Reid  v.  Borland  (14  Mass.  208) 

v.  Butt  (25  Ga.  28) 

v.  Corrigan  (143  111.  402) 

v.  Kellv  (1  Dev.  L.  313) 

v.  State  (74  Ind.  252) 

v.  Sullivan  (20  Colo.  498) 

Reiff's  Appeal  (124  Pa.  St.  145) 
Reiff  v.  Horst  (55  Mich.  42) 

v.  Reiff  (64  Pa.  St.  134) 

Reifsnvder  v.  Hunter  (19  Pa.  St.  41 
Reihl  v.  Martin  (29  La.  An.  15) 
Reilley  v.  Duffv  (4  Dem.  366) 
Reimer's  Estate  (159  Pa.  212) 
Reinders  v.  Koppelmann  (68  Mo.  482) 


224 

759 

172,  201 

260 

96 

St. 

48 

686 

96 

672 

1103,  1104 

336 


306 
861 

1000 
253 
598 
954 
795 

1120 
883 

140, 


v.  Koppelmann  (94  Mo.  338) 

Reinhardt  v.  Evans  (48  Miss.  230) 

v.  Gartrell  (33  Ark.  727) 

v.  Reinhardt  (21  W.  Va.  76) 

Reinig  v.  Hartman  (69  Wis.  28) 
Reinstein  v.  Smith  (65  Tex.  247) 
Reisch   v.   Commonwealth   (106    Pa. 
521) 


878,  1244 

871,  873 

834 

1133 

202,  210 

861 

689 

St. 

691  a 


Reist  v.  Hellbrenner  (11  Serg.  &  R.  131)   620 
Reitz  v.  Bennett  (6  W.  Va.  417)  1138 

Reitzell  v.  Miller  (52  111.  67)  685,  812 

Reniick  v.  Buttertield  (31  N.  H.  70)  1087 

Remington  v.  Amer.  Bible  Soc.  (44  Conn. 
512)  712 

v.  Bank  (76  Md.  564)  1239 

—  v.  Walker  (21  Hun,  322)  1121 

Remiuler  v.  Shenuit  (15  Mo.  App.  192)       676 
Renan  v.  Banks  (83  N.  C.  483)  1271 

Renfrow  v.  Pearce  (68  III.  125)  284 

Renick  v.  Renick  (92  Kv.  335)  1168 

Renihan  v.  Wright  (125  Ind.  536)  591 

Renneberg's  Succession  (15  La.  An.  661)  1033 
Renner  v.  Ross  (111  Ind.  269)  1035 

Renshaw  v.  Stafford  (30  La.  An.  853)         810 

v.  Williams  (75  Md.  498)  1174 

Renton's  Estate  (10  Wash.  533)  939 

Rentschler  v.  Jamison  (6  Mo.  App.  135)     361 
Renz  v.  Drurv  (57  Kans.  84)  140 

Reppy  v.  Reppv  (46  Mo.  571)  828 

Resor  v.  Resor'(9  Ind.  347)  611 

Reuff  v.  Coleman  (30  W.  Va.  175)  951 

Rex  v.  Bettesworth  (2  Str.  1111)  517 

v.  Creel  (22  W.  Va.  373)  1271 

v.  Portington  (1  Salk.  162)  907 

v.  Raines  (1  Ld.  Raym.  361)  509 


Rexroad  v.  McQuain  (24  W.  Va.  32) 

v.  Wells  (13  W.  Va.  812) 

Reynolds,  In  re  (L.  R.  3  Pr.  &  D.  35) 

Matter  of  (4  Dem.  68) 

Matter  of  (124  N.  Y.  388) 

v.  Adams  (90  111.  134) 

v.  Bond  (83  Ind.  36) 

v.  Brown  (138  Ind.  434) 

v.  Canal  Co.  (30  Ark.  520) 


'Page 
1230, 
1246 
354 
101 
472 
969 
490,  491 
1099 
691 
1142,  1148, 
1165,  1166 

v.  Kortwright  (18  Beav.  417)  60 

v.  Lansford  (16  Tex.  286)  G09 

v.  McCurrv  (100  111.  356)  254 

V.  McGregor  (16  Vt.  191)  854 

v.  McMullen  (55  Mich.  568)  360,  366,  398 

v.  May  (4  Greene,  283)  1265 

v.  Miller  (6  Iowa,  459)  1200 

v.  People  (55  111.  328)  1120 

v.  Reynolds  (11  Ala.  1023)  1145 

v.  Reynolds  (92  Kv.  556)  825 

v.  Reynolds  (1  Spe'ers,  253)  52,  68 

v.  Robinson  (64  N.  Y.  589)  59 

v.  Robinson  (82  N.  Y.  103)   892,  976,  981 

v.  Rogers  (5  Oh.  169)  552 

v.  Root  (62  Barb.  250)  43,  48 

v.  Schmidt  (20  Wis.  374)  1036 

i>.  Wilson  (15  III.  394)  1048,  1050 

v.  Zink  (27  Grat.  29)  576 

Rhamev.  Lewis  (13  Rich.  Eq.  269)  694 

Rhea  v.  Greer  (86  Tenn.  59)  186,  191 

v.  Meredith  (6  Lea,  605)  260 

Rhem  v.  Tull  (13  Ired.  57)  632 

Rhett  v.  Cotton  Co.  (84  Ga.  521)  1073 

v.  Mason  (18  Grat.  541)  1134 

Rhoades  v.  Davis  (51  Mich.  306)  265 

Rhoads's  Appeal  (39  Pa.  St.  186)  1124 

Rhode  Island  Trust  Co.  v.  Bank  (14  R.  I. 

625)  949 

Rhodes's  Estate  (11  Phila.  103)  271 

Rhodes  v.  Childs  (64  Pa.  St.  18)  120,  121 

v.  Prav  (36  Minn.  392)  835 

v.  Rhodes  (137  Mass.  343)  878 

v.  Rhodes  (88  Tenn.  G37)  921,  925 

v.  Seymour  (36  Conn.  1)  795 

v.  Vinson  (9  Gill,  169)  484 

v.  Welbv  (46  Oh.  St.  234)  110 

Rhorer  v.  Brockhage  (86  Mo.  544)     200,  202, 

208 

v.  Brockhage  (13  Mo.  App.  397)  202,  208, 

1244 
Rhoton  v.  Blevin  (99  Cal.  645)  110 

Rhvmer's  Appeal  (93  Pa.  St.  142)  "911 

Ricard  v.  Smith  (37  Miss.  644)  1200 

t>.  Williams  (7  Wheat.  59)  1025 

Ricaud's  Estate  (57  Cal.  421)  1230 

Estate  (70  Cal.  69)  1166 

Rice's  Estate  (Mvr.  183)  499 

Succession  (14  La.  An.  317)         706, 1164 

Rice  v.  Boston  Post  (56  N.  H.  191)      970,  971 

o.  Cannon  (Bai.  Eq.  172)  774 

v.  Dickerman  (47  Minn.  527)  1091 

v.  Harbeson  (63  N.  Y.  493)  1107 

v.  Harbeson  (2  Th.  &  C.  4)  1112 

v.  Henlv  (90  Tenn.  69)  564 

v.  Hoskinsr  (105  Mich.  303)         470,  500 

v.  Jones  (4  Cal.  89)  495 

i>.  McMartin  (39  Conn.  573  289 

v.  McRevnolds  (8  Lea,  36)  639,  641, 1014 

v.  Nelson  (27  Iowa,  148)  274 

v.  Rice  (50  Mich.  488)  38,  41 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Rice  v.  Rice  (53  Mich.  432)  31,  34 

v.  Satterwhite  (1  D.  &  B.  Eq.  69)        915 

v.  Smith  (14  Mass.  431)  1153,  1245 

v.  Thompson  (14  B.  Mon.  377)  642 

Rich,  Matter  of  (3  Redf.  177)  1181 

v.  Bowker  (25  Kan.  7)  36 

v.  Cockell  (9  Ves.  368)  26 

v.  Eldredge  (42  N.  H.  246)  854 

v.  Gilkey  (73  Me.  595)  89 

v.  Rich  (7  Bush,  53)  262 

v.  Sowles  (64  Vt.  408)  643,  757 

v.  Tubbs  (41  Cal.  34)  215 

Richards  v.  Adamson  (43  Iowa,  248)  1055 

—  r.  Bellingham  (47  Fed.  R.  854)   220,  243 

v.  Bellingham  (54  Fed.  R.  209)   220,  243 

v.  Browne  (3  Bing.  N.  Cas.  493)        991 

v.  Dutch  (8  Mass.  506)  375 

v.  Griggs  (16  Mo.  416)  390 

v.  Humphreys  (15  Pick.  133)  973, 977,  980 

v.  Miller  (62  111.  417)  494,  902,  903 

v.  Moore  (5  Redf.  278)  504 

v.  Pierce  (44  Mich.  444)  410 

v.  Richards  (11  Humph.  429)  1217 

Richardson,    Ex  parte   (Buck's   Cas.    in 
Bankr.  202)  282 

v.  BHlingslea  (69  Md.  407)  1131 

v.  Butler  (82  Cal.  174)     1037,  1039,  1048 

v.  Drevfus  (64  Mo.  App.  600)  429 

i\  Eveland  (126  III.  37)  981,  1100 

v.  Green  (61  Fed.  423)  357,  470 

v.  Hall  (124  Mass.  228)  988 

r.  Harrison  (36  Mo.  96)  846,  847 

v.  Hildreth  (8  Cush.  225)  731 

v.  Ilorton  (7  Beav.  112)  659 

v.  Judah  (2  Bradf.  157)  1032 

v.  Keel  (9  Lea,  74)  1237,  1238 

v.  Lewis  (21  Mo.  App   531)  184 

v.  Loupe  (80  Cal.  490)  346,  1243 

v.  McLemore  (60  Miss.  315)  711 

v.  Martin  (55  N.  H.  45)  902 

r.  Merrill  (32  Vt.  27)  164,  611,  666 

v.  New  York  Central  R.  R.  Co.  (98 

Mass.  85) 

v.  Paige  (54  Vt.  373) 

- —  v.  Palmer  (24  Mo.  App  480) 

v.  Raughley  (1  Houst.  561) 

v.  Richardson  (75  Me.  574) 

v.  Richardson  (80  Me.  585) 

V.  Richardson  (9  Pa.  St.  428) 

v.  Richardson  (35  Vt.  238) 

v.  Stansburv  (4  Har.  &  J.  275) 

v.  Vaughn  (86  Tex.  93) 

v.  Wheatland  (7  Met.  169) 

v.  Wvatt  (2  Des.  471) 

v.  Wyman  (62  Me.  280) 

Richmond's  Appeal  (59  Conn  226) 

Succession  (35  La.  An.  858) 

Richmond  v.  Foote  (3  Lans.  244) 


630 

949 

757 

896 

1004 

729 

1132 

76 

1170 

432 

942 

289 

246 

49 

810 

330,  1036, 

1089 

Richter  r.  Poppenhusen  (39  How.  Pr.  82)  285 
Richwine  v.  Heim  (1  Pa.  Rep.  373)  (140 

Rick  r.  Gilson  (1  Pa.  St.  54)  734 

Rickards  v.  Hutchinson  (18  Nev.  215)         800 
Rickenbacker  v.  Zimmermann  (10  S.  C. 

110)  1214,  1219,  1221,  1222 

Rickenbaugh,  In   re  (42  Mo.  App.  328)     720, 


Rickcr's  Estate  (11  Mont.  153) 
Ricketson  r.  Richardson  (19  Cal.  330) 
Rickettsia.  Ricketts  (4  Lea,  168) 

Rickner  v.  Kessler  (138  111.  636) 
cxxxvi 


1 166 

117H 
807 
795 
874 


*  Page 
Ricks  v.  Hilliard  (45  Miss.  359)  433, 1246 
Ridden  v.  Thrall  (55  Hun,  185)  120 

v.  Thrall  (125  N.  Y.  572)  119,  120 

Riddle's  Estate  (19  Pa.  St.  431)        1219,  1222 
Riddle  v.  Mandeville  (5  Cr.  322)  1271 

v.  Murphv  (7  S.  &  R.  230)  1088 

v.  Roll  (24  Oh.  St.  572)  1087 

Ridenbaugh  v.  Burnes  (14  Fed.  R.  93)     1131, 

1132 
Ridgely  v.  Bennett  (13  Lea,  210)     1031, 1032, 

1034,  1090 

v.  Bond  (18  Md.  432)  883 

Ridgeway  v.  Ridgewav  (84  Ga.  25)  1068 

v.  Underwood  (67  111.  419)  728,  889 

Ridgwav  v.  Darwin  (8  Ves.  65) 

v.  McAlpine  (31  Ala.  458) 

v.  Manifold  (39  Ind.  58) 

v.  Masting  (23  Oh.  St.  294) 

Ridler  v.  Ridler  (93  Iowa,  347) 
Ridley  v.  Coleman  (1  Sneed,  616) 
Rife  v.  Geyer  (59  Pa.  St.  393) 
Rigden  v.  Vallier  (2  Ves.  Sr.  252) 
Rigg  v.  Schweitzer  (170  Pa.  St.  549) 
Kiggs  v.  Cragg  (26  Hun,  89) 


v.  Cragg  (89  N.  Y.  479) 
—  v.  Girard  (133  III.  619) 

v.  Mvers  (20  Mo.  239) 

v.  Pa'lmer  (115  N.  Y.  506) 

v.  Riggs  (135  Mass.  238) 

v.  Sterling  (51  Mich.  157) 

Right  v.  Price  (1  Doug].  241) 
Riker  r.  Corn  well  (113  N.  Y.  115) 
Rilev  v.  Albany  Bank  (36  Hun,  513) 

'v.  Kepler "(94  hid.  308) 

v.  McCord  (24  Mo.  265) 

v.  Mclnlear  (61  Vt.  254) 

v.  Mitchell  (38  Minn.  9) 

r.  Moseley  (44  Miss.  37) 

v.  Norman  (39  Ark.  158) 

v.  Riley  (25  Conn.  154) 

v.  Sherwood  (45  S.  W.  R.  1077) 

Smith  (5  S.  W.  R.  809) 


32 
273 

1016 
237 
825 
81 
956 
125 
1087 
1004 
323,  352,  1249 
256,  258 
893 
89,  131,  227 
68 
216 
67 
1018 
687 
1056,  1077 
568 
821,  1137 
1201 
359 
1132 
607,  608 
46 
2' '2 
P.inard  v.  West  (92  Ind.  359)  1264,  1265 
Rindge  v.  Oliphint  (62  Tex.  682)  1063 
Rinehart  v.  Rinehart  (15  N.  J.  Eq.  44)   739 

v.  Rinehart  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  475)     530* 

Riner  v.  Riner  (166  Pa.  617)  844 

Ringgold  v.  Malott  (1  H.  &  J.  299)  304 

v.  Stone  (20  Ark.  526)  1132,  1137 

Ringhouse  v.  Keever  (49  111.  470)  445,  446 
h'ingo  v.  Richardson  (53  Mo.  385)  825 

Rintch  v.  Cunningham  (4  Bibb,  462)  259 

Riplev  v.  Sampson  (10  Pick.  371)  691 

v.  Seligman  (88  Mich.  177)  831 

Riser  v.  Snoddv  (7  Ind.  442)  1033 

Risk's  Appeal  "(HO  Pa.  St.  171)  1095 

Ritch  v.  Bellamy  (14  Fla.  537)  340,  350 

v.  Hawxhurst  (114  N.  Y.512)  1214,1220 

v.  Morris  (78  N.  C.  377)  999 

Ritchey  v.  "Withers  (72  Mo.  556)        177,  180, 
191,  192,  1125 
Ritchie  v.  McAuslin  (1  Hayw.  220)     405,  532 
Rittenhouse  v.  Levering  (6  Watts  &  S. 

190)  H53 

Rittcr's  Appeal  (23  Pa.  St.  95)  843,  1150 

Estate  (11  Phila.  12)  1189 

Rivenett  v.  Bourquin  (53  Mich.  10)  936 
Rivers  V.  Rivers  (3  Desaus.  190)  58,  204 
Rives  v.  Patty  (74  Miss.  381)  1148 
Rix  v.  Nevins  (26  Vt.  384)  698 
v.  Smith  (8  Vt.  365)                             1159 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  bide  pages.  ] 


•Page 
Rixner,  Succession  of  (48  La.  An.  552)   GUI  a 

190 
728,  880,  928, 
943,  944,  940 
087 
848 
847 


Rizer's  Estate  (15  Pliila.  547) 
Rizer  v.  Perry  (58  Md.  112) 


Koach  17.  Ames  (80  Kv.  0) 

v.  Caraffa  (85  Cal  430) 

Koaf  v.  Knight  (77  Iowa,  500) 
Koanoke  Nav.  Co.  v.  Green  (3  Dev.  434)    513, 

741,  743 
Ro  Bards  v.  Lamb  (70  Mo.  192)  1196 

v.  Lamb  (89  Mo.  303)  401,  1 183 

v.  Lamb  (127  U.  S.  58)  1183 

Kobards  v.  Wortham  (2  Dev.  Eq.  123)    1094, 


Robb's  Appeal  (41  Pa.  St.  45) 
Kobb  v.  Belt  (12  B.  Mon.  043) 

v.  Irwin  (15  Oh.  089) 

v.  Mann  (11  Pa.  St.  300) 

Robbin's  Case  (Nov,  09) 
Bobbins  v.  Bates  (4  Cush.  104) 

v.  Brewer  (48  Me.  481) 

v.  Gleason  (47  Me.  259) 

17.  Bobbins  (8  Blackf.  174) 

v.  Bobbins  (50  N.  J.  Eq.  742) 

v.  Bobbins  (1  S.  W.  R.  152) 

V.  Tafft  (12  B.  I.  07) 

i\  Walcott  (27  Conn.  234) 

Robert  v.  Brown  (14  La.  An.  597) 

v.  West  (15  Ga.  122) 

Robert's  Appeal  (95  Pa.  St.  407) 

Estate  (07  Cal.  349) 

Roberts'  Estate  (103  Pa.  408) 
Roberts,  Matter  of  (3  John.  Ch.  42) 

v.  Briscoe  (44  Oh.  St.  59G) 

v.  Burton  (27  Vt.  390) 


1105 
1103 

yg.) 

1030,  1034 
1007 
415 
1080 
854 
951 
239 
70 
1147,  1149 
340 
1147,  1188 
095 
007,  878 
1138,  1202 
192 
1137,  1237 
1173 
835 
857 
—  v.  Coleman  (37  W.  Va.  143)  1217,  1218, 
1219,  1220 

V.  Colvin  (3  Grat.  358)  552 

v.  Connellee  (71  Tex.  11)  720 

v.  Dale  (7  B.  Mon.  199)  1228,  1231 

V.  Dickerson  (95  Ga.  727)  183 

v.  Elliott  (3  T.  B.  Mon.  395)  887 

v.  Flanagan  (21  Neb.  503)  498 

v.  Flatt  (142  111.  485)  805,  801 

v.  Johns  (10  S.  C.  171)  1127 

v.  Lisenbee  (86  N.  C.  136)  629 

v.  Longley  (41  Tex.  454)  507 

v.  Martin  (70  Ga.  196)  1089 

v.  Messinger  (134  Pa.  St.  298)     1S9,  434 

v.  Mosely  (51  Mo.  282)  608 

o.  Ogbourne  (37  Ala.  174)  902 

v.  Phillips  (4  El.  &  Bl.  450)  09 

».  Polgrean  (1  H.  Bl.  535)  594,  595 

v.  Boberts  (2  Lee,  399)  1115 

v.  Boberts  (34  Miss.  322)  1127 

v.  Boberts  (65  N.  C.  27)  1057,  1083 

v.  Spencer  (112  Ind.  81)  1127 

v.  Spencer  (112  Ind.  85)  840,  1121 

v.  Stevens  (84  Me.  325)  956 

v.  Stuart  (80  Tex.  379)  385 

i;.  Thomas  (32  Ga.  31)  738 

v.  Trawick  (13  Ala.  68)  490 

v.  Tunnell  (105  111.  031)  842 

17.  Ware  (80  Mo.  303)  208 

v.  Watson  (4  Jones  L.  319)  871 

■ v.  Welch  (40  Vt.  104)  70 

Robertson's  Succession  (49  La.  An.  868)      79 
Robertson  17.  Barbour  (0  T.  B.  Mon.  523)   494 

17.  Bradford  (73  Ala.  110)  1080 

■ v.  Burrell  (110  Cal.  508)  281 

■ 17.  Burrell  (40  Ind.  328)  145 


Robertson  v.  Gaines  (2  Humph.  367)  411, 


71 


v.  Johnston  (24  Ga.  102)  872. 

17.  McGeoch  (11  Pai.  640)  512, 

17.  Paul  (16  Tex.  472) 

17.  Pickrell  (109  U.  S.  008)   407,  481 

17.  Robertson  (120  Ind.  333) 

Robie's  Estate  (Myr.  220) 
Bobie  v.  Flanders  (33  N.  H   524)        255. 
Robins'  Estate  (180  Pa.  030)  1153,  1228, 
Robins  v.  Arnold  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  511) 

v.  McClure  (100  N.  Y.  328)  518 

Robinson's  Appeal  (02  Pa.  St.  213) 

Estate  (6  Mich.  137) 

Estate  (12  Phil.  114) 

Estate  (12  Phil.  170)  344 

Robinson,  Appellant  (1  D.  Chip.  357) 

17.  Adams  (02  Me.  369)  37,  478. 

17   Allison  (74  Ala.  254) 

17.  Baker  (47  Mich.  619) 

— — - 17.  Bank  of  Darien  (18  Ga.  65) 

17.  Bates  (3  Met.  Mass.  40) 

v.  Brewster  (140  111.  049) 

17.  Clark  (70  Me.  493) 

17.  Crandall  (9  Wend.  425) 

0.  Elam  (90  Kv.  300) 

17.  Epping  (24  Fla.  237)  { 

17.  Fair  (128  U.  S.  53) 

17.  Gallier  (2  South.  L.  Rev.  594) 

v.  Gholson  (8  Sm.  &  M.  392) 

-  17.  Greene  (14  R.  I.  181)  I 

».  Hodge  (117  Mass.  222) 

v.  Hutchinson  (20  Vt.  38) 

v.  Lakenan  (28  Mo.  App.  135) 

f.  Lowater  (17  Beav.  592) 

v.  McAfee  (59  Mich.  375) 

».  Mclver  (03  N.  C.  645)  989, 

17.  Millard  (133  Mass.  236) 

17.  Mosely  (93  Ala.  70) 

17.  Oceanic  Co.  (112  N.  Y.  315) 

17.  Palmer  (90  Me.  240) 

17.  Randoph  (21  Fla.  029)  955 

v.  Raynor  (28  N.  Y.  494) 

v.  Robinson  (3  Harr.  433) 

17.  Bobinson  (02  Vt.  153) 

v.  Schly  (0  Ga.  515) 

17.  Simmons  (146  Mass.  167) 

».  Ware  (94  Mo.  078) 

Robison  v.  Codman  (1  Sumn.  121) 

r.  Furman  (47  N.  J.  Eq.  307) 

Bobnett  t>.  Ashlock  (49  Mo.  171) 
Robson  v.  Robson  (3  Del.  Ch.  51) 
Robyns  v.  Corvell  (27  Barb.  550) 
Bochelle  v.  Harrison  (8  Port.  351)      032, 
Rochereau  ».  Maignan  (32  La.  An.  45) 
Rochester,  Re  City  of  (40  Hun,  051)  1095, 
Rochester,  In  re  (110  N.  Y.  159) 
Bochon,  In  re  (15  La.  An.  6) 
Rock  17.  Haas  (110  111.  528)  181,  182,  204 

».  Leightou  (1  Salk.  310) 

Bocke  17.  Hart  (11  Ves.  58) 

v.  Bocke  (9  Beav.  00) 

Rockhev  r.  Rockhev  (97  Mo.  70)         202 
Bock  Hill  College  v.  Jones  (47  Md.  1) 
Rockhold  v.  Blevins  (0  Baxt.  115) 
Rockport  17.  Walden  (54  N.  H.  107) 
Bock  well's  Appeal  (54  Conn.  119) 
Rockwell  17.  Bradshaw  (07  Conn.  8)  938 

17.  Young  (00  Md.  503)       420 

Rockwood  y.  Wiggin  (10  Grav,  402)  110 
Roddan  v.  Doane  (92  Cal.  555") 

exxxvii 


512> 

718 

,  881 

,  513 

210 

,496 

433 

532 

,  274 

1242 

805 

.  042 

1009 

1120 

401 

,  348 

1234 

,  490 

723 

203 

773 

240 

,  474 

609 

367 

1248 

,  501 

1243 

446 

1197 

,  950 

806 

37 

270 

710 

823 

1104 

560 

1214 

526 

942 

,957 

1208 

774 

38 

61 

285 

274 

270 

1048 

55 

120 

06 

1070 

1232 

1090 

1095 

1199 

,  205 

769 

1139 

995 

,  212 

308 

700 

841 

47 

1238 

,  427 

,  124 

805 


TABLE    OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 
♦Page 


Rodenbach's  Appeal  (102  Pa.  St.  572)      1140 
Roderigas  v.  East  River  Sav.  Inst.  (63 
N.  Y.  460)  453,  454 

v.  East  Riv.  Sav.  Inst.  (76  X.  Y. 

316)  502 

Rodman  v.  Rodman  (54  Ind.  444)      599,  665, 

1142 

v.  Smith  (2  N.  J.  L.  2)  147 

Roe  v.  Taylor  (45  111.  485)  41,  48 

v.  Vmgut  (117  N.  V.  204)  884 

Roehl  b.  Houmesser  (114  Ind.  311)  59 

v.  Pleasants  (31  Tex.  45)  1043 

Roethlesberger  v.  Caspari  (12  Mo.  App. 

514)  826 

Rofi  r.  Johnson  (40  Ga.  555)  195,  199,215 
Rotrinac's  Succession  (21  La.  An.  364)  359 
Rogers,  Appellant  (11  Me.  303)  57,  58 

Rogers'  E?tate  (10  N.  Y.  Supp.  22)  691  a 

Rogers,  Ex  parte  (63  N.  C.  110)  19t) 

v.  In  re  (94  Cal.  526)  942 

o.  Matter  of  (153  N.  V.  316)      749,  1182 

v.  Buinpass  (4  Ired.  Eq.  385)  639 

v.  Chandler  (3  Munf.  65)  1116 

v.  Diamond  (13  Ark.  474)   36,  47,  67,69, 

70 

v.  Dively  (51  Mo.  193) 

■ v.  Pales  (5  Pa   St.  154) 

v.  Farrar  (6  T.  B.  Mon.  421) 

v.  French  (19  Ga.  316) 

v.  Hand  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  2701 

v.  Hoberlein  (11  Cal.  120) 

v.  Hosack  (18  Wend.  319) 

v.  Johnson  (125  Mo.  202) 


Page 


715 

209 

810 

1187 

948 

890 

03 

881 

764 

4-il 

691  « 

057,  882 


402,  539 

011 

1202 

980 

1165 

396 

646 

534,  1031, 

1038,  1045,  1256 

. o.  Law  (1  Black,  253)  960 

v.  Ludlow  (3  Sanuf.  Ch.  104)  609 

v.  Marsh  (73  Mo.  04)     195,  210,  214,  215 


Martin  (47  Conn.  248) 

■ v.  Maves  (81  Mo.  520) 

v.  Mitchell  (1  Met.  Ky.  22) 

v.  Moor  (1  Root,  472) 

v.  Morrison  (21  La.  An.  455) 

v.  Pittis  (1  Add.  30) 

v.  Ragland  (42  Tex.  422) 

v.  Renshaw  (37  Tex.  625) 

o.  Rogers  (78  Ga.  638) 

v.  Borers  (67  Me.  456) 

v.  Rogers  (153  X.  Y.  343) 

r.  Rogers  (3  Wend.  503) 

v.  Ross  (4  John.  Ch.  608 

v.  Traphagan  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  421) 


v.  Trevathan  (07  Tex.  400) 

r.  Weller  (5  Biss.  100) 

v.  Wilson  (13  Ark.  507) 

v.  Wintoii  (2  Humph.  178) 

v.  Zook  (80  Ind.  217) 

Rogcrson,  Goods  of  (2  Curt.  056) 
Roggenkamp  v.  Roggcnkamp  (08  Fed.  R. 

005) 
Rohrbacher's  Estate  (108  Pa.  158) 
Rohrbaugh  v.  Hainblin  (57  Kans.  393) 


1190 

208 

803 

740 

576 

86 

199 

212 

894 

854 

835, 888 

702 

355 

1012, 

1232 

1010 

157 

329,  10311 

472 

387,  093 

531 


Romaine  v.  Hendriekson   (24  N.  J.  Eq. 

231) 
Romero's  Estate  (75  Cal.  379) 

Estate  (38  La.  An   947) 

Romigo's  Appeal  (84  Pa.  St.  235) 
Bona  v.  Meier  (47  Iowa,  607) 
Roney  v.  Stiltz  (5  Whart.  381) 
Rook  v.  Wilson  (142  Ind.  24) 
Roome  v.  Phillips  (24  N.  Y.  463) 
Rooney,  In  re  (3  Redf.  15) 
Roorbach  v.  Lord  (4  Conn.  347) 
Roosevelt,  Matter  of  (143  N.  Y.  120) 

v.  Fulton  (7  Cow.  71) 

v.  Thunnan  (1  John.  Ch.  220) 

Root's  Will  (81  Wis.  203)  903,  1100 

Root,  In  re  ( 1  Redf.  257)  533 

v.  Davis  (10  Mont.  228)  525,  520 

v.  Taylor  (20  John.  137)  828 

Roper  v.  Roper  (L.  R.  3  Ch.  D.  414)  9S0 

Roquet  v.  Eldridge  (118  Ind.  147)  979 

Rosborough  r.  Mills  (35  S.  C.  578)  794 

Rose's  Estate  (03  Cal.  346)      1047,  1090,  1187 

Estate  (80  Cal.  160)  688,  757,  1145 

Rose  v.  Clark  (8  Pai.  574)  1239 

v.  Dravton  (4  Rich.  Eq.  200)  86 

v.  Gunu  (79  Ala.  411)  280,  287 

v.  Lewis  (3  Lans.  320)  1200 

v.  Newman  (26  Tex.  131)  695 

v.  Porter  (141  Mass.  309 

v.  Quick  (30  Pa.  St.  225) 

v.  Rose  (4  Abb.  App.  Dec.  108) 

v.  Sanderson  (38  Hi.  247) 

— — v.  Winn  (51  'lex.  545) 

v.  Wortham  (95  Term.  505) 

Roseboom  v.  Roseboom  (81  N.  Y.  356) 
Rosenberg  v.  Frank  (58  Cal.  387) 
Rosenthal  v.  Enevoidsen  (61  Miss.  532) 

v.  Mavhugb  (33  Oh.  St    155) 

v.  Prussing  (108  III.  128) 

v.  Renick  (44  III.  202)  361,378.  442.  076, 

1025 
Roskelley  v.  Godolphin  (T.  Raym 


422 

291 

1264, 

1200 


Rolain  v.  Darbv  (1  McC.  Ch.  72)  772 

Roland  v.  Miller  (100  Pa.  St.  47)  727 

Rolfaon  o.  Cannon  (3  Utah,  232)  1152 

Roller  Mill-  V    Ward  (0  N.  1).  317)  070 

Rollinv.  Whipper  (17  S.  ('.  :;2)  5  11 

Rollins  v.  Lice  (59  N.  II.  493)  1023 

Rollwagon  >-.  Rollwaeon  (3  Hun,  121)  49!t 

Romaine,  Estate  of  (127  N.  Y.  80)  693  a 


877 
01 
920 
277 
552 
047 
957 
352 
839 
263 
400 


483) 


Ross,  Matter  of  (87  N.  Y.  514) 
— —  v.  Alleman  (00  Mo.  209) 

v.  Barclay  (18  Pa.  St.  179) 

v.  Carson  (32  Mo.  App.  148) 

v.  Davis  (17  Ark.  113) 

v.  Duncan  (Freem.  Ch.  587) 

v.  Henderson  (77  N.  C.  170) 

v.  Hine  (48  Ark.  304) 

V.  Julian  (70  Mo.  209) 

v.  Kiger  (42  W.  Ya.  402) 

».  Mines  (7  Sin.  &  M.  121) 

v.  Murphv  (55  Mo.  372) 

ti.  Ross  (12  B.  Mon.  437) 

c.  Ross  (129  Mass.  243) 

v.  Wharton  (10  Verg.  190) 

Rosser  v.  Franklin  (0  Grat.  1) 
Rostel  v.  Morat  (19  Oreg.  181) 
Rotch  r.  Emerson  (105  .Mass.  431) 


87, 

788 

42 

1150 

720 

293 

997 

19 

289 

808 

340,  1073 

893 

547 

1192 

890 

141,  157 

789 

68 

1155 

873,  884, 

1005 

79 


Roth's  Succession  (31  La.  An.  315) 

Roth  v.  Holland  (56  Ark.  633)  844,  1025,  1028 

v.  Hotard  (32  La.  An.  280  390 

Rothmaler  v.  Mvers  (4  Des.  215)  906 

Rothschild  v.  Rowe  (44  Vt.  389)  610 

Rottenberrv  v.  Pipes  (53  Ala.  447)  215,  216 
Rottmann  v.  Schmucker(94  Mo.  139)  330.  333 
Hough  v.  Womer  (76  Mich.  375)  714 

Roulston  v.  Washington  (79  Ala.  529)         297 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


♦Page 
Koundtree  v.  Sawyer  (4  Dev.  44)  798 

v.  Dennard  (59  Ga.  629)  208 

v.  Talbot  (89  III.  24(1)  868 

Rountree  v.  Pursell  (11  Ind.  App.  522)       154 
Rouse  v.  Morris  (17  S.  &  K.  328)  765 

Roush  v.  Miller  (39  W.  Va.  638)  238 

Rowan  v.  Kirkpatrick  (14  111.  1)  1182 

Rowand  v.  Carroll  (81  III.  224)  1047 

Rowe  v.  Hamilton  (3  Me.  63)  265 

v.  Lansing  (53  Hun.  210)  985 

v.  White  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  411)  994 

Rowell  v.  Patterson  (76  Me.  196)  846 

Rowland,  In  re  (5  Dem.  216)  1188 

v.  Rowland  (2  Sneed,  543)  245 

v.  Swope  (39  111.  App.  514)  1041 

Rowley  v.  Fair  (104  Ind.  189)  655 

S'trav  (32  Mich.  70)  145,  154 

Rowton  v.  Rowton  (1  Hen.  &  M.  91)  236 

Roy  v.  Monroe  (47  N.  J.  Eq.  356)  728 

v.  Rowzie  (25  Grat.  599)  894 

v.  Rov  (16  Grat.  418)  65 

v.  Segrist  (19  Ala.  810)  497 

Rovce  ».  Burrell  (12  Mass.  407)  522 

Rover's  Appeal  (13  Pa.  St.  569)  1149 

Rovs  v.  Vilas  (18  Wis.  169)  283,  290 

Rovston  v.  Royston  (21  Ga.  161)  244 

Rozelle  v.  Harmon  (29  Mo.  App.  569)         429 

v.  Harmon  ( 103  Mo.  339)  429 

Rozier  v.  Fagan  (46  111.  404)  1036,  1038 

Rubber  Co.  v.  Goodvear  (6  Wall.  153)      1169 
Rubeck  v.  Gardner  (7  Watts,  455)       22,  306, 

310 
Rubel  v.  Bushnell  (91  Kv.  251)  1266,  1268 
Rubottom  v.  Morrow  (24  Ind.  202)  691,  1151 
Ruch  v.  Bierv  (110  Ind.  444)  1195,  1201, 

1214, 1217,  1219,  1223 
Kucker  v.  Dver  (44  Miss.  591)  1045 

v.  Lambdin  (12  Sm.  &  M.  230)       72,  76 

Ruckle  v.  Grafflin  (86  Md.  627)  880 

Rucks  v.  Taylor  (49  Miss.  552)  366 

Rudd  i>.  Hagan  (86  Kv.  159)  956 

17.  Rudd  (4  Dem."335)  346 

Ruddoni7.  McDonald  (1  Bradf.  352)  67 

Rudisell  v.  Rodes  (29  Grat.  147)  100,  101 

v.  Watson  (2  Dev.  Eq.  430)  607 

Rudolph  17.  Underwood  (88  Ga.  664*  1074 

Rudy  17.  Ulrich  (69  Pa.  St.  177)  48,  100 

Ruff  v.  Dovle  (56  Mo.  301)  682 

17.  Smith  (31  Miss.  59)  752 

Ruffin  17.  Harrison  (81  N.  C.  208)  551 

17.  Harrison  (86  N.  C.  190)  551, 1252 

Ruffino,  In  re  (116  Cal.  305)  48 

Rugg  17.  Rngg  (83  N.  Y.  592)  71,  475 

Ruggles  17.  Super.  Ct.  (103  Cal.  125)        1203 
Rugle  17.  Webster  (55  Mo.  246)  1058 

Rule  v.  Maupin  (84  Mo.  587)  490 

Rumph  v.  Hiott  (35  S.  C.  444)  502 

v.  Truelove  (66  Ga.  480)  1023 

Rumrill  17.  First  National  Bank  (28  Minn. 

202)  583 

Ramsey  v.  Otis  (133  Mo.  85)  1113 

Rundle"  t\  Pegram  (49  Miss.  751)  223 

Runkle  o.  Gates  (11  Ind.  95)  89,  90 

Runnels  v.  Runnels  (27  Tex.  515)       212,  215 
Runvan's  Appeal  (27  Pa.  St.  121)  177 

Run  van  v.  Newark  Co.  (24  N.  J.  L.  467)  1048 

i\  Price  (15  Oh.  St.  1)  42 

Runvon's  Estate  (53  Cal.  196)  1125 

Ruoff's  Appeal  (26  Pa.  St.  219)  63 

Ruser,  In  re  (6  Dem.  31)  482 

Rush  v.  Megee  (36  Ind.  69)  39 


•Page 
Rush  17.  Rush  (40  Ind.  83)  952 

v.  Vought  (55  Pa.  St.  437)  611 

Rusing  v.  Rusing  (25  Ind.  63)  902 

Rusling  17.  Rusling  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  603)         490 
Russ  17.  Russ  (9  Fla.  105)  949 

Russell,  In  re  (33  Hun,  271)  482 

17.  Allen  (107  U.  S.  163)  920,  929 

v.  Clowes  (2  Coll.  648)  98 

17.  Erwin  (41  Ala.  292)  395,  396,  622,  714 

17.  Kubanks  (84  Mo.  82)  949 

17.  Hartt  (87  N.  Y.  19)  481,  534 

17.  Hoar  (3  Met.  Mass.  187)         535,  537 

17.  Hooker  (67  Conn.  24)  441 

17.  Hubbard  (59  111.  335)  807,  849 

17.  Lane  (1  Barb.  519)  807,  808 

17.  Lewis  (3  Or.  380)  323 

17.  McDougall  (3  Sm.  &  M.  234)  336 

17.  Madden  (95  111.  485)  360 

v.  Russell  (84  Ala.  48)  112,  140 

17.  Sunbury  (37  Oh.  St.  372)        627,  628 

17.  United  States  (15  Ct.  of  CI.  168)     336 

Rust  v.  Billingslea  (44  Ga.  306)  780 

17.  Witherington  (17  Ark.  129)  428 

Rustling  v.  Rustling  (47  N.  J.  L.  1)  795 

Ruston  17.  Ruston  (2  Yeates,  54)  1106 

Ruth  17.  Oberbrunner  (40  Wis.  238)    928,  932, 

1230 
Rutherford  17.  Allen  (62  Vt.  260) 
17.  Alyea  (54  N.  J.  Eq.  41l) 


17.  Clark  (4  Bush,  27) 

17.  Crawford  (53  Ga.  138) 

17.  Mavo  (76  Va.  117) 

17.  Morris  (77111.  397) 

v.  Pope  (15  Md.  579) 

i7.  Thompson  (14  Or.  236) 

v.  Williams  (62  Mo.  252) 

Rutledge,  Ex  parte  (Harp.  Ch.  65) 

17.  Simpson  (141  Mo.  290) 

Ryan  v.  Allen  (120  111.  648) 

17.  Am.  Co.  (96  Ga.  322) 

17.  Andrews  (21  Mich.  229) 

17.  Ferguson  (3  Wash.  356) 


1200 

631,  632, 

1124 

362,  456 

331 

271 

39,  43,  46 

337 

429 

676,  805 

638 

777 

902,  1102 

546 

145,  154 

280,  337, 

1067 


804 
861 
865 
1266 
387 
647 
520 


v.  Flanagan  (38  N.  J.  L.  161) 

v.  Hollidav  (110  Cal.  335) 

17.  Kinnev  (2  Mont.  454) 

17.  McLeod  (32  Grat.  367) 

17.  North  Bank  (168  Mass.  215) 

17.  Rothweiler  (50  Oh.  St.  595) 

v.  Rvan  (2  Phillim.  332) 

v.  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  R.  (64  Tex.  239)   464, 

465,  466 
Rvden  17.  Jones  (1  Hawks,  497) 
Rvder's  Estate  (129  N.  Y.  640) 
Rvder  v.  Wilson  (41  N.  Y.  Eq.  9) 
Ryerson,  In  re  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  43) 
— —  17.  Hendrie  (22  Iowa,  480) 
Ryker  v.  Vawter  (117  Ind.  425) 


02 
821 
840 

1000 
287 

1073 


Saam  v.  Saam  (4  Watts,  432)  424 

S'abalot  v.  Populus  (31  La.  An.  854)  214 

Sacia  v.  Berthoud  (17  Barb.  15)  693 

Sacket  v.  Mead  (1  Conn.  13)  857 
Sackville  y.  Smith  (L.  K.  17  Eq.  153)        1111 

Saddington  v.  Hewitt  (70  Wis.  240)  680 

Saddler  v.  Kennedv  (26  W.  Va.  636)  1029 

Sadler  v.  Sadler  (16  Ark.  628)  568 
Saeger  v.  Wilson  (4  W.  &  S.  501 )  684,  702 
Safford  17.  Houghton  (48  Vt.  236) 

cxxxix 


157 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  Btar  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Sage  v.  Woodin  (66  N.  Y.  578)  282,  290 

Sager  v.  Gallowav  (113  Pa.  St.  500)  942 

v.  Mead  (164  Pa.  125)  1031 

Sahler  v.  Signer  (44  Barb.  606)  1043 

Sale  v.  Dishman  (3  Leigh,  548)  287 

v.  Thornsberrv  (86  Ivy.  266)  877 

Salisbury  v.  Aldrich  (118  111.  199)  34 

r.  Morse  (7  Lans.  359)  1 103 

Sallee  v.  Waters  (17  Ala.  482)  182 

Salmon,  In  re  (107  Cal.  614)  110 

v.  Hays  (4  Hagg.  382)  63 

Salomon  v.  Holden  (72  111.  App.  346)        1250 
Salsbury  v.  Ellison  (7  Col.  107)  286 

Salter  v.  Blount  (2  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  218)      1247 

v.  Cain  (7  Ala.  478)  744 

v.  Neaville  (1  Bradf.  488)  777 

r.  Salter  (6  Bush,  624)  774 

v.  Salter  (98  Ind.  522)  433 

v.  Williamson  (2  N.  J.  Eq.  480)        1123 

r.  Smith  (32  Ala.  404)  255 

Saltonstall  v.  Sanders  (11  Allen,  446)        922, 

926,  933,  934 

Sammis  v.  Sammis  (14  R.  I.  123)       942,  950, 

1102 

r.  Wightman  (31  Fla.  10)  842 

Sammon  r.  Wood  (107  Mich.  824)  824 

Sample  r.  Barr  (25  Pa.  St.  457)       1030,  1030 


Sampson  r.  Browning  (22  Ga.  293) 

v.  Brvce  (5  Munf.  175) 

v.  Graham  (96  Pa.  St.  405) 

r.  Randall  (72  Me.  109) 

r.  Sampson  (63  Me.  328) 

Sams  v.  Sams  (85  Kv.  396) 
Samson  v.  Samson  (64  Cal.  327) 
Samuel  v.  Thomas  (51  Wis.  549) 
Samwell  v.  Wake  (1  Bro.  Ch.  144) 
Sanborn's  Estate  (109  Mich.  191) 
Sanborn  v.  Goodhue  (28  N.  H.  48) 


81 

993 

603 

1000 

1267 

157 

499,  500 

760,  765 

1094 

391,  1128 

118,  126, 

679 

361 

121 

622,  713 


v.  Perrv  (86  Wis.  361) 

v.  Sanborn  (65  N.  II.  172) 

Sanchez  v.  Hart  (17  Fla.  507) 
Sanderlin  i\  Sanderlin  (1  Swan,  441)  167, 181, 

182 
Sanders,  In  re  (4  Pai.  293)  850 

v  Blain  (6  J.  .1.  Marsh.  446)  734 

v.  Edwards  (29  La.  An.  696)  549 

v.  Jones  (8  Ired.  Eq.  246)  359.  363 

v.  Lov  (61  Ind.  298)  1182,  1254 

v.  McMillan  (98  Ala.  144)  261 

v.  Moore  (52  Ark.  376)  433 

v.  Peck  (131  111.  398)  1149 

v.  Sanders  (2  Dev.  Eq.  262)  1039 

r.  Simcich  (65  Cal.  150)  109 

v.  Sorrell  (65  Miss.  2S8)  1086 

v.  Soulier  (126  N.  Y.  193)  340,  1123 

Sanderson's  Estate  (74  Cal.  199)         677,  738. 

1186 
Sanderson  v.  Bavlev  (4  Mvl.  &  Cr.  56)      899 

i'.  Pearson  (45  Md.  483) 

B.  Sanderson  (17  Fla.  820) 


Sanford  v.  Atwood  (44  Conn.  141)  611 

v.  Head  (5  Cal.  297)  1130 

v.  Sanford  (61  Barb.  293)  612 

v.  Sanford  (5  Lans.  486)  612 

v.  Sanford  (62  N.  Y.  553)  842,  844 

San  Francisco  O.   A.  v.  Super.  Ct.  (116 

Cal.  443)  499,  500,  691 

Sangston  v.  Hack  (52  Md.  173)  284 

Sankey's  Appeal  (55  Pa.  St.  491)   1051,  1059, 

1060 
Sankey  v.  Cook  (82  Iowa,  125)  832,  847 

v.  Elsberrv  (10  Ala.  455)  1242 

v.  Simkev  (6  Ala.  607)  1230,  1231 

v.  Sankev  (8  Ala.  601)  1231 

San  Roman  v.  Watson  (54  Tex.  254)  537 

Santana  v.  Pendleton  (81  Fed.  R.  784)     1060 

390 

526,  533 

1138 

531 

818 

250 

638,  995 

440,  646 

505,  518 

401, 

1205 


v.  Sanderson  (20  Fla.  292) 


1186 

821,  822, 

1123,  1228 

1135,  H  16, 

1165,  1168 

-  r.  White  (18  Pick.  328)        919,  923,  929 
Saudford  r.  lilake  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  247)  944 

r.  MeL.'.in  (.'!  I'.ii.  117)  244,251 

Sandoe'a  Appeal  (65  I'm.  St.  314)  273 

Sanda'i  Case  '3  Salk.  22)  516,  574 

Cas.-  (Sid.  179)  516,  574 

Sands  ,-.  Lynharo  (27  Grat.  291)  306 

rxl 


Sapp  v.  McArdle  (41  Ga.  628) 
Sargent's  Estate  (62  Wis.  130) 
Sargent  v.  Davis  (3  La.  An.  353) 

—  v.  Fox  (2  McCord,  309) 
v.  Kimball  (37  Vt.  320) 

v.  Roberts  (34  Me.  135) 

v.  Sargent  (103  Mass.  297) 

v.  Sargent  (168  Mass.  420) 

Sarkie's  Appeal  (2  Pa.  St.  157) 

Sarle  v.  Court  of  Probate  (7  R.  I.  270) 


Sarrazin's  Succession  (34  La.  An.  1168)     522 
Sartor  v.  Beatv  (25  S.  C.  293)  1237,  1238 

Sartoris,  In  re  (1  Curt.  910)  404 

Sarver  v.  Beal  (36  Kan.  555)  131, 1239 

Sasscer  v.  Walker  (5  G.  &  J.  102)  647 

Satterfield  v.  Mayes  (11  Humph.  58)  896 

Satterthwaite  r.  Satterthwaite  (3  Phillim. 

1)  471 

Satterwhite  v.  Carson  (3  Ired.  L.  549)        401 

v.  Littlefield  (13  Sm.  &  M.  302)  341,  1168 

Sauer  v.  Griffin  (67  Mo.  654)  1262 

Saunders's  Appeal  (54  Conn.  108)  48 

Saunders  v.  Bell  (56  Ga.  442)  1064 

v.  Denison  (20  Conn.  521)  1194 

v.  Ferrill  (1  Ired.  L.  97)  610 

v.  Haughton  (8  Ired.  Eq.  217)  1001 

v.  Rudd  (21  Ark.  519)  803,  808 

v.  Saunders  (2  Lit.  314)  787,  1123 

v.  Saunders  (108  N.  C.  327)  945 

v.  Weston  (74  Me.  85)  361,  650 

v.  Wilder  (2  Head,  577)  287 

Saunderson  v.  Stearns  (6  Mass.  37)  383 

Sauner  v.  Phoenix  Co.  (41  Mo.  App.  480)  647 
Sauter  v.  Muller  (4  Dem.  389)  950 

Savage  r.  Benham  (17  Ala.  119)  357 

v.  Gould  (60  How.  Pr.  217)  1135 

v.  O'Neil  (44  N.  Y.  298)  613 

Savings  Bank  v.  Burgin  (73  Mo.  App.  108)  839 
Savings  Societv  V.   Hutchinson   (68  Cal. 

52)  845 

Sawbridge  v.  Hill  (L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  219)     529 
Sawtelle's  Appeal  (84  Fa.  St.  306)  816 

Sawtelle  v.  Witham  (94  Wis.  412)       922,  923 
Sawver  v.  Baldwin  (20  Pick.  378)        355,  882 

"v.  Concord  R.  R.  Co.  (58  N.  11.517)  617, 

620 

v.  Dozier  (5  Ired.  97)  511 

i'.  Freeman  (101  Mass.  543)  944 

v.  Grandy  (113  N.  C.  42)  832 

v.  Sawver  (7  Jones  L.  134)  71 

v.  SawVer  (28  Vt.  245)         163,  166,  180, 

182,  189,  768 
Sawyers  v.  Baker  (77  Ala.  461)  612 

Saxon  v.  Cain  (19  Neb.  488)  1089 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Saxon  v.  Whitaker  (30  Ala.  237)  39 

Saxton  v.  Chamberlain  (0  Pick.  422)        1126 
Saver  v.  Bennett  281 

— -  v.  Sayer  (2  Vern.  G88)  908 

Savles  v.  Baker  (5  R.  I.  457)  1220 

v.  Briggs  (4  Met.  Mass.  421)  336 

Saylor  v.  Powell  (90  N.  C.  202)  203 

Savre  v.  Hclme  (61  Pa.  St.  299)  359 

— —  v.  Savre  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  207)  531 

Sbarboro's  Estate  (63  Cal.  5)  499 

Scales  v.  Scales  (6  Jones  Eq.  103)  940 

Scammell  v.  Wilkinson  (2  Last,  552)  26 

Scammon  v.  Campbell  (75  111.  223)     201,  202 

v.  Ward  (1  Wash.  St.  179)  800,  801 

Scanlan  v.  Turner  (1  Bai.  L.  421)  252 

v.  Wright  (13  Pick.  523)  22 

Scarborough  v.  State  (24  Ark.  20)  1120 

v.  Watkins  (9  B.  Mon.  540)  677 

Scarce  v.  Page  (12  B.  Mon.  311)  390 

Schaaber's  Appeal  (13  Atl.  R.  775)  48 

Schad's  Appeal  (88  Fa.  St.  Ill)  61 

Schadt  v.  Heppe  (45  Cal.  433)  216 

Schaefer  v.  Causey  (8  Mo.  A  pp.  142)        1080 

v.  Schaefer  (141  111.  337)      878,  880,  897 

Schaeffer's  Appeal  (119  Fa.  St.  640)         1228 
Schaeffer  v.  Beldsmeier  (107  Mo.  314)        214 

v.  Weed  (8  111.  511)  239 

Schaeffner's  Appeal  (41  Wis.  260)  351 

Schafer  v.  Causev  (70  Mo.  305)  1080 

v.  Eneu  (54* Pa.  St.  304)  141 

Schaffer's  Succession  (13  La.  An.  113)     1254 
Schaffer  v.  Kettell  (14  Allen,  528)  937 

Schaffner  v.  Grutzmacher  (0  Iowa,  137)     183 
Schafroth  v.  Ambs  (40  Mo.  114)  607,  608 

Schaife  v.  Emmons  (84  Ga.  619)  82 

Schai^b  v.  Griffin  (84  Md.  558)  446 

Schedel,  In  re  (69  Cal.  241)  1204 

In  re  (73  Cal.  594)  897 

Schee  v.  Wiseman  (79  Ind.  389)  593,  621 

Schenck  v.  Dart  (22  N.  Y.  420)  1168 

v.  Schenck  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  174)  072 

v.  Vail  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  538)  147,  151 

Schenkl  v.  Dana  (118  Mass.  230)  284 

Scherer  v.  Ingerman  (110  Ind.  428)  833,  1026, 

1029 
Schermerhorn  v.  Negus  (1  Denio,  448) 
Scherer  v.  Brown  (21  Colo.  481) 
Schick  v.  Grote  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  352) 
Schieffelin  v.  Stewart  (1  John.  Ch.  620) 


955 

107 
1208 

705 
1138 

227 
34 


Schiffer  v.  Pruden  (64  N.  Y.  47) 
Schildknecht  v.  Rompf  (4  S.  W.  R.  235) 
Schinz  v.  Schinz  (90  Wis.  230)        1121,  1124 
Schlarb  v.  Holderbaum  (80  Iowa,  394)      206, 

1026 
Schley  v.  Collis  (47  Fed.  R.  250)  992,  993 
Schlicker  v.  Hemenway  (110  Cal.  579)    1055, 

1058,  1059 
Schlink  v.  Maxton  (153  111.  447)  332,  814,  816 
Schlottman  v.  Hoffman  (73  Miss.  188)  892 
Schluter  v.  Bowery  Bank  (117  N.  Y.  125)  305, 
508,  587,  588 
Schmidt's  Estate  (182  Pa.  St.  267)  1064,  1067 

Estate  (183  Pa.  St.  129)  529 

Schmidt,  In  re  (94  Cal.  334)  215 

v.  Heusner  (4  Dem.  275)  663 

v.  Stark  (61  Minn.  91)  1234,  1246 

Schmidth's  Estate  (183  Pa.  St.  641)  883 

Schmidtke  v.  Miller  (71  Tex.  103)    777,  1263, 

1264 
Schmitt  v.  Willis  (40  N.  J.Eq.  515)  263,  1074 


*  Page 
Schmittler  v.  Simon  (101  N.  Y.  554)  757 

Schmucker  v.  Reel  (61  Mo.  592)  876,  877 

Schnebly  v.  Sthneblv  (26  111.  116)  230 

Schneider  v.  Bray  (59  Tex.  668)  199,  207 

v.  Hoffmann  (9  Mo.  App.  280)  212 

v.  McFarland  (2  N.  Y.  459)  1054 

v.  Manning  (121  111.  376)  34,  42 

Schneidt's  Fstate  (185  Pa.  St.  579)  1147 

Scbnell  v.  Chicago  (38  111.  382)        1032,  1037 

V.  Schroder  (Bail.  Eq.  334)  391,  654 

Schoeneich  v.  Reed  (8  Mo.  App.  356)        172, 

803,  1152,  1155,  1170 

Schofield  v.  Heap  (27  Beav.  93)  978 

v.  Walker  (58  Mich.  90)  40,  47 

Scholefield  v.  Eichelberger  (7  Pet.  586)     281, 

282 
Scholev  v.  Rew  (23  Wall.  331)  69*1  a 

Scholl  v.  Olmstead  (84  Ga.  693)  721 

Schooler  v.  Stark  (73  Mo.  301)  1 189 

Schoolheld  v.  Rudd  (9  B.  Mon.  291)  645 

Schope  v.  Schaffner  (140  III.  470)  1074 

Schoppert  v.  Gillam  (6  Rich.  Eq.  83)  892 

Schori  v.  Stevens  (02  Ind.  441)  1244 

Schorr  v.  Etling  (124  Mo.  42)  212 

Schott's  Estate  (78  Fa.  St.  40)  873,  878 

Schouler,  Petitioner  (134  Mass.  426)  909 

Schrader,  Matter  of  (03  Hun.  36)  352 

Schreiber  v.  Sharpless  (110  U.  S.  76)  620 

Schroeder's  Estate  (46  Cal.  304)  793 

Schroeder  v.  Superior  Court  (70  Cal.  343) 

507,  574 

v.  Wilcox  (39  Neb.  136)     719,  722,  1089 

Schug's  Appeal  (14  W.  N.  C.  49)  1057 

Schull  v.  Murray  (32  Md.  9)  27,  352,  468 

Schult  v.  Moll  (132  N.  Y.  122)  883 

Schulte  v.  Coulthurst  (94  Iowa,  418)  825 

Schultz  v.  Brown  (47  Minn.  255)     '  1193 

v.  Pulver  (11  Wend.  301)   359,  363,  365, 

673.  677 

v.  Schultz  (10  Grat.  358)  '  498 

v.  Schultz  (35  N.  Y.  053)  481 

Schultze  v.  Schultze  (144  III.  290)  304 

Schumaker  v.  Schmidt  (44  Ala.  454)  57 

Schurtz  17.  Thomas  (8  Fa.  St.  359)  1066 

Schutt  v.  Missionary  Soc.  (41  N.  J.  Eq. 


115) 
Schutz  v.  Marette  (146  N.  Y.  137) 

Schuyler  v.  Hanna  (31  Neb.  307) 

v.  Hoyle  (5  John.  Ch.  196) 

Schwab  v.  Pierro  (43  Minn.  520) 


59 

810,812, 
846 
197 
639 
59 


Schwallenberg  v.  Jennings  (43  Md.  552)  1063 
Schwartz's  Appeal  (119  Pa.  St.  337)  918 

Estate  (14  Pa.  St.  42)  1142 

Estate  (12  Phila.  11)  1058 

Schwatken  v.  Daudt  (53  Mo.  App.  1)         172 
Scobee  v.  Bridges  (87  Kv.  427)  1221 

Scofield  v.  Adams  (12  Hun,  306)         987.  988 

v.  Churchill  (72  N.  Y.  565)  547,  548 

v.  Olcott  (120  111.  362)  883,  941,  942,  943 

Scoggins  v.  Turner  (98  N.  C.  135)  92 

Scogin  v.  Stacy  (20  Ark.  265)  609 

Scott's  Appeal"  (112  Pa.  St.  427)  1131 

Estate  (15  Cal.  220)  440 

Estate  (137  Pa.  St.  454)  1233 

Estate  (147  Pa.  St.  89)  60 

Estate  (163  Pa.  165)  903 

Estate  (9  Watts  &  S.  98)  1149,  1150 

Scott  v.  Ashlin  (86  Va.  581)  1041 

v.  Burch  (6  H.  &  J.  67)  702 

v.  Cheatham  (78  Va.  82)  205,  212 

cxli 


Scott  v.  Crews  (72  Mo.  261) 

1182 

v.  Dorsey  (1  Har.  &  J.  227)  1153 

v.  Dunn  (1  D.  &  B.  Eq.  425)  1080 

r.  Fink  (45  Mich.  241)  100 

v.  Fox  (14  Md.  388)  342,  393 

v.  Governor  (1  Mo.  686)  660 

V.  Hancock  (13  Mass.  162)  843 

v.  Harris  (127  Ind.  520)  833,  1218 

v.  Kennedy  (12  B.  Mon.  510)  1126 

v.  Kev  (11' La.  An.  232)  157 

v.  Lawson  (10  La.  An.  547)  505,  576 

v.  McNeal  (154  U.  S.  34)      449,  452,  455 

v.  McNeal  (5  Wash.  St.  309)       452,  455 

v.  Monell  (1  Redf.  431)  1153 

i).  Newsom  (27  Ga.  125)  713 

v.  Patchin  (54  Vt.  253)  1100 

v.  Price  (2  Serg.  &  R.  59)  950 

v.  Purcell  (7  Blackf.  66)  249 

v.  Ratcliffe  (5  Pet.  81)  446 

v.  Rilev  (49  Mo.  App.  251)  837 

v.  Searles  (7  Sm.  &  M.  498)        693,  746 

v.  Spashett  .3  Mac.  &  G.  599)  1015 

v.  Stebbins  (91  N.  Y.  605)  989 

v.  Terry  (37  Miss.  650)  144 

v.  Ware  (64  Ala.  174)  843, 1022 

v.  Wells  (55  Minn.  274)  1074 

v.  West  (63  Wis.  529)  383,723,  895,  896, 

942,  1185 

v.  Whitehall  (1  Mo.  764)  862 

Scovil  v.  Scovil  (45  Barb.  517)  842 

Scoville's  Estate  (20  111.  App.  426)     183,  189 
Scoville  v.  Post  (3  Edw.  303)  414 

Scranton  v.  Demere  (6  Ga.  92)  431 

Scribner  v.  Williams  (1  Pai.  550)      499,  1208, 

1209 
Scroggin  v.  Scroggin  (1  J.  J.  Marsh.  362) 

336 
Scroggs  v.  Stevenson  (100  N.  C.  354)      1167, 

1168,1173 

v.  Tutt  (20  Kan.  271)  809,  826 

Scruggs  v.  Foot  (19  S.  C.  274)  215 

Scudder  r.  Ames  (89  Mo.  496)  284 

0.  Ames  (142  Mo.  187)  284,  292,  301 

Scull  o.  Beattv  (27  Fla.  426)  196 

Seabright  v.  Seabright  (28  W.  Va.  412)    1190 
Seabrook  r.  Freeman  (3  McCord,  371)        410 

v.  Seabrook  (10  Rich.  Eq.  495)  903 

Seager's  Estate  (92  Mich.  186)  229,  230 

Seagrave  v.  Seagrave  (13  Ves.  439)  226 

Seaman  v.  Durvea  (10  Barb.  523)  1250 

v.  Durvea*  (11  N.  Y.  324)  326,  1250 

v.  Whitehead  (78  N.  Y.  306)  1146 

Seaman's  Friend  Soc.  v.  Hopper  (33  N. 

Y. 619)  34 

Search's  Appeal  (13  Pa.  St.  108)  75 

Search  v.  Search  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  137)  357,  1124 
Searcv  v.  Holmes  (43  Ala.  608)  1128 

Searight's  Estate  (163  Pa.  St.  222)  1039 

Searing  >•.  Searing  (9  Pai.  283)  639 

Searles  v.  Scott  (22  Miss.  94)  1182 

Sears  r.  Dillingham  (12  Mass.  358)  582,  1254 

v.  Giddey  (41  Mich.  590)  762 

Seavey's  Estate  (82  Iowa,  440)  337 

Sechresl  v.  Edwards  (4  Met  Kv.  163)      1208 
Becor  v.  Sentis  (5  Redf.  570)  1174 

Security  Co.  v.  Brvanl  (52  Conn.  311)       985 

s.'Hardenburgh  (53  Conn.  109)  999 

, v.  Prat(  (65  Conn.  161)  357,  1000 

Security  8av.  v.  Connell  (65  Cal.  574)       861 
Seda  v.  Huble  (75  Iowa,  129)  909 

cxlii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  oaees.1 
*  Page 
394,  749,  1131 


Sedgwick  v.  Ashburner  (1  Bradf.  105)        737 

v.  Minot  (6  Allen,  171)         146,  149,  903 

See  v.  See  (06  Mo.  App.  566)  187 

Seebrock  v.  Fedawa  (30  Neb.  424)  37,  46 

v.  Fedawa  (33  Neb.  413)  894,  1150 

Seeds  v.  Burk  (181  Pa.  St.  281)  1023 

Seegar  v.  Betton  (6  H.  &  J.  162)  551 

Seek  v.  Haynes  (68  Mo.  13)  205 

Seeley's  Appeal  (56  Conn.  202)  266 

Seeley  v.  Hinck  (65  Conn.  1)  954 

Seelv  v.  Beck  (42  Mo.  143)  534 

Seibert's  Appeal  (19  Pa.  St.  49)         356,  1007 
Seibert  v.  Wise  (70  Pa.  St.  147)  872 

Seider  v.  Seider  (5  Whart.  208)  350 

Seiders  v.  Giles  (141  Pa.  St.  93)  1244 

Seighman  v.  Marshall  (17  Md.  550)  1116,  1125 
Seitz,  In  re  (6  Mo.  App.  250)  1170 

Seitzinger's  Estate  (170  Pa.  St.  531)  1096 

Selb  v.  Montague  (102  111.  446)  599,  1056 

Selbv's  Estate  (Mvr.  125)  865 

Seidell  v.  Keen  (2*7  Grat.  576)  962 

Seldner  v.  McCreerv  (75  Md   287)  568 

Selectmen  v.  Bovlston  (2  Mass.  384)  363,  374, 

649 
Selin  v.  Snvder  (7  S.  &  R.  166)  331 

Selleck,  In're  (111  N.  Y.  284)  1151 

v.  French  (1  Am.  Lead.  Cas.)  1137 

Seller's  Estate  (82  Pa.  St.  153)  670 

Sellers  v.  Reed  (88  Va.  377)  942 

Sellew's  Appeal  (36  Conn.  186)        1129,  1131 
Selling,  Matter  of  (5  Dein.  225)  1228 

Selma  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lacey  (49  Ga.  106)       629 
Selna's  Estate  (Mvr.  233)  1136 

Selover  v.  Coe  (63  N.  Y.  438)  1264,  1270 

Semine  v.  Semine  (2  Lev.  90)  587 

Semmes  v.  Semmes  (7  Har.  &  J.  388)    91,  94 

v.  Young  (10  Md.  242)         821,  822,  843 

Semoice  t'.  Semoice  (35  Ala.  295)  1128 

Senger  v.  Senger  (81  Va.  687)     892,  893,  899 
Sergeant  v.  Steinberger  (2  Ohio,  305)  233 

Serle  v.  St.  Eloy  (2  P.  Wms.  386)     '         1106 
Sermon  v.  Black  (79  Ala.  507)  1035 

Sessions  v.  Moseley  (4  Cush.  87)  122,  124 

Sessoms  v.  Sessoms  (2  Dev.  &  B.  Eq. 

453)  966 

Severance  v.  Hammatt  (28  Me.  511)  855 

Severin  v.  Zack  (55  Iowa,  28)  41 

Sevier  i\  Gordon  (21  La.  An.  373)  796 

r.  Teal  (16  Tex.  371)  342 

Sewall  i\  Cargill  (15  Me.  414)  924 

v.  Robbins  (139  Mass.  164)  95 

u.  Wilmer  (132  Mass.  131)  496 

Seward  v.  Clark  (67  Ind.  289)  1196 

Sewell  17.  Stingluff  (62  Md.  592)  1125 

Sexton  v.  Pickering  (3  Rand.  468)  249 

Seybold  v.  Bank  (5  N.  Dak.  460)        115,  127 
Seymour  t>.  Seymour  (22  Conn.  272)        1045, 

1090 

440, 

1123 

963 

272 

748 

116 

951 

763 

624 

171 

323,  324,  669, 

1144 

131)  677 


v.  Seymour  (4  John.  Ch.  409)    357 

Shackelford  v.  Hall  (19  111.  212) 

v.  Miller  (91  N.  C.  181) 

17.  Runvan  (7  Humph.  141) 

Shackleford  v.  Brown  (89  Mo.  546) 
Shadden  v.  Hembree  (17  Oreg.  14) 
Shaeffer  v.  Shaeffer  (54  Md.  679) 
Shafer  v.  Grimes  (23  low  i.  550) 

--  r.  Shafer  (129  Ind.  394) 
v.  Shafer  (85  Md.  554) 

Shaffer's  Appeal  (46  Pa.  St. 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Shaffer  v.  Richardson  (27  Ind.  122) 

v.  Shaffer  (50  Pa.  St.  394) 

Shahan  v.  Swan  (48  Ohio  St.  25) 
Shailer  v.  Bumstead  (99  Mass.  112) 


*Page 

226 

260 

59 

46,  48, 

477,  490 

1085 

St. 


Shakeley  v.  Taylor  (1  Bond,  142) 
Shakespeare  v.  Fidelity  Co.  97  Pa 
173)  441 

v.  Markham  (10  Hun,  311)  58 

v.  Markham  (72  N.  Y.  400)  349 

Shale  v.  Schantz  (35  Hun,  622)  624 

Shallcross  v.  Finden  (3  Ves.  738)  1099 

Shaker's  Appeal  (43  Pa.  St.  83)  553 

Shakers  v.  Ladd  (141  Pa.  St.  349)  903 

Shane  v.  McNeill  (76  Iowa,  459)  249 

Shanks  v.  Klein  (104  Otto,  18)  289 

v.  Lancaster  (5  Grat.  110)  250 

Shanley's  Appeal  (62  Conn.  325)  41 

Shannon  v.  Shannon  (111  Mass.  331)  493 

v.  White  (109  Mass.  146)  184 

Shape  v.  Shaffner  (140  111.  420)  1074 

Shaper  v.  Eneu  (54  Pa.  St.  304)  522 

Share  v.  Andersen  (7  S.  &  R.  43)  252 

Sharkey's  Estate  (2  Phila.  276)  547 

Sharkey  v.  Bankston  (30  La.  An.  891)      1080 

v.  McDermott  (91  Mo.  647)  59 

v.  McDermott  (16  Mo.  App.  80)  140 

Sharland  v.  Mildon  (5  Hare,  468)  417 

Sharp's  Estate  (11  Phila.  92)  1167 

Sharp,  In  re  (78  Calif.  483)  199 

v.  Caldwell  (7  Humph.  415)  632 

v.  Sharp  (35  Ala.  574)  857 

v.  Sharp  (76  Ala.  312)       341,  1022,  1035 

v.  Sharp  (2  Leigh.  249)  488 

Sharpe  v.  Rockwood  (78  Va.  24)  710,  1117 
Shattuck  v.  Chandler  (40  Kans.  516)  286 

v.  Gragg  (23  Pick.  88)  229,  258 

v.  Young  (2  Sm.  &  M.  30)  1231 

Shauffler  v.  Stoever  (4  S.  &  R.  202)  588,  1204 
Shaver  ».  McCarthy  (110  Pa.  St.  339)  31,  42 
Shaw,  Appellant  (81  Me.  207)   281,  294,  1194, 

1195 

v.  Beers  (84  Ind.  528) 

v.  Berry  (35  Me.  279) 

v.  Bovd  (5  S.  &  R.  309) 

v.  Cainp  (56  111.  App.  23) 

v.  Coble  (63  N.  C.  377) 

v.  Gookin  (7  N.  H.  16) 

v.  Groomer  (60  Mo.  495) 

v.  Hallihan  (46  Vt.  389) 

v.  Hoadlev  (8  Blackf.  165) 

v.  McCameron  (11  S.  &  R.  252) 

v.  Moderwell  (104  111.  64) 

v.  Newell  (9  R.  I.  Ill) 

».  Nicholav  (30  Mo.  99) 

v.  Russ  (14  Me.  432) 

o.  Shaw  (3  Cent.  R.  592) 

v.  Shaw  (2  Dana,  341) 

v.  Shaw  (1  Dem.  21) 

Shawhan  v.  Loffer  (24  Iowa,  217) 
Shav  v.  Sessaman  (10  Pa.  St.  432) 
Shea's  Appeal  (121  Pa.  St.  302) 

v.  Boschetti  (18  Beav.  321) 

Sheafe  v.  Spring  (9  Mass.  9) 
Sheaffe  v.  O'Neil  (1  Mass.  256) 
Shearer  v.  Paine  (12  Allen,  289) 
Shearin  v.  Eaton  (2  Ired.  Eq.  282) 
Shearman  v.  Angel  (Bai.  Eq.  351) 

v.  Christian  (9  Leigh,  571) 

v.  Pvke  (3  Curt.  539) 

Shedd,  Matter  of  (60  Hun,  367) 


251, 


1244 

733 

264 

1151 

699 

828 

681 

421 

596 

392 

1149 

1201 

684,  1045 

249 

1171 

271 

490 

259,  748 

641 

245 

486 

259 

22 

290 

1247 

897,  898 

1125 

85 

184,  664 


Sheer.  French  (3  Drew.  716) 

v.  Hale  (13  Ves.  404) 

Sheedy  v.  Roach  (124  Mass.  472) 
Sheehan  v.  Hennessv  (65  N.  H.  101) 

d.  Kennelly  (32  Ga.  145) 

Sheer  v.  Sheer  (159  111.  591) 
Sheets  v.  Grubbs  (4  Mete.  339) 

o.  Peabodv  (6  Blackf.  120) 

Sheetz's  Appeal  (100  Pa.  St.  197) 
Sheetz  v.  Kirtley  (62  Mo.  417) 


*Page 

657 

956 

118 

830 

740 

66 

938 

751 

1150 

1126,  1131, 

1132 


Shegogg  v.  Perkins  (34  Ark.  117)  1123 

Shelby  v.  Shelby  (1  B.  Mon.  266)  1240 

Shelden  v.  Warner  (59  Mich.  444)  679 

Sheldon  v.  Bliss  (8  N.  Y.  31)  174 

v.  Court  of  Probate  (5  R.  I.  436)       1201 

v.  Newton  (3  Oh.  St.  494)  330,  1034,  1089 

v.  Rice  (30  Mich.  296)  359,  368,  442,  702 

v.  Sheldon  (133  N.  Y.  1)  975 

v.  Stockbridge  (67  Vt.  299)  913 

v.  Woodbridge  (2  Root,  473)  702 

v.  Wright  (7  Barb.  39)       562,  564,  1034, 

1049,  1136 
Shellenberger  v.  Ransom  (31  Neb.  61)        131, 

227 

v.  Ransom  (41  Neb.  631)  131,  227 

Shelley's  Case  (1  Co.  93)  900 

Shelly's  Case  (1  Salk.  296)  760 

Shelton  v.  Armor  (13  Ala.  647)  250 

v.  Berry  (19  Tex.  154)  812 

v.  Hadfock  (62  Conn.  143)  816,  854,    856 

v.  Homer  (5  Met.  Mass.  462)  722 

v.  Hurst  (16  Lea,  470)  208 

v.  Shelton  (94  Ind.  113)  254 

Shepard's  Estate  (170  Pa.  St.  323)  499 

Shepard  v.  National  Bank  (67  111.  292)      807 

v.  Parker  (13  Ired.  L.  103)  1166 

v.  Patterson  (3  Dem.  183)  707 

v.  Shepard  (57  Conn.  24)  899 

».  Shepard  (19  Fla.  300)     677,  697,  1145, 

1149,  1161 

v.  Shepard  (108  Mich.  82)  795 

v.  Spaulding  (4  Met.  Mass.  416)  606 

v.  Speer  (140  111.  238)  340,  357 

v.  Tavlor  (15  R.  I.  204)  154 

v.  Tavlor  (16  R.  I.  166)  154 

Shephard  v.  Curriel  (19  111.  313)  494 

v.  Rhodes  (60  111.  301)  568,  1204 

Shepherd  v.  Bridenstein  (80  Iowa,  225)      390 

v.  Carlin  (99  Tenn.  64)  153 

v.  Howard  (2  N.  H.  507)  249 

v.  Nabors  (6  Ala.  631)  61,  902 

Sheppard  v.  Boggs  (9  Neb.  257)  291,  292 

v.  Green  (48  S.  C.  165)  632 

v.  Sheppard  (87  Ala.  560)  259 

v.  Starke  (3  Munf.  29)  1230 

Sheridan  v.  Houghton  (6  Abb.  N.  C.  234)  482 
Sheriff  v.  Brown  (5  Mackey,  172)  871,  878 
Sherlev  v.  Sherlev  (81  Kv.  240)  31,  35 

Sherman,  Matter'of  (153  N.  Y.  1)  691  a 

v.  Angel  (2  Hill  Ch.  26)  1147 

v.  Chace  (9  R.  I.  166)  1125 

v.  Kreul  (42  Wis.  33)  287 

v.  Lanier  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  249)         340,  709 

v.  Lewis  (44  Minn.  107)  1016 

v.  Newton  (6  Gray,  307)  270 

v.  Page  (85  N.  Y.  123)        359,  360,  364, 

665,  673,  1184 

v.  Sherman  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  125)  1000 

Sherry's  Estate  (7  Abb.  N.  Cas.  390)  326 

Sherry  v.  Lozier  (1  Bradf.  437)  105J 106 

cxliii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Sherwell,  Estate  of  (125  N.  Y.  376)         691  a 
Sherwood  v.  American  Bible  Soc.  (4  Abb. 
App.  Dec.  227)  912 

v.  Baker  (105  Mo.  472)  1067,  1089 

. v.  Hill  (25  Mo.  391)  660 

v.  Johnson  (I  Wend.  443)  776 

v.  Smith  (23  Conn.  516)  1220 

Shields  v.  Allen  (11  N.  C.  375)  1080 

o.  Alsup  (5  Lea,  508)        822,  1125,  1190 

v.  Anderson  (3  Leigh,  729)  420,  422 

v.  Ashlev  (16  Mo.  471)  1033,  1195 

v.  Batts  "(5  J.  J.  Marsh.  12)  259 

v.  Insurance  Co.  (119  N.  C.  380)         441 

v.  McDowell  (82  N.  C.  137)  1040 

v.  Odell  (27  Oh.  St.  398)  1140 

v.  Sharp  (35  Mo.  App.  178)  647 

v.  Shields  (60  Barb.  56)        544,  545,  578 

v.  Sullivan  (3  Dem.  296)  766 

Shiell  v.  Sloan  (22  S.  C.  151)  244 

Shillaber  v.  Wvman  (15  Mass.  322)  426 

Shilton's  Estate  (Tuck.  73)  526 

Shindel's  Appeal  (57  Pa.  St.  43)  1124 

Shine  v.  Redwine  (30  Ga.  780)  342 

Shinn's  Estate  (166  Pa.  St.  121)  363,  365,  369, 

710,  1164 
Shipherd  v.  Furness  (153  111.  590)  774 

Shiplev,  Ex  parte  (4  Md.  493)  705 

Shipman  v.  Buttertield  (47  Mich.  487)       561, 

563 

v.  Kevs  (127  Ind.  353)  171 

f.  Rollins  (98  N.  Y.  311)  912 

Shipp  v.  Davis  (78  Ga.  201)  835 

Shippen  v.  Burd  (42  Pa.  St.  461)  1176 

Shirack  v.  Shirack  (44  Kans.  653)  200 

Shirlev  v.  Healds  (34  N.  H.  407)         384,  410 

t*.  Shirlev  (9  Pai.  363)  607 

v.  Thompson  (123  Ind.  454)     1132,  1185 

v.  Whitehead  (1  Ired.  Eq.  130)    116,  120 

Shiver  v.  Rousseau  (68  Ala.  564)  855 

Shivers  v.  Goar  (40  Ga.  676)  960 

Shobe  v.  Brinson  (148  Ind.  285)  249 

Shoemaker's  Appeal  (106  Pa.  St.  392)      1002 
Shoemaker  v.  Brown  (10  Kan.  383)  340,  356, 

821,  1123 

■ v.  National  Bank  (2  Abb.  U.  S.  416)  858 

v.  Walker  (2  S.  &  R.  554)  236 

Shoemate  v.  Lockridge  (53  111.  503)  1032 

Shoenberger's  Estate  (28  Pa.  St.  459)         686 
Shoenberger  v.   Lancaster   (20  Pa.  St. 

459)  384,  385,  410 

Shofner  v.  Shofner  (5  Sneed,  94)  599 

Shollenberger's  Appeal  (21  Pa.  St.  337)    340, 

344 
Shomo'a  Appeal  (57  Pa.  St.  356)  532,  533 
Shontz  V.  Brown  (27  Pa.  St.  123)  1065 

Shoolbred  v.  Dravton  (2  Des.  246)  595 

Shore  v.  Wilson  (9  CI.  &  Fin.  355)  871 

Shores  v.  Carlev  (8  Allen,  425)  276,  277 

v.  Hooper  (153  Mass.  228)        1230,  1234 

Short's  Estate  (16  Pa.  St.  63)  691  a 

Short  v.  Johnson  (25  111.  489)  749 

v.  Smith  (4  East,  419)  93 

SI,,, Hall  r.  Hincklev  (31  111.  219)  277 

Shortridge  v.  Eaoley  (10  Ala.  450)  787 

Shouse  v.  Krusor  (24  Mo.  App.  279)  036 

Show  v.  Conwav  (7  Pa.  St.  136)  1149 

Showers  v.  Robinson  (48  Mich.  502)  200,  205, 
214,  215,  1075 

v.  Showers  (27  Pa.  St.  485)  63 

Shreiner's  Appeal  (63  Pa.  St.  106)  873 

-     are  v.  Joyce  (36  N.  J.  L.  44)  736,  796 

cxliv 


*Page 
Shreve  v.  Shreve  (10  N.  J.  Eq.  385)  968 

v.  Shreve  (17  N.  J.  Eq.  487)  967 

Shriver  v.  State  (65  Md.  278)    155,  444,  1015, 

1230,  1251 
Shropshire  v.  Reno  (5  J.  J.  Marsh.  91)         43 

v.  Withers  (5  J.  J.  Marsh.  210)  528 

Shroyer  v.  Richmond  (16  Oh.  St.  455)       325, 

326,  330,  331,  1089 

Shuler  v.  Millsaps  (71  N.  C.  297)  624 

Shull  v.  Johnson  (2  Jones  Eq.  202)  899 

v.  Kennon  (12  Ind.  34)  342 

Shultz  v.  Johnson  (5  B.  Mon.  497)  687 

v.  Pulver  (3  Pai.  182)  363,  677 

Shuman  v.  Reigart  (7  W.  &  S.  168)  640 

v.  Shuman  (80  Wis.  479)     145,  153,  154 

Shumate  v.  Bailey  (110  Mo.  411)  880 

Shumwav  v.  Cooper  (16  Barb.  556)  344,     518 

v.  Holbrook  (1  Pick.  114)  467 

Shupp  r.  Gavlord  (103  Pa.  St.  319)  1102 

Shurbun  v.  Hooper  (40  Mich.  503)  854 

Shurtliff  v.  Witherspoon  (1  Sm.  &  M.  613)  1167 
Shute  v.  Shute  (5  Dem.  1)  767 

».  Shute  (]20  N.  C.  440)  1083,  1085 

Shuttleworth  v.  Winter  (55  N.  Y.  624)  666 
Sibbs  v.  Societv  (153  Pa.  St.  345)  745 

Siblev  v.  Cook* (3  Atk.  572)  936 

v.  Simonton  (20  Fed.  R.  784)  1265,  1272 

t7.  Waffle  (16  N.  Y.  180)  323 

Sibthorp  v.  Moxom  (3  Atk.  580)  936 

Sickles  v.  New  Orleans  (80  Fed.  C.  C.  A. 

868)  923,  1238 

Sidall  17.  Harrison  (15  Pac.  R.  130)  354 

Sidle  v.  Anderson  (45  Pa.  St.  464)  795 

Sifford  w.  Morrison  (63  Md.  14)  549 

Siglar  17.  Haywood  (8  Wheat.  675)  792 

Sigournev  v.  Munn  (7  Conn.  11)  291 

v.  S'iblev  (21  Pick.  101)  571 

v.  Sibley  (22  Pick.  507)  526,  571 

v.  Wetherell  (6  Met.  553)  654 

Sikemever  v.  Galvin  (124  Mo.  367)  1244 

Sikes  v".  Parker  (95  N.  C.  232)  831 

r.  Truitt  (4  Jones  Eq.  361)  554 

Silcox  v.  Nelson  (24  Ga.  84)  944 

v.  Nelson  (1  Ga.  Dec.  24)  173 

Siler  17.  Dorsett  (108  N.  C.  300)  485 

17.  Gray  (86  N.  C.  566)  687 

Sill  v.  McKnight  (7  W.  &  S.  244)  508 

17.  Sill  (31  Kan.  270)  268,  269 

v.  Sill  (39  Kan.  189)  1148 

Silliman  v.  Whitaker  (H9  N.  C.  89)  897,  898 
Sillings  v.  Baumgardener  (9  Grat.  273)  1230 
Silsbv  v.  Sawver  (64  N.  H.  580)  906 

Silver  v.  Williams  (17  S.  &  R.  292)  780 

Silverbrandt  17.  Widmever  (2  Dem.  263)  666 
Silverman  v.  Chase  (90*111.  37)  287 

17.  Gundleringer  (82  Cal.  548)  1089 

Silvers  v.  Canarv  (109  Ind.  267)  729 

v.  Canarv  (114  Ind.  129)   941,  1012,  1269 

Silverthorn's  "Will  (68  Wis.  372)  37 

Silverthorn  v.  McKinster  (12  Pa.  St.  67)  1086 
Silvev's  Estate  (42  Cal.  210) 
Simar  v.  Canaday  (53  N.  Y.  298) 
Simmermann  v.  Sonper  (29  Grat.  9) 
Simmons  r.  Beazil  (125  Ind.  302) 

t7.  Biggs  (1)9  N.  C.  236) 

v.  Blanchard  (46  Tex.  266) 

v.  Holland  (3  Meriv.  547) 

«.  Bvrd  (49  Ga.  285) 

17.  Goodell  (63  N.  II.  458) 


17.  Ileman  (17  Mo.  App.  444) 


266 
240 
46 
103 
647 

1060 
790 

1152 
1131,  1132, 

1209 
676 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


'Page 
Simmons  v.  Henderson  (Freem.  Ch.  493)    341 

354 

71 

256,  258 

1255 

94 


v  Hendricks  (8  Ired.  Eq.  84) 
—  v.  Leonard  (91  Tenn.  183) 

v.  Lvle  (32  Grat.  752) 

v.  Price  (18  Ala.  405) 

v.  Rudall  (1  Sim.  U.  S.  115) 

v.  Saul  (138  U.  S.  440)        329,  568, 1089 

v.  Simmons  (26  Barb.  68)        87,  97,  101 

p.  Sisson  (26  N.  V.  264)  832 

v.  Spratt  (26  Pla.  448)  593 

Simms  v.  Garrot  (1  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  393)      902 

v.  Guess  (52  III.  App.  543)  666,  821,  1140 

v.  Richardson  (32  Ark.  297)        860,  861 

Simon  v.  Albright  (12  S.  &  B.  429)  733 

Simonds  v.  Harris  (92  Ind.  505)  390 

v.  Simonds  (3  Met.  Mass.  558)  955 

Simons  v.  Page  (96  Tenn.  718)  792 

Simonton  v.  Brown  (72  N.  C.  46)  1074 

v.  McLane  (25  Ala.  353)  414,  417 

Simpson's  Appeal  (109  Pa.  St.  383)  1228 

Simpson,  In  re  (56  How.  Pr.  125)  101 

v.  Cook  (24  Minn.  180)  504,  721 

v.  Cureton  (97  N.  C.  112)  178,  184 

v.  Graves  (Rilev  Ch.  232)  610 

v.  Jones  (82  N.*C.  323)  580 

v.  Leech  (86  111   286)  234,  290 

v.  Mansfield  Co.  (38  Mich.  626)         1202 

v.  Moore  (30  Barb.  637)  1004 

v.  Pearson  (31  Ind.  1)  1049 

v.  Reily  (31  Tex.  298)  860 

v.  Simpson  (114  111.  603)  1216,  1220 

v.  Simpson  (16  111.  App.  170)  149 

v.  Snyder  (54  Iowa,  557)  645 

v.  Spence  (5  Jones  Eq.  208)  896 

8.  Wallace  (83  N.  C.  477)  207 

v.  Welcome  (72  Me.  496)  922 

Simrell's  Estate  (154  Pa.  St.  604)  93 

Sims  v.  Aughterv  (4  Strobh.  Eq.  103)       1247 

v.  Ferrill  (45  Ga.  585)  1072 

v.  Gray  (66  Mo.  613)  1060 

v.  Hodges  (65  Miss.  210)  369 

v.  Rickets  (35  Ind.  181)  609 

v.  Sims  (30  Miss.  333)  1155 

v.  Sims  (10  N.  J.  Eq.  158)  980 

v.  Sims  (94  Va.  580)  895 

v.  Stilwell  (3  How.  Miss.  176)  795 

Sinclair's  Will  (5  Oh.  St.  290)  481 

Sinclair  v.  Hone  (6  Ves.  607)  55 

Singerly's  Estate  (14  Phila.  313)  955 

Singleton  v.  Bremar  (4  McCord,  12)  61 

v.  Singleton  (8  B.  Mon.  340)  469 

v.  Singleton  (5  Dana,  87)     '       599,  1182 

Singree  v.  Welch  (32  Oh.  St.  320)  242 

Sinnet  v.  Bowman  (151  III.  146)  30,  31, 469,  499 
Sinnickson  v.  Painter  (32  Pa.  St.  384)  390 
Sipr.  Lawback  (17  N.  J.  L.  442)  1075 

Sipperlv  v.  Baucus  (24  N.  Y.  46)  323,  1131 
Siron  v.  Ruleman  (32  Grat.  215)  1098 

Sisk  v.  Smith  (6  III.  503)  236 

Sisters  of  Visitation  v.   Glass  (45  Iowa, 

154)  1208 

Siter's  Case  (4  Rawle,  468)  640 

Sitzman  v.  Pacquette  (13  Wis.  291)    323,  583, 

1034,  1255 
Siveley  v.  Summers  (57  Md.  712)  538,  1062 
Sixtv-Seventh  Street,  Matter  of  (60  How. 

Pr".  264)  730 

Sizemore  v.  Wedge  (20  La.  An.  124)  329 

Skeggs  v.  Horton  (82  Ala.  352)  481,  484 

Skellenger  v.  Skellenger  (32  N.  J.  Eq. 

659)  236,  1233 

VOL.  l.—j 


♦Page 
Skerrett,  In  re  (67  Cal.  585)  61 

Skidmore  v.  Davies  (10  Pai.  306)  571 

Skiles  v.  Houston  (110  Pa.  St.  254)  827 

Skillern  v.  Mav  (6  Cr.  267)  325 

Skillman  r.  Skillman  (13  N.  J.  Eq.  403)  611 
Skinner  v.  Friersen  (8  Ala.  915)  793 

V.  Harrison  Township  (116  Ind.  139)  913 

v.  Wynne  (2  Jones  Eq.  41)  1216 

Skipwitii  v.  Cabell  (19  Grat.  758)  55,  892 

Skouten  v.  Wood  (57  Mo.  380)  195,  197,  215 
Skrine  v.  Simmons  (11  Ga.  401)  696 

Slack  v.  Emery  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  458)  1105 

Slade  v.  Fooks  (9  Sim.  386)  899 

v.  Slade  (10  Vt.  192)  1137 

v.  Street  (27  Ga.  17)  497 

v.  Washburn  (3  Ired.  L.  557)       402,  569 

Slagle  v.  Entrekin  (44  Oh.  St.  637)    546,  547, 

583,  589,  748 
Slater  v.  May  (2  Ld.  Ravin.  1071)  405 

v.  Nason  (15  Pick.  345)  22,  306 

Slatter  v.  Slatter  (1  Y.  &  C.  28)  520 

Slaughter  v.  Froman  (5  T.  B.  Mon.  19)      744 

v.  McBride  (69  Ala.  510)  201 

v.  Stephens  (81  Ala.  418)  491 

Slauter  v.  Chenowith  (7  Ind.  211)  361 

Slaymaker  v.  Bank  (103  Pa.  St.  616)  745 

Slavton  v.  Singleton  (72  Tex.  209)  494 

Sledge  v.  Elliott  (116  N.  C.  712)  1049 

Sleech  v.  Thorington  (2  Ves.  Sr.  560)  1015 
Sleeper  v.  Kellev  (65  N.  H.  206)  1236 

Sleight  v.  Lawson  (3  Kay  &  J.  392)  798 

Slinger's  Will  (72  Wis.  22)  38,  440 

Slingerland,  Matter  of  (36  Hun,  575)  680,  682 
Sloan's  Appeal  (168  Pa.  St.  422)  911,  1010 
Sloan,  Matter  of  (154  N.  Y.  109)  691  a 

v.  Hanse  (2  Rawle,  28)  881 

v.  Johnson  (14  Sm  &  M.  47)  743 

v.  Maxwell  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  563)  41,  43 

v.  Sloan  (21  Fla.  589)  370 

v.  Sloan  (25  Fla.  53)  1090 

v.  Strickler  (12  Colo.  179)  1049 

v.  Webb  (26  Tex.  189)  180 

Slocum  v.  Ames  (19  R.  I.  401)  104 

v.  English  (62  N.  Y.  494)  1028 

V.  Sanford  (2  Conn.  533)  650 

Slocumb  o.  Lizardi  (21  La.  Am.  355)  686 

Sloggv  v.  Dilworth  (38  Minn.  179)  621 

Sloniger  o.  Sloniger  (161  HI.  270)  59 

Small's  Estate  (151  Pa.  St.  1)  691a 

Small  v.  Commonwealth  (8  Pa.  St.  101)    546, 

552 

v.  Field  (102  Mo.  104)  893 

v.  Haskins  (26  Vt.  209)  1202 

v.  Marbury  (77  Md.  11)  727 

v.  Proctor  (15  Mass.  495)  232 

v.  Small  (4  Me.  220)  46 

Smalley  v.  Isaacson  (30  Minn.  450)  1244 

v.  Smalley  (70  Me.  545)  477 

v.  Wright  (40  N.  J.  L.  471)  686 

Smallwood  v.  Brickhouse  (2  Mod.  315)  24 
Smart  v.  Clark  (3  Russ.  C.  C.  365)  881 

v.  Easlev  (5  J.  J.  Marsh.  214)  500 

v.  Tranter  (L.  R.  43  Ch.  D.  587)  26 

v.  Waterhose  (10  Yerg.  94)  269 

v.  Watterbouse  (6  Humph.  158)  693 

v.  Whalev  (6  Sm.  &  M.  308)  223 

Smethurst  v.  Tomlin  (2  Sw.  &  Tr.  143)  509 
Smilev  v.  Bell  (M.  &  Y.  378)  432 

v.  Cockrell  (92  Mo.  105)  1129,  1234 

v.  Gambill  (2  Head,  164)  93 

v.  Smiley  (80  Mo.  44)  648,  1131 

cxlv 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Smiley  v.  Smiley  (18  Oh.  St.  543)  609 

Smilie  v.  Siler  (35  Ala.  88)  1120 

Smith's  Appeal  (23  Pa.  St.  9)  883 

Appeal  (103  Pa.  St.  559)  973 

Appeal  (115  Pa.  St.  319)  608 

Estate  (51  Cal.  563)  216,  1037 

Estate  (118  Cal.  462)  690,  1144 

Estate  (140  Pa.  St.  344)  1004 

Estate  (177  Pa.  St.  17)  1027 

Estate  (179  Pa.  St.  208)  1063 

Estate  (181  Pa.  St.  109)  926,  928 

Succession  (3  So.  R.  539)  400 

Will  (6  Phila.  104)  85 

Will  (52  Wis.  543)  34,  68 

Smith.  Ex  parte  (53  Cal.  204)  1249 

Matter  of  (108  Cal.  115)  1237 

Matter  of  (95  N.  Y.  516)  49,  835 

Matter  of  (131  N.  Y.  239)  896 

Matter  of  (153  N.  Y.  124)  835 

v.  Allen  (5  Allen,  454)  610 

v.  Anderson  (31  Oh.  St.  144)  1045 

v.  Ashurst  (34  Ala.  208)  895 

v.  Axtell  (1  N.  J.  Eq.  494)  1033 

v.  Aver  (101  U.  S.  320)  282,  693 

r.  Bank  (4  Cush.  1)  691 

v.  Bavlis  (3  Dem.  567)  1236 

v.  Beil  (6  Pet.  68)  874,  878,  947,  948 

v.  Blackwell  (31  Grat.  291)  774 

v.  Bland  (7  B.  Mon.  21) 

v.  Bone  (7  Bush,  367) 

v.  Bonsall  (5  Rawle,  80) 

v.  Brannon  (99  Ala.  445) 

v.  Britton  (45  How.  Pr.  428) 

v.  Britton  (2  Patt.  &  H.  124) 

v.  Brown  (99  N.  C.  377) 

v.  Brown  (101  N.  C  347) 

v.  Bryant  (60  Ala.  235) 

v.  Burnet  (35  N.  J.  Eq.  314) 

r.  Callowav  (7  Blackf.  86) 

r.  Carrere  (1  Rich.  Eq.  123) 

v.  Carroll  (4  Green,  Iowa,  146) 

v.  Carroll  (112  Pa.  St.  390) 

v.  Chenault  (48  Tex.  455) 

o.  Chenev  (1  Robins.  98) 

v.  Chew  "(35  Miss.  153) 

v.  Clay  (Ainb.  645) 

v.  Collamer  (2  Dem.  147) 

v.  Combs  (49  N.  J.  Eq.  420) 

v.  Crater  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  636) 

o.  Croom  (7  Fla.  81) 

»\  Cunningham  (1  Add.  448) 

P.  Curtis  (29  N.  J.  L.  345) 

v.  Denman  (48  Ind.  65) 

v.  Denson  (2  Sm.  &  M.  326) 

v.  Dolby  (4  Harr.  350) 

v.  Downey  (3  Ired.  Eq.  268) 

v .  Drake  (23  N.  J.  Eq.  302) 

o.  DuBose  (78  Ga.  415) 

v.  Dutton  (16  Me.  308) 

V.  Over  (16  Mass.  18) 

v.  Edrington  (8  Cr.  66) 

v.  Edwards  (1  Houst.  427) 

i'.  Ellington  (14  Ga.  379) 

v.  Eustis  (7  Me.  41) 

v.  Evans  (1  Wils.  313) 

v.  Fellows  (131  Mass.  20)   988,  1098,  1102 

v.  Penner  (1  (Jail.  C.  C.  170)  51,  92,  490 

c.  Ferguson  [90  Ind.  229)  122 

v.  Field  (6  Dana,  361)  1005 

cxlvi 


636 

268 

501 

1035 

676 

1156 

1041 

844 

787 

835 

1247 

745,  1182 

604 

993,  1099 

200 

1167 

695,  1002 

1110 

678 

646,  774. 

848 

859,  861 

447 

101 

946 

808 

1059 

70 

125,  786 

702,  703, 

1087 

46,  898 

1026 

595 

887 

828 

774 

237 

63 


•Page 

Smith  v.  Fox  (82  Va.  763)  897 

v.  Gaines  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  297)  151 

v.  Garey  (2  D.  &  B.  Eq.  42)  656 

v.  Gentry  (16  Ga.  31)  307 

v.  Gill  (37  Minn.  455)  1208 

v.  Gil  lam  (80  Ala  296)  860 

v.  Gilmore  (13  Mo.  App.  155)  347 

v.  Gregory  (26  Grat.  248)  391 

v.  Goggans  (Harp.  52)  793 

v.  Goodrich  (167  111.  46)       361,  807,  809 

v.  Gorham  (119  Ind.  436)  1033 

v.  Grady  (68  Wis.  215)  841 

v.  Greer  (88  Ala.  414)  901 

v.  Gregory  (75  Mo.  121)  1180 

v.  Grove  (12  Mo.  51)  620 

v.  Guerant  (55  Mo.  372)  1192 

v.  Guild  (34  Me.  443)  359,  500,  1016 

v.  Handy  (16  Oh.  191)  248 

v.  Harrison  (2  Heisk.  230)  497 

v.  Hastings  (29  Vt.  240)  901 

v.  Henning  (10  W.  Va.  596)  720- 

v   His  Creditors  (59  Cal.  267)  336 

v.  Holden  (58  Kans.  535)  893 

v.  Howard  (80  Me.  203)        184,  323,  375 

v.  Hurd  (7  How.  186)  1255 

v.  Hutchinson  (108  111.  662)  731 

v.  Hutchinson  (61  Mo.  83)  890 

v.  Jackson  (2  Edw.  Ch.  28)  235 

v.  James  (34  N.  W.  R.  309)  43 

v.  Jewett  (40  N.  H.  513)     '  952,  1136 

v.  Johnson  (21  Ga.  386)  901 

v.  Jones  (68  Vt.  132)  72 

v.  Kearnev  (2  Barb.  Ch.  533)  1237 

v.  Kelly  (23  Miss.  167)  157 

v.  Kennard  (38  Ala.  695)  116a 

v.  Kimball  (153  111.  368)  916 

v.  King  (22  Ala.  558)  1141 

v.  Kinnev  (30  La.  An.  332)  1064 

v.  Kittridge  (21  Vt.  238)  117 

v.  Knoebel  (82  111.  392)  1080 

v.  Knowlton  (11  N.  H.  191)  445- 

v.  Lambert  (30  Me.  137)  1129 

v.  Lampton  (8  Dana,  69)  966 

v.  Lawrence  (11  Pai.  206)  740- 

v.  Lidiard  (3  K.  &  J.  252)  899 

v.  Lorillard  (10  John.  338)  260 

v.  McCartv  (119  Mass.  519)  23& 

v.  McChes'ney  (15  N.  J.  Eq.  359)  96 

v.  McConnell  (17  III.  135)  715 

v.  McCrary  (3  Ired.  Eq.  204)  722 

v.  McKitterick  (51  Iowa,  548)  1006 

v.  McLaughlin  (77  111.  596)  762 

v.  Mercer  (3  Pa.  L.  J.  529)  367,  635 

v.  Monks  (55  Mo.  106)  367 

v.  Montgomery  (75  Md.  138)  725,  1023 

v.  Moore  (37  Ala.  327)  957 

v.  Moore  (25  Vt.  127)  1007,  1008 

—  v.  Munroe  (1  Ired.  345)  532 

v.  Mvers  (19  Mo.  433)  824 

v.  Neilson  (13  Lea,  461)  494 

v.  Oglesby  (33  S.  C.  194)  275 

v.  Oliver  (11  Beav.  481)  910 

v.  Oliver  (Dudley,  190)  1258 

v.  Olmstead  (88  Cal.  582)  110,  1240 

v.  Park  (31  Minn.  70)  606,  714 

v.  Pattie  (81  Va.  654)    795,  843,  815,  846 

v.  Payne  (2  Bush,  583)  1242 

v.  Phillips  (54  Ala.  8)  54* 

v.  Porter  (35  Me.  287)  419 

v.  Presbyterian  Church  (26  N.J.  Eq. 

132)  89J 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Smith  v.  Preston  (170  III.  179) 

v.  Railway  (89  Tenn.  664) 

v.  Rice  (11  Mass.  507)  1230, 

v.  Rix  (9  Vt.  240) 

v.  Robertson  (24  Hun,  210) 

v.  Robertson  (89  N.  Y.  555)       111, 

v.  Seaton  (117  Pa.  St.  382) 

v.  Shaw  (150  Mass.  297) 

v.  Sherman  (4  Cush.  408)  523,  624, 

v.  Smith  (13  Ala.  329)         257,  362, 

v.  Smith  (1  Allen,  129) 

v.  Smith  (2  Bush,  520) 

v.  Smith  (12  Cal.  216) 

v.  Smith  (5  Dana,  179) 

r.  Smith  (1  Dr.  &  Sm.  384) 

17.  Smith  (23  Ga.  21)  966 

v.  Smith  (17  Grat.  268) 

v.  Smith  (14  Gray,  532)  500, 

v.  Smith  (168  111.  488)  468 

v.  Smith  (76  Ind.  236) 

v.  Smith  (4  John.  Ch.  281) 

v.  Smith  (5  Jones  Eq.  305) 

v.  Smith  (59  Me.  214) 

v.  Smith  (13  N.  J.  Eq.  164) 

v.  Smith  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  445) 

v.  Smith  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  1) 

v.  Smith  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  566) 

v.  Smith  (63  N.  C.  637) 

v.  Smith  (101  N.  C.  461)  835, 

v.  Smith  (5  Oh.  St.  32) 

v.  Smith  (4  Paige,  271) 

v.  Smith  (12  R.  I.  456) 

v.  Smith  (24  S.  C.  304) 

v.  Smith  (Str.  955) 

v.  Smith  (1  Tex.  621)  223,  518 

—  v.  Smith  (67  Vt.  443) 

v.  Smith  (5  Ves.  189) 

v.  Smith  (15  Wash.  239)  346. 

-  v.  State  (5  Gill,  45) 

v.  Tateham  (2  Exch.  205) 

v.  Tebbitt  (L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  398) 

v.  Tiffany  (16  Hun,  552) 

v.  Towers  (69  Md.  77) 

v   Union  Bank  (5  Pet.  518) 

v.  United  States  (2  Wall.  219) 

v.  Uzzell  (61  Tex.  220) 

v.  Van  Ostrand  (64  N.  Y.  278)  949, 

0.  Wait  (4  Barb.  28) 

v.  Wratkins  (8  Humph.  331) 

v.  Wehrle  (41  W.  Va.  270) 

o.  Wert  (64  Ala.  34) 

v.  Westerfield  (88  Cal.  374) 

r.  Whiting  (9  Mass.  334) 

v.  Wildman  (178  Pa.  St.  245)   1029, 

o.  Wilmington  Co.  (83  111.  498)  686 

v.  Wingo  (1  Rice,  287) 

v.  Woodworth  (4  Dill.  584) 

V.  Worthington  (10  U.  S.  App.  616) 

v.  Wyckoff  (11  Paige,  49) 

v.  Young  (5  Gill,  197) 

Sniitha  v.  Flournoy  (47  Ala.  345) 
Smither  v.  Smither  (9  Bush,  230) 
Smithers  v.  Hooper  (23  Md.  273) 
Smithsonian  Inst.  v.  Meech  (169  U.  S. 
398)  960, 

Smock  v.  Smock  (11  N.  J.  Eq.  156) 
Smvlev  v.  Reese  (53  Ala.  89) 
Smythe  v.  Henry  (41  Fed.  R.  705) 


1059, 


Page 

688 

1201 

1245 

1131 

1240 

1240 

1045 

254 

1194 

650, 

1125 

975 

145 

200 

262 

790 

,  980 

808 

1016 

,  587 

1229 

707 

940 

1216 

1071 

1036 

895 

35 

82 

1137 

223 

893 

260 

897 

123 

,  519 

47 

.234 

,  504 

773 

794 

909 

367 

956 

374 

94 

200 

998, 

1000 

89 

789 

274 

1060 

324 

734 

1089 

,  687 

535 

227 

357, 

1132 

1103 

527 

1037 

269 

1137 

1017 

89 

1149 

1022 


•Page 
Smythe  v.  Irick  (46  S.  C.  299)  71 

Snead  v.  Coleman  (7  Grat.  300)  795 

Snedecor  v.  Freeman  (71  Ala.  140)  201 

Snedeker  v.  Allen  (2  N.  J.  L.  35)  476 

Sneed  v.  Ewing  (5  J.  J.  Marsh.  460)  494 

v.  Jenkins  (90  Tenn.  137)  183 

Snelgrove  v.  Snelgrove  (4  Des.  274)  1215 

Snell  v.  Fewell  (64  Miss.  655)  833 

v.  Snell  (123  111.  403)  207 

Snelling's  Will  (136  N.  Y.  515)  31 

Snider  v.  Burks  (84  Ala.  53)    89,  92,  474,  476 

v.  Coleman  (72  Mo.  568)  1081 

v.  Crov  (2  John.  227)  620 

v.  Newson  (24  Ga.  139)  961 

v.  Snider  (149  Pa.  362)  1220 

v.  Snider  (3  W.  Va.  200)  1080 

Snivelv  v.  Stover  (78  Pa.  St.  484)       873,  878 
Snodgrass's  Appeal  (96  Pa.  St.  420)  1197 

Snodgrass  v.  Andrews  (30  Miss.  472)  660 

Snook  v.  Snook  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  132)  269 

Snow  v.  Benton  (28  111.  306)  39 

v.  Callum  (1  Des.  542)  1168,  1170 

v.  Folev  (119  Mass.  102)  972 

v.  Perkins  (60  N.  II .  493)  603,  604 

Snowhill  r.  Snowhill  (2  N.  J.  Eq.  30)        640 

v.  Snowhill  (23  N.  J.  L.  447)  87 

Snuffer  v.  Howerton  (124  Mo.  637)  409 

Snyder's  Appeal  (36  Pa.  St.  166)        323,  324 
Snyder  v.  Baer  (144  Pa.  St.  278) 

v.  Ball  (17  Pa.  St.  54) 

v.  Fiedler  (139  U.  S.  478) 

v.  Snyder  (96  N.  Y.  88) 

Soher,  In  re  (78  Calif.  477) 
Sohier  v.  Burr  (127  Ma«s.  221) 

v.  Eldredge  (103  Mass.  345) 

v.  Massachusetts  Hospital  (3  Cush 

483) 


8 
63 
833 
822 
79 
354 
638 


930 
Soldini  v.  Hvams  (15  La.  An.  551)  553,  648 
Solinski  v.  Nat'l  Bank  (82  Tex.  244)  367 

Solliday  v.  Bissey  (12  Pa.  St.  347)  1168 

Soloma'n  v.  Wixon  (27  Conn.  520)  512 

Solomons  v  Kursheedt  (3  Dem.  307)  1134 
Soltan  v.  Soltan  (93  Mo.  307)  277 

Somers's  Estate  (14  Phila.  261)  190 

Somerset,  Goods  of  (L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  350)  406 
Sommers  v.  Bovd  (48  Oh.  St.  648)  691 

Sontag  v.  Schniisseur  (76  111.  541)  203 

Soper  v.  Brown  (136  N.  Y.  244)  903 

Sorin  v.  Olinger  (12  Ind.  29)  768,  1153 

Sorrell  v.  Ham  (9  Ga.  55)  622,  713 

Sorrelle  v.  Sorrelle  (5  Ala.  245)  976 

Sorrels  v.  Trantham  (48  Ark.  386)   844,  1153, 

1183 
Sossman  v.  Powell  (21  Tex.  664)  198,  214 
Soubiran  v.  Rivollett  (4  La.  An.  328)  436 

Souhegan   Bank   v.   Wallace  (60  N.  H. 

354)  854 

Soulard's  Estate  (141  Mo.  642)  834 

Soule,  In  re  (1  Conolly,  54)  499,  501 

South  v.  Carr  (7  T.  B.  Mon.  419)  794 

v.  Hoy  (3  T.  B.  Mon.  88)  1213 

Southall  v.  Tavlor  (14  Grat.  269)  677,  698 
Southard's  Will  (48  Minn.  37)  493 

South  Baltimore  v.  Muhlbach  (69  Md.  395)  830 
Southerland  v.  Southerland  (5  Bush,  591)  118, 

123,  608 
Southgate  v.  Annan  (31  Md.  113)  158 

Southmead,  Goods  of  (3  Curt.  28)  406,  531 
South  Western  Railroad  v.  Paulk  (24  Ga. 

356)  368 

v.  Thomason  (40  Ga.  408)  1246 

cxlvii 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


♦Page 
Southwick  v.  Morrell  (121  Mass.  520)       1024 

v.  Probate  Court  (18  K.  I.  402)  461 

Southworth  v.  Adams  (11  Biss.  256)  98 

Soutter's  Estate  (105  N    Y.  514)  1129 

Soverhill  v.  Suvdam  (59  N.  Y.  140)  1141 

Soward  v.  So  ward  (1  Duv.  126)  62 

Sowards  p.  Pritchett  (37  111.  517)  1052 

Sowell  v.  Sowell  (40  Ala.  243)  469,  497 

v.  Sowell  (41  Ala.  359)  579 

Sowers  v.  Cvrenius  (39  Oh.  St.  29)  922 

Sowles,  In  re  (57  Vt.  384)  1198 

Sowles  v.  First  Nat'l  Bank  (54  Fed.  R. 

564)  357 

p.  Quinn  (61  Vt.  354)  854 

Soye  v.  Maverick  (18  Tex.  100)  1043 

Spackman  v.  Timbrell  (8  Sim.  253)  659,  1096 
Spain  v.  Adams  (3  Tenn.  Ch.  319)  260 

Spalding  v.  Hershfield  (15  Mont.  253)  268 
Spangler's  Estate  (9  XV.  &  G.  135)  1007 

Spangler  v.  Stanler  (1  Md.  Cb.  36)  231 

v.  York  Co.  (13  Pa.  St.  322)  1002 

Sparhawk  v.  Buell  (9  Vt.  41)    738,  857,  1011, 

1013,  1129,  1246,  1254 

Sparks  v.  White  (7  Humph.  86)  363,  650 

Sparrow's  Succession  (39  La.  An.  696)     579, 

655,  689 

Succession  (40  La.  An.  484)     1147,  1151 

Succession  (42  La.  An.  500)  1176 

Spath  v.  Ziegler  (48  La.  An.  1168)  976 

Spaulding's  Appeal  (33  N.  H.  479)  1202 

Spaulding  v.  Gibbons  (5  Redf.  316)  68 

v.  Hollenbeck  (35  N.  Y.  204)  825 

v.  Suss  (4  Mo.  App.  541)      781,  804,  806 

v.  Wakefield  (53  Vt.  660)  710 

Speakman's  Appeal  (71  Pa.  St.  25)  661,  666 
Spear  v.  Tinkham  (2  Barb.  Ch.  211)  1138 
Spear's  Succession  28  La.  An.  804)  1031 

Speck  v.  Wohlien  (22  Mo.  310)  1060 

Speckles  v.  Public  Administrator  (1  Dem. 

475)  400 

Speed  v.  Kellv  (59  Miss.  47)        379,  440,  442 

v.  Nelson  (8  B.  Mon.  499)  1130 

Speelman  r.  Culbertson  (15  Ind.  441)  693 
Speer  v.  Miller  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  492)       145,  153 

v.  Richmond  (3  Mo.  App.  572)  547 

v.  Speer  (67  Ga.  748)  267,  268 

Speidel's  Appeal  (107  Pa.  St.  18)  175,  184 
Speidel  v.  Schlosser  (13  XV.  Va.  686)  210 

Speirs  v.  Wisner  (88  Mich.  614)  1171 

Spence  v.  Robins  (6  G.  &  J.  507)  941 

Spencer,  Ex  parte  (95  N.  C.  271)  1206 

In  re  (96  Cal.  448)  34 

Petitioner  (16  R.  I.  25)       989,  994,  1005 

v.  Bank  of  the  State  (Bai.  Eq.  468)    731 

j).  Boardman  (118  111.  553)  831 

r.  Cahoon  (4  Dev.  225)  546,  568 

v.  Dennis  (8  Gill,  314) 

v.  Higgins  (22  Conn.  521) 

v.  Jennings  (123  Pa.  St.  184) 

v.  Moore  (4  Call,  423) 

v.  Sheehan  (19  Minn.  338) 

f.  Strait  (40  Hun.  463) 

v.  Trafford  (42  Md.  1) 

v.  Wolfe  (49  Neb.  8) 

Sperber  v.  Balster  (66  Ga.  317) 
Sperry'a  Estate  (1  Afltam.  347) 
Speyerer  v.  Bennett  (79  Pa.  St.  445) 
Spier's  Appeal  (26  Pa.  St.  233) 
Spinning's  Will  (Tuck.  78) 


Spinning  v.  Spinning  (44  N.  J. 
cxlviii 


957 

893 

1022 

469 

1031 

1146 

836 

440,  531,  564 

60 

658 

836 

184 

535 

Eq.  215)  256, 

258 


964, 


Spire  v.  Lovell  (17  111.  App.  559) 
Spitzmiller  v.  Fisher  (77  Iowa,  289) 
Spode  v.  Smith  (3  Russ.  511) 
Sponsor's  Appeal  (107  Pa.  St.  95) 
Spooner  v.  Hilbish  (92  Va.  333) 
Spoor  v.  Wells  (3  Barb.  Ch.  199) 
Spoors  v.  Coen  (44  Oh.  St.  497) 
Spotts  v.  Hanley  (85  Cal.  155) 
Spraddling  v.  Pipkin  (15  Mo.  118) 

Spragins  v.  Taylor  (48  Ala.  520) 
Sprague  v.  We"st  (127  Mass.  471) 
Spraker  v.  Van  Alstvne  (18  Wend.  200)  1104 


♦Page 

762,  1144 

824 

993 

971 

632 

274 

1044 

713 

360,  371, 

375,  1182 

1030 

354,  1034 


Spratt  v.  Baldwin  (3*3  Miss.  581)  '   1165 

v.  First  Nat'l  Bank  (84  Ky.  85)  859 

Spravberry  v.  Culberson  (32  Ga.  299)  440 
Sprenkle's  Appeal  (15  Atl.  R.  773)  979 

Spring  v.  Parkman  (12  Me.  127)  493 

v.  Sanford  (7  Paige,  550)  1246 

Springer's  Appeal  (29  Pa.  St.  208)  1213,  1238 

Appeal  (111  Pa.  St.  274)  1098 

Springer  v.  Sha vender  (116  N.  C.  12)         452 

v.  Shavender  (118  N.  C.  33)  452 

Springfield  Inst.  v.  Copeland  (160  Mass. 

380)  646 

Springs  v.  Irwin  (6  Ired.  27)  512,  572 

Springsteen  v.  Samson  (32  N.  Y.  703)  764 
Sprinkle  v.  Hutchinson  (66  N.  C.  450)  1123 
Sprott  v.  Baldwin  (34  Miss.  327)  1173 

Sproul's  Appeal  (105  Pa.  St.  438)  1102,  1237 
Sproull  »>.  Seav  (74  Ga.  676)  1064 

Spruill  v.  Cannon  (2  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  400)  1168 
Spurlock  v.  Brown  (91  Tenn.  241)  264.  265 
Spurgin  v.  Bowers  (82  Iowa,  187)  1030,  1089 
Spurr  v.  Trimble  (1  A.  K.  Marsh.  278)  444 
Squier  v.  Mavor  (2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  430)       601 

v.  Squier  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  627)  1171 

Stack  v.  I.'ovce  (34  Neb.  83:;)  1022,  1030 

Stackable  v.  Stackable  (65  Mich.  515)  834 
Stackhouse  v.  Berrvhill  (47  Minn.  20)        571 

v.  Norton  (15  N.  J.  Eq.  202)  34,  46 

Stacy  v.  Thrasher  (6  How.  44)  360,  361,  752 
Stafford  v.  Harris  (82  Tex.  178)  1245 

v.  Woods  (144  111.  203)  200 

Stag  v.  Punter  (3  Atk.  119)  763 

Stagg  v.  Green  (47  Mo.  500)  384,  410 

v.  Jackson  (2  Barb.  Ch.  86)  1069 

v.  Jackson  (1  N.  Y.  206)  1141 

Staggs  v.  Ferguson  (4  Heisk.  690)  626 

Stahl  v.  Brown  (72  Iowa,  720)  385 

v.  Stahl  (114  111.  375)  204,  228 

Stahlschmidt  v.  Lett  (1  Sm.  &  Giff.  415)  788 
Staigg  v.  Atkinson  (144  Mass.  564)  361 

Stair  o.  York  Bank  (55  Pa.  St.  364)  744,  745 
Stairlev  v.  Babe  (McNull.  Eq.  22)  580 

Stairs  5;.  Peaslee  (18  How.  521)  670 

Stall  r.  Wilbur  (77  N.  Y.  158)  599 

Stallings  v.  Foreman  (2  Hill  Ch.  401)  701,702 

i'.  Ivey  (49  Ga.  274)  1072 

Stallworth  v.  Stallworth  (29  Ala.  76)  153 

Stambaugh  v.  Smith  (23  Oh.  St.  584)  804 
Stamm  v.  Bostwick  (122  N.  Y.  48)  23 

v.  Stamm  (11  Mo.  App.  598)        200,  204 

Stamper  v.  Garnett  (31  Grat.  550)  1186 

Stamps  i'.  Bell  (2  Baxt.  170)  857 

Stanbrough's  Succession  (37  La.  An.  275) 

1083 
Standi  v.  Kenan  (35  Ga.  102)  468 

Standifer  V.  Hubbard  (39  Tex.  417)  847 

Stanfield,  Matter  of  (135  N.  Y.  292)  1006 

Stanley  v.  Bemes  (1  Hagg.  221)  402 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
493 
1089 
973,  980 
615,  622 
892 
153 
955 
205 
830 
34 
283 


Stanley  v.  Morse  (26  Iowa,  454) 

v.  Noble  (69  Iowa,  666) 

v.  Potter  (2  Cox.  Ch.  180) 

v.  Vogel  (9  Mo.  App.  98) 

Standard  v.  Barnum  (51  Md.  440) 

v.  Case  (40  Oh.  St.  211) 

Stansberry  v.  Hubner  (73  Md.  228) 
Stanton  v.  Hitchcock  (31  N.  W.  395) 

v.  Ryan  (41  Mo.  510) 

v.  Wetherwax  (16  Barb.  259) 

Stanwood  v.  Owen  (14  Grav,  195) 
Staples's  Appeal  (52  Conn.  421)  712,  762, 1144, 

1243 
Staples  v.  Connor  (79  Cal.  14)  713 

v.  Staples  (24  Grat.  225)     700,  702,  1083 

v.  Staples  (85  Va.  76)  757,  1029 

v.  Wellington  (58  Me.  453)  39 

Staring  v.  lioweu  (6  Barb.  109)  472 

Stark  v.  Hunton  (I  N.  J.  Eq.  216)  271 

v.  Hunton  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  300)  677 

v.  Parker  (56  N.  H.  481)  495 

v.  Smiley  (25  Me.  201)  952 

Starke  v.  Keenan  (5  Ala.  590)  750 

Starke v's  Appeal  (61  Conn.  199)  59 

Starkey  v.  Hammer  (1  Baxt.  438)  1036 

Starkweather  v.  American  Bible  Soc.  (72 

111.  50)  913,  931 

Starnes  v.  Hill  (112  N.  C.  1)  900 

Starr  v.  Brewer  (58  Vt.  24)  1067 

v.  Case  (59  Iowa,  491)  284 

v.  McEwan  (69  Me.  334)  1000 

State  v.  Allen  (92  Mo.  20)  1193 

v.  Ames  (23  La.  An.  69)  309 

r.  Alston  (94  Tenn.  674)  691  a 

v.  Bank  of  Maryland  (6  G.  &  J.  205)  773 

v.  Barrett  (121  Ind.  92) 

i\  Bates  (38  S  C.  326) 

v.  Belin  (5  Hair.  400) 

v.  Benton  (12  Mont.  66) 

v.  Berning  (74  Mo.  87) 

v.  Berning  (6  Mo.  App.  105) 

v.  Bidlingmaier  (26  Mo.  483) 


549,  1142 

734 

738 

439 

549,  1163 

549,  1242 

407,  525, 

584,  821 

1247 

953.  1230 

553 

551 

551 

643 

691  a 

691  a 

999 

1122.  1124 

818,  1268 

747 


v.  Blackwell  (20  Mo.  97) 

V.  Blake  (69  Conn.  64) 

v.  Boring  (15  Oh.  507) 

v.  Branch  (112  Mo.  661) 

v.  Branch  (126  Mo.  448) 

v.  Branch  (134  Mo.  592) 

v.  Brevard  (4  Jones  Eq.  141) 

v.  Brim  (4  Jones  Eq.  300) 

».  Brown  (64  Md.  97) 

v.  Brutch  (12  Ind.  381) 

—  v.  Buck  (63  Ark.  218) 

v.  Campbell  (10  Mo.  324) 

v.  Central  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  (10  Nev. 

47)  337 

v.  Cheston  (51  Md.  352)    391,  1179, 1252 

v.  Chrisman  (2  Ind.  126)  559 

v.  Clarke  (3  Harr.  Del.  557)  25 

v.  Claudius  (3  Mo.  App.  561)  815 

v.  Coffey  (5  Mo.  App.  577)  1182 

v.  Collector  (39  N.  J.  L.  79)  691 

v.  Collier  (62  Mo.  App.  38)  527 

v.  Collins  (16  Ark.  32)  809 

v.  Connoway  (2  Houst.  206)  823 

v.  Conover  (9  N.  J.  L.  338)      1021,  1040 

v.  Craddock  (7  Harr.  &  John.  40)      401 

v.  Crossley  (69  Ind.  203)  978 

v.  Dalrymple  (70  Md.  294)  691  a 

• v.  Dicksou  (38  Ga.  171)  773 


•Page 
State  v.  Dilley  (64  Md.  314)  1123 

v.  Donaldson  (28  Mo.  App.  190)  772 

v.  Donegan  (94  Mo.  66)  829 

v.  Drurv  (36  Mo.  281)  548 

v.  Edwards  (11  Ind   App.  226)  847 

v.  Elliot  (11  N.  H.  540)  606 

v.  Engelhard  (70  N.  C.  377)  710 

v.  Farmer  (54  Mo.  439)  394,  559,  748,  866 

v.  Ferris  (53  Oh.  St.  314) 

v   Fields  (Peck,  140) 

v.  Fields  (53  Mo.  474) 

v.  Findlev  (10  Oh.  51) 

v.  Fowler  (108  Mo.  465) 

v.  French  (60  Conn.  478) 

v.  Fulton  (35  Mo.  323; 

v.  Gorman  (40  Minn.  232) 

v.  Grav  (106  Mo.  526) 

v.  Green  (65  Mo.  528) 

v.  Gregory  (88  Ind.  110) 

v.  Gregorv  (119  Ind.  503) 

v.  Griffith  (2  Del.  Ch.  392) 

v.  Grigsby  (92  Mo.  419) 

v.  Hallett  (8  Ala.  159) 

v.  Hamlin  (86  Me.  495) 

v.  Hanner  (64  N.  C.  668) 

v.  Harris  (2  Bailey,  598) 

v.  Hart  (57  Md.  234) 

v.  Heinrichs  (82  Mo.  542) 

v.  Hirons  (1  Houst.  252) 

v.  Huether  (4  Mo.  App.  575) 

v.  Johnson  (7  Blackf.  529) 

v.  Jones  (89  Mo.  470) 

v.  Jones  (131  Mo.  194) 

v.  Jones  (53  Mo.  App.  207) 

v.  Jones  (39  N".  J.  L.  650) 

v.  Jovce  (48  Ind.  310) 

v.  Judge  (17  La.  An.  189) 

v.  Judge  (10  Mont.  401) 

i'.  Kennedy  (73  Mo.  App.  384) 

v.  Knox  (10  Ala.  608) 

v.  Leckie  (14  La.  An.  641) 

v.  Lewellvn  (25  Tex.  797) 

v.  Lichtenberg  (4  Wash.  231) 

v.  McAleer  (5  Ired.  L.  632) 

v.  McCarty  (64  Md.  253) 

v.  McGlvnn  (20  Cal.  233) 

v  Matson  (44  Mo.  305)     749,  1182,  1248 

v.  Matthews  (10  Oh.  St.  431)  691 

v.  Maulsbv  (53  Mo.  500  866 

v.  Maxwell  (64  N.  C.  313)  832 

v.  Meagher  (44  Mo.  356)  1158 

v.  Medarv  (17  Oh.  554)  552 

v.  Megown  (89  Mo.  156)  1193 

v.  Menard  (8  Mo.  286)  1247 

v.  Mever  (63  Ind.  33)  307 

v.  Miller  (18  Mo.  App.  41)  1262 

v.  Mitchell  (3  Brev.  520)  1193 

v.  Moehlenkamp  (133  Mo.  134)  402 

v.  Moore  (18  Mo.  App.  406)  432 

v.  Morton  (18  Mo.  53)  747 

v.  Newlin  (69  Ind.  108)  41 

v.  Orange  (54  N.  J.  L.  Ill)  1051 

v.  Osborn  (71  Mo.  86)  650 

v.  Osborne  (69  Conn.  257)  646 

v.  Pace  (9  Rich.  355)  464 

v.  Parish  Court  (30  La.  An.  183)       1124 

v.  Parker  (9  N.  J.  L.  242)  346 

v.  Parrish  (4  Humph.  285)  1119 

v.  Paul  (21  Mo.  51)  815 

v.  Pohl  (30  Mo.  App.  321)        1262,  1266 

v.  Porter  (9  Ind.  342) 


691  a 
336 
548 
552 
527,  1204 
662 
748 
691a 
1131,  1182,  1183 
395 
677 
652,  654 
921 
1248 
443 
691a 
699 
772,  773 
749 
748,  1183 
715 
548 
707 
1125 
1085,  1235 
1084 
691 
880 
465,  502 
1198 
396, 397 
1191 
437 
434,  1264 
191, 1202 
1229 
1207 
468,  497 


cxlix 


TAELE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 

State  0.  Preble  (18  Nev.  251)  23 

v.  Price  (15  Mo.  375)  553 

v.  Price  (21  Mo.  434)  566 

o.  Probate  Court  (33  Minn.  94)  331, 1062 

v.  Probate  Court  (40  Minn.  296)       1028, 

1029,  1181 

v.  Probate  Court  (51  Minn.  241)  628 

v.  Probate  Court  (66  Minn.  246)  505,  815, 

827 

v.  Ramsev  Probate  Court  (25  Minn. 

22)  854,  1045 

v.  Pveeder  (5  Neb.  203)  308 

v.  Reigart  (1  Gill,  1)  1015 

v.  Reinhardt  (31  Mo.  95)  525,  821 

v.  Robertson  (5  Harr.  201)  639,  641 

v.  Robinson  (57  Md.  486)  999 

r.  Roeper  (82  Mo.  57)  1125 

r.  Roeper  (9  Mo.  App.  21)  1125 

v.  Rogers  (13  Calif.  159)  22 

v.  Rogers  (2  H.  &  McH.  198)  773 

■ v   Rogers  (1  Houst.  569)  503 

r.  Roth  (47  Ark.  222)  984,  1230 

v.  Rucker  (59  Mo  17)  395,  505 

r.  Scott  (1  Bai.  294)  328 

v.  Seahorn  (139  Mo.  582)  691,  772 

v.  Shacklett  (73  Mo.  App.  265)   288,  300 


v.  SligoCo.  (88  Mo.  222) 
v.  Smit  (20  Mo.  50) 
v.  Smith  (70Cal.  153) 
v.  Smith  (52  Conn.  557) 


211 
611 
23,  310 
661,  749,  883. 
948 
950 
863 


v.  Smith  (16  Lea,  662) 

v.  Stafford  (73  Mo.  658) 

v.  Stuart  (74  Mo.  App.  182)    1127,  1128, 

1234 

v.  Superior  Court  (11  Wash.  Ill) 

v.  Superior  Court  (13  Wash.  25) 

v.  Switzler  (143  Mo.  287) 

v.  Taggart  (88  Ind.  269) 

v.  Thornton  (56  Mo.  325) 

v.  Tittman  (103  Mo.  553) 

v.  Tittman  (119  Mo.  661) 


442 

1255 

691  a 

1251 

749, 1182 

691,  772 

691,  772,  804, 

847 

v.  Tittman  (134  Mo.  162)  819 

v.  Tittman  (54  Mo.  App.  490)  819 

v.  Ueland  (30  Minn.  277)  271,  351 

v.  Walsh  (67  Mo.  App.  348)  758 

v.  Watson  (2  Speers,  97)  503 

v.  Watts  (23  Ark.  304)  396 

v.  West  (2  Harr.  151)  914 

v.  White  (7  Ired.  L.  116)  450 

v.  Williams  (9  Gill,  172)  588,  1204 

v.  Wilson  (51  Ind.  96)  1125 

v.  Wiltbank  (2  Harr.  18)  914 

v.  Withrow  (141  Mo.  69)      283,  286,  300 

v.  Wolff  (10  Mo.  App.  95)  549 

v.  Woods  (36  Mo.  73)  299 

v.  Woodv  (20  Mont.  413)  397,  399 

v.  Wright  (4  H.  &  J.  148)  743 

v.  Wright  (16  Ind.  App.  662)  407 

v.  Wvant  (67  Ind.  25)  558,  559 

v.  Wigall  (51  Tex.  621)  1251 

v.  Younts  (89  Ind.  313)  1058 

State  Rank  r.  Bliss  (67  Conn.  317)  58 

v.  Hinton  (21  Oh.  St.  509)  237 

v.  Tutt  (44  Mo.  368)  775,  781 

v.  Walker  (14  Ark.  234)  826,  842 

v.  Williams  (6  Ark.  156)  1186 

State    National    Rank  v.  Evans  (32  La. 

An.  464)  499 

Staub's  Appeal  (66  Conn.  127)  175 

cl 


Staunton  v.  Parker  (19  Hun,  55) 
Stavner's  Case  (33  Oh.  St.  431) 
Stavton  v.  Halpern  (50  Ark.  329) 
Steacy  v.  Rice  (27  Pa.  St.  75) 
Steadman  v.  Powell  (1  Add.  58) 
Stearns  v.  Barnham  (5  Me.  261) 

v.  Brown  (1  Pick.  530) 

v.  Fisk  (18  Pick.  24) 

v.  Stearns  (1  Pick.  157) 

v.  Stearns  (30  Vt.  213) 

v.  Swift  (8  Pick.  532) 

t>.  Wright  (51  N.  H.  600) 

Stebbins'  Estate  (94  Mich.  304) 
Stebbins  v.  Field  (43  Mich.  333) 

v.  Lathrop  (4  Pick.  33) 

v.  Palmer  (1  Pick.  71) 

v.  Stebbins  (86  Mich.  474) 

Steed  v.  Cruise  (70  Ga.  168) 
Steel  v.  Halladav  (20  Oreg.  70) 
v.  Halladav  (20  Oreg.  462) 

Steele  v.  Atkinson  (14  S.  C.  154) 
v.  Frierson  (85  Tenn.  430) 

v.  Graves  (68  Ala.  17) 

v.  Lineberger  (59  Pa.  St.  308) 

v.  Morrison  (4  Dana.  617) 

0.  Price  (5  B.  Mon.  58) 

v.  Steele  (64  Ala.  438) 

v.  Steele  (89  111.  51) 

v.  Tutwiler  (08  Ala.  107) 

Steen  v.  Bennett  (24  Vt.  302) 


*  Page 

513 

112.3 

215 

817 

26 

368 

1137 

521,  52i 

121 : 
8i.r 

2-)i 

441 

111 

1057 

464.  512 

523,  624 

881 

J  87 

691,  11T8 

1148,  1141). 

1166,  1169 

746 

1218,  1221, 

1222 

550 

1029 

1187 

98,  484 

270,  272,  1096 

1051 

554 

395 


v.  Steen  (25  Miss.  513)     1123,  1127, 1230 
Steere  v.  Wood  (15  R.  I.  199)  1228 

Steffv's  Appeal  (76  Pa.  St.  94)  731 

Stegall  v.  Stegall  (2  Brock.  256)  227 

Steger  v.  Bush  (1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  172)        697 
Steib  v.  Whitehead  (111  III.  247)  956 

Stein  v.  Burden  (30  Ala.  270)     '  1133 

v.  Huesman  (38  N.  J.  Eq.  405)  1167 

Steiner  v.  McDaniel  (110  Ala.  409)  199 

Steinmann  v.   Saunderson   (14  S.  &  R. 

357)  740 

Steinmetz's  Appeal  (168  Pa.  St.  175)  28 

Stell's  Appeal  (10  Pa.  St.  149)  737 

Stembel  v.  Martin  (50  Oh.  St.  495)  144 

Stent  v.  Robinson  (12  Ves.  461)  1008 

Stephens's  Appeal  (56  Pa.  St.  409)  111" 

Stephens'  Succession  (45  La.  An.  962)       995 
Stephens  v.  Barnett  (7  Dana,  257)       415,  422 

v.  Beal  (4  Ga.  319)  639 

v.  Bernavs  (119  Mo.  143)  777,  826 

v.  Booneville  (34  Mo.  323)  691 

v.  Cotterell  (99  Pa.  St.  188)  832 

v.  Crawford  (3  Ga.  499)  553 

v.  Gibbes  (14  Fla.  331)  270 

v.  Harris  (6  Ired.  Eq.  57)  782 

v.  Stephens  (129  Mo.  422)  63 

v.  Taylor  (62  Ala.  269)  559 

v.  Van  Buren  (1  Paige,  479)  1010 

v.  Venables  (30  Beav.  625)  1015 

Stephenson  v.  Axson  (Bai.  Eq.  274)  995,  996, 

1005,  1010 

v.  Donahue  (40  Oh.  St.  184)  610 

v.  Heathcote  (1  Eden,  38)  873 

O.  King  (81  Kv.  425)  118    119,  123 

v.  Ontario  Asylum  (27  Hun,  380)        943 

v.  Short  (92  N.  Y.  433)  911 

v.  Stephenson  (3  Hayw.  123)  1145 

v.  Stephenson  (4  Jones,  472)  524 

v.  Yandel  (5  Hayw.  261)  1187 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Sterling  v.  Sims  (72  Ga.  51)  639 

Sternberg's  Estate  (94  Iowa,  305)  485 

Sternberg  v.  Larkin  (58  Kans.  201)    282,  289, 

290 
Sterrett's  Appeal  (2  Pa.  419)  737,  1146,  1188 
Sterrett  v  Barker  (119  Cal.  492)  689 

v.  Trust  Co.  (10  D.  C.  App.  131)     1228, 

1242 
Stetson  v.  Eastman  (84  Me.  366)  937 

v.  Moulton  (140  Mass.  597)  1243 

Steuart  v.  Carr  (6  Gill,  430)  805,  841 

Stevens,  In  re  (83  Cal.  322)  110,  193 

In  re  (1  Sawv.  397)  288 

i'.  Enders  (28  N.  Y.  82)  1244 

v.  Fisher  (144  Mass.  114)  967 

v.  Flower  (46  N.  J.  Eq.  340)  1098 

v.  Gavlord  (11  Mass.  256)  364,  365,  375, 

654 

v.  Gregg  (10  G.  &  J.  143)  1095 

v.  Hope  (52  Mich.  65)  100 

v.  MeNamara  (36  Me.  176)  444 

v.  R.  R.  Co.  (103  Cal.  252)  1149 

v.  Shannahan  (160  111.  330)  368 

v.  Shippen  (28  N.  J.  Eq.  487)  111 

v.  Smith  (4  J.  J.  Marsh,  64)  234 

v.  Stevens  (3  Dana,  371)  262 

v.  Stevens  (127  Ind.  560)  38. 

v.  Stevens  (5  Th.  &  C.  87)  124 

v.  Vancleve  (4  Wash.  C.  C.  262)  32,  42, 

65,  66,  490 
Stevenson's  Appeal  (32  Pa.  St. 318)  1131 

Stevenson,  In  re  (72  Cal.  164)  532 

Stevenson  v.  Brasher  (90  Ky.  23)  234 

v.  Flournov  (89  Kv.  561)  1029 

v.  Fox  (12b  Pa.  St".  568)  951 

v.  Martin  (11  Bush,  485)  1216,  1218, 1221 

v.  Polk  (71  Iowa,  278)  595,  731 

v.  Schriver  (9  G.  &  3.  324)  1193 

v.  Superior  Court  (62  Cal.  60)  451 

v.  Valentine  (38  Neb.  902)  814 

v.  Wilcox  (16  S.  C.  432)  401 

Steward  v.  Hinkel  (72  Cal.  187)  812 

Stewart's  Appeal  (56  Me.  300)  507 

Appeal  (56  Pa.  St.  241 )  1244 

Appeal  (110  Pa.  St.  410)      669,  702,  710 

Matter  of  (131  N.  Y.  274)  691  a 

Stewart's  Estate  (18  Mont.  595)  404,  532 

Estate  (147  Pa.  St.  383)  902 

Stewart,  In  re  (1  Connollv,  412)  959 

v.  Barclav  (2  Bush,  550)  276,  277 

v.  Barrow  (7  Bush,  368)  955 

v.  Blalock  (45  S.  C.  61)  196,  201 

v.  Blease  (4  S.  C  37)  260 

v.  Bradv  (3  Bush,  623) 

v.  Cave~(l  Mo.  752) 

v.  Chambers  (2  Sandf .  Ch.  382) 

v.  Conner  (9  Ala.  803) 

v.  Elliott  (2  Mackev,  307) 

v.  Gibson  (71  Mo.  App.  232) 

v.  Glenn  (3  Heisk.  581) 

v.  Glenn  (58  Mo.  481) 

v.  Harriman  (56  N.  H.  25) 


v.  Kearney  (6  Watts,  453) 

v.  Lispenard  (26  Wend.  255) 

v.  Morrison  (81  Tex.  396) 

v.  Mulholland  (88  Kv.  38) 

v.  Pattison  (8  Gill,  46) 

v.  Pearson  (4  S.  C.  46) 

v.  Pettus  (10  Mo.  755) 

k v.  Phenice  (65  Iowa,  475) 


955 
566 

988 
737 
31,  46 
777,  864 
1236 
681,  825 
72,  76,  468, 
499 
631 
32 
1249 
107 
1213 
262 
496 
748 


Stewart  v.  Powell  (90  Kv.  511) 

v.  Richey  (17  N.  J"  L.  164) 

v.  Robinson  (115  N.  Y.  339) 

v.  Smiley  (46  Ark.  373) 

v.  Stewart  (5  Conn.  317) 

v.  Stewart  (96  Iowa,  620) 

v.  Stewart  (7  John.  Ch.  229) 

v.  Stewart  (3  J.  J.  Marsh.  48) 

v.  Stewart  (L.  R.  15  Ch.  D.  539) 

v.  Stewart  (13  La.  An.  398) 

Stickney's  Will  (85  Md.  79) 


*Paga 
170 
643 

282 

636, 714 

247 

894 

642 

245 

1215, 

1222 

196 

914,  951,  952, 

953 

331,  675 

95 

499 

241 


Sticknev  v.  Davis  (17  Pick.  169) 

v.  Hammond  (138  Mass.  116) 

Sticknoth's  Estate  (7  Nev.  233) 

Stidger  v.  Evans  (64  Iowa,  91) 

Stiger,  Matter  of  (28  N.  Y.  Supp.  162)    691  a 

Stiles  v.  Smith  (55  Mo.  363)          829,  841,  843 

Still,  In  re  (117  Cal.  509)             197,  208,  216 

v.  Hutto  (48  S.  C.  415)  1015 

Stillev  v.  Folger  (14  Oh.  610)  264 

Stillnian  v.  Young  (16  111.  318)  1069 

Stillwell  v.  Doughty  (3  Bradf.  359)  637 

Stilwell  v.  Carpenter  (59  N.  Y.  414)  340 

v.  Knapper  (69  Ind.  558)  964 

v.  Melrose  (15  Hun,  376)  1151 

Stimson  v.  Vroman  (99  N.  Y.  74)  874,  878 

Stinchfield  v.  Emerson  (52  Me.  465)  444 

Stingor  v.  Commonwealth  (26  Pa.  St.  429) 

691a 

Stinson  r.  Stinson  (38  Me.  593)  636 

Stirling  v.  Stirling  (64  Md.  138)  50 

■  v.  Winter  (80  Mo.  141)  757,  795 

Stitt  v.  Buch  (22  Oreg.  239)  146 

Stiver's  Appeal  (56  Pa.  St.  9)  1062 

Stiver  v.  Stiver  (8  Oh.  217)  1141 
Stockbridge,  Petitioner  (145  Mass.  517)      939 

Stockton's  Appeal  (64  Pa.  St.  58)  339 

Stockton  v.  Wilson  (3  Pa.  129)  421 

Stoddard  v.  Calcompt  (41  Iowa,  329)  271 

v.  Maulthrop  (9  Conn.  502)  854 

Stoeckman  v.  Terre  Haute  R.  R.  (15  Mo. 

App.  503)  629 

Stoever  v.  Ludwis;  (4  S.  &  R.  201)  571 

Stokelv's  Estate  (19  Pa.  St.  476)  375 

Stokes  v   Dale  (1  Detn.  260)  348 

v.  Goodvkoontz  (126  Ind.  535)  1229 

v.  McAllister  (2  Mo.  163)  257 

v.  Pavne  (58  Miss.  614)  732 

v.  Pillow  (64  Ark.  1)  212 

v.  Porter  (Dyer,  166  b)  415 

v.  Sticknev  (96  N.  Y.  323)  626 

v.  Tillv  (9  N.  J.  L.  130  872 

v.  Van  Wvck  (83  Va.  724)  872,  900 

v.  Weston*  (142  N.  Y.  433)  883 

Stoltz's  Succession  (28  La.  An.  175)  1048 

Stone's  Estate  (14  Utah,  205)  172 

Succession  (31  La.  An.  311)  678 

Stone  v.  Brown  (16  Tex.  425)  465 

v.  Carev  (42  W.  Va.  276)  289 

v.  Clarke  (40  111.  411)  849 

v.  Cook  (79  111.  424)  837 

v.  Damon  (12  Mass.  487)  38 

v.  Gazzam  (46  Ala.  269)  609 

v.  Green  (30  Ga.  340)  468 

v.  Halley  (1  Dana,  197)  1213 

v.  Hunt  (114  Mo.  66)  836 

v.  Huxford  (8  Blackf.  452)  464 

v.  Kaufman  (25  Ark.  186)  809 

v.  Massey  (2  Yeates,  263)  942 

cli 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Stone  v.  McEkton  (57  Conn.  194)  1000 

t-.  Morgan  (10  Pai.  615)  1127 

v.  Pennock  (31  Mo.  App.  544)  975 

v.  Scripture  (4  Lans.  186)  365 

v.  Stillwell  (23  Ark.  444)  1136 

v.  Stone  (18  Mo.  389)  127 

v.  Todd  (49  N.  J.  L.  274)  59, 1268 

v.  Union  Bank  (13  R.  I.  25)  737 

v.  Vandermark  (146  111.  312)       269,  271 

v.  Wilson  (4  McCord,  203)  553 

v.  Wood  (16  111.  177)  1029 

Stoner  v.  Zimmerman  (21  Pa.  St.  394)      1142 
Stonestreet  v.  Doyle  (75  Va.  356)  944 

Stong  v.  Wilkson  (14  Mo.  116)        1131,  1J37 
Storer's  Will  (28  Minn.  9)  490 

Storer  v.  Hinkly  (1  Root,  182)  1152 

v.  Wheatlev  (1  Pa.  St.  506)         517,  904 

Storey's  Appeal" (83  Pa.  St.  89)        1217,  1218 

Will  (120  111.  244)    469,  1193,  1202,  1208 

Will  (20  111.  App.  183)  34,  42,  469 

Storm,  Matter  ol  (28  Hun,  499)  737 

Storms  v.  Quackenbush  (34  N.  J.  Eq.  201)  737 
Storrs  v.  Whitnev  (54  Conn.  342)  920,  921, 923 

749 

1148 

287 

973 

1007 

Eq. 

31,  46 

719 

714 

86 

1034,  1059 

474,  475 

238 

735,  1023 

246,  274 

497,  499 

948,  949 

128 

57 

1047,  1062 


Stose  v.  People  (15  111.  600) 
Stott's  Estate  (Mvr.  168) 
Stout  v.  Baker  (32  Kan.  113) 

v.  Hart  (7  N.  J.  L.  414) 

v.  Stout  (44  N.  J.  Eq.  479) 

Stoutenburgh  v.  Hopkins  (43  N.  J 
577  ;  s.  c.  12  Atl.  K.  689) 

v  Moore  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  63) 

Stovall  v.  Clay  (108  Ala.  105) 
Stover  v.  Kendall  (1  Coldw.  557) 
Stow  v.  Kimball  (28  111.  93) 

v.  Stow  (1  Redf.  305) 

v.  Tifft  (15  John.  458) 

Stowe  v.  Banks  (123  Mo.  672) 

v.  Steele  (114  111.  382) 

v.  Stowe  (140  Mo.  594) 

Stowell  v.  Hastings  (59  Vt.  494) 

Straat  v.  ONeil  (84  Mo.  68) 

Stracev,  Goods  of  (Dea.  &  Sw.  6) 

Stradlev  v.  King  (84  N.  C.  635) 

Strange  v.  Austin  (134  Pa.  St.  96)  1059,  1063 

v.  Harris  (3  Bro.  C.  C.  365)  799 

Stratton's  Estate  (112  Cal.  513)  880 

Estate  (46  Md.  551)  1125,  1167 

Stratton  ».  McCandliss  (32  Kan.  512)         326 

v.  M.-Candless  (27  Kans.  296)  863 

v.  Physio-Med.  Col.  (149  Mass.  505)  934 

Stranb  v.  Dimm  (27  Pa.  St.  36)  309 

Strewn  v.  Strewn  (53  111.  263)  167,  170,  182 
Strayer  v.  Long  (86  V:i.  557)  242 

Street,  Ex  parte  (1  Bbmd.  Ch.  532,  n.)     1039 

v.  Saunders  (27  Ark.  554)  230 

Streeter  v.  Paton  (7  Mich.  341)  713 

Streetv  v.  McCurdv  (104  Ala.  493)  1237 

Stretch  v.  Pvnn  (l'l.ee,  30)  519 

Stribling  v.  Coal  Co.  (31  W.  Va.  82)  692 
Strieker  v.  Oldenburgh  (39  Iowa,  653)  80 

Strickland  v.  Aldrich  (9  Ves.  516)  910 

v.  Hudson  (55  Miss.  235)  836 

v.  Strickland  (10  Sim.  374^  1094 

v.  Wvnn  (51  Oa.  600)  830 

Striewig's  Estate  (169  Pa.  St.  61)  1018 

Striker  r.  Mott  (28  N.  Y.  82)  1244 

Stringer's  Estate  (L.  R.  6  Ch.  Div.  1)  948 
Si  robe],  Kx  parte  (2  S.  C.  309)  216 

Strode  v.  Commonwealth  (52  Pa.  St.  181)  691 a 
Strode*  v.  Patton  (1  Brock.  228)  685,  1043 
Strong,  Matter  of  (2  Connolly,  574)  71 

clii 


•Page 
Strong's  Estate  (119  Calif.  663)  431 

Strong  v.  Bass  (35  Pa.  St.  333)  1236 

v.  Clem  (12  Ind.  37)  243,  255 

v.  Garrett  (90  Iowa,  100)      195,  196,  210 

v.  Smith  (1  Met.  Mass.  476)  641 

v.  Smith  (84  Mich.  567)  939 

v.  Strong  (8  Conn.  408)  346 

v.  Strong  (3  Redf.  477)  1131 

v.  Williams  (12  Mass.  391)  975 

Stronghill  v.  Anstey  (1  DeGex  M.  &  G. 


732 

1045 

783,  1216 

1060 

815,  863 


589,  749 

31,  36 

628 

224 


635) 
Strother  v.  Hull  (23  Grat.  652) 

v.  Mitchell  (80  Va.  149) 

Strouse  v.  Drennan  (41  Mo.  289) 

v.  Lawrence  (160  Pa.  421) 

Strvker  v.  Vnnderbilt  (27  N.  J.  L.  68)  1067 
Stuart's  Estate  (67  Mo.  App.  61)  344,  681,  682 
Stuart  v.  Allen  (16  Cal.  473)  1055 

v.  Kissam  (2  Barb.  493)  1118 

v.  Walker  (72  Me.  145)  729,  949 

Stubblefield  v.  McRaren  (5   Sm.  &  M. 

130) 
Stubbs  v.  Houston  (33  Ala.  555) 
Stuber  v.  McEntee  (142  N.  Y.  200) 
Stuckey  v.  Mathes  (24  Hun,  461) 
Studebaker  v.  Montgomery  (74  Mo.  101)    757 
Studlev  ?'.  Josselvn  (5  Allen,  118)  1033 

Stukes"  v.  Collins* (4  Des.  207)  697 

Stull's  Estate  (183  Pa.  St.  625)  224,  520 

Stull  v.  Graham  (60  Ark.  461)  256 

Stulz  v.  Schaeffle  (18  Eng.  L.  &  E.  576)      4ft 
Stunz  v.  Stunz  (131  111.  210) 
Sturdivant  ».  Davis  (9  Ired.  L.  365) 

v.  Neill  (27  Miss.  157) 

Sturdy  v.  Jacoway  (19  Ark.  499)      329,  1058, 

1059 
Sturges  v.  Tufts  (R.  M.  Charlt.  17)  522 

Sturgis  v.  Paine  (146  Mass.  354)  877 

v.  Work  (122  Ind.  134)  96,  886,  894 

Sturtevant  v.  Sturtevant  (4  Allen,  122)      820 

v.  Tallman  (27  Me.  78)  1122 

Stuttmeister's  Estate  (75  Calif.  346)  1148 

Estate  (17  Pac.  R.  223)  1148 

Stuyvesant  v.  Hall  (2  Barb.  Ch.  151)         734 

St.  Andrae  v.  Rachal  (7  La.  An.  69) 

St.  Clair  v.  Morris  (9  Ohio,  15) 

St.  James  Church  v.  Walker  (1  Del.  Ch. 

284)  489,  494 

St.  John's  Succession  (6  La.  An.  192)  363 
St.  John  v.  Lofland  (5  N.  Dak.  140)   830,  832 

v.  McKee  (2  Dem.  236)  1146 

St.  John  Assoc,  v.  Buchly   (5  Mackey, 


212 
417 
493 


1138 
1075 


406) 


873 

374 

49 


St.  Jurjo  v.  Dunscomb  (2  Bradf.  105) 

St.  Leger's  Will  (34  Conn.  334) 

St.  Louis  Trust  Co.  v.  Rudolph  (136  Mo. 

169)  1218 

St.  Mary's  Church  v.  Wallace  (10  N.  J.  L. 

311)  "  1268 

St.    Paul's   Church  v.   Atty.   Gen.  (164 

Mass.  188)  919,  920 

St.  Paul  Trust  Co.  v.  Mintzer  (65  Minn. 
124)  1002 

v.  Weiskopf  (62  Minn.  408)      1138,  1139 

St.  Vrain's  Estate  (1  Mo.  App.  294)  1214 

Suarez,  Matter  of  (3  Dem.  164)  584 

Sublett  ».  Nelson  (38  Mo.  487)  339 

Succession  of. For  cases  under  "Suc- 
cession of,"  see  names  of  the  parties. 
Sugden  v.  St.  Leonards  (L.  R.  1  Pr.  D. 
104)  483- 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*Page 
Suggett  v.  Kitchell  (6  Yerg.  425)  473,  488 
Suggitt's  Trust  (L.  R.  3  Ch.  App.  215)  1015 
Suggs  v.  Sapp  (20  Ga.  100)  990,  991 

Suisse  v.  Lowther  (2  Hare,  424)  969 

Sullice  v.  Gradenigo  (15  La.  An.  582)  631 
Sullings  v.  Richmond  (5  Allen,  187)  173 

v.  Sullings  (9  Allen,  234)  264 

Sullivan's  Will  (Tuck.  94)  543 

Sullivan  v.  Deadman  (23  Ark.  14)  1208 

v.  Fosdick  (10  Hun,  173)  441 

v.  Holker  (15  Mass.  374)  736 

v.  Horner  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  299)  759,  762,  763 

v.  McMillan  (26  Fla.  543)  733 

v.  Parker  (113  N.  C.  301)  898 

v.  Raab  (86  Ala.  433)  498,  714 

v.  Sheets  (22  Colo.  153)  861 

v.  Sullivan  (106  Mass.  474)  72,  75 

v.  Sullivan  (1  Phillim.  343)  107 

v.  Tioga  R.  R.  (44  Hun,  304)  546 

v.  Winthrop  (1  Sumn.  1)  994,  1007,  1009 

Sulz  v.  M.  Assn.  (145  N.  Y.  563)       361,  441, 

647,  650 
Sulzberger  v.  Sulzberger  (50  Cal.  385)  212 
Sumeral  v.  Sumeral  (34  S.  C.  85)  267 

Summerfield  v.  Howie  (2  Redf.  149)  347 

Summerford  v.  Gilbert  (37  Ga.  59)  187 

Summers  v.  Reynolds  (95  N.  C.  404)  704 

r.  Smith  ('127  III.  645)  _     847 

Summersett  v.  Summeisett  (40  Ala.  596)  336 
Summerville  v.  Holiday  (1  Watts,  507)  1247 
Sumner  v.  Child  (2  Conn.  607)  1025 

v.  Conant  (10  Vt.  9)  250 

v.  Crane  (155  Mass.  483)  57,  502 

v.  Hampson  (8  Oh.  328)  289 

v.  Parker  (7  Mass.  79)  1244 

v.  Society  (64  N.  H.  321)  988 

v.  Williams  (8  Mass.  162)  795,  1066 

Sunderland's  Estate  (60  Iowa,  732)  140,  141 
Sunderland  v.  Hood  (84  Mo.  293)  48 

v.  Hood  (13  Mo.  App.  282)  46,  48 

Surber  v.  Kent  (5  W.  Va.  96)  1155,  1157 

Susz  v.  Forst  (4  Dem.  346)  581 

Sutherland  v.  Brush  (7  John.  Ch.  17)  387,738 

v.  Harrison  (86  111.  363)  1105 

v.  Sutherland  (102  Iowa,  535)  267 

v.  Sydnor  (84  Va.  880)  882 

Suttle  v.  Turner  (8  Jones,  403)  535 

Sutton's  Succession  (20  La.  An.  150)  437 

Sutton  v.  Chenault  (18  Ga.  1)  72 

v.  Craddock  (1  Ired.  Eq.  134)  1000 

v.  Public  Adm'r  (4  Dem.  33)       400,  533 

v.  Sutton  (87  Kv.  216)  156 

v.  Warren  (10  Met.  451)  224 

v.  Weeks  (5  Redf.  353)  555 

Suydam  v.  Barber  (18  N.  Y.  468)  496 

v.  Bastedo  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  433)     737,  1180 

v.  Broadnax  (14  Pet.  67)  1268 

Svanoe  v.  Jurgens  (144  III.  507)  774 

Swackhamer  v.  Kline  (25  N.  J.  Eq.  503) 

1033,  1195 
Swails  v.  Swails  (98  Ind.  511)  103,  978,  979 
Swain,  In  re  (67  Cal.  637)  808,  817 

v.  Hardin  (64  Ind.  85)  262 

v.  Naglee  (19  Cal.  127)  336 

v.  Spruill  (4  Jones  Eq.  364)  1000 

v.  Stewart  (98  Ga.  366)  183 

Swaine  v.  Periue  (5  John.  Ch.  482)  245,  265 
Swan's  Estate  (54  Mo.  App.  17)  859 

Swan  v.  Hammond  (138  Mass.  45)      108,  109 

v.  House  (50  Tex.  650)  810 

> v.  Ligan  (1  McCord  Ch.  227)  1002 


*  Page 
Swan  v.  Picquet  (3  Pick.  443)  1195 

v.  Thompson  (36  Mo.  App.  155)  859 

v.  Wheeler  (4  Dav,  137)  1058,  1134 

Swancy  v.  Scott  (9  Hum  ph.  327)  441 

Swandale  v.  Swandale  (25  S.  C.  389)  211 

Swann  v.  Garrett  (71  Ga.  506)  728,  1017 

v.  Houseman  (90  Va.  816)  1196 

Swarthout  v.  Kanier  (143  N.  Y.  499)  732 

Swasev  v.  American  Bible  Soc.  (57  Me. 
523)'  923,  924,  926,  934,  987,  988 

v.  Ames  (79  Me.  483)  832 

v.  Jaques  (144  Mass.  135)    353,  904,  905 

Swash  v.  Sharpstein  (14  Wash.  426)  59 

Swatzell  v.  Arnold  (1  Woolw.  383)  369 

Swavze  v.  Wade  (25  Kan.  551)  1198 

Sweanev  v.  Mallorv  (62  Mo.  485)  275 

Swearingen  v.  Pendleton  (4  S.  &  R.  389) 

363,  374,  649 
Sweeney  v.  Damron  (47  111.  450)  609 

v.  Muldoon  (139  Mass.  304)         760,  765 

v.  Warren  (127  N.  Y.  426)  1103 

Sweet  v.  Burnett  (136  N.  Y.  204)  1018 

v.  Sweet  (1  Redf.  451)  92 

Sweetland  v.  Sweetland  (4  Sw.  &  Tr.  6)      64 
Sweetser's  Estate  (109  Mich.  198)  1120 

Sweetser  v.  Hav  (2  Gray,  49)  553 

Sweezey  v.  Willis  (1  Bradf.  495)  516,528,  596 
Sweezv  v.  Thaver  (1  Duer,  286) 
Sweigart  v.  Berk  (8  S.  &  K.  299) 
Swenson's  Estate  (55  Minn.  300) 
Swett  v.  Boardman  (1  Mass.  258) 
Swift,  Matter  of  (137  N.  Y.  77) 

v.  Martin  (19  Mo.  App.  488) 

v.  Miles  (2  Kich.  Eq.  147) 

v.  Swift  (1  Russ.  &  Mvl.  575) 

v.  Wiley  (1  B.  Mon.  114) 

Swink  v.  Snodgrass  (17  Ala.  653) 
Swinton  v.  Legare  (2  McCord  Ch.  440) 
Swires  v.  Parsons  (5  W.  &  S.  357) 
Switzer  v.  Hank  (89  Ind.  73) 

v.  Kee  (69  111.  App.  499) 

Swoope's  Appeal  (27  Pa.  St.  58) 
Sykes  v.  Chadwick  (18  Wall.  141) 
Svkora  v.  Case  (59  Minn.  132) 
Syme  v.  Badger  (92  N.  C.  706)         711 


v.  Riddle  (88  N.  C.  463) 

Symmes  v.  Arnold  (10  Ga.  506) 


1233 

638 

885,  902 

61 

691  a 

416 

1230 

1012 

68 

746 

896 

824 

1075 

1147 

978 

242 

628 

1017, 

1158 

1032 

61 


Tabb  v.  Cabell  (17  Grat.  160)  1002 

v.  Collier  (68  Ga.  641)  187 

Taber  v.  Packwood  (1  Dav.  150)  431 

Tabier  v.  Tabler  (62  Md.  601 )  485 

v.  Wiseman  (2  Oh.  St.  207)  232 

Taft  v.  Marsilv  (120  N.  Y.  474)  646 

v.  Morse  "(4  Met.  Mass.  523)  1097 

v.  Stevens  (3  Grav,  504)  595 

Taggard  v.  Piper  (118  Mass.  315)  999 
Tainter  v.  Clark  (13  Met.  220)  393,  593 
Talbe  t's  Succession  (16  La.  An.  230)         531 

Talbot  v.  Talbot  (1  Hagg.  705)  106 

v.  Talbot  (14  R.  I.  57)  244 

v.  Whipple  (14  Allen,  177)  606 

Taliaferro  v.  Burwell  (4  Call,  321)  232 

v.  Lane  (23  Ala.  369)  815 

v.  Minor  (2  Call,  190)  1134 

Tallmadge  v.  Sill  (21  Barb.  34)  656 

Tallon  v.  Tallon  (156  Mass.  313)  742 

Tally  v.  Butterworth  (10  Yerg.  501)  83,  483 

Talmadge  v.  Seaman  (92  Hun,  242)  691  a 
cliii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 

Talmadge  v.  Talmadge  (66  Ala.  199)  199 

Talmage  v.  Chapel  (16  Mass.  71)  301,366,676 


1128 
678 
533 
560 
216 
439 
974,  1191 

1207 


435 

178,  1203 

906 

201 

1014 

721 

1254 

54,  497 


244 

78 

228 

943 

969 

698 

34,  47 

353,  354 

277 

880 

897,  942,  943 

702 

83 

787,  821 

1158 

41 


Tankerslv  v.  Pettis  (61  Ala.  354) 
Tanner  V.  Bennett  (33  Grat.  251) 

v.  Huss  (80  Ga.  614) 

v.  Mills  (50  Ala.  356) 

v.  Thomas  (71  Ala.  233) 

Tant  v.  Wigfall  (65  Ga.  412) 

Tanton  v.  Keller  (167  111.  129) 

Tapp  v.  Cox  (56  Ala.  553) 

Tappan's  Appeal  (52  Conn.  412)  923,  933,  951 

Tappan  v.  Bruen  (5  Mass.  193)  791 

v.  Church  (3  Dem.  187)  352 

v.  Davton  (51  N.  J.  Eq.  260)    1051, 1052 

v.  Deblois  (45  Me.  122)  929 

v.  Tappan  (30  N.  H.  50)       384,  432,  436 

Tappen  v.  Davidson  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  459)        71 

r.  Kain  (12  John.  120)  1069 

Tarbell  v.  Jewett  (129  Mass.  457)  653 

v.  Parker  (106  Mass.  347)         1026,  1036 

v.  Whiting  (5  N.  H.  63) 

Tarbox  v.  Fisher  (50  Me.  236) 
Tarrant  v.  Backus  (63  Conn.  277) 

. v.  Swain  (15  Kan.  146) 

Tarsev's  Trust  (L.  R.  1  Eq.  501) 
Tarver  v.  Haines  (55  Ala.  503) 

v.  Tankerslev  (51  Ala.  309) 

v.  Tarver  (9  Pet.  174) 

Tasker  v.  Shepherd  (6  Hurls.  &  Norm 

575)  coo 

Tate  v.  Hilbert  (2  Ves.  Jr.  Ill)   117,  125,  127 

v.  Hunter  (3  Strobh.  Eq.  136)  1254 

v.  Morehead  (65  N.  C.  681)  390 

v.  Norton  (94  U.  S.  746)      691,  714,  816, 

1029 

. v.  Tate  (1  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  22) 

■ v.  Tate  (11  Humph.  465) 

Tatro  v.  Tatro  (18  Neb.  395) 
Tatum  r.  McLellan  (50  Miss.  1) 
Taubenhan  v.  Dunz  (125  111.  524) 
Taveau  v.  Ball  (1  McCord  Ch.  456) 
Tawnev  v.  Long  (76  Pa.  St.  106) 
Tavloe"t>.  Bond  (Busb.  Eq.  5) 
— -  v.  Gould  (10  Barb.  388) 

v.  Johnson  (63  N.  C  381) 

v.  Mosher  (29  Md.  443) 

o.  Tayloe  (108  N.  C.  69) 

Tavlor's  Appeal  (47  Pa.  St.  31) 
— ^  Estate  (10  Cal.  482) 

Estate  (52  Cal.  477) 

Estate  (92  Cal.  564) 

Tavlor  v.  Adams  (2  Serg.  &  R.  534)  718 

— ^  v.  Barron  (35  N.  H.  484)     359,  360,  361, 

404,  440,  536,  753 

v.  Benham  (5  How.  233)  752 

v.  Biddle  (71  N.  C.  1)  570,  576 

v.  Brav  (32  N.  .1.  L.  182)  147,  151 

v.  Brodhead  (5  Redf.  624)  71 

v.  Brooks  (4  I).  &  B.  149)  394 

v.  Brvn  College  (34  N.  J.  Eq.  101)     929 

r.  Burk  (91  Ind.  252) 

v.  Conner  (7  Ind.  115) 

v.  Cox  (153  III.  220) 

v.  Cresswell  (45  Md.  422) 

v.  Elder  (39  Oh.  St.  535) 

v.  Galloway  (I  Oh.  232) 

v.  Haygarth  (14  Sim.  8) 

v.  Highberger  (65  Iowa.  134) 

r.  Butchison  (25  Grat.  536) 


Taylor  v.  Kellv  (31  Ala.  59) 

v.  Lanier'(3  Murph.  98) 

v.  McCrackin  (2  Blackf.  260) 

v.  McElrath  (35  Ala.  330) 

v.  Maris  (90  N.  C.  619) 

v.  Martindale  (12  Sim.  158) 

v.  Mason  (9  Wheat.  325) 


*Pag« 
47 

980 

257 

1207 

727,  892 

633 

953,  960 

v.  Minor  (90  Kv.  544)      1138,  1147,  1150 

733 

72 

58 

419 

31,  44 

630 

434 

1214 

486 

221,  261 

752,  1256 

738 

201 

1110 

687 

264 

1220,  1222 

228 


1196 

882 

43 

36 

1097 

718 

97 

241 

285,  291 


v.  Johnson  (2  I'.  Wins.  504)  1008 

i>.  Jones  (97  Ky.  201)  1237 

cliv 


v.  Minton  (45  Kans.  17) 

v.  Mitchell  (57  Pa.  St.  209) 

v.  Mitchell  (87  Pa.  St.  518) 

v.  Moore  (47  Conn.  278) 

v.  Pegram  (151  111.  106) 

v.  Penn.  R   Co.  (78  Ky.  348) 

v.  Phillips  (30  Vt.  238) 

v.  Reese  (4  Ala.  121) 

v.  Richardson  (2  Drew.  16) 

v.  Sample  (51  Ind.  423) 

v.  Savage  (1  How.  282) 

v.  Shuit  (4  Dem.  528) 

v.  Tavlor  (53  Ala.  135) 

v.  Taylor  (8  B.  Mon.  419) 

17.  Tavlor  (3  Bradf.  54) 

v.  Tavlor  (144  111.  436) 

v.  Tavlor  (145  Mass.  239) 

v.  Tavlor  (93  N.  C.  418) 

v.  TaVlor  (2  Nott  &  McCord,  482)       100 

v.  TaVlor  (63  Pa.  St.  481)  903 

v.  Thorn  (29  Oh.  St.  569)  196,  214 

v.  Tibbats  (13  B.  Mon.  177)         498,  513 

v.  Tolen  (38  N.  J.  Eq.  91)   893,  971,  974, 

1099 

v.  Trich  (165  Pa.  586)  34 

v.  Walker  (1  Heisk.  734)  1031 

v.  Wendel  (4  Bradf.  324)  1112 

v.  Winburn  (20  Mo.  306)  46 

v.  Wright  (93  Ind.  121)    767,  1146,  1162 

Teacle's  Estate  (153  Pa.  219)  97,  911 

Teague  v.  Corbitt  (57  Ala.  529)       1156,  1169, 

1179 

v.  Downs  (69  N.  C.  280)  612 

Teasdale  v.  Reaborne  (2  Bav,  546)  609 

Teat  v.  Lee  (8  Port.  507)  1232 

Tebbets  v.  Tilton  (24  N.  H.  120)  326 

v.  Tilton  (31  N.  H.  273)     '  1131 

Tederall  v.  Bouknight  (25  S.  C.  275)        1244, 

1245 
Teel  v.  Winston  (22  Oreg.  489)  860,  861 

Teele  v.  Bishop  (168  Mass.  341)  931 

Teets  v.  VVeise  (47  N.  J.  L.  154)  896 

Telford  v.  Boggs  (63  111.  498)  192 

v.  Morrison  (2  Add.  319)  1116 

v.  Patton  (144  111.  611)  122 

Tell  Furniture  Co.  v.  Stiles  (60  Miss.  849)   696, 

1155,  1158 
Temple  v.  Sammis  (97  N.  Y.  526)  873,  878 
Tcmpleman  v.  Fontleroy  (3  Rand.  434)  642 
Temples  v.  Cain  (60  Miss.  478)  1087 

Tenbrook  v.  Brown  (17  Tnd.  410)  124 

Tenev  v.  Laing  (47  Kas.  297)  295,  301 

Ten  Evck  v.  Runk  (31  IS.  J.  L.  428)  621 

V.  Vanderpool  (8  John.  120)  795 

Tennell  v.  Ford  (30  Ga.  707)  881 

Tennent  v.  Pattons  (6  Leigh,  196)  1022 

Tenney  V.  Poor  (14  Gray,  500)  1036 

Tennison  v.  Tenniaon  (46  Mo.  77)  641 

Tennv  v.  Laslev  (80  Mo.  664)  819 

Terhune  v.  Old'is  (44  N.  J.  Eq.  146)  654 

v.  White  (34  N.  J.  Eq.  98)  840 

Terrell  v.  McCown  (91  Tex.  231)  720 
v.  Reeves  (103  Ala.  264)  884 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Terrell  v.  Rowland  (86  Kv.  67)  284,  1132 

Territory  v.  Bramble  (2  Dak.  189)  713 

v.  Bedding  (1  Fla.  242)  283 

Terry's  Appeal  (55  Pa.  St  344)  190 

'Appeal  (07  Conn.  181)  383,  503,  534 

Estate  (13  Phila.  298)  1072 

Terry  v.  Bale  (1  Dem.  452)  1142 

v.  Dayton  (31  Barb.  519)  1187,  1214 

v.  Edminster  (9  Pick.  355,  note)  103 

v.  Ferguson  (8  Port.  500)  648,  1142 

v.  Robins  (5  Sm.  &  M.  291)  602 

v.  Smith  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  504)         884,  952 

v.  Vest  (11  Ired.  L.  65)  793,  794 

v.  Wilson  (63  Mo.  493)  641 

Tertrou  v.  Comeau  (28  La.  An.  633)  1031 

Terwillinger  v.  Brown  (44  N.  Y.  237)        702, 

1084,  1087 
Teschemacher  v.  Thompson  (18  Cal.  11)  577 
Taverbaugh  v.  Hawkins  (82  Mo.  180)      1031, 

1047 
Tevis  v.  Tevis  (23  Mo.  256)  782,  805 

Thacher  v.  Dunham  (5  Gray,  26)  1146 

Thackara  v.  Mintzer  (100  Pa.  St.  151)  956 
Thatcher  v.  Phinney  (7  Allen,  146)  609 

Thayer  ».  Boston  (15  Gray,  347)  893 

"v.  Finnegan  (134  Mass.  62)  1098 

v.  Homer  (11  Met.  104)  584 

v.  Kinsey  (162  Mass.  232)  751 

v.  Lane  (Hair.  Mich.  247)  1034 

v.  Spear  (58  Vt,  327)  958 

v.  Thayer  (7  Pick.  209)  1245 

v.  Thaver  (14  Vt.  107)  247 

v.  Wellington  (9  Allen,  283)      968,  1018 

v.  Winchester  (133  Mass.  447)  330 

The  Euphrates  (8  Cr.  385)  1208 

Theller  v.  Such  (57  Cal.  447)  296,  323,  344 
Thellusson  v.  Woodford  (4  Ves.  227)  884,917 
Thellusson  v.  Woodford  (13  Ves.  209)  500 
Thelusson  v.  Smith  (2  Wheat.  396)  771 

Theological  Society  v.  Attorney  General 

(135  Mass.  285)  920,  931 

The  Pizarro  (2  Wheat.  227)  1208 

The  Protector  (9  Wall.  687)  847 

The  St.  Lawrence  (8  Cr.  434)  1208 

Thibodeaux's   Succession    (38    La.    An. 

716)  1267 

Thiebaut  v.  Sebastian  (10  Ind.  454)  492 

Thiefes  v.  Mason  (55  N.  J.  Eq.  456)  383,  411, 

745 
Thimes  v.  Stumpff  (33  Kan.  53)  212 
Thomas  v.  Adams  (10  111.  319)  397 
v.  Attorney  General  (2  Y.  &  Col. 

525)  1008 

v.  Benton  (4  Desaus.  17)  901 

v.  Black  (113  Mo.  66)  111 

v.  Bonnie  (66  Tex.  635)  1264 

v.  Butler  (Ventr.  217)  404,  516 

v.  Cameron  (16  Wend.  579)  410 

v.  Carter  (170  Pa.  St.  272)  34 

v.  Copps  (5  Bush,  273)  978,  980 

v.  Chamberlain  (39  Oh.  St.  112)        750, 

806,  846 

v.  Davis  (76  Mo.  72)  602 

v.  Dumas  (67  Ala.  271)  1131 

v.  Ellmaker  (1  Pars.  Eq.  98)  928 

v.  Frederick  (9  Gill  &  J.  115)  1163 

v.  Gammel  (6  Leigh,  9)  251 

v.  Gregg  (78  Md.  545)  1005 

v.  Hanson  (44  Iowa,  651)  237 

v.  Harkness  (13  Bush,  23)  608 

v.  Hesse  (34  Mo.  13)  243,  261 


Thomas  v.  Higgins  (47  Md.  439) 

v.  Knighton  (23  Md.  318) 

v.  Le  Baron  (8  Met.  355) 

v.  Levering  (73  Md.  451)  J 

v.  Lewis  (89  Va.  1) 

v.  McElwee  (3  Strobh.  L.  131) 


*  Pago 
900 
538 
1067 
873,  903 
123 
777 


v.  Moore  (52  Ohio  St.  200)      '  757,  1146 

v.  Morrisett  (76  Ga.  384)  493 

v.  Parker  (97  Cal.  456)  731 

v.  People  (107  111.  517)  452 

v.  Rector  (23  W.  Va.  26)  989 

v.  Scruggs  (10  Yerg.  400)  738 

v.  Simpson  (3  Pa.  St.  60)  350 

v.  Stanley  (4  Sneed,  411)  745 

v.  Stevens  (4  John.  Ch.  607)  893 

v.  Stump  (62  Mo.  275)  43 

i'.  Tanner  (6  T.  B.  Mon.  52)  441 

v.  Thomas  (15  B.  Mon.  178)  803 

v.  Thomas  (73  Iowa,  657)  271,  1246 

v.  Thomas  (108  Ind.  576)  882 

v.  Thomas  (3  Lit.  8)  786 

v.  Thomas  (17  N.  J.  Eq.  356)  1105,  1110 

v.  White  (3  Lit.  177)  679 

o.  Wood  (1  Md.  Ch.  296)  272 

Thomason  v.  Blackwell  (5  St.  &  P.  181)    582 
Thomasson  v.  Driskell  (13  Ga.  253)  794 

Thompson's  Estate  (33  Barb.  334)       509,  535 

Estate  (6  Maekey,  536)  236,  536 

Thompson,  Ex  parte  (4  Bradf.  154)        84,  85 

v.  Allen  (103  Pa.  St.  44)  610 

v.  Branch  (35  Tex.  21)  804 

v.  Brown  (4  John.  Ch.  619)        281,  282, 

679,  708,  798,  1272 

v.  Brown  (16  Mass.  172)    435,  450,  1090 

v.  Canterbury  (2  McCrarv,  332)  757 

v.  Carmichael  (3  Sandf.  Ch.  120)     1215, 

1224 

v.  Central  R.  R.  (60  Ga.  120)  620 

v.  Churchill  (60  Vt.  371)  86,  972 

v.  Conner  (3  Bradf.  366)  54 

v.  Corby  (27  Beav.  649)  926 

v.  Cox  (8  Jones  L.  311)  1062 

v.  Crockett  (19  Nev.  242)  646 

v.  Davitte  (59  Ga.  472)  71 

v.  Deeds  (93  Iowa,  228)  591 

v.  Doe  (8  Blackf.  336)     1034,  1035,  1037 

v.  Duncan  (1  Tex.  485)  712 

v.  Gaut  (14  Lea,  310)  868,  960 

v.  Heffernan  (4  Drurv  &  W.  285)  49, 129 

v.  Hoop  (6  Oh.  St.  480)  271,  950 

v.  Huckett  (2  Hill,  S.  C.  347)      535,  571 

v.  Ish  (99  Mo.  160)  46,  48 

v.  Joyner  (71  N.  C.  369)  1040 

v.  King  (54  Ark.  9)  195,  208 

v.  Knight  (23  Ga.  399)  588 

v.  Kyner  (65  Pa.  St.  368)  40,  42,  47 

v.  McDonald  (2  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  463)  898 

v.  McGaw  (2  Watts,  161)  1247 

v.  Mills  (39  Ind.  528)  611 

v.  Morgan  (5  S.  &  R.  289)  261 

v.  Munger  (15  Tex.  523)  1077 

v.  Meyers  (95  Kv.  597)  1237 

v.  Onley  (96  N.  C.  9)  831 

v.  Palmer  (2  Rich.  Eq.  32)  632 

v.  Pinchell  (11  Mod.  177)  387 

v.  Reno  Bank  (9  Pac.  121)  848 

v.  Samson  (64  Cal.  330)  501,  568 

v.  Sandford  (13  Ga.  238)  1044 

v.  Schmidt  (3  Hill  S.  C.  156)  991 

v.  Swoope  (24  Pa.  St.  474)  913 

v.  Taylor  (71  N.  Y.  217)  864 

civ 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Thompson  v.  Thomas  (30  Miss.  152)  1239 

v.  Thompson  (51  Ala.  493)  180,  215 

v.  Thompson  (1  Coll.  388)  £89 

v.  Thompson  (3  Dem.  409)  968,  989 

v.  Thomp^n  (1  Jones  L.  430)  232 

v.  Thompson  (6  Munf.  514)  599 

v.  Thompson  (4  Oh.  St.  333)  1105 

v.  Thompson  (12  Tex.  327)  120,  125 

r.  Tolniie  (2  Pet.  157)  325 

v.  Tracv  («0  N.  Y.  174)  1203 

v.  White  (45  Me.  445)  645,  656 

v.  Whitmarsh  (100  N.  Y.  3i)  828 

v.  Wilson  (2  N.  H.  291)  368,  440 

v.  Winnebago  Co.  (48  Iowa,  155)       648 

v.  Wood  (115  Cal.  301)  813 

v.  Young  (25  Md.  450)  906 

Thompsons  v.  Meek  (7  Leigh,  419)      512,  534 
Thorns  v.  King  (95  Tenn.  60)  228 

Thomson's  Appeal  (89  Pa.  St.  36)  879 

Estate  (153  Pa.  St.  332)  1004 

Estate  (12  Phila.  36)  1230 

Estate  (5  Week.  N.  Cas.  14)  691  a 

Thomson  o.  Norris  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  489)        933 

v.  Thomson  (1  Bradf.  24)  663 

v.  Thomson  (115  Mo.  57)  895 

v.  Smith  (64  N.  H.  412)  758 

Thorn's  Appeal  (35  Pa.  St.  47)  1046 

Thorn  v.  Garner  (42  Hun,  507)  1138 

v.  Garner  (113  N.  Y.  198)         1005,  1007 

v.  Ingram  (25  Ark.  52)  1059 

Thornburg    v.   Thornburg    (18  W.  Va. 

522)  227 

Thorndike  v.  Barrett  (2  Me.  312)  1044 

v.  Boston  (1  Met.  242)  442 

v.  Loring  (15  Gray,  391)  911 

Thome's  Case  (4  Sw.  &  Tr.  36)  55 

Thornton,  Goods  of  (L.  K.  14Prob.  D.  82)    90 

v.  Burch  (20  Ga.  791)  598 

v.  Howe  (31  Beav.  14)  909 

v.  Loague  (95  Tenn.  93)  396 

v.  Mehring  (117  111.  55)  593 

v.  Moore  (61  Ala.  347)  526 

v.  Mulquinne  (12  Iowa,  549)    1030,  1046 

v.  Thornton  (45  Ala.  274)  203,  205 

v.  Winston  (4  Leigh,  152)     511,  514,  516 

Thorp  v.  Miller  (137  Mo.  231)  715,  730 

v.  Munro  (47  Hun,  246)  1097 

Thrasher  v.  Ingram  (32  Ala.  645)        878,  992 
Threat  v.  Moody  (87  Tenn.  143)  201 

Throckmorton  v.  Ilobbv  (1  Brownl.  51)     585 

v.  Pence  (121  Mo."50)  1080,  1245 

Thrupp  v.  Collett  (26  Beav.  125)  907 

Thrustout  r.  Croppin  (2  W.  Bl.  801)  507 

Thumb  v.  Gresham  (2  Met.  Ky.  306)  440 

Thurber  v.  Battev  (105  Mich.  718)  873 

v.  Chambers  (66  N.  Y.  42)  874 

Thursby  v.  Mvers  (57  Ga.  155)  991 

Thurston  v.  Doane  (47  Me.  79)  645 

v.  Lowder  (40  Me.  197)  645 

v.  Maddocks  (6  Allen,  427)  201 

v.  Sinclair  (79  Va.  101)  1012 

Thweatt  v.  Redd  (50  Ga.  181)  892 

Thyme  v.  Glengall  (2  H.  L.  Cas.  131)       975 
Tibbats  v.  Berrv  (10  B.  Mon.  473)  469 

Tichborne  v.  Tichborne  (L.R.2P.&  D. 

41)  402 

Tichenor  v.  Brewer  (98  Ky.  349)  903 

Tickle  v.  Quinn  (1   Dem.  425)      726,  727,  985 
Ticknor's  Estate  (13  Mich.  44)  912 

Ticknor  v.  Harris  (14  N.  II.  272)     1262,  I2B4 
Tidd  v.  Quinn  (52  N.  II.  341)  212 

clvi 


Tiebout  v.  Millican  (61  Tex.  514) 
Tiemann  v.  Molliter  (71  Mo.  512) 

v.  Tiemann  (34  Tex.  522) 

Tier  v.  Pennell  (1  Edw.  Ch.  354) 
Tiernan  v.  Beam  (2  Oh.  383) 

v.  Binns  (92  Pa.  St.  248) 

Tiers  v.  Tiers  (98  N.  Y.  568) 
Tift  v  Collier  (78  Ga.  194) 
Tifft  p.  Porter  (8  N.  Y.  516) 
Tigner  v.  McGehee  (60  Miss.  185) 
Tilbv  v.  Til  by  (2  Dem.  514) 
Tilden.  In  re  (98  N.  Y.  434) 

Matter  of  (5  Dem.  230) 

v.  Dows  (2  Dem.  489) 

v.  Dows  (3  Dem.  240) 

v.  Green  (130  N.  Y.  29) 


•Page 

191,  196 

674 

204 

903 

1048 

175 

884 

1264,  1267 

964 

1098 

959 

1130 

1234 

345 

345, 1236 

880,  884,  924, 

925,  932 

86,  472,  972 

62 

1047 


v.  Tilden  (13  Grav,  103) 

Tilghman  v.  Steuart  (4"  Harr.  &  J.  156) 
Tillett  v.  Avdlett  (90  N.  C.  551) 
Tillev  v.  Bridges  (105  111.  336) 
Tillinghast  v.  Bradford  (5  R.  I.  205) 

v.  Wheaton  (8  R.  I.  536) 

Tillman  v.  Bowman  (68  Iowa,  450) 

v.  Davis  (95  N.  Y.  17) 

v.  Thomas  (87  Ala.  321) 

Tillotsou  v.  Race  (22  N.  Y.  122) 

v.  Tillotson  (34  Conn.  335) 

Tillson  v.  Small  (80  Me.  90) 
Tillv  v.  Tilly  (2  Bl.  Ch.  436) 
Tilton  v.  Society  (60  N.  H.  377) 

r.  Tilton  (32  N.  H.  257) 

v.  Tilton  (41  N.  H.  479) 

v.  Yount  (28  111.  App.  580) 

Timberlake  v.  Parish  (5  Dana,  345) 
Timbers  v.  Katz  (6  W.  &  S.  290) 


1077 
956 
119 
814 
903 
1062 
981 
283 
345,  1194,  1235 
444,  445 
893,  1250 
873 
1040,  1194 
844 
273 
641 
Timmons  v.  Timmons  (6  Ind.  8)      1034,  1038 
Timothy  v.  Farr  (42  Vt.  43)  1196 

Tindall  v.  Tindall  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  512)  944 

Tiner  v.  Christian  (27  Ark.  306)      1073,  1164 
Tinkham  v.  Smith  (56  Vt.  187)  1237 

Tinnen  v.  Mebane  (10  Tex.  246)  1247 

Tirrel  v.  Kenney  (137  Mass.  30)  205 

Tisdale  v.  Conn.  Life  Ins.  Co.  (26  Iowa, 
170)  445 

0.  Jones  (38  Barb.  523)  608 

Titcomb's  Estate  (Mvr.  55)  198 

Titlow's  Estate  (163*Pa.  35)  1149 

Titlow  i\  Titlow  (54  Pa.  St.  216)  42 

Titman  v.  Moore  (43  111.  169)  200 

Titterington  v.  Hooker  (58  Mo.  593)  340,  356, 
658. 659, 731, 850, 1027, 1028, 1039, 1107, 1263 
Tittman  v.  Edwards  (27  Mo.  App.  492)      581 

v.  Green  (108  Mo.  22)  391,  551 

v.  Thornton  (107  Mo.  500)  366 

Titus  v.  Poole  (145  N.  Y.  414)  339,  838 

v.  Titus  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  Ill)  987,988 

Tobelman  v.  Hildebrandt  (72  Cal.  313)     1126 
Tobey  V.  Miller  (54  Me.  480) 
Tobias  V.  Francis  (3  Vt.  425) 

v.  Ketchum  (32  N.  Y.  319) 

Tobv  v.  Allen  (3  Kan.  399) 
Todd's  Will  (2  Watts  &  S.  145) 
Todd  v.  Bradford  (17  Mass.  567) 

v.  Davenport  (22  S.  C.  147) 

v.  Moore  (1  Leigh,  457) 

i>.  Terry  (26  Mo.  App.  598) 

v.  Willis  (66  Tex.  704) 

v.  Wright  (12  Heisk.  442) 

Toebhe  v.  Williams  (81)  Ky.  661) 
Toerring  v.  Lamp  (77  Iowa,  488) 


424, 

425 

603 

268 

802 

842 

55 

856 

391 

655 

702 

817 

407,  748 

749 

402 

6-2 

488 

TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


•Page 
Toledo,  P.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Curtenius  (65 

III.  120)  1075 

Toler  v.  Toler  (2  Patt.  &  H.  71)  1083 

Tolson  v.  Tolson  (10  Gill  &  .1.  159)  905 

Toman  v.  Dunlop  (18  Pa.  St.  72)  915 

Tome's  Appeal  (50  Pa.  St.  285)  32(5 

Tomkins's  Estate  (12  Cal.  114)  214,  1075 

Tonikins  v.  Tomkins  (1  Bail.  92)  44 

v.  Tomkins  (18  S.  <J.  1)  282,  1158 

Tomlin  v.  Beck  (1  Turn.  &  R.  438)  420 

v.  Javne  (14  B.  Mon.  160)  270 

Tomlinsori's  Estate  133  Pa.  St.  245)  62 

Tomlinson  v.  Bury  (145  Mass.  346)    964,  968, 

986,  1110 

v.  Wright  (12  Ind.  App.  292)  407 

Tompkins's  Estate  (12  Cal.  114)  214,  1075 
Tompkins  v.  Fonda  (4  Pai.  448)  255 

v.  Tompkins  (18  S.  C.  1)  738 

v.  Tompkins  (1  Sto.  547)  326 

v.  Weeks  (26  Cal.  50)  865 

Tomppert  v.  Tomppert  (13  Bush,  326)  224 
Toms  v.  Williams  (41  Mich.  552)  883,  884,  942 
Toney  v.  Spragins  (80  Ala.  541)  1016 

Tongue  v.  Nutwell  (13  Md.  415)  943 

Tooke  v.  Hardeman  (7  Ga.  20)  207,  269 

v.  Hartlev  (2  Dick.  785)  859 

Tootle  v.  Cold'well  (30  Kan.  125)  609 

Torrance  v.  McDougald  (12  Ga.  526)  531,  564 
Torrence  v.  Davidson  (92  N.  C.  437)  678,  708 
Torrey  v.  Bank  (9  Pai.  649)  702 

v.  Bishop  (104  Ala.  548)  839 

D.  Minor  (1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  489)  274 

Toulouse  v.  Burkett  (2  Idaho,  170)  860 

Touzanne's  Succession  (36  La.  An.  420)  1137, 

1164 
Tower's  Appropriation  (9  W.  &  S.  103)      951 

Estate  (49  Minn.  371)  917 

v.  Hagner  (3  Whart.  48)  611 

Towle  v.  Swasey  (106  Mass.  100)       636,  964, 
965,  984,  985,  1007 

I?.  Towle  (79  Wis.  596)  1016 

v.  Wood  (60  N.  H.  434)  57 

Towler  v.  Bull  (3  Kan    App.  626)  295 

Towne  v.  Ammidown  (20  Pick.  535)  558 

Townsend's  Appeal  (106  Pa.  St.  268)        1006 

Succession  (37  La.  An.  405)  706 

Succession  (37  La.  An.  408)  588 

Succession  (40  La.  An.  66)  307 

Townsend  v.  Bogart  (5  Redf.  93)  31 

v.  Downer  (32  Vt.  183)  492 

v.  Gordon  (19  Cal.  188)  324,  562 

v.  Mavnard  (45  Pa.  St.  198)  610 

v.  Pell  (3  Dem.  367)  571 

v.  Radcliffe  (44  111.  446)  1246 

o.  Tallant  (33  Cal.  45)  1030,  1052 

v.  Townsend  (4  Coldw.  70)  466,  497 

D.  Townsend  (2  Sandf.  711)  265 

Townshend,  Appellant  (85  Me.  57)  1201 

v.  Brooke  (9  Gill,  90)  348 

v.  Howard  (86  Me.  285)  91,  93,  94 

v.  Townshend  (7  Gill,  10)  479 

Townson  v.  Tickell  (3  B.  &  Aid.  31)  992 

Tozer  v.  Tozer  (2  Am.  L.  Reg.  510)  184 

Trabue  v.  Harris  (1  Met.  Kv.  597)  808 

Tracev  v.  Shumate  (22  W.  Va.  474)  267 

Tracy  v.  Card  (2  Oh.  St.  431)         653,  749, 

1139 

v.  Murray  (44  Mich.  109)  268,  272 

v.  Smith '(2  Lev.  173)  144 

v.  Strong  (2  Conn.  659)  638 

Trafford  v.  Young  (3  Tenn.  Ch.  496)         1031 


•Page 

699,  1165, 

1176 


Trammel  v.  Philleo  (33  Tex.  395) 

Trammell  v.  Neal  (1  Tex.  Unr.  Cas.  51)  214 
Transue's  Estate  (141  Pa.  St.  170)  647 

Trappes  v.  Harter  (3  Tyrw.  603)  601 

Trask  v.  Baxter  (48  111.  406)  257 

v.  Donoghue  (1  Aik.  370)  385,  410 

Travis  v.  Insley  (28  La.  An.  784)  576 

Trawick  v.  Davis  (85  Ala.  342)  61,  432 

v.  Trawick  (67  Ala.  271)  1127,  1131 

Travlor  v.  Cabanne"  (8  Mo.  App.  131)         817 

v.  Marshall  (11  Ala.  458)  695 

Treadwell  v.  Cordis  (5  Grav,  341)  303 

Treat's  Appeal  (30  Conn.  113)  '  923,  930 
Treat  v.  Fortune  (2  Bradf.  116)  821 

v.  Treat  (80  Me.  156)  1153 

Trecothick  v.  Austin  (4  Mas.  16)        359,  365, 
374,  643,  646 
Tredwell  v.  Graham  (88  N.  C.  208)  832 

Tremble  v.  Jones  (3  Murphy,  579)  1272 

Tremain  v.  Severin  (16  Ind"  App.  447)  836 
Tremmel  v.  Kleiboldt  (75  Mo.  255)  276 

v.  Kleiboldt  (6  Mo   App.  549)  276 

Trenholm  v.  Morgan  (28  S.  C.  268)  121 

Trent  v.  Trent  (24  Mo.  307)  1033 

Trescot  v.  Trescot  (1  McC.  Ch.  417)  1123 

Trevelvan  v.  Lofft  (83  Va.  141)  1164 

v.  Trevelvan  (1  Phillim.  149)  481 

Trewick  v.  Ho'ward  (105  Cal.  434)  654 

Triche's  Succession  (29  La.  An.  384)  1064 
Trigg  v.  Daniel  (2  Bibb,  301)  1153 

Trimble  v.  Dzieduzviki  (57  How.  Pr.  208)   375 

v.  Fariss  (78  Ala.  260)  788,  843 

v.  James  (40  Ark.  393)    1132,  1152, 1159 

v.  Marshall  (66  Iowa,  233)  843 

Trimmer  v.  Adams  (18  N.  J.  Eq.  505)     1130, 

1209 

v.  Bavne  (7  Ves.  508)  981 

v.  Thomson  (19  S.  C.  247)  792 

Trimmier  v.  Trail  (2  Bai.  480)  550,  701 

Triplett  v.  Wells  (Litt.  Cas.  49)  533 

Tripner  v.  Abrahams  (47  Pa.  St.  220)  609 
Trippe  v.  Frazier  (4  H.  &  J.  446)  925,  935 
Trish  v.  Newell  (62  111.  196)  32,  38,  39 

Tritt  v.  Crotzer  (13  Pa.  St.  451)  691  a 

Trott  v.  West  (9  Yerg.  433)  846 

Trotter  v.  Mitchell  (115  N.  C.  190)  396 

v.  Mitchell  (115  N.  C.  193)  396 

v.  Trotter  (31  Ark.  145)  195 

v.  Trotter  (40  Miss.  704)  844,  1187 

r.  White  (10  Sm.  &  M.  607)  366 

Trotters  v.  Winchester  (1  Mo.  413)  72 

Trough's  Estate  (75  Pa.  St.  115)  119 

Troup  o.  Rice  (55  Miss.  278)  1138 

v.  Wood  (4  John    Ch.  228)  462 

Trowbridge  v.  Cross  (117  111.  109)  201 

?-.  Holden  (58  Me.  117)  612 

True  v.  Morrill  (28  Vt.  672)  1198 

Trueman  v.  Tilden  (6  N.  H.  201)  760 

Truett  v.  Cummons  (6  111.  App.  73)  423 

Trumble  v.  Trumble  (37  Neb.  340)      135,  220 

v.  Williams  (18  Neb.  144)    576,  583,  752 

Truslow,  Matter  of  (140  N.  Y.  559)  883 

Trust  v.  Harned  (4  Bradf.  213)  776 

Trustees  v.  Calhoun  (25  N.  Y.  422)  475 

v.  College  (75  Md.  188)  77 

v.  Dickson  (1  Freem.  Ch.  474)  860 

v.  Fleming  (10  Bush,  234)  1264 

v.  Guthrie  (86  Va.  125)  920,  929 

v.  King  (12  Mass.  546)  913 

t>  Peaslee  (15  N.  H.  317)  89* 

clvii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


v.  Bellamy  (4  S.  E.  R.  34) 

o.  Bishop  (16  N.  Y.  402) 

v.  Brown  (9  Wash.  357) 

v.  Field  (5  Redf.  139) 

v.  Grace  (61  Ark.  410) 

v.  Harris  (13  Ga.  1) 

v.  Henderson  (63  Ala.  280) 


*  Page 

Trustees  v.  Wilkinson  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  141)   922 

Trustees  Church  v.  Morris  (99  Ky.  317)     273, 

1010 

Tryon  v.  Farnsworth  (30  Wis.  577)  1123 

— —  v.  Trvon  (16  Vt.  313)  330,  1089 

Tuck  v.  Boone  (8  Gill,  187)  567 

v.  Nelson  (62  N.  H.  469)  834 

v.  Walker  (106  N.  C  285)  631 

Tucker  v.  Bellamy  (98  N.  C.  31)  158 

158 

896 

434 

46 

757,  1146 

323,  325,  566 

190 

..  Inman  (4  M.  &  Gr.  1049)  26 

v.  Sandidge  (85  Va.  548)  31,  476 

v.  Seaman's  Aid  Society  (7  Met.  188)  892, 

923 

v.  Stiles  (39  Miss.  196) 

v.  Thurstan  (17  Ves.  131) 

v.  Tucker  (5  Ired.  L.  161) 

v.  Tucker  (4  Keyes,  136) 

v.  Tucker  (29  Mo.  350) 

v.  Tucker  (32  Mo.  464) 

v.  Tucker  (103  N.  C.  170) 

v.  Tucker  (28  N.  J.  Eq.  223) 

i\  Tucker  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  235) 

v.  Tucker  (5  N.  Y.  408) 

v.  Wells  (111  Mo.  399) 

v.  Whalev  (11  R.  I.  543) 

v.  Williams  (Dudley,  329) 

v.  Yell  (25  Ark.  420) 

Tudor  o.  James  (53  Ga.  302) 

v.  Terrel  (2  Dana,  47) 

Tuggle  t-.  Gilbert  (1  Duv.  340) 

Tugwell's  Succession  (43  La.  An.  879)       178 

Tulbert  v.  Hollar  (102  N.  C.  406)        583,  749 

Tuller,  In  re  (79  III.  99) 

Tullett  v.  Armstrong  (1  Beav.  1) 

Tullis  v.  Kidd  (12  Ala.  648) 

Tunis  v.  Hertem-ille  (149  Pa.  St.  70) 

Tunison  v.  Tunison  (4  Bradf.  138) 

Tunno  r.  Trezevant  (2  Desaus.  264) 

Tunstall  v.  Pollard  (11  Leigh,  1) 


897 
130 
76 
349 
128 
128 
203 
1191 
705,  709 
915 
860 
411 
417 
776 
355 
893 
(178 


104,  108 
816 
480 
690 
69 
608 

364,  371, 


649,  1184 

r.  Withers  (86  Va.  892)  396 

Turbeville  v.  Gibson  (5  Heisk.  565)  237 

Tureaud  v.  Gex  (21  La.  An.  253)  1072,  1073 
Turley  v.  Young  (5  J.  J.  Marsh.  133)  1230 
Turnage  v.  Turmige  (7  Ired.  Eq.  127)       1229 


Turner's  Appeal  (52  Mich.  398) 
Turner  v.  Amsdell  (3  Dem.  19) 

v.  Balfour  (02  Conn.  89) 

v.  Hank  of  No.  America  (4  Dall 

v.  Bennett  (70  111.  263) 

v.  Benoist  (50  Mo.  145) 

v.  Cheesman  (15  N.  J.  Eq.  243) 


979 
1036 


8) 


32 1 

203 

334 

37,  40, 

41,  42,  43,  44 

417,  422 

36,70 

666,  1040 

170 

1097 


v.  Child  (1  Dev.  L.  331) 

v.  Cook  (36  Ind.  129) 

v.  Ellis  (24  Miss.  173) 

v.  Fisher  (4  Sneed,  209) 

t>.  Gibb  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  526) 

v.  Hallowell  Institution  (76  Me.  527)  895 

t-.  Horner  (29  Ark.  44D)  861 

v.  Ivie  (•',  HeUk.  222)  898,  917 

v.  Johnson  Co.  (14  Hush,  411)  1197 

V.  Kelly  (67  Ala.  173)  1221 

v.  Luird  (68  Conn.  198)  1105,  1113 

clviii 


358,  368 

324,  326,  330 

.  429) 


Turner  v.  Linam  (55  Ga.  253) 

v.  Maloue  (24  S.  C.  398) 

i).  Martin  (7  DeG.  M.  &  G.  429)  986 

v.  Ogden  (1  Cox.  Ch.  316)  927 

v.  Rizor  (54  Ark.  33)  361 

v.  Scheiber  (89  Wis.  1)  212 

v.  Scott  (51  Pa.  St.  126)  60 

v.  Shuffler  (108  N.  C.  642)  1039 

v.  Street  (2  Rand.  404)  1017 

v.  Tapscott  (30  Ark.  312)  1146 

v.  Turner  (44  Ala.  437)  228 

v.  Turner  (30  Miss.  428)       166,  170,  213 

v.  Turner  (57  Miss.  775)  1100 

v.  Whitten  (40  Ala.  530)  215 

Turney  v.  Torrev  (100  Ala.  157)  41 

v.  Turney  (24  111.  625)  1032,  1037 

v.  Williams  (7  Yerg.  172)         1125.  1128 

Turnipseed  v.  Fitzpatrick  (75  Ala.  297) '  216, 

254  259 
Turpin  v.  Thompson  (2  Met.  Ky.  420)      '  119 

v.  Turpin  (88  Mo.  337)  1215 

Turvies's  Case  (2  Rolle  Abr.  678)  1117 

Tutt's  Estate  (41  Mo.  App.  662)  284 

Tuttle's  Case  (49  N.  J   Eq.  259)  1003 

Tuttle  v.  Berryman  (94  Kv.  553)  485 

■ v.  Robinson  (33  N.  H.  104)  602,  651,  691, 

761,  764 

v.  Tuttle  (2  Dem.  48)  940 

v.  Wilson  (10  Oh.  24)  274 

Tuxbury's  Appeal  (67  Me.  267)  1194 

Tweedy  v.  Bennett  (31  Conn.  276)  766 

Twigg's  Estate  (15  N.  Y.  Supp.  548)  691  a 
Twitchell  v.  Smith  (35  N.  H.  48)  1207 

Twitty  v.  Camp  (1  Phil.  Eq.  61)  955 

v.  Houser  (7  S.  C.  153)  711 

v.  Martin  (90  N.  C.  643)  938,  941 

Tygh  v.  Dolan  (95  Ala.  269)  356 

Tylden  v.  Hyde  (2  Sim.  &  St.  238)  716 

Tyler  v.  Burrington  (39  Wis.  376)  823 

v.  Gallup  (68  Mich.  185)  1209 

v.  Gardiner  (35  N.  Y.  559)  48 

v.  Jewett  (82  Ala.  93)  201,  210 

v.  Priest  (31  Mo.  App.  272)  1142 

v.  Tyler  (19  111.  151)  107 

v.  Wrheeler  (160  Mass.  206)  271 

v.  Whitney  (8  Vt.  26)  675 

Tvnan  v.  Kerns  (119  Cal.  447)  1132 
-^—  v.  Paschall  (27  Tex.  286)  90 
Tyrrell  t'.  Morris  (1  D.  &  B.  Eq.  559)  693 
Tyson's  Appeal  (10  Pa.  St.  220)  691  a 
Tyson  v.  Blake  (22  N.  Y.  558)  874 
v.  State  (28  Md.  577)                        691  a 


Udnv  v.  Udnv  (L.  R.  1  H.  L.  Sc.  461)  443 
Uhler  v.  Semple  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  288)  234 

Uldrick  v.  Simpson  (1  S.  C.  283)  411,  512,  545 
Ullmann,  Estate  of  (137  N.  Y.  403)  691  a 

Oilman  r.  Brunswick  Co.  (96  Ga.  625)  175 
lip  r.  Campbell  (19  Pa.  St.  361)  249 

Ulricta  V.  Litchfield  (2  Atk.  372)  895 

Tlrici  v.  Boeckeler  (72  Mo.  App.  661)  646 
Underbill's  Estate  (20  N.  Y.  Supp.  22)  691  a 
Uuderhill  r.  Newburger  (4  Redf.  499)       1188 

v.  Saratoga  Co.  (20  Barb.  455)  951 

Underwood  v.  Curtis  (127  N.  Y.  523)727,  884 

v.  Dismukes  (Meigs,  299)  942 

v.  Bobbins  (117  Ind.  308)  901 

v.  Underwood  (22  W.  Va.  303)         1037 

Unger  r.  Leiter  (32  Oh.  St.  210)  238,  202 
v.  Price  (9  Md.  552)  242 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Union  Bank  r.  Hicks  (67  Wis.  189)  828 

v.  Jolly  (18  How.  503)  374,  1269 

■ t\  Mariguv  (11  Rob.  (La.)  209)  859 

. v.  Powell  (3  Pla.  175)  1057 

v.  Smith  (4  Cr.  C.  G.  509)  704,  1138 

Union  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stevens  (19  Ped. 

Rep.  671)  647 

United  States  v.  Backus  (6  McLean,  443)  771 

v.  Clark  (1  Paine,  629)  772 

v.  Cutts  (1  Sumn.  133)  655 

v.  Duncan  (4  McLean,  99)  267,  269 

v.  Duncan  (4  McLean,  607)  771,  772 

v.  Eggleston  (4  Sawy.  199)  654,  766, 770, 

v.  Fisher  (2  Cr.  358)  771,  772 

v.  Fox  (104  U.  S.  315)  378,  912 

v.  Hack  (8  Pet.  271)  771 

v.  Hahn  (37  Mo.  App.  580)  771 

v.  Hailey  (2  Idaho,  26)  357,  374 

v.  Hodson  (10  Wall.  395)  554 

v.  Hooe  (3  Cr.  73)  771 

v.  Hunter  (5  Mass.  229)  772 

v.  May  (4  Mackev,  4)         391,  551,  1252 

v.  Payne  (4  Dillon,  387)        443,  451,  455 

■ v.   Pennsylvania  Co.    (27   Fed.   R. 

539)  691  a 

v.  Rickett  (2  Cr.  C.  C.  553)  772 

v.  16  Packages  (2  Mason,  48)  670 

v.  Tappan  (11  Wheat.  419)  670 

v.  Trucks  (37  Fed.  R.  541)  691  a 

v.  Walker  (109  U.  S.  258)  744,  745 

v.  Wiley  (11  Wall.  508)  847 

United  States  Trust  Co.  v.  Ins.  Co.  (115 

N.  Y. 152)  647 

Universalist  Soc.  v.  Kimball  (34  Me.  424) 

924 
Universalists  v.  Meyer  (36  Ind.  375)  1265 

University's  Appeal  (97  Pa.  St.  187)  984,  985, 

987,  988 
University  v.  Hughes  (90  N.  C.  537)  394,  749 

v.  Tucker  (31  W.   Va.   621)      893,  913, 

1102 
University  of  North  Carolina  v.  Foy  (1 

Murphv,  58)  308 

Unknown  Heirs  v.  Baker  (23  111.  484)       383, 

397,  561 
Upchurch  v.  Unchurch  (16  B.  Mon.  102)  70 
Updegraff  v.  Trask  (18  Cal.  458)  713 

Updegraph  v.  Commonwealth  (11  S.  &  R. 

394)  908 

Updike  v.  Tompkins  (100  111.  406)  889 

Upfill  v.  Marshall  (3  Curt.  Ec.  630)  101 

Upham  v.  Emerson  (119  Mass.  509)  208 

Upper  Appomattox  Co.  v.  Hardings  (11 

Grat.  1)  621 

Upshaw  v.  Upshaw  (2  Hen.  &  M.  381)       269 
Upton  v.  Bernstein  (76  Hun,  516)  501 

Urev  v.  Urey  (5  S.  W.  859)  355 

Urich's  Appeal  (86  Pa.  St.  386)  874 

Urmey  v.  Wooden  (1  Oh.  St.  160)  923 

Urqunart  v.  Oliver  (56  Ga.  344)  28 

Ury  v.  Bush  (85  Iowa,  698)  847 

Usher  v.  Railroad  (126  Pa.  St.  206)  630 

v.  Richardson  (29  Me.  415)  251 

Usticke  v.  Bawden  (2  Add.  116)  99 

Utassy  v.  Giedinghagen  (132  Mo.  53)  23 

Utica  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lynch  (11  Pai.  520)         705 
Utley  v.  Rawlins  (2  D.  &  B.  Eq.  438)         679 

v.  Titcomb  (63  N.  H.  129)  971,  972 

Utterton  v.  Robins  (1  Ad.  &  El.  423)  86 

Utz's  Estate  (43  Cal.  200)  110 


*  Page 
Vachell  v.  Jefferevs  (Prec.  Ch.  170)  1215 

Vail's  Appeal  (37"  Conn.  185)       340,  814,  855 
Vail  v.  Anderson  (61  Minn.  552)  433 

v.  Givan  (55  Ind.  59)  574,  580 

v.  Male  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  521)  584,  1259 

v.  Rinehart  (105  Ind.  6)  1072 

Valcourt  v.  Sessions  (30  Ark.  515)  549 

Valdez,  In  re  (L.  R.  40  Ch.  D.  159)  944 

Valencia  V.  Bernal  (26  Cal.  328)  428 

Valentine's  Will  (93  Wis.  45)     477,  481,  500, 

834 
Valentine  v.  Durvea  (37  Hun,  427)  1085 

v.  Norton  (30  Me.  194)  626 

v.  Ruste  (93  111.  585)  1008 

v.  Strong  (20  Md.  522)  1136 

v.  Valentine  (2  Barb.  Ch.  430)  1170. 1175 

v.  Valentine  (4  Redf.  265)        1125,  118!) 

v.  Wvsor  (123  Ind.  47)  281,  283,  291,  293 

Valle  v.  Brvan  (19  Mo.  423)  1033,  1043 

v.  Fleming  (19  Mo.  454)  1031 

Van  Aken  v.  Clark  (82  Iowa,  256)  289 

Van  Alst  v.  Hunter  (5  Johns.  Ch.  148)  43 

Van  Alstvne  v.  Van  Alstvne  (28  N.  Y. 

375)      "  88S 

Vanarsdall  v.  Fauntlerov  (7  B.  Mon.  401)  277 
Van  Bibber  v.  Julian  (81  Mo.  618)   748,  1041, 

1183 

v.  Reese  (71  Md.  608)  1271 

Van  Blarcom  v.  Dager  (31  N.  J.  Eq.  783)    1006 
Van   Bramer  v.  Hoffman  (2  John.  Cas. 

200)  1007 

Vance's  Estate  (141  Pa.  St.  201)  273,  950 

Succession  (36  La.  An.  559)  932 

Succession  (39  La.  An.  371)  923 

Vance  v.  Anderson  (39  Iowa,  426)  493 

v.  Campbell  (1  Dana,  229)  962 

v.  Crawford  (4  Ga.  445)  500 

v.  Maronev  (4  Col.  47)      330, 1021,  1090 

v.  McLaughlin  (8  Grat.  289)  390 

v.  Nagle  (70  Pa.  St.  176)  611 

v.  Upson  (64  Tex.  206)  298 

v.  Upson  (66  Tex.  476)  34 

v.  Vance  (21  Me.  364)  265 

Vancil  v.  Evans  (4  Coldw.  340)  873 

Van  Cleaf  v.  Bums  (43  Hun,  461)  228 

v.  Burns  (62  Hun,  252)  228 

v.  Burns  (118  N.  Y.  549)  228 

v.  Burns  (133  N.  Y.  540)  228 

Van  Cleve  v.  Van  Fossen  (73  Mich.  342)    147 
Van  Cortland  r.  Kip  (1  Hill,  590)  113 

Vanderbilt,  Matter  of  (10  N.  Y.  Supp. 

239)  691  a 

Vanderford's  Appeal  (12  Atl.  R.  491)       1167 
Vanderhevden  v.  Reid  (Elopk.  408)  1209 

v.  Vanderheyden  (2  Paige,  287)       1168, 

1170,  1176 
Van  Dermoor,  In  re  (42  Hun,  326)  647 

Vanderveer  v.  Alston  (16  Ala.  494)  425 

Vander  Volgen  v.  Yates  (3  Barb.  Ch.  242)  933 
Vandervoort,  In  re  (62  Hun,  612)        959,  976 

In  re  (1  Redf.  270)  1142 

Vanderzee  v.  Slingerland  (103  N.  Y.  47)    949, 

951 
Van  Deusen  v.  Havward  (17  Wend.  67) 
Van  Deuzer  v.  Gordon  (39  Vt.  Ill) 
Vandever  v.  Baker  (13  Pa.  St.  121) 

v.  Freeman  (20  Tex.  333) 

Vandewalker  v.  Rollins  (63  N.  H.  460) 


Vandigrift  v.  Potts  (72  Ga.  665) 
Vandiver  v.  Vandiver  (20  Kan.  501) 
clix 


554 
■85 
1058 
804 
944, 
1018 
183 
195 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  aide  pages.] 


Vandor  v.  Roach  (73  Cal.  614) 
Van  Doren  v.  Olden  (19  N.  J.  Eq.  176) 
Vandruff  v.  Rinehart  (29  Pa.  St.  232) 
Van  Dusen's  Appeal  (102  Pa.  St.  224) 
Van  Duyne  v.  Van  Duyne  (14  N.  J.  Eq. 

49) 

v.  Vreeland  (12  N.  J.  Eq.  142) 

Vanduzer  v.  McMillan  (37  Ga.  299) 
Vandyke  v.  Chandler  (10  N.  J.  L.  49) 
Van  Dyke  v.  Vanderpool  (14  N.  J.  Eq. 

198) 
Van  Emon  v.  Super.  Ct.  (76  Cal.  789) 
Van  Epps  v.  Van  Deusen  (4  Pai.  64) 
Van  Gieson  v.  Howard  (7  N.  J.  Eq.  462)  938 
Van  Gorder  v.  Smith  (99  Ind.  404)  877 

Van  Guilder  v.  Justice  (56  Iowa,  669)  268 
Van  Guvsling  v.  Van  Kuren  (35  N.  Y. 

70)      '  31 

Van  Hanswyck  V.  Wiese  (44  Barh.  494)  65 
Van  Hook  v.  Letchford  (35  Tex.  598)  867 
Vanhook  v.  Vanhook  (1  D.  &  B.  Eq.  589)  942 


Page 
116 

1004 

65 

999 

500 

59 

284 

857 

942 
761 
640 


Van  Horn  v.  Ford  (16  Iowa,  578) 

v.  Keenan  (28  111.  445) 

v.  Teasdale  (9  N.  J.  L.  379) 

Vanhorn  v.  Walker  (27  Mo.  App.  78) 


1062 

41 

797 

345, 

1235 

Van  Home  v.  Campbell  (100  N.  Y.  287)    947, 

948 

i'.  Fonda  (5  John.  Ch.  388)  512 

Van  Houten,  Matter  of  (18  N.  Y.  App.  D. 
306)  993 

v.  Post  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  709)  978,  980,  1139 

v.  Post  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  51)  972 

Van  Huss  v.  Rainbolt  (2  Coldw.  139)      42,  43 
Van  Kleeck  v.  Dutch  Church  (20  Wend. 
457)  884,  944 

v.  McCabe  (87  Mich.  599)  287 

v.  Reformed  Church  (6  Pai.  600)         882 

Van  Kleek,  Matter  of  (121  N.  Y.  701)  691  a 
Vanleer  v.  Vanleer  (3  Tenn.  Ch.  23)  232.  247 
Van  Liew  v.  Barrett  (144  Mo.  509)  1127 

Van  Matre  v.  Sankev  (148  111.  536)  141 

Vanmeter  v.  Jones  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  520)  668, 1131 

v.  Lore  (33  111.  260)  .       1266 

Vann  v.  Newsom  (110  N.  C.  122)  1016 

Van  Nest's  Estate  (Tuck.  130)  1171 

Van  Nest  v.  Van  Nest  (43  N.J.  Eq.  126)  968, 

987 
Van  Nostrand  v.  Moore  (52  N.  Y.  12) 

v.  Wright  (Hill  &  Den.  260) 

Van  Osdell  v.  Champion  (89  Wis.  661) 

Vanpelt  v.  Veghte  (14  N.  J.  L.  207) 

Van  Renssellaer  v.  Kearnev  (11  How.  297)  263 

v.  Van  Renssellaer  (113  N.  Y.  207)    1008 

Van  Saun  v.  Farlev  (4  Dalv,  165)  812 

Van  Schaack  v.  Leonard  (164  III.  602)  1016 
Van  Slooten  i>.  Dodge  (145  N.  Y.  327)  757 
Van  Slyke  v.  Schmeck  (10  Pai.  301)  1199 
Van  Steenwvck  v.  Washburn  (59  Wis. 

483)  '  268,  270,  271 

Van  Syckel  v.  Beam  (110  Mo.  58:))  493,  494 
Van  Tuvl  v.  Van  Tuvl  (57  Barb.  235)  260 
Van  Vechten  v   Keafor  (63  N.  Y.  52)  873 

v.  Pearson  (5  Pai.  512)  949 

Van  Vliet's  Appeal  (102  Pa.  St.  574)         1099 
Van  Voorhia  v.  Brintnall  (86  N.  Y.  18) 
Van  Vronker  r.  Eastman  (7  Met.  157) 
Van  Wert  v.  Benedict  (1  Bradf.  114) 
Van  Wickle  v.  Lan.lry  (29  La.  An.  330) 
Van  Winkel  v.  Van  Houten  (3  N.  J.  Eq 
172) 

clx 


873 

1035 

955 

738 


*Page 
Van  Winkle  v.  Schoonmaker  (15  N.  J. 

Eq.  381)  26 

Van  Wyck  v.  Bloodgood  (1  Bradf.  155)  942 
Vanzandt  v.  Vanzandt  (23  111.  536)  204 

v.  Bigham  (76  Ga.  759)  991 

v.  Morris  (25  Ala.  285)  432,  898 

Varnell  v.  Loague  (9  Lea,  158)  399 

Varner  v.  Bevil  (17  Ala.  286)  442,  494,  495 
Varnon  v.  Varnon  (67  Mo.  App.  534)  93,  483, 

485 
Varnum  v.  Meserve  (8  Allen,  156)  596 

Varrell  v.  Wendell  (20  N.  H.  431)  904 

Vassar,  Matter  of  (127  N.  Y.  1)  691  a 

Vastine  v.  Dinan  (42  Mo.  269)  749, 1212 

Vaughan  v.  Browne  (2  Str.  1106)  426 

v.  Dickes  (20  Pa.  St.  509)  915,  949 

v.  Farmer  (90  N.  C.  607)  726 

v.  Holmes  (22  Ala.  593)  1043 

v.  Northup  (15  Pet.  1)  358,  363,  651 

v.  Vaughan  (30  Ala.  329)  953 

Vaughn,  In  re  (92  Cal.  192)  1235 

v.  Barrett  (5  Vt.  333)  359,  440 

v.  Deloatch  (65  N.  C  378)  648,  715, 1142 

v.  Lovejov  (34  Ala.  437)  963 

v.  Suggs  (82  Ala.  357)  1128 

v.  Vaughn  (88  Tenn.  742)  198,  230 

Vawter  v.  Missouri  R.  R.  Co.  (84  Mo. 

679)  630 

Veach  v.  Rice  (131  U.  S.  293)  329,  395,  549 
Veal  v.  Fortson  (57  Tex.  482)  434 

Veazey  v.  Whitehouse  (10  N.  H.  409)  1097 
Veazie  Bank  v.  Young  (53  Md.  555)  1195 

Vedder  v.  Saxton  (46  Barb.  188)  171 

Venable  v.  Mercantile  Co.  (74  Md.  187)    719, 

725 

v.  Mitchell  (29  Ga.  566)  393,  503 

v.  Wabash  Ry.  (112  Mo.  103)  239 

Ventress  v.  Smith  (10  Pet.  161)  695,  1021 
Verdier  v.  Bigne  (16  Oreg.  208)  861 

v.  Roach  (96  Cal.  467)  819 

v.  Verdier  (8  Rich.  135)  70,  1094 

Vermilyea  v.  Beattv  (6  Barb.  429)  369,  650 
Verner's  Estate  (6  Watts,  250)  737,  1138 

Vernet  v.  Williams  (3  Dem.  349)  1005 

Vernon  V.  Curtis  (2  H.  Bl.  18)  422 

v.  Egmont  (1  Bligh,  n.  s.  554)  790 

v.  Kirk  (30  Pa.  St.  218)  475 

v.  Manvers  (31  Beav.  623)  1104 

v.  Valk  (2  Hill  Ch.  257)  1022 

Vernor  v.  Coville  (54  Mich.  281)  722 

Verplanck,  In  re  (91  N.  Y.  439)  323,  351.  352 
Verrv  v.  McClellan  (6  Gray,  535)  1047 

Vester  v.  Collins  (101  N.  C.  114)  76,  477 

Vestry  v.  Bostwick  (8  Dist.  C  App.  453)  485 
Vezey  v.  Jamson  (1  Sim.  &  St.  69)  934 

Vick  v.  Vicksburg  (1  How.  Miss.  379)      534, 


157 

239 

27 

210 

1099 


Vickers  v.  Cowell  (1  Beav.  529) 

0.  Pound  (6  H.  L.  Cas.  885) 

v.  Vickers  (L.  R.  37  Ch.  Div 

Victory  v.  Krauss  (41  Hun,  533) 
Vidal  "v.  Commagere  (13  La.  An.  516) 


561 
592 
968 
525)  978 
623 
140, 
141 

v.  Girard  (2  How.  127)  908,  920,  927,  958 

Viehle  v.  Keeler  (129  N.  Y.  190)  873 

Viles  v.  Green  (91  Wis.  217)  687 

Villard  v.  Robert  (1  Strobh.  Eq.  393)        746, 

1147,  1182 
Vincent  v.  Martin  (79  Ala.  540)  283,  296, 

1132 
v.  Piatt  (5  Harr.  164)  596 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Vincent  v.  Spooner  (2  Cush.  467) 

v.  Vincent  (1  Heisk.  333) 

Vining  v.  Hall  (40  Miss.  83) 

».  Willis  (40  Kans.  (509) 

Virgin  v.  Gaither  (42  111.  39) 
Vittum  v.  Giiman  (48  N.  H.  416) 
Voelckner  v.  Hudson  (1  Sandf.  215) 
Vogel's  Succession  (16  La.  An.  139) 


264 

182,  220 

96 

195 

121 

617,  625 

257 

445 


608 
841 

38 

1249 

94 

1046 

603 

1137 

913 

1124 

89,  480 

283 

287 

277 


1  Succession  (20  La.  An.  81)  384,  409,  576 

Vogel  v.  Vogel  (22  Mo.  161) 
Von  Arx  V.  Wemple  (43  N.  J.  L.  154) 
Von  de  Veld  v.  Judv  (143  Mo.  348) 
Von  Kettler  v.  Johnson  (57  111.  100) 
Voorhees,  In  re  (6  Dem.  162) 

v.  Bank  of  U.  S.  (10  Pet.  449) 

v.  MeGinnis  (4S  N.  Y.  278) 

r.  Stoothoff  (11  N.  J.  L.  145) 

v.  Voorhees  (6  N.  J.  Eq.  511) 

v.  Voorhees  (N.  J.  Eq.  223) 

v.  Voorhees  (39  N.  Y.  463) 

Voorhies  o.  Baxter  (1  Abb.  Pr.  43) 
Voorhis  v.  Childs  (17  N.  Y.  354) 
Voting  Laws,  In  re  (12  R.  I.  586) 
Vowinckel  v.  Patterson  (114  Pa.  St.  21)    1244 
Vreedenburgh  v.  Calf  (9  Pai.  128)      332,  571, 

1203 
Vreeland  v.  Jacobus  (19  N.  J.  Eq.  231)      237 

v.  Rvno  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  160)  28 

v.  Vreeland  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  512)  855, 1154 

v.  Vreeland  (13  N.  J.  L.  512)  697 

Vroom  v.  Van  Home  (10  Pai.  549)      365,  426 
Vrooman  v.  Powers  (47  Oh.  St.  191)  75 

Vulliamy  v.  Noble  (3  Mer.  593)  288 


Waddill  v.  Martin  (3  Led.  Eq.  562)  1170 

Waddington  v.  Buzbv  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  173)    46 
Wade's  Appeal  (29  Pa.  St.  328)  776 

Wade  v.  Amer.  Soc.  (4  Sm.  &  M.  670)    1201 

■ v.  American    Colonization    Societj' 

(7  Sm.  &  M.  663)  927,  929 

v.  Bridges  (24  Ark.  569)  407 

v.  Hardy  (75  Mo.  394)  832 

v.  Jones  (20  Mo.  75)  181 

v.  Kalbfleisch  (58  N.  Y.  282)  624 

v.  Labdell  (4  Cush.  510)  350 

v.  Nazer  (1  Rob.  Ec.  627)  101 

v.  Odeneal  (3  Dev.  L.  423)  336 

v.  Pritchard  (69  111.  279)      680,  681,  682 

v.  Russell  (17  Ga.  425)  1014 

v.  Wade  (1  Wash.  C.  C.  477)  1138 

Wadsworth's  Succession  (2  La.  An.  966)  1053 
Wadsworth  v.  Chick  (55  Tex.  241)  346 

v.  Henderson  (16  Fed.  R.  447)  1264 

Wager  v.  Barbour  (4  S.  E.  R.  842)  833 

v.  Wager  (89  N.  Y.  161)   354,  719,  1123, 

1124 

v.  Wager  (96  N.  Y.  164)  937 

Wagner's  Appeal  (43  Pa.  St.  102)  893 

Estate  (52  Hun,  23)  1120 

■  Estate  (119  N.  Y.  28)  1120 

Wagner  v.  McDonald  (2  Harr.  &  J.  346)    55, 

61 

v.  Varner  (50  Iowa,  532)  140 

Wagstaff  v.  Lowerre  (23  Barb.  209)  1175 

Wahrmund  v.  Merritt  (60  Tex.  24)  210 

Wainford  v.  Barker  (1  Ld.  Raym.  232)     1115 
Wainright's  Appeal  (89  Pa.  St.  220)  48 

Wait,  Appellant  (7  Pick.  100  645 

v.  Holt  (58  N.  H.  467)  757 

v.  Huntington  (40  Conn.  9)  925 

VOL.  l.  —  k 


Wait  v.  Wait  (4  N.  Y.  95)  228 

Waite  v.  Breeze  (18  Hun,  403)  46 

v.  Frisbie  (45  Minn.  361)  65 

Wakefield  v.  Campbell  (20  Me.  393)  1056 

v.  Phelps  (37  N.  II.  296)  885 

Wakeman  v.  Hazleton  (3  Barb.  Ch.  148)   678 
Walden  v.  Chambers  (7  Oh.  St.  30)  639 

v.  Gridley  (36  111.  523)  1077 

v.  Phillips  (86  Ky.  302)  145 

Waldon  v.  Beemer  (45  Neb.  626)     1033, 1039 
Waldron  r.  Simmons  (28  Ala.  629) 

v.  Waldron  (4  Bradf.  114) 

Wales  v.  Bowdish  (61  Vt.  23) 

v.  Nawbould  (9  Mich.  45) 

v.  Willard  (2  Mass.  120) 

Walker's  Appeal  (116  Pa.  St.  419) 

Estate  (3  Rawle,  229) 

Estate  (9  Serg.  &  R.  223) 


287 

1105 

656 

680 

448 

1142 

1108 

1163,  1170, 

1172 

344,  352 

165,  180 

60,71 

443 

880 

852 

1219 

357 


Will  (136  N.  Y.  20) 

Walker,  Appellant  (83  Me.  17) 

In  re  (110  Cal.  387) 

In  re  (1  Mo.  App.  404) 

v.  Atmore  (50  Fed.  R.  644) 

v.  Bradley  (3  Pick.  261) 

v.  Brooks  (99  N.  C.  207) 

v.  Brown  (27  U.  S.  App.  291) 

v.  Byers  (14  Ark.  246)  429,  809, 817,  842, 

1267,  1268 

v.  Cheever  (35  N.  H.  339)  798 

v.  Cheever  (39  N.  H.  420)  845 

v.  Covar  (2  S.  C.  16)  859 

v.  Craig  (18  111.  116)  693 

v.  Crosland  (3  Rich.  Eq.  23)  552 

v.  Deaver  (79  Mo.  664)  1266 

v.  Deaver  (5  Mo.  App.  139)  242 

v.  Diehl  (79  111.  473) 


816,  1036,  1038, 

1155 

401 

817 

383 

667 

852 

473 

992,  996,  997 

896 

857,  1199 

426 


v.  Doughertv  (14  Ga.  653) 

v.  Drew  (20"Fla.  908) 

v.  Galbreath  (3  Head,  315) 

v.  Hall  (1  Pick.  19) 

v.  Hill  (17  Mass.  380) 

v.  Hunter  (17  Ga.  364) 

v.  Johnson  (82  Ala.  347) 

v.  Johnston  (70  N.  C.  576) 

v.  Lvman  (6  Pick.  458) 

v.  May  (2  Hill  Ch.  22) 

v.  Morris  (14  Ga.  323)  570 

r.  Murphy  (34  Ala.  591)  593 

—  v.  Newton  (85  Me.  458)  852,  854 

17.  Patterson  (36  Me.  273)  795 

v.  Perryman  (23  Ga.  309)  500 

v.  Pritchard  (121  111.  221)  948,  999 

v.  Schuvler  (10  Wend.  480)  230 

v.  Sherman  (20  Wend.  636)  603 

v.  Skeene  (3  Head,  1)  74 

v.  Torrance  (12  Ga.  604)  505,  576 

v.  Walker  (17  Ala.  396)  873,  1007 

v.  Walker  (2  Curt.  854)  106 

v.  Walker  (14  Ga.  242)  41 

v.  Walker  (25  Ga.  420)  913,  923 

v.  Walker  (2  111.  App.  418)  262 

v.  Walker  (88  Ky.  615)  739 

v.  Walker  (14  Oh.  St.  157)  56,  58 

v.  Walker  (67  Miss.  529)  68 

v.  Walker  (1  Mo.  App.  404)  443 

v.  Walker  (25  Mo.  367)  641 

v.  Wetherell  (6  Ves.  473)  1013 

v.  Wigginton  (50  Ala.  579)  808 

v.  Williamson  (25  Ga.  549)  895 

cbri 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Walker  v.  Wootten  (18  Ga.  119)  1132 

• v.  Yowell  (94  Ky.  205)  1022 

Walkerly,  In  re  (77  Cal.  642)  161,  170 

In  re  (108  Cal.  627)      727,  882,  883,  915, 

917 

v.  Bacon  (85  Cal.  137)  810 

"Wall  v.  Hinds  (4  Gray,  256)  605 

Walla  Walla  v.  Moore  (16  Wash.  339)       691 
Wallace  v.  Dubois  (65  Md.  153)  940,  978,  980 

v.  Gatchell  (106  111.  315)  803,  825 

v.  Hall  (19  Ala.  367)  257,  1059 

v.  Hawes  (79  Me.  177)  884 

v.  Long  (105  Ind.  522)  59 

v.  Mevers  (38  Fed.  R.  184)  691  a 

■ v.  Minor  (86  Va.  650)  902 

v.  Nichols  (56  Ala.  321)  1065,  1081 

v.  Owen  (71  Ga.  544)  1220,  1223 

v.  Pomfret  (11  Ves.  542)  981 

v.  Reddick  (119  111.  151)  1214,  1226 

v.  Walker  (37  Ga.  265)  570 

v.  Wallace  (23  N.  H.  148)  964,  967,  984. 

1104 

v.  Wallace  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  616)  495 

Wallahan  v.  Ingersoll  (117  111.  123)  306 

v.  People  (40  111.  103)  336 

Waller  v.  Logan  (5  B.  Mon.  515)  593 

. v.  Mardus  (29  Mo.  25)  255 

v.  Ray  (48  Ala.  468)  1182 

Wallev  v.  Gentry  (68  Mo.  App.  298)  782 

Walling  r.  Lewis  (119  Ind.  496)  691 

Wallis  v.  Cooper  (123  Ind.  40)  527 

v.  Hodson  (2  Atk.  116)  155 

v.  Wallis  (114  Mass.  510)  484 

v.  Wallis  (1  Winst.  78)  404 

Walls  v.  Stewart  (16  Pa.  St.  275)  966 

v.  Walker  (37  Cal.  424)  864,  1126 

Wally  v.  Wally  (41  Miss.  657)  180 

Wain's  Estate  (156  Pa.  St.  194)  944 

Walpole  v.  Apthorp  (L.  R.  4  Eq.  37)  968 

v.  Oxford  (3  Ves.  402)  56 

Walsh's  Appeal  (122  Pa.  St.  177)  119 

Will  (1  Tuck.  132)  472 

Walsh  v.  Edmonson  (19  Mo.  142)  1208 

v.  Kelly  (34  Pa.  St.  84)  250,  265 

v.  Ketchum  (84  Mo.  427)  609 

v.  Laffin  (2  Dem.  498)  70 

v.  Mathews  (11  Mo.  131)  961 

v.  Packard  (165  Mass.  189)  621 

v.  Reis  (50  111.  477)  205,  262 

v.  Sexton  (55  Barb.  251)  120 

Walston  v.  White  (5  Md.  297)  891 

Walter's  Will  (64  Wis.  487)  60 

Walter  v.  Ford  (74  Mo.  195)  122 

v.  Radcliffe  (2  Des.  577)  843 

Walters  v.  Hill  (27  Grat.  388)  570 

v.  Jordan  (13  Led.  L.  361)  227 

v.  Nettleton  (5  Cash.  544)  624 

v.  Prestidge  (30  Tex.  65)  808 

v.  Ratliff  (5  Bush,  575)  469,  497 

Walton's  Estate  (8  DeG.  M.  &  G.  173)       882 
Walton  v.  Avery  (2  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  405)   1166, 

1168 

v.  Bonham  (24  Ala.  513)  631 

v.  Hall  (Ot;  Yt.  455)       358,  414,  494,  496 

p.  Pearson  (85  N.  C.  34)  334 

v.  Reager  (20  Tex.  103)  1077 

v.  Torrey  (1  Harr.  Ch.  259)  955 

V.  Walton  (7  .1.  .1.  Marsh.  58)      887,  890 

v.  Walton  (7  John.  <  'h.  258)      102,  965, 

967,  973,  974 
Walworth  v.  Abel  (52  Pa.  St.  370)  434 

clxii 


Walworth  v.  Ballard  (12  La.  An.  245) 
Wampler  v.  Wampler  (9  Md.  540) 
Wamsley  v.  Wamsley  (26  W.  Va.  45) 


Page 

429 

52 

685, 
811 

383, 


Wankford  v.  Wankford  (1  Salk.  299) 

507,  513,  789 
Wanzer  v.  Eldridge  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  511)    1057, 

1064 
Waples  v.  Marsh  (19  Iowa,  381)  1022 

v.  Waples  (1  Harr.  392)  1010 

Warbass  v.  Armstrong  (10  N.  J.  Eq.  263)  1163 
Ward's  Will  (70  Wis.  251)  108,  109 

Ward,  In  re  (1  Bradf.  254)  534 

v.  Barrows  (2  Oh.  St.  241)  881 

v.  BeviU  (10  Ala.  197)  419 

v.  Blackwood  (41  Ark.  295)  623 

i).  Callahan  (49  Kas.  149)  1075 

v.  Cameron  (37  Ala.  691)  581 

v.  Church  (06  Vt.  490)  353,  354 

v.  Dodd  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  414)  944 

v.  Dunham  (134  111.  195)  807 

v.  Ford  (4  Redf.  34)  1164,  1176 

v.  Kilpatrick  (85  N.  Y.  413)  604 

v.  Mayrield  (41  Ark.  94)  201 

v.  Oates  (43  Ala.  515)  492,  493 

v.  Thompson  (6  Gill  &  J.  349)  517 

548,  690 

693 

121,123,125 

110,  986,  1240 

836 

718,  870 

1078 

171 

1145 

724 

936 

829 

553 

242,  262 

979 


v.  Tinkham  (65  Mich.  695) 

v.  Turner  (7  Ired.  Eq.  73) 

v.  Turner  (2  Ves.  Sr.  431) 

v.  Ward  (120  111.  Ill) 

v.  Ward  (37  Mich.  253) 

v.  Ward  (105  N.  Y.  68) 

r.  Williams  (45  Tex.  617) 

v.  Wolf  (56  Iowa,  465) 

Warden  v.  Burts  (2  McCord  Ch.  73) 
Wardwell  v.  McDowell  (31  111.  364) 
Ware  v.  Fisher  (2  Yeates,  578) 

v.  Howley  (68  Iowa,  633) 

v.  Jackson  (24  Me.  166) 

v.  Owens  (42  Ala.  212) 

v.  People  (19  111.  App.  196) 

v.  St.  Louis  Bagging  Co.  (47  Ala. 

667)  793 

v.  Ware  (8  Me.  42)  412 

V.  Washington  (6  Sm.  &  M.  737)         31 

Wareham  v.  Sellers  (9  Gill  &  J.  98)  61 

Warehime  v.  Graf  (83  Md.  98)  1022,  1192 
Warfield  v.  Warfield  (5  H.  &  J.  459)  1214 
Warford  v.  Noble  (9  Biss.  320)  242 

Waring  v.  Bosher  (91  Va.  286)  874 

v.  Edmonds  (11  Md.  424) 

v.  Lewis  (53  Ala.  615) 

v.  Purcell  (1  Hill  Ch.  193) 

v.  Waring  (2  Bland,  673) 

v.  Waring  (6  Thornt.  Notes,  388)  33 

Warlev  v.  Warlev  (Bai.  Eq.  397)       968,  989, 

1109 
Warner's  Estate  (130  Pa.  St.  359) 
Warner  v.  Bates  (98  Mass.  274) 

v.  Beach  (4  Gray,  162) 

v.  Sprigg  (62  Md.  14) 

Warren  v.  Carter  (92  Mo.  288) 

v.  Farmer  (100  Ind.  593) 

v.  Hall  (6  Dana,  450) 

r.  Harding  (2  R.  I.  133) 

r.  Hearne  (82  Ala.  554) 

V.  Morris  (4  Del.  Ch.  289)  110,  267,  272, 

985,  986,  989 

v.  Prescott  (84  Me.  483)  140,  939 

v.  Taylor  (50  Iowa,  182)  103 

V.  Warren  (148  111.  641)  268 


119 

694 

599,  638 

1041,  1042 


1149 
876 
109 
900 
396 
288 
417 
85 

1032 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Warren  v.  Webb  (68  Me.  133)  1000 

v.  Williams  (25  Mo.  App.  22)  232 

Wartnaby,  Goods  of  (4  Notes  of  C.  476)  486 
Warwick  v.  Greville  (1  Phill.  122)  529 

i>.  State  (5  Ind.  350)  1045 

v.  Warwick  (86  Va.  596)  65 

Washbon  v.  Cope  (144  N.  Y.  287)      353,  878, 

951 
Washburn  v.  Goodman  (17  Pick.  519)        284 

v.  Gould  (3  Story,  122)  634 

v.  Hale  (10  Pick1;  429)         666,  768,  1153 

v.  Sewall  (9  Met.  280)  923 

v.  Van  Steenwvk  (32  Minn.  336)       222, 

268,  361,  378 

v.  Washburn  (10  Pick.  374)  164,  165. 169 

Washington's  Estate  (75  Pa.  St.  102)  918 
Washington  v.  Black  (83  Cal.  290)    713,  1141 

v.  Blount  (8  Ired.  Eq.  253)  512,  582,  1254 

t>.  Emerv  (4  Jones  Eq.  32)  1165 

v.  L.  &'N.  R.  R.  (136  111.  49)  628 

v.  McCaughan  (34  Miss.  304)  1046 

v.  Sasser  (6  Ired.  Eq.  336)        1264,  1272 

Wass  v.  Bucknam  (38  Me.  356)  277 

Wassell  i\  Armstrong  (35  Ark.  247)  1146 

v.  Tunuah  (25  Ark.  101)  194 

Waterbnry  v.  Netherland  (6  Heisk.  512)  270 
Waterhouse  v.  Bourke  (14  La.  An.  358)  666 
Waterman  v.  Alden  (115  111.  83)  1232 

v.  Alden  (42  111.  App.  294)  1004 

v.  Ball  (64  How.  Pr.  368)        1202,  1208 

v.  Bigham  (2  Hill,  S.  C.  512)  549 

v.  Dockrav  (78  Me.  139)  743,  745 

v.  Dockrav  (79  Me.  149)  554 

v.  Hawkins  (63  Me.  156)  110,  1012 

Waters  v.  Collins  (3  Dem.  374)  986,  987 

v.  Crossen  (41  Iowa,  261)  1026 

v.  Cullen  (2  Bradf.  354)  502 

v.  Davis  (2  S.  W.  R.  695)  835 

v.  Engle  (53  Md.  179)  336 

v.  Howard  (1  Md.  Ch.  112)  1016 

Waters  v.  Margerum  (60  Pa.  St.  39)  722 

v.  Ogden  (2  Doug.  45)  785 

v.  Stickney  (12  Allen,  1)      497,  498,  571 

v.  Tazewell  (9  Md.  291 )  607,  982 

v.  Williams  (38  Ala.  680)  257 

Watherell  v.  Howells  (1  Camp.  227)  598 

Watkins  v.  Adams  (32  Miss.  333)        395,  440 

v.  Bevans  (6  Md.  489)  1158 

v.  Davis  (61  Tex.  414)  207 

v.  Donnellv  (88  Mo.  322)  339 

v.  Dorsett  (1  Bland  Ch.  530)  1039 

v.  Romine  (106  Ind.  378)  761,  1170 

v.  Snadon  (93  Kv.  501)  1000 

v.  Stewart  (78  Va.  Ill)  692,  708 

v.  Young  (31  Grat.  84)    1217,  1218,  1222 

Watriss  v.  Bank  (124  Mass.  571)  606 

Watrous  v.  Chalker  (7  Conn.  224)  816 

Watson's  Appeal  (6  Pa.  St.  505)  1158 

Appeal  (125  Pa.  St.  346)  1000 

Watson  t7.  Blaine  (12  Serg.  &  R.  131)        621 

v.  Bvrd  (53  Miss.  4S0)  433,  1246 

t>.  Child  (9  Rich.  Eq.  129)  886,  887 

v.  Glover  (77  Ala.  323)  571 

v.  His  Creditors  (58  Cal.  556)  198 

v.  Hutto  (27  Ala.  513)  326 

v.  Lyle  (4  Leigh,  236)  311 

v.  McClenahau  (13  Ala.  57)  1154 

■ v.  Martin  (75  Ala.  506)  723 

v.  Mercer  (8  Pet.  88)  202 

v.  Milward  (2  Lee,  332)  662 

v.  Murray  (54  Ark.  499)  1218 


1130 

516 

860 

268 

49 


Watson  v.  Parker  (6  Beav.  283)  782,  799 

v.  Pipes  (32  Miss.  451)  68 

v.  Prestwood  (79  Ala.  416)  714 

v.  Riskamire  (45  Iowa,  231)  609 

t7.  Rose  (51  Ala.  292)  857 

v.  Stone  (40  Ala.  451)  699 

v.  Turner  (89  Ala.  220)  498 

v.  Watson  (33  Beav.  574)  978 

v.  Watson  (10  Conn.  77)  1067 

17.  Watson  (13  Conn.  83)  276,  277 

v.  Watson  (58  Md.  442)  821 

v.  Watson  (110  Mo.  164)  902 

v.  Watson  (2  B.  Mon.  74)  43 

Watson  Soc.  v.  Johnson  (58  Me.  139)         944 
Watt  v.  Pitman  (125  Ind.  168)        1098,  1100 

r.  Watt  (37  Ala.  543) 

v.  Watt  (3  Ves.  244) 

17.  White  (46  Tex.  338) 

Watterson's  Appeal  (95  Pa.  St.  312) 
Watterson  v.  Watterson  (1  Head,  1) 
Wattles  17.  Hyde  (9  Conn.  10)  1035, 1036,  1144 

406 

855 

195,  206 

1271 

1121 

796,  859, 

860,  861 

76 

834,  837 

1005 

259 

700,  702, 

1083 

224 

354 

948 

1048,  1124 

206,  207 

901 

1226 

1008 

518 

243 

186 

439 

434 

175,  183 


Watts'  Estate  (158  Pa.  1) 

Watts,  Goods  of  (1  Sw.  &  Tr.  538) 

»7.  Gayle  (20  Ala.  817) 

v.  Leggett  (66  N.  C.  197) 

v.  Taylor  (80  Va.  627) 

v.  Watts  (38  Oh.  St.  480) 

Waughop  v.  Bartlett  (165  111.  124) 

Wax,  In  re  (106  Cal.  343) 
Way  v.  Harriman  (126  111.  132) 

-  v.  Priest  (13  Mo.  App.  555) 

r.  Way  (42  Conn.  52) 

Way  land  v.  Crank  (78  Va.  602) 

Wavmire  v.  Jetmore  (22  Oh.  St.  271) 
Wead  v.  Cantwell  (36  Hun,  528) 

17.  Gray  (78  Mo.  59) 

Weakly  v.  Gurley  (60  Ala.  399) 
Weatherford  v.  King  (119  Mo.  51) 

i;.  Tate  (2  Stiobh.  Eq.  27) 

Weatherhead  v.  Field  (26  Vt.  665) 
Weatherlv  v.  Kier  (38  N.  J.  Eq.  87) 
Weaver  v.  Chace  (5  R.  I.  356) 

v.  Gregg  (6  Oh.  547) 

».  Low  (29  Ind.  57) 

v.  Norwood  (59  Miss.  665) 

v.  Roth  (105  Pa.  St.  408) 

v.  Weaver  (109  (111.  225)  1/0,  i»a 

Webb's  Estate  (165  Pa.  St.  330)  652,  678,  761 
Webb  v.  Archibald  (128  Mo.  299)     '  890 

17.  Balard  (90  Ala.  357)  1068 

17.  Burlington  (28  Vt.  188)  1002 

i'.  Company  (161  Pa.  623)  621 

17.  Day  (2  Dem.  459)  65 

v.  De  Beauvoisin  (31  Beav.  573)        1104 

v.  Dietrich  (7  W.  &  S.  401)  579 

v.  Dve  (18  W.  Va.  376)  476 

v.  Fleming  (30  Ga.  808)  69,  70 

17.  Fuller  (85  Me.  443)  1-236 

f.  Gross  (79  Me.  224)  1119 

v.  Hitchins  (105  Pa.  St.  91)         896,  897 

(7.  Jones  (36  N.  J.  Eq.  163)  104, 108,  974 

!•.  Keller  (39  La.  An.  55)  1089 

v.  Kelly  (9  Sim.  469)  1008 

17.  Needham  (1  Add.  494)  521,  529 

v.  Russell  (3  T.  R.  393)  390 

v.  Simpson  (105  Ind.  327)  1200 

v.  Smith  (40  Ark.  17)  1074 

r.  Stillman  (23  Kan.  371)  1197 

v.  Townsend  (1  Pick.  21)  229 

clxiii  j 


TARLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Webb  v.  Webb  (7  T.  B.  Mon.  626)  489 

Webber  v.  Sullivan  (58  Iowa,  200)  36,  47,  48 

v.  Webber  (6  Me.  127)  595,  1267 

v.  Webber  (1  Sim.  &  St.  311)  !>'J6 

Weber  v.  Noth  (51  Iowa,  375)  866 

v.  Short  (55  Ala.  311)  200 

Webster  v.  Calden  (56  Me.  204)  595 

v.  Campbell  (1  Allen,  313)  238 

v.  Cooper  (14  How.  488)  960 

v.  Hale  (8  Ves.  410)  1005 

v.  Le  Compte  (67  Md.  249)  794 

v.  Lowell  (139  Mass.  172)  621 

v.  Merriam  (9  Conn.  225)  1244 

v.  Morris  (66  Wis.  366)       893,  902,  947, 

918,  922,  928,  932 

-=—  v.  Seattle  Co.  (7  Wash.  642)  351,  347, 


1240,  1244 

103 

421 

872,  896 

1195 

6,  920,  927 

434,  1272 


v.  Webster  (105  Mass.  538) 

v.  Webster  (10  Ves.  93) 

v.  Welton  (53  Conn.  183) 

v.  White  (8  So.  Dak.  479) 

v.  Wiggin  (19  R.  I.  73) 

v.  Willis  (56  Tex.  468) 

Wedekin  v.  Hallenberg  (88  Ky.  114)  943 

Wederstrand's   Succession   (19   La.   An. 

494)  1144 

Weed's  Estate  (32  N.  Y.  Supp.  777)        691  a 
Weed  v.  Edmonds  (4  Ind.  468)         1037,  1047 

v.  Lermond  (33  Me.  492)  1136 

v.  Weed  (25  Conn.  337)  336 

Weeks  v.  Cornwell  (104  N.  Y.  325)     868,  874 

v.  Gibbs  (9  Mass.  74)  386,  422 

v.  Gore  (3  P.  Wms.  184)  788 

v.  Hull  (19  Conn.  376)  807 

v.  Jewett  (45  N.  H.  540)  133,  518 

v.  Love  (19  Ala.  25)  751 

v.  McReth  (14  Ala.  474)  91 

v.  Patten  (18  Me.  42)  500 

v.  Sowles  (58  Vt.  696)  1248 

v.  Weeks  (5  Ired.  Eq.  Ill)  639 

Weems  v.  Bryan  (21  Ala.  302)  653,  655 

v.  Weems  (19  Md.  334)  41,  75 

Weer  v.  Gand  (88  111.  490)  1193 

Wehr  v.  Brooks  (21  111.  App.  115)  622 

Wehrle  v.  Wehrle  (39  Oh.  St.  365)  215,  1080, 

1089 
Weider  v.  Osborn  (20  Oreg.  307)  694 

Weigand's  Appeal  (28   Pa.  St.  471)  738 

Weimar  v.  Path  (43  N.  J.  L.  1)  719 

Weindel  v.  Weindel  (126  Mo.  640)  231 

Weir  v.  Chidester  (63  111.  453)  82 

v.  Fitzgerald  (2  Bradf.  42)      43,  52,  432 

v.  Humphries  (4  lied.  Eq.  264)  299 

v.  Mead  (101  Cal.  125)  552 

v.  Monahan  (67  Miss.  434)  548,  566,  749 


v.  Mosher  (19  Wis.  311) 

v.  People  (78  111.  192) 

v.  Smith  (62  Tex.  1) 

v.  Tate  (4  Ired.  Eq.  264) 

v.  Weir  (3  B.  Mon.  645) 

Weise  v.  Moore  (22  Mo.  App.  530) 
Wcisue's  Appeal  (39  Conn.  537) 
Welbora  v.  Coon  (57  Ind.  270) 

r.  Townsend  (31  S.  C.  408) 

Welch's  Surn-s^i,,ii  (36  La.  Aii.  702) 
Welch,  In  re  (86  Cal.  179) 

In  re  (106  Cal.  427) 

In  re  (110  Cal.  605) 

v.  Adams  (152  Mass.  74) 


734 

1228 

949 

699 


v.  Adams  (03  N.  II.  344) 

clxiT 


301 
1049 
828 
886 
433 
580 
401 
704 
375,  401, 
1005,  1007 
68 


*  Page 
Welch  v.  Anderson  (28  Mo.  293)  270 

v.  McGratli  (09  Iowa,  519)  1086 

Weld  v.  McClure  (9  Watts,  495)  748 

Weldv's  Appeal  (102  Pa.  St.  454)       737,  739 
Well's  Estate  (63  Vt.  116)  212 

Will  (5  Litt.  273)  498 

Wellborn  v.  Rogers  (24  Ga.  558)  1120 

Weller  v.  Weller  (28  Barb.  588)  233 

Welles's  Estate  (161  Pa.  218)  154,  375 

Welles  v.  Cowles  (4  Conn.  182)  646,  647 

Welling  v.  Welling  (3  Dem.  511)   1164,  1171, 

1176 
Wellington  v.  Apthorp  (145  Mass.  69)  58 

Wellman  v.  Lawrence  (15  Mass.  326)       1050, 

1053 
Wellmever's  Succession  (34  La.  An.  819)  196 
Wells,  In  re  (113   N.  Y.  396)  892,  936 

v.  Aver  (81  Vra.  341)     '  835 

v.  Child  (49  111.  465)  564 

v.  Doane  (3  Gray,  201)  922 

v.  Harper  (81  Ga.  194)  1056 

v.  Miller  (45  111.  33)  805 

v.  Miller  (45  111.  382)  362,  385 

v.  Mills  (22  Tex.  302)  1050 

v.  Robinson  (13  Cal.  133)  1166 

v.  Smith  (44  Miss.  296)  324,341,  342,  814 

v.  Stearns  (35  Hun,  323)  497 

v.  Thompson  (13  Ala.  793)  276 

v.  Treadwell  (28  Miss.  717)  611 

v.  Tucker  (3  Binn.  366)       119,  121,  122, 

125,  126 

v.  Wells  (6  Ind.  447)  25 

v.  Wells  (L.  R.  18  Eq.  504)  899 

v.  Wells  (35  Miss.  638)  360 

v.  Wells  (144  Mo.  198)  500 

v.  Wells  (4  T.  B.  Mon.  152)  93 

Welschr.  Belleville  Bank  (94  111.  191)873,999 
Welsh,  In  re  (1  Redf.  238)  49,  51,  484 

v.  Brown  (43  N.  J.  L.  37)  1005, 1006,  1007 

r.  Perkins  (8  Oh.  52)  1040 

o.  Welsh  (105  Mhss.  229)     631,  632,  858 

Weltv  v.  Weltv  (8  Md.  15)     '  473 

Wendell  r.  French  (19  N.  H.  205)  1145, 

1163,  1169 
Wenger's  Appeal  (143  Pa.  St.  615)  942 

Wentworth  v.  Read  (160  111.  139)  1098 

Wentz's  Appeal  (100  Pa.  St.  301)  1002 

Appeal  (126  Pa.  St.  541)  1233 

Werborn  v.  Kahn  (93  Ala.  201)  570,  631 

Weringer,  In  re  (100  Cal.  345)  762,  763 

Werkheiser  v.  Werkheiser  (0  Watts  &  S. 

184)  83 

Wernick  v.  McMurdo  (5  Rand.  51)      745,  750 
Wernse  v.  McPike  (70  Mo.  249)  825 

v.  McPike  (100  Mo.  470)      775,  806,  826 

Werts  v.  Spearman  (22  S.  C.  200)  632 

Wertz's  Appeal  (69  Pa.  St.  173)  1097 

West's  Appeal  (64  Pa.  St.  186)  305,  311 

West,  Matter  of  (40  Hun,  291)  576 

v.  Bank  of  Rutland  (19  Vt.  403)         859 

v.  Beck  (95  Iowa,  520)  1214,  1218,  1223, 

1225 
v.  Cochran  (104  Pa.  St.  482) 


v.  Fitz  (109  111.  425) 

i'.  Jones  (85  Va.  616) 

v.  McMullen  (112  Mo.  405) 

v.  Moore  (8  East,  339) 

v.  Moore  (37  Miss.  114) 

v.  Randle  (79  Ga.  28) 

v.  Rassman  (135  Ind.  279) 


330,  1033, 
1037 
718 
1221 
195,  200 
599 
953 
873 
903 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 

[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
West  v.  Shuttleworth  (2  M.  &  K.  684)       907 

v.  Smith  (8  How.  402)  1165,  1168 

v.  Thomburgh  (6  Blackf.  542)  340 

v.  Townsend  (12  Ind.  434)  1072 

v.  Waddill  (33  Ark.  575)  1085,  1086 

v.  West  (89  Ind.  529)  938 

v.  West  (75  Mo.  204)  1125 

v.  Willby  (3  Phillini.  374)  404 

v.  Williams  ;i5  Ark.  682)  154,  937 

v.  Wright  (98  Ind.  335)  ,  1056 

Westcott  v.  Cady  (5  John.  Ch.  334)  1001 

v.  Campbell  (11  R.  I.  378)  261 

v.  Sheppard  (51  N.  J.  Eq.  315)      46,  47 

v.  Westcott  (69  Vt.  234)  824 

Westerfield  v.  Kiminer  (82  Ind.  365)  242 

v.  Westerfield  (1  Bradf.  198)  1168 

Westerlo  v.  De  Witt  (36  N.  Y.  340)  119,  120. 

124 
Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  McGill  (57  Fed. 

K.  699)  628 

Westfall  v.  Duncan  (14  Oh.  St.  276)         1056 
Weston.  In  re  (91  N.  Y.  502)  710 

v.  Right  (17  Me.  287)  120 

v  Johnson  (48  Ind.  1)  977,  979 

v.  Murnan  (4  Ind.  271)  734,  736 

v.  Weston  (102  Mass.  514)  602 

v.  Weston  (125  Mass.  268)  638 

Westpheling  v.  Enright  (60  Mo.  279)        1201 
Wetherbee  v.  Chase  (57  Vt.  347)  1241 

Wethered  v.  Safe  D.  Co.  (79  Md.  153)      1006 
Wetherhead  v.  Baskerville  (11  How.  U.  S. 

329)  892 

Wetmore  v.  Parker  (52  N.  Y.  450)      469,  884 

v.  St.  Lukes  Hosp.  (56  Hun,  313)      987 

Wetter  v.  Haversham  (60  Ga.  193)       37,  147 

v.  Walker  (62  Ga.  142)  949 

Wetzell  v.  Waters  (18  Mo.  396)  397 

Weyer  v.  Watt  (48  Oh.  St.  545)       1255,  1258 
Weyman  v.  Murdock  (Harper,  125)  369 

v.  Thompson  (50  N.  J.  Eq.  8)  1180 

v.  Thompson  (52  N.  J.  Eq.  263)        1180 

Wharram  v.  Wharram  (3  Sw.  &  Tr.  301)  483 
Wharton  v.  Leggett  (80  N.  C   169)     196,  203 

v.  Marberry  (3  Sneed,  603)  822 

v.  Taylor  (88  N.  C.  230)  203 

Wheat  v.  Dingle  (32  S.  C.  473)  859,  861 

v.  Fuller  (82  Ala.  572)  530,  563 

Wheatland  v.  Dodge  (10  Met.  502)  897 

Wheatley  v.  Badger  (7  Pa.  St.  459)  504 

v.  Calhoun  (12  Leigh,  264)  235,  236 

v.  Lane  (1  Saund.  216)  618,  792,  796,  797 

685 

39 

831 

866 

93 

1246 

669,  1139 

1010 

154 

61 

1270 

337 

990,  1005 

820 

240 

237 

432 

932 

241 

734 


v.  Martin  (6  Leigh,  62) 

Wheeler  v.  Alderson  (3  Haerg.  574) 

v.  Arnold  (30  Mich.  304) 

v.  Barker  (51  Neb.  846) 

v.  Bent  (7  Pick.  61) 

v.  Bolton  (66  Cal.  83) 

v.  Bolton  (92  Cal.  159) 

v.  Brem  (33  Miss.  126) 

v.  Clutterbuck  (52  N.  Y.  67) 

v.  Durant  (3  Rich.  Eq.  352) 

r.  Flovd  (24  S.  C.  413) 

v.  Goffe  (24  Tex.  650) 

v.  Hatheway  (54  Mich.  547) 

v.  Joslin  (63  N.  H.  164) 

v.  Kirtland  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  534) 

v.  Morris  (2  Bosw.  524) 

v.  St.  J.  R.  R.  (31  Kan.  640) 

v.  Smith  (9  How.  55) 

v.  Smith  (55  Mich.  355) 

v.  Wheeler  (9  Cow.  34) 


Wheeler  v.  Wheeler  (134  III.  522)  469,  499 

v.  Wheeler  (1  R.  I.  364)  108 

v.  Wheeler  (47  Vt.  637)  1220,  1223,  1226 

Wheelhouse  v.  Bryant  (13  Iowa,  160)         866 
Wheelock  v.  American  Tract  Soc.  ^(109 

Mich.  141)  922,  925 

v.  Overshiner  (110  Mo.  100)  205 

v.  Pierce  (6  Cush.  288)  368 

Whelan  v.  Reillv  (3  W.  Va.  597)  905 

Whetstone  v.  Baker  (140  Ind.  213)  860 

Whetton,  In  re  (98  Cal.  203)     498,  500,  1149 

Whiddon  v.  Williams  (98  Ga.  310)  691,  792 

Whipple  v.  Eddv  (161  111.  114)  34 

Whistler  v.  Webster  (2  Ves.  Jr.  367)  500 

Whit  v.  Rav  (4  Ired.  L.  14)  432 

Whitaker  v.  Groover  (54  Ga.  174)  836 

v.  Sparkman  (30  Fla.  347)  863 

v.  Whitaker  (6  John.  112)  516 

v.  Whitaker  (12  Lea,  393)  746,  748 

Whitcomb,  in  re  (86  Cal.  265)  870 

v.  Cook  (38  Vt.  477)  623 

v.  Davenport  (63  Vt.  656)  807,  1198 

v.  Reid  (31  Miss.  567)  185 

v.  Rodman  (150  III.  116)  894 

White's  Estate  (53  Cal.  19)  547 

Estate  (163  Pa.  388)  952 

Succession  (2  La.  An.  964)  1196 

Will  (25  N.  J.  Eq.  501)  94 

Will  (121  N.  Y.  406;  34 

White,  ex  parte  (33  S.  C.  442)  1206 

Goods  of  (22  L.  Rep.  110)  85 

v.  Alexander  (73  N.  C.  444)  1157 

v.  Arndt  (1  Whart.  91)  606 

v.  Beaman  (96  N.  C.  122)  834 

v.  Bettis  (9  Heisk.  645)  610 

v.  Blake  (74  Me.  489)  336 

v.  Brown  (19  Conn.  577)  805 

v.  Bullock  (4  Abb.  Dec.  578)  1171 

v.  Bullock  (20  Barb.  91)  1171 

v.  Casten  (1  Jones  L.  193)  93 

v.  Christopherson  (9  La.  An.  232)     696, 

702 

v.  Clarke  (7  T.  B.  Mon.  640)  256 

v.  Cordwell  (L.  R.  20  Eq.  644)  1238 

v.  Corrico  (2  Met.  Kv.  232)  774 

v.  Curd  (86  Ky.  191)  212 

v.  Cutler  (17  Pick.  248)  229 

v.  Ditson  (140  Mass.  351)  1138 

v.  Driver  (1  Phillim.  84)  40 

V.  Fisk  (22  Conn.  31)  824,  930 

v.  Fitzgerald  (19  Wis.  480)  829 

v.  Frank  (91  Tex.  66)  1078 

v.  Hale  (2  Coldw.  77)  929 

v.  Henlv  (54  Mo.  592)  827 

v.  Howard  (38  Conn.  342)  912,  919 

V.  Howard  (46  N.  Y.  144)  727,  912 

v.  Iselin  (26  Minn.  487)  1087 

v.  Jovce  (158  U.  S.  128)  843,  1035 

v.  Judson  (2  Root,  301)  842 

v.  Kauffmann  (66  Md.  89)  1098 

v.  Keller  (68  Fed.  R.  796)  386,  914 

v.  Ledvard  (48  Mich.  264)  390 

v.  Lowe  (1  Redf.  376)  518,  520 

v.  Mann  (26  Me.  361)  414,  415,  445 

v.  Moore  (23  S.  C.  456)  1219 

v.  Palmer  (4  Mass.  147)  38 

t\  Plummer  (96  111.  394)  207 

v.  Pullev  (27  Fed.  R.  436)  643 

v.  Repton  (3  Curt.  818)  85 

v.  Riggs  (27  Me.  114)  342 

v.  Russell  (79  111.  155)  631 

clxv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
White  v.  Spaulding  (50  Mich.  22)  580 

o.  Spillers  (85  Ga.  555)  553 

v.  Stantield  (146  Mass.  424)  902 

t>.  Stoddard  (11  Grav,  258)  686 

V.  Storv  (43  Barb.  124)  811 

t'.  Swain  (3  Pick.  365)  1129,  1255 

v.  Tennant  (31  W.  Va.  790)  443 

v.  Thompson  (79  Me.  207)  757 

v.  White  (52  Conn.  518)  874 

v.  White  (3  Dana,  374)  1137 

v.  White  (4  Dev.  &  B.  401)         992,  994 

v.  White  (19  Oh.  St.  531)  154 

v.  White  (30  Vt.  338)  956 

».  White  (63  Vt.  577)  196,  201 

».  Willis  (7  Pick.  143)  229 

17.  Winchester  (6  Pick.  48)  974 

Whiteaker  v.  Belt  (25  Oreg.  490)  1075 

».  Vanschoiack  (5  Oreg.  113)  235 

Whitehall  v.  Squire  (Carth.  103)  424 

17.  Squire  (Holt,  45)  426 

Whitehead  v.  Cade  (1  How.  Miss.  95)        828 

v.  Gibbons  (10  N.  J.  Eq.  230)  1103 

v.  McBride  (73  Ga.  741)  176,  770 

Whitehurst  v.  Dey  (90  N.  C.  542)  846 

17.  Harker  (2  Ired.  Eq.  292)  639 

Whitelv  v.  Equitable  Soc.  (72  Wis.  170)    445 
Whiteman  v.  Swem  (71  Ind.  530)  171 

Whitenack  v.  Stryker  (2  N.  J.  Eq.  8)   27,  38, 

41 
Whiteside's  Appeal  (23  Pa.  St.  114)  444 

Whiteside  17.  Whiteside  (20  Pa.  St.  473)   344, 

1123 
Whitesides  17.  Barber  (24  S.  C.  373)  1023 

v.  Cannon  (23  Mo.  457)  817 

17.  Green  (64  N.  C.  307)  832 

Whitfield  v.  Hurst  (3  Ired.  Eq.  242)  28 

Whitford  17.  Panama  R.  Co.  (23  N.  Y. 

465)  630 

Whithed  v.  Mallorv  (4  Cush.  138)  244 

Whiting,  Matter  of  (150  N.  Y.  27)  691  a 

■».  Whiting  (64  Md.  157)  739,  740 

Whitlev  v.  Alexander  (73  N.  C.  444        1159 

v.  Stephenson  (38  Miss.  113)        177, 180 

Whitlock  v.  Whitlock  (1  Dem.  160)  1014 

Whitlow  17.  Echols  (78  Ala.  206)       1245,  1246 
Whitman  v.  Haywood  (77  Tex.  557)  498 

V.  Morev  (63  N.  H.  448)  48 

v.  Watson  (16  Me.  461)  1242 

Whitmire  v.  Wright  (22  S.  C.  446)     231,  232 
Whitmore  17.  Foose  (1  Denio,  159)  838 

v.  Johnson  (10  Humph.  610)      330,  1090 

17.  Oxborrow  (2  Y.  &  Coll.  13)  799 

v.  San  Francisco  Union  (50  Cal.  145)  861 

Whitnev,  Matter  of  (153  N.  Y.  259)       60,  64 

v.  Coapman  (39  Barb.  482) 

v.  Dodge  (105  Cal.  192) 

17.  Munro  (4  Edw.  Ch.  5) 

17.  Peddicord  (63  111.  249) 

17.  Pinney  (51  Minn.  146) 

17.  Porter"  (23  111.  445) 

v.  Twomblv  (136  Mass.  145) 

v.  Wheeler  (116  Mass.  490) 

17.  Whitney  (14  Mass.  88) 

Whiton  r.  Harmon  (54  Hun.  552) 
Wlutsmi  v.  Whitson  (58  N.  Y.  479) 
Whittakur  B.  Whittaker  (10  Lea.  93) 


739 

1238 

1123 

708 

1234 

1034 

44 

118 

647 

958 

1002 

371, 

1184 

—  17.  Wright  (35  Ark.  51 1 )  1144 

Whitted  .7.  Webb  (2  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  442)  1145 
Whim-more  v,  ('utter  (1  Gall.  429)  635 

17.  Russell  (80  Me.)  999 

clxvi 


*Paga 
Whittier  v.  Waterman  (75  Me.  409)  1000 

Whittle  17.  Samuels  (54  Ga.  548)  206 

Whittlesey  «.  Brohammer  (31  Mo.  98)     1261, 

1262 
Whitworth  17.  Oliver  (39  Ala.  286)  550,  584 
Whorton  17.  Moragne  (59  Ala.  641)  1124 

17.  Moragne  (62  Ala.  201)     329,  992,  993 

Whvte  i'.  Rose  (3  Q.  B.  493)  365 

Wicker  17.  Ray  (118  HI.  472)  878,  901 

Wickersham's  Appeal  (64  Pa.  St.  67)  1170 
Wickersbam  17.  Comerford  (96  Cal.  433)    175, 

213,  215 

17.  Comerford  (104  Cal.  494)  215 

17.  Johnston  (104  Cal.  407)  694 

Wick  ham  v.  Page  (49  Mo.  526)  748 

Wickwire  17.  Chapman  (15  Barb.  302)  527,  529 
Widger,  Goods  of  (3  Curt.  55)  531 

Widmaver  17.  Widmayer  (76  Hun,  251)  721 
Wiece  17.  Marbut  (55  Ga.  613)  220 

Wier  17.  Davis  (4  Ala.  442)  695 

Wiesmann  17.  Town  (83  Wis.  550)  1149 

Wiggin  v.  Buzzell  (58  N.  H.  329)  204 

—  17.  Perkins  (64  N.  H.  36)  873 

17.  Plumer  (31  N.  H.  251)  589 

17.  Superior  Court  (68  Cal.  398)  1130 

i'.  Swett  (6  Met.  194)  507,  638,  995, 

1151,  1194 
Wiggins  17.  Lovering  (16  Mass.  429)  841 

17.  Lovering  (9  Mo.  262)  842 

17.  Mertins  (111  Ala.  164)  174,  176 

Wightman  e.  Townroe  (1  M.  &  Sel.  412)  283 
Wigle  v.  Wigle  (6  Watts,  522)  125 

WTigley  17.  Beauchamp  (51  Mo.  544)  257 

Wikoff's  Appeal  (15  Pa.  St.  281)   65,  94, 101, 

113,  469 
Wilber's  Application  (52  Wis.  295)  268 

Wilber  w.  Wilber  (52  Wis.  298)  268 

Wilbourn  v.  Shell  (59  Miss.  205)  90,  481 

—  17.  W7ilbourn  (48  Miss.  38)  422 
Wilbraham  17.  Ludlow  (99  Mass.  587)  443 
Wilbur  17.  Gilmore  (21  Pick.  250)  618 
— -  v.  Hutto  (25  S.  C.  246)  548 

v.  Maxam  (133  Mass.  541)  354 

17.  Wilbur  (129  111.  392)  37 

Wilbv  17.  Phinney  (15  Mass.  Ill)  286 

Wilcke  17.  Wilcke  (102  Iowa,  173)  159 

Wilcox's  Appeal  (54  Conn.  320)  12(  8 

Wilcox  17.  Derickson  (168  Pa.  331)  283 

17.  Matteson  (53  Wis.  23)  121 

17.  Powers  (6  Mo.  145)  816 

17.  Randall  (7  Barb.  633)  233 

17.  Rootes  (1  Wash.  Va.  140)  105 

17.  Smith  (26  Barb.  316)    730,  1151,  1260 

i'.  State  (24  Tex.  544)  883 

r.  Wilcox  (13  Allen,  252)    290,  966,  989, 

1104 

17.  Wilcox  (48  Barb.  3"27)  823 

17.  Wilcox  (89  Iowa,  388)  206 

Wilcoxon  o.  Donellv  (90  N.  C.  245)  1243 

17.  Reese  (63  Md.  542)  395,  725 

Wild's  Case  (Co.  pt.  6,  *17)  897 

Wild  v.  Brewer  (2  Mass.  570)  110 

17.  Davenport    (48  N.  J.  L.  129)  282,  283 

Wildberger  i>.  Cheek  (94  Va.  517)  940 

Wilder  17.  Aldrich  (2  R.  I.  518)  639 

17.  Rannev  (95  N.  Y.  7)  728 

Wilderman  v.  Baltimore  (8  Md.  551)  925 

Wildridge  v.  Patterson  (15  Mass.  148)  576 
Wile  V.  Wright  (32  Iowa,  451)  782 

Wilev's  Appeal  (84  Pa.  St.  270)  340 

Wiley  17.  Brainerd  (11  Vt.  107)  576 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Wiley  v.  Gray  (36  Miss  510)  609 

v.  Gregory  (135  Ind.  647)  949 

v.  Morse  (30  Mo.  A  pp.  266)  830,  835 

v.  White  (3  Stew.  &  P.  355)  1050 

v.  Wiley  (63  N.  C.  182)  1040 

Wilkerson  v.  Alien  (67  Mo.  502)  1060 

v.  Gordon  (48  Ark.  360)  809 

v.  Wootten  (28  Ga.  568)  734 

Wilkes  v.  Cornelius  (21  Oreg.  341)  1201 

v.  Cornelius  (21  Greg.  348)  804,  811,  825 

Wilkev's  Appeal  (108  Pa.  St.  567)  524 

Wilkins  v.  Ellett  (9  Wall.  740)  364 

v.  Harris  (Winst.  Eq.  41)  570,  579 

17.  Walker  (115  Ala.  590)  194 

17   Wilkins  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  595)  1222 

Wilkinson  t\  Brandon  (92  Ala.  530)  255 

17.  Chew  (54  Ga.  602)  991 

17.  Conatv  (65  Mich.  614)  561 

17.  Leland  (2  Pet.  627)  467 

v.  Parish  (3  Pai.  653)  232 

17.  Stuart  (74  Ala.  198)  1244 

17.  Winne  (15  Minn.  159)  842 

Wilks  17.  Slaughter  (49  Ark.  235)  684 

Will  of .  For  cases  under  "  Will  of," 

see  the  names  of  the  parties. 
Willamette  Co.  v.  Gordon  (6  Or.  175)        502 
Willard's  Appeal  (65  Pa.  St.  265)  340 

Willard  v.  Van  Leeuwen  (56  Mich.  15)      861 

17.  Willard  (6  Baxt.  297)  224 

17.  Wood  (1  App.  D.  C.  44)  650 

Willeford  17.  Watson  (12  Heisk.  476)        1228 
Willet  17.  Sandford  (1  Ves.  Sr.  186)  910 

Willett's  Appeal  (50  Conn.  330)  496 

Willett  17.  Brown  (65  Mo.  138)  234 

17.  Malli  (65  Iowa,  675)  1029 

Willerts,  In  re  (112  N.  Y.  289)         1171,  1175 
William  &  Mary  College  y.  Powell  (12 

Grat.  372^  609 

William  Hill  Co.  17.  Lawler  (116  Cal.  359)  337, 

1230,  1235 
Williams's  Appeal  (7  Pa.  St.  259)      518,  530, 

535    571 

Appeal  (106  Pa.  St.  116)  '  612 

Williams'  Appeal  (122  Pa.  St.  472)  287 

Case  (18  Abb.  Pr.  350)  579 

Williams,  In  re  (92  Cal.  183)  1023 

In  re  (112  Cal.  521)  1005,  1007 

Williams'  Estate  (62  Mo.  App.  339)  1216 

Estate  (106  Mich.  490)  59 

Succession  (22  La.  An.  94)  580 

Succession  (26  La.  An.  207)  570 

Williams,  Ex  parte  (13  Rich.  77)  310 

Matter  of  (5  Dem.  292)  527 

Matter  of  (44  Hun,  67)  526,  527 

v.  Adams  (94  Ga.  270)  1153 

17.  American  Bank  (4  Met.  Mass.  317)  865 

v.  Avery  (38  Ala.  115)  609 

17.  Bank  (91  Tex.  651)  407 

«.  Belden  (1  Root,  464)  846 

17.  Benedict  (8  How.  107)  374,  863 

17.  Bradley  (7  Heisk.  54)  1080 

17.  Breedon  (1  Bos   &  Pul.  329)  617 

v.  Campbell  (46  Miss.  57)  699,  704 

v.  Childress  (25  Miss.  78)         1037,  1047 

17.  Claiborne  (7  Sm.  &  M.  488)  607 

17.  Conley  (20  111.  634)  681 

17.  Courtney  (77  Mo.  587)  244 

17.  Cowden  (13  Mo  212)  961 

v.  Cox  (3  Edw.  Ch.  178)  239 

17.  Crary  (8  Cow.  246)  982 

■ 17.  Cushing  (34  Me.  370)  1012 


•Page 
Williams  v.  Davies  (L.  R.  44  Ch.  D.  484)  905 

17.  Edwards  (94  Mo.  447)  830,  836 

17.  Elv  (13  Wis.  1)  595,  693 

17.  Ewing  (31  Ark.  229)  1272 

17.  Flippin  (68  Miss.  680)  547,  548 

17.  Goude  (1  Hagg.  577)  46 

17.  Guile  (117  N.  Y.  343)  120 

17.  Haddock  (145  N.  Y.  144)  593 

v.  Hale  (71  Ala.  83)  228 

17.  Heard  (140  U.  S.  520)  646 

17.  Herrick  (18  K.  I.  120)  352,  1153,  1249 

17.  Holden  (4  Wend.  223)  691 

17.  Holmes  (9  Md.  281)  1232 

17.  Hudson  (93  Mo.  524)  675 

17.  Hutchinson  (3  N.  Y.  312)  823 

17.  Johnson  (112  111.  61)  890 

17.  Jones  (14  Bush,  418)  494 

17.  Jones  (1  Russ.  Ch.  517)  937 

17.  Kimball  (35  Fla.  49)  153,  156 

17.  Lee  (47  Md.  321)  42 

v.  McDonald  (13  Tex.  322)  1077 

v.  McKinney  (34  Kan.  514)  873 

17.  Maitland  (1  Ired.  Eq.  92)  739 

17.  Marshall  (4  G.  &  J.  376)  702,  703 

i;.  Mason  (23  Ala.  488)  1070 

v.  Maull  (20  Ala.  721)  608 

17.  Mitchell  (112  Mo.  300)  330 

17.  Mobley  (38  Ga.  241)  1013 

17.  Moore  (9  Pick.  432)  366 

17.  Morehouse  (9  Conn.  470)  651,  653,  666 

17.  Neff  (52  Pa.  St.  326)  946 

17.  Neville  (108  N.  C.  559)     530,  533,  535 

17.  Nichol  (47  Ark.  254)  1099,  1100 

».  Pearson  (38  Ala.  299)  921,  923,  928,  932 

17.  Penn.  (12  Mo.  App.  393)  781,  850 

v.  Pennsvlvania  Railroad  (9  Phil.  298)  369 

17.  Perrin  (73  Ind.  57)  1061 

17.  Petticrew  (62  Mo.  460)  669, 1138, 1158, 

1188 

17.  Price  (11  Cal.  212)  1130 

17.  Price  (21  Ga.  507)  776 

17.  Purdy  (6  Pai.  166)  821 

17.  Ratcliff  (42  Miss.  145)  1043 

17.  Rhodes  (81  111.  571)  1084,  1087 

17.  Robinson  (63  Tex.  576)  326 

17.  Robinson  (42  Vt.  658)     37,  1203,  1208 

v.  Robson  (6  Oh.  St.  510)  249 

17.  Samuels  (90  Kv.  59)  209 

17.  Saunders  (5  Co"ld.  60)  77, 1193 

17.  Shelbv  (2  Or.  144)  553 

17.  Sims  "(8  Port.  579)  791 

17.  Sloan  (75  Va.  137)  640,  641 

17.  Spencer  (150  Mass.  346)  41 

v.  Stonestreet  (3  Rand.  559)       823,  1213 

17.  Storrs  (6  John.  Ch.  353)  364 

17.  Stratton  (10  Sm.  &  Sm.  418)  1043,1151 

17.  Tobias  (37  Ind.  345)  576 

17.  Verne  (68  Tex.  414)  555 

t7.  Vreeland  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  734)  895 

— -  17.  Wescott  (77  Iowa,  342)  241 

17.  Whedon  (109  N.  Y.  333)  284,  286 

17.  Wilkins  (2  Phill.  100)  529 

17.  Williams  (49  Ala.  439)  1030 

17.  Williams  (14  Pac.  R.,  Cal.  394)  352,  353 

17.  Williams  (2  Dev.  Eq.  69)  1039 

17.  Williams  (5  Gray,  24)  171 

17.  Williams  (125  Ind.  156)  1127 

17.  Williams  (15  Lea,  438)  822 

17.  Williams  (78  Me.  82)  259 

17.  Williams  (5  Md.  467)  375 

v.  Williams  ( 142  Mass.  515)  100 

clxvii 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Williams  v.  Williams  (43  Miss.  430)  1157 

v.  Williams  (79  N.  C.  417)  673 

v.  Williams  (85  N.  C.  313)  1088 

v.  Williams  (8  N.  Y.  525)  925 

v.  Williams  (55  Wis.  300)  704 

v.  Wilson  (4  Sandf.  Ch.  379)  292 

v.  Worthington  (49  Md.  572)  877 

Williamson's  Appeal  (94  Pa.  St.  231)  340,  344 

Estate  (153  Pa.  St.  521)  691  a 

Succession  (3  La.  An.  261)  439,517 

Williamson  v.  Authonv  (47  Mo.  299)  787,  821, 

822 

v.  Branch  Bank  (7  Ala.  906)         371,  693 

t>.  Fontain  (7  Baxt.  212)  290 

».  Furbush  (31  Ark.  539)  396 

v.  Gasque  (24  S.  C.  100)  262 

v.  Hill  (6  Port.  184)  1128 

v.  Howell  (4  Ala.  693)  866 

v.  McCrarv  (33  Ark.  470)  847 

v.  Mason  (23  Ala.  488)  1146 

v.  Norwitch  (Stv.  337)  426 

v.  Wilkins  (14  Ga.  416)  1160 

v.  Williamson  (18  B.  Mon.  329)  901 

v.  Williamson  (6  Paige,  298)    985,  1006, 

1007 

v.  Williamson  (3  Sm.  &  M.  715)       1046 

Willing  v.  Perot  (5  Rawle,  264)  374,  405,  753 
Willis  v.  Farlev  (24  Cal.  490)     810,  861,  1256 

v.  Ferguson  (59  Tex.  172)  1089 

v.  Foster  (65  Ga.  82)  1086 

v.  Jenkins  (30  Ga.  167)  897 

v.  Jones  (42  Md.  422)  518 

v.  Loan  (2  T.  B.  Mon.  141)  828 

v.  Marks  (29  Oreg.  493)  805 

v.  Roberts  (48  Me.  257)  639,  941 

v.  Sharp  (43  Hun,  434)  689 

v.  Sharp  (113  N.  Y.  586)  689 

v.  Sharp  (115  N.  Y.  390)  689,  690 

v.  Sharp  (124  N.  Y.  406)  690 

v.  Smith  (65  Tex.  656)  632 

v.  Smith  (66  Tex.  31)  732 

v.  Tozer  (44  S.  C.  1)  794 

v.  Watson  (5  111.  64)  888 

v.  Willis  (9  Ala.  330)  1153 

Willitts  v.  Schuyler  (3  Ind.  App.  118)  599,  834 
Willock's  Estate  (165  Pa.  St.  552)  '  1236 
Willoughbv  v.  McCluer  (2  Wend.  608)  669 
Wills  v.  Cowper  (2  Ohio,  312)  393 

v.  Dunn  (5  Grat.  384)  1189 

v.  Paulv  (116  Cal.  575)  1047 

v.  Wills  (85  Kv.  486)  951 

Willson  v.  Bergin  (28  N.  H.  96)  1049 

v.  Tvson  (61  Md.  575)  968,  988 

v.  Whitfield  (38  Ga.  269)  544 

Wilmarth  t;.  Reed  (83  Mich.  44)  714 

Wilmerding,  Estate  of  (117  Cal.  281)       691  a 

it  McKesson  (28  Hun,  184)  738 

v.  McKesson  (103  N.  Y.  329)  738 

Wilmington  v.  Sutton  (6  Iowa,  44)  183 

Wilson's  Appeal  (99  Pa.  St.  545)  47 

. Appeal  (115  Pa.  St.  95)  737,  738 

Estate  (2  Pa.  St.  325)  392 

Estate  (15  Phila.  528)  986 

Wilson,  In  re  (117  Cal.  262)       31,  35,  40,  46, 
48,  499,  500 

In  re  (103  N.  Y.  374)  76,  477 

[n  re  (8  Wis.  171)  92,94 

v.  Arric.k  (4  MacArthur,  228)  745 

v.  Arrick  (112  U.  S.  83)  745 

v.  Paptist  Soi-i.-tv  (10  Barb.  308)      1155 

• v.  Branch  (77  Va.  05)  258 

clxviii 


*  Page 
Wilson  v.  Brown  (21  Mo.  410)  1049,  1198 

v.  Bvnum  (92  N.  C.  717)  1024,  1143 

v.  Cochran  (31  Tex.  677)  181,  905 

v.  Cox  (49  Miss.  538)  268 

v.  Crook  (17  Ala.  59)  1022 

v.  Davis  (37  Ind.  141)         421,  423,  1265 

v.  Dibble  (16  Fla.  782)  397 

v.  Doster  (7  Ired.  Eq.  231)  693 

v.  Frazier  (2  Humph.  30)    439,  517,  570, 

571 

v.  Fridenburg  (19  Fla.  461)  202,  208 

v.  Fridenberg  (21  Fla.  386)  267 

v.  Fridenberg  (22  Fla.  114)  757 

v.  Fritts  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  59)  1240 

v.  Hastings  (66  Cal.  243)  1035 

v.  Hetterick  (2  Bradf.  427)  472 

v.  Hinton  (63  Ark.  145)  748,  1182 

v.  Holt  (83  Ala.  528)  1023 

v.  Hoss  (3  Humph.  142)  571 

v.  Hudson  (4  Harr.  168)       414,  415,  427 

v.  111.  Trust  Co.  (166  111.  386)  197 

v.  Imboden  (8  La.  An.  140)  566 

v.  Keeler  (2  Chip.  Vt.  10)  661 

v.  Kelly  (16  S.  C.  216)  1237,  1238 

v.  Kelly  (21  S.  C.  535)  1222 

v.  Knubley  (7  East,  128)  1261 

v.  Leishman  (12  Met.  316)  1122 

v.  Lineberger  (88  N.  C.  416)  077 

v.  Long  (12  S.  &  R.  58)  795 

v.  Mason  (158  111.  304)  724,  734,  757 

v.  McCartv  (55  Md.  277)  1129,  1131 

v.  McLena'trhan  (1  McMul.  Eq.  35)     255 

v.  Miller  (30  Md.  82)  1085 

v.  Miller  (1  Pat.  &  H.  353)       1214,  1240 

v.  Mitchell  (101  Pa.  St.  495)     43,  44,  52 

v.  Moran  (3  Bradf.  172)  49 

v.  Morris  (94  Tenn.  547)  171 

v.  Odell  (58  Mich.  553)  918 

v.  O'Leary  (L.  R.  12  Eq.  525 ;  aff 'd 

L.  R.  7  Ch.  App.  448)  970 

v.  Paul  (8  Sim.  03)  786 

v.  Perry  (29  W.  Ya.  169)     920,  928,  932 

v.  Piper  (77  Ind.  437)  1100 

v.  Proctor  (28  Minn.  13)  215,  217 

v.  Rine  (1  Harr.  &  J.  138)  990 

v.  Rose  (3  Cr.  C.  C.  371)  1140 

v.  Rousseau  (4  How.  U.  S.  646)  634 

Shearer  (9  Met.  504)         091,  759,  705 


v.  Slade  (2  Harr.  &  J.  281) 

v.  Soper  (13  B.  Mon.  411) 

v.  Staats  (33  N.  J.  Eq.  524) 

v.  Thompson  (20  Minn.  299) 

v.  Tootle  (55  Fed.  R.  211) 

v.  Turner  (104  111.  398) 

v.  White  (2  Dev.  Eq.  29) 

White  (133  Ind.  014) 


001 

285 

710 

1052 

300,  030 

944,  955 

1080 

091,  1002 

v.  White  (109  N.  Y.  59)  1030,  1031, 1080 


v.  Wilson  (145  Ind.  059)  271 

v.  Wilson  (1  Cr.  C.  C.  255)  785 

v.  Wilson  (3  Phillim.  543)  99 

v.  Wilson  (3  G.  &  J.  20)  1105 

v.  Wilson  (54  Mo.  213)  385,  426 

Wiltu.  Bird  (7  Blackf.  258)  794 

v.  Cutler  (38  Mich.  189)  494 

Wiltbank'H  Appeal  (64  Pa.  St.  250)  1004 
Wilton  v.  Eaton  (127  Mass.  174)  795 
Wiltsie  v.  Shaw  (100  N.  Y.  191)  1098 
Winborn  v.  King  (35  Miss.  157)  1127 
Windier  v.  Shrewsbury  (3  111.  283)  597 
Winchester  v.  Forster  (3  Cush.  300)  886,  890 
V.  Holmes  (138  Mass.  540)  265 


TABLE   OP   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


*  Page 
Windeatt  v.  Sharland  (L.  R.  2  P.  &  D. 

217)  531 

Windell  v.  Hudson  (102  Ind.  521)  3-39 

Windsor  v.  Bell  (01  Ga.  671)     513,  741,  1012, 

1014 
Wineland's  Appeal  (118  Pa.  St.  37)  64 

Winfield  v.  Burton  (79  N.  C.  388)  1271 

Winfrey  v.  Clarke  (107  Ala.  355)  421,  423 
Wing  v.  Angrave  (8  H.  L.  183)  446,  447 

v.  Merchant  (57  Me.  383)  124 

Wingate  v.  Pool  (25  111.  118)      648,  849,  1158 

v.  Wallis  (5  S.  &  M.  249)  342 

v.  Wheat  (6  La.  An.  238)  366 

v.  Wooten  (5  Sm.  &  M.  245)  574 

Wingerter  v.  Wingerter  (71  CaL  105)  1028 
Winkle  v.  Winkle  (8  Oreg.  193)  1123 

Winkler  v.  Winkler  (18  W.  Va.  455)  276,  277 
Winkley  v.  Kaime  (32  N.  H.  268)  894 

Winn's  Succession  (27  La.  An.  687)  576 

Winn  v.  Bamett  (31  Miss.  653)  632 

v.  Bob  (3  Leigh,  140)  489 

v.  Ingilby  (5  B.  &  Aid.  625)  602 

Winningham  v.  Crouch  (2  Swan,  170)        621 

v.  Holloway  (51  Ark.  385)  694,  809 

Winona  Bridge  Co.,  In  re  (51  Minn.  97)  1040 
Winship  v.  Bass  (12  Mass.  199)  578,  653 

Winslow  v.  Crowell  (32  Wis.  639)  1080 

v.  Cummings  (3  Cush.  358)  923 

v.  Donnelly  (119  Ind.  565)  498 

v.  Kimball  (25  Me.  493)  75 

v.  Leland  (128  111.  304)  356,  816 

Winsmith  v.  Winsmith  (15  S.  C.  611)  632 
Winston  i>.  McLendon  (43  Miss.  254)        1031 

v.  Street  (2  Pat.  &  Heath,  169)  1247 

v.  Young  (52  Minn.  1)  348,  757 

Winter  v.  London  (99  Ala.  263)  441 

v.  Winter  (Walker,  Miss.  211)    363,  369 

Winterhalter  v.  Workmen  (75  Cal.  245)  647 
Winters  v.  De  Turk  (133  Pa.  St.  359)  274 
Wintermute's  Will  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  447)  43 

Wiutermute  v.  Ridington  (1  Fisher,  239)    635 

»>.  Snvder  (3  N.  J.  Eq.  489)  901 

v.  Wilson  (28  N.  J.  Eq.  437)  43 

Winters  v.  Elliott  (1  Lea,  676)  1082 

Wintou's  Appeal  (111  Pa.  St.  387)  348 

Winton  v.  Eldridge  (3  Head,  361)  859 

Wippeler,  In  re,  (2  Dem.  626)  1000 

Wire  v.  Wyman  (93  Ind.  392)  1075 

Wirt  v.  Pintard  (40  La.  An.  233)  566 

Wisdom  v.  Buckner  (31  La.  An.  52)         1089 

i<.  Parker  (31  La.  An.  52)  329 

Wise  v.  Foote  (81  Kv.  10)  44,  46 

v.  Hogan  (77  Cal.  184)  826 

v.  O'Mallev  (60  Tex.  588)  344 

v.  Williams  (72  Cal.  544)  845 

v.  Williams  (88  Cal.  30)  802 

Wiseman  v.  Beckwith  (90  Ind.  185)  220 

v.  Parker  (73  Miss.  378)  199 

V.  Wiseman  (73  Ind.  112)  227 

Wiser  v.  Blachlv  (1  John.  Ch.  607)  554 

Wisham  v.  Lipp'incott  (9  N.  J.  Eq.  353)  287 
Wisner's  Estate  (20  Mich.  442)  1105 

Wisner  v.  Mablev  (70  Mich.  271)  1169 

v.  Mablev  (74  Mich.  143)  1169 

Wistar's  Appeal  (115  Pa.  St.  241)  1197 

Estate  (13  Phila.  242)  1230 

Wistar  v.  Scott  (105  Pa.  St.  200)  903 

Wiswall  v.  Hall  (3  Pai.  313)  246 

Wiswell  v.  Wiswell  (35  Minn.  371)  385,  794 
Withee  v.  Rowe  (45  Me.  571)  341 

Withers's  Appeal  (13  Pa.  St.  582)  1147 


*Page 
Withers'  Appeal  (14  S.  &  R.  185)  715 

Withers'  Succession  (45  La.  An.  556)  400 
Withers  v.  Baird  (7  Watts,  227)  252 

v.  Jenkins  (14  S.  C.  597)  276 

v.  Patterson  (27  Tex.  491)  1048 

Witherspoon  v.  Blewett  (47  Miss.  570)       832 

v.  Watts  (18  S.  C.  396)  273,  580 

Withinton,  In  re  (7  Mo.  App.  575)  1138 

v.  Withinton  (7  Mo.  589)  473 

Withrow  v.  De  Priest  (119  N.  C  541)  530 
Witman  r.  Lex  (17  Serg.  &  R.  88)  921 

v.  Norton  (6  Binn.  395)  1104 

Witt  v.  Elmore  (2  Bail.  595)  426 

v.  Gardiner  (158  111.  176)  68 

Witter  v.  Biscoe  (13  Ark.  422)  249 

v.  Mott  (2  Conn.  67)  113 

Witters  v.  Foster  (26  Fed.  Rep.  737)  626 

Witthaus  v.  Schack  (105  N.  Y.  332)   242,  248, 

253 
Wittmeier's  Estate  (118  Cal.  255)  1249 

Witz  v.  Dale  (129  Ind.  120)  1100 

Witzel  v.  Pierce  (22  Ga.  112)  566 

Woehrlin  v.  Schaffer  (17  Mo.  App.  442)  076 
Woelfel  v.  Evans  (74  Md.  346)  1231 

Woelpper's  Appeal  (126  Pa.  St.  562)  870,  951 
Woerther  v.  Miller  (13  Mo.  App.  567)  211 
Wohlien  v.  Speck  (18  Mo.  561)  1067 

Wolcott  v.  Hall  (2  Brown  Ch.  305)  1110 

Wolf  v.  Banks  (41  Ark.  104)  331,  1157 

v.  Beaird  (123  111.  585)  1155 

v.  Bolinger  (62  111.  368)  90 

v.  Ogden  (66  111.  224)  214,  1025 

v.  Railway  (55  Oh.  St.  517)         627,  628 

v.  Robinson  (20  Mo.  459)  1043 

v.  Wolf  (07  111.  55)  208 

Wolfe,  Estate  of  (137  N.  Y.  205)  691  a 

v.  Kable  (107  Ind.  565)  1218,  1224 

v.  Lynch  (2  Dem.  610)  348 

v.  Van  Nostrand  (2  N.  Y.  436)  949 

Wolfer  v.  Hemmer  (144  111.  554)  901,  948 
Wolfersberger  v.  Bucher  (10  S.  &  R.  10)  828 
Wolff  v.  Schaeffer  (74  Mo.  154)  547,  548 

v.  Schaffer  (4  Mo.  App.  367)        547,  866 

v.  Wohlien  (32  Mo.  124)  1049 

Wolffe  v.  Eberlein  (74  Ala.  99)  407 

•!?.  Loeb  (98  Ala.  426)  503,  882 

Wolfinger  v.  Forsman  (6  Pa.  St.  294)  559 

Wolfort  v.  Reilly  (133  Mo.  463)  1139 

Wollaston  v.  King  (L.  R.  8  Eq.  165)  1016 
Wolverton  v.  Van  Sychle  (57  N.  J.  L.  393)  831 
Womack's  Succession  (29  La.  An.  577)  699 
Womack  v.  Bovd  (31  Miss.  443)  183,  185 

v.  Womack  (2  La.  An.  339)  357 

Wombles  v.  Young  (62  Mo.  App.  115)  340 
Worm's  Estate  (80  Iowa,  750)  1155 

Wood's  Appeal  (92  Pa.  St.  379)  693,  734 

Estate  (1  Ashm.  314)  688,  761 

Estate  (36  Cal.  75)  880 

Wood,  In  re  (71  Mo.  623)  1128 

o.  Brown  (34  N.  Y.  337)  705, 739,  740,  804 

v.  Brvant  (68  Miss.  198)  715 

v.  By'ington  (2  Barb.  Ch.  337)  1038 

v.  Chetwood  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  311)  507 

v.  Cosbv  (76  Ala.  557)   384,  410,435,  994 

v.  Curran  (99  Cal.  137)  643 

v.  Gaynon  (Amb.  395)  605 

v.  Goodridge  (6  Cush.  117)  732 

v.  Hammond  (16  R.  I.  98)    113,  873,  914 

v.  Johnson  (13  111.  App.  548)   1193,  1198 

v.  Lee  (5  T.  B.  Mon.  50)  1153 

v.  McChesney  (40  Barb.  417)     330,  1089 

clxix 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 

[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 
•Page 


Wood  v.  Matthews  (53  Ala.  1)  502 

v.  Morgan  (56  Ala.  397)  261,  262 

v.  Myrick  (16  Minn.  494)  342 

v.  Myrick  (17  Minn.  408)  707 

v.  Paine  (66  Fed.  R.  807)  357 

v.  Roane  (35  La.  An.  865)  58,  81 

v.  Savage  (2  Doug.  Mich.  316)  610 

v.  Simmons  (20  Mo.  363)  641 

v.  Sparks  (1  D.  &  B.  389)     410,  513,  718 

v.  Stone  (39  N.  H.  572)  324,  345 

v.  Tallman  (1  N.  J.  L.  153)        341,  1140 

v.  Tomlin  (92  Tenn.  514)  749 

v.  Tunnicliff  (74  N.  Y.  38)  685,  811 

v.  Vandenburgh  (6  Pai.  277)        985,  987 

v.  Warden  (20  Oh.  518)  611 

v.  Washburn  (2  Pick.  24)  552 

r.  Weightman  (L.  R.  13  Eq.  434)       790 

v.  White  (32  Me.  340)  893 

v.  Williams  (61  Mo.  63)  548,  549 

v.  Wood  (63  Conn.  324)  905 

v.  Wood  (4  Pai.  299)  543,  545 

v.  Wood  (5  Pai.  596)  492 

Woodard  v.  Mich.  R.  R.  (10  Oh.  St.  121)   630 

v.  Woodard  (36  S.  C.  118)  1148 

Woodberry  v.  Matherson  (19  Fla.  778)  231 
Woodbridge  v.  Woodbridge  (70  Ga.  733)  185 
Woodburn's  Estate  (138  Pa.  St.  606)  269, 1003 
Woodburn  v.  Woodburn  (123  111.  608)  122 
Woodburv  v.  Hammond  (54  Me.  332)       1194 

v.  Obear  (7  Gray,  467)  35 

v.  Woodbury  (58  N.  H.  44)  161 

Wooden  v.  Cowles  (11  Conn.  292)  806 

v.  W.  R.  R.  (126  N.  Y.  10)  630 

Woodfill  v.  Patton  (76  Ind.  575)  89,  94 

Woodfin  v.  McNealy  (9  Fla.  256)  650 

Woodfolk  v.  Beatlv  (18  Ga.  520)  431 

Woodford  v.  Stephens  (51  Mo.  443)  612 

Woodgate  v.  Field  (2  Hare,  211)  799 

Woodhouse  v.  Phelps  (51  Conn.  521)  434 

Woodhull  v.  Longstreet  (18  N.  J.  L.  405)  233 
Woodin  v.  Baaley  (13  Wend.  453)  811 

Woodlief  v.  Bragg  (108  N.  C.  571)  812 

v.  Merritt  (9*6  N.  C.  226)  354 

Woodman  v.  Rowe  (56  N.  H.  453)  433 

Woodruff  v.  Lounsberry  (40  N.  J.  Eq. 
545)  708,  1159 

v.  Marsh  (63  Conn.  125)  920,  922 

v.  Migeon  (46  Conn.  236)  976 

v.  Pleasants  (81  Va.  37)  899 

v.  Schultz  (49  Iowa,  430)  359 

v.  Taylor  (20  Vt.  65)  500 

v.  Woodruff  (17  Abb.  Pr.  165)  1136 

V.  Woodruff  (3  Dem.  505)  345 

v.  Woodruff  (32  Ga.  358)  898 

Woods,  In  re  (94  Cal.  428)  404,  533 

v.  Drake  (135  Mo.  393)  111 

Woods  v.  Elliott  (49  Miss.  168)  841,  847 

v.  Elv  (7  So.  Dak.  471)  1267 

v.  Irwin  (163  Pa.  413)  1157 

v.  Legg  (91  Ala.  507)     648,  713,  714,  715 


v.  McCann  (3  Ala.  61) 
v.  Monroe  (17  Mich.  238) 

v.  Ridley  (27  Miss.  119) 

v.  State'dO  Mo.  698) 

v.  Woods  (2  Bav,  476) 

v.  Woods  (1  Met.  512) 

r.  Woods  (99  Tenn.  50) 


Woodward,  In  re  (53  Hun,  466) 

v.  Darcy  (1  Plowd.  184) 

v.  Howard  (13  Wis.  557) 

v.  James  (44  Hun,  95) 

v.  James  (115  N.  Y.  346) 

v.  Lincoln  (9  Allen,  239) 

v.  Woodward  (2  Rich.  Eq.  23) 

Woodworth's  Estate  (31  Cal.  595) 


853 

330,  1043, 

1046,  1089 

489,1155 

554 

223 

945 

841,  844,  845, 

846 

Woodson  v.  Pool  (19  Mo.  340)  609,  612 

Woodstock  v.  Fullenwider  (87  Ala.  584)  1080 
clxx 


•Page 

899 

786,  789 

863 

902 

902 

215,  346 

262 

968,  987, 

1105 


Woodworth,  Matter  of  (5  Dem.  156)  1233 

t;.  Hall  (1  Woodb.  &  Min.  248)  367 

v.  Sherman  (3  Story,  171)  634 

v.  Wilson  (50  N.  H.  220)  1200 

Woodv  v.  Brooks  (102  N.  C.  324)  1247 

Woodvard  v.  Threlkeld  (1  A.  K.  Marsh. 

10) "  397 

Wooldridge  v.  Watkins  (3  Bibb,  349)         724 

v.  Wilkins  (3  How.  Miss.  360)  290 

Woolfork  v.  Sullivan  (23  Ala.  548)     427,684 
Woolley  v.  Clark  (5  B.  &  Aid.  744)  384,  424, 

586 

v.  Gordon  (3  Phillim.  314)  407 

v.  Paxson  (46  Oh.  St.  307)  939 

v.  Pemberton  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  394)       1039 

v.  Preston  (82  Ky.  415)  956 

Wooley  v.  Price  (86  Md.  176)  551 

t>.  Schrader  (116  111.  29)  1016 

Woolridge  v.  Page  (1  Lea,  135)  1029 

Woolstone's  Appeal  (51  Pa.  St.  452)  609 

Woonsocket  v.  Ballou  (16  R.  I.  351)         1096 
Wooster  v.  Cooper  (53  N.  J.  Eq.  682)        949 

v.  Hunts  Co.  (38  Conn.  256)  254 

Wooten's  Estate  (56  Cal.  322)  531 

Worcester's  Estate  (60  Vt.  420)  214 

v.  Clark  (2  Grant,  84)  240 

v.  Worcester  (101  Mass.  128)  896 

Word  v.  Mitchell  (32  Ga.  623)  944 

v.  West  (38  Ark.  243)  844 

v.  Word  (90  Ala.  81)  284 

Worden  v.  Humeston  (72  Iowa,  201)  627 

Work  v.  Cowhick  (81  111.  317)  1082 

Workman  v.  Cannon  (5  Harr.  91)  878 

v.  Dominick  (3  Strobh.  589)  72 

Worley's  Succession  (40  La.  An.  622)        688 
Worlev,  Ex  parte  (49  S.  C.  41)  1246 

».  Taylor  (21  Oreg.  589)  1096 

Worman  v.  Teagarden  (2  Oh.  St.  380)       953 

Worsham  v.  Collison  (49  Mo.  206)  236 

Worth  v.  McAden  (1  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  199)  512, 

513,  739,  743 

v.  Worth  (95  N.  C.  239)  1099 

Worthev  v.  Johnson  (8  Ga.  236  1021 

Worthington,  Matter  of  (141  N.  Y.  9)       1160 

„.  Gittings  (56  Md.  542)  499 

Worthington  v.  Klemm  (144  Mass.  167)       60 

v.  McRoberts  (9  Ala.  297)  1078 

v.  Miller  (85  Ky.  320)  833 

Worthley  v.  Hammond  (13  Bush,  510)        808 
Worthy  v.  Lvon  (18  Ala.  784)  1184 

v."  Mcintosh  (90  N.  C.  536)  842 

Wortman  v.  Skinner  (12  N.  J.  Eq.  358)    735, 

1024 
Worton  v.  Ashley  (2  Sm.  &  M.  527)  1249 
Wotton,  Goods  of  (L.  R.  3  P.  &  D.  159)  62 
Wray  v.  Davenport  (79  Va.  19)  202 

Wright's  Appeal  (89  Pa.  St.  67)  879 

Wright  v.  Blakeslee  (101  U.  S.  174)        691  a 

v.  Campbell  (27  Ark.  637)  702 

r.  Charlev  (129  Ind.  257)  951 

v.  De  Groff  (14  Mich.  164)  1066 

v.  Denu  (10  Wheat.  204)  880,  1098 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Wright  v.  Dunham  (9  Pick.  37) 

v.  Dunning  (46  111.  271) 

v.  Edwards  (10  Oreg.  298) 


854 

204 

1021,  1035, 

1037,  1080 

882,  884 

359,  833 

806 

1112 

1112 

218,  262 

653,  654 

68 

933 

576,  1061 

439 


v.  Fultz  (138  Ind.  594) 

v.  Gilbert  (51  Md.  146) 

v.  Harris  (31  Iowa,  272) 

v.  Holbrook  (32  N.  Y.  587) 

v.  HolDrook  (2  Rob.  N".  Y.  516) 

v.  Jennings  (1  Bai.  L.  277) 

v.  Lang  (66  Ala.  389) 

v.  Lewis  (5  Rich.  212) 

v.  Linn  (9  Pa.  St.  433) 

v.  McNatt  (49  Tex.  425) 

v.  Mare  (50  Ala.  549) 

v.  Mongle  (10  Lea,  38)  566 

v.  Phillips  (56  Ala.  69)  375 

v.  Rogers  (L   R.  1  P.  &  D.  678)  71 

v.  Senn  (85  Mich.  191)  823 

v.  Smith  (19  Nev.  143)  433 

v.  Steed  (10  La.  An.  238)  1031 

v.  Thornton  (87  Tenn.  74)  589 

v.  Tinslev  (30  Mo.  389)  58 

v.  Watson  (96  Ala.  536)  599 

v.  West  (2  Lea,  78)  270,  271 

v.  Wilkerson  (41  Ala.  267)         348,  1163 

v.  Wright  (13  Allen,  207)  189 

v.  Wright  (59  Barb.  505)  609 

v.  Wright  (7  Bing.  457)  70 

v.  Wright  (2  Brev.  125)  795 

v.  Wright  (1  Cow.  598)  121 

v.  Wright  (5  Ind.  389)  71,  89,  90 

v.  Wright  (72  Ind.  149)  525 

v.  Wright  (Mart.  &  Y.  43)  434,  532 

v.  Wright  (99  Mich.  170)  59 

Wrigly  v.  Sykes  (2  Jur.  78)  716 

Wuesthoff  v.  Germania  Life  Ins.  Co.  (107 

N.  Y.  580) 
Wunderle  v.  Wunderle  (144  111.  40) 


Wurts  v.  Jenkins  (11  Barb.  546) 
Wurtz  v.  Hart  (13  Iowa,  515) 
Wurzell  v.  Beck  man  (52  Mich.  478) 
Wyatt  v.  Rambo  (29  Ala.  510) 

v.  Steele  (26  Ala.  639) 

v.  Williams  (43  N.  H.  102) 

Wyche's  Estate  (Mvr.  85) 
Wyche  v.  Clapp  (43  Tex   543) 
v.  Ross  (119  N.  C.  174) 


64 

22,  23, 

304 

1260 

859 

99,  490 

694 

328 

617 

522 

57 

679,  750 


Wvckoff  v.  Perrine  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  118)      973, 

980 

v.  Van  Siclen  (3  Dem.  75)        1116,  1139 

v.  Wyckoff  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  401)     475,  481 

v.  Wvckoff  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  113)  1097 

v.  Wyckoff  (49  N.  J.  Eq.  344)  1097 

Wyeth  v.  Stone  (144  Mass.  441)  141 

Wylie  v.  White  (10  Rich.  Eq.  294)  956 

Wyllv  v.  Gazan  (69  Ga.  506)  1053,  1064 

Wvnian's  Appeal  (13  N.  H.  18)  684 

Wvman  v.  Brigden  (4  Mass.  150)      967,  1025 

o.  Buckstaff  (24  Wis.  477)  336 

v.  Campbell  (6  Port.  219)  329,  1021 

v.  Fox  (59  Me.  100)  246 

v.  Halstead  (109  U.  S.  654)  364,  441, 650, 

651 

v.  Srmmes  (10  Allen,  153)  76,  477 

v.  Wyman  (26  N.  Y.  253)  647 

Wvndham"  v.  Chetwynd  (1  Burr.  414)  70 

—1-  v.  Way  (4  Taunt.  316)  598 

Wvnkoop  v.  Wvnkoop  (42  Pa.  St.  293)     591 
Wynn  v.  Booker  (26  Ga.  553)  826 


•Page 
Wynne  v.  Thomas  (Willes  R.  563)  335 

Wynns  v.  Alexander  (2  Dev.  &  B.  Eq. 

58)  696 

Wyse  v.  Smith  (4  G.  &  J.  295)  1040 

v.  Wvse  (155  N.  Y.  367)  41 

Wysong  v.  Nealis  (13  Ind.  App.  165)       1155 


Yancev  v.  Field  (85  Va.  756)  122 

Yandell  v.  Pugh  (53  Miss.  295)  1026 

Yankee  v.  Sweeney  (85  Ky.  55)  276 

Yarborough's  Succession  (16  La.  An.  258)812 
Yarborough  v.  Leggett  (14  Tex.  677)  685,  811 

v.  Ward  (34  Ark.  204)  643,  757 

Yard  v.  Murrev  (86  Pa.  St.  113)  944,  946 

Yard  ley  v.  Arnold  (Carr.  &  M.  434)  423 

v.  Cuthbertson  (108  Pa.  St.  395)     49,  50 

v.  Cuthbertson  (15  Phila.  77)  50 

v.  Raub  (5  Whart.  117)  611 

Yarnall's  Will  (4  Rawle,  46)  82 

Yarter  v.  Flagg  (143  Mass.  280)  626 

Yates  v.  Houston  (3  Tex.  433)  223 

v.  Paddock  (10  Wend.  528)  254 

Yawger  v.  Yawger  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  216)       1017 
Yeakle  v.  Priest  (61  Mo.  App.  47)  758 

Yeap  Cheah  v.  Ong  Cheng  Neo  (L.  R. 

6  P.  C.  381)  907 

Yearlev  v.  Cocke  (68  Md.  174)  1131 

v.  Long  (40  Oh.  St.  27)  1098,  1248 

Yeates  v.  Briggs  (95  111.  79)  201 

v.  Gill  (9  B.  Mon.  203)  899 

Yeatman  v.  Woods  (6  Yerg.  20)  290 

v.  Yeatman  (35  Neb.  422)  814,  816 

Yeaton  v.  Roberts  (28  N.  H.  459)        937,  950 
Yeaw  v.  Searle  (2  R.  I.  164)  581 

Yee  Yun's  Estate  (Mvr.  181)  533 

Yeldell  v.  Shinholster  (15  Ga.  189)  645 

Yelton  v.  R.  R.  (134  Ind.  414)  628,  684 

Yeo  v.  Mercereau  (18  N.  J.  L.  387)  236 

Yeomans  v.  Brown  (8  Met.  51)  631 

Yerbv  v.  Hill  (16  Tex.  377)  1059 

v.  Lvnch  (3  Grat.  460)  774 

v.  Matthews  (26  Ga.  549)  849 

v.  Yerby  (3  Call,  334)  106 

Yerger  v.  Ferguson  (55  Miss.  190)  1031 

Yerkes  r.  Broom  (10  La.  An.  94)  542 

Yertore  v.  Wiswall  (16  How.  Pr.  8)  628 

Yesler  v.  Hoclistettler  (4  Wash.  349)        1203 
Yingling  v.  Hesson  (16  Md.  112)  811 

Ynogoso's  Succession  (13  La.  An.  559)     1072 
Yoe  v.  Hanvev  (25  S   C.  94)  202 

v.  McCord  (74  111.  33)  44,  474 

Yoeman  v.  Younger  (84  Mo.  424)  326 

Yohe  v.  Barney  (1  Binn.  358)  1236 

Yonlev  v.  Lavender  (21  Wall.  276)  357 

York  v.  Walker  (12  M.  &  W.  591)  86 

v.  Welsh  (117  Pa.  St.  174)  240 

v.  York  (38  111.  522)  177 

Yorklv  v.  Stinson  (97  N .  C.  236)  269 

Yorks's  Appeal  (110  Pa.  St.  69)'  842 

Yost's  Estate  (134  Pa.  St.  426)  1008 

Yosti  v.  Lau^hran  (49  Mo.  594)  49 

Youndt  v.  Miller  (91  N.  C.  331)  ,    258 

v.  Youndt  (3  Grant  Cas.  140)        90,  481 

Young's  Appeal  (26  N.  W.  643)  823 

Appeal  (83  Pa.  St.  59)  904 

Appeal  (99  Pa.  St.  74)     739,  1130,  1131, 

1203 

Estate  (97  Iowa,  705)  706 

Settlement  (18  Beav.  199)  995 

Young,  In  re  (3  N.  B.  Reg.  440)  294 

clxxi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  star  or  side  pages.] 


Young,  Ex  parte  (8  Gill,  285) 

v.  Alexander  (16  Lea,  108) 

v.  Barner  (27  Grat.  96) 

v.  Boardman  (97  Mo.  181) 

v.  Brown  (75  Ga.  1) 

v.  Brown  (1  Hagg.  53) 

v.  Brush  (28  N.  Y.  667) 

v.  Cook  (30  Miss.  320) 

v.  Downey  (145  Mo.  250) 

v.  Gori  (13  Abb.  Pr.  13) 

v.  Hicks  (92  N.  Y.  235) 

v.  Holmes  (1  Stra.  70) 

r.  Hunter  (6  N.  Y.  203) 

v.  Jones  (9  Humph.  551) 

v.  Kennedy  (95  N.  C.  265) 


533,  1150 

1146 

42,  70,  476 

270,  271 

1124 

402 

1146 

1247 

1031 

611 

184 

991 

953 

611 

1151, 

1184 

747,  1182 

365,  650 

1142 


1146 


v.  Kimball  (8  Blackf.  167) 

v.  O'Neal  (3  Sneed,  55) 

v.  People  (35  111.  App.  363) 

v.  Kadford  (Hob.  3  b) 

v.  Ridenbaugh  (67  Mo.  574) 

v.  Scoville  (99  Iowa,  177) 

v.  Shumate  (3  Sneed,  369) 

v.  Suggs  (Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  393) 

v.  Thrasher  (115  Mo.  222) 

v.  Thrasher  (48  Mo.  App.  327) 

v.  Thrasher  (61  Mo.  App.  413) 

v.  Twigg  (27  Md.  620) 

v.  Wickliffe  (7  Dana,  447) 

».  Wittenmyre  (22  111.  App.  496) 

v.  Wittenmyre  (123  111.  303) 

v.  Young  (1  A.  K.  Marsh.  562) 

v.  Young  (45  N.  J.  L.  197) 

Youngblood  v.   Norton  (1  Strobh.   Eq. 
122) 


595 

44 

285 

348 

1231 
261,  290 

1140 
254 

1080 
702 
375 

1042 
271 
840 


1213 


Younger  v.  Duffie  (94  N.  Y.  535) 
Youngs  v.  Youngs  (45  N.  Y.  254) 
Youse  v.  Forman  (5  Bush,  337) 
Yundt's  Appeal  (13  Pa.  St.  575) 
Estate  (6  Pa.  St.  35) 


'Page 

64 

890 

90 

1222 

1153 


Zacharias  v.  Collis  (3  Phillim.  176) 
Zachary  v.  Chambers  (1  Oreg.  321) 
Zaegel  v.  Kuster  (51  Wis.  31) 
Zahrt,  Matter  of  (94  N.  Y.  605) 
Zavitz  v.  Preston  (96  Iowa,  52) 

v.  Eckert  (6  Pa.  St.  13) 

Zeigler  v.  Mize  (132  Ind.  403) 
Zei'le,  In  re  (74  Cal.  125) 
Zeisweiss  v.  James  (63  Pa.  St.  465) 
Zell's  Appeal  (126  Pa.  329) 
Zeller  v.  Jordan  (105  Cal.  143) 
Zeph,  In  re  (50  Hun,  523) 
Zerbe  v.  Zerbe  (84  Pa.  St.  147) 
Ziegler  v.  Grim  (6  Watts,  106) 
Zillmer  v.  Landguth  (94  Wis.  607) 
Zimmer  v.  Sennott  (134  111.  505) 
Zimmerman  v.  Anders  (6  W.  &  S.  218)    923, 

929 
Zimmermann  v.  Hafer  (81  Md.  347) 

v.  Kinkle  (108  N.  Y.  282) 

v.  Streeper  (75  Pa.  St.  147) 

v.  Zimmermann  (129  Pa.  St.  229) 

Zoellner  v.  Zoellner  (53  Mich.  620) 
Zumwalt  v.  Zumwalt  (3  Mo.  269) 
Zwerneman  v.  Van  Rosenberg  (76  Tex 

522) 
Zwick  v.  Johns  (89  Iowa,  550) 


50,51 

804,  809 
270 

267,  268 
901 

976,  981 
184 

970,  971 
908 
284 
120 
462 
880 
1244 
955 
1099 


884 
693 
121 
825 
203 
1193 


196 

206 


clxxii 


A    TREATISE 


AMERICAN  LAW  OF  ADMINISTRATION. 


INTRODUCTION. 

OF  THE  NATURE  OF    PROPERTY  AND  THE  PRINCIPLE 
DETERMINING   ITS   DEVOLUTION. 


CHAPTER   I. 

OF   PROPERTY   IN   GENERAL.1 


§  1.    The  Acquisition   of  Property.  —  My  property  is   that  which 
is  mine.     That  only  is  mine  which  I  acquire,  hold,  and  dispose  of  by 
my  will.     It  is  my  will  which  determines  the  acquisi-   Property  is 
tion  of  a  thing  by  me,  whether  originally,  by  reducing   ^Von't^ 

to  possession,  and  thus  making  my  property  that   owner. 
[*  2]  which  *  was  no  one's  property  before  ;  or  by  contract,  by  which 
a  thing  becomes  mine  through  the  concurrence  of  my  will  with 

1  The  definition  of  property  has  been 
attempted    upon    various    theories.      An 


able  writer,  Mr.  U.  M.  Rose,  has  pub- 
lished, in  the  "  Southern  Law  Review  " 
(N.  S.,  vol.  ii.  p.  1  et  seq),  a  series  of  arti- 
cles, entitled  "  Controversies  of  Modern 
Continental  Jurists,"  in  which  he  com- 
ments upon  the  most  celebrated  theories 
concerning  the  derivation  of  rights,  and 
dwells  with  approbation  upon  Kant's  Sys- 
tem, which  he  styles  the  Possibility  of 
Coexistence  (as  to  Kant's  definition  of 
property,  see  his  Rechtslehre,  published  in 
the  Philnsophische  Bibliothek,  vol.  xxix., 
Berlin,  1870),  and  Rosmini's  theory,  from 
whose  work  (Delhi  Natura  del  Diritto, 
Naples,  1837)  be  quotes  to  some  extent. 
VOL.    I.  —  1 


The  reader  wrill  notice  how  near  these 
views  approach  those  given  in  the  text, 
which  follow  the  exposition  of  Hegel 
in  his  Philosophic  des  Eechts,  §§  40-70. 
No  translation  into  the  English  tongue 
of  this  truly  exhaustive  and  masterly 
treatise  on  the  law  has,  as  yet,  it  is  be- 
lieved, appeared  ;  but  in  " The  Journal 
of  Speculative  Philosophy "  (vol.  iv.  p. 
155)  was  published  the  "Outlines  of  the 
Science  of  Rights,  Morals,  and  Religion," 
which  is  a  translation  of  Hegel's  Philoso- 
phische  Propddeutik,  enriched  by  explan- 
atory notes,  elucidating  Hegel's  terminol- 
ogy and  abstruse  reasoning,  and  which 
contains  a  full  synopsis  of  his  greater 
work. 


*  2,  *  3  NATURE   OP   PROPERTY.  §§  2,  3 

that  of  its  former  owner.  Since  I  cannot  rightfully  acquire  the  prop- 
erty of  another  without  his  consent,  —  that  is,  without  his  free  will, 
—  it  is  obvious  that  the  will  of  the  original  owner  is  a  necessary 
element  in  my  ownership,  and  in  the  ownership  of  any  one  who  may 
lawfully  acquire  it  after  me,  and  remains  operative  until  the  property 
has  lost  its  character  as  such  by  voluntary  abandonment.  By  ray 
own  free  will  I  may  abandon  my  property,  whereupon  it  ceases  to  be 
such,  and  relapses  into  the  condition  of  res  nullius,  —  subject  to 
become  property  by  the  sole  will  of  any  person  who  acquires  it. 

§  2.  Tenure  and  Use  of  Property ;  its  Loss  by  Non-user.  —  I 
hold  or  use  a  thing  which  is  mine,  at  will.  Matter  is  unfree, — i.  e. 
It  is  so  only  it  has  no  will,  it  does  not  belong  to  itself.  Neither 
ownei^wnifit  right  nor  duty  can  be  predicated  of  a  mere  thing ;  its 
to  be  so.  quality  is  to  offer  resistance  ;  it  is,  therefore,  negative  to 

my  will :  my  will,  in  realizing  itself,  overcomes  this  resistance  and 
subjects  the  thing  to  its  purposes,  —  changing  its  form,  destroying, 
consuming  it.  That  which  is  mine  is  thus  a  part  of  my  personality, 
of  me,  in  so  far  as  its  end  and  purpose  of  existence  is  the  satisfaction, 
the  realization  of  my  will,  and  to  serve  it  for  its  purposes  as  my 
bodily  limbs  serve  me.  Will,  then,  is  the  essence  of  property ;  with- 
out it  there  is  none.  Hence,  that  from  which  I  have  withdrawn  my 
will,  which  I  have  abandoned,  ceases  to  be  my  property,  and  becomes, 
as  we  have  seen,  res  nullius,  the  appropriation  of  which  by  another 
is  no  violation  of  my  right,  because  it  is  no  collision  with  my  will. 
If,  then,  I  wish  to  preserve  my  property,  or,  which  is  the  same  in 
effect,  my  right  to  it,  I  must  indicate,  in  some  way  perceptible  to 
others,  that  it  is  still  subject  to  my  will ;  otherwise  I  may  be  under- 
stood as  having  abandoned  it.  To  avoid  collisions  arising  out  of  a 
misinterpretation  of  my  relation  to  a  thing,  a  definite  period  is  fixed 
It  ceases  to  be  hy  custom  or  law,  within  which  my  will  is  presumed  to 
the  property  attach  to  it ;  if  I  permit  this  period  to  expire  without 
ceases  to  will  using  the  thing,  or  indicating  in  some  tangible  way  that 
it  to  be  his.  j^  continues  to  be  mine  (keeping  it  in  possession,  laying 
it  up,  or  in  some  way  exercising  ownership  over  it),  its  abandonment 
is  presumed,  and  my  right  to  it  is  lost  by  prescription,  my  ownership 
barred  by  limitation. 

*§  3.  Alienability  of  Property.  —  In  like  manner  I  may  relin-  [*  3J 
quish  my  property  to  another,  either  by  freely  giving  it,  or  ex- 
0     ...  ..  .        changing  it  for  other  property.     We  have  already  seen 

be  Borne  one's  that  property  acquired  from  another  can  become  such 
only  by  the  will  of  the  former  owner.  My  donee  as  well 
as  my  vendee  holds  the  property  given  or  sold  by  the  concurrence  of 
my  will  with  his  own  ;  it  must  be  my  will  that  the  donee  shall  take, 
and  his  that  he  will  receive,  the  thing  which  he  acquires  from  me  by 
gilt;  and  my  will  to  relinquish  and  that  the  vendee  shall  hold  the 
property  I  sell  or  barter,  and  his  to  relinquish  and  that  I  shall  hold 

2 


§  4  OPERATION   OP   OWNER'S   WILL   AFTER   DEATH.  *  3,  *  4 

the  property  I  get  in  exchange  therefor.  Property  so  relinquished 
does  not  cease  to  be  property  when  it  ceases  to  be  mine,  for  it  is  my 
will  that  my  donee  or  vendee  shall  hold  it.     The  aliena-    ...     ..     . 

J  Alienation  is 

tion  of  property  constitutes  one  of  the  forms  in  which  I  one  of  the  uses 
use  it,  in  which  it  serves  my  purposes,  and  in  which  I  erty  may  be0P" 
realize  my  will.  This  phase  or  quality  of  property  con-  p«t  by  its 
stitutes  the  sphere  of  contract.  Alienability  is  of  the 
essence  of  property ;  an  infringement  of  my  right  or  power  to  alien- 
ate my  property  is  therefore  a  limitation  upon  my  free  will,  and  to 
that  extent  a  violation  of  my  personal  liberty,  because  my  free  will 
finds  realization  in  property.  The  infraction  of  my  personal  freedom 
is  precisely  the  same  if  a  limitation  is  put  upon  my  power  to  alienate 
property  as  if  I  were  prevented  from  acquiring,  or  from  holding  or 
using  it.  The  limitation  would  in  either  case  deprive  me  of  my 
power  to  contract,  and  thus  destroy  my  liberty.1 

§  4.     Operation  of  the  Owner's  Will  after  his  Death. — Property, 
then,  is  the  realization  of  the  free  will  of  a  person,  the  external 
[*  4]*  sphere   of   his  freedom.      As   such,  it   partakes   of,  and    is 
clothed  with,  the  dignity  and  inviolability  of  the  person.     The 
things  which  constitute  property  can  have  no  rights,  for    The  ]aw  recog. 
they  have  no  will ;  and  will  alone,  or  the  person  in  which    nizes  in  prop- 
it  has  its  abode  and  vehicle,  can  be  the  subject  of  right    0r  right  of  its 
and  of  its  correlative,  duty.     The  law  recognizes  and   ow»er- 
deals  with  property  only  in  so  far  as  it  recognizes  and  deals  with  the 
will  of  the  owner,  realized  or  externalized  therein.     For  the  sphere 
of  the  law  is  the  Spiritual ;  it  operates  upon  and  through  the  will 
alone.2     Thus  the  law  recognizes  in  the  property  of  a  deceased  per- 
son his  free  will ;  that  is,  his  rational  will,  and  enforces  it.     The  fail- 

1  Intellectual  or  manual  skill,  sciences,  which  are  inalienable.  The  servant  or 
arts,  even  religious  functions  (sermons,  laborer  for  hire  realizes  his  will  by  ex- 
masses,  prayers,  etc.),  as  well  as  services  changing  his  services  or  productions  for 
to  be  rendered  for  another  at  or  for  a  his  wages,  and  thus  enters  into  a  lawful 
given  period,  are  all  included  in  the  contract ;  but  the  slave  gives  up  or  is  de- 
sphere  of  contract.  It  might  appear,  on  prived  of  his  free  will,  to  the  destruction 
a  superficial  view,  that  such  skill,  or  func-  of  his  personality,  which  can  neither  be 
tions,  or  services,  cannot  be  classed  as  relinquished  nor  acquired  as  property  by 
things,  and  do  not  therefore  constitute  another.  Hegel,  Philosophie  des  Eechts, 
property,  being  themselves  emanations  §§  43,  66,  67,  and  addenda. 
of  free  will,  and  qualities  or  attributes  of  2  The  will  is  free;  freedom  is  its  sub- 
the  mind.  But  it  is  within  the  province  stance  and  essential  quality,  in  like  man- 
of  my  mind  or  will  to  externalize  a  lim-  ner  as  the  substance  and  essential  quality 
ited  share  of  my  activity,  to  give  to  an-  of  matter  is  gravity.  Gravity  is  not  an 
other  an  interest  in  it,  and  thus  to  reduce  accidental  predicate  of  matter,  but  mat- 
it  to  the  condition  of  an  external  thing,  ter  itself;  so  with  freedom  and  will :  free- 
which  I  may  alienate  for  his  use; — not  doni  is  will.  Will  without  freedom  is  a 
the  whole  of  my  labor,  skill,  or  services,  word  void  of  meaning ;  freedom  exists 
—  the  totality  of  my  activity  or  produc-  only  as  will.  Hegel's  Philosophie  des 
tions,  —  for  that  would  be  to  alienate  my  Kechts,  §  4,  and  addendum. 
own  personality,  to  destroy  my  free  will, 


*4,  *5  NATURE   OF   PROPERTY.  §§  5,6 

ure  of  such  recognition  would  destroy  the  property,  which  can  be 
such  only  through  the  will  of  its  owner.  If  this  has  been  ade- 
quately expressed,  the  disposition  of  the  property  is  enforced  ac- 
cordingly ;  if  not,  the  law  itself  supplies  the  omission  by  imparting 
to  the  property  the  universal  will,  which  is  the  free  will  of  rational 
persons. 

§  5.  Distinction  between  Rational  and  Capricious  Will.  —  The 
distinction  between  truly  free  or  rational  will  and  caprice,  unfree  or 
But  cancels  irrational  will,  lies  in  the  content  which  the  will  gives 
mere  caprice,  itself,  or  the  object  which  it  pursues.  Universal  will 
(as  distinguished  from  personal,  individual,  or  subjective  will)  is  the 
will  as  embodied  in  the  law,  in  morality,  ethics,  religion.  Without 
universal  will  there  could  be  no  laws,  nor  anything  obligatory  upon  us 
all.  Each  one  would  act  according  to  his  own  caprice  or  pleasure, 
without  respecting  the  caprice  or  pleasure  of  others.  In  so  far,  then, 
as  the  will  of  the  individual  has  for  its  content  or  object  the  univer- 
sal will,  it  is  rational  and  free.1  Caprice,  arbitrary  or  limited  will, 
has  for  its  object  or  content  the  gratification  of  some  impulse  or 
appetite,  which  may  or  may  not  be  rational,  i.  e.  in  consonance  with 
the  universal  or  absolute  will.a  It  follows  that  the  law  can  re- 
cognize and  enforce  only  *  true  or  rational  will,  and  must  [*  5] 
ignore  and  cancel  that  which  is  capricious  and  arbitrary. 

§  6.    Relation  of  Property  to   the   Family.  —  The  ethical  relation 
between  the  sexes  demands  their  union  in  matrimony,  from  which 
.  .         the  family  results  as  a  spontaneous  natural  (social  union) 
family  to  society,  whose  members  are  united  by  the  bonds  of  mut- 

property.  uaj   affection,  implicit   trust,  and   voluntary   obedience 

(jpietas).  The  family  is  an  organic  totality,  whose  constituent  ele- 
ments have  their  true  existence  not  in  their  individuality,  but  in  their 
relation  to  each  other  through  the  totality,  lacking  independence 
when  separated  from  it;  they  have  no  separate  interests  to  seek,  but 
only  one  common  interest  for  the  whole.  Hence,  there  dwells  in  the 
family  but  one   will ;  namely,  that  of  the  head  of  the  family,  who 

1  "  The  absolute  will  has  only  itself  for  choice  lies  in  the  indeterminateness  of 
object,  while  the  relative  will  has  some-  the  Ego  and  the  determinateness  of  the 
thing  limited":  Hegel,  1'ropadeutik,  §  20  ;  content;  being  determined  (limited)  by 
Jour.  Sp.  Ph.,  vol.  iv.  p.  57.  See  also  this  content,  the  will  is  not  free — i.e. 
Hegel,  Encyelopadie,  §§  483-486.  has  not  itself  (universal  will)  for  its  con- 

2  Caprice  (arbitrariness)  is  formal,  but  tent.  Whether  the  content  (object)  of 
not  true  freedom.  Since  I  may  elect  to  the  capricious  will  be  rational  (conform- 
determine,  or  not  to  determine,  this  or  ing  to  the  universal  will)  or  not,  depends 
that,  I  possess  what  is  ordinarily  called  upon  Occident ;  my  dependence  upon  the 
freedom.  My  choice  consists  in  the  fac-  content  constitutes  the  inconsistency  of 
ulty  of  the  will  to  make  this  or  the  other  caprice.  Men  usually  believe  themselves 
thing  mine.  Being  a  particular  content,  free  when  allowed  to  act  arbitrarily,  but 
this  thing  is  not  adequate  to  me:  I  am  true  freedom  has  no  contingent  content ; 
not  identical  with  it;  lam  simply  the  po-  it  alone  is  not  contingent.  Hegel,  Phil, 
tentialitv  to  make    it   mine.      Hence,  the  d.  R.,  §  15;  Jour.  Sp.  Vh  ,  iv.  5G-58. 

4 


§  7  TESTAMENTARY   DISPOSITION   OF   PROPERTY.  *  5,  *  6 

represents  it  in  its  legal  relations  to  others.1  In  recognizing  the 
true  nature  and  validity  of  the  family,  the  law  accords  to  it  and  se- 
cures it  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  necessary  means  to  its  existence, 
property  ;  and  this  in  a  higher  sense  and  in  a  more  efficient  degree 
than  it  secures  the  property  of  individuals.  The  existence  of  the 
family  as  an  aggregate  person  requires  a  permanent  estate,  adequate 
not  only  to  the  capricious  purposes  and  desires  of  an  individual,  but 
to  the  common  collective  wants  of  all  its  members.2  In  this  estate  or 
property  no  one  member  of  the  family  has  an  exclusive  interest  or 
right  of  possession,  but  each  his  undivided  interest  in  the  common 
fund.3  Nevertheless,  the  property  is  usually  held  by  the  head  of  the 
family,  and  in  his  name.     It  devolves  chiefly  upon  him  to  provide 

for  it  the  means  of  subsistence  and  of  satisfying  their  various 
£*  6]  wants.    He  controls,  manages,  and  disposes  of  the  property  *or 

estate,  limited  in  his  absolute  dominion  over  it,  aside  from  his 
moral  obligations,  only  by  the  affirmative  provisions  of  the  law.  Upon 
the  dissolution  of  the  family  through  the  development  of  its  ethical 
purpose,  i.  e.  upon  the  attainment  of  majority  of  the  children,  —  who 
then  separate  from  it  as  persons  sui  juris,  capable  of  holding  prop- 
erty of  their  own  and  becoming  founders  of  new  families,  — their  in- 
terest in  the  family  estate  is  modified  accordingly;  the  authority  of 
the  father,  as  well  as  his  liability  to  support  such  children,  is  no 
longer  recognized  in  law,  but  becomes  of  ethical  or  moral  force 
only.4 

§  7.  Testamentary  Disposition  of  Property.  —  From  the  nature  of 
property,  in  its  relation  to  the  individual  as  well  as  to  the  family, 
springs  the  principle  of  its  devolution  upon  the  death  of  Testamentary 
the  owner.  The  power  to  dispose  of  property  by  last  KJStff^gB 
will  or  testament  results  strictly  from  its  essential  qual-  of  alienation. 
ity  of  alienability  by  the  owner,5  and  is,  like  gifts  or  contracts  inter 
vivos,  limited  only  by  the  policy  of  the  law.6     The  restraint  placed 

1  3  Jour.  Sp.  Phil.,  p.  167,  §  23.  tary  discrimination  between   his   natural 

2  Hence  the  provisions  in  the  statutes  heirs.  Unless,  however,  this  is  resorted 
of  the  several  States  securing  to  the  widow  to  in  a  very  limited  measure,  and  for  valid 
and  orphans  of  a  deceased  person  the  reasons  it  will  be  in  violation  of  the  logi- 
homestead,  year's  support,  etc.,  as  against  cal  and  ethical  basis  of  the  family.  Nor 
creditors  ;  the  homestead  acts,  liability  of  can  the  testatory  power  be  deduced  from 
a  father  for  the  support  and  education  of  the  arbitrary  will  of  the  testator  against 
his  minor  children,  the  wife's  right  to  the  substantial  rights  of  the  family  unless 
dower,  etc.  the  kinship  be    remote.     The    arbitrary 

a  Hegel,  Phil.  d.  R.,  §§  158,  170;  En-  power  of  the  father  to  disinherit  his  chil- 

cycl.,  §  520.  dren  is  one  of  the  immoral  provisions  of 

4  Hegel,  Phil.  d.  R.,  §  177.  the  Roman  laws,  according  to  which   he 

6  See  ante,  §  3.  might  also  kill  or  sell  his  son ;  and  the 

6  But,  from  the  standpoint  of  ethics  wife  (even  if  not  in  the  relation  of  a  slave 

and    morality,    the    unlimited    testatory  to  her  husband,  in  manum  conveniret,   in 

power  is  not  justifiable.     If  the  testator  mancipio  esset,  but  as   a  matron)   was   a 

die  after  his  children  have  reached  major-  member,  not  of  the  family  of  which  she 

ity,  there  may  be  some  ground  for  volun-  was  the  mother,  but  of  that  of  which  she 

5 


*  6,  *  7  NATURE   OF   PROPERTY.  §  g 

upon  a  testator  is  no  greater  than  that  which  exists  in  cases  of 
alienation  of  property  inter  vivos  ;  *  the  wife's  dower,  the  pro-  [*  7] 
visions,  clothing,  year's  support,  household  furniture,  etc.,  of 
Limited  oniv  wnicn  a  testator  cannot  deprive  his  family,  are  similarly 
by  the  rights  protected  against  creditors,  and,  in  many  cases,  against 
o  is  amiiy.  improvident  alienation  by  the  living  head  of  the  family. 
A  fruitful  source  of  litigation  is  found  in  the  capricious  and  arbitrary 
dispositions  often  made  in  wills,  to  the  grievance  and  unjust  depriva- 
tion of  heirs  at  law ;  and  the  readiness  with  which  juries  seize  upon 
slight  pretexts,  flimsy  proof  of  "undue  influence,"  etc.,  to  set  aside 
such  unjust  wills,  is  indicative  of  a  deep-seated  ethical  aversion  to- 
the  power  of  arbitrarily  diverting  the  natural  channel  of  the  devolu- 
tion of  property. 

§  8.  Succession  of  Property  at  Law.  —  Upon  the  natural  dis- 
solution of  the  family  by  the  death  of  the  parents,  or  more  particu- 
Hence  property  larly  of  the  husband  or  father,  the  property  of  the  family 
fam^vuVon ita  descends  to  the  heirs.  It  is  quite  apparent  that,  in  the- 
owner's  death,  case  of  a  family  in  the  most  restricted,  natural  sense 
(consisting  of  parents  and  children),  there  is  in  this  process  no  sub- 
stantial, but  only  a  formal  change  of  ownership  :  the  property  held 
by  them  in  common,  or  by  the  head  of  the  family  for  them,1  now 
passes  to  them  directly.  In  the  absence  of  a  testamentary  division,, 
the  property  vests  by  the  law  of  descent,  passing  from  the  husband 
and  father  to  the  wife  and  children,  that  being  the  natural,  substan- 
tial, and  rational  course  ;  such,  in  the  absence  of  a  contrary  disposi- 
tion, is  the  rational,  substantial  will  of  the  deceased  to  which  the  law 
gives  effect.  In  default  of  wife  and  children,  the  parents,  brothers- 
and  sisters,  or  other  more  distant  relatives,  constitute  the  heirs  ;  the- 
family  bond  is  looser  as  the  kinship  is  more  remote  and  the  relatives 
belong  to  other  families  of  their  own.  In  the  same  ratio  in  which, 
the  reason  demanding  the  heirship  between  members  of  the  same 
family  loses  force  with  the  remoteness  of  kinship,  the  propriety  and 

was  a   descendant,    inheriting   from    the  1  et  seq.)      Under  the  codes  of  Louisiana, 

latter,  and  the  latter  inheriting  from  her.  and  most  of  the  continental  countries  of 

Hegel,  Phil.  d.  R.,  §§  179,  180.  Europe,  the  right  to  disinherit  one's  own 

The  power  of  testamentary  disposition  children  is  allowed  only  for  certain  causes 

of  property  is  nowhere   so   unlimited  as  pointed  out  by  the   law,  which   are    re- 

under   the   modern    statutes  of   England  quired  to   he   recited   in  the  instrument, 

and  the  American  States.     The  common  the  truth  of  which  may  be  traversed  and 

law  of  England,  at  least  the  custom  in  the  will  set  aside  if  not  sustained  at  the 

particular  places,  did  not  allow  a  man  to  trial.     Blackstone   is  eloquent  in  the  ex-. 

dispose  of  the  whole  of  his  personal  es-  pression    of    his   disapprobation   of   "  the 

tate  by  will  unless  he  died  without  either  power  of  wantonly  disinheriting  the  heir 

wife  or  issue,   hut.  required  him  to  leave  by     will,    and     transferring    the    estate, 

one  third  to  his  wife  and  one  third  to  his  through  the  dotage  or  caprice  of  the  an- 

children,  if  he  left  both  wife  and  children ;  cestor,  from  those  of  Ids  blood  to  utter 

or  one  half  to  his  wife  or  children  if  he  left  strangers  "  :  2  P>la.  Comm.  373. 
cither.     (Seel  Perk.   Williams  on  Exec,  *  See  ante,  §  6. 

6 


§  9  THE   LAW   AS   THE   RATIONAL   WILL   OP   THE   OWNER.       *  7,  *  8 

justice  of  testamentary  disposition  of  property  becomes  more  ap- 
parent.1 The  disposition  of  property  in  anticipation  of  death 
[*  8]  *  {donatio  mortis  causa)  is  but  another  form  of  testamentary 
disposition.2 
§  9.  The  Law  as  the  Rational  Will  of  the  Owner.  —  It  is  self- 
evident  that  the  claims  of  creditors  of  a  deceased  person  constitute  a 
tkle  to  the  property  left  by  him  superior  to  that  of  heirs,  „,  . 
whether  testamentary  or  at  law.  A  debt  constitutes  compiishes 
property  of  the  creditor  remaining  in  the  possession  of  ^easecUnmself 
the  debtor,  which,  by  the  concurrent  will  of  both,  is,  at  would  have 
some  period  subsequent  to  the  creation  of  the  debt  (aris- 
ing out  of  an  express  or  implied  contract),  to  pass  into  the  possession 
of  the  creditor.  The  debtor,  then,  has  only  a  qualified  property  in 
the  thing  (usually  the  price  for  goods  sold  or  services  rendered) 
which  constitutes  the  debt ;  namely,  the  right  of  possession  for  a 
period  of  time  which  may  be  definite,  or  depend  upon  the  forbearance 
of  the  creditor.  The  substantial  property  —  the  right  to  the  thing, 
with  a  present  or  future  right  to  the  possession  also  —  is  already  in 
the  creditor ;  for  this  reason,  it  cannot  go  to  the  debtor's  heirs,  or  it 
goes  to  them  to  the  extent  only  in  which  he  had  an  interest  therein. 
To  secure  the  rights  of  creditors  in  the  estates  of  deceased  persons 
against  the  heirs  as  well  as  against  strangers,  and  to  secure  justice 
to  and  between  the  heirs  themselves,  —  in  other  words,  to  .enforce  the 
rational  will  of  the  decedent,  which  can  be  no  other  than  that  upon 
his  death  his  property  shall  pass  to  his  creditors  and  testamentary  or 
legal  heirs,  —  the  law  itself  performs  the  office  of  the  deceased 
owner,  substituting  for  or  supplying  as  his  will  its  own  universal 
will.3 


1  The  institution  of  primogeniture   is  generally   inhibited   by  the   constitutions 

deducible  from  the  political  necessity  of  or  statutes  of  the  several  States, 

the   State,  which   seeks    to    increase   its  2  See  post,  ch.  vii. 

stability  by  creating  a  class  of   persons  3  "  The  character  of  this  estate,  together 

independent  alike  of  the  favor  of  the  gov-  with  the  variety  of  individuals  who  may 

ernment  and  of  the  public  at  large,  and  be  interested  in  it,  as  creditors,  legatees, 

protected  even  against  their  own  impru-  or  distributees,  seems  to  demand  that  it 

dence  and  caprice  by  the  entail  of  their  es-  also  should    be    vested  by  law    in   some 

tates,  relieving  them  from  the  distracting  common  agent,  who  shall  preserve  it  from 

cares  of  obtaining  the  means  of  support,  waste,  and  dispose  of  it  to  those  entitled 

and  from  the  vicissitudes  of  fortune,  thus  to  receive  it   according  to  the  provisions 

enabling  them  to  devote  their  undivided  of   that    law    which    has    undertaken  to 

energies  to  the  service  of  the  State.     Pri-  provide   for  the   discharge  of  the  duties 

mogeniture    and  entail  are   violative  of  omitted  by  the   intestate.     The   creation 

the  true  principle  of  property,  destroying  of  this  agent  the  law  wisely  leaves  to  the 

both  its  alienability  and  natural  course  of  discretion  of  the  ancestor,  if   he  chooses 

descent ;    hence,   they    are   utterly    inde-  to  exercise  it :  he  may  make  his  own  will 

fensible  and  immoral,  where  no  political  instead  of  leaving  it   to  the  law  to  make 

necessity  exists  for  them.     (Hegel,  Phil.  d.  one  for  him,  and  he  may  appoint  his  own 

R.,  §§  306,   180.)     In   America  they  are  agent  or    executor   instead  of  confiding 

7 


*  9,  *  10  NATURE   OP   PROPERTY.  §  10 

*  From  this  theory  it  is  apparent  that  the  true  reason  of  the  [*  9] 
law  of  descent,  of  the  recognition  of  the  validity  of  testaments, 

and  of  the  authority  assumed  by  the  law  over  the  estates 
property  and  °^  deceased  persons,  is  to  be  found  in  the  necessity  of 
rights  of  the  restoring  the  essential  quality  of  property  which  has  lost 
mine 'the  the  will  element  by  the   death  of   the  owner.      Some 

course  of  text-writers    look   upon   the    property  left  by  deceased 

persons  as  res  nullius,  which  might  be  seized  and  ap- 
propriated by  the  first  comer  or  bystander,  and  hold  that  the  laws 
of  descent  and  of  distribution  are  simply  wise  and  necessary  precau- 
tionary measures  to  prevent  strife  and  violence  at  the  death-bed. 
That  such  is  the  effect  of  these  laws  is  evident  enough,  as  also  their 
wisdom  and  validity ;  but  to  place  the  reason  of  their  enactment  on 
this  ground  is  to  ignore  the  true  nature  of  the  family,  as  well  as  the 
true  nature  of  property.1 

§  10.  Administration  :  Functions  of  Executors  and  Administrators. 
—  The  purpose  of  the  law  in  this  respect  is  accomplished  in  a  simple 
The  devolution  an<^  efficient  manner  by  its  officers  or  ministers,  vested 
of  property  ac-   with  powers  and  duties  commensurate  with  the  exigen- 

complished  bv  , ,     .       .    .  ,.  rm  £    ,,     . 

executors  aud"  cies  requiring  their  intervention.  I  he  sum  of  their 
administrators,  activity  is  called  administration,  which,  in  its  narrowest 
legal  sense,  is  the  collection,  management,  and  distribution,  under 
legal  authority,  of  the  estate  of  an  intestate  by  an  officer  known  as 
administrator ;  or  of  the  estate  of  a  testator  having  no  competent 
executor,  by  an  administrator  with  the  will  annexed.  The  person 
charged  with  the  management  and  disposition  of  the  estate  of  a  testa- 
tor, is  an  executor,  and  his  office  is  called  executorship,  because  he 
executes  the  testator's  will,  but  his  official  acts  are  also  called 
administration.'1  The  functions  of  these  officers  are  in  many  re- 
spects similar  to  those  of  trustees  as  *  known  in  chancery.  Text-  [*  10] 
writers  find  it  convenient  to  subsume  them  under  the  same  class 

this  duty  to  the  probate  court  under  the  2  The   term  administration,  in  its  pri- 

authority  of  the  law.     If  the  ancestor,  by  mary    signification    and     general     sense 

will,  appoint  his  own  agent  or  executor,  equivalent  to  conduct,   management,  distri- 

he  thereby  becomes  vested  with  the  title  button,  etc.  (Webster),  is  also  applicable  to 

to  the  property  in   a  fiduciary  character,  the  management  of  the  estates  of  minors, 

But  if,    either    designedly   or   otherwise,  persons    of    unsound     mind,    drunkards, 

the   ancestor  die   without   executing  his  spendthrifts,    etc ,   by  officers    known  as 

power   of    testamentary    disposition,    the  guardians,  curators,  tutors,  committees,  etc- 

law,  as  in   case    of   real   estate,  assumes  Persons  who    are    incompetent    to    man- 

itself  the  duty  of  appointment,  and  vests  age  their  affairs  have  not  free  will,  with- 

tliis  title  and  authority  over  the  personal  out    which,    as    previously    set   forth   in 

estate  in  a  common  agent  for  the  parties  the  text,  there  can  be  no  property;  hence, 

in  interest,   who   is  called  an  administra-  as  in   the   case   of   deceased  persons,  the 

tor."  —  Harris,     J.,    delivering    the    dis-  law  vindicates  its    character  as  such    by 

senting   opinion    in    Evans   v.  Fisher,  40  supplying  it  with  the  content  of  its  own 

Mi.'-s.  f.-J'J,  679,  et  seq.,  citing  from  1  Tuck,  universal    will,  through    the   intervention 

Lect.,  pt  2,  pp.  .197,  398.  of  guardians,  etc. 
i  Hegel,  Phil.  d.  R.,  §  178. 
8 


§  11    COURTS  CONTROLLING  DEVOLUTION  OF  PROPERTY.  *  10,  *  11 

when  discussing  the  powers,  rights,  duties,  and  liabilities  of  trustees. 
But  there  is  an  obvious  and  essential  distinction  between  adminis- 
trators and  ordinary  trustees :  while  the  latter  derive  their  powers 
from  the  voluntary  creators  of  the  trust,  the  authority  of  the  former 
flows  directly  from  the  law  itself.  Their  functions  constitute  an 
essential  element  of  the  law,  and  are  exercised  with  entire  independ- 
ence of  the  personal  views,  desires,  and  intentions  of  the  parties 
concerned.  They  are  in  the  full  sense  officers  of  the  law,  and  of 
courts  organized  and  having  jurisdiction  for  the  especial  purpose  of 
aiding  and  controlling  them.1  They  are  clothed  with  authority  to  act 
in  all  matters  connected  with  the  disposition  of  the  decedent's  estate 
precisely  as  he  himself  would  rationally  have  done  ;  and  it  is  the 
office  of  these  courts  to  compel  such  action,  and  to  cancel  all  capri- 
cious, wilful  acts  inconsistent  with  justice  and  the  legal  rights  of 
creditors  and  distributees. 

§  11.    Functions  of  Courts  controlling  the  Devolution  of  Property. 
—  The  organization   of  courts   having   exclusive    jurisdiction    over 
matters  pertaining  to  the  administration  of  the  estates    controlled  by 
of  deceased  persons,  and  of  minors  and   persons   inca-  a  class  of 
pable  of  managing  their  affairs,  has  undoubtedly  proved    ize(t  for  this 
exceedingly  useful  and  convenient  to  the  public.     But    PurPose- 
while  to  this  circumstance  may  be  ascribed  their  historical  develop- 
ment and  the  modern  growth  and  increased  extent  of  their  jurisdic- 
tion, yet  the  true  distinction  between  them  and  the  courts  of  ordinary 
plenary  jurisdiction  is  not  found  in  their  usefulness  or  convenience, 
but  is  based  upon  the  more  profound  principle  underlying  their  origin, 
the  logical  diremption  of  the  functions  peculiar  to  the  two  classes  of 
courts,  which  a  brief  examination  of  these  functions   will  readily 
disclose.2 

The  division  of  the  powers  of  government  into  their  constituent 
elements  results,  in  all  modern  free  states,  in  the  three  co-ordinate 
departments,  confided  to  separate  magistracies,  known  as  the  legisla- 
tive, judicial,  and  executive.  It  is  sufficient  for  the  present  purpose 
to  bear  in  mind  that  it  is  the  office  of  the  judiciary  to  interpret  and 
apply  the  law  established  by  the  legislative  branch  to  cases  arising 
out  of  collision,  whether  actual  or  imaginary,  with  the  law,  leaving  it 
to  the  executive  branch  to  carry  out  the  judgments  of  the 
[*  11]  courts.  Thus  the  judge  is  seen  to  act  as  the  *  organ  or  mouth- 
piece of  the  law,  announcing,  in  each  case  brought  to  his 
official  cognizance,  whether  the  alleged  collision  between  the  will  of 
an  individual,  as  objectified  in  an  outward  act  (for  will  which  is 
undetermined,  not  become  external  by  accomplishment  of  its  purpose, 

1  That  administrators  are  officers  of  the  property  of  minors  and  persons  of 
the  court  see :  Kaugh  v.  Weis,  138  Ind.  unsound  mind  are  discussed  in  Woerner 
42,  45  ;  Byers  v.  McAuley,  149  U.  S.  608.  on  Guardianship,  §§  1-3. 

2  The  functions  of  courts  in  respect  of 


*  11  NATURE   OF   PROPERTY.  §   11 

is  beyond  the  realm  of  the  law,  which  deals  only  with  the  actual1),  is 
real  or  imaginary.  In  the  exercise  of  this  function,  the  judge,  with 
a  directness  peculiar  to  this  branch  of  sovereign  power,  accomplishes 
the  great  office  and  end  of  the  state  and  of  all  government,  the  accom- 
plishment of  justice,  the  realization  of  will :  securing  to  the  rational 
will  of  the  individual  its  legitimate  fruition,  and  holding  the  irra- 
tional, capricious,  or  negative  will  to  its  own  logical  result  (reparation 
and  punishment  for  wrong  and  crime). 

But  we  have  seen  that  all  property  subject  to  administration  is 
deficient  in  that  element  which  alone  can  be  the  basis  of  a  collision 
between  the  individual  will  and  the  law ;  it  is  the  province  of  the 
court  having  jurisdiction  over  executors  and  administrators  to  supply 
the  individual  will  lacking  in  property,  to  fill  the  vacuum  created  by 
the  death  of  the  owner  with  the  content  of  the  universal  will ;  that 
is,  to  secure  the  disposition  of  property  under  administration  as  the 
owner,  acting  rationally,  would  have  disposed  of  it  if  living.  The 
functions  involved  in  this  office 2  have  a  ministerial  element  super- 
added to  their  judicial  quality,  which,  if  they  occurred  in  ordinary 
courts  of  law  or  equity,  would  require  the  intervention  of  adjuncts  — 
commissioners,  auditors,  referees,  etc.  —  involving,  aside  from  the 
question  of  inconvenience,  delay,  and  cost,  an  incongruity  in  the 
duties  of  the  office.3 

Such  being  the  logical  basis  and  scope  of  courts  having  control 
of  executors  and  administrators,  their  historical  development  in  Eng- 
land, but  more  particularly  in  the  United  States,  has  been  a  gradual 
but  steady  separation  from  the  common  law  and  chancery  courts,  and 
has  resulted  in  a  practical  recognition  of  probate  jurisdiction  as  a 
distinct  and  independent  branch  of  the  law,  destined  to  achieve  for 
itself  a  sphere  sui  generis,  based  upon  and  determined  by  its  own 
inherent  principles. 

1  Hegel,  Phil.  d.  R.,  §§  113,  13.  ing  inventories,  settlements,  reports,  etc., 

2  Such  as  the  appointment  of  admin-  fixing  the  dividends  to  be  paid  to  credi- 
istrators,  granting  probate  of  wills  in  non-  tors,    decreeing    payment     of     legacies, 
contentious  cases,   qualifying    executors,  ordering  distribution  of  the  residue,  etc. 
fixing  the  amount  and  passing  upon  the  3  Jurisdiction     of     Probate     Courts: 
sufficiency  of  bonds  and  sureties,  receiv-  South.  L.  R.  (N.  S.),  vol.  iii.  pp.  254-267. 


JO 


I  12  MOVABLE   AND   IMMOVABLE   PROPERTY.  *  12,  *  13 


[*12]  *  CHAPTER   II. 

OF   THE   DISTINCTION    BETWEEN   REAL   AND    PERSONAL   PROPERTY. 

§  12.    Distinction  between  Movable  and  Immovable,   or  Real  and 
Personal  Property. —  All  property,  of   whatever  kind  or  division,  is 
necessarily  determined,  in  its  devolution  upon  the  death   All  property 
•of  the  owner,  by  the  same  immanent  law  or  principle.    cording3tothe 
There  is  no  inherent  difference  in  this  respect  between   owner's  will. 
corporeal  and  incorporeal,  or  between  movable  and  immovable  prop- 
erty ;  all  alike  passes  according  to  the  will  of  the  deceased  owner, 
whether  expressed  by  himself  or  presumed  by  the  law.    But  real  and 
But  the  difference  existing  between  movable  and  immov-   personal  prop- 
able  property,  with  respect  to  the  feasibility  of  its  actual    under  different 
transfer  or  delivery  from  person  to  person,  and   from    rules- 
place  to  place,  gives  rise  to  important  distinctions  to  be  observed, 
both  as  regards  the  formalities  necessary  to  constitute  a  valid  testa- 
mentary disposition,  and  as  to  the  code  of  law  which  may  govern  the 
descent.     It  will  appear,  from  the  consideration  of  the  subject  here- 
after,1 that  immovable  property  must  be  determined  by  the  law  of 
the  place  where  it  is  situated ;  but  that  movables  generally  descend 
according  to  the  law  of  the  owner's  last  domicil. 

The  most  important  classification  of  property,  giving  rise  to  far- 
reaching  and  radical  distinctions  at  the  common  law  and  in  most  of 
the  States,  is  its  division  into  real  and  personal,2  corresponding  sub- 
stantially, but  not  precisely,  to  immovable  and  movable  property,  or 
to  lands  and  tenements  on  the  one  side,  and  goods  and  chattels  on 
the  other.  The  importance  of  this  division  grows  out  of,  or  is  at 
least  enhanced  by,  the  introduction  of  the  feudal  system    The  distinc- 

into  England  after  the  Conquest,  which  put  an  ^"feudal"* 
[*  13]  end  to  all  absolute  ownership  in  land,  and  *  thus    system. 

did  violence  to  the  principle  upon  which  property  rests.  The 
feudal  system  has  so  thoroughly  permeated  the  common  law,  and  so 
thoroughly  given  it  form  and  color,  that  neither  this  nor  the  statu- 
tory systems  of  England  or  America  can  be  understood  without  a 

1  Post,  §  168.  because  it  is   directed   against  the  thing 

2  The  terms  "  real "  and  "  personal "  itself,  —  the  real  thing  ;  that  for  goods  and 
seem  to  owe  their  origin  to  the  nature  of  chattels  is  personal,  because  the  proceed- 
the  remedies  applicable  for  the  depriva-  ing  is  against  the  person  only  :  Rap.  &  L. 
tion  of  either   of  these  classes  of  prop-  Law  D.,  1066. 

erty :  the  action  for  land  is  a  real  action, 

11 


*  13,  *  14        REAL  AND  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.        §§  13,  14 

knowledge  of,  and  continual  reference  to,  the  feudal  principles.  A 
brief  outline  of  the  origin  and  history  of  the  tenure  by  which  land 
was  and  now  is  held  in  England  must  therefore  precede  the  further 
consideration  of  the  subject. 

§  13.  Origin  of  the  Tenure  of  Real  Estate  at  Common  Law.  —  The 
peculiarity  of  the  feudal  system  consists  in  the  division  of  the  owner- 
Tenure  of  ship  :  under  it  the  property  in,  as  well  as  dominion  over, 
thedfeudaier  a^  lands  i11  England  was  originally  in  the  king,  who 
system.  granted  out  their  use  on  condition  of  certain  services  to 
be  performed.  This  holding,  or  tenure,  was  not  limited  to  the  first 
or  paramount  lord  and  his  vassals,  but  extended  to  all  to  whom  such 
vassals  parted  out  their  feuds  to  their  own  vassals,  thus  becoming 
mesne  lords  between  the  latter  and  the  lord  paramount.1  It  became 
a  fundamental  maxim  and  necessary  principle  (though  in  reality, 
says  Blackstone,  a  mere  fiction)  "  that  the  king  is  the  universal  lord 
and  original  proprietor  of  all  the  lands  in  the  kingdom ;  and  that 
no  man  doth  or  can  possess  any  part  of  it,  but  what  has  mediately 
or  immediately  been  derived  as  a  gift  from  him,  to  be  held  upon 
feudal  services."2  Gratuitous  as  were  these  feuds  at  their  first 
introduction,  so  they  were  precarious,  depending  upon  the  will  of  the 
lord,  who  was  the  sole  judge  whether  his  vassal  performed  his  ser- 
vices faithfully.  Then  they  became  certain  for  one  or  more  years, 
and  later  they  began  to  be  granted  for  the  life  of  the  feudatory; 
until  in  process  of  time  it  became  unusual,  and  was  therefore  thought 
hard,  to  reject  the  heir,  if  capable  of  performing  the  services.  The 
heir,  when  admitted  to  the  feud  of  his  ancestor,  used  to  pay  a  fine 
for  the  renewal,  which  continued  to  be  exacted  upon  the  death  of  the 
tenant  even  after  feuds  became  absolutely  hereditary.3 

The  ancient  English  tenures  are  described  by  Bracton  (in  the  time 
of  Henry  III.)  as  of  four  kinds,  which  he  calls  knight  service,  free 
socage,  pure  villenage,  and  villein  socage,  all  of  them  being  upon 
condition  of  services,  duties,  and  burdens  more  or  less  *  op-  [*  14] 
pressive ; 4  but  they  were  swept  away,  in  the  course  of  time, 
with  all  their  heavy  appendages,6  and  all  tenures  in  general  (except 
frank-almoign,  grand  serjeanty,  and  copyhold)  reduced  to  one  general 
species  of  tenure  called  free  and  common  socage,  by  which  all  free- 
hold lands  in  England  are  held  to  this  day.6 

§  14.    Substantial   Abrogation   of    the   Feudal    Tenure    by   English 

1  1  Washh.  on  Real  Property,  bk.  1,  Charta  itself ;  since  that  only  pruned  the 
ch.  2,  pi.  11.  luxuriances  that   had  grown  out  of   the 

2  2  Bla.  Comm.  51.  military  tenures,  and   thereby   preserved 
8  2  Bla.  Comm.  54  et  seq.  them  in  vigor ;  but  the  statute   of  King 

4  2  Bla.  Comm.  61  et  seq.  Charles  extirpated  the  whole  and  demol- 

5  By  stat.  12  Car.  II.  c.  24,  pi.  1,  2;  ished  both  root  and  branches":  2  Bla, 
"  a  statute,"    says    Blackstone,    "  which     Comm.  77. 

was  a  greater  acquisition  to  the  civil  prop-        6  l  Washb.  on  R.  P.,  bk.  1,  ch.  2,  pi. 
erty  of  this  kingdom  than  even  Magna     42;  2  Bla.  Comm.  79. 
12 


§  15  THE  DEVOLUTION  OF  REAL  AND  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.  *  14,  *15 

Statutes.  —  It  is  readily  seen  that  the  tenure  of  the  feudatory,  under 
the  strictly  feudal  principle,  was  not  property  in  the  Tenure  of 
true  sense  ;  for  we  have  seen  that  an  essential  attribute  j^ n e n » i" ' d e r 
of  property  is  its  alienability,1  and  the  feudal  tenant  statutes, 
could  neither  convey  his  right  to  another  during  his  lifetime,  nor 
transmit  it  to  heirs  or  devisees  after  his  death.  The  tenure  was 
enlarged  in  the  course  of  time ;  the  power  to  alienate,2  to  transmit, 
first  by  descent,  and  finally  by  devise,8  was  accorded  to  the  tenant,  so 
that  at  the  present  time  there  is  but  little  practical  difference  between 
the  absolute  ownership  enjoyed  by  the  American  landholder  and  the 
tenure  by  free  and  common  socage  now  prevalent  in  England.4  But 
this  enlargement  of  the  tenant's  rights  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  the 
fruit  of  the  logical  development  of  the  feudal  tenure ;  it  is  rather  a 
departure  from  it,  an  abandonment  of  its  principles,  imperatively 
demanded  by  the  change  in  the  relations  between  the  lord  and  the 
vassal,  —  a  change  which  in  the  course  of  time  has  swept  away  every 
condition  supporting  the  feudal  system.  In  so  far  as  lands  are  now 
recognized,  in  England,  as  property,  whose  owners  enjoy  all  the 
rights  and  consequences  involved  in  absolute  ownership,  the  feudal 
tenure  has  been  abolished  in  reality,  though  the  name  and  the  forms 

which  it  entailed  upon  the  common  law  have  survived. 
[*  15]       *  §  15.  The  Devolution  of  Real  Property  to  the  Heir  or  De- 
visee, and  of  Personal  Property  to  the  Administrator  or  Ex- 
ecutor.—  The  common  law  of  England  took  form  and  growth  under 
the  influences  of  the  feudal  system  in  its  original  vigor  :  feudal  prin- 
ciples constitute  one  of  its  essential  features,  and  determine  wholly 
its  policy  in  respect  of  real  estate.     Whatever  rights  of  ownership 
are  now  enjoyed  by  English  landholders  have  been  granted  by  acts 
of  Parliament,  in  derogation  of  the  common  law  as  well  as  in  conflict 
with  feudal  principles.5     Since  at  common  law  no  English  subject 
could  hold  land  allodially,  or  in  absolute  ownership,  but 
held  it  upon  condition  of  rendering  services  and  duties    conditioned1 9 
(some  of  them  being  military,  hence  excluding  from  a   uPon  service 

.  of  the  vassal " 

genuine  feud  all  infants,  women,  and  professed  monks, 

as  incapable  of  bearing  arms),  and  under  purely  voluntary  grant  (dedi 

et  concessi),  from  the  feudal  lord,  it  follows  that  feudal       .  ,.  . ,   , 
''  '  not  liable  for 

grants  could  not  be  taken  for  the  debts  of  the  tenant,    the  tenant's 

either  before  or  after  his  death,  nor  devolve  by  succes-   debts ' 

sion  upon  his  heir  or  devisee.     Nor  had  the  personal  representative 

1  Ante,  §§  3,  7.  c.  1,  removed   all   restrictions    upon  the 

2  In  the  year  1285,  by  the  statute  of     alienation  of  the  lands  of  freemen. 

13  Edw.  I.,   called  the   Statute  of  Mer-         3  By  statute  of  32  Henry  VIII.  c.  1, 

chants,  it   was   provided   that   the  goods  followed    by  the   explanatory   statute  of 

and  lands  of  the  debtor  shall  be  delivered  34  &  35  Henry  VIII.  c.  5. 
to  the  creditor,  if  the  debt  be  not  dis-  *  2  Bla.  Comm.  78,  79. 
charged;  and  in  1290  the  statute  known  6  Ante,  §  14. 

as  "Quia  emptoris  terrarum,"  18  Edw.  I. 

13 


*  15,  *  16  REAL   AND   PERSONAL   PROPERTY.  §  15 

..       of  a  deceased  feudal  tenant  the  slightest  claim  to  or  in- 

and  reverted  i-it 

to  the  lord  on  terest  in  the  tee  held  by  the  decedent,  for  the  fee  re- 
tenant's  death.  verfce(j  ^o  the  lord ;  neither  creditors  nor  next  of  kin 
were  entitled  thereto,  and  if  it  passed  to  the  heir  it  was  not  by  de- 
„  .        ,  scent  or  in  right  of  the  ancestor,  but  by  a  renewed  grant 

by  renewed  from  the  lord.1  Feuds  became  hereditary,  and  the  un- 
conditional descent  of  lands  from  the  ancestor  to  the 
Statute  abol-  neir  was  secured  by  a  statute  which  abolished  the  court 
ishing  feudal  0f  wards  and  liveries,  of  wardships,  liveries,  primer 
seisins,  ousterlemains,  values  and  forfeitures  of  marriage, 
fines  for  alienation,  and  tenures  by  homage,  knight  service,  and  escu- 
confirmed  title  age-2  This  statute  operated  as  a  confirmation  of  title  in 
of  the  heir,  the  \ie[V}  \yn^  creditors  were  not  allowed  to  subject  lands 
claim  to  in  the  hands  of  heirs  to  the  satisfaction  of  their  claims 

creditors.  against  the  ancestor ;  consequently  executors  and  admin- 

istrators, whose  principal  function  it  is  to  pay  creditors  out  of  the 
estate  left  by  decedents,  had  no  interest  in  or  duties  with  reference 
to  such  lands.  The  law  subsequently  gave  recognition 
jectfnfHand"  t°  the  rights  of  creditors  in  a  series  of  statutes,  culmi- 
to  payment        nating  in  3  &  4  William  IV.  c.  104,  which  makes 

*  real  estate  of  a  deceased  person  liable  for  simple  [*  16] 
contract  debts,  as  well  as  for  specialties.  Thus,  by  a  number 
of  statutes,  the  tenure  of  English  landholders  was  made  equal,  in 
every  practical  respect,  to  absolute  ownership,  investing  the  tenant 
with  all  the  rights,  and  subjecting  him  to  all  the  duties,  of  allodial 
owners ;  while  the  common  law,  in  its  forms  of  procedure,  in  the 
nature  of  the  remedies  and  defences  accorded  to  litigants,  and  in  the 
principles  governing  its  technical  construction,  is  feudal  in  its  theory. 
This  dual  nature  of  the  English  law  sometimes  produces  antag- 
onism between  its  content  and  its  form,  and  thus  violates  in  its 
provisions  the  strict  requirements  of  logic;  a  notable 
p^ocfucedby  instance  of  which  may  be  found  in  the  rule  that  the 
the  statutory  legal  ownership  of  personal  property  descends  to  the 
executor  or  administrator,  but  that  of  real  property  to 
the  devisee  or  heir.  The  rule  arose  out  of  the  feudal  tenure  of  lands, 
which  could  not,  as  above  shown,  go  to  the  personal  representative, 
because  neither  the  creditors  nor  the  heirs  had  any  right  thereto. 
The  gradual  conversion  of  this  tenure  into  an  ownership  possessing 
all  the  essential  qualities  of  property  except  the  name  removed  the 
foundation  and  reason  of  the  rule ;  but  the  rule  remained,  —  a  form 
void  of  essence,  a  body  from  which  the  soul  has  fled. 

It  is  very  important,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  scope  and 

meaning  of  the  numerous  rules,  statutory  enactments,  and  judicial 

decisions  bearing  upon   the  distinction  between  real  and  personal 

property,  to  keep  continually  in  mind  that  they  are  traceable  to  a 

1  Ante,  §  13.  2  Stat.  12  Car.  II.  c.  24. 

14 


§  16  INCONGRUITY   OP   THE   RULE   IN    AMERICA.  *  16,  *  17 

condition  of  things  no  longer  existing  in  England,  and  which  never 
had  existence  in  America. 

§  16.    Incongruity  of  the  Rule  in  America.  —  The  common-law  dis- 
tinction between  real  and  personal  property  is  still  recognized  in 
most  of  the  American  States,  and  with  it  the  doctrine    Mischief  pro- 
t  at  real  property  descends  to  the  devisee  or  heir,  and   duced  by  the 

,     L       r        ^  ,  ,      .    .    ,  recognition  of 

personal    property    to    the    executor   or    administrator,    the  common- 
This  doctrine  was  received  along  with  the  common  law    law  rule- 
of  which  it  forms  a  part.     Its  incongruity,  more  conspicuous  in  a 
country  in  which  feudalism  had  never  obtained  foothold,  together 
with  the  attempts  made  in  many  of  the  States  to  abolish  or  modify 
the    rule    as   inconsistent    with   the    true   theory   of    property,    has 

produced  much  confusion  and  inconsistency  in  the  decisions 
[*  17]  of  the  courts  of  the  several  States  touching  the  law  of  *  real 

estate  of  deceased  persons.  The  common  law,  as  well  as 
the  statutes  of  England  enacted  before  the  settlement  of  the  Col- 
onies, is  not  only  the  basis  upon  which  the  new  States  built  up 
their  own  systems,  but  was  enacted  as  law  in  almost  every  State,1 
introducing,  save  as  against  affirmative  legislative  modification,  the 
feudal  principles  which  it  embodies.  These  principles  are  so  inter- 
woven with  common-law  jurisprudence  that  to  remove  them  would 
destroy  the  whole  texture.2  It  seems  to  be  so  difficult,  indeed,  en- 
tirely to  eliminate  from  our  codes  those  rules  and  doctrines  which 
constitute  an  essential  element  of  the  common  law,  but  which  grew 
out  of  conditions  utterly  different  from  our  own,  that  but  few  legis- 
latures have  undertaken  the  task  of  building  up  a  purely  American 
system ;  and  what  efforts  are  made  by  legislatures  in  this  direction 
are  often  thwarted  by  the  conservative  spirit  of  lawyers  and  judges, 
in  construing  American  statutes  from  the  standpoint  of  the  common 
law.  In  some  of  the  States,  however,  the  distinction  between  per- 
sonal and  real  property,  as  affecting  the  course  of  its  descent,  has 
been  entirely  abolished,3  and  in  most  of  them  the  common-law  rule 
more  or  less  modified.  These  attempts  to  adapt  the  common  law  to 
the  condition  of  things  in  America,  in  which  the  legislative  and  judi- 
cial authorities  of  each  State  proceed  according  to  their  own  views  of 
the  policy  demanded  for  the  interest  of  its  citizens,  either  retaining 
the  common  law,  or  modifying  it  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  or  cut- 
ting loose  from  it  entirely,  have  resulted  in  a  bewildering  laby- 
rinth of  conflicting  decisions,  not  only  among  the  several  States,  but 
in  the  States  themselves.4 

1  Except  Louisiana.  tingent   remainders,  has    been  extended 

2  Tilghman,  C.  J.,  in    Lyle  v.  Rich-     to  Pennsylvania, 
ards,  9  Serg.  &  R.  322,  333.     It  is  held  in  3  See  post,  §  337. 

this  case  that  the  common-law  doctrine  of  *  The  diversity  of  the  American   law 

forfeiture,  for  the  purpose  of  barring  con-    on  this  point,  and   on  the  scope   of  the 

15 


17 


REAL   AND   PERSONAL   PROPERTY. 


§16 


jurisdiction  of  probate  courts  and  the 
conclusiveness  of  their  judgment  (see,  on 
this  point,  post,  §§  143  et  seq.),  is  not  only 
the  source  of  distressing  uncertainty  and 
anxiety  to  administrators  and  their  legal 
advisers,  but  a  positive  injury  to  cred- 
itors and  distributees,  in  its  mischievous 
tendency  to  destroy  faith  in  the  validity 
of  the  title  to  property  which  executors 
and    administrators  find  it  necessary  to 


sell  in  winding  up  the  estates  under  their 
charge.  See,  on  this  point,  the  remarks 
of  the  Hon.  John  F.  Dillon  in  his  address 
before  the  Alabama  Bar  Association,  22 
Am.  L.  Kev.  30,  37,  entitled  "  A  Century 
of  American  Law  ;  "  and  of  the  Hon.  Da- 
vid Dudley  Field  before  a  reunion  of  the 
Yale  Kent  Club  at  New  Haven,  entitled 
"  Improvements  in  the  Law,"  to  be  found 
in  22  Am.  L.  Rev.  57,  61. 


[*18]  *TITLE   FIRST. 

OF  THE  DEVOLUTION  OF  PKOPEETY  ON  THE 
DEATH   OF   ITS   OWNER. 


PART  FIRST. 

OF  THE  DEVOLUTION  AS  DETERMINED  BY  THE  ACT 
OF  THE  OWNER. 


BOOK   FIRST. 
OF  TESTAMENTARY  DISPOSITION  OF  PROPERTY. 

The  scope  of  the  present  treatise  forbids  an  exhaustive  disquisition 
on  the  Law  of  Wills  and  Testaments  ;  nor  is  there  any  need  for  such 
an  undertaking,  the  whole  ground  being  amply  covered  by  the  able 
and  thorough  work  of  Jarman,  the  fifth  American  edition  of  which 
contains  references  to  the  latest  American  decisions  relating  to  the 
subject  up  to  the  time  of  its  publication,  with  explanatory  comments 
by  the  American  editor.1  But  it  is  unavoidable  to  refer  to  the  prin- 
ciples upon  which  the  law  is  based,  and  to  incorporate  into  the  pres- 
ent work  some  of  the  details  bearing  upon  testamentary  capacity,  the 
form,  execution,  attestation,  revocation,  and  probate  of  wills,  as  well 
as,  at  the  appropriate  time,  to  point  out  the  principal  rules  of  con- 
struction, and  the  principles  upon  which  the  will  is  carried  into 
effect. 

1  "  A  Treatise  on  Wills,  by  Thomas     M.  Bigelow,  Ph.  D.,  of  the  Boston  Bar. 
Jarman,  Esq.     The  Fifth  American  from     Little,  Brown,  &  Co.,  1881." 
the  Fourth  English  Edition.    By  Melville 


vol.  I.  — 2  17 


*  19,  *  20  EXTERNAL  LIMITS  ON  TESTAMENTARY  CAPACITY.  §  17 


*  CHAPTER  m.  [*19] 

OF   THE   EXTERNAL   LIMITS   PLACED    UPON   TESTAMENTARY   CAPACITY. 

§  17.    Limitation  of  the  Property  disposable  by  Will.  —  It   may  be 

proper,  in  the  first  place,  to  consider  what  part  of  a  man's  property 
is  subject  to  his  testamentary  disposition.  In  this  particular  the 
practical  development  of  the  English  law  is  not  in  strict  harmony 
with  the  logical  notion  of  property,  which  seems  to  demand  a  restric- 
tion of  the  power  within  narrower  limits  than  are  placed  upon  it  in 
either  England  or  America.  Contrary  to  the  progress  of  testamentary 
law  in  Rome  and  on  the  European  continent,  which  proceeded  from 
practically  unlimited  power  of  disposition  (Law  of  the  Twelve 
Tables)  to  a  limitation  thereof  {Lex  Falcidia),  the  legislation  of 
England  has  constantly  enlarged  the  powers  of  testators  in  this 
respect,1  until  now,  both  in  England  and  America,  the  right  to  dis- 
pose of  property  by  will  is  as  broad  and  comprehensive  as  the  right 
of  disposition  while  living.2 

Without  inquiring  into  the  distinctions  as  to  the  various  kinds  of 
property  which  may  be  devised  or  bequeathed,  and  whether  property 
acquired  by  the  testator  after  the  time  of  executing  his  will  passes 
thereby,8  it  is  necessary  to  remember,  in  this  connection,  the  various 
provisions  existing  at  common  law  and  enacted  by  the  several  States 
in  favor  of  the  widow  and  surviving  minor  children,  as  limitations 
upon  the  testator's  power  over  his  property.  These  subjects  will  be 
treated  hereafter  in  connection  with  the  subjects  of  dower,4  support 
of  the  family,6  and  homestead.6 

In  Louisiana,  whose  code  of  laws  retains  many  of  the  principles 
of  the  civil  law,  the  testator's  power  to  disinherit   his  chil- 
dren and  *  father  or  mother  is  limited  to  cases  enumerated  by  [*  20] 
the  statute,  and  based  upon  their  own   misconduct,  the  par- 

1  "   ...  Glanvil  will  inform  us,  that,  the  reign  of  Charles  I.  to  be  the  general 

by  the  common  law,  as   it  stood  in   the  law  of  the  land."    2  Bla.  Comm.  491. 

reign  of  Henry  II.,  a  man's  goods  were  2  Ross  v.  Duncan,    Freem.    Ch.   587, 

to  be  divided  into  three  equal  parts,  of  598,  et  seq. 

which  one  went  to  his  heirs  or  lineal  de-  8  This   subject    will    be    treated  in  a 

ecendants,  another  to    his  wife,  and  the  subsequent  part  of  this  work.     See  post, 

third  was  at    his  own  disposal.  .  .  .  This  §  419 ;  also  §  53. 

continued  to  be  the  law  of  the  land  at  *  Post,  §  105  et  seq. 

the  time  of  Magna  Charta,  .  .  .  and  Sir  6  Post,  §  77. 

Henry   Finch  lavs  it  down  expressly  in  G  Post,  §  64. 
18 


§18  LIMITATIONS    ON   TESTAMENTARY   CAPACITY.  *20,  *  21 

ticulars  of  which  must  be  alleged  in  the  will  ; l  and  the  Disinheritance 
other  heirs  of  the  testator  are,  moreover,  obliged  to  prove  of  children  in 
the  facts  on  which  the  disinheritance  is  founded,  other-  0Ulbiana- 
vise  it  is  null ; 2  nor  can  a  testator,  if  he  leaves  a  legitimate  child, 
dispose  of  more  than  two-thirds  of  his  property,  nor  of  more  than 
one-half  if  he  leaves  two,  nor  of  more  than  one-third  if  he  leaves 
three  or  more  legitimate  children  ; 3  nor  of  more  thau  two-thirds,  if 
he  leaves  no  children,  but  a  father,  or  mother,  or  both.4 

§  18.    Limitations   upon   Testamentary    Capacity.  —  We    have    seen 
that  the  power  of  testamentary  disposition  is  an  essential  element  in 
the  nature  of  property,5  because  the  right  to  hold  prop-    what  is  testa- 
erty  includes  the  right  to  alienate  it  in  such  manner  as    mentary 
the  owner  may,  in  the  exercise  of  his  free  will,  deter-   capaL1^- 
mine.6     It  follows  from  this,  that  evei*y  person  may  make  testamen- 
tary disposition  of  his  property  who  is  capable,  with  reference  thereto, 
of  exercising  free  will.7     But  this  definition  of  testamentary  capacity, 
although  perhaps  strictly  accurate  in  the  abstract,  is  too  general  and 
vague  to  serve  as  a  sufficient  rule  of  law.     To  enable  judges  and 
juries  to  act  with  the  certainty  and  uniformity  required    Rules  neces- 
for  the  purposes  of  justice  in  ascertaining  the  validity  of    mine  teslamen-. 
testamentary   dispositions,   particular   rules    are   estab-    tary  capacity, 
lished  by  legislative  enactment  and  judicial  authority,  by  means  of 
which  the   law   is  rendered  positive  and  certain,  so  far   as  human 
intelligence   can  make  it.      These  particular,  positive  rules  of  law, 
themselves    established    to    carry  out   the   fundamental    principle, 
operate  as  a  limitation  upon  the  discretional  scope  of  judges  and 
juries ;    without   which  the   line  of  division   between   testamentary 
capacity  and  incapacity  would  necessarily  be  fixed  by  each  person 
acting  in  a  judicial  character,  now  here,  now  there,  according  to  the 
personal  impression  of  the  moment,  producing  upon  the  community 
rather  the  effect  of  a  misleading  ignis  fatuus,  than  serving  as  a  light 

to  guide  them  in  the  knowledge  of  the  law. 
[*  21]       *  In   the  nature  of  things  such  rules    must  be  negative  in 

form,  because  they  operate  as  limitations,  —  particularizing,, 
defining  the  general  law,  as  exhaustively  stated  in  the 
general  formula,  Every   person    capable  of   exercising    ne^ativel^"5 
free  will  may  make  a  valid  testamentary  disposition  of   form' 
his  property.     The  first  step  will  therefore  be  to  state  the  proposition 

1  Voorhies'  Rev.    Civ.   C.  1888,   arts,     of  twenty-one  years,  not  under  legal  dis- 
1617-1624.  ability,  are  competent  to  dispose  of  their 

2  lb,  art.  1624.  property  by  will.     So  in  Delaware,  Indi- 

3  Ib-.  art-  1493-  ana,     Kentucky,    Maine,    Massachusetts, 

4  Ib->  art-  1494-  Michigan,    Minnesota,    Mississippi,     Ne- 

5  Ante,  §  7.  braska,    New    Hampshire,    New    Jersey, 

6  Ante,  §  3.  North  Carolina,  Ohio,  Oregon,  Pennsyl- 

7  Hence,  in   most   States,  all   persons     vania,    and   Vermont.      See  post,  §    2ty 
having  attained  the  age  of  majority,  or     p.  *  25.  notes  3  and  4. 


*21,*22      EXTERNAL   LIMITS   OF   TESTAMENTARY   CAPACITY.  §19 

itself  in  its  negative  form  :  No  person  is  capable  of  exercising  testa- 
mentary power  who  is,  for  any  reason,  incapable  of  exercising  free 
will ;  from  which  the  classification  of  testamentary  incapacity,  or  of 
persons  incapable  of  making  wills  because  they  lack  testamentary 
capacity,  naturally  arises.  Manifold  are  the  distinctions  drawn,  in 
the  numerous  books  which  treat  of  this  subject,  as  to  the  sources  of 
testamentary  incapacity ; !  it  will  be  sufficient,  however,  for  the 
purposes  of  this  work,  to  observe  the  distinction  between  external 
T  limitations  upon  the  will,  or  disabilities  created  by  the 

divided  into  law  in  furtherance  of  public  policy,  and  incapacity 
strktionVand  arising  from  an  immanent  defect  of  the  mind  by  reason 
immanent  de-  of  which  the  person  is  devoid  of  the  reasoning  power 
and  firmness  of  intellect  necessary  to  realize  his  own 
will. 

To  the  former  belong  the  legal  presumption  of  want  of  discretion 
arising  from  infancy,  the  merger  of  a  married  woman's  personality 
in  that  of  her  husband,  the  incapacity  of  an  alien  to  devise 
lands,  etc. 

*  To  the  latter  may  be  referred  idiocy,  lunacy,  delirium,  or  [*  22] 
any  condition  of  weakness  or  unsoundness  of  mind  by  reason 
of  which  a  person's  acts  or  conduct  are  not  attributable  to  his  own 
free  will. 

§  19.  Incapacity  of  Aliens.  —  The  testamentary  incapacity  of 
aliens  does  not  extend  to  personal  property ; 2  and  the  invalidity  of 
Incapacity  of  the  devise  of  real  estate  by  them  arises  out  of  their 
aliens  extends  incapacity  to  hold  real  estate.  Considerations  of  pub- 
erty only.  lie  policy  require  that  no  alien,  whether  friend  or  enemy, 

1  Godolphin,  in  his  "  Orphan's  Legacy :  Cases   absolutely  and  utterly   Intestable, 

or  a    Testamentary    Abridgment,"   reck-  but  in   some  certain  Cases  only,  as  will 

ons  five  classes  of  persons  incapable  of  more  distinctly  appear  hereafter."  —  God. 

making  testaments:  "  1.  Such  as  are  by  on  Wills,  ch.  vii. 

Law  prohibited  for  want  of  Discrrtion ;  as  Williams,  the  most  accurate  and  logi- 
Childreu,  Mad  or  Lunatick  Persons,  Idi-  cal,  and  at  the  same  time  most  careful  and 
ots,  Old  Persons  grown  Childish  through  diligent,  and  therefore  thoroughly  reli- 
excess  of  Age,  and  Persons  Actually  able  author  on  Testamentary  Law,  dis- 
Drunk.  2.  For  want  of  Freedom  or  Lib-  tinguishes  between  what  he  calls  "  three 
erty,  or  that  are  not  Sui  juris  in  all  re-  grounds  of  incapacity:  1.  the  want  of 
speets ;  as  Villains,  Captives,  and  Women  sufheient  legal  discretion  ;  2.  the  want  of 
Covert.  3.  For  want  of  some  of  their  liberty  or  freewill;  3.  the  criminal  con- 
principal  Senses;  as  Deaf,  and  Dumb,  duct  of  the  party":  Wms.  on  Ex.  [12]; 
and  Blind.  4.  Such  as  are  Criminous ;  as  to  which  he  adds,  as  not  strictly  subsum- 
Traytors,  Felons,  wilful  Felo's  de  se,  and  able  under  any  one  of  these  heads,  the 
the  like.  5.  Such  as  are  prohibited  by  cases  of  aliens  and  of  the  reigning  sov- 
reason  of  some  certain  Legal  Impedi-  ereign.  This  division  seems  better  to 
ments ;  as  outlawed  Persons,  Persons  at  accord  with  the  ancient  learning  on  the 
the  very  Point  of  Death,  Alien  Enemies,  subject,  than  with  strict  logic, 
and  such  others."  This  classification,  2  Greenia  v.  Greenia,  14  Mo.  526,  528, 
however,  does  not  seem  to  satisfy  him,  for  approved  in  Harney  v.  Donohoe,  97  Mo. 
he  is  careful  to  add:  "But  here  note,  141,  144;  Evan's  Appeal,  51  Conn.  435, 
That  all  the  said  Persons  are  not  in  all  439. 
20 


§19 


INCAPACITY   OF   ALIENS. 


*22,  *23 


shall  have  title  to  lands  as  against  the  sovereignty ; 1  but  an  alien 
may  take  land  by  purchase  or  devise,  and  hold  the  title  subject  to 
the  right  of  the  sovereignty  to  procure  an  escheat  or  forfeiture  upon 
information  and  office  found.2     Until  the  land  is  so  seized,  or  the 
alien  owner  in  some  way  dispossessed,  he  has  complete  dominion 
over  the  same,  and  may  convey  it  to  a  purchaser ; 3   but  upon  the 
alien's  death,  although  he  leaves  heirs  who  would  be  capable  of  tak- 
ing if  he  were  a  citizen,  the  land  escheats.4     This  is  the  rule  at  com- 
mon law,  according  to  which  aliens  cannot  take  real  estate  by  descent, 
or  by  operation  of  law  in  any  respect.5     A  change  took  place  during 
the  second  half  of  the  century,  both  in  England  and  in    Tendency  to 
America,  in  the  direction  of  obliterating  the  distinction    obliterate  dis- 
between  citizens  and  aliens  in  the  ownership  of  property,    tween  citizens 
Most  of  the  States  enabled  alien  friends  to  acquire  lands    and  aliens- 
by  purchase,  devise,  or  descent,  and  to  hold,  alien,  devise,  and  transmit 

the  same  by  descent ; 6  unconditionally,  as  in  Alabama,7  Arkan- 
[*  23]  sas,8  Colorado,9  Florida,10  Georgia,11  *  Maine,12  Mary-    Aliens  hold 

land,18  Massachusetts,14  Michigan,15  Missouri,16  Ne-   lands  same  as 
vada,17  New  Jersey,18  North  Carolina,19  North  Dakota,20    citize,ls- 


1  Commonwealth  v.  Martin,  5  Munf. 
117,  119. 

2  Fairfax  v.  Hunter,  7  Cr.  603,  619, 
et  seq.;  Fox  v.  Southack,  12  Mass.  143, 
146  ;  per  Dykman,  J.,  in  Maynard  v.  May- 
nard,  36  Hun,  227,  229;  Peekham,  J.,  in 
Re  McGraw,  111  N.  Y.  66,  96.  See  post, 
on  the  subject  of  Escheats,  §§  131  et  seq. 

8  Sheaffe  v.  O'Neil,  1  Mass.  256; 
McCreery  v.  Allender,  4  H.  &  McH.  409, 
412  ;  Marshall  v.  Conrad,  5  Call,  364,  402  ; 
Scaulan  v.  Wright,  13  Pick.  523,  529; 
Ramires  v.  Kent,  2  Cal.  558,  560. 

*  See  post,  §§  131  et  seq.;  Slater  v. 
Nason,  15  Pick.  345,  349 ;  Mooers  v. 
"White,  6  Johns.  Ch.  360,  365  ;  Rubeck 
v.  Gardner,  7  Watts,  455,  458 ;  Maynard 
v.  Maynard,  36  Hun,  227,  230. 

5  In  other  words,  they  may  take  by 
act  of  a  part}7,  but  not  by  operation  of 
law :  Swayne,  J.,  in  Hauenstein  v.  Lyn- 
ham,  100  U.  S.  483,  484;  Montgomery  v. 
Dorion,  7  N.  H.  475,480;  Blight  v. 
Rochester,  7  Wheat.  535,  544 ;  Dawson 
v.  Godfrey,  4  Cra.  321,  322;  People  v. 
Conklin,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  67,  69  ;  Geoffrey 
v.  Riggs,  18  Dist.  Col.  331,  334 ;  s.  c.  133 
U.  S.  258;  Wunderle  v.  Wunderle,  144 
111.  40,  64,  and  cases  cited ;  Utassy  v. 
Giedinghagen,  132  Mo.  53,  60. 

6  Howard  v.  Moot,  64  N.  Y.  262,  270 ; 
Lumb  v.  Jenkins,  100  Mass.  527 ;  Doe  v. 


Robertson,  11  Wheat.  332,  357;  Billings 
v.  Hauver,  65  Cal.  593  ;  Kilfoy  v.  Powers, 
3  Dem.  (N.  Y.)  198. 

7  Code,  1886,  §  1914;  Nicrosi  v. 
Phillipi,  91  Ala.  299,  307. 

8  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  247. 

9  McConville  v.  Howell,  17  Fed.  R. 
104.  It  is  held  in  this  case,  following 
State  v.  Rogers,  13  Cal.  159,  that  the  con- 
stitution is  not  a  grant  of  power,  but  a 
limitation  on  the  general  legislative  power ; 
and  that  the  right  given  to  resident  aliens 
may  be  enlarged,  but  cannot  be  abridged 
by  the  legislature. 

10  Rev.  St.  1892,  §  1816. 

11  Code,  1882,  §  1661:  Alien  friends 
"  shall  have  the  privilege  of  purchasing, 
holding,  and  conveying  real  estate." 

12  Rev.  St.  1883,  p.  604,  §  2  ;  p.  539,  §  14. 

13  Publ.  Gen.  L.  1888. 

14  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  744,  §  1. 

15  How.  St.  1882,  §  5775. 

16  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  342.  See  Utassy  v. 
Giedinghagen,  132  Mo.  53,  59. 

17  Laws,  1879,  p.  51  ;  Gen.  St.  1885, 
§  2655.  An  exception  is  made  in  this  State 
against  subjects  of  the  Chinese  Empire; 
but  see  State  v.  Preble,  18  Nev.  251. 

18  Gen.  St.  N.  J.  1895,  p.  23,  §  3. 

19  Code,  1883,  §  7. 

20  Rev.  Code,  1895,  §  3277. 


21 


23 


EXTERNAL   LIMITS   OF   TESTAMENTARY    CAPACITY. 


§  19 


Ohio,1  Oregon.2  Rhode  Island,8  South  Carolina,4  Tennessee,6  Virginia,6 
Wisconsin,7  and  West  Virginia ; 8  or  upon  condition  of  bona  fide 
residence  in  the  State  or  United  States  or  appearance  by  the  heir 
„  nn        or   devisee  within   a   time   limited   by    statute,   during 

Or  upon  con-  .  ,  J  '  ° 

dition  of  resi-  which  the  claimant  may  become  a  citizen,  or  sell  the 
dence,  etc.  jan(j  before  jt  escheats  to  the  State,  as  substantially 
provided  in  Arizona,9  California,10  Connecticut,11  Idaho,12  Indiana,18 
Kentucky,14  Montana,16  New  Hampshire,16  New  York,17  and  Pennsyl- 
vania.18 The  Naturalization  Act  accomplishes  the  same  result  in 
England.19  It  may  be  mentioned  in  connection  with  this  subject, 
that  both  the  English  and  most  of  the  American  statutes  provide 
Alienage  of  ^hat  alienage  in  aav  grantor  or  ancestor  through  whom 
title  to  real  estate  is  claimed,  shall  constitute  no  defect 
in  such  title.20  But  in  recent  years  a  counter  current 
seems  to  have  set  in,  notably  in  the  new  Western  States, 
indicating  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  legislators  to  re- 
strict, rather  than  to  enlarge,  the  capacity  of  aliens  to  hold 
real  estate  in  this  country.  Thus  aliens  are  inhibited  from  acquiring 
any  interest  in  agricultural,  arid,  or  range  lands  in  excess  of  2000  acres 
in  Colorado  ; 21  while  in  Illinois 22  and  Iowa  23  non-resident  aliens  are 


ancestors  no 
defect  of  title 


Restrictive 
tendency  in 
recent  years 


1  Rev.  St.  1890,  §  4173. 

2  Code,  1887,  §  2988. 

3  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  442,  §  6. 

4  Rev.  St.  1894,  §  1981. 

5  Code,  1884,  §§  2804  et  seq. 
8  Rev.  St.  1887,  §43. 

7  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  22C0. 

8  Code,  1887,  ch.  70,  §§1,2. 

9  Rev.  St.  1887,  §  1472. 

10  Five  years  is  allowed  in  this  State, 
after  which  the  land  escheats  :  Civ.  Code, 
§§  671,  672  ;  State  v.  Smith,  70  Cal.  153. 
Proceeding  to  escheat  within  five  years 
after  intestate's  death  is  premature  :  Peo- 
ple r.  Roach,  76  Cal.  294. 

11  Gen.  St.  1887,  §  15;  see  Campbell's 
Appeal,  64  Conn.  277.  Exception  is 
made  in  this  State  in  favor  of  French 
citizens,  who  are  classed  with  resident 
aliens,  and  may  purchase,  hold,  inherit, 
and  transmit  real  estate  as  fully  as 
native  citizens,  so  long  as  France  accords 
the  same  right  to  American  citizens. 
Non-resident  aliens  may  hold  and  transmit 
real  eBtate  used  for  mining  purposes:  lb., 
§  16. 

>3   Five  years  :   Rev.  St.  1887,  §  5715. 


18  Ann.  St.  1894,  §§  3328,  3331,  3333  ; 
but  see  also,  §  3389,  authorizing  all  natural 
persons  who  are  aliens,  whether  resident 
or  not,  to  hold  property  in  same  manner 
as  citizens. 

14  Eight  years  from  final  settlement : 
Ky.  St.  1894,  §§  334,  338. 

15  Comp.  St.  1888,  p.  400,  §  553. 
!S  Pub.  St.  1891,  p.  378,  §  16. 

17  Stamm  v.  Bostwick,  122  N.  Y.  48 ; 
Branagh  v.  Smith,  46  Fed.  Rep.  517. 

18  Aliens  take  by  devise  or  descent, 
liable  to  be  sequestered  during  a  war  with 
his  State  or  prince  ;  resident  alien  friends 
take  by  purchase,  but  not  exceeding  500 
acres  until  he  becomes  a  citizen ;  non- 
resident foreigners  may  acquire  land  by 
purchase  not  exceeding  5000  acres : 
Bright.  Purd.  Dig.  p.  84,  §§1,3,  6. 

19  33  Vict.  c.  14,  §  2. 

20  See  post,  §  76,  on  the  subject  of 
Descent  to  Aliens. 

21  Rev.  St.  1891,  §  100. 

22  Wunderle  v.  Wunderle,  144  111.  40,  50  ; 
Beavan  v.  Went,  155  111.  594.  The 
amendment  of  1891  to  the  statute  (pro- 
viding that  where  a  deed  to  laud  has  been 


-3   In  this  State  most  of  the  distinctions  non-resident  aliens  were  prohibited  from 

between  eiti/.ens  and  non-resident   aliens  acquiring  title  to  any  real  estate,  except 

had   been  abolished  in  1868  :  Furenes  v.  that  widows  and  heirs  of   naturalized  citi- 

Mickelson,   86    Iowa,  508.  510.     In    1888  zens  and  of  aliens  who  had  acquired  title 

22 


§  19  INCAPACITY   OF   ALIENS.  *  23 

incapable  of  acquiring  title  to  or  holding  any  lands  or  real  estate  by- 
descent,  devise,  or  purchase.  In  Kansas,  the  constitutional  provision 
that  "  No  distinction  shall  ever  be  made  between  citizens  and  aliens 
in  reference  to  the  purchase,  enjoyment,  or  descent  of  property  "  was 
changed  in  1888,  so  as  to  inhibit  any  distinction  between  "  citizens  of 
the  State  of  Kansas  and  the  citizens  of  other  States  and  Territories  of 
the  United  States  "  in  this  respect,  and  the  right  to  legislate  thereon 
expressly  conferred  upon  the  legislature  ; 1  and  in  1891  the  rights  of 
non-resident  aliens  and  foreign  corporations  were  largely  cut  down, 
but  heirs  of  aliens  theretofore  acquiring  lands  had  three  years  to 
hold  and  dispose  of  them.2  In  Minnesota,3  Mississippi,4  and  Mis- 
souri 5  non-citizens,  or  persons  who  have  not  declared  their  intention 
to  become  citizens,  cannot  acquire,  hold,  or  own  real  estate  except 
(in  Mississippi  and  Missouri)  it  be  acquired  by  devise  or  inheritance, 
or  in  any  of  these  States,  in  due  course  of  justice  in  collecting  a 
debt.  In  Nebraska  non-resident  aliens  cannot  acquire  title  to,  or 
take  or  hold  any  real  estate  by  devise,  descent,  or  purchase  ;  but  may 
take  a  lien  and  purchase  under  a  sale  for  a  debt  due  them,  and  sell  it 
within  ten  years.6  In  Texas  aliens  may  acquire  lands  by  purchase, 
devise,  or  descent,  defeasible  only  at  the  instance  of  the  State ; 7  a 
statute  passed  in  1891,  limiting  the  time  within  which  aliens  could 
hold  lands  by  devise  or  descent  to  six  years  was  held  unconstitu- 
tional because  not  properly  entitled.8 

Though  the  title  of  aliens  to  lands  within  the  limits    Treaties  con- 
of  the  several  States  of  the  Union  is  matter  of  State    legislation 

made  to  an  alien,  the  alien  shall  have  years  to  enable  the  alien  to  sell,  and  there- 
power  to  convey  to  a  citizen  of  the  United  after  by  a  sale  by  the  State,  etc.  :  Laws 
States  a  good  title  thereto  or  encumber  1897,  p.  5  et  seq. 

the  same  in  favor  of  a  citizen,  if  the  con-  1  Buffington  v.  Grosvenor,  46  Kans.  730. 

veyance  or  encumbrance  be  made  before  2  St.  1897,  ch.  51,  §  1.     If  under  21  five 

legal  proceedings  are  taken  to  seize  such  years  were  given, 

land  in  behalf  of  the  State)  applies  only  to  3  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  3996. 

alien  males  who  have  declared  an  inten-  4  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  2439. 

tion  to  become  citizens  and  to  alien  females  5  Laws,    1895,    p.    207;     amended    in 

actually  resident  in  the  State:  De  Graff  Laws,  1897,  p.  144. 

v.  Went,   164  111.   485,  489.     But  in   1897  6  Con.  St.  1893,  §§  4396  et  seq. 

the  statute  of  1887  was  repealed  and  anew  7  Gray  v.  Kaufmann,  82  Tex.  65,  67. 

law  respecting  aliens    enacted  providing  8  Gunter  v.  Texas  Co.,  82  Tex.  496. 
inter  alia  for  the  holding  of  realty  for  six 


before  may  hold  such  lands  by  devise  or  resident  heirs  of  a  non-resident  may  hold 

descent  for  ten  years,  after  which,  unless  inherited  lands  for  ten  years  :  Easton  v. 

the  alien   heirs  have   sold    such  lands,   or  Huott,  95  Iowa,  473.     A  non-resident  alien 

become  citizens,  they  escheat :  Laws,  1888,  could  under  this  statute  acquire  by  pur- 

ch.  85,  §  1.     It  is  held,  under  this  statute,  chase  if  within  five  years  the  same  was 

that  a  naturalized  citizen  cannot  inherit  placed  in  the  actual  possession  of  certain 

through  a   father,  who  is   a  non-resident  relatives,  but  not  by  descent :  Burrow  v. 

alien,  the  lands  of  a  great-uncle,  who  was  Burrow,  98  Iowa,  400.     See   Laws,  1894, 

a  naturalized  citizen  :     Furenes  v.  Mickel-  Ch.  82  ;  also  Opel  v.  Shoup,  100  Iowa,  407. 
eon,  supra.     It  is  also  held  that  the  non- 
23 


*  23,  *  24      EXTERNAL   LIMITS   OF   TESTAMENTARY    CAPACITY.  §  20 

.  ,  _  regulation,  yet  the  treaty-making  power  of  the  United 
ship  of  lauds  States  includes  the  regulation  of  the  transfer,  devise, 
by  aliens.  auci  inheritance  of  property  in  this  country  owned  by 

citizens  of  a  foreign  country ;  hence  a  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  a  foreign  nation  will  control  or  suspend  the  statutes  of 
the  individual  States  when  there  is  a  difference  between  them.1 

§20.  Incapacity  of  Infants. — The  incapacity  of  infants  arises 
necessarily  out  of  their  want  of  discretion.  But  the  gradations  of 
Incapacity  of  mental  capacity  are  impossible  of  accurate  measurement ; 
infants,  disa-  and,  since  it  is  impracticable  to  ascertain  the  precise  mo- 
bv  age  and  ment  when  an  infant's  mind  is  sufficiently  matured 
sex-  to  act  rationally  upon  the  ordinary  affairs  of  *  life,    [*  24] 

the  law  fixes  a  definite  age  before  the  attainment  of  which  it 
conclusively  presumes  the  want  of  discretion.  It  is  evident  that, 
whatever  age  may  be  fixed  upon,  there  will  be  many  whose  mind  is 
riper  and  better  able  to  understand  the  nature  of  human  transactions 
before  they  reach  it  than  that  of  others  who  have  passed  this  age. 
The  limitation,  therefore,  is  an  external  one,  based  not  so  much  upon 
mental  incapacity,  but  arising  out  of  a  legal  disability.  The  necessity 
of  classing  infancy  with  external  limitations  upon  testamentary 
power  is  apparent  also  from  the  diversity  of  the  rules  laid  down  with 
Common-  regard  thereto  in  the  several  codes.     For  at  common  law 

law  rule.  male  infants  of  fourteen,  and  female  infants  of  twelve 

years  of  age,  were  held  competent  to  make  wills  in  regard  to  their 
Abolished  bv  personal  estate.2  This  rule  was  abolished  in  England 
English  stat-  by  statute,3  in  1838,  which  allows  no  valid  will  by  any 
person  under  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  whether  of 
personal  or  real  property ;  but  in  many  of  the  American  States  the 
Rules  ob-  common-law  distinction  is  still  observed.     In  Florida4 

American  anc*  South  Carolina  the  statute  fixes  the  age  of  twenty- 

States,  one  years  as  necessary  to  devise  real  estate,  but  is  silent 

as  to  personal  property.  In  Tennessee  6  no  age  qualification  is  men- 
tioned for  either  real  or  personal  property  ;  hence  the  common  law  re- 
mains unchanged  in  each  of  these  three  States.  In  New  York  6  males 
of  eighteen  and  females  of  sixteen,  in  Georgia 7  infants  of  fourteen 

1  Wunderle  v.  Wunderle,  144  111.  40,  which  there  had  exclusive  jurisdiction 
54;  Hauenstein  v.  Lynham,  100  U.  S.  over  the  probate  of  wills  of  personalty, 
483;  Opel  v.  Shoup,  100  Iowa,  407  (treaty  and  is  traceable  to  the  civil  law.  See 
with  Bavaria)  ;  Adams  v.  Akerluud,  168  Smallwood  r.  Brickhouse,  2  Mod.  315  ; 
111.  632  (holding  that  subjects  of  Swe-  Hyde  v.  Hyde,  Prec.  Ch.  316;  Arnold  v. 
den  could  hold  realty  in  the  U.  S.) ;  Doeh-  Earle,  2  Lee  Eccl.  R.  529,  531. 

rel    v.    Hillmer,    102    Iowa    (treaty   with  3  1  Vict.  c.  26,  amended  by  15  &  16 

Prussia),  169,  171.  Vict.  c.  24. 

2  The  rule  is  not  so  much  that  of  the  *  Meyer  v.  Meyer,  7  Fla.  292,  294. 
common  law,  which  seems  to  fix  the  age  6  Moore   v.   Steele,    10    Humph.   562, 
of  seventeen  years  as  the  period  of  testa-  565  ;  Campbell  v.  Browder,  7  Lea,  240. 
mentary    capacity,    hut    introduced    into  6  Banks  &  Bro.  (9th  ed.)  p.  1876,  §  21. 
England    by    the    ecclesiastical    courts,  7  O'Byrne  v.  Feely,  61  Ga.  77,  85. 

24 


§  20  INCAPACITY   OF   INFANTS.  *  24,  *  25 

and  in  Colorado  of  seventeen  years  of  age,  and  in  Maryland  parties 
"  when  competent  to  contract  and  make  deed,"  may  bequeath  per- 
sonal property.  In  a  number  of  States  the  age  required  of  either 
sex  is  twenty-one  to  devise  real,  and  eighteen  to  bequeath  personal 
property;1  in  others,  the  age  of  twenty -one  for  males  and 
[*  25]  eighteen  for  females  is  fixed  as  necessary  to  will  *  either  real 
or  personal  property.2  In  Missouri  males  may  will  personal 
property  at  eighteen,  but  must  be  twenty-one  to  devise  real  estate, 
while  females  may  will  either  personal  or  real  estate  at  eighteen.  In 
several  States  wills  of  realty  as  well  as  of  personalty  may  be  made  by 
either  sex  at  eighteen  ; 3  in  Wisconsin  the  marriage  of  a  female,  and 
in  Arizona  and  Texas  the  marriage  of  a  male  or  female,  enables 
such  person  to  dispose  of  real  or  personal  property  by  will  before 
reaching  the  age  of  majority.  But  by  far  the  greater  number  of 
States  require  a  testator  of  either  sex  to  be  of  full  age,4  or  of  the  age 
of  twenty-one  years,6  to  dispose  of  either  real  or  personal  property 
by  will. 

The  appointment  of  testamentary  guardians,  as  authorized  by  the 
Statute  of  12  Car.  II.,  is  in  many  States  expressly  conferred  on  infant 
fathers.6 

A  rule  of  computing  time  should  be  noticed  in  connection  with  the 
question  of  infancy  and  majority,  which  is  a  departure  from  the 
ordinary  rule.     At  common  law,  in  computing  the  age    c 
of  a  person  for  testamentary  purposes,  the  day  of  his    time  of  ma- 
birth  is  included.     As  the  law  does  not  recognize  frac-   )0Tlty- 
tions  of  a  day,  but  directs  both  the  day  of  the  birth  and  of  the  anni- 
versary to  be  reckoned  as  full  days,  it  results  that  a  person  born  on 
the  first  day  of  January,  1880,  in  the  last  hour  of  that  day,  will 
attain  majority  on  the  first  instant  of  the  thirty-first  day  of  Decem- 
ber, 1900,  — nearly  two  days  less  than  twenty-one  years.7     The  rule 
is  recognized  in  several  American  States.8 

1  In  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Oregon,  6  Woerner  on  Guardianship,  §  20,  p.  56. 
Khode  Island,  Virginia,  and  West  Vir-  7  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *  45.  Judge  Red- 
ginia.  In  Arkansas  the  real  and  personal  field  cites  Swinburn,  Blackstone,  Kent, 
property  of  a  married  female  is  made  her  Bingham,  and  Metcalf  as  so  laying  down 
separate  property  by  the  Constitution,  the  rule,  and  takes  occasion  to  express  his 
and  may  be  devised  as  if  she  were  a  emphatic  dissent  therefrom,  deeming  it 
feme  sole.     Const.,  art.  xii.  §  6.  "  scarcely  less  than  a  blunder,  which,  for 

2  In  Illiuois,  Iowa,  Kansas.  the  good  sense  of  the  thing,"  he  wished  to 
s  In  California,  Connecticut,   Nevada,     see  set  right.     1  Redf.  on  Wills,  20  et  seq. 

Montana,  North  Dakota,  South  Dakota,  But  in  some  States  the  method  of  compu- 

Utah.  tation  is  fixed  by  statute  :  see  Woerner  on 

4  Arizona,    Massachusetts,     Michigan,  Guardianship,  §  6,  p.  17. 
Minnesota,  Nebraska,  New  Jersey,  Ohio,  8  State  v.  Clarke,  3  Harr.  (Del.)  557, 

Vermont,  Washington.  558 ;  Hamlin  v.  Stevenson,  4  Dana,  597 ; 

6  Delaware,  Indiana,  Kentucky,  Maine,  Wells  v.  Wells,  6  Ind.  447. 
Mississippi,  New  Hampshire,  North  Caro- 
lina, Oregon,  Pennsylvania. 

25 


*  25,  *  26      EXTERNAL   LIMITS   OP   TESTAMENTARY   CAPACITY.  §  21 

§  21.  Incapacity  of  Married  Women.  —  The  disability  attaching 
to  married  women  to  dispose  of  their  property  by  last  will  is  peculiar 
Coverture  to  the  English  law.     It  arises  out  of  the  fiction  at  com- 

affecting  tes-  mon  jaw^  {.j^  C0Verture  merges  the  personal  existence 
capacity.  of  the  wife  in  that  of  the  husband  ;  it  is  said  that  a 

married  woman  has  no  legal  existence  apart  from  her  husband.1 
This  rule  was  not  changed  in  England  by  the  several  statutes 
concerning  wills  ; 2  but  in  the  Married  Women's  Property  *  Act  [*  26] 
of  1882  8  married  women  are  enabled  to  hold  and  dispose  of 
"  by  will  or  otherwise  "  any  real  or  personal  property,  in  the  same 
manner  as  if  they  were  femes  sole  ;  since  which  time  wills  of  married 
women  are  entitled  to  general  probate,  including  all  property  dis- 
-r.       ,.  nosed  of   in   the   will.4     Exceptions   are   mentioned  in 

Exceptions  to      r  .  . 

the  rule  at  English  cases,  according  to  which  married  women  may, 
common  law.  even  at  common  law,  make  valid  wills ;  but  it  will  be 
noticed  that  the  term  "exceptions  "  is  scarcely  applicable,  as  the  cir- 
cumstances under  which  the  power  is  recognized  are  not  strictly  sub- 
sumable  under  the  rule. 

The  first  of  these  exceptions  is,  that  a  married  woman  may  will 
her  personal  property  with  the  consent  of  her  husband.5  But  since 
at  common  law  the  personal  property  of  the  wife  is  absolutely  that 
of  the  husband,  his  consent  to  its  testamentary  disposition  is  in  re- 
ality the  gift  of  the  husband  to  the  wife's  legatee ; 6  and  this  view  is 
recognized  by  the  power  vested  in  the  husband  to  retract  his  consent, 
even  after  the  wife's  death,  at  any  time  before  probate  of  the  will.7 

Another  exception  is  said  to  be  the  power  of  a  married  woman  to 
dispose  by  will  (without  the  husband's  consent)  of  property  which 
she  holds  in  miter  droit,  as  where  she  takes  as  executrix ; 8  but  this 
affects  only  such  property  as  passes  by  representation,  and  includes 
none  in  which  she  has  a  beneficial  interest,  to  which  the  right  of  the 
husband  would  attach.9 

It  is  also  mentioned  as  an  exception  to  the  disability  of  a  married 
woman  to  devise  property,  that  she  may  do  so  in  pursuance  of  a  suf- 
ficient ante  or  post  nuptial  contract; 10  this  is  clearly  the  result  of  the 

1  Murray  v.  Barlee,  3  M.  &  K.  209,  220.  ual  courts  have  jurisdiction  to  decide  the 

2  Married    women    are    expressly  dis-  question  whether  the  husband  consented 
abled  by  the  statute  of  I  Vict.  c.  26,  nor  or  uot.    Steadman  v.  Powell,  1  Add.  58 ; 
was  the  rule  changed  in  the  amendatory  Tucker  v.  Inman,  4  M.  &  Gr.  1049,  1076. 
statute  of  15  &  16  Vict.  c.  24.  6  So  held  per  North,  C.  J.,  in  Brook 

3  45  &  46  Vict.  c.  75,  §  1,  pi.  1,  §  2.  v.  Turner,  1  Mod.  211. 

4  Goods  of  Price,  L.  R.  12  Prob.  D.  ~>  Maas  v.  Sheffield,  1  Rob.  364,  10  Jur. 
137;  Goods  of  Homfray,  L.  R.  12  Prob.  417;  Brook  v.  Turner,  2  Mod.  170,  172; 
I).  138,  note.  See  Smart  v.  Trauter,  L.  R.  Van  Winkle  v.  Schoonmaker,  15  N.  J. 
43  Ch.  I).  587.  Eq.  381,  386,  et  seq. 

&  Bransby   v.    Haines,  1    Cas.    Tern}).  8  Scammell  v.  Wilkinson,  2  East,  552, 

Lee,  120,  holding  that  the  will  of  a  mar-  556. 

ried  woman,  made  without  the  husband's  9  Scammell  v.  Wilkinson,  supra. 

consent,  is  a  men:  nullity;  but  the  spirit-  10  1   Redf.  on  Wills,  24,  citing  Rich  v. 
26 


§21 


INCAPACITY   OF   MARRIED   WOMEN. 


*26,  *27 


marriage  contract,  and  not  the  exercise  of  testamentary  power  con- 
ferred by  the  law. 
£*  27]       *  But  in  equity  the  power  of  married  women  to  dispose  of 
their  real  as  well  as  personal  property  is  fully  recognized ; 
hence    all     property   over    which   courts     of    chancery    coverture  no 
obtain  jurisdiction  may  be  as  freely  and  fully  devised    disability  in 
by  a  married  woman  as    by  a  feme  sole,  whether   the    equi  -v" 
legal  estate  is  vested  in  a  trustee  or  not,  since  the  husband  and  all 
persons  on  whom  the  legal  estate  may  devolve  will  be  deemed  trustees 
for  the  persons  to  whom  the  wife  has  given  the  equitable  interest.1 

In  America  there  is  a  tendency  to  depart  from  the  ancient  doctrine 
of  the  common  law  in  respect  of  the  property  rights  of  married 
women.  So  great  is  the  progress  already  made  in  this 
direction,  that  it  seems  not  impossible  that  at  some  future 
day  the  principles  of  the  civil  law  will  have  entirely 
supplanted  the  common  law  in  this  respect,  and  when  no 
distinction  will  be  recognized  between  the  sexes,  and  between  mar- 
ried and  unmarried  females,  in  respect  of  their  right  to  acquire,  hold, 
and  dispose  of  property.2 

In  respect  of  the  testamentary  power  of  married  women  they  have 
been  placed  upon  a  footing  of  substantial,  if  not  absolute,  equality 
with  unmarried  women  and  men  in  Arizona,8  Arkansas,4 
Connecticut,  Florida,6 Illinois,6  Indiana,  Iowa,  Louisiana, 
Maine,7  Maryland,8  Michigan,9  Minnesota,10  Mississippi,11 
Montana,12  Nebraska,18  Nevada,14  New  Hampshire,16  New 
York,16  Ohio,17  Pennsylvania,18  South  Carolina,19  South   and  men 


Tendency  in 
America  to 
abolish  inca- 
pacity from 
coverture. 


States  put- 
ting married 
women  upon 
same  footing 
with  unmar- 
ried women 


Cockell,  9  Ves.  368,  375 ;  Hodsden  v. 
Lloyd,  2  Br.  C.  C.  534.  See  the  Chan- 
cellor's remarks,  p.  543  ;  the  will  was 
made  before  marriage,  and  held  revoked 
by  the  marriage. 

1  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *  39-41.  Seethe 
elaborate  statement  by  the  American  edi- 
tor of  the  common-law  doctrine  of  testa- 
mentary incapacity  by  coverture,  p.  *  41. 

a  The  Married  Women's  Property 
Act,  1882,  also  indicates  the  policy  of 
England  to  place  a  married  woman,  so  far 
as  her  separate  property  is  concerned,  in 
the  position  of  a  feme  sole :  Butt,  J.,  in 
Goods  of  Price,  L.  R.  12  Prob.  D.  137,  138. 

3  Rev.  St.  Ariz.  1887,  §  3232. 

*  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §§  7390,  7391. 

6  Rev.  St.  Fla.  1892,  §  1793. 

6  St.  &  Curt.  St.  1896,  ch.  148, T  1. 

7  Rev.  St.  c.  61,  §  1.  See  Meserve  v. 
Meserve,  63  Me.  518. 

8  Pub.  G.  L.  1888,  art.  93,  §  309.  See 
Schull  v.  Murray,  32  Md.  9,  15. 


9  Const.,  art.  xvi.  §  5. 

10  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  5627. 

11  Miss.  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  4488.  "A 
married  woman  enjoys  as  large  a  freedom 
in  this  State  as  a  man  in  regard  to  the 
testamentary  disposition  of  her  property. 
She  may  dispose  of  her  estate,  real  and 
personal,  by  last  will  and  testament,  in 
the  same  manner  as  if  she  were  not  mar- 
ried " :  Kelly  v.  Alfred,  65  Miss.  495,  497. 

12  St.  Mont.  1895,  Div.  II.  §  1720. 

13  Comp.  St.  1891,  ch.  23,  §  123. 

14  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  3001. 

15  Pub.  St.  N.  H.  oh.  186,  §  1. 

16  2  Banks  &  Bro.  (9th  ed.)  p.  1875, 
§  1 .  See  Van  Wert  v.  Benedict,  1  Bradf. 
114,  116. 

17  Code,  1897,  §  5914;  Allen  v.  Little, 
5  Oh.  66,  68,  et  seq. 

18  Laws,  1887;  Grubb's  Estate,  174 
Pa.  St.  187. 

19  A  will  made  by  a  married  woman 
before  she  was  enabled  by  statute  will  not 


27,  *  28      EXTERNAL   LIMITS   OF   TESTAMENTARY    CAPACITY.  §  21 


Dakota,1   Texas,2   Utah,8   Vermont,4   Washington,5   Wisconsin,6  and 
Wyoming ; 7  in  some  States  it  was  deemed  necessary  to  annex 
a  limitation   with   reference   *  to   the    husband's   rights   (as  [*  28] 
tenant  by  the  curtesy,  etc.,  in  strict  analogy  with  the  widow's 

right  of  dower,  etc.),  as  in  Missouri,8  New  Hampshire,9 
New  Jersey,10  Pennsylvania,11  Oregon,12  and  Rhode 
Island,18  in  others,  to  limit  the  power  to  one  half  of  her 
property,  without  consent  of  the  husband  in  respect  of 
the  other  half,  as  in  Colorado,14  Kansas,18  and  Massachu- 
setts.16 Power  to  dispose  of  her  separate  property  by 
will  is  given  in  Alabama,17  California,18  Indiana,19  Ken- 
tucky,20 Tennessee,21  and  Virginia,22  by  which  it  would 
States  allowing  seem  her  common-law  status  is  slightly,  if  at  all,  changed. 
poslTctfequit-  In  Georgia,  the  common  law  is  substantially  enacted  by 
able  estates.  statute,28  and  in  North  Carolina  the  common  law  pre- 
vails.24 In  Delaware  a  wife  may  will  her  property  with  the  consent 
of  her  husband  expressed  in  writing  and  attested  by  two  witnesses  ; 
but  such  will  is  nevertheless  inoperative  against  the  husband's  right 
to  curtesy.     In  Kentucky,  where  a  married  woman  cannot  make  a 


the  husband's 
marital  rights 

States  limiting 
testamentary 
power  of  mar- 
ried women  to 
one  half  their 
estate. 


be  validated  by  the  enabling  act  passed 
before  her  death :  Burkett  v.  Whittemore, 
36  S.  C.  428. 

1  Terr.  Dak.  1887,  §  3806. 

2  Rev.  St.  1895,  §  5333.  In  this  State 
marriage  enables  an  infant  female,  other- 
wise disqualified,  to  make  a  valid  will. 

3  Utah,  St.  1898,  §  2731. 
*  Vt.  St.  1894,  §  2346. 

6  Code  Wash.  1896,  §  5308. 
6  Wis.  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2277  (married 
women  at  18). 

I  Rev.  St.  Wyom.  1887,  §  1561. 

8  Rev.  St.  Mo.  1889,  §  8869. 

9  Code  1893,  p.  600,  §  5. 

io  Rev.  St.  N.  J.  1895,  p.  2014,  §  9.  See 
Vreeland  v.  Ryno,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  160 ;  Cam- 
den Co.  v.  Ingham,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  3,  6. 

II  Dickinson  v.  Dickinson,  61  Pa.  St. 
401.  And  see  Lee's  Appeal,  124  Pa.  St. 
74.  The  act  of  1887  (p.  333,  §  5)  enlarges 
the  feme  covert's  rights,  but  does  not  en- 
able her  to  pass  by  will  property  held  for 
her  in  trust:  Steinmetz' Appeal,  168  Pa. 
St.  175. 

12  Code,  1887,  §  3068. 

"  Gen.  L.  1896,  ch.  203,  §  12. 

«  Mills'  Ann.  St.  1891,  §3010. 

w  Gen.  St.  1897,  §§  34,  35.  See  Barry 
d.  Barry,  15  Kans.  587  ;  Bennett  u.  Hutch- 
inson, 11  Kans.  398,  408. 

if<  In  personalty:  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  819, 
28 


§  6.  This  statute  also  secures  to  the  hus- 
band his  curtesy.  It  is  held  that  the 
husband  takes  no  interest  in  his  wife's 
realty  devised  to  others,  if  he  has  no 
curtesy:  Burke  v.  Colbert,  144  Mass.  160. 

17  See  Mosser  v.  Mosser,  32  Ala.  551, 
555  ;  O'Donnell  v.  Rodiger,  76  Ala.  222. 

is  Civ.  Code,  §  1273. 

i9  Formerly  :  Noble  v.  Enos,  19  Ind.  72. 
But  see  Rev.  St.  1881,  §  2557  and  subse- 
quent statutes. 

20  Gen.  St.  1883,  p.  832,  §  4.  See 
George  v.  Bussing,  15  B.  Mou.  558,  562. 

21  Johnson  v.  Sharp,  4  Coldw.  45. 

22  Code  1887,  §  2286,  2513. 

28  Code  1882,  §  2410,  giving  the  reasons 
for  the  common-law  rule,  and  all  excep- 
tions. But  it  is  there  held  that  a  married 
woman  may  will  her  property  (the  lan- 
guage of  the  judge  is  "  all  they  own," 
which  seems  to  include  real  and  personal 
property,  whether  legal  or  equitable) 
without  her  husband's  consent :  Urquhart 
v.  Oliver,  56  Ga.  344,  346.  The  code  of 
1 895  seems  to  omit  reference  to  capacity 
of  married  women. 

24  A  married  woman  may  dispose  by 
will  of  her  equitable  property :  Leigh  v. 
Smith,  3  Ired.  Eq.  442,  445;  and  such 
will  must  be  admitted  to  probate  in  the 
probate  court :  Whitfield  v.  Hurst,  3 
Ired.  Eq.  242,  244. 


§  22  INCAPACITY   OP   CRIMINALS.  *  28,  *  29 

will,  it  was  held  that  a  holographic  will  executed  by  a  married  woman 
and  after  her  husband's  death  recognized  and  adopted  by  her  as  her 
will,  is  valid.1  But  when  the  will  is  not  wholly  written  by  testatrix, 
it  must  be  re-attested  after  removal  of  her  disability.'2 

§  22.    Incapacity  of  Criminals.  —  Other  limitations  upon  the  right 

to  dispose  of  property  by  last  will  existed  at  common  law 
[*  29]  *or  under  ancient  English  statutes.    Traitors  and  felons  were 

formerly  incompetent  to  devise  their  lands,  because    T 

~  , r  '  Incapacity 

they  were  by  the  attainder  ipso  facto  vested  in  the  crown.3  from  criuii- 
This  rule  included  a  felo  de  se  4  as  to  his  personal  prop-  nallt-v- 
erty,  but  he  was  capable  of  devising  his  realty  because  there  was  no 
attainder.5  This  subject  is  of  little  importance  now,  even  in  Eng- 
land, attainder  having  been  abolished  by  statute,6  and  has  not  been 
known  in  the  United  States  since  the  adoption  of  the  Federal 
Constitution.  Whether  the  murder  of  a  testator  or  ancestor  disables 
the  criminal  from  inheriting  is  discussed  in  a  later  chapter.7 

1  Porter  v.  Ford,  82  Ky.  191.  bate,  although  the  personal  property  of  the 

2  Gregory  v.  Oates,  92  Ky.  532.  deceased  was  forfeit  to  the  crown  :  Goods 

3  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *  43  et  seq.  of  Bailey,  2  Sw.  &  Tr.  156,  159. 

4  But  only  as  to  the  forfeiture  ;  it  was         6  Norris  v.  Chambres,  29    Beav.  246, 
held  that  the  executor  of  the  will  of  a  258. 

person  found  felo  de  se  by  the  verdict  of         «  33  &  34  Vict.  c.  23. 
a  coroner's  inquest  is  entitled  to  have  pro-         "  Post,  §  64. 


99 


*  30,  *  31       INCAPACITY   ARISING    FROM    MENTAL   DISABILITIES.      §  23 


*  CHAPTER   IV.  [*30] 

INCAPACITY   ARISING    FROM   MENTAL   DISABILITIES. 

§  23.  Degree  of  Mental  Vigor  requisite  to  make  a  Will.  —  The 
most  important  ground  of  testamentary  incapacity,  fertile  in  abund- 
Soundness  of  au^  crops  of  litigation,  is  that  of  mental  deficiency  aris- 
mind  neces-  mg  either  from  idiocy,  lunacy,  or  any  other  permanent 
tamentary  or  temporary  disorder  of  the  mind,  inconsistent  with  the 

capacity.  exercise   of  free  will ;  or  from    such  weakness   of   the 

mind  as  unfits  it  to  resist  undue  influences,  so  that  the  testator's  dis- 
positions cannot  be  said  to  be  his  own  spontaneous  acts,  but  are 
rather  the  results  of  importunities,  devices,  fraudulent  representa- 
tions, or  even  of  threats  and  force  brought  to  bear  upon  him  by  de- 
signing persons. 

This  subject  has  been  much  enlarged  upon  by  able  and  ingenious 
writers  of  the  legal  as  well  as  medical  profession,  who  have  treasured 
up  a  vast  amount  of  learning  in  their  voluminous  books.  Referring 
to  them  for  the  details  and  subtle  distinctions  drawn  between  the 
several  forms  of  incapacity  which  are  held  to  invalidate  wills,  it  is 
nevertheless  necessary  to  examine  the  principal  grounds  constituting 
such  incapacity,  in  order  to  point  out  the  principles  upon  which, 
under  our  system  of  laws,  property  passes  by  will. 

It  is  conceded  on  all  hands  that  no  rule  can  be  laid  down  to  indi- 
cate the  precise  degree  of  intelligence  or  mental  vigor  necessary  to 
constitute  testamentary  capacity.  The  nearest  approach  thereto  is 
the  requirement  of  the  same  capacity  for  testamentary  purposes 
Business  capa-  as  f°r  the  transaction  of  the  ordinary  business  of  life, 
city  as  a  test,  a  party  capable  of  acting  rationally  in  buying  and  sell- 
ing property,  settling  accounts,  collecting  and  paying  out  money,  or 
borrowing  or  loaning  money,  is  capable  of  making  a  valid  will.1  But 
inadequate  as  such  a  rule  is,  because  the  sole  criterion  which  it  fur- 
nishes is  an  uncertain  factor,  itself  to  be  ascertained  by  the  jury 
from  evidence  depending  more  or  less  upon  the  opinion  of  witnesses, 
it  is  not  of  universal  application  ;  for  it  has  been  held,  as  will 
appear  from  *  the  further  consideration  of  this  subject,2  that  [*  31J 
a  man  may  be  incapable  of  managing  his  business,  or  to  make 
a  contract,  and  yet  competent  to  make  a  valid  will.8     The  doctrine 

1  Meeker  v.  Meeker,   75  111.  260,  266.  2  Post,  §  29. 

See  also  Bice  t\  Hall,  120  111.  597,  601 ;  8  The  broad  statement  by  the  reporter 

Brown  v.  Biggin,  94  111.  560.  of  the  case  of  Townsend  t\  Bogart,  5  Kedf. 
30 


§23 


MENTAL   VIGOR   REQUISITE   TO    MAKE   A   WILL. 


31 


once  held  in  Illinois,  that  inability  to  perform  or  transact  ordinary  busi- 
ness is  a  correct  test  of  testamentary  incapacity,  has  been  expressly 
receded  from.1  Business  capacity  is  not,  therefore,  an  absolutely  re- 
liable standard  of  testamentary  capacity.2  But  it  seems  to  be  held  as 
a  general  rule,  that  as  it  requires  no  greater  mental  capacity  to  dis- 
pose of  property  by  will  than  to  transact  ordinary  business,  it  has 
generally  been  held  that  capacity  to  transact  such  ordinary  business 
would  show  testamentary  capacity.3  The  most  accurate  rule  laid  down 
in  a  number  of  States  seems  now  to  be  this  :  "While  the  law  does  not 
undertake  to  measure  a  person's  intellect,  and  define  the  exact  quan- 
tity of  mind  and  memory  which  a  testator  shall  possess  to  authorize 
him  to  make  a  valid  will,  yet  it  does  require  him  to  possess  mind  to 
know  the  extent  and  value  of  his  property,  the  number  and  names  of 
the  persons  who  are  the  natural  objects  of  his  bounty,  their  deserts 
with  reference  to  their  conduct  and  treatment  toward  him,  their 
capacity  and  necessity,  and  that  he  shall  have  sufficient  active  mem- 
ory to  retain  all  these  facts  in  his  mind  long  enough  to  have  his  will 
prepared  and  executed;  if  he  has  sufficient  mind  and  memory  to  do 
this,  the  law  holds  that  he  has  testamentary  capacity  ;  and  even  if 
this  amount  of  mental  capacity  is  somewhat  obscured  or  clouded, 
still  the  will  may  be  sustained."4     And  it  should  be  re- 

J  .    .  .  .  The  will  must 

membered  that  the  decisive  question  always  is  whether   be  the  sponta- 
the  instrument  propounded  is  the  spontaneous  act  of  a  ™°t^0*f  of 
person  understanding  its  nature  and  consequences  ;  and 


93,  that  a  person  may  be  compos  vientis  in 
the  ordinary  broad  use  of  the  term,  and 
yet  be  mentally  incompetent  to  make  a 
will,  is  hardly  justified  by  the  language 
of  the  surrogate,  either  in  this  case  (p. 
105),  or  in  the  case  of  Mairs  v.  Freeman, 
3  Redf.  181,  to  which  reference  is  made. 

1  Greene  v.  Greene,  145  111.  264,  275  ; 
Sinnet  v.  Bowman,  151  111.  146. 

2  Townsend  v.  Bogart,  5  Redf  93,  104; 
Kramer  v.  Weinert,  81  Ala.  414,  416,  cit- 
ing Stubbs  v.  Houston,  33  Ala.  555 ;  Sin- 
net  v.  Bowman,  151  111.  146,  155.  In 
.Maryland  the  statute  provides  that  to 
make  a  valid  will  the  testator  must  be 
capable  of  executing  a  valid  deed  or  con- 
tract :  Davis  v.  Calvert,  5  G.  &  J.  269  ; 
Stewart  v.  Elliott,  2  Mackey,  307,  318. 

3  Craig  v.  Southard,  148  111.  37,  45. 

*  Bundy  v.  McKnight,  48  Ind.  502,  in- 
struction to  the  jury,  p.  511,  approved, 
p.  514.  See  cases  there  cited:  Moore  v. 
Moore,  2  Bradf.  261  ;  Morris  v.  Stokes,  21 
Ga.  552,  571.  Also  cases  cited  by  Cal- 
vin, Surrogate,  in  Townsend  v.  Bogart, 
supra :    Van  Guysling  v.  Van   Kuren,  35 


N.  Y.  70;  Barnhart  v.  Smith,  86  N.  C. 
473,  483.  To  similar  effect:  Elliott  v. 
Welby,  13  Mo.  App.  19,  24;  Couch  v. 
Gentry,  113  Mo.  248;  Benoist  v.  Murrin, 
58  Mo.  307,  322 ;  affirmed,  Jackson  v. 
Hardin,  83  Mo.  175,  180;  Delafield  v. 
Parish,  25  N.  Y.  9,  29,  citing  numerous 
cases;  Snelling's  Will,  136  N.  Y.  515; 
Campbell  v.  Campbell,  130  111.  466; 
Tucker  r.  Sundfidge,  85  Va.  546  ;  O'Don- 
nell  v.  Rodiger,  76  Ala.  222,  228.  See 
Rice  v.  Rice,  53  Mich.  432,  437  ;  Ballan- 
tine  v.  Proudfoot,  62  Wis.  216;  Will  of 
Farnsworth,  62  Wis.  474 ;  Delaney  v. 
Salina,  34  Kans.  532;  Sherley  v.  Sher- 
ley,  81  Ky.  240,  249 ;  Blough  v.  Parry, 
144  Ind.  463,  489  ;  Burkhart  v.  Gladish, 
123  Ind.  337;  Shaver  v.  McCarthy,  110 
Pa.  St.  339  ;  Stoutenburg  v.  Hopkins,  43 
N.  J.  Eq.  577  ;  Chrisman  v.  Chrisman,  16 
Oreg.  127;  Epling  v.  Hutton,  121  111.  555. 
"And  medical  experts  cannot  =et  aside 
the  law  by  stating  that  these  facts  make 
no  difference  with  their  opinions  : "  Pren- 
tis  v.  Bates,  88  Mich.  567,  591  ;  s.  c.  on 
rehearing,  93  Mich.  234.  "  A  person  may 
31 


*  31,  *  32         INCAPACITY  ARISING  FROM  MENTAL  DISABILITIES.        §  24 

that  this  is,  ultimately,  a  question  of  fact  to  be  determined  by  the 
jury.1 

*  §  24.    Incapacity  of  Idiots.  —  An  idiot  is  said  to  be  a  per-  [*  32] 
son  wholly  destitute  of  the  reasoning  faculty,  unable  to  compare 

two  ideas  together,2  and  utterly  incapacitated  for  the 
deprivation  transaction  of  any  business.3  Early  writers  laid  down  very 
of  reasoning       narrow  tests  of  idiocy,  such  as  inability  to  count  twenty 

pence,  to  tell  father  or  mother,  or  how  old  he  is  ;  * 
Blackstone  lays  down  the  same  rule  nearly  two  centuries  afterward,5 
and  Lord  Hardwicke  said  that  the  term  non  compos  m,entis  imports 
not  weakness  of  understanding,  but  a  total  deprivation  of  reason.6 
In  later  years,  courts  of  equity,  both  in  England  and  America,  have 
taken  jurisdiction  of  persons  who  had  become  from  any  cause  so 
weak  and  incapacitated  in  mind  as  to  be  unable  to  manage  their 
affairs,  and  placed  them  under  guardianship  ; '  but  in  respect  of  the 
testatory  power  it  seems  that,  while  the  will  of  a  person  proved  an 
idiot  is  of  course  void,8  mere  weakness  of  mind,  imbecility,  whimsi- 
cality, or  eccentricity  is  not  sufficient,  in  the  absence  of  other  proof 
of  incapacity,  to  invalidate  a  will.9 


be  mentally  competent  to  dispose  of  a 
small  estate  among  a  few  persons,  and  yet 
not  have  capacity  to  dispose  of  a  large 
estate  among  a  greater  number  " :  Taylor 
v.  Pegram,  151  111.  106,  120. 

1  See  the  case  of  Potts  v.  House,  6  Ga. 
324,  350,  et  seq. ;  Stewart  v.  Lispenard,  26 
Wend.  255,  296,  et  seq.  ;  Comstock  v. 
Hadlyme,  8  Conn.  254,  264  ;  Cordrey  v. 
Cordrey,  1  Houst.  269,  273 ;  Trish  v. 
Newell^  62  111.  196,  203 ;  Brooke  v.  Town- 
send,  7  Gill,  10,  32;  Stevens  v.  Vancleve, 
4  Wash.  C.  C.  262,  269;  Boyd  v.  Eby,  8 
Watts,  66,  70 ;  Gardiner  v.  Gardiner,  34 
N.  Y.  155,  157. 

It  is  error  to  take  from  the  jury  the 
question  of  undue  influence,  or  to  tell  them 
that  in  case  of  doubt  they  must  find  for 
the  will :  Muller  v.  St.  Louis  Hospital,  73 
Mo.  242,  affirming  8.  c.  5  Mo.  App.  390. 
But  where  the  testimony  is  such  that  the 
court  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  legal  dis- 
cretion would  not  sustain  the  verdict,  the 
court  should  refuse  to  direct  an  issue  : 
Eddey's  Appeal,  109  Pa.  St.  406  ;  Herster 
v.  Herster,  116  Pa.  St.  612  ;  s.  c.  122  Pa. 
St.  239,  264.  To  same  effect :  McFadin 
v.  Catron,  138  Mo.  197;  Nelson's  Will, 
39  Minn.  204  ;  In  rr  Wilson.  1 1  7  Cal.  262  , 
and  see  also  on  effect  to  be  given  to  the 
jury's  verdict, post,  §  227,  p.  *  500,  note. 
32 


2  See  Dr.  Ray,  Med.  Jur.  Insan.,  §  60 
(5th  ed.). 

3  Bannatyne  v.  Bannatyne,  14  Eng.  L. 
&  Eq.  581,  590. 

4  "  So  as  it  may  appear  that  he  hath  no 
understanding  or  reason  what  shall  be  for 
his  profit,  or  what  for  his  loss :  but  if  he 
hath  such  understanding,  that  he  know 
and  understand  his  letters,  and  read  by 
teaching  or  information  of  another  man, 
theu  it  seemeth  he  is  not  a  fool  or  natural 
idiot.-  "  Comment  ascribed  to  Lord  Hale, 
in  Fitzherbert's  Natura  Brevium,  233. 

5  "  A  man  is  not  an  idiot  if  he  hath 
any  glimmering  of  reason,  so  that  he  can 
tell  his  parents,  his  age,  or  the  like  com- 
mon matters :  "  1  Bla.  Comm.  304. 

6  Ex  parte  Barnsley,  3  Atk.  168,  173. 

7  Gibson  v.  Jeyes,  6  Ves.  266,  272  ; 
Ridgway  v.  Darwin,  8  Ves.  65;  In  re 
Barker,  2  Johns.  Ch.  233. 

8  1  .Tarm.  on  Wills,  *  34;  Whart.  & 
Stille,  Med.  Jur.  §  20. 

9  The  cases  so  holding  are  very  numer- 
ous. See  Stewart  v.  Lispenard,  26  Wend. 
255,  particularly  the  Surrogate's  opinion, 
p.  263 :  the  Chancellor's  opinion,  p.  290 ; 
aud  the  opinions  of  Senators  Verplanck, 
p.  296.  and  Scott,  p.  314;  Lee  v.  Lee,  4 
McCord,  183  ;  Delafield  v.  Parish,  25 
N.  Y.  9,    102;  Kinne  v.  Kinne,  9  Conn. 


§  25  INCAPACITY   OP   LUNATICS.  **  32-34 

§  25.    Incapacity  of  Lunatics.  —  Unless,  therefore,  a  person  is  proved 
to  have  been  an  idiot,  or  natural  fool,  some  other  evidence 
[*  33]  *  of  incapacity  must  exist,  in  addition  to  imbecility  or  weakness 
of  the  mind,  to  invalidate  his  will.     Persons  non    T 

n  ,        .     ,        ,  .    ,  Lunacv  or 

compos  mentis  —  or  or  unsound  mind,  which  terms  are  periodical 
now  generally  conceded  to  mean  the  same  thing  1  —  may  1Ilsanit>'- 
be  lunatics,  distinguishable  from  idiots  chiefly  by  the  periodicity  or 
partial  nature  of  the  disorder  of  their  mind,  while  idiots  are  uni- 
formly and  wholly  deprived  of  reason ;  and  from  imbeciles,  who  may 
or  may  not  possess  sufficient  vigor  of  mind  to  dispose  of  their  prop- 
erty, according  to  the  circumstances  by  which  they  are  surrounded, 
while  lunatics  who  are  not  imbeciles,  but  affected  with  delusions,  may 
have  ample  mental  force,  but  exercise  it  in  an  abnormal  or  perverted 
manner.  The  importance  of  the  distinction  lies  in  the  difference  of 
the  treatment  of  the  issue  of  devisavit  vel  non,  and  of  the  evidence 
under  it,  necessary  to  meet  the  case  arising  on  the  one  or  other 
ground.  For  if  it  be  proved  that  the  testator  was  an  idiot,  this  will 
invalidate  the  will.  If  it  be  shown  that  he  was  of  weak  mind,  the 
question  will  be  whether  there  was  undue  influence.  If  his  mind  was 
affected  by  delusions,  the  validity  of  the  will  must  depend  upon  the 
further  question  whether  it  is  affected  by,  or  its  provisions  are  the 
consequence  of,  an  insane  delusion.2 

The  term  lunacy  originated  in  the  hypothesis  formerly  entertained 
concerning  periodical  insanity,  that  the  persons  affected  were  under 
the  influence,  of  the  moon  ;  it  is  now  used  in  the  law  to 
denote  insanity  or  derangement  of  the  mind  generally.3   tVderan^e- 
It  is  said  to  be  a  disease  of  the  brain,  a  mental  disorder,    mentof  mind 
by  which  the  freedom   of  the  will   is   impaired.     The   ger    a  "' 
legal  test  of  insanity  is  delusion.     "Insane  delusion  consists  in  a  be- 
lief of  facts  which  no  rational  person  would  believe  ;  "  4  taking  things 
for  realities  which  exist  only  in  the  imagination,5  and  which 
[*  34]  are  impossible  in  the  nature  of  things ; 6  "  mingling  *  ideas 

102,   105;   Harrison  v.   Rowan,  3  Wash,  tion,  Mania,  Delirium,  Frenzy,  Monoma- 

C.    C.    580,    586 ;    Hall   v.   Dougherty,   5  nia,  Dementia,  as  synonyms. 

Houst.  435,  449.  *  Forman's  Will,    54    Barb.  274,  289, 

1  1  Redf.  on  Wills,  *  59,  pi.  1 ;  lb.,  61,  quoting  from  Dew  v.  Clark,  3  Addams's 
pi.  5;  Buswell  on  Insanity,  §  18.  Eccl.  R.  79.     See  also  various  definitions 

2  See  Bigelow's  note  (1 ),  1  Jarm.  on  quoted  in  Kimberly's  Appeal,  68  Conn. 
Wills,  *  38,  in  which  he  calls  attention  to  428,  435. 

the  necessity  of  this  distinction,  and  col-  5  Waring    v.    Waring,    6    Thornton's 

lects  numerous    English    and    American  Notes,  388 ;  Morse  v.  Scott,  4  Dem.  507, 

authorities  on  the  subject  under  cousid-  508.     See  also  Potter  v.  Jones,  20  Oreg. 

eration.  239. 

8  Per  Patton,  Pr.,  in  McElroy's  Case,  6  Ray's  Med.  Jur.  §  169.     "  It  is  of  the 

6  W.  &  S.  451,  453.     Webster  mentions,  essence  of  an  insane  delusion,  that,  as  it 

under  the  word  "  Insanity,"  Lunacy,  Mad-  has   no  basis  in  reason,  so  it  cannot  by 

ness,  Derangement,  Alienation,   Aberra-  reason  be  dispersed  ":'  Merrill  v.  Rolston, 

5  Redf.  220,  251. 

VOL.  I.  —  3  33 


*34 


INCAPACITY    ARISING    FROM    MENTAL    DISABILITIES. 


J  £5 


of  imagination  with  those  of  sensation,  and  mistaking  one  for  the 
other."  x 

Partial  insanity,  where  a  person  has  insane  delusions  as  to  one  or 
more  subjects,  and  not  as  to  others,  does  not  destroy  testamentary 
Partial  capacity,  unless  the  insane  delusion  concerns  the  subject 

insanity.  0f  the   testamentary    disposition.2     But  however  unim- 

paired the  memory  may  be,  and  although  there  may  be  reasoning 
power,  if  there  be  insane  delusion  concerning  the  property  which  one 
seeks  to  dispose  of,  he  cannot  make  a  valid  will.8 

Neither  superstition  nor  ignorance,  however  gross,4  nor  error  in 
fact,5  nor  prejudice,6  nor  unfounded   suspicion,7  amounts  to  an  insane 

1  Duffield  v.  Morris,  2  Harr.  (Del).  375,     son  v.  Cofield,  171  111.  14  ;  Denson  v.  Beaz- 

ley,  34  Tex.  191,  198,  and  dissenting 
opinion,  206  et  seq. ;  Otto  v.  Doty,  61  Iowa, 
23  ;  Storey's  Will,  20  111.  App."  183,  194  ; 
Whipple  v.  Eddy,  161  111.  114;  In  re 
Spencer,  96  Cal.  448 ;    McClary  v.   Stull, 

44  Neb.  175;  Will  of  Smith,  52  Wis.  543, 
547,  et  seq. ;  and  Brown  v.  Ward,  53  Md. 
376  ;  all  holding  that  a  belief  in  spiritual- 
ism is  not  of  itself  a  certain  test  of  insanity. 
La  Bau  v.  Vanderbilt,  3  Redf.  384,  388, 
holding  that  a  belief  in  clairvoyance  does 
not  invalidate  a  will,  unless  it  be  shown 
that  it  was  the  offspring  of  such  belief. 
To  similar  effect,  Schildknecht  t\  Rompf, 
4  Southw.  R.  (Ky.)  235.  And  see  the 
reporter's  note  appended  to  Middleditch  v. 
Williams,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  726,  727,  for  a 
collection  of  cases  on  the  effect  of  spirit- 
ualism and  similar  beliefs  on  wills. 

6  Hall  v.  Hall,  38  Ala.  131,  134  ;  Clapp 
v.  Fullerton,  34  N.  Y.  190;  Hite  v.  Sims, 
94    Ind.  333  ;    Middleditch   v.  Williams, 

45  N.  J.  Eq.  726;  Will  of  White,  121 
N.  Y.  406;  Cline's  Will,  24  Oreg.  175. 
But  see  Ballantine  v.  Proudfoot,  62  Wis. 
21 7,  where  the  erroneous  impression  of  the 
testatrix  as  to  the  conduct  of  her  daughter 
was  held  an  insane  delusion  avoiding  the 
will  ;  and  see  also  Re  Dorman,  5  Dem. 
112.  And  a  will  made  as  the  offspring  of 
a  monomaniacal  delusiou  of  the  testator 
against  his  daughter,  and  the  supposed 
misconduct  of  such  daughter,  which  has 
no  existence  whatever,  being  merely  the 
creation  of  testator's  imagination,  such 
will  will  be  set  aside :  Thomas  v.  Carter, 
170  Pa.  St.  272. 

6  Den  v.  Gibbons,  22  N.  J.L.  117,  155 ; 


380.     See  YVhart.  &  Stille's  Med.  Jurispr. 
(4th  ed.)  §  19  et  seq.,  §  305  et  seq. 

2  Forman's  Will,  54  Barb.  274,  289 
et  seq.,  citing  (p.  289)  Dew  v.  Clark,  3 
Addams's  Eccl.  R.  79  ;  Frere  v.  Peacocke, 
1  Rob.  Eccl.  R.  442,  445;  Fulleck  v. 
Allinson,  3  Hagg.  527  ;  Seaman's  Friend 
Soc.  v.  Hopper,  33  N.  Y.  619  ;  Stanton  v. 
Wetherwax,  16  Barb.  259;  Potter  v. 
Jones,  20  Oreg.  239;  Taylor  v.  Trich, 
165  Pa.  St.  586,  603,  605.  "  See  also  Cot- 
ton v.  Ulmer,  45  Ala.  378,  395  ;  Board- 
man  v.  Woodman,  47  N.  H.  120 ;  Gardner 
v.  Lamback,  47  Ga.  133,  192;  Hollinger 
v.  Syms,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  221,  236,  et  seq.  ; 
Benoist  v.  Murrin,  58  Mo.  307,  323 ;  Rice 
r.  Rice,  53  Mich.  432,  434 ;  Brace  v.  Black, 
125  111.  33.  It  was  held  in  Louisiana,  that 
where  a  person  himself,  unaided  by  others, 
makes  a  sage  and  judicious  will  containing 
nothing  "  sounding  in  folly,"  it  will  be 
presumed,  in  the  case  of  a  person  habitu- 
ally insane,  that  it  was  made  during  a 
lucid  interval,  throwing  the  burden  of 
proof  upon  those  attacking  it :  Kingsbury 
r.  Whittaker,  32  La.  An.  1055,  1061,  et  seq. 
See  Vance  v.  Upson,  66  Tex.  476,  488. 

8  Brinton's  Estate,  13  Phila.  234  ;  Taw- 
ney  v.  Long,  76  Pa.  St.  106,  111,  116; 
Taylor  v.  Trich,  1 65  Pa.  St.  586  ;  Ballantine 
v.  Proudfoot,  62  Wis.  216. 

*  Florey  v.  Florey,  24  Ala.  241,  249,  et 
seq.;  Leech  V.  Leech,  1  Phila.  244,  247; 
Addington  v.  Wilson,  5  Ind.  137,  139; 
Gass  v.  Gass,  3  Humph.  278,282;  Chafin 
Will  ('as,-,  32  Wis.  557,  564.  Belief  in 
spiritualism  has  often  been  held  not  to  be 
conclusive  evidence  "f  insanity:  Orchard- 


7  Seaman's  Friend   Society  v.  Hopper     228;  Cole's  Will,  49  Wis.  179,181;    Pot- 
(IbM, per  Will   Case),  83   N.  V.  019,624;     ter  v.  Jones,  20  Oreg.  239. 
Stackhonse  v.  Norton,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  202, 


§  26  PRESUMPTION  OF  SANITY,  AND  LUCID  INTERVALS.        *  34,  *  35 

delusion.     Nor  does  moral  insanity,  unaccompanied  by    What  are     t 

insane  delusion,  vitiate  a  will,  however  unjust,  un-   insane 
[*  35]  natural,  or  perverse  the  content,  or  immoral  *  the    delusion8- 

motive  may  be.1     But  such  facts  may  be  shown,  together  with 
other  evidence  on  the  question  of  unsoundness  of  mind.2 

§  26.    Presumption  of  Sanity,  and  Lucid  Intervals.  —  As  partial  in- 
sanity, or  the  existence  of  delusion  on  one  or  more  subjects  (mono- 
mania), is  not  sufficient  to  invalidate  a  will  unless  the  de-    Rur(jen  0I 
lusion  be  upon  the  subject  affected  by  the  testatory  act,8   proof  of 
so,  too,  the  will  of  an  insane  person  may  be  valid,  if  it  be    alwavs  on 
shown  that  it  was  executed  during  a  lucid  interval.    The    proponent, 
importance,  in  a  legal  sense,  of  the  subject  of  lucid  intervals  in  a 
mind  affected  by  insanity,  is  due,  like  that  of  the  distinction  between 
idiocy  and  lunacy,  to  the  nature  of  the  evidence  necessary  to  estab- 
lish the  will  of  a  person  proved  to  have  been  insane.     For  the  bur- 
den of  proving  the  validity  of  a  will  resting  necessarily  upon  him 
who  propounds  it  for  probate,  it  is  obvious  that  he  must  show,  among 
other  things,  the  sanity  of  the  testator,  without  which  his  proof  must 
fail,  and  the  instrument  propounded  cannot  receive  probate.4     But 
since  experience  has  shown  that  sanity  or  soundness  is  the  general 
condition  of  the  human  mind,  the  law  permits  the  pro-    But  may  con- 
ponent  of  the  instrument  to  rely  on  the  presumption  of    presumption 
sanity  arising  out  of  this  experience,  instead  of  requir-    of  sanity, 
ing  affirmative  or  actual  proof  thereof.     If,  therefore,  a  will  is  pro- 
duced, and  its  due  execution  proved,  this,  in  the  absence  of  further 
proof,  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  will.5    This  presumption,  however, 

Jenckes  v.  Smithfield,  2  R.  I.  255,  263  ;  will,  and  also  to   be  the  free  and  uncon- 

Phillips  v.  Chater,  1  Dem.  533  ;  Carter  v.  strained    product    of  a  sound  mind,  the 

Dixon,  69  Ga.  82;  Salisbury  v.  Aldrich,  courts  are  bound  to  uphold  it":  Middle- 

118  111.  199,  203;    Chaney   v.   Bryan,   16  ditch  v.  Williams,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  726,729; 

Lea,  63,  68;  Schneider  v.  Manning,  121  Smith  v.  Smith,  48   N.  J.    Eq.  566,  591; 

111.  376  ;  In  re  Spencer,  96  Cal.  448.  In  re  Wilson,  117  Cal.  262.     And  a  gift 

1  If  the  disposition  is  not  against  the  to  one  with  whom  the   testator  lived  in 

policy  of  the   law.      See  Dew  v.   Glark,  adultery  or  concubinage  is  not  for  that 

supra  ;  Boardman  v.  Woodman,  47  N.  H.  reason  void  :  see  post,  §  31,  p.  *  48,  n.  5. 
120,  136  ;  Frere  v.  Peacocke,  supra ;  Nich-  2  Bitner  v.  Bituer,  65  Pa.  St.  347,  362  ; 

olas  v.  Kershner,  20  W.  Va.  251  ;    Mayo  Mayo  v.  Jones,  supra ;  Leech  v.  Leech,  I 

v.  Jones,  78  N.  C.  402,406;  Carpenters.  Phila.  244;    Woodbury  v.  O  bear,  7  Gray, 

Calvert,  83  111.  62,  70 ;  Higgins  v.  Carlton,  467,  470  ;  Hubbard  v.  Hubbard,  7  Oreg. 

28  Md.  115  ;    Lewis's  Case,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  42,  46  ;  Lamb  v.  Lamb,  105  Ind.  456,  462 ; 

219,226,  holding  that  a  man  may  be  a  Gurley  v.  Park,  135  Ind.  440 ;  Nicewander 

thief,    a  miser,  unclean,   profane,  and  of  v.  Nicewander,  151   111.    156;    Sherley  v. 

ungovernable  temper,  and  yet  have  testa-  Sherley,  81  Ky.  240. 
mentary  capacity  ;    Will   of   Blakely,  48  3  Ante,  §  25. 

Wis.  294.     "A  will  may  be  contrary  to  4  Wms.  Ex.  [21]. 

the  principles  of  justice  and  humanity,  its  5  At  least  in  contentious  proceedings, 

provisions  may  be  shockingly   unnatural  The  statutory  requirements  in  the  several 

and  extremely  unjust,  nevertheless,  if  it  States,  and  the  rules  of  proceeding  in  the 

appear  to  have  been  made  by  a  person  of  probate  of  a  will  in  common  form,  or  in 

sufficient  age  to  be  competent  to  make  a  a  non-contentious  or  ex  parte  proceeding, 

35 


**  35-37        INCAPACITY  ARISING  FROM  MENTAL  DISABILITIES. 


§26 


This  pre- 
sumption 
may  be  re 
butted. 


may  be  met  by  evidence  of  the  testator's  incompetency, 
which  mayor  may  not  convince  the  jury;  if  it  fail  to 
disturb  their   confidence   in   his   competency,    the   pre- 
sumption will  still  prevail,  although  no  evidence  of  sanity  be 

*  offered.    But  if  the  evidence  be  such  as  to  show  [*  3C 
the  existence  of  insanity  in  the  testator  generally, 
so  that  in  the  absence  of  further  proof  the  presumption  of 
sanity  would  be  rebutted,  it  may  still  be  shown,  in  sup- 
port of  the  will,  that  it  was  made  during  a  lucid  interval.1 
The  applicability  of  the  presumption  of  sanity,  and  its  extent  in 
support  of  a  last  will,  has  given  rise  to  voluminous  discussions  in 
text-books  and  in  the  courts  of  the  several  American  States.     The 
prevailing  doctrine  (in  the  absence  of  statutory  provi* 
sions  to  the  contrary)  is  in  accordance  with  the  English 
view,    as   above   stated.2     It   is   so   held    in   Alabama,3 
Arkansas,4  California,5  Delaware,6  Indiana,7  Iowa,8 
Kansas,9  Kentucky,10   Maryland,11   Massachusetts,1'2  *  Missis-  [*  37] 


And  then  it 
may  be  shown 
that  will  was 
made  during 
a  lucid 
interval. 


States  in  which 
the  presump- 
tion of  sanity 
mav  be  relied 


may  raise  a  different  rule.     See  on  this 
subject,  post,  §§  216,  220. 

1  Cartwright  v.  Cartwright,  1  Phillim. 
90,  100,  in  which  Sir  Win.  Wynne  states 
the  law  as  follows  :  "  If  you  can  establish 
that  the  party  afflicted  habitually  by  a 
malady  of  the  mind  has  intermissions, 
and  if  there  was  an  intermission  of  the 
disorder  at  the  time  of  the  act,  that  being 
proved  is  sufficient,  and  the  general  ha- 
bitual insanity  will  not  affect  it ;  but  the 
effect  of  it  is  this,  it  inverts  the  order  of 
proof  and  of  presumption ;  for  until  proof 
of  an  habitual  insanity  is  made,  the  pre- 
sumption is  that  the  party  agent,  like  all 
human  creatures,  was  rational ;  but  where 
an  habitual  insanity,  in  the  mind  of  the 
person  who  does  the  act,  is  established, 
there  the  party  who  would  take  advan- 
tage of  an  interval  of  reason  must  prove 
it."  See  Wms.  Ex.  [20]  et  seq.,  and 
numerous  English  cases  cited  there.  1 
Jarm.  on  Wills,  *  37. 

2  Wms.  Ex.  [20]  etseq.  See  preceding 
note. 

:i  Stubbs  v.  Houston,  33  Ala.  555,  563, 
in  effect  overruling  Punlap  v.  Robinson, 
28  Ala.  100;  Cotton  v.  Ulmer,  45  Ala. 
378,  396 ;  O'Donnell  v.  Rodiger,  76  Ala. 
222,  227  ;  Eastis  v.  Montgomery,  95  Ala. 
486,  494. 


4  McDaniel  v.  Crosby,  19  Ark.  533, 
545,  on  the  authority  of  and  approving 
Rogers  v.  Diamond,  13  Ark.  474,  and 
several  English  cases  so  holding ;  Mc- 
Cullogh  v.  Campbell,  49  Ark.  367. 

5  Panaud  v.  Jones,  1  Cal.  488  (per 
Bennet,  J    p.  438). 

6  Chandler  v.  Ferris,  1  Harr.  454,  461  ; 
Jamison  v.  Jamison,  3  Houst.  108,  124. 
The  Syllabus  omits  to  mention  this  point; 
the  charge  to  the  jury  contains  these 
words :  "  The  presumption  of  law  is  in 
favor  of  his  capacity ;  the  burden  of 
showing  want  of  capacity  rests  on  those 
who  oppose  the  will ;  and  it  is  incum- 
bent on  them  to  show  such  incapacity  by 
satisfactory  proof."  (p.  124.) 

7  Turner  v.  Cook,  36  Ind.  129,  137.  In 
this  case  the  statute  is  referred  to  as  re- 
quiring proof,  in  probate  in  the  common 
form,  of  execution,  competence,  and  free- 
dom from  restraint ;  but  throws  the  onus 
to  prove  unsoundness  of  mind  on  the 
party  alleging  it.  Blough  v.  Parry,  144 
Ind.  463. 

8  Webber  v.  Sullivan,  58  Iowa,  260, 
266. 

9  Rich  v.  Bowker,  25  Ivans.  7,  1 2. 

1"  Milton  v.  Hunter,  13  Bush,  163,  170, 
distinguishing  between  the  practice  in 
probate  courts,  where  the  statute  requires 


11  Taylor  v.  Cr^sswell,  45  Md.  422,  430.  proof  is  upon  the  party  impeaching  a  will 

"  In  this  State  the  presumption  of  law  is  for  want  of  testamentary  capacity." 
in    favor  of  sanity,  and    the   burthen    of  12  It  was  held  in  this  State,  in  the  case 

36 


§26 


PRESUMPTION  OF  SANITY,  AND  LUCID  INTERVALS. 


3T 


sippi,1  New  Hampshire,2  New  Jersey,8  New  York,4  North  Carolina,5 
Oregon,6    Pennsylvania,7    Tennessee,8    and    apparently   in   Wiscon- 
sin.9    The  States  in  which  the  presumption  is  held  inap-   states  in  which 
plicable  or  insufficient,  and  that  affirmative  evidence  of   |J^nPsen"[np~ 
the  testator's  sanity  is  necessary  to  establish  the  will,  are    sufficient. 
Connecticut,10  Georgia,11  Illinois,12  Maine,13  Michigan,14  Miunesota,15 


the  witnesses  to  be  interrogated  concern- 
ing the  testator's  sanity,  and  the  contest 
of  a  will  in  chancery  or  on  appeal ;  af- 
firmed in  Flood  *;.  Pragoff,  79  Ky.  607, 
612. 

1  Payne  v.  Banks,  32  Miss.  292,  296. 

2Pettest>.  Bingham,  10  N.  II.  514, 
515,  affirmed  in  Perkins  v.  Perkins,  39 
N.  H.  163,  167. 

8  Elkinten  v.  Brick,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  154, 
158  ;  Whitenack  v.  Stryker,  2  N.  J.  Eq.  8, 
11,  affirming  the  rule  as  stated  in  the 
text,  and  repeated  in  Turner  v.  Cheesman, 
15  N.  J.  Eq.  243,  245,  and  Boylan  v. 
Meeker,  28  N.  J.  L.  274,  280  ;  and  in  Den 
v.  Gibbons,  22  N.  J.  L.  117,  the  court  ap- 
prove an  instruction  to  the  jury,  that  the 
existence  of  doubt  should  be  decisive 
against  the  conclusion  of  insanity,  p.  141. 

*  Ean  v.  Snyder,  46  Barb.  230,  232; 
Gombault  v.  Public  Administrator,  4 
Bradf.  226,  244;  Brown  v.  Torrey,  24 
Barb.  583,  586. 

6  Mayo  v.  Jones,  78  N.  C.  402,  403, 
et  seq.,  distinguishing  between  the  probate 
in  common  form  and  the  trial  of  an  issue 
between  parties,  p.  405. 

6  Clark  v.  Ellis,  9  Oreg.  128, 142,  et  seq. ; 
Chrisman  v.  Chrisman,  16  Oreg.  127. 

7  Grubbs  v.  McDonald,  91  Pa.  St.  236, 
241,  citing  Landis  v.  Landis,  1  Grant,  248. 

8  Puryear  v.  Reese,  6  Coldw.  21,  25; 
Bartee  v.  Thompson,  8  Baxt.  508,  512. 

9  In  Lewis's  Will,  the  judge,  having 
found  the  testator  to  be  competent  by 
preponderance  of  evidence,  adds :  "  The 
presumption  is  that  he  continued  compe- 
tent to  do  so  until  the  will  was  executed ; 
.  .  .  we  think  the  contestant  has  failed  to 
overthrow  that  presumption":  51  Wis. 
101,  112;  Cole's  Will,  49  Wis.  179,  182; 
Lyon,  J.,  in  Silverthorn's  Will,  68  Wis. 
372,  379,  states  that  in  his  opinion  the 
statute  requires  affirmative  proof  to  be 
made  of  the  mental  soundness  of  the 
testator  before  the  will  can  be  admitted 


to  probate ;  but  slight  evidence  is  suffi- 
cient to  put  the  contestant  to  his  proofs 
upon  that  question :  Allen  v.  Griffin,  69 
Wis.  529,  537. 

10  Knox's  Appeal,  26  Conn.  20,  22,  af- 
firming Comstock  v.  Hadlyme,  8  Conn. 
254,  and  relying  for  authority  on  Maine 
and  Massachusetts  cases.  (But  in  Massa- 
chusetts the  law  is  otherwise :  see  Baxter 
v.  Abbott,  supra.)  But  merely  formal 
proof  by  the  proponent  in  the  first  instance 
is  enough  to  discharge  the  burden  and 
then  that  of  proving  incapacity  rests  on 
the  party  alleging  it :  Barber's  Appeal, 
63  Conn.  393,  with  a  full  discussion  aud 
citation  of  cases. 

11  Evans  v.  Arnold,  52  Ga.  169,  179, 
et  seq.  This  case  does  not  entirely  reject 
the  presumption  of  sanity,  but  requires 
some  affirmative  proof.  It  is  affirmed  in 
Wetter  v.  Haversham,  60  Ga.  193,  194, 
and  relies  for  authority  on  Maine,  Con- 
necticut, and  Michigan  cases. 

12  Carpenter  v.  Calvert,  83  111.  62,  71, 
holding  affirmative  proof  of  sanity  to  be 
required  by  the  terms  of  the  statute  in 
the  first  instance.  Wilbur  v.  Wilbur,  129 
111.  392.  The  contestant  of  the  validity 
of  the  will  should  introduce  all  his  evi- 
dence in  the  first  instance  and  not  merely 
establish  a  prima  facie  case,  his  subsequent 
evidence  being  only  in  rebuttal ;  this, 
though  upon  a  prima  facie  case  being 
made,  the  presumption  of  sanity  then 
arises,  which  casts  the  burden  upon  the 
contestant  to  show,  by  a  preponderance  of 
all  the  evidence,  that  the  testator  had  not 
mental  capacity  to  make  a  will :  Craig  v. 
Southard,  148  111.  37,  44. 

13  Robinson  v.  Adams.  62  Me.  369; 
Cilley  v.  Cilley,  34  Me.  1 62 ;  Barnes  v. 
Barnes,  66  Me.  286 ;  Gerrish  v.  Nason,  22 
Me.  438,  441. 

14  McGinnis  v.  Kempsey,  27  Mich.  363, 
373. 

15  Layman's  Will,  48  Minn  371. 


of  Crowninshield    v.  Crowninshield,  that 
the  burden  of  proof  of  the  testator's  san- 


ity did  not  shift  from  the  proponent  even 
upon  proof  of  sanity  by  the  subscribing 
37 


37,  *  38         INCAPACITY  ARISING  FROM  MENTAL  DISABILITIES. 


27 


Missouri,1  Nebraska,2  Texas,8  Vermont,4  Washington, 6  and 
West  Virginia.6  *  In  Ohio  the  statute  requires  proof  to  be  [*  38] 
made  in  common  form,  and  makes  such  probate  prima  facie 
valid ;  hence  the  presumption  of  sanity  is  immaterial.7  But  even  in 
some  of  these  States  the  presumption  of  sanity,  although  it  may  not 
be  sufficient  when  entirely  unsupported  by  affirmative  testimony,  may 
be  relied  on  in  aid  of  such  affirmative  testimony,  and  will  have  its 
effect  in  cases  where  the  testimony  is  doubtful  or  contradictory.8 

§  27.  Presumption  of  Insanity.  —  When  such  evidence  has  been 
produced  as  will  satisfy  the  jury  of  the  testator's  insanity  before  or 
recently  after  the  execution  of  the  will,  it  is  of  course 
indispensable  to  the  validity  of  the  will  that  it  be  shown 
to  have  been  executed  during  a  lucid  interval,  or  upon 
cessation,  whether  temporary  or  permanent,  of  the 
malady.9  If  the  proof  of  insanity  consist  in  the  decree 
or  judgment  of  a  competent  court  declaring  the  testator 
to  be  non  compos  mentis,  and  placing  him  under  guardianship,  the 
presumption  is,  and  continues  until  there  be  a  decree  or  judgment  by 
a  competent  court  declaring  his  restoration,  that  he  is  incompetent  to 
make  a  valid  will ; 10  but  this  presumption  may  be  rebutted  by  proof 


Insanity 
shown,  there 
must  be  proof 
of  lucid  inter- 
val or  cessa- 
tion of  in- 
sauitj'. 


1  As  intimated  by  Napton,  J.,  in  Har- 
ris v.  Hays,  53  Mo.  90,  96.  See  also 
Miiller  v.  St.  Louis  Hospital,  5  Mo.  App. 
390,  in  which  an  instruction  to  the  jury 
was  refused,  that  upon  equiponderance 
of  evidence  the  verdict  should  be  in  favor 
of  the  will.  This  case  was  approved  in 
73  Mo.  242,  and  later  cases  turning  on 
this  point  are  not  inconsistent  therewith  : 
Jackson  v.  Hardin,  83  Mo.  175,  182;  El- 
liott v.  Wei  by,  13  Mo.  App  19,28  ;  Jones 
v.  Roberts,  37  Mo.  App.  163;  and  it  was 
expressly  so  held  in  Norton  v.  Pax  ton,  110 
Mo.  456.  citing  prior  cases  ;  Carle.  Goebel, 
120  Mo.  283. 

2  Seebrock  v.  Fedowa,  30  Neb.  424  ; 
Marry  v.  Hennessey,  48  Neb.  608. 

3  Beazley  v.  Denson,  40  Tex.  416,  424. 

4  Williams  >:  Robinson,  42  Vt.  658, 
6  U.  overruling  dicta  to  the  contrary  in 
Robinson  v.  Hutchinson,  26  Vt.  38,  and 
;      m  v.  Dean,  27  Vt.  746. 

J  Baldwin's  Estate,  13  Wash.  666. 
i;  McMechen  v.  McMechen,  17  W.  Va. 
i    -  :oo. 


7  Mears  v.  Mears,  15  Ohio  St.  90,  101. 

8  See  Barber's  Appeal,  63  Conn.  393 ; 
Evans  v.  Arnold,  supra  ;  Carpenter  v.  Cal- 
vert, supra;  Trish  v.  Newell,  62  111.  196. 

9  Ante,  §  26,  p.  *36,  n.  1.  The  possibility 
of  lucid  intervals  is  in  modern  times  denied 
by  some  eminent  alienists.  But  whether 
the  term  "  lucid  interval  "  is  accurately 
or  improperly  used,  in  the  scientific  sense, 
is  unimportant  for  legal  purposes.  The 
law  recognizes  certain  conditions  of  in- 
sane persons  as  enabling  them  to  act  in- 
telligently and  exercise  free  will ;  which 
is  not  denied  by  psychological  physicians, 
but  accounted  for  by  them  as  a  temporary 
mask  of  the  delirium,  or  one  of  the  phases 
of  the  disease  conditioned  by  the  perio- 
dicity of  its  nature,  —  a  fleeting  remission 
of  the  symptoms  rather  than  a  change  of 
the  pathological  condition.  See  Whart. 
&  Stille'  Med.  Jurisp.  §§  61  et  seq.,  744  et 
seq. 

10  White  v.  Palmer,  4  Mass.  147,  149  ; 
Breed  v.  Pratt,  18  Pick.  115  ;  Hamilton  v. 
Hamilton,   10   R.  1.538,  542;  Harden  v. 


witnesses,  and  that   the   presumption    of  (Thomas,   J.,   dissenting)   held    that   the 

sanity  was    rendered  inapplicable  by  the  legal  presumption,  in  the  absence  of  evi- 

Btatnte  :  2  Cray,  524,  532,  et  seq.     But  in  dence  to   the   contrary,  was  in  favor  of 

the   later  case    of    Baxter    v.   Abbott,    7  sanity. 
Gray,    71,    S3,    a    majority   of    the   court 
3  I 


27 


PRESUMPTION    OF   INSANITY. 


*38,  *39 


showing  his  sanity  at  the  time  of  executing  the  will,  although  the 
guardianship  be  unrepealed,1  or  the  Chancellor  may,  if  he  is  satisfied 

that  such  party  is  competent  to  dispose  of  his  estate  by  will, 
[*  39]  with  sense  and  judgment,  suspend  proceedings  *  against  him, 

so  as  to  enable  him  to  make  a  will.2  A  similar  presumption 
arises,  as  above  stated,  when  a  condition  of  insanity  or  derangement 
of  the  mind  has  been  proved  by  witnesses  ; 8  whereby  the  onus  to 
prove  sanity  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  will  is  thrown  upon 
the  proponent.4  But  this  presumption  does  not  exist  Accidental  or 
where  the  malady  under  which  the  testator  labored  was    temporary 

J  •11  e.  msanitv  not 

in  its  nature  either  accidental  or  temporary  ; a  nor  is  it    presumed  to 
raised  by  the  suicide  of  the  testator  soon  after  making   continue, 
his  will.6    Delirium,  being  the  direct  result  of  a  bodily  disease,  gen- 


Hays,  9  Pa.  St.  151,  161  ;  Pancoast  v.  Gra- 
ham, 15  N.  J.  Eq.  294,  308;  Stevens  v. 
Stevens,  127  Ind.  560,  569  ;  Murdy's  Ap- 
peal, 123  Pa.  St.  464,  473  ;  Harrison  v. 
Bishop,  131  Ind.  161  (holding  such  adju- 
dication prima  facie  but  not  conclusive 
evidence  of  incapacity).  "The  holdings 
are  numerous  to  the  effect  that  persons 
under  guardianship  are,  prima  facie,  dis- 
qualified to  make  a  will :  "  Teuton's  Will, 
97  Iowa,  192,  195.  In  Illinois  it  is  held 
that  the  record  of  a  court  showing  the 
appointment  of  a  conservator  to  a  per- 
son adjudged  to  be  incompetent  to  man- 
age his  affairs,  is  not  competent  evidence 
to  show  the  insanity  of  such  person  at  the 
time  of  making  a  will  subsequent  to  the 
abjudication;  Pittard  v.  Foster,  12  111. 
App.  132,  139.  In  Michigan  such  or- 
der  may  be  put  in  evidence  as  bearing  on 
the  testator's  condition,  but  is  not  prima 
facie  evidence  of  testamentary  incapacity  : 
Rice  v.  Rice,  50  Mich.  448  ;  and  in  Wis- 
consin and  Vermont  the  mere  fact  that 
such  person  is  under  guardianship  as  to 
his  person  and  property  will  not  incapaci- 
tate him  from  making  a  valid  will :  Sling- 
er's  Will,  72  Wis.  22 ;  Robinson  v.  Kobin- 
son,  39  Vt.  267.  Nor  is  a  decree  denying 
the  appointment  of  a  guardian  an  adjudi- 
cation that  such  person  has  then  testamen- 
tary capacity :  Manley  v.  Staples,  62  Vt. 
153. 

1  Stone  v.  Damon,  12  Mass.  487,  488; 
Whitenack  v.  Stryker,  2  N.  J.  Eq.  8,  28 ; 
Estate  of  Johnson,  57  Cal.  529,  531 ; 
Brady  v.  McBride,  39  N.  J.  Eq.  495. 

2  In  the  Matter  of  Burr,  2  Barb.  Ch. 
208,  210. 


8  Clark  v.  Fisher,  1  Pai.  171,  174  (but 
see  Clarke  v.  Sawyer,  infra,  3  Sandf.  Ch. 
351);  Morrison  v.  Smith,  3  Bradf.  209 
223  ;  Rush  v.  Megee,  36  Ind.  69,  85  ;  God- 
den  v.  Burke,  35  La.  An.  160,  171; 
O'Donnell  v.  Rodiger,  76  Ala.  222. 

4  And  it  is  not  sufficient  to  prove  san- 
ity before  and  after  the  day  on  which  the 
will  was  made,  but  the  lucid  interval 
must  be  proved  at  the  very  time :  Harden 
v.  Hays,  9  Pa.  St.  151,  162;  Aubert  v. 
Aubert,  6  La.  An.  104,  108;  Saxon  v. 
Whitaker,  30  Ala.  237 ;  Von  de  Veld 
v.  Judy,  44  S.  W.  R.  (Mo.)  1117. 

Complete  restoration  need  not,  how- 
ever, be  shown  in  proving  the  lucid  inter- 
val ;  it  is  sufficient  to  prove  a  restoration 
of  the  faculties  of  the  mind  sufficient  to 
enable  the  testator  soundly  to  judge  of 
the  act  :  Boyd  v.  Eby,  8  Watts,  66,  70 ; 
see  Busw.  on  Insanity,  §  189,  and  English 
cases  cited,  i.  a.  Creagh  v.  Blood,  2  Jones 
&  LaT.  509,  516. 

s  Brooke  v.  Townshend,  7  Gill,  10,  31 ; 
Staples  v.  Wellington,  58  Me.  453,  459 
(stating  the  law  as  applied  to  contracts, 
applicable  a  fortiori  to  wills) ;  McMasters 
v.  Blair,  29  Pa.  St.  298,  302  ;  Snow  v.  Ben- 
ton, 28  111.  306,  308 ;  Rutherford  v.  Mor- 
ris, 77  111.  397, 409,  citing  Trish  v.  Newell, 
62  111.  196  ;  O'Donnell  v.  Rodiger,  76  Ala. 
222  ;  Von  de  Veld  v.  Judy,  44  S.  W.  R. 
1117,  1121  ;  Johnson  v.  Armstrong,  97  Ala. 
731.     See  Blake  v.  Rourke,  74  Iowa,  519. 

6  Duffield  v.  Morris,  2  Harr.  375,  382 ; 
Brooks  v.  Barrett,  7  Pick.  94,  97  ;  McEl- 
wee  v.  Ferguson,  43  Md.  479,  484 ;  Bey's 
Succession,  46  La.  An.  773.  It  has  been 
held  that  suicide  is  evidence  tending  to 
39 


*  39,  *  40         INCAPACITY  ARISING  FROM  MENTAL  DISABILITIES.        §  28 

erally  abates  with  the  fever  producing  it,  and  wholly  ceases  with 
restoration  to  health;  hence  no  presumption  of  perma- 
nent insanity  arises  from  mere  delirium.1     Intoxication 
or  drunkenness,  if  it  exist  to  the  extent  of  producing  mental  oblivion, 
or  to  disorder  the  faculties  and  pervert  the  judgment,  deprives  a  per- 
son  of   the  testamentary  capacity  while  it  continues ; 2 
but  as  it  ceases  with  the  cause,  it  is  no  indication  of  sub- 
sequent disability,8  unless  it  become  habitual,  and  continue  so 

*  long  as  to  produce  actual  insanity.4    By  itself  it  does  not,  as  [*  40] 
rule  of  law,  raise  the  presumption  of  incapacity.5 

§  28.  Competency  of  "Witnesses  on  Questions  of  Sanity.  —  "  The 
proof  of  a  lucid  interval  is  a  matter  of  extreme  difficulty,"  says 
Difficulty  of  Williams,6  "for  this,  among  other  reasons,  that  the 
proof  of 'lucid  patient  is  not  unfrequently  rational,  to  all  outward 
appearances,  without  any  real  abatement  of  his  malady. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  deceased  was  subject  to  attacks  producing 
temporary  incapacity,  and  was  at  other  times  in  full  possession  of 
his  mental  powers,  such  attacks  may  naturally  create  in  those  who 
only  happen  to  see  him  when  subject  to  them  a  strong  opinion  of  his 
permanent  incapacity.  These  considerations,  while  they  tend  to 
reconcile  the  apparent  contradictions  of  witnesses,  render  it  necessary 
for  the  court  to  rely  but  little  upon  mere  opinion,  to  look  at  the 
grounds  upon  which  opinions  are  formed,  and  to  be  guided  in  its  own 
judgment  by  facts  proved,  and  by  acts  done,  rather  than  by  the 
judgments  of  others."  7 

show  insanity  :  Frary  v.  Gusha,  59  Vt.  257,     of  Johnson,  57  Cal.  529  ;  Lang's  Estate,  65 
264  ;  Godden  v.  Burke,  35  La.  An.  160, 171.     Cal.  19  ;  hi  re  Wilson,  117  Cal.  262  (with 

1  1   Redf.  on  Wills,  92;  Busw.   on  In-     full  discussion  by  the  court). 

sanity,  §  191  ;  Clarke  v.  Sawyer,  3  Sandf.  4  Duffield   v.   Morris,   supra,  in  which 

Ch.  351,  410  (a  case  of  apoplexy,  causing  Harrington,  J.,  said:  "It  is  not  improb- 

paralysis ;  see  Clark    v.  Fisher,  supra,  1  able  that  drunkenness  long  continued  or 

Pai.  171)  ;  Brown  v.  Riggin,  94  111.  560,  much  indulged  in  may  produce  on  some 

569  (a  case  of  epileptic  attacks,  attended  minds  and  with  some  temperaments  per- 

with  convulsions,  fever,  and  delirium).  manent     derangement,    fixed    insanity." 

2  1  Redf.  on  Wills,  160,  and  author-  Gardner  v.  Gardner,  supra;  McSorley  v. 
ities  there  cited;  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  * 34,  McSorley,  2  Bradf.  188,  198;  Cochraue's 
note   1,  and  authorities.     Intoxication  at  Will,  1  T.  B.  Mon.  263. 

the  time  of  making  the  will  does  not  of         5  Gardner  v.  Gardner,  22  Wend.  526; 

itself  avoid  it,  if  it  does  not  prevent  him  Lewis  v.  Jones,  50   Barb.  645;  Ex  parte 

from  knowing  what  lie  is  about:  Pierce  Patterson, 4  How.  Pr.  34  ;  Leckey  v.  Cuu. 

v.  Pierce,  38  Mich.  412,  417;  Key  v.  IIol-  ningham,  56   Pa.    St.  370;    McPherson's 

loway,  7  Baxter,  575,  585.  Appeal,   11   Atl.  R.  205  (Pa.) ;    Bannister 

:i  Wheeler  v.  Alderson,  3  Ilagg.  574,  v.  Jackson,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  702. 
602;    Ayrey   v.    Hill,   2   Add.    206,210;  6  Wms.  Ex.  [22],  citing  Sir  John  Nicholl 

Gardner  >>.  Gardner,  22  Wend.  526,  533,  in  Whiten.  Driver,  1  Phillim.  84,  88;  cit- 

>i   '■"/.  ;    Peck   '-.    Gary,    27    N.  Y.  9,  17;  ing   also  Bragden  v.  Brown,  2  Add.  441, 

Jnlke  ".  Adam,  1    Redf.  154,  457;  Pierre  445;  Ayrey  v.  Hill,  2  Add.  206,  210;  and 

v.  Pierce,  88  Midi.  412,  -iih;  Turner  v.  other  English  authorities. 
Cheesman,  IS  N.J.  Eq.  243,246;  Tliomp-  7  Kinleside  v.  Harrison,  2  Phillim.  449, 

BOD  v.  Kvn<r,  65  Pa.  St.  368,  37*  ;    Estate  459,  and  other  English  authorities. 
40 


§  28     COMPETENCY  OF  WITNESSES  ON  QUESTIONS  OP  SANITY.     *40,  *  41 


But  there  is  a  difficulty  attaching  to  the  subject  of   Necessity  of 
the  proof  of  insanity  itself,  apart  from  the  distinction    testimony  of 
between  general  sanity  and  lucid  intervals,  which  in  the    r     exptr 
nature  of  things  compels  resort  to  the  opinions  of  witnesses,  although 
they  may  not  be  professionals  or  experts.1     The  opinion  of  non-pro- 
fessional witnesses  as  to  the  sanity  or  insanity  of  the  testator  is 
[*  41]  generally  permitted  to  be  given,  although  the  authorities  *  are 
by  no  means  unanimous  on  this  subject.2     In  some  States  this 
is  confined  to  the  subscribing  witnesses ; 8  but  in  by  far  the  greater 
number,  courts  permit  non-experts,  whether  subscribing    Testimony  of 
witnesses  or  not,  to  give  their  opinion  of  the  testator's    witnes'sesTai- 
sanity  on  condition  of  stating  also  the  facts  upon  which   ways  admitted, 
it  is  based.    So  in  Alabama,4  Arkansas,5  California,6  Con-   Non-experts 
necticut,7  Delaware,8  Georgia,9  Illinois,10  Indiana,11  Iowa,12   "a"js  ||.  * 


1  "  They  are  competent  because,  con- 
sidered in  connection  with  the  means  of 
observation  on  which  they  are  based,  they 
are  the  best  evidence  of  which  the  case  in 
its  nature  is  susceptible.  From  the  nature 
of  the  subject,  it  cannot  generally  be  so  de- 
scribed by  witnesses  as  to  enable  others  to 
form  an  accurate  judgment  in  regard  to 
it :  "  Doe,  J.,  dissenting,  in  Boardman  v. 
Woodman,  47  N.  H.  120,  144;  Cline  v. 
Lindsey,  110  Ind.  337,  341;  1  Redf.  on 
Wills,  139,  pi.  4;  and  see  p.  140  etseq.; 
also  p.  137,  pi.  3;  Whart.  &  St.  Med. 
Jurisp.  §§  257  et  seq. 

2  1  Redf.  on  Wills,  140  et  seq.  It  is 
noticeable,  however,  that  the  doctrine 
according  to  which  the  testimony  of  non- 
professional witnesses  is  admissible  is 
gaining  ground.     See  authorities,  infra. 

8  Ware  v.  Ware,  8  Me.  42,  54,  et  seq. ; 
Poole  v.  Richardson,  3  Mass.  330;  Need- 
ham  v.  Ide,  5  Pick.  510,  512;  McConnell 
v.  Wildes,  153  Mass.  487.  In  the  case  of 
Baxter  v.  Abbott,  7  Gray,  71,  Judge 
Thomas  regrets  the  rule  but  sustains  it : 
"  If  it  were  a  new  question,  I  should  be 
disposed  to  allow  every  witness  to  give 
his  opinion,  subject  to  cross-examination 
upon  the  reasons  upon  which  it  is  based, 
his  degree  of  intelligence,  and  bis  means 
of  observation.  It  is  at  least  unwise  to 
increase  the  existing  restrictions."  (p.  79  ) 
In  Williams  v.  Spencer,  150  Mass.  346, 
the  testimony  was  not  only  confined  to 
attesting  witnesses  but  to  the  opinion 
which  they  formed  when  the  will  was 
executed. 

4  In  re  Carmichael,  36  Ala.  514,  522, 


ipon 

citing  numerous  earlier  Alabama  cases ; 
Turney  v.  Torrey,  100  Ala.  157. 

5  Abraham  v.  Wilkins,  1 7  Ark.  292, 322. 

6  Taylor's  Estate,  92  Cal.  564.  Under 
the  statute  the  opinion  of  an  intimate 
acquaintance  is  competent  evidence,  the 
reason  for  the  opinion  being  given  :  Code 
Civ.  Proc.  §  1870,  pi.  10.  See  In  re 
Carpenter,  79  Cal.  382;  s.  c.  94  Cal. 
406. 

7  Shanley's  Appeal,  62  Conn.  325 ; 
Dunham's  Appeal,  27  Conn.  192.  In  this 
State  a  witness  so  giving  his  opinion  can- 
not be  compelled  to  give  his  opinion  on  a 
hypothetical  case  to  test  the  value  of  his 
opinion  (p.  200). 

8  Duffield  v.  Morris,  2  Harr.  375,  385. 

9  Walker  v.  Walker,  14  Ga.  242,  251, 
relying  on  Potts  v.  House,  6  Ga.  324. 

10  Craig  v.  Southard,  148  111.  37,  47; 
Keithley  v.  Stafford,  126  111.  507,  520; 
American  Bible  Society  v.  Price,  115  111. 
623,  642  ;  Roe  v.  Taylor,  45  111.  485,  dis- 
claiming a  contrary  view  ascribed  to  Van 
Horn  v.  Keenan,  28  III.  445,  449. 

11  Leach  v.  Prebster,  39  Ind  492,  494  ; 
State  v.  Newlin,  69  Ind.  108,112;  Cline 
v.  Lindsey,  110  Ind.  337,  341  ;  Buckhart 
v.  Gladish,  123  Ind.  337,  345. 

12  Pelamourges  v.  Clark,  9  Iowa,  1,  12; 
Severin  ''  Zack,  55  Iowa,  28.  31  ;  Parsons 
'•.  "arsons.  66  Iowa,  754,  759  ;  Norman's 
Will.  72  Iowa.  84;  Meeker  v.  Meeker,  74 
Iowa.  352.  The  court,  however,  may  first 
rule,  whether  the  fact  stated  by  the  wit- 
ness lay  any  foundation  for  an  opinion: 
Denning  v.  Butcher,  91  Iowa,  425. 


41 


*  41,  *  42        INCAPACITY  ARISING  FROM  MENTAL  DISABILITIES. 


28 


which  their 
opinion  is 
grounded. 


Kentucky,1    Maryland,2    Michigan,8    Minnesota,4    Mis- 
souri,5   New    Hampshire,6    New    Jersey,7    New 
York,8  *  North  Carolina,9  Ohio,10  Pennsylvania,11  [*  42] 
Tennessee,12 Texas,13  Vermont,14  Virginia,16  and  West  Virginia.16 
In  South  Carolina  it  is  intimated  that  only  subscribing  witnesses 
can  give  their  opinion.17     Subscribing  witnesses  are  not   generally 


1  Hunt  v.  Huut,  3  B.  Mon.  575,  577. 
It  is  necessary  to  be  shown  that  the  non- 
expert had  opportunity  to  form  such 
opinion,  l>ut  if  that  is  shown  his  opinion 
is  admissible,  though  he  cannot  state  the 
specific  facts  showing  sanity  or  insanity  : 
Newcomb  v.  Newcomb,  96  Ky.  120. 

2  Weeins  v.  Weems,  19  Md.  334,  345. 

3  Beaubien  v.  Cicotte,  12  Mich.  459, 
495,  et  seq. ;  Rice  v.  Rice,  50  Mich.  448. 
But  it  is  for  the  court  to  say  whether  there 
is  any  basis  shown  by  the  testimony  of 
the  witness,  upon  which  he  could  give  an 
opinion :  Prentis  v.  Bates,  93  Mich.  234, 
241  ;  see  also  O'Connor  v.  Madison,  98 
Mich.  183. 

*  Rinney's  Will,  27  Minn.  280,  281 ; 
Layman's  Will,  40  Minn.  371. 

5  Moore  v.  Moore,  67  Mo.  192,  195,  re- 
lying on  Baldwine  v.  The  State,  12  Mo. 
223,  and  Crowe  v.  Peters,  63  Mo.  429, 
434. 

6  Hardy  v.  Merrill,  56  N.  H.  227,  re- 
viewing the  history  of  the  contrary  doc- 
trine and  overruling  Hamblett  v.  Hamb- 
lett,  6  N.  H.  333,  349 ;  Boardman  v. 
Woodman,  47  N.  H.  120,  135. 

7  Turner  v.  Cheesman,  15  N.  J.  Eq. 
243.  But  the  New  Jersey  cases  (Sloan  v. 
Maxwell,  3  N.  J.  Eq.  563,  Whitenack  v. 
Stryker,  2  N.  J.  Eq.  8,  Lowe  v.  William- 
son, 2  N.  J.  Eq.  82,  Garrison  v.  Garrison, 
15  N.  J.  Eq.  266)  all  give  very  little  weight 
to  such  opinions  :  the  court  draws  its  own 
conclusions  and  forma  its  own  judgment 
from  the  premises  which  have  produced 
the  conviction  in  the  mind  of  the  witness  ; 
see  also  Clifton  v.  Clifton,  47  N.  J.  Eq. 
227. 

Iver  v  ETaslam,  7  Barb.  314,  af- 
firmed iii  DeWitl  p.  Barley,  13  Barb.  550, 
fj.'.l  ;  but  witnesses  who  did  not  subscribe 
the  will  are  confine. 1   to   their    conclusions 

from  the  (acta  to  which  they  testify  ;  and 
they  are  not  permitted  to  testify  as  to 
their  opinion  of  the  testator's  sanity,  but 
only  whether  the  acts  testified  to  were 
rational  or  irrational;  attesting  witnesses 
42 


may  give  their  opinion  generally:  Wtw 
v.  Wyse,  155  N.  Y.  367,  and  numerous 
cases  cited  ;  Clapp  v.  Fullerton,  34  N.  V 
190,  194,  et  sec/. ;  In  the  Matter  of  Ross,  S7 
N.  Y.  514,  520,  citing  Hewlett  v.  Wood, 
55  N.  Y.  634. 

9  Clary  v.  Clary,  2  Ired  L.  78,  80. 
10  Clark  v.  State,  12  Ohio,  483,  492. 
But  see  Runyan  v.  Price,  15  Ohio  St.  1,14, 
in  which  the  court  held  that  a  witness 
could  not  be  allowed  to  state  his  opinion 
as  to  the  sanity  or  insanity  of  a  testator, 
or  his  capacity  to  make  a  will,  at  the  tune 
he  icas  called  upon  to  witness  the  icill,  for 
two  reasons :  one  of  which  was  stated  to 
be  that  the  inquiry  involved  a  question  of 
law  anil  fact,  and  the  very  question  to  be 
decided  by  the  jury,  and  assumed  that  the 
witness  knew  the  degree  of  capacity  which 
the  law  required  for  the  performance  of 
the  act  of  executing  a  will. 

«  Shaver  v.  McCarthy,  110  Pa.  St. 
339,  346;  Titlow  ;•.  Titlow,  54  Pa.  St.  216, 
223  ;  Bricker  v.  Lightner,  40  Pa.  St.  199, 
205  ;  Pidcock  v.  Potter,  68  Pa.  St.  342. 
351. 

12  Gibson  v.  Gibson,  9  Yerg.  329,  hold- 
ing that  the  opinions  of  non-experts  (not 
subscribing  witnesses),  considered  merely 
as  opinions,  are  not  evidence,  but  may  be 
given  after  stating  the  appearance,  con- 
duct, or  conversation  of  testator,  or  other 
fact  from  which  his  mind  may  be  in- 
ferred (p.  332) ;  Puryear  v.  Reese,  6  Coldw. 
21,  26. 

is  Denson  v.  Beazley,  34  Tex.  191,212; 
Brown  v.  Mitchell,  75  Tex.  9,  15;  s.  c. 
88  Tex.  350,  358. 

14  Cram  v.  Cram,  33  Vt.  15,  18,  et  seq. ; 
Foster  r.  Dickerson,  64  Vt.  233.  See  also 
Fairchild  v.  Bascom,  35  Vt.  398. 

is  Burton  v.  Scott,  3  Rand.  399,  403  et 
seq. ;  Young  v.  Barner,  27   Gratt.  96,  103, 

et  Si>q. 

W  Kerr  v.  Lnnsford,  31  W.  Va.  659, 
678. 

17  Jeter  v.  Tucker,  1  S.  C.  245,  254. 


§29 


INCAPACITY   FROM    IMBECILITY. 


42,  *43 


required  to  state  the  facts  upon  which  they  base  their    But  not  Sllb. 
opinion ; l    but    their   testimony  is   not  conclusive,2   al-    scribing  wit- 
though  entitled  to  the  greatest  regard.3     But  a  distinc- 
tion is  drawn  between  the  admissibility  of  the  witnesses'  opinion  of 
the  testator's  mental  condition  as  to  sanity  or  insanity,  or  the  like, 
which,  it  is  said,  are  allowed  by  nearly  all  the  authorities,  and  such 
opinions  when  directed  to  the  question  of  legal  capacity  to  perform 
the  act  in  question,  which  is  a  question  of  law  upon  which  no  witness 
may  express  an  opinion.4 

§  29.    Incapacity  from  Imbecility.  —  Mere  imbecility  or  weakness 

of  mind,  whether  natural  or  brought  on  by  old  age,  epilepsy  or  similar 

diseases,  habitual  drunkenness,  or  any  other  cause,  does  not,  as  has 

already  appeared,5  deprive  a  person  of  testamentary  capacity.8 

[*  43]  *  It  seems  that  extreme  old  age  in  a  testator  is  deemed  by  the 


courts  a  circumstance  calling  for  their  vigilance,7 


Old  aire. 


but  by   itself  constitutes   no  testamentary  disqualifica- 
tion.8    Yet  imbecility,  though  not  amounting  to  actual  insanity,  may 


1  Titlow  v.  Titlow,  54  Pa.  St.  216,  223 ; 
Gibson  v.  Gibson,  9  Yerg.  329,  332  ;  Van 
Huss  v.  Rainbolt,  2  Coldw.  139;  Williams 
v.  Lee,  47  Md.  321,  325. 

2  McTaggert  v.  Thompson,  14  Pa.  St. 


R.  84,  90 ;  Blanchard  v.  Nestle,  3  Demo, 
37,  40;  Crolius  v.  Stark,  64  Barb.  112, 
117;  Thompson  v.  Kyner,  65  Pa.  St.  368, 
378;  Rutherford  v.  Morris,  77  111.  397, 
holding  that  even  softening  of  the  brain 


149,  154;  at  least  not  in  solemn  probate  :  two  years  prior  to  the  making  of  the  will 
Mays  v.  Mays,  114  Mo.  536.  See,  on  the  will  not  invalidate  it,  if  the  testator  at 
effect   of    the    testimony   of    subscribing     the   time   of   making   it  was   capable   of 


witnesses,  post,  §  218. 

3  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  3  Wash.  C.  C. 
580,  586 ;  Stevens  v.  Vancleve,  4  Wash. 
C.  C.  262,  268;  Turner  v.  Cheesman,  15 
N.J.  Eq.  243;  Shaver  v.  McCarthy,  110 
Pa.  St.  339,  347.  But  in  Connecticut  it  is 
held  that  the  evidence  of  attesting  wit- 
nesses to  testator's  capacity  is  not  entitled 
to  special  consideration  merely  because 
they  are  attesting  witnesses :  Crandall's 
Appeal,  63  Conn.  365. 

4  Brown  v.  Mitchell,  88  Tex.  350,  358, 
et  seq.,  discussing  principle  and  authorities 
pro  and  con  ;  Kempsey  v.  McGinnis,  21 
Mich.  123,  141 ;  Blood's  Will,  62  Vt.  359, 
364;  Schneider  v.  Manning,  121  111.376, 
386. 

5  Ante,  §  25. 

6  "  For  courts  cannot  measure  the  size 


transacting  his  ordinary  business  affairs 
(p.  408  et  seq.);  Wintermute  v.  Wilson,  28 
N.  J.  Eq.  437  (affirming  Wintermute's 
Will,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  447);  Chrisman  v. 
Chrisman,  16  Oreg.  127. 

7  Collins  v.  Townley,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  353, 
in  which  the  age  of  the  testatrix  (ninety- 
eight  years)  was  held  to  warrant  a  de- 
mand for  full  formal  proof  of  the  will ; 
Weir  v.  Fitzgerald,  2  Bradf .  42,  64  ;  Cuth- 
bertson's  Appeal,  97  Pa.  St.  163,  affirm- 
ing Boyd  v.  Boyd,  66  Pa.  St.  283 ;  Will 
of  Ames,  51  Iowa,  596,  604. 

8  "  On  the  contrary,  it  calls  for  protec- 
tion and  aid  to  further  its  wishes,  when  a 
mind  capable  of  acting  rationally,  and  a 
memory  sufficient  in  essentials,  are  shown 
to  have  existed  "  :  Maverick  v.  Reynolds, 
2   Bradf.  360,   384.     See   also   Pooler   v. 


of  people's  understandings  and  capacities,     Christman,  145  111.  405,  410;  Watson  v. 

nor  examine  into  the  wisdom  or  prudence 

of  men    in   disposing  of   their   estates  "  : 

Wms.  Ex.  [40],  citing  Osmond  v.  Fitzrov, 

3  P.  Wms.  129.     See  also  Reed's  Will,  2 

B.  Mon.  79  ;  Bleecker  v.  Lynch,  1  Bradf. 

458,  470 ;  Elliott's  Will,  2  j"  J.  Marsh.  340, 

342;  Dornick  v  Reichenback,  10  Sero-.  & 


Watson,  2  B.  Mon.  74;  Creely  v.  Os- 
trander,  3  Bradf.  107:  Reynolds  v.  Root, 
62  Barb.  250,  253  ;  Van  Alst  v.  Hunter, 
5  Johns.  Ch.  148,  158;  Van  Huss  v. 
Rainbolt,  2  Coldw.  139,  142;  Thomas  v. 
Stump,  62  Mo.  275, 279 ;  Browne  v.  Mollis- 
ton,  3  Whnrt.  129,  137  ;  Sloan  v.  Maxwell, 
43 


*  43,  *  44         INCAPACITY  ARISING  PROM  MENTAL  DISABILITIES.         §  29 

r  b    ....  be  shown  to  exist  to  an  extent  which  invalidates  the 

may  invalidate  will,1  as  where  he  has  not  sufficient  mind  to  comprehend 
the  nature  and  effect  of  the  act  he  was  performing,  or 
the  relation  he  held  to  the  various  individuals  who  might  naturally 
be  expected  to  become  objects  of  his  bounty,  or  to  be  capable  of  mak- 
ing a  rational  selection  among  them.2  Senile  dementia  may  so  far 
impair  the  mind  that  "  a  man  in  his  old  age  becomes  a  very  child 
again  in  his  understanding,  and  so  forgetful  that  he  knows  not  his 
own  name ; "  such  a  person  has  obviously  no  more  testamentary 
capacity  "than  a  natural  fool,  or  a  child,  or  a  lunatic."  3  It  must  be 
remembered,  however,  that  a  lower  degree  of  intellectual  vigor  is  nec- 
essary, or  held  sufficient,  to  make  a  valid  will,  than  is  required 
to  sustain  a  contract.4  Total  loss  of  memory,  or  *  the  loss  of  [*44] 
Loss  of  memory  of  the  testator's  family  or  property,  is 

memory,  fatal  to  the  validity  of  the  will ; 5  but  if  memory  is  not 


3  N.  J.  Eq.  563,  581  ;  Den  v.  Johnson,  5 
N.  J.  L.  454,  457,  et  seq. ;  Humphrey's 
Will,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  513  ;  Wilson  v.  Mitchell, 
101  Pa.  St.  495,  503 ;  Smith  v.  James,  34 
N.  W.  R.  (Io.)309;  Napple's  Estate,  134 
Pa.  St.  492,  494;  Kerr  v.  Lansford,  31 
W.  Va.  659,  679. 

1  McTaggart  v.  Thompson,  14  Pa.  St. 
149,  154;  Shropshire  v.  Reno,  5  J.  J. 
Marsh.  91,  92;  Den  v.  Vancleve,  5  N.  J. 
L.  589,  660,  et  seq. ;  Holden  v.  Meadows, 
31  Wis.  284,  296;  Hyatt  v.  Lunnin,  1 
Dem   14. 

2  Forman  v.  Swift,  7  Lans.  443,  446; 
Daniel  v.  Daniel,  39  Pa.  St.  191,  207; 
Bates  v.  Bates.  27  Iowa,  110,  116;  Bundy 
v.  McKnight,  48  Ind.  502,  513,  et  seq. 

8  1  Redf.  on  Wills,  98,  pi.  6,  quoting 
from  the  "  Orphan's  Legacy  "  by  Godol- 
phin,  and  citing  Griffiths  v.  Robins,  3 
Madd.  191,  turning  on  a  deed  of  gift; 
Mackenzie  v.  Handasyde,  2  Hagg.  Eccl. 
211,  218;  and  Potts  v.  House,  6  Ga. 
324. 

4  "A  man  maybe  capable  of  making 
a  will  and  yet  incapable  of  making  a  con- 
tract, or  to  manage  his  estate  "  :  Harrison 
v.  Rowan,  3  Wash  C.  C.  580,  586  ;  Greene 
V.  Greene,  115  111.  264,  275;  Taylor  v, 
Cox,  153  111.  220;  Madilox  V.  Maddox 
114  Mo.  85 j  Meeker  ».  Meeker,  74  Iowa 
352;  Gardner  r.  Lamback,  47  Ga.  133 
192;  Turner  v.  Cheesman,  15  N.  J.  Eq 

243,   250;    Kinne    r.    Kinne,   9    Conn.    102 

105;  Converse  v.  Convene,  21  Vt.  168 
Ilovev  v.Cham,  52  Me.  804, 314;  Brink- 
man  V.  Rneggesick,  71  Mo.  553,  555:   Wise 
44 


v.  Foote,    81    Ky.   10,   15;    Whitney   v 
Twombly,  136  Mass.  145. 

In  the  case  of  Harvey  v.  Sullens,  46 
Mo.  147,  153,  an  instruction  to  the  jury, 
that  if  the  testatrix  at  the  time  of  execut- 
ing the  will  was  "old  and  infirm  in  body 
and  feeble  and  childish  in  mind,  and  so- 
incapable  of  transacting  her  ordinary  busi- 
ness, then  she  had  not  sufficient  capacity 
to  make  a  will,"  was  held  to  be  justified 
"  under  the  circumstances  here  presented," 
but  the  court  say  that  as  an  abstract  prop- 
osition of  law  it  would  not  be  quite  accu- 
rate. The  proposition  that,  "  if  one  be 
able  to  transact  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life, 
lie  may,  of  course,  execute  a  valid  will," 
is  approved,  and  the  cases  of  Tomkins  v. 
Tomkins,  1  Bail.  92,  and  Coleman  v.  Rob- 
ertson, 17  Ala.  84,  cited  in  support  thereof 
(p.  154).  The  principle  announced  in  the 
syllabus  of  the  case  (p.  148),  that  persons 
incapable  of  transacting  ordinary  busi- 
ness are  incapable  of  making  a  will,  is 
not,  therefore,  an  accurate  statement  of 
the  principle  announced  by  the  court.  In 
Young  v.  Ridenbaugh,  67  Mo.  574,  586, 
the  testamentary  capacity  required  is 
stated  to  be  an  understanding  of  the  dis- 
position the  testator  wishes  to  make  of 
his  property,  and  whether  the  will  makes 
that  disposition. 

6  Yoe  v.  McCord,  74  111.  33,  39  ;  Turner 
v.  Cheesman,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  243,  256;  Con- 
verse v.  Converse,  21  Vt.  168,  in  which 
Judge  Redfield  says  that  the  testator 
"  must  undoubtedly  retain  sufficient  active 
memory   to   collect    in    his    mind,    without 


§30 


INCAPACITY    IN    CONSEQUENCE   OP   FORCE,   ETC. 


44,  *45 


totally  lost,  the  fact  that  it  is  poor  or  impaired  does  not  affect  the 
testatory  capacity,1  for  the  mind  may  be  sound,  although  the  memory 
be  impaired.2  It  has  been  held  that  want  of  memory,  vacillation  of 
purpose,  credulity,  and  vagueness  of  thought  may  all  exist  in  con- 
nection with  testamentary  capacity ; 3  and  "  there  is  no  rule  of  law 
which  prescribes  average  capacity  for  a  testamentary  act."4 

§  30.    Incapacity  in  Consequence  of  Force,  Fraud,  or  Intimidation 
—  A  will  coerced  by  actual  force  employed  upon  the  testator,5  or 

by  threats   and   intimidations,6  or   obtained   in   consequence 
[*  45]  *  of  fraud  perpetrated  upon  him,7  is  self-evidently   Force,  threats, 

void,  because  it  is  not  his  spontaneous  act  or  free    o^l"^/™' 
will.     For  the  same  reason,  the  law  does  not  recognize    validate  will. 
that  as  a  valid  testamentary  act  which  is  the  result  of   undue  in- 
external  influence  brought  to  bear  upon  the  testator  to  an    nuence. 
extent  and  under  circumstances  which  overpower  his  free  will.8    Out 


prompting,  particulars  or  elements  of  the 
business  to  be  transacted,  and  to  hold 
them  in  his  mind  a  sufficient  length  of 
time  to  perceive  at  least  their  obvious  re- 
lations to  each  other,  and  be  able  to  form 
some  rational  judgment  in  relation  to 
them"  (p.  170);  Delafield  v.  Parish,  25 
N.  Y.  9,  29  ;  Aikin  v.  Weckerly,  19  Mich. 
482, 506 ;  Lamb  v.  Lamb,  105  Ind.  456,462. 

1  See  cases  supra,  note  5 ;  Taylor  v. 
Pegram,  151  111.  106;  Eddy's  Case,  32  N. 
J.  Eq.  701  ;  Wilson  v.  Mitchell,  101  Pa. 
St.  495,  505 ;  Montague  v.  Allan,  78  Va. 
592. 

2  Lowder  v.  Lowder,  58  Ind.  538,  542. 
"  If  the  testator  was  of  sound  mind,  but 
of  poor  or  impaired  memory,  he  was  of 
sound  mind  and  memory,  as  the  phrase  is 
known  in  the  law":  Yoe  v.  McCord,  74 
111.  33,  39. 

3  Hopple's  Estate,  13  Phila.  259. 

4  Per  Cooley,  J.,  in  Hoban  v.  Piquette, 
52  Mich.  346,  361. 

5  Mountain  v.  Bennett,  1  Cox  Ch.  C. 
353,  355. 

6  "  Imaginary  terrors  may  have  been 
created  sufficient  to  deprive  him  of  free 
agency."  "  The  conduct  of  a  person  in 
vigorous  health  towards  one  feeble  in 
body,  even  though  not  unsound  of  mind, 
may  be  such  as  to  excite  terror  and  make 
him  execute  as  his  will  an  instrument 
which,  if  he  had  been  free  from  such  in- 
fluence, he  would  not  have  executed " : 
Boyse  v.  Rossborough,  6  H.  L.  Cas.  2,  49. 
See  Will  of  Parnsworth,  infra. 

7  Davis  v.  Calvert,  5  Gill  &  J.  269,  303  ; 


Dietrick  v.  Dietrick,  5  Serg.  &  R.  207  (in- 
cluding as  fraudulent  unfounded  imputa- 
tions against  those  entitled  to  the  testator's 
bounty)  ;  Will  of  Parnsworth,  62  Wis. 
474 ;  but  the  mistake  of  the  testator  as  to 
a  fact,  unless  occasioned  by  fraudulent  or 
deceptive  representations,  does  not  in- 
validate a  will:  Howell  v.  Troutman,  8 
Jones  L.  304,  307  ;  aliter,  if  the  benefi- 
ciary, possessing  the  confidence  of  the 
testatrix,  knowingly  permits  her  to  make 
a  will  under  a  false  impression :  Green- 
wood v.  Cline,  7  Or.  17. 

8  Lord  Cranworth,  in  the  case  of 
Boyse  v.  Rossborough,  supra,  points  out 
that  it  is  not  metaphysically  accurate  to 
predicate  want  of  will  of  a  person  acting 
under  coercion.  He  illustrates  by  argu- 
ing that  it  is  the  will  of  the  traveller  to 
give  up  his  purse  when  threatened  with 
death  by  the  highwayman  in  case  of  re- 
fusal, and  that  it  is  the  will  of  the  owner 
to  give  up  his  horse  to  the  thief  who 
steals  it  under  the  fraudulent  pretence  of 
borrowing  it,  and  adds :  "  But  the  law 
deals  with  the  case  as  if  they  had  been 
obtained  against  my  will,  my  will  having 
been  the  result  in  one  case  of  fear,  and  in 
the  other  of  fraud.  The  same  principle 
must  guide  us  in  determining  whether  an 
instrument  duly  executed  in  point  of  form 
is  or  is  not  a  will.  The  inquiries  must  he 
.  .  .  was  the  instrument  in  question  the 
expression  of  his  genuine  will,  or  was  it 
the  expression  of  a  will  created  in  his 
mind  by  coercion  or  fraud?"  6  H.  L. 
Cas.  44,"  45. 

45 


*  45,  *  46        INCAPACITY  ARISING  PROM  MENTAL  DISABILITIES. 


31 


of  this  principle  springs  a  prolific  source  of  litigation  between  heirs 
at  law  and  beneficiaries  of  testators ;  and  no  subject  affords  greater 
scope  to  juries  for  the  indulgence  of  personal  opinions  and  views  of 
right  and  wrong,  because  no  general  rule  can  be  laid  down  to  ascer- 
tain the  extent  and  nature  of  the  influence  under  which  a  testator 
may  have  acted,  or,  where  this  is  ascertained,  to  determine  whether 
and  to  what  extent  such  influence  was  legitimate  or  unlawful.1 

§  31.    Incapacity  arising  from  Undue  Influence. —  Undue  influence, 
,„,   ,        t.       to  vitiate  a  will,  must  be    such   as    caused    the 

\v  hat  consti-  ,   ' 

tutes  undue  testator  to  *  dispose  of  his  property  contrary  [*  4G] 
influence.  ^Q  j^g  jut[gment   or    desire,2   in    consequence    of 

fraudulent  representations 3  or  importunities  and  external  pressure 
which  he  was  too  weak  to  resist,4  and  hence  always  contains  an  ele- 
Must contain  ment  of  coercion  or  fraud  destroying  free  agency;5  if 
an  element  of      j^g  nU0Vment  was  not  misled  by  fa.lse  representations, 

coercion  or  .  .  J      .  .  .    . 

fraud.  nor  his  will  overpowered  by  irresistible  importunities, 


i  "  To  make  a  good  will,  a  man  must 
be  a  free  agent.  But  all  influences  are 
not  unlawful.  Persuasion  —  appeals  to 
the  affections,  or  ties  of  kindred  —  to  a 
sentiment  of  gratitude  for  past  services, 
or  pity  for  future  destitution,  or  the  like 
—  these  are  all  legitimate  and  may  be 
fairly  pressed  on  a  testator.  On  the 
other  hand,  pressure  of  whatever  charac- 
ter, whether  acting  on  the  fears  or  hopes, 
if  so  exerted  as  to  overpower  volition 
without  convincing  the  judgment,  is  a 
species  of  restraint  under  which  no  valid 
will  can  be  made.  Importunity  or  threats 
such  as  the  testator  has  not  the  courage 
to  resist  —  moral  command  asserted  and 
yielded  to  for  the  sake  of  peace  and  quiet ; 
or  of  escaping  from  distress  of  mind  or 
Bocial  discomfort, —  these  if  carried  to  a 
degree  in  which  the  free  play  of  the  tes- 
tator's jndgment,  discretion,  or  wish  is 
overborne,  will  constitute  undue  influ- 
ence, though  no  force  is  either  used  or 
threatened.  In  a  word,  a  testator  may  be 
led,  but  not  driven;  and  his  will  must  be 
the  offspring  of  his  own  volition,  but  not 
the  record  of  some  one  else's":  Hall  v. 
Hall,  87  L.  J.  P.  40. 

-  Forney  v.  Ferrell,  4  W.  Va.  729; 
Leverett  v.  Carlisle,  19  Ala.  so ;  Marx  v. 
McGlynn,  ««  N.  Y.  357  ;  Sunderland  v. 
Hood.  13  Mo.  App  282 ;  Stoutenburgh 
.  Hopkins,  n  N.  J.  Eq.  -r.77,  .r)Si  ;  Mar- 
shall V.  Flinn,  4  doncs  L.  199,  204; 
Mit.hcli  r.  Mitchell,  43  Minn.  73;  See- 
brock  c.  Fedowa,  30  Neh.  424,438. 
46 


3  To  invalidate  a  will  on  the  ground 
of  false  representations  to  the  testator  it 
must  be  proved  that  such  representations 
were  made,  that  they  are  false,  and  that 
the  disposition  in  the  will  was  made  in 
consequence  thereof ;  but  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  prove  that  the  representations 
were  made  in  bad  faith  for  the  purpose  of 
procuring  the  will :  Smith  v.  Du  Bose,  78 
Ga.  413.     See  ante,  §  30  (p.  *45,  note  1 ). 

4  Kinleside  v.  Harrison,  2  Phillim.  449, 
551  ;  Chandler  v.  Ferris,  1  Harr.  (Del.) 
454,  464,  et  seq.;  Taylor  v.  Wilbnrn,  20 
Mo.  306,  309;  Brick  v.  Brick,  66  N.  Y. 
144,  149  ;  Layman  v.  Conrey,  60  Md.  286, 
292 ;  Will  of  Parnsworth,  62  Wis.  474 ; 
Maynard  v.  Vinton,  59  Mich.  139  ;  Scho- 
field  v.  Walker,  58  Mich.  96,  106 ;  Wad- 
dington  v.  Busby,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  173,  175, 
Grove  v.  Spiker,  72  Md.  300;  McFadin 
v.  Catron,  138  Mo.  197. 

6  Williams  v.  Goude,  1  Hagg.  577,  581  ; 
Gardiner  v.  Gardiner,  34  N.  Y.  155;  Gai- 
ther  r.  Gaither,  20  Ga.  709  ;  Stackhouse 
v.  Horton,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  202,  231  ;  West- 
cott  v.  Sheppard,  51  N.  J.  Eq.  315  ;  Knox 
v.  Knox,  95  Ala.  475  ;  Herster  v.  Ilerster, 
122  1 'a.  St.  239;  Jn  re  Wilson,  117  Cal. 
262  ;  Kiley  v.  Sherwood,  45  S.  W.  R. 
(Mo.)  1077,  1080;  Jackson  v.  Hardin,  83 
Mo.  175.  185  :  Higgins  v.  Carlton,  28  Md. 
115;  Children's  Aid  Society  v.  Lovcridge, 
70  N.  Y.  387,  394;  Potter's  Appeal,  53 
Mich.  106,113.  Tn  Stewart  v.  Elliott,  2 
M.'ickey.  307,  319,   it   is    held   that  undue 

Influence  mav  exist  iu  the  absence  of  fraud. 


§31 


INCAPACITY    ARISING    FROM    UNDUE   INFLUENCE.        *  46,  *  47 


no  influence  brought  to  bear  upon  him  can  invalidate  his  will,  because 
it  is  in  such  case  free  from  the  element  of  coercion  or  fraud.1    No 
precise  line  can  be  drawn  distinguishing  legitimate  from  unlawful 
influence,  except  the  general  one  thus  indicated ;  2  but  it  is  held  that 
considerations  addressed  to  a  testator's   good  feelings,    Wliat  is  not 
simply  influencing   his  better  judgment;3   the   earnest    undue  in- 
solicitations   of   a   wife,4   or   the   exercise   of   influence     uence* 
springing  from  family  relations,  or  from  motives  of  duty,  affection, 
or  gratitude ; 5  persuasion,  argument,   or  flattery ; 6  kindness 
[*  47]  *  and  attentions  to  the  testator ; 7  and  influence  worthily  ex- 
erted for  the  benefit  of  others  8  cannot  be  considered  as  "  un- 
due," so  as  to  affect  the  validity  of  a  will  inspired  thereby.     The 
mere  opportunity  to  exercise  influence   over  a  testator    „ 

rir  .  .  .  .  .,  Opportunity 

does  not,  even  in  connection  with  an  unjust  will,  war-   to  influence* 
rant  the  presumption  of  undue  influence,  in  the  absence    ^ant  presump- 
of  affirmative  evidence  of  its  exercise,  where  the  testa-    tion  of  undue 
tor's  mind  is  unimpaired,  and  he  understood  the  contents 
of  his  will.' 


influence. 


1  Simmerman  v.  Songer,  29  Graft.  9, 
24;  Shailer  ».  Bumstead,  99  Mass.  112, 
121,  etseq. ;  In  re  Kaufman,  117  Cal.  288; 
Latham  v.  Udell,  38  Mich.  238 ;  Allmon 
v.  Pigg,  82  111.  149 ;    Munroe  v.  Barclay, 

17  Ohio  St.  302,  314,  et  seq. ;  Parramore  v. 
Taylor,  1 1  Graft.  220,  239 ;  Stoutenburgh 
v.  Hopkins,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  577,  590. 

2  Boyse  v.  Rossborough,  6  H.  L.  Cas. 
2,  47  ;  Lynch  v.  Clements,  24  N.  J.  Eq. 
431,  434;  Maynard  v.  Vinton,  59  Mich. 
139,  153. 

3  Tucker  v.  Field,  5  Redf.  139  ;  Potts 
v.  House,  6  Ga.  324,  359  ;  Wise  v.  Foote, 
81  Ky.  10,  15. 

4  Rankin  v.  Rankin,  61  Mo.  295,  300 ; 
Small  v.  Small,  4  Me.  220;  Jackman's 
Will,  26  Wis.  104,  116  ;  Stulz  v.  Schaeffle, 

18  Eng.  L.  &  E.  576 ;  Langford's  Estate, 
108  Cal.  608. 

6  Wait  v.  Breeze,  18  Hun,  403,  404  ; 
Halli;.  Hall,  L.  R.  1  Prob.  &  Div.  481, 
482  ;  Rutherford  v.  Morris,  77  111.  397, 
412;  Matter  of  Mondorf,  110  N.  Y.  450, 
456  ;  Hughes  v.  Murtha,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  288  ; 
Pierce  v.  Pierce,  38  Mich.  412  ;  Barnes  v. 
Barnes,  66  Me.  286,  297  ;  McCullogh  v. 
Campbell,  49  Ark.  367,  371  ;  McFadin  v. 
Catron,  138  Mo.  197;  Thompson  v.  Ish, 
99  Mo.  160,  182  ;  Bevelot  v.  Lestrode,  153 
111.  625. 

6  Potts  v.  House,  6  Ga.  324,  359 ; 
Chandler   v.   Ferris,    1    Harr.    454,   464; 


Eastis  v.  Montgomery,  93  Ala.  293 ; 
O'Neall  v.  Farr,  1  Rich.  80,  84  ;  McDaniel 
v.  Crosby,  19  Ark.  533,  551 ;  Mclntire  v. 
McConn,  28  Iowa,  480,  486 ;  Schofield  v. 
Walker,  58  Mich.  96,  106;  Bush  v.  Lisle, 
89  Ky.  393. 

7  Miller  v.  Miller,  3  Serg.  &  R.  267, 
270 ;  Lowe  v.  Williamson,  2  N.  J.  Eq.  82, 
88;  Den  v.  Gibbons,  22  N.  J.  L.  117, 
158;  Gleespin's  Will,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  523, 
527 ;  Rogers  v.  Diamond,  13  Ark.  474, 
483;  Eddy's  Case,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  701, 
708  ;  Wilson's  Appeal,  99  Pa.  St.  545, 
551  ;  McCoy  v.  McCoy,  4  Redf.  54,  60 ; 
Kerr  v.  Lunsford,  31  W.  Va.  659,  680. 

8  Harrison's  Will,  1  B.  Mon.  351,  352; 
Creely  v.  Ostrander,  3  Bradf.  107,  112; 
Tawney  v.  Long,  76  Pa.  St.  106,  115. 
"  The  influence  must  be  specially  directed 
toward  procuring  a  will  in  favor  of 
particular  parties  "  :  McCulloch  v.  Camp- 
bell, 49  Ark.  367,  371. 

9  McCoy  v.  McCoy,  4  Redf.  54,  60; 
Hoban  v.  Piquette,  52  Mich.  346,  364- 
(But  see  Demmert  v.  Schnell,  4  Redf. 
409,  as  to  what  opportunities  were  held, 
by  another  surrogate,  to  raise  the  pre- 
sumption of  undue  influence.)  Estate  of 
Brooks,  54  Cal.  471,  474;  Hubbard  v. 
Hubbard,  7  Or.  42,  47  ;  In  re  Martin,  98 
N.  Y.  193,  197  ;  Blake  v.  Rourke,  74  Iowa, 
519;  Maddox  v.  Maddox,  114  Mo.  135; 
McFadin   v.   Catron,  138  Mo.  197;  Hess" 

47 


47,  *  48        INCAPACITY  ARISING  FROM  MENTAL  DISABILITIES.         §  31 


What  degree  of  influence  will  vitiate  a  will  depends  much  upon  the 
bodily  and  mental  vigor  of  the  testator,  for  that  which  would  over- 
Undue  influ-  whelm  a  mind  weakened  by  sickness,  dissipation,  or  age 
ence  over  a       might  prove  no  influence  at  all  to  one  of  strong  mind  in 

weak  mav  not       ,  r  ,.    , .  „    ,        „,,  . .  ,         ,      . ,    ,     . 

be  such  over  a  the  vigor  ot  hie.1  lhe  question  to  be  decided  is, 
strong  mind,  whether  the  testator  had  intelligence  enough  to  detect 
the  fraud,  and  strength  of  will  enough  to  resist  the  influence  brought 
to  bear  upon  him.2 

Influence  is  never  presumed  (except  in  the  case  to  be  considered 
below,  between  attorney  and  client,  or  where  the  legatee  sustained  a 
fiduciary  relation  to  the  testator),  but  must  always  be 
musTIdways  proved  by  the  party  alleging  it;3  not  generally,  but  as 
be  proved.  a  present  constraint  operating  at  the  time  of  executing 
the  will,4  hence  the  ratification  of  a  will  drawn  under  undue  influ- 
_  ^s-    .       ,    ence,  when  the  influence  has  been  removed,  cancels  the 

Ratification  of  »  ' 

will  after  influ-   objection   to   the   validity  of   the   will   on    that 

ence  removed.     grouncL5     The  proof  must  exclude  the  *  hypothe-  [*  48] 

sis  of  the  testator's  acting  upon  his  own  free  will,6  which,  like 

other  facts,  may  be  proved  circumstantially.7     The  contents  of  the 


Will,  48   Minn.  504  ;    Nelson's  Will,   39 

Minn.  204,  208.     See,  also,  infra,  p.  *48, 

note  5. 

i  Haydock  w.  Haydock,  33  N.   J.  Eq. 

494 ;  Myers  v.  Hauger,  98  Mo.  433,  438  ; 

Westcott  v.   Sheppard,  51   N.  J.  Eq.  315, 

320. 

2  Robinson,   J.,   in   Griffith   v.  Diffen- 

derffer,  50  Md.  466,  480. 

8  Jones  v.  Roberts,  37  Mo.  App.  163, 

174  ;  Humphrey's  Will,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  513, 

521;    Ewen    v.    Perrine,   5    Redf.    640; 

Davis  v.  Davis,  123  Mass.  590,  597; 
Webber   v.  Sullivan,  58  Iowa,  260,  264  ; 

Armstrong  v.  Armstrong,  63  Wis.  162  ; 
M-  Master  v.  Scriven,  85  Wis.  162;  Carl 
v.  Gabel,  120  Mo.  283,298;  Rockwell's 
Appeal,  54  Conn.  119. 

4  Thompson  v.  Vigner,  65  Pa.  St.  368, 
379,  citing  earlier  Pennsylvania  cases ; 
Mr.Mahon  v.  Ryan,  20  Pa.  St.  329,330; 
In  re  Carpenter,  94  Cal.  406,  412  ;  Foster 
v.  Dickers.!!.  64  Vt.  23%  265;  In  re 
Kaufman,  117  Cal.  288. 

»  Taylor  V.  Kelly,  31  Ala.  59,  71.  To 
similar  effect  see  Shailei  V.  Bumstead, 
!»'»  Mas-.  1 12,  125  ;  O'Neal]  V.  Farr,  1  Ricli. 
BO,  89;  and  centra:  Chaddick  v.  Haley, 
Bl  Tex  617,619;  Haines  v.  Hayden,  95 
Mich.  332,  353.  The  ratification  tbat 
might  be  inferred  by  testator's  failure  to 

alt.  r  oi  destroj  the  will  when  B  long  time 
48 


elapses  between  its  execution  and  testator's 
death  (Hoshauer  v.  Hoshauer,  26  Pa.  St. 
406)  cannot  be  inferred  where  the  will  is 
shown  not  to  have  been  in  his  possession 
during  that  time,  coupled  with  other  cir- 
cumstances :  Barbour  v.  Moore,  10  App. 
Dist.  C.  30,  47. 

6  Boyse  v.  Rossborough,  6  H.  L.  Cas. 
2,  47 ;  Maynard  v.  Vinton,  59  Mich.  139, 
153  ;  In  re  McDevitt,  95  Cal.  17.  But  an 
instruction  to  the  jury  that,  "  in  order  to 
set  aside  the  will  on  the  ground  of  undue 
influence,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  cir- 
cumstances of  its  execution  are  inconsist- 
ent with  any  other  hypothesis  than  such 
undue  influence "  was  held  erroneous : 
Gay  v.  Gillilan,  92  Mo.  250,  257. 

"  Reynolds  v.  Root,  62  Barb.  250; 
Beaubien  v.  Cicotte,  12  Mich.  459,  488; 
Smith  v.  Smith,  67  Vt.  443 ;  Jackman's 
Will,  26  Wis.  104,  130;  Denny  v.  Pinney, 
60  Vt.  524 ;  Primmer  v.  Primmer,  75  Iowa, 
415,  418.  "From  the  nature  of  the 
case,  the  evidence  of  undue  influence  will 
generally  be  circumstantial.  It  is  not 
usually  exercised  openly,  in  the  presence 
of  others,  so  that  it  may  be  directly 
proved;"  per  Gilfillan,  C.  J.,  in  Nelson's 
Will,  39  Minn.  204,206;  Tyler  v.  Gardi- 
ner, 35  N.  V.  r>.r);> ;  Saunders'  Appeal,  54 
Conn.  108,  116;  Herster  V.  Ilerster,  116 
Pa.  St.  612.     Declarations  of  the  testator 


§31 


INCAPACITY   ARISING    FROM   UNDUE   INFLUENCE. 


48 


Inequality'. 


will,1  or  even  of  a  prior  revoked  will,2  may  be  considered    M    b        .  d 
in  connection  with  the  testator's  disposition  and  affections,    by  circum- 
and  declarations  about  it,  as  indicating  whether  there   8tancea- 
was  extraneous  influence ;  remembering,  however,  that  the  unnatural 
character   of    the   will  does   not  of  itself  prove  undue 
influence.8     But  gross  inequality  of  distribution  may  be 
considered  as  a  circumstance,  though  not  of  itself  sufficient,  to  prove 
undue  influence ; 4  and  the  unnatural  character  of  the  will,  when  sup- 
plemented by  other  suspicious  circumstances,  may  throw  the  onus 
upon  the  favored  beneficiary.5     So,  also,  the  relations  which  the  tes- 
tator sustained  toward  the  legatees  may  furnish  indicia, 
and  it  is  held  that,  unlike  the  influence  arising  from    iatLL°mS  lega- 
gratitude,  affection,  or  esteem,  or  the  kind  offices  of  a   teesasevi- 

.  .  .         deuce. 

wife  or  husband,  or  other  person  in  the  ordinary  social 

relations  of  life,  which  are  held  lawful  and  proper,  such  influence 

arising  from  unlawful  relations  is  undue  and  vitiates  the  will.6     That 


long  before  the  making  of  the  will  are 
competent  to  explain  preferences  :  Dye  v. 
Young,  55  Iowa,  433 ;  Moore  v.  McDonald, 
€8  Md.  321,  338.  See  also  cases  cited  post, 
%  225,  p.  *  490. 

1  Tyler  v.  Gardiner,  supra:  Allen  v. 
Public  Administrator,  1  Bradf.  378,386; 
McLaughlin  v.  McDevitt,  63  N.  Y.  213, 
217;  Denton  v.  Franklin,  9  B.  Mon.  28, 
30;  Myers  v.  Hauger,  98  Mo.  433,  438; 
Beattie  v.  Thomasson,  16  It.  I.  13  ;  Potter 
v.  Baldwin,  133  Mass.  427,  allowing  dec- 
larations of  the  testator,  both  before  and 
after  the  date  of  the  will,  to  be  given  in 
evidence  and  citing  Shailer  v.  Bumstead, 
99  Mass.  112;  Lewis  v.  Mason,  109  Mass. 
169;  and  May  v.  Bradlee,  127  Mass.  414  ; 
Parsons  v.  Parsons,  66  Iowa,  754,  758 ; 
Whitman  v.  Morey,  63  N.  H.  448;  Her- 
ster  v.  Herster,  116  Pa.  St.  612.  Decla- 
rations by  the  testator  are  held  admissible 
only  when  part  of  the  res  gestce  :  see  cases 
post,  §  225,  p.  *  490. 

2  To  show  the  then  fixed  purpose  of 
the  testator :  Thompson  v.  Ish,  99  Mo. 
160,  171.  Even  a  mere  draft  or  memo- 
randum of  a  prior  proposed  will  has  been 
held  admissible  :  McConnell  v.  Wilder,  153 
Mass.  487. 

3  Kevil  v.  Kevil,2  Bush,  614;  Kitchell 
v.  Beach,  35  N.  J.  Eq.  446 ;  Webber  v. 
Sullivan,  58  Iowa,  260,  265;  Coffman  v. 
Hedrick,  32  W.  Va.  119,  132.  In  re  Wil- 
son, 117  Cal.  262.  Says  Clark,  J.,  in  Hers- 
ter v.  Herster,  122  Pa!  St.  239,  260:  "The 
very  object  of  making  a  will  is  to  disturb 

VOL.   I.  — 4 


the  equality  of  distribution ;  it  is  only 
when  the  will  is  grossly  unreasonable  in 
its  provisions,  and  plainly  inconsistent  with 
the  testator's  duty  to  his  family  that,  in 
case  of  doubt,  the  inequality  can  have  any 
effect  on  the  question  of  undue  influence." 

4  Pooler  v.  Cristman,  145  111.  405; 
Nicewander  v.  Nicewander,  151  111.  156; 
McFadin  v.  Catron,  120  Mo.  252,  273; 
Maddox  v.  Maddox,  114  Mo.  35. 

6  Gay  v.  Gillilan,  92  Mo.  250,  254,  as 
explained  in  the  subsequent  Missouri 
cases  above  cited. 

6  Denton  v.  Franklin,  9  B.  Mon.  28  ; 
Dean  v.  Negley,  41  Pa.  St.  312, 317  ;  Rudy 
v.  Ulrich,  69  Pa.  St.  177,  181  ;  McClure  v. 
McClure,  86  Tenn.  173  (holding,  however, 
that  where  the  parties  believe  the  rela- 
tion to  be  lawful,  no  unfavorable  inference 
should  be  drawn),  178;  Kessinger  v.  Kes- 
singer,  37  Ind.  341,  343.  See  also  Reich- 
enbach  v.  Ruddach,  127  Pa.  St.  564,  593. 
But  the  existence  of  the  relation  is  not 
itself  proof,  nor  does  it  give  rise  to  a  pre- 
sumption of  undue  influence  :  Main  v. 
Ryder,  84  Pa.  St.  217,  225  ;  Johnson's  Es- 
tate, 159  Pa.  St.  630;  Farr  v.  Thompson, 
Cheves,  37, 48  ;  Roe  v.  Taylor,  45  111.  485  ; 
Sunderland  v.  Hood,  84  Mo.  293,  affirming 
s.  c.  13  Mo.  App.  232,  236,  et  seo.  :  Wain- 
wright's  Appeal,  89  Pa.  St.  220,  226 ;  Don- 
nely's  Will,  68  Iowa,  126;  Porschet  v. 
Porschet,  82  Ky.  93 ;  Matter  of  Mondorf, 
110  N.  Y.  450.  And  the  rule  making  a 
distinction  as  to  the  source  of  the  "  unlaw- 
ful "  influence  was  criticised  in  Matter  of 
49 


*  48,  *  49         INCAPACITY  ARISING  FROM  MENTAL  DISABILITIES.         §  82 

a  portion  of  the  festator's  estate  is  bequeathed  in  violation  of  the 
terms  of  a  family  settlement  does  not,  in  the  absence  of  proof  of 
fraud  or  undue  influence,  vitiate  the  will;  the  rights  of  parties 
affected  may  be  enforced  on  the  distribution  of  the  estate.1 

*  §  32.  Presumption  against  Legacies  to  Fiduciary  Ad-  [*  49] 
visers.  —  The  rule  that  undue  influence  may  never  be  pre- 
sumed, but  must  be  proved  by  the  person  who  alleges  it,  is  subject 
to  an  exception  in  those  cases  in  which  a  legacy  is  given  by  a  testator 
to  his  attorney,  confidential  adviser,  guardian,  or  other  person  sus- 
_..    .         ,      taining   toward   him   any  fiduciary  relation.     Proof  of 

Fiduciary  rela-  ?  *  .   J 

tion  of  legatee  the  existence  of  such  relation  raises  the  presumption  of 
raises  pre-         undue  influence,  which  is  fatal  to  the  bequest  unless 

sumption  oi  '  *■ 

undue  rebutted  by  proof  of  full  deliberation  and  spontaneity 

on  the  part  of  the  testator,  and  good  faith  on  the  part 
of   the  legatee.2     The  presumption   extends  beyond   the  period   of 
minority  in  the  case  of  guardian  and  ward,  so  as  to  in- 
validate a  will  made  by  a  person  in  favor  of  his  former 
guardian  a  few  days  after  attaining  majority ; 8  and  a  bequest  to  the 
wife  of  a  guardian  likewise  gives  rise  to  the  presumption,  where  it 
appears  that  the  guardian  may  expect  and  derive  substantial  advan- 
tage and  benefit  from  such  will  of  his  ward.4     It  is  held  to  be  the 
duty  of  a  priest  acting  as  confessor  and  adviser  of   a 
testator  about  to  will  his  property  to  a  stranger  in  blood, 
to  make  inquiries  touching  his  family  relations,  and  disinterestedly 
advise  him  as  to  his  duties  to  wife  and  children,  and  that  a  failure  to 
do  so  avoids  a  gift  or  testamentary  donation,  although  it  be  not  to 
the  donee's  personal  benefit,  but  "  in  the  interest  of  religion  "  and 
for  "his  spiritual  welfare."  5     The  principle  avoiding  such  gifts  can- 
not be  evaded  by  giving  interests  to  third  persons,  instead  of  those 
who  exercise  the  undue  influence.6     In  some  of  the  cases  in  which 

Ruffino,  116  Cal.  305,  316,  in  which  the  mond's    Appeal,  59  Conn.  226;    Drake's 

court  holds  that  "it  makes  no  difference  Appeal,  45  Conn.  9,  18. 

what  the  moral  qualities  of  the  influence  3  Garvin  v.  Williams,  44  Mo.  465,  469, 

may  be,"  the  question  being  whether  the  et  seq. ;  s.  c.  50  Mo.  206. 

proposed  will  is  the  spontaneous  act  of  a  4  Bridwell  v.  Swank,  84  Mo.  455. 

competent  testator.  5  Forcl  »■  Hennessey,  70  Mo.  580,  587, 

i  Schaaber's  Appeal,  13  Atl.  R.  (Pa.)  et  seq.,  citing  Kirwan  v.  Cullen,  4  Irish 

775.  Ch.  (n.  8.)  322,  326  (sustaining  a  gift  inter 

2  Meek  v.  Perry,  36  Miss.  190,  244,  et  vivos  in  trust) ;  Thompson  v.  Heffernan, 

teq.,  citing  numerous  English  and  Amer-  4   Drury  &  W.  285,  291  (a  donatio  mortis 

ican    authorities;    St.    Leger'a    Will,  34  causa  held  void) ;  and  Iloghton  v.  Hogh- 

Conn.   434,    450;     Wilson    v.   Moran,    3  ton,  15  Beav.  278,  299  (avoiding  a  deed  of 

Bradf.  172, 180;  Jones  v.  Roberts,  37  Mo.  resettlement   of    family   estates   between 

App.  168,  174  ;  Bridwell  v.  Swank,  84  Mo.  a  father  and  his  eldest  son,  executed  soon 

I.'."..  467;   Pinegan    v.  Theissen,  92  Mich,  after  the  son    attained  majority);    Marx 

17.'t,  184;    Barvey  v.  Bnllens,  46  Mo.  147,  v.  McOlynn,  88  N.  Y.  357,  371  ;  see  also 

154;   Wattenon  V,  Watterson,  1  Head,  1;  Finegan  v.  Theissen,  92   Mich.  173,  184; 

Morris  v.  Stokes,  21    On.  5.r.2,  573;  In  re  and  Ilegney  v.  Head,  126  Mo.  619. 
Welsh,  1    Redf.  238.  245.     See  also  Rich-  °  Ford    v.    Hennessey,    supra,     citing 

50 


§32 


PRESUMPTION   AGAINST   LEGACIES,   ETC 


49,  *  50 


wills  were  held  void  by  reason  of  undue  influence  exerted  on  the 
testators,  courts  seem  reluctant  to  announce  as  a  rule  that  where  a 
legacy  is  given  to  a  confidential  adviser  or  fiduciary,  the  burden  of 
proof  is  on  the  beneficiary,  contenting  themselves  with  the  state- 
ment that  such  relation  is  a  circumstance  of  suspicion,  requiring 
clear  evidence  of  the  testator's  knowledge  of  and  assent  to  the  con- 
tents of  the  will,  independent  of  its  formal  execution,  and  usually 
dwell  on  the  mental  weakness  of  the  testator  or  similar  accompany- 
ing facts.1  And  in  some  States  the  principle  above  announced,  so 
far  as  it  applies  to  wills,  is  modified  to  the  extent  that  the  mere  fact 
that  a  gift  is  made  to  one  standing  in  a  fiduciary  relation  (no  matter 
how  close),  while  being  a  suspicious  circumstance  calling  for  jealous 
scrutiny,  is  of  itself  insufficient  to  presumptively  invalidate  such 
gift ;  there  must  be  coupled  therewith  some  act  of  the  beneficiary, 
however  slight  (depending  on  the  circumstances)  in  some  way  con- 
necting him  with  the  will.2 
[*  50]  *A  similar  rule  of  law  prevails,  where  the  person  who  pre- 
pares the  instrument  or  conducts  its  execution  is  himself 
benefited  by  its  provisions ;  very  clear  proof  of  volition  and  capacity, 
as  well  as  of  knowledge  by  the  testator  of  the  contents,  Scriveners 
is  necessary  in  such  case  to  the  validity  of  the  instru-  of  Wl11- 
ment.8     But  if  the  beneficiary  writing  the  will  is  a  near  relative,  who 


Yosti  v.  Laughran,  49  Mo.  594,  599,  and 
Eankeu  v.  Patton,  65  Mo.  378,  390,  et  seq. ; 
Drake's  Appeal,  45  Conn.  9,  18. 

1  Yardley  v.  Cuthbertson,  108  Pa.  St. 
395,  456,  et  seq.,  citing  English  and  Amer- 
ican cases  ;  Harrison's  Appeal,  100  Pa.  St. 
458,  469 ;  Cuthbertson 's  Appeal,  97  Pa. 
St  168;  Barry  r.  Butlin,  1  Curt.  637;  Ar- 
mor's Estate,  154  Pa.  St.  517;  McCom- 
mon  v.  McCommon,  151  111.  428. 

2  Bancroft  v.  Otis,  91  Ala.  279,  286, 
reviewing  English  and  American  author- 
ities and  overruling  prior  Alabama  cases 
on  this  point  ;  per  Handy,  J.,  dissenting, 
in  Meek  v.  Perry,  36  Miss.  190,  269  ;  Grif- 
fith v.  Diffenderffer,  50  Md.  466,  483  ;  per 
Andrews,  J.,  in  Matter  of  Smith,  95  N.  Y. 
516,  523  ;  Bennett  >;.  Bennett,  50  N.  J. 
Eq.  439;  Denning  v.  Butcher,  91  Iowa, 
425,  declaring  this  to  be  the  better  rule, 
and  citing  many  cases  :  439  et  seq. 

8  Wms.  on  Ex.  [112],  citing  English 
and  American  authorities ;  Garrett  v.  Hef- 
lin,  98  Ala.  615  ;  Post  v.  Mason,  91  N.  Y. 
539.  It  is  said  in  this  case,  by  Danforth, 
J., "  the  relation  of  attorney  and  draughts- 
man no  doubt  gave,  in  the  case  before  us, 
the  opportunity  for  influence,  and  self- 
interest  might  supply  a  motive  to  unduly 


exert  it ;  but  its  exercise  cannot  be  pre- 
sumed in  aid  of  those  who  seek  to  over- 
throw a  will  already  established  by  the 
judgment  of  a  competent  tribunal,  ren- 
dered in  proceedings  to  which  the  plain- 
tiffs were  themselves  parties,  nor  in  the 
absence  of  evidence  warrant  a  presump- 
tion that  the  intention  of  the  testator  was 
improperly,  much  less  fraudulently,  con- 
trolled." So  in  Coffin  v.  Coffin,  23  N.  Y. 
9, 13,  it  is  held  that  the  mere  fact  that  the 
draughtsman  is  a  legatee  is  insufficient 
without  other  indications  of  undue  influ- 
ence to  presumptively  invalidate  the  leg- 
acy, and  that  such  relation  "  is,  at  most, 
a  suspicious  circumstance,  of  more  or 
less  weight,  according  to  the  facts  of  each 
particular  case,"  etc.,  quoting  from  Barry 
».  Butlin,  1  Curt.  (Eccl.)  637,  640.  See 
to  same  effect,  Stirling  v.  Stirling,  64 
Md.  138,  147;  Cramer  v.  Crumbaugh,  3 
Md.  491,  499,  503  ;  Carter  v.  Dixon,  69 
Ga.  82,  89  ;  Berberet  v.  Berberet,  131  Mo. 
399.  See  also  Crispell  v.  Dubois,  4  Barb. 
393,398;  Caldwell  v.  Anderson,  104  Pa. 
St.  199  ;  Yardley  v.  Cuthbertson,  15  Phila. 
77;  9.  C.  108  Pa.  St.  395,  456,  et  seq.; 
Purdy  v.  Hall,  134  111.  298, 308.  It  makes 
no  difference  that  the  will,  having  been 
51 


*  50,  *  51     INCAPACITY  ARISING  FROM  MENTAL  DISABILITIES.     §§  33,  34 

would  take  a  considerable  share  of  the  estate  if  there  were  no  will, 
the  presumption  which  might  arise  against  a  stranger  is  not  applica- 
ble to  him.1  The  appointment  of  the  scrivener  as  executor  is  not 
sufficient  to  require  affirmative  proof  that  the  paper  was  drawn  in 
accordance  with  the  instructions  of  the  testator,  or  that  he  is  aware 
of  its  contents  and  legal  effect.2 

§  33.  Presumption  as  to  Seamen's  Wills.  —  A  similar  exception  to 
the  ordinary  rules  and  presumptions  by  which  the  intention  of  testa- 
tors is  to  be  ascertained  is  made  in  the  case  of  seamen,8 
sumpuonln"       whose  temporary  necessities  are  considered  to  operate 
case  of  the  will  Up0n    them    as  a   sort   of   duress    on    the    part 

*  of  those  who  are  to  furnish  the  supply.4  It  [*  51] 
was  therefore  held,  that,  although  the  statute8  provides 
"that  no  will  of  any  seaman  contained,  printed,  or  written  in  the 
same  instrument,  paper  or  parchment,  with  a  warrant  or  letter  of 
attorney,  shall  be  good  or  available  in  law  to  any  intent  or  purpose 
whatsoever,"  yet  a  will  was  invalid  when  executed  on  a  different  in- 
strument from  the  power  of  attorney.6  Neither  the  relation  of  agent 
and  seaman,  nor  the  indebtedness  of  the  seaman  to  his  agent,  operates 
as  an  absolute  defeasance  of  the  will ;  but  there  must  be  clear  proof 
in  such  cases  of  the  subscription  of  the  deceased  to  the  instrument, 
and  of  his  knowledge  of  its  nature  and  effect :  if  executed  merely  as 
a  security  for  a  debt,  it  shall  not  operate  as  a  testamentary  disposi- 
tion of  the  whole  property;  but  if  there  be  satisfactory  evidence  of 
an  intention  to  dispose  of  the  property  by  will,  the  instrument  shall 
be  valid  although  there  be  a  debt.7 

§  34.  Partial  Avoidance  of  Will  by  Undue  Influence.  —  If  undue 
influence  or  fraud,  though  exercised  by  one  legatee  only,  affect  the 
whole  will,  the  whole  will  is  void; 8  but  both  justice  and  policy  require 

written  by  the  beneficiary,  is  subsequently  country,"  says   Sir  John  Nicholl  in  the 

copied   by    another:    Kelly  v.    Settegast,  case   of   Zacharias  v.  Colhs,  3  Phil.   176, 

68  Tex   13  20      So  when  any  beneficiary  "and  of  several  others,  to   grant  special 

has  the  testator  completely  under  his  con-  indulgences,  and  to  extend  special  protec- 

trol,  with  power  to  make  his  will  the  will  tions  to  the  testamentary  intentions  of  this 

of   the   testator,  especially  in   case  of  an  class  of  persons." 
unnatural    disposition    of    the    property,  *  Wins.  Ex.  [51]. 

un.ln,   influence  is  presumed :   Carrall  v.         *  9  &  10  Will.  III.  c.  41   §  6  ;  repealed 

House  48  N  J  Eq  269.  and  re-enacted  by  55  Geo.  III.  c.  60,  §  4; 

■  Caldwell    v.   Anderson,    104   Pa.    St.  also   1   &  2  Geo.  IV.  c.  49,  §  2;  and  see 

199,  206.     But   even  in  such  case,  when  11  Geo.  IV.,  and  1  Will.  IV.  c.  20,  §§  48 

the  evidence  shows  that  the  will  was  not  etserj.;  28  &  29  Vict.  c.  72,  §  4. 
read  by  the  testator,  nor  explained  to  him,         'Zacharias  r.  Collis,  S  PhiUim.  1-6, 

the  burden  of  showing  thai  the  will  was  citing  Craig  v.  Lester,  p.  189;  also  Moore 

drawn  as  directed  by  the  testator  is  on  the  w.  Smart,  p.  190;  Hay  v.  Mullo,  p.  194; 

beneficiary:  Blume  v.  Hartman,  115  Pa.  Forbes  v.  Burt,  p.  196. 
St   82  1  Wins.  Kx.  [58],    citing  Zacharias  v. 

'-'  Union's  Appeal,  104  Pa.  St.  228,  237  ;  Collis,  supra,  and  Deardsley  v.  Fleming,  2 

Livingston's  Appeal,  63  Conn.  68,  78.  Oas.  Temp.  Lee,  98. 

«  "It  is  the  policy  of  the  law  of  this        H  Florey  v.  Florey,  24  Ala.  241,  248. 
52 


§35  WILLS   OF   DEAF,    DUMB,   AND    BLIND   PERSONS.  *51,*52 

that  the  rejection  of  a  legacy  obtained  by  fraud  or  undue    a  will  may 
influence  should  not  invalidate  other  provisions  in  the    !>e  avoided 
same  will  in  favor  of  legatees  who  have   not  resorted    sustained  iu 
to  improper  means.1     For  the  like  reason,  an  erasure  or    Part- 
alteration  in  the  will,  though  found  to  have  been  made  after  execu- 
tion, does  not  avoid  the  will  in  toto  ;  if  made  by  a  stranger,  and  the 
original  legacy  be  known,  it  will  have  no  legal  effect,  the  legacy  will 
be  still  recoverable,  and  ought  to  be  proved  as  it  originally  stood ; 
but  if  made  by  the  legatee  himself,  it  will  avoid  the  legacy  so  altered, 
but  cannot  destroy  other  bequests  in  the  will,  either  to  such  legatee 

or  others.2     Hence  a  will  may  be  valid  as  to  some  of  its  dis- 
[*  52]  positions,  and  *  invalid  as  to  others.     This  doctrine  will  be 

further  considered  iu  connection  with  the  probate  of  wills.8 
§  35.    Wills  of  Deaf,  Dumb,  and   Blind    Persons.  —  The    imperfec- 
tions of  deaf,  dumb,  and  blind  persons,  although  in  no  wise  incon- 
sistent   with    perfect    testamentary   capacity,    demand    \ynis  0f  deaf, 
special  precautions  in  the  proof  of  their  wills.     Persons    Ji.um.b>  aud 

blind  persons 

born  deaf,  blind,  and  dumb  were  by  Blackstone  classed   not  necessa- 
with  "  those  who  are  incapable,  by  reason  of  mental  dis-    rib' v0ld* 
ability,  to  make  a  will."     Surrogate  Bradford  points  out 4  that  this 
rule  —  borrowed  from  the  civil  law,  which  itself  allowed  the  testa- 
tory  power  where  these  defects  were  not  congenital  —  must  of  neces- 
sity be  qualified  by  the  reason  of  it,  which  was  a  presumed  want  of 
capacity.6     If,  therefore,  a  person,  although  deaf,  dumb,  and  blind, 
have  received  such  education  as  to  endow  him  with  ordinary  intel- 
lectual powers,  he  may  make  a  valid  will ; 6  a  fortiori,  where  the 
person  is  blind,  but  not  deaf  and  dumb,7  or  deaf  and  dumb,  but  not 
blind.8     In  all  such  cases  it  is  necessary  to  prove,  to  the  entire  satis- 
faction of  the  court  or  jury  passing  upon  the  validity  of   B        .  . 
the  will,  that  the  testator  was  acquainted  with  its  con-   proof  must 
tents.9     It  is  not  necessary,  ordinarily,  to  prove  that  the    be  made' 
will  was  read  by  or  to  the  testator  before  executing  it ; 10  but  if  evi- 

1  In  re  Welsh,  1  Redf.  238,  247  ;  Baker's  7  Ray  v.  Hill,  3  Strobh.  L.  297,  302  ; 
Will,  2  Redf.  179, 197  ;  Harrison's  Appeal,     Wilson  v.  Mitchell,  101  Pa.  St.  495. 

48  Conn.  202,  204.  8  Gombault  v.  Public  Administrator,  4 

2  Smith  v.  Fenner,  1  Gall.  C.  C.  170,     Bradf.   226,   230;   Matter  of  Perego,  65 
174;    Camp  v.    Shaw,   52   111.  App.    241,     Hun,  478. 

249.     As  to  interlineations,  see  post,  §  49.  9  Davis  v.  Rogers,  1  Houst.  44,  93. 

8  Post,  §  222.  w  Because,  as  a  general  rule,  the  person 

4  In  the  case  of  Weir  v.  Fitzgerald,  2  signing  an  instrument  is  presumed  to  know 

Bradf.  42,  68.  its  contents :  Androscoggin  Bank  v.  Kim- 

6  '*.   .   .   who,    as    they   have    always  ball,  10  Cush.  373, 374;  which  rule  applies 

wanted  the  common  inlets  of  understand-  to  wills  as  well  as  to  other  instruments : 

ing,  are  incapable  of  having  animum  tes-  Munnikhuysen   v.  Magraw,  35  Md.   280, 

tnndi,  and  their  testaments  are  therefore  287  ;  Downey  v.  Murphy,  1  Dev.  &  B.  L. 

void":  2  Bla.  Comm.  497.  82,  87. 

6  Reynolds  v.  Reynolds,  1  Speers,  253, 
257. 

53 


*  52,  *  53      INCAPACITY  ARISING  FROM  MENTAL  DISABILITIES.  §  o5 

dence  be  given  that  the  testator  was  blind,  or  could  not  read,  or,  for 
any  reason,  was  unacquainted  with  its  contents,  such  evidence  must 
be  met  by  satisfactory  proof,  either  that  the  will  was  read  to  or  by, 
or  that  the  contents  were  known  to,  the  testator.1  Modern  authori- 
ties go  no  further  than  to  require  very  great  scrutiny,  in  such  cases, 
into  the  testator's  knowledge  and  approval  of  the  contents 
of  the  will}2  and  "it  is  *  almost  superfluous  to  observe,  that,  [*53] 
in  proportion  as  the  infirmities  of  a  testator  expose  him  to 
deception,  it  becomes  imperatively  the  duty,  and  should  be  anxiously 
the  care,  of  all  persons  assisting  in  the  testamentary  transaction,  to 
be  prepared  with  the  clearest  proof  that  no  imposition  has  been 
practised."  8 

1  Harrison   v.   Rowan,  3   Wash.  C.  C.         2  Bigelow's  note  1  to  1  Jarm.  on  Wills, 

580,  585;  Wampler   v.  Wampler,  9  Md.  *34,  b.,  p.  46. 

540,550;  Martin  v.  Mitchell,  28  Ga.  382,         s  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *  34,  Bigelow's  note 

885 ;  Guthrie  v.  Price,  23  Ark.  396,  403,  (1);  1  Redf.  on  Wills,  58. 
et  seq. ;  Day  v.  Day,  3  N.  J.  Eq.  549,  552. 


§  36  ABSOLUTE   AND    CONDITIONAL   WILLS.  *  54,  *  55 


[*54]  *  CHAPTER  V. 

FORM,   EXECUTION,   AND    ATTESTATION   OF   WILLS. 

§  36.    Absolute  and  Conditional  Wills.  —  The  office    of    a    will  — 
more   accurately  called    last  will   or  testament  —  is  to  control  the 
disposition,  in  the  manner  desired  by  the  testator,  of   0mce  of  wills 
his   property   after   his   death,    and,    in   many   of    the 
States,1  as  under  the  statute  of  12  Car.  II.  c.  24,  to  appoint  a  guar- 
dian for  his  minor  children.2     In  its  essential  nature  a  will  is  ambu- 
latory,   for   it   is   not   operative    before   the   testator's    They  are  am- 
death,  until  which  time  it  can  vest  no  rights  in  others,    bulatory ; 
and  may  therefore  be  revoked  or  changed  at  the  testator's  pleasure.3 
It  is  usually  absolute  in    its    provisions,  but   may    be    usualiyabso. 
made  conditional  upon  the  happening  of   some   event,    lute,  but  may 
and  is  then  void  unless  such  event  happen.4     In  such 
case  it  is  important  to  ascertain,  first,  whether  the  intention  of  the 
testator  is  to  make  the  validity  of  the   will    dependent   upon   the 
condition,  or   merely  to  state  the  circumstances    inducing   him    to 
make  the  testamentary  provision ;  and  next,  whether,  if  the  language 
clearly  imports  a  condition,  it  apply  to   the  whole  will,  or   affect 
only  some  part  of  it.5     The  case  of  French  v.  French6   case  illustrat- 
presents   some   instructive  features   on   this    question,    ing  distinction 
and  may  with  profit  be  noticed  in  extenso.     The  will    iuteVand  con-" 

was   a   holograph,  in  the  following  form:    "Let   ditionai  will. 
[*  55]  all  men  know  hereby,  if  *  I  get  drowned  this  morning,  March 

7,  1872,  that  I  bequeath  all  my  property,  personal  and  real, 

1  In  all  of  them  except  Iowa  and  Ne-  ing  rights  upon  delivery,  enforceable  by 
braska,  in  the  statutes  of  which  no  pro-  the  parties,  is  a  contract  inter  vivos,  and 
visions  to  this  effect  have  been  met  with,  not  revoked  by  a  subsequent  will :  Book 
The   power  is  given  in  all  cases  to  the  v.  Book,  104  Pa.  St.  240. 

father,  in  many  of  them  also  to  the  sur-  *  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *  17  et  seq. ;  Mor- 

viving  mother,  and  in  two  or  three  States  row's  Appeal,  116  Pa.  St.  440;  Maxwell 

the   power  to  the  father   is   conditioned  v.  Maxwell,  3  Mete.  (Ky.)  101,  104;  Jacks 

upon  the    consent   of    the    mother.      In  v.  Henderson,  1  Desaus.  543,  554. 
Maine,   New   Hampshire,  and   Ohio,  the  5  Damon  v.  Damon,  8  Allen,  192,  194, 

testamentary  appointment  operates  only  et  seq.;  Tarver  v.  Tarver,  9  Pet.  174,  179; 

if  held  suitable  by  the  probate  court.  Ex  parte   Lindsay,    2    Bradf.   204,    206  ; 

2  Balch  v.  Smith,  12  N.  H.  437,  440;  Thompson  v.  Conner,  3  Bradf.  366  ;  Kelle- 
See  the  subject  of  testamentary  guardians  her  v.  Kernan,  60  Md.  440;  Likefield  v 
treated  in  Woerner  on  Guardianship,  §  20.  Likefield,  82  Ky.  589. 

3  See  infra,  §  37.     An  instrument  vest-  6  14  W.  Va.  458. 

55 


*  55,  *  56       FOEM,   EXECUTION,    AND   ATTESTATION   OP   WILLS.         §  37 

to  my  beloved  wife,  Florence.  Witness  my  hand  and  seal,  7th  of 
March,  1872.  Wm.  T.  French."  It  was  proved,  on  the  propound- 
ing of  the  will,  that  French  was  about  to  cross  a  deep  river;  that 
his  wife,  being  afraid  that  some  accident  would  happen,  was  anxious 
that  he  should  not  go;  that  decedent  started  out  of  the  room,  and 
then  came  back  and  wrote  the  will.  It  also  appeared  in  the  cause  1 
that  French  had  no  children;  that  he  was  not  drowned  on  the  day  of 
writing  the  will,  but  died  on  the  29th  of  December,  1874;  that  if  he 
had  died  on  the  day  of  the  date  of  said  will,  his  wife  would  have 
been  the  sole  legal  heir  of  her  husband;  but  that  after  that  day,  and 
before  the  day  of  his  death,  the  law  of  descent  was  so  amended  that 
the  father  of  the  deceased  was  his  sole  legal  heir.  It  was  also 
proved  in  the  proceeding  to  set  aside  the  probate  of  said  will  that 
the  testator  subsequently  recognized  the  writing  as  x  valid  will ;  but 
the  court  held  such  testimony  inadmissible.1  Upon  these  facts  the 
majority  of  the  court,  after  an  extensive  review  of  English  and 
American  authorities  bearing  upon  the  question  of  contingent  wills,2 
reached  the  conclusion  that  "  it  was  the  intention  and  purpose  of  the 
decedent  that  said  paper  writing  should  be  his  unconditional  will 
and  testament,  giving  to  his  wife  Florence  all  of  his  real  and  per- 
sonal estate  at  his  death,  whether  natural  or  otherwise;  and  the 
court,  in  order  to  give  effect  to  the  intention  of  the  decedent,  will 
presume  that  said  paper  writing  was  executed  in  contemplation  of 
any  change  of  the  law  of  descents  as  to  legal  heirship  which 
might  be  and  was  made  between  the  date  of  the  said  will  and  the 
death  of  the  decedent."8  The  president  of  the  court  dissented, 
holding  it  to  be  self-evident  that  the  words  of  the  will,  "  */  I  get 
drowned,"  &c,  could  not  possibly  mean  "as  I  may  get  drowned," 
&c.4  Four  of  the  five  judges  concurred  in  the  majority  opinion, 
rendered  by  Haymon,  J. 

*  §  37.  joint  and  Mutual  Wills.  —  It  follows  from  the  ambu-  [*  56] 
„  ,  latorv  quality  of  wills,  that  a  testator  cannot  by 

Kule  as  to  J    *  J  '       .  . 

joint  or  mu-        will  deprive  himself  of  his  power  to  revoke  a  testamen- 

tuai  wills.  tai,y  ^position.6     It  is  therefore  said  that  the  conjoint 

1  Page  506  of  the  opinion.  346;   Todd's  Will,  2   Watts   &   S.   145; 

2  Mentioning,  as  holding  wills  absolute  Maxwell  v.  Maxwell,  supra;  Dougherty 
because  the  contingencies  were  therein  v.  Dougherty,  4  Mete.  (Ky.)  25;  McGee 
mentioned  as  inducements,  Cody  v.  Conly,  17.  McNeil,  41  Miss.  17;  Robnett  v.  Ash- 
L'Tfiraii    313;  floods  of  Dobson,  1  P.  &  D.  lock,  49  Mo.  171. 

(L.  R.)  x*  ;  Goods  of  Martin,  1   P.  &  D.  3  Page  503  of  the  opinion. 

(L.  R.)  ".80  ;  Thome's  Case,  4  Sw.  &  Tr.  4  Page  507. 

86  ;  Skipwitb  v.  Cabell,  19  Gratt.  758;  and  5  "The  making  of  a  will  is   but  the 

Bl  holding  wills  conditional  and  void  be-  inception  of  it,  and  it  doth  not  take  any 

cause   tint   contingency    did    not   happen,  effect  till  the  death  of  the  devisor;   for 

Parsons  v.   Lanoe,   l  Ves.  Sen.  189;  In-  omne  testament?  mortt •  consummaf  est,  et  vo- 

gram  v.  Strong,  -'  Phillim.  294;  .lacks  v.  luntas  est  ambtdatoria  usque  ad  extremum 

Henderson,  supra;  Sinclair  v.  Hone,  6  Ves.  vitce  exitum.    Then  it  would  be  against 

607  ;  Wagner  V.  McDonald,  2  Ilarr.  &  J.  the  nature  of  a  will  to  be  so  absolute  that 
50 


§  87  JOINT   AND   MUTUAL  WILLS.  *  56,  *  57 

will  of  several  testators  cannot  be  admitted  to  probate,  as  being  un- 
known to  the  testamentary  law.1  Jarman,  in  the  earlier  editions 
of  his  work  on  Wills,  inclines  to  this  view ; 2  but  in  the  last  edition 
he  announces  that  two  or  more  persons  may  make  a  joint  will,  which, 
if  properly  executed  by  each,  is,  so  far  as  his  own  property  is  con- 
cerned, as  much  his  will,  and  is  as  well  entitled  to  probate  upon  the 
death  of  each,  as  if  he  had  made  a  separate  will.3  It  Maybe  admit- 
seems  clear  that  if  two  or  more  persons  join  in  making  ted  t0  Pr°t>ate 
a  will,  or  make  mutual  wills  dependent  upon  each  other,  so  that  the 
mutual  wills  or  joint  will  of  all  becomes  a  joint  transaction,  each  of 
the  testators  may,  by  exercising  his  power  of  revocation,  jf  not  revoked 
destroy  the  testamentary  character  or  validity  of  the  in-  by  any  of  the 
strument,  at  least,  to  the  extent  of  his  interest  therein.4 
This  follows  from  the  revocability  of  wills.  But  in  so  far  as  a  joint 
or  mutual  will  may  rest  upon  a  mutual  agreement,  But  if  revoked 
according  to  which  the  execution  of  the  instrument  by    as  a  "5II> ll 

°  .    ^      mav  be  en- 

one  is  the  condition  or  consideration  for  its  execution   forced  as  a 
by  another,  the  element  of  contract  is  superadded  to  the   contract- 
transaction ;  and,  as  a  contract,  the  instrument  is  of  course  irrevo- 
cable without  the  consent  of  all  the  parties  to  it.5    In  this  sense,  the 
law  making  a  will  based  upon  a  valuable  consideration  binding  as  a 

contract  is  fully  applicable.6  Hence,  if  one  of  the  parties 
[*  57]  to  a  joint  or  mutual  will  *  die  without  having  revoked  it,  and 

the  survivor  benefit  thereby,  the  will  may  be  enforced  in 
equity,  as  a  compact,  against  revocation  by  the  survivor.7  The 
doctrine  announced  by  Jarman  in  the  later  editions  seems,  therefore, 
incontrovertible  on  principle,  and  is  sanctioned  by  the  current  of 
English  and  American  decisions.  It  asserts  the  revocability  of  joint 
and  mutual  wills  as  testamentary  dispositions  of  property,  and  there- 
he  who  makes  it,  being  of  good  and  per-  (Code,  1882,  §  2470)  that  even  in  case 
feet  memory,  cannot  countermand  it  "  :  of  mutual  wills  with  a  covenant  against 
Ferse  &  Hembling's  Case,  4  Co.  16  b.  revocation,  the   power  of  revocation   re- 

1  Clayton  v.  Livermau,  2  Dev.  &  B.  L.     mains. 

558  ;   Hobson  v.  Blackburn,  1  Add.  274,  5  Schouler  on  Wills,  §  455.    But  to  at- 

277;  Walker  v.  Walker,  14  Oh.  St.  157;  tribute  to  a  will  the  quality  of  irrevoca- 

Hershey  v.  Clark,  35  Ark.  17,  23.  bility  demands  the  most  indisputable  evi- 

2  So  in  Perkins's  2d  American  edition  deuce  of  the  agreement  which  is  relied 
(1849),  where  he  says:  "A  joint  or  mu-  upon  to  change  its  ambulatory  nature, 
tual  will  is  said  to  be  unknown  to  the  and  presumptions  growing  out  of  the 
testamentary  law  of  England.  .  .  .  How-  similarity  of  cross  provisions,  identity  of 
ever,  such  a  will  may,  it  should  seem,  in  purpose,  etc.,  are  insufficient  to  supply 
some  cases,  be  enforced  in  equity  as  a  proof  that  the  parties  intended  to  execute 
compact " :  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  27  (2d  mutual  wills  irrevocably  binding  them- 
Am.  ed.).  selves  and  their  estates  :  Edson  v.  Parsons, 

3  1    Jarm.    (Bigelow's    5th  American  155  N.  Y.  555,  565,  568. 
from  the  4th  English  edition),  *18.  6  Infra,  p.  *58. 

4  Hobson  v.  Blackburn,  1  Add.  274 ;  7  Story  Eq.  §  785 ;  Dufour  v.  Pereira, 
Walpole  v.  Oxford,  3  Ves.  402,  415.  1  Dick.  419;  Carmichael  v.  Carmichael, 

It  is  provided  in  the  Code  of  Georgia    72  Mich.  76,  85. 

57 


*  57,  *  58        FORM,    EXECUTION,    AND    ATTESTATION    OF   WILLS.         §  37 

fore  entitled  to  probate  as  such,  to  be  consistent  with  their  irrevoca- 
bility as  contracts,  and  therefore  enforceable  in  equity  if  broken  by 
Joint  will  may  ^ue  revocation  of  the  testamentary  disposition.1  Ac- 
be  admitted  to  cordingly,  if  by  two  mutual  wills,  or  in  a  joint  will, 
death  of  testa-  two  testators  will  their  respective  estates  to  the  sur- 
tor  first  dying.  viy0r  of  them,  without  further  testamentary  disposition, 
the  will  of  the  one  who  first  dies  (which  is  the  joint  will)  is  enti- 
tled to  probate,  and  the  survivor  may  then  dispose  of  the  property 
devised  at  pleasure,  for  the  will  has  fully  accomplished  its  office, 
and  made  the  property  his.2  But  if  a  joint  will  contains  provisions 
J  '  t  d    "  *or  °^ier  purposes,  or  legacies  to  other  persons,  it  ean- 

third  parties  not  take  effect  as  to  such  until  it  receive  probate  upon 
a^dfaThof  tne  death  of  the  last  surviving  testator.3  Surrogate 
last  surviving  Bradford,  in  discussing  this  question,  points  out  that 
the  decision  of  Sir  John  Nicholl  in  Hobson  v.  Black- 
burn has  been  misconceived;  that,  instead  of  deciding  that  a  compact 
of  a  testamentary  character  could  not  be  proved  as  a  will  because  it 
was  a  mutual  or  conjoint  act,  he  only  held  that  such  an  instrument 
could  not  be  set  up  as  irrevocable  against  a  subsequent  will  revok- 
ing it;  and  he  also  shows  that  this  ruling  is  in  harmony 
with  the  civil  law.4  And  the  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio  *have  [*  58] 
expressly  disavowed  Walker  v.  Walker,5  in  so  far  as  the 
decision  of  that  case  indicates  the  policy  of  Ohio  to  be  opposed  to 
joint  wills,  and  affirmatively  hold  that  several  persons  may  dispose 
of  their  property  by  joint  will,  being  in  effect  the  will  of  each, 
revocable  by  each,  and  subject  to  probate,  either  severally  upon  the 
death  of  each  testator,  as  his  will,  or  jointly  after  the  death  of  all, 
as  the  will  of  each  and  all  of  them.6  But  in  Connecticut  it  was  held 
that  a  joint  will,  which  was  not  to  receive  probate  until  after  the 
death  of  the  survivor,  in  which  the  property  owned  in  common  by  the 

1  In  re  Davis,  120  N.  C.  9  (overruling  1  Bradf.  476;  Bynum  v.  Bynum,  11  Ired. 
Clayton  v.  Liverman,  supra) ;  Keep  in  re,  L.  632,  637  ;  Cowley's  Estate,  136  Pa.  St. 
1    Connoly,  104;  Gould  v.  Mansfield,  103     628. 

Mass.  408  ;  Edson   v.  Parsons,  155  N.  Y.  8  Schumaker  v.  Schmidt,  supra;  Goods 

355,  366;   Izard  v.  Middleton,  1   Desaus.  of  Raine,   1    Sw.    &   Tr.    144;   Goods  of 

116;  Wyche  v.  Clapp,  43  Tex.  543,  548;  Lovegrove,  2  Sw.  &  Tr.  453,  455;  Black 

March  v.  Huyter,  50  Tex.  243,  252;  Breath-  v.  Richards,  95  Ind.  184,  189. 
itttf.  Whittaker,  8  B.  Mon.  530,534;  see  4  Ex  parte   Day,   1    Bradf.   476,    482, 

also  Sumner  v.  Crane,  155  Mass.  483,  and  quoting   from   Passmore   v.   Passmore,    1 

Towle  v.  Wood,  60  X.  11.434  (announcing  Phillim.  216;    Masterman    v.  Maherly,  2 

Bach  to  be  the  law,  although  the  will  was  Hagg.  235;  Domat,  pt.  2,  lib.  3,  tit.  1. 

held  void   for  want  of   the  required  for-  See  also  Goods  of  Stracey,  Dea.  &  Sw.  6; 

malitiea  of  execution).  Rogers,  Appellant,  11  Me.  303,  305;  In  re 

2  The  joint  will,  in   such  cases,  is  hut  Davis,  120  X.  C.  9. 
the   will   of    the   testator   who    dies    first:  5  14  Oh.  St.  157. 

Lewis    '■.   Bcofleld,   26    Conn.  452,  454;         «  Betts  v.  Harper,  39  Oh.  St.  639,  cit- 
Evans  >•.  Smith,  2s  Ga.  98,  104;  Schu-    ing  numerous  authorities  to  similar  effect 
maker   v.  Schmidt,  44   Ala.  454,  464;  In     See  also  Hill  v.  Harding,  92  Ky.  76. 
re*  Die/.,  50  N.  Y.  88,  92;  Ex  parte  Day, 
5  s 


§  37  JOINT   AND   MUTUAL   WILLS.  *  58,  *  59 

testators  was  disposed  of,  and  provided  for  the  payment  of  the  debts 
of  each  testator,  as  well  as  legacies  to  third  persons  in  excess  of  the 
interest  of  each  testator,  was  illegal,  and  that  on  the  death  of  the 
first  testator  his  property  was  to  be  distributed  as  intestate  estate.1 

The  will  of  a  husband  and  wife,  though  joint  in  form,  is  not  a 
joint  will,  if  the  property  devised  belongs  to  the  husband  or  wife 
only ; 2  and  where  such  a  will  is  contingent,  it  is  void  if  the  contin- 
gency does  not  happen.8  But  where  husband  and  wife  had  joint 
power  to  devise,  and  had  executed  it  by  joint  will,  neither  of  them 
can  revoke  the  joint  will  so  made  by  a  separate  will.4 

In  Louisiana  mutual  and  joint  wills  are  prohibited  by  statute ; 5 
in  Georgia  the  power  of  revoking  mutual  wills  is  secured  by  stat- 
ute, even  if  there  be  a  covenant  in  such  will  against  revocation.6 

It  may  be  worth  while  to  mention,  in  this  connection,  the  equi- 
table principle,  that  where  an  instrument,  though  clearly    ^jUg  upon  a 
testamentary  in  form  and  phraseology,  is  executed  on  a   consideration 
valuable  consideration,  it  constitutes  an  irrevocable  con-   forced  in  equity 
tract,  which  a  court  of  equity  will,  as  near  as  may  be    lf  revoked- 
possible,  specifically  enforce ; 7  and  this  although  the  agreement  was 
by  parol,  if  not  avoided  by  the  Statute  of  Frauds.8     So,  also,  a  bind- 
ing agreement  between  a  testator  and  his  heir  at  law  will  be  enforced, 
although  repudiated  by  his  will.9     It  is  well  settled  that  a  contract 
to  make  a  certain  provision  by  will  for  a  particular  person  is 
[*59]  valid  if  founded  on  a  sufficient  consideration;10   *an  action 
will  lie  for  the  breach  thereof,11  or  for  a  balance  due,  if  pro- 

1  State  Bank  v.  Bliss,  67  Conn.  317,  re-  194 ;  Wright  v.  Tinsley,  30  Mo.  389,  396 ; 
lying  on  Walker  v.  Walker,  supra.  Parsell   v.  Stryker,  41    N.  Y.  480,    485; 

2  Rogers,  Appellant,  supra;  Kunnen  v.  Bolman  v.  Overall,  80  Ala.  451,  454  ;  and 
Zurline,  2  Cin.  440,  447 ;  Allen  v.  Allen,  see  cases  infra. 

28  Kan.  18,  24.    A  will  signed  by  hus-         8  Shakespeare   v.  Markham,   10  Hun, 

band  and  wife,  but  which  the  latter  did  311,    322;    Bolman    v.    Overall,    supra; 

not  sign  animo  testandi,  but  only  to  evi-  Clark,  J.,  in  Burgess  v.  Burgess,  109  Pa. 

dence  her  consent  to  the  disposition  made,  St.  312,316;  Hoffman's  Estate,  161  Pa. 

is  the  will  of  the  husband  alone:  Chaney  St.  331. 
v.  Home  Soc,  28  111.  App.  621.  9  Taylor  v.  Mitchell,  87  Pa.  St.  518; 

3  Goods  of  Hugo,  L.  R.  2  P.  D.  73.  see  also  Meck's  Appeal,  97  Pa.  St.  313, 
*  Breathitt  v.  Whittaker,  8  B.  Mon.  316. 

530,  534.  10  Wellington  v.  Apthorp,   145  Mass. 

5  Voorhies'  Rev.  C.  1889,  art.  1574.  69,  72;  Caviness  v.  Rushton,  101  Ind. 
But  this  prohibition  does  not  extend  to  500 ;  Bird  v.  Pope,  73  Mich.  483 ;  McKei- 
the  wills  of  husband  and  wife,  or  of  any  gan  v.  O'Neil,  22  S.  C.  454,  467 ;  Newton 
two  persons,  in  favor  of  the  same  bene-  v.  Newton,  46  Minn.  33 ;  if  there  is  no 
ficiary,  although  written  out  by  the  same  sufficient  consideration,  the  promise  is  un- 
party  on  the  same  day,  if  separately  at-  enforceable :  Drake  v  Lanning,  49  N.  J. 
tested :  Wood  v.  Roane,  35  La.  An.  865,  Eq.  452. 

869.     But  see  12  La.  An.  880.  n  Jenkins  v.  Stetson,  9  Allen,  128, 132; 

6  Code,  1882,  §  2470.  Starkey's  Appeal,  61  Conn.  199;  Koch  v. 

7  Johnson  v.  Hubbell,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  332,  Hebel,  32  Mo.  App.  103,  110 ;  Purviance 
335;    Rivers   v.   Rivers,   3   Desaus.    190,  v.  Shultz,  16  Ind.  App.  94,  95. 

59 


*59 


FORM,   EXECUTION,   AND   ATTESTATION   OP   WILLS. 


§37 


vision  is  made  in  part  only;1  or  specific  performance  may  be  de- 
creed; 2  and  if  the  action  for  specific  performance  is  defeated  by  the 
Statute  of  Frauds,  an  action  on  the  quantum  meruit  is  maintainable 
to  recover  for  the  services  rendered.3  While  services  rendered  on 
a  mere  expectation  of  a  legacy  do  not  constitute  a  good  cause  of 
action,4  yet  an  action  lies  for  the  breach  of  a  promise  to  pay  for  ser- 
vices by  a  legacy,5  or  devise.6  And  where  services  are  rendered  by 
a  son,  under  the  general  expectation  of  compensation  by  will  or  other- 
wise, the  mode  being  left  in  the  judgment  of  the  father,  the  son  is 

unless  the  promisee  took  possession  under 
the  contract).  See  Nowack  v.  Berger,  133 
Mo.  24,  holding  that  on  principle  marriage 
constitutes  such  part  performance  as  will 
avoid  the  defence  of  the  statute,  and  dis- 
cussing the  cases  pro  and  con  on  this  ques- 
tion. In  a  New  York  case  the  court  went 
to  the  length  of  holding  that  an  injunc- 
tion would  lie  against  the  probate  of  a 
will  different  from  a  prior  one  made  in 
pursuance  of  a  valid  contract :  Cobb  v. 
Hanford,  88  Hun,  21. 

3  Miller  v.  Eldridge,  126  Ind.  461,  465  ; 
Wallace  v.  Long,  105  Ind.  522,  citing  and 
commenting  on  numerous  cases ;  Ellis  v. 
Cary,  74  Wis.  176,  187;  Grant  v.  Grant, 
63  Conn.  530. 

4  Miller's  Estate,  136  Pa.  St.  239.  The 
evidence  of  a  promise  should  be  direct 
and  positive:  King's  Estate,  150  Pa.  St. 
143  ;  Sloniger  v.  Sloniger,  161  111.  270. 

5  Schutt  v.  Missionary  Society,  41  N.  J. 
Eq.  115  ;  Clark  v.  Cardry,  69  Mo.  App.  6  ; 
Schwab  v.  Pierre,  43  Minn.  520  (allowing 
recovery  on  a  quantum  meruit),  523  ;  Hud- 
son v.  Hudson,  87  Ga.  678  (recovery  on 
quantum  meruit,  the  promisor  becoming 
insane,  and  hence  incapable  of  making  a 
will)  ;  In  re  Williams'  Estate,  106  Mich. 
490.  In  such  cases  the  Statute  of  Limi- 
tations begins  to  run  from  the  death  of 
the  promisor  :  Stone  v.  Todd,  49  N.  J.  L. 
274,  280;  Manning  v.  Pippen,  86  Ala. 
357  ;  Kauss  v.  Kohner,  172  Pa.  St.  481  ; 
Cann  v.  Cann,  40  W.  Va.  138,  157,  in 
which  Holt,  J.,  cites  many  cases.  Numer- 
ous cases  on  this  and  cognate  points  are 
collected  by  the  reporter  in  a  note  to 
Pfluger  v.  Pultz,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  440. 

'•  Roehl  i'.  Haumesser,  114  Ind.  311, 
holding  that  a  contract  in  general  terms 
to  devise  "  one-half  of  my  estate  "  is  not 
void  for  I  lie  want  of  a  more  certain 
description. 


1  Reynolds  v.  Robinson,  64  N.  Y.  589, 
594. 

2  Parsell  v.  Stryker,  41  N.  Y.  480,  485  ; 
Mauck  f.  Melton,  64  Ind.  414 ;  Newton  v. 
Newton,  46  Minn.  33  (declaring  one  to  be 
equitable  owner  of  property  which  the 
testator  had  agreed  to  bequeath  him,  but 
failed)  36 ;  Kofka  v.  Kosicky,  41  Neb. 
328  (holding  likewise)  ;  Fogle  v.  Church, 
48  S.  C.  86  (asserting  the  same  remedy  of 
decreeing  the  disappointed  devisee  to  be 
the  equitable  owner) ;  Pfluger  v.  Pultz,  43 
N.  J.  Eq.  440;  Sharkey  v.  McDermott, 
91  Mo.  647 ;  Crofut  v.  Layton,  68  Conn.  91 
(where  testator  made  a  conditional  legacy 
instead  of  an  absolute  one,  as  he  had  con- 
tracted to  do).  In  Kansas  it  seems  to  be 
held  that  specific  performance  will  not  be 
decreed  if  the  value  of  the  services  form- 
ing the  consideration  for  such  promise  can 
be  easily  computed :  Hazleton  v.  Reed,  46 
Kans.  73.  So  where  specific  performance 
would  be  inequitable  :  Fuchs  v.  Fuchs,  48 
Mo.  App.  18.  As  to  what  constitutes 
sufficient  part  performance  to  avoid  the 
Statute  of  Frauds,  see  cases  cited  and 
commented  on  in  Shahan  v.  Swan,  48  Oh. 
St.  25,  39,  and  Hale  v.  Hale,  90  Va.  728 ; 
Swash  v.  Sharpstein,  14  Wash.  426  (hold- 
ing that  the  verbal  contract  to  devise  is 
void,  unless  the  decedent  has  done  some 
act  of  part  performance,  though  valuable 
rights  may  have  been  relinquished  by  the 
intended  devisee  in  consideration  of  the 
contract).  So  in  Massachusetts,  where  the 
statute  requires  sucli  a  contract  to  be  in 
writing,  an  oral  contract  cannot  be  en- 
forced, even  if  the.  plaintiff  has  furnished 
the  stipulated  consideration  :  Emery  v. 
Burbank,  163  Mass.  326.  To  same  effect: 
Dicken  v,  McKinley,  L63  111.  318  (holding 
a  rerbal  agreement  to  devise  land,  or  to 
make  no  will  depriving  an  heir  of  his 
share,  to  l/e  void,  and  that  part  perform- 
ance did  not  make  the  contract  enforceable 

60 


§  38      GENERAL  RULES  AS  TO  THE  FORM  OF  WILLS.   *  59,  *  60 

bound  by  any  provision  made  by  the  father,  whether  satisfactory 
or  not.1  It  has  been  held,  that  a  contract  to  leave  all  one's  prop- 
erty at  one's  death  to  an  adopted  child  would  not  restrain  such 
person  from  disposing  of  his  property  in  his  lifetime.2  But  a  con- 
tract to  adopt  may,  on  a  proper  showing,  be  specifically  enforced 
against  the  promisor's  administrator.8 

§  38.    General  Rules  as  to  the  Form  of  Wills.  —  It  is  unimportant 
to  notice,  in  this  connection,  the  various  solemnities  and  formalities 
required  in  different  countries  and  at  various  times  to    Common  law 
make  a  valid  will  or  testament,  because  this  matter  is    and  statutes 
regulated  by  statute  in  each  State,  as  well  as  in  Eng-    yui.  and  29 
land,  and  will  be  considered  at  the  proper  time.     But  it    par.  II.  affect- 
is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind   the   distinction   between      g  W1 
personal   and   real   property    in   connection   with   its   testamentary 
disposition,4  and  that,  while  at  common  law  real  estate  could  not  be 
devised,  the  power  of  making  a  will  of  personal  property  existed 
in   England   from   the   earliest   period  of   its  law.5     The  power  to 
devise  lands,  after  the  Conquest,  was  first  granted,  in  England,  by 
the  statute  of  32  Henry  VIII.,  from  which  and  that  of  29  Car.  II. 
the  American  statutes  regulating  devises  are  substantially  taken.6 
Although  both  in  England  and  America  the  formalities  required  to 
vindicate  the  validity  of  wills  of  both  real  and  personal  property 
are  now  prescribed  by  statute,7  yet  the  distinction  existing  between 
legacies  (gifts  of  personal  property)  and  devises  (of  real  estate)  at 

the  time  of  the  enactment  of  the  several  statutes  is  not  wholly 
[*60]  obliterated;   and  the  common  law  *  rules  on  the  subject  of 

wills  remain  in  force  as  the  law  of  most  States,  in  so  far  as 
they  are  not  abrogated  by  American  legislation.  It  is  necessary, 
therefore,  briefly  to  review  the  common  law  in  this  respect,  before 
considering  the  provisions  of  American  statutes.8 

At  common  law,9  no  particular  form  is  necessary  to  constitute  a 

1  Lee's  Appeal,  53  Conn.  363.  tion  of  inheriting  as   an  adopted   child, 

2  Austin  v.  Davis,  128  Ind.  472;  Van  Wright   v.  Wright,    99    Mich.    170,   and 
Duyne  v.  Vreeland,  12  N.  J.  Eq.  142.  cases  cited;    and  Quinn  v.  Quinn,  5  S. 

3  Healy  v.  Simpson,  113  Mo.  340.     It  Dak.  328. 

was  held  in  Nowack  v.  Berger,  133  Mo.  24,  *  Ante,  §§  12  et  seq. 

that  a  marriage  is  such  part  performance  6  Wms.  Ex.  1. 

of  a  parol  antenuptial  contract   made  in  6  4  Kent  Comm.  504  et  seq. 

consideration  thereof,  to  adopt  the  infant  7  In  England,  by  the  statute  of  1  Vict. 

son  by  a  former  marriage  of  the  woman  c.  26. 

and  make  him  the  promisor's  heir,  as  will  8  See  ante,  §§  15  et  seq.,  on  the  influ- 

take  it  out  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds ;  in  euce  of  the  feudal  tenure  of  lands  on  the 

Dicken  v.  McKinley,  163  111.  318,  it  is  held  American  law. 

that  a  verbal  contract   to  devise  in  con-         9  Or   rather  under  the    ecclesiastical 

sideration  of  adoption  is  not  enforceable  law   of    England,   for  wills   of  personal 

under  the  Statute  of  Frauds  though  the  estate  were  cognizable  exclusively  in  the 

adoption  was  legally  consummated.     See,  spiritual  or  other  testamentary  courts. 

also,  as  to  services  performed  on  expecta- 

61 


*  60,  *  61      FORM,    EXECUTION,    AND    ATTESTATION   OF   WILLS.  §  38 


valid  will  of  personalty;  and  the  same  is  true  of  all  wills  in 
No  particular  America,  save  as  modified  by  statute.1  It  is  equally 
valid,  whether  written  in  the  language  used  in  the 
forum,  or  in  a  foreign  tongue; 2  if  in  a  foreign  language, 
it  should  be  interpreted  by  persons  skilled  in  the  rules 
of  interpreting  wills  in  the  country  in  whose  language 
it  is  written.3  A  will  duly  executed,  with  knowledge  of 
its  contents,  is  valid,  though  never  read  by  the  testator,4 
or  written  in  a  language  unknown  to  him.5  Nor  is  it  important 
that  its  language  or  phraseology  should  be  technically 
appropriate  to  its  testamentary  character;  it  is  suffi- 
cient that  the  instrument,  however  irregular  in  form  or  inartificial 
in  expression,  disclose  the  intention  of  the  testator  respecting  the 
post-mortuary  disposition  of  his  property.6  It  may  operate  as  a 
valid  will  although  drawn  in  the  form  of  a  deed-poll  or 
an  indenture,7  or  a  deed  of  gift,8  a  warranty  deed,9  a 
bond,10  marriage  settlements,11  letters,12  drafts 
on  bankers,13  *the  assignment  of  a  bond,  note,  [*61] 
bill,  or  stocks,  by  indorsement,14  promissory  notes 


form  required 
at  common  law 
or  under  Amer- 
ican statutes. 

Equally  valid 
whether  in 
English  or  for- 
eign tongue. 


Phraseology 
unimportant 


Deed  or  inden- 
ture, bond, 
marriage  set- 
tlement, letter, 
draft,  assign- 
ment, promis- 


1  "  The  legislature  has  power  to  pre- 
scribe the  formalities  to  be  observed  in 
the  execution  of  a  will ;  and  by  so  doing 
does  not  interfere  with  the  rights  of  an 
individual  to  dispose  of  his  property  as 
he  sees  fit "  :  McCabe's  Estate,  68  Cal. 
519.  And  the  technical  mandates  of  the 
statute  must  be  complied  with,  as  the 
courts  cannot  consider,  in  respect  of 
the  execution  of  a  will,  the  intention  of  the 
testator  or  attesting  witnesses,  but  only 
the  intention  of  the  legislature:  In  re 
Walker,  110  Cal.  387  ;  per  Bartlett,  J.,  in 
Matter  of  Whitney,  153  N.  Y.  259,  264. 

2  Reynolds  v.  Kortwright,  18  Beav. 
417,  426  ;  Caulfield  v.  Sullivan,  85  N.  Y. 
153. 

3  Foubert  ;\  De  Cresseron,  Show.  P.  C. 
194,  197  ;  Caulfield  v.  Sullivan,  supra. 

4  Worthington  v.  Klemm,  144  Mass. 
167. 

6  Walter's  Will,  64  Wis.  487. 

6  Mitchell  v  Donohue,  100  Cal.  202; 
Allen  v.  McFarland,  150  111.455;  Alston 
p.  Davis,  118  N.  C.  202;  Fosselman  v. 
Elder,  98  Pa.  St.  159,  160,  168;  Meck's 
Appeal,  distinguishing  between  a  contract 
inter  tiros,  although  the  price  for  land 
Conveyed  was  payable  after   the  grantor's 

death,  and   :i  testamentary    disposition: 

97  1'a   St    818,  816. 

7  Habergham  v.  Vincent  2  Ves.  Jr.  204', 


231,  235;  Sperber  r.  Balster,  66  Ga.  317  ; 
Miller  v.  Holt,  68  Mo.  584,  587. 

8  Will  of  Belcher,  66  N.  C.  51,  53; 
Crocker  v.  Smith,  94  Ala.  295 ;  Jordan  v. 
Jordan,  65  Ala.  301,  305,  and  Alabama 
cases  cited  ;  Turner  v.  Scott,  51  Pa.  St. 
126 ;  Miller  v.  Holt,  68  Mo.  584,  587. 

9  Lautenschlager  v.  Lautenschlager,  80 
Mich.  285. 

10  Masterman  v.  Maberly,  2  Hagg.  235, 
248. 

"  Marnell  v.  Walton  (T.  T.  1796),  cited 
in  Masterman  v.  Maberly,  2  Hagg.  247. 

12  Leathers  v.  Greeuacre,  53  Me.  561, 
565;  Scott's  Estate,  147  Pa.  St.  89;  Fos- 
selman v.  Elder,  98  Pa.  St.  159,  161  (2  Am. 
Prob.  Rep.  541),  holding  that  a  letter  and 
the  inscription  on  the  envelope,  together 
with  a  promissory  note  contained  therein, 
constitute  a  valid  testamentary  disposition 
of  the  note  operating  as  a  codicil  to  the 
will ;  Wagner  v.  McDonald,  2  Ilarr.  &  J. 
346;  Morrell  v.  Dickey,  1  Johns.  Ch.  153; 
Byers  v.  Hoppe,  61  Md.  206;  Alston  v. 
Davis,  1 18  N.  C.  202.  In  California  a  let- 
ter and  copy  of  a  deed  were  together  ad- 
mitted as  constituting  a  good  holographic 
will :   In  re  Skerrett,  67  Cal.  585. 

13  Bartholomew  v.  Henley,  3  Philliin. 
317;  Schad's  Appeal,  88  Pa."  St.  Ill,  113. 

14  Hnntv.  Hunt,  4  N.  11.434,  438;  Mus- 
grave  /•.    Down   (T.  T.  1784),  and   other 


§38 


GENERAL  RULES  AS  TO  THE  FORM  OF  WILLS. 


61 


and  notes  payable  by  executors  and  administrators  to    sorv  note,  or 
evade  the  legacy  duty,1  a  power  of  attorney;2  it  may   ney may ton-' 
be  in  part  a  deed  or  other  contract,  and  in  part  a  will; 3   Bti.^te  a  valid 
or  it  may  be  intended  to  operate  as  a  deed,  bond,  or 
other  instrument  of  gift,  and  yet,  though  inoperative  as  such,  be 
valid  as  a   will,  if  it  provide  for  the  disposition  of  property  after 
death.4     It  must  not  be  understood,  however,  that  any  instrument 
is  operative  as  a  will  which  shows  that  there  was  no   if  wrjtten  ani- 
animus  testandi ; 5  nor  that,  because  it  cannot  operate  in    mo  ^standi. 
the  form  in  which  it  is  drawn,  it  should  for  that  reason  be  operative 
as  a  will; 6  it  is  essential,  as  already  stated,7  that  the  instrument  be 
made  to  depend  upon  the  event  of  death  for  its  consummation;  for 
where  a  paper   directs  a  benefit   to  be  conferred   inter   To  take  effect 
vivos,  without   expressed  or   implied   reference  to   the    after  testator's 
grantor's   death,    it   cannot    be    established    as   testa- 
mentary.8 


death. 


cases  cited  by  Sir  John  Nicholl  in  2  Hagg. 
247  ;  Chaworth  v.  Beech,  4  Ves.  556,  565. 

1  Longstaff  v.  Rennison,  1  Drew.  28, 
35.  In  Moore  v.  Stephens,  97  Ind.  271,  a 
paper  reading  "  at  my  death,  my  estate 
shall  pay  to  A.  .  .  .  two  hundred  dollars," 
&c,  was  held  testamentary  in  its  charac- 
ter, and  void  for  want  of  proper  attesta- 
tion ;  to  same  effect,  Cover  v.  Stem,  67 
Md.  449.  The  addition,  however,  of  the 
words  "  value  received  "  was  in  Delaware 
deemed  sufficient  to  induce  the  court  to 
regard  the  paper  prima  facie  as  a  note  : 
Kirkpatrick  v.  Kirkpatrick,  6  Houston, 
569,  583.  An  instrument  may  be  valid 
as  a  promissory  note  though  not  payable 
until  a  time  certain  after  the  maker's 
death  :  Carnwright  v.  Gray,  127  N.  Y.  92  ; 
Hageman  v.  Moon,  131  N.  Y.  462  ;  so  a 
purely  voluntary  covenant  is  valid  as  such, 
in  which  the  executors  of  the  obligor  are 
to  pay  a  sum  of  money  within  a  certain 
time  after  his  death :  Crell  v.  Codman, 
154  Mass.  454. 

2  Rose  v.  Quick,  30  Pa.  St.  225. 

8  Robinson  v.  Schly,  6  Ga.  515,  529; 
Dudley  v.  Mallery,  4  Ga.  52,  64  ;  Shep- 
herd v.  Nabors,  6  Ala.  631,  636;  Dawson 
v.  Dawson,  2  Strobh.  Eq.  34,  38 ;  Castor 
v.  Jones,  86  Ind.  289  ;  Reed  v.  Hazleton, 
37  Kans.  321. 

4  Crain  v.  Crain,  21  Tex.  790,  796  ;  and 
though  acknowledged  and  recorded  as  a 
deed:  Hawes  v.  Nicholas,  72  Tex.  481. 

5  Swett  v.  Boardman,  1  Mass.  258,  262, 


et  seq. ;  Combs  v.  Jolly,  3  N.  J.  Eq.  625, 
628  ;  Meade's  Estate,  118  Cal.  428. 

6  Cover  v.  Stem,  67  Md.  449  ;  Edwards 
v.  Smith,  35  Miss.  197,  200.  In  Travick 
v.  Davis,  85  Mo.  342,  345,  it  is  said  that 
"  When  it  can  have  no  effect  as  a  deed, 
the  court  is  inclined  to  regard  it  as  a  will, 
if  in  that  character  effect  can  be  given  to 
the  evident  intention  of  the  maker.  The 
controlling  question  is,  whether  the  maker 
intended  that  an  estate  or  interest  should 
vest  before  his  death.  The  reservation  of 
a  life  estate  does  not  of  itself  make  it  a 
will."  See  also  Nichols  v.  Emery,  109  Cal. 
323.  Williams,  in  his  treatise  on  Ex- 
ecutors and  Administrators,  deduces  from 
the  authorities  these  rules:  1 .  That  if  it  was 
the  writer's  intention  to  convey  benefits 
which  would  be  conveyed  if  the  paper  were 
a  will,  and  that  such  conveyance  should 
take  effect  only  in  case  of  his  death,  then, 
whatever  be  the  form,  it  may  be  admitted 
to  probate  as  testamentary.  (Singleton  v. 
Bremar,  4  McCord,  12,  14)  2.  That  in- 
struments in  their  terms  dispositive  are 
entitled  to  probate  unless  proved  not  to 
have  been  executed  animo  testandi,  while 
such  as  are  equivocal  in  character  must 
be  proved  to  have  been  executed  animo 
testandi:  Wms.  Ex.  [106],  and  authorities 
cited. 

7  See  ante,  §  36. 

8  Wms.  Ex.  [107],  and  authorities; 
Wareham  v.  Sellers,  9  Gill  &  J.  98 ; 
Wheeler  v.  Durant,  3  Rich.  Eq.  452,  454, 

63 


*  62  FORM,   EXECUTION,   AND   ATTESTATION   OP   WILLS.  §  38 

May  be  writ-  *  A  will  may  be  written  or  printed,  or  partly  [*  62] 

engraved,  or      written  and  partly  printed,  engraved,  or   litho- 
lithograpked.      graphed.1     Blank  spaces  left  in  the  will  do  not  neces- 
sarily invalidate  it; 2  but  it  is  better  to  avoid  them,  because  they  facil- 
itate fraudulent  interlineations.3     The  writing  may  be  in  ink  or  in 
Writing  may      pencil ; 4  but  when  a  question  arises  whether  the  testator 
be  in  pencil  or     intended  the  paper  as  testamentary,  or  merely  prepara- 
tory to  a  more  formal  disposition,  the  material  with 
which  it  is  written  becomes  a  most  important  circumstance,5  and  the 
general  presumption  and  probability  is  held  to  be,  that,  where  altera- 
tions are  made  in  pencil,  they  are  deliberative;  where  in  ink,  they 
are  final  and  absolute.6     But  in  Pennsylvania  this  presumption  was 
denied,  the  court  declaring  that   lead-pencil   alterations  in   a  will 
written  in  ink  should  be  accorded  the  same  effect  as  though  they 
were    in  ink.7      A  will   written   on  a  slate   has   been   held   void;8 
but   holographic  entries  in  a  diary,9  or  an  entry  in  an 
amntn-book  oT   account-book,  containing  a  full  disposition  of  the  prop- 
diary  may  be      erty    and    appointment   of    an    executor,    dated    eight 
months  before  the  testatrix's  death,  subscribed  and  care- 
fully preserved,  was  admitted  to  probate,  although  it  contained  the 
words,  "I    intend   this   as   a   sketch  of   my  will,  which   I   intend 
making  on  my  return  home."  10     So  a  paper  written  and  subscribed 
by  the  testator,   with  the  intention  of  making  it  his  will,  thereby 
becomes  his  will,  although  he  may  not  have  deemed  it  a  completed 
paper  by  reason  of  a  mistaken  notion  that  the  law  required  a  wit- 
citing  Dawson  v.  Dawson,  Rice  Eq.  243,  3  Where   there  was  unnecessary  and 
and  Jaggers  v.  Estes,  2  Strobh.  Eq.  343 ;     unreasonable  space   between   the  conclu- 
Symmes  v.  Arnold,  10  Ga.  506.     See  also     sion  of  the  will  and  the  testator's  signa- 
Book  v.  Book,  104  Pa.  St.  240.     "If  an    ture.it  has  been  held  not  legally  executed  : 
instrument  passes  a  present   interest,  al-     Soward  v.  Soward,  1  Duv.  126,  134.     See 
though   the   right   to   its    possession  and     also  Tilghman  v.  Steuart,  in  which  two  of 
enjoyment   may   not    accrue    until  some     the   judges   held  the  will  valid,  notwith- 
future  time,  it  "is  a  deed  or  contract ;  but     standing   blank  spaces  left  for  names  of 
if  the  instrument  does  not  pass  an  interest     legatees,  but  the  majority  held  that  they 
or  right  until  the  death  of  the  maker,  it  is     indicated  that  the  voluntas   testandi  was 
a  will  or  testamentary  paper":    Reed  v.     not  complete:  4  Harr.  &  J.  156,  172. 
Hazleton,   37   Kans.   321,   325;   Cover  v.         4  Myers  v.  Vanderbelt,  84  Pa.  St.  510, 
Stem,  67  Md.  440  ;  Phillips  v.  Co.,  94  Ky.     513  ;  Philbrick  v.  Spangler,  15  La.  An.  46. 
445  ;  Nichols  v.  Emery,  supra  (in  which  a  6  Patterson  v.  English,  71  Pa.  St.  454  ; 
paper  was  held  to  be  a  valid  deed,  though     Kell  V.  Charmer,  23  Beav.  195. 
there   was   a  conveyance  in  trust,   made          6  In  the  Goods  of  Adams,  L.  R.  2  P.  & 
revocable  by  the  settlor,  and  a  reservation     D.  367,  368 ;  In  the  Goods  of  Hall,  L.  R. 
to  him  of  a  life  estate,  and  the  conveyance     2  P.  &  I).  256,  257.     See  also  Gardiner  v. 
was  so  made  to  avoid  administration  of     Gardiner,  65  N.  II.  230,  232. 
his  estate  after  his  death).  7  Tomlinson's  Estate,  133  Pa.  St.  245. 

i  hi  the  Goods  of  Wotton,  L.  R.  8  P.         8  Reed  v.  Woodward,  n  Phila.  541. 
&D.  159,  160;   I  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *  18.  9  Although    made   at  different  times: 

-  Corneby  v.  Gibbons,  i  Rob. 705,  TOR;    Reagan  v.  Stanley,  11  Lea,  316. 
In  the  Goods  of  Kirby,  l  Rob.  too  ;  Barne-        1U  Hattatt  v.  Ilattatt,  4  Hagg.  211. 

wall  v.  Murnll,  108  Ala  866,  885 
64 


§  39  THE   SIGNATURE.  *  62,  *  63 

ness.1  It  must  be  remembered  in  this  connection  that  before 
the  enactment  of  the  Wills  Act  (St.  1  Vict.  c.  2G)  wills 
[*  63]  *  of  personal  estate  in  England  needed  neither  witnesses  to 
their  publication,2  nor  signature,8  nor  solemnity  of  any  kind.4 
The  effect  to  be  given  to  an  extraneous  paper  sought  to  be  incor- 
porated in  the  will  by  reference  therein  is  mentioned  elsewhere.5 

§  39.  The  Signature.  —  Under  the  English  Statute  of  Frauds  all 
devises  of  lands  and  tenements  were  required  to  be  in  writing  and 
signed  by  the  party  devising  the  same,  or  by  some  Will  must  be 
person  in  his  presence  and  by  his  express  direction,  signed  by  tes- 
This  provision  is  incorporated  into  the  statutes  regu- 
lating wills  in  nearly  all  the  States,6  and  a  declaration  is  added  in 
many  of  them,  that  unless  so  signed  no  will  shall  be  valid.  In 
Pennsylvania  an  exception  is  allowed  where  the  testator  is  prevented 
from  either  signing  or  directing  some  other  person  to  sign  for  him;  7 
and  it  is  there  held  that,  if  a  will  be  put  in  writing  during  the 
testator's  lifetime,  according  to  his  directions,  it  will  be  held  good 
without  his  signature,  upon  proof  by  two  competent  witnesses  that 
he  was  prevented  from  signing  under  the  circumstances  mentioned 
in  the  statute.8  Where  two  persons,  intending  to  make  wills  in 
favor  of  each  other,  and  precisely  alike,  mutatis  mutandis,  each  by 
mistake  signs  the  other's  intended  will,  there  is  no  valid  execution 
of  either  document.9 

The  making  of  a  mark  by  the  testator  was  held  sufficient  as  a  signa- 
ture under  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  without  reference  to  the  question 
whether^  he  could  write  at  the  time; 10  it  is  held  equally  His  mark  is  a 
sufficient  under  the  Wills  Act,11  and  in  the  several  good  signature. 
States.12  The  mark  of  the  testator  has  been  held  a  proper  signature, 
although  the   name   was  improperly  written  by  the  scrivener;13  a 

1  Toebbe    v.  Williams,   80  Ky.    661.  Greenough  v.  Greenough,  11  Pa.  St.  489, 
This  principle  has,  of  course,  validity  in  496 ;  Snyder  v.  Bull,  1 7  Pa.  St.  54,  60. 
those   States   only  in   which  holographic  9  Alter's    Appeal,    67     Pa.     St.    341  ; 
•wills  are  held  valid  without  being  attested.  Nelson  v.    McDonald,  61    Hun,  406,  and 

2  Custody  is  a   sufficient  publication :  cases  cited. 

Miller  v.  Brown,  2  Hagg.  209,  211.  10  Baker  v.  Dening,  8  Ad.  &  El.  94,  97, 

3  Salmon  v.  Hays,  4  Hagg.  382,  385.  et  seq. 

4  Wms.  Ex.  [68]  et  seq.  n  In  the  Goods  of  Bryce,  2  Curt.  325, 
6  Post,  §  222.                                                 326,  in  which  the  name  of  the  testatrix 

6  In  Georgia  both   real   and   personal  appeared  in  no  part  of  the  will, 
property  may   pass  by  nuncupative  will :  "  Except    in    Pennsylvania,   for    the 
Code,  1882,  §  2482.  reason  stated  supra.     It  is  sufficient  that 

7  Bright.  Purd.  Dig.  1883,  p.  1709,  §  6.  the  evidence  shows  the  testator's  adoption 

8  Blocher  v.  Hostetter,  2  Gr.  Cas.  288,  of  the  mark  as  his  signature,  though  no 
291.  The  courts  in  Pennsylvania  hold  witness  testifies  to  having  seen  him  make 
proponents  to  a  very  strict  compliance  it:  Stephens  v.  Stephens,  129  Mo.  422. 
with  the  literal  requirements  of  the  statute  I3  Rook  v.  Wilson,  142  Ind.  24,  in 
in  this  respect :  Ruoff's  Appeal,  26  Pa.  St.  which  the  testator's  name  was  written 
219;  Showers  v.  Showers,  27  Pa.  St.  485,  James  Rook,  instead  of  Samuel  Rook,  as 
491  ;  Grabill  v.  Barr,  5  Pa.  St.  441,  445;  it  ought  to  have  been;  In  the  Goods  of 

VOL.  i.  —  5  65 


63,  *  64     FORM,   EXECUTION,    AND    ATTESTATION    OP    WILLS.  §  39 


Stamp  is  suffi- 
cient. 

Seal  not  usu- 
ally necessary 


stamp,  which  had  been  used  by  the  testator  in  place  of 
his  signature  to  letters  and  other  documents,  was  held 
a  sufficient  execution  by  mark.1  But  a  seal  can- 
not be  used  in  place  of  a  signature,2  *  although  [*64] 
it  was  at  one  time  so  held  under  the  Statute  of 
Frauds.  Nor  is  a  seal  necessary,  although  mentioned  in  the  testa- 
tum clause.8 

In  the  statutes  of  Arkansas,4  California,5  Idaho,6  Kansas,7  Ken- 
tucky,8 Minnesota,9  Montana,10  New  York,11  North 
qSg'si'gna-  Dakota,12  Ohio, 18  Oklahoma, 14  Pennsylvania, 15  and  South 
tureatendof  Dakota,16  it  is  provided,  that  the  will  shall  be  signed 
"at  the  end  thereof;"  a  provision  evidently  designed 
to  do  away  with  the  rule  of  construction  under  the  Statute  of  Frauds, 
that  the  name  of  the  testator  written  in  the  commencement,  —  thus : 
"I,  A.  B.,  do  make"  &c,  — or  in  any  other  part  of  the  will,  was  a 
sufficient  signature.17  It  is  held,  under  these  statutes,  that  any  dis- 
position, following  under  or  after  the  testator's  signature,  of  the 
property  -mentioned  in  the  will,  not  again  signed  by  the  testator, 
invalidates  the  whole  instrument  as  a  will.14     But  where  the  portion 


Douce,  2  Sw.  &  Tr.  593,  in  which  the 
testator's  name,  Thomas  Douce,  was  writ- 
ten throughout  John  Douce ;  In  the  Goods 
of  Clarke,  where  the  testatrix's  maiden 
name,  Barrell,  had  been  written  instead  of 
the  name  she  bore  after  her  marriage, 
Clarke  :  1  Sw.  &  Tr.  22  ;  In  the  Goods  of 
Glover,  where  the  testatrix  wrote  the 
name  she  bore  of  a  previous  husband :  5 
Notes  of  Cas.  553 ;  Bailey  v.  Bailey,  35 
Ala.  687,  690.  In  Knox's  Estate,  131  Pa. 
St.  220,  under  peculiar  circumstances,  the 
signature  of  the  first  name  only  was  held 
sufficient ;  but  the  mark,  whatever  it  be, 
must  be  made  with  the  intent  to  execute 
the  will  by  mark  :  Plate's  Appeal,  148  Pa. 
St.  55. 

i  Jenkins  v.  Gaisford,  3  Sw.  &  Tr.  93, 
96. 

2  Smith  v.  Evans,  1  Wils.  313.  In 
Nevada  (Gen.  St.  1885,  §  3002)  and  New 
Hampshire  (Gen.  L.  1878,  p.  455,  §  6)  the 
statute  requires  the  testator  to  affix  his 
seal  to  the  will,  in  addition  to  his  signa- 
ture. 

8  Ketelmm  v.  Stearns,  8  Mo.  App.  66  ; 
the  unnecessary  addition  <>f  a  seal  does 
not  change  the  essential   character  of  the 

instrument:  Wuesthoff  v.  Germania  Ins. 
Co.,  107  X.  V   580,  592. 

I    Dig  of  St.  1894,  §  7392. 

■•  c,  L276. 

.  T, 


6  Rev.  St.  1887,  §  5729. 

7  Gen.  St.  1889,  §  7206. 

8  The  statute,  providing  for  a  will 
"  with  the  name  of  the  testator  subscribed 
thereto  "  (Ky.  St.  1894,  §  4828,  unchanged 
in  this  respect  from  previous  statutes),  is 
construed  as  requiring  the  signature  to  be 
written  at  foot  of  the  will :  Soward  i>. 
Soward,  1  Duv.  126.  And  see  Flood  i\ 
Pragoff,  79  Ky.  607. 

9  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  5629. 

l°  Const..  Codes  and  St.  1895,  §  1723. 

11  3  Banks  &  Bro.  Rev.  St.  7th  ed.  p. 
2285,  §  40. 

12  Rev.  Code,  1 895,  §  3648. 
is  Rev.  St.  1890,  §  5916. 

14  St.  1890,  §  6805. 

15  Bright  Purd.  Dig.  p.  1709,  §  6. 

16  Coinp.  L.  (Terr.)  1887,  §  3313. 
"  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *1 05. 

i8  Wiueland's  Appeal,  118  Pa.  St.  37; 
Glancey  v.  Glaucey,  17  Oh.  St.  134  ;  Hays 
v.  Harden,  6  Pa.  St.  409  (although  the 
testator  only  appended  a  memorandum, 
stating  his  reasons  for  making  the  will, 
after  his  signature),  413  ;  Re  O'Neil,  27 
Hun,  130,  133;  8.  c.  91  N.  Y.  516  ;  if  the 
signature  is  not  at  the  end,  the  statute  is 
held  not  to  be  complied  with,  although 
reference  is  made  in  the  portion  preceding 
the  signature  to  what  follows  it,,  and  the 
words  "sicnature  on  face  of  the  will"' 


o<J 


THE   SIGNATURE. 


64,  *65 


preceding  the  signature  constitutes  a  complete  will,  it  may  be  ad- 
mitted to  probate.1     Signing  below  the  attestation  clause,2  or  before 
the  date,8  or  after  a  blank  space,4  does  uot  invalidate 
the  will.     In  the  other  States,  where  the  position   of   JJ^Si^ftt, 
the  signature  is  not  fixed  by  statute,  the  rule  adopted  in    will  sufficient 
England  under  the  Statute  of  Frauds  is  still  generally    JJ  a^auue"06 
observed:    where  every  part  of   the  will  is  written  by 
the   testator  himself,    or   acknowledged   by   him   to    the    attesting 
witnesses,    the    name    appearing   in    the    body,    or    as    the 
[*65]  *  usual  exordium, — "I,  A.   B.,  do  make,"  &c, — is  a  suffi- 
cient signing,5  if  the  testator  so  considered  it.6     But  it  has 
also  been  held,  where  the  will  was  not  written  nor  subscribed  by  the 
testator,  that  the  name  in  the  exordium  does  not  satisfy  the  statute 
requiring  the  will   to   be   signed.7     Where  the  will  is    written  on 
separate  pieces  or  sheets  of  paper,  not  physically  con-    Written  on 
nected,  it  is  sufficient  for  the  probate  thereof  that  it  be    separate  sheets, 
signed  on  one  of  them,  if  it  appear  by  the  contents,   or  by  other 
proof,  that  the  testator  included  all  of  them  as  constituting  the  will 
when  he  signed.8     But  words  of  reference  will  not  suffice  to  incor- 
porate into  it  the  contents  of  an  extraneous  paper,  unless  it  can  be 


appear  at  the  end,  on  the  ground,  mainly, 
that  the  statute  is  to  prevent  fraud  : 
Matter  of  Conway,  124  New  York,  455 
(three  judges  dissenting),  to  same  effect; 
Matter  of  Whitney,  153  N.  Y.  259.  But 
in  Baker's  Appeal,  107  Pa.  St.  381,  it  is 
held  that  a  will  need  not  be  signed  at  the 
end  in  point  of  space,  if  so  in  point  of 
fact. 

1  Estate  of  McCullough,  Myr.  76.  As 
where  the  testator,  after  his  signature, 
writes  a  sentence  exempting  the  executor 
from  bond :  such  addition  will  be  disre- 
garded, and  the  will  probated :  Baker  v. 
Baker,  51  Oh.  St.  217.  But  "the  court 
would  not  be  justified  in  fixing  upon  a 
signature  in  the  midst  of  what  the  testator 
intended  as  his  will,  and  treating  it  as  an 
execution  of  all  that  preceded,  and  grant- 
ing probate  of  so  much  of  the  will 
to  the  disregard  of  the  remainder : " 
Margary  v.  Robinson,  12  Prob.  Div.  8,  13, 
quoting  from  Sweetland  v.  Sweetland,  4 
Sw.  &  Tr.  6. 

2  Cohen's  Will,  Tuck.  286;  Younger 
v.  Duffie,  94  N.  Y.  535. 

8  Flood  v.  Pragoff,  79  Ky.  607. 

4  Nothing  intervening  between  the 
instrument  and  signature :  Gilman  v. 
Gilman,  1  Redf.  354,365;  In  re  Collins, 
5  Redf.  20,  25. 


5  Armstrong  v.  Armstrong,  29  Ala. 
538,  540,  citing  English  and  American 
authorities ;  Allen  v.  Everett,  12  B.  Mon. 
371,  378 ;  Adams  v.  Field,  21  Vt.  256, 
266. 

6  Miles's  Will,  4  Dana,  1,2;  Booth's 
Will,  127  N.  Y.  109,  115,  holding  that  the 
writing  of  the  name  must  be  proved  to 
have  been  for  the  purpose  of  validating 
the  instrument;  Roy  v.  Roy,  16  Gratt. 
418  (held  insufficient  under  the  evidence). 
Martin  v.  Hamlin,  4  Strobh.  188,  190.  In 
Virginia  the  statute  now  provides  that 
the  will  must  be  so  signed  as  to  make  it 
manifest  that  a  signature  was  intended  ; 
and  it  is  held  that  the  name  in  the  exor- 
dium is  insufficient :  Warwick  v.  Warwick, 
86  Va.  596. 

7  Catlett  v.  Catlett,  55  Mo.  330,  339,  ft 
seq.  As  to  the  rule  in  Louisiana,  see 
Armaut's  Succession,  43  La.  An.  310,314, 
also  commenting  on  the  English  rule. 

8  Martin  v.  Hamlin,  4  Strobh.  188; 
Ela  v.  Edwards,  16  Gray,  91,  99,  citing 
Bond  v.  Seawell,  3  Burr.  1773,  Gass  v. 
Gass,  3  Humph.  278,  and  Wikoff's  Ap- 
peal. 15  Pa.  St.  281,  290;  Essex's  Case, 
cited  in  1  Show.  69;  Baker's  Appeal,  107 
Pa.  St.  381  :  Barnewall  v.  Murrell,  108 
Ala.  3G6,  378. 


67 


*  65,  *  66      FORM,   EXECUTION,    AND   ATTESTATION   OF   WILLS.  §  40 

clearly  shown  that,  at  the  time  such  will  was  executed,  such  paper 
was  actually  in  existence.1 

By  the  terms  of  the   statutes  in  all  the   States,   it  is  believed, 

except  New  Jersey  and  New  York,   the  signature  may  be  written 

by  another  person,  in  the  presence  and  by  the  express 

Signature  may    direction  of  the  testator.     It  is  held  that  the  testator's 

be  written  by  ■,*■%■%  i       .  i  i  • 

another  person,   hand  may  be  guided  to  make  tne  mark,  or  write  his  name, 

utoraguidedeS"  au(^  tnat  ttlis  constitutes  a  valid  signature  by  the  tes- 
tator;2 and  the  acknowledgment  of  the  execution  of 
the  instrument  as  a  will  is  a  sufficient  direction,  although  sigued  by 
another.3  But  if  the  testator  direct  another  person  to  sign  for  him, 
and  intends  to  affix  his  mark  in  completion  of  the  signature,  the  will 
is  not  properly  signed  unless  such  mark  is  made ; 4  and  where  the 
statute  requires  the  person  who  writes  the  testator's  name  to  add  his 
own  as  a  witness,  and  to  state  that  he  wrote  the  testator's 
name  at  his  request,  as  it  does  in  some  of  the  States,5  *the  [*66] 
will  is  invalid  if  this  is  omitted,  although  the  testator  affix 
his  mark  in  person.6 

In  New  Jersey  and  New  York  it  is  held  that  the  statute  requires 
Except  in  New   *^e    signature   to    be   made   by  the  testator  in  person, 
Jersey  and         either   by    writing   his   name,  -  or   making   a  mark,  or 
acknowledging  it  to  be  his  signature.7 

Proof  of  the  testator's  signature  is  prima  facie  proof  of  his  having 
understandingly  executed  the  same.8 

§  40.  Attestation.  —  The  English  Statute  of  Frauds  required  the  at- 
Numberof  testation  of  wills  by  "three  or  four  credible  witnesses," 
attesting  by  subscribing  the  same  in  the  presence  of  the  testator. 

unde^Eng-        A  similar   provision   is  incorporated  into  the  statutes 
lish  stature.        0f   ail   the    States,    varying,  however,  as   to  the  num- 

1  Webb  v.  Day,  2  Dem.  459,  461.    See  1278  ;  New  York:  2  Banks  &  Bro.  Rev. 

post,  §  222,  p.  * 485.  St.  1896    (9th   ed.),  p.    1878;  Oklahoma: 

2'  Vandruff  v.  Rinehart,  29  Pa.  St.  232,  St.  1890,  §   6807  ;    Oregon:    Code  1887,  § 

234;  Cozzenss  Will,  61  Pa.  St.  196,  201  ;  3070. 

Stevens  v.  Vancleve,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  262,  6  Northcutt  v.  Northcutt,  20  Mo.  266 

269 ;  Van    Hanswyck  v.  Wiese,  44  Barb,  (this  and  some  other  Missouri  eases  hold- 

494,  497;  McMechen  v.  McMechen,  17  W.  ing  the  same   doctrine  were  conditioned 

Va.  683  711.  hy  a  statute  now  repealed);  Will  of  Cor- 

8  Herbert  v.  Berrier,  81  Ind.  1.  Mere  nelius,  14  Ark.  675,  683. 
knowledge  by  the  testator  that  another  7  Jn  re  McElwaiue,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  499, 
is  signing,  and  acquiescing  in  it,  there  502;  Robyns  v.  Coryell,  27  Barb.  556, 
being  no  previous  express  direction,  is  558;  Chaffee  v.  Baptist  Missionary  Con- 
not  enough  ;  and  if  the  previous  express  vention,  10  Pai.  85,  91.  See  remarks  of 
direction  he  given  by  gestures,  they  must  Washington,  J.,  in  Stevens  ?'.  Vancleve,  4 
be  as  unambiguous  as  words  :  Waite  v.  Wash.  262,  269.  Unless  the  mark  be 
Frisbe, 45  Minn.  361 ;  Murryf.  Hennessey,  made  under  decedent's  direction  and  af- 
1-  Neb.  608.  terwards  acknowledged  as  his   signature: 

4  Main  v.  Ryder,  84  Pa.  St.  217,  223.  Knapp  v.   Reilly,  3  Dem.  427,    431,  and 

'■•  For   Instance,  in    Arkansas:    Dig.  of  New  York  cases  cited. 
St.    1894,   §    7.'!'.).'i;    California:    Code,   §  8  Sheer  v.  Sheer,  159  111.  591,  594. 

08 


§40 


ATTESTATION. 


*66,  *67 


ber    of   witnesses   required,    and    as   to    the    further   requirement 

that  the  witnesses  shall  subscribe  "  in  the  presence  of  each  other." 

Wills  devising  real  estate  are  required  to  be  attested  by  "two  or 

more,"   or   "at    least    two"    witnesses,    in    Alabama,1    c.  , 

'  '     otates  re- 

Arizona,2  Arkansas,8  California,4  Colorado,5  Delaware,6   quiring  at 

Florida,7  Idaho,8  Illinois,9  Indiana,10  Iowa,11  Kansas,12  least  two- 
Kentucky,13  Maryland,14  Michigan,16  Minnesota,16  Mississippi,17 
Missouri,18  Nebraska,19  Nevada,20  New  Jersey,21  New  York,22  North 
Carolina,23  North  Dakota,24  Ohio,26  Oklahoma,26  Oregon,27  Pennsyl- 
vania,28 Rhode  Island,29  South  Dakota,80  Tennessee,81  Texas,32 
[*67]  Utah,88  Virginia,84  Washington,85  West  Virginia,36  *  Wiscon- 
sin,87 and  Wyoming; 38  and  by  three  or  more  in  Connecticut,89 
Georgia,40  Maine,41  Massachusetts,42  New  Hampshire,48  South  Caro- 
lina,44 and  Vermont.46  In  Louisiana  the  forms  of  the  civil  law  are 
followed  to  some  extent,  and  three  resident  or  five  non-resident  wit- 
nesses are  required  for  nuncupative  or  "  open  "  testaments,  while 
a  "mystic,"  "secret,"  or  "closed"  testament  must  be  delivered  to  a 
notary  public  in  a  sealed  envelope,  and  attested  by  seven  witnesses, 
who,  together  with  the  notary  and  the  testator,  are  required  to  sign 
the  "  act  of  superscription  "  drawn  up  by  the  notary,  after  the  decla- 
ration by  the  testator,  in  the  presence  of  the  notary  and  witnesses, 
that  the  enclosed  paper  contains  his  testament.46 


1  Code,  1896,  §  4263. 

2  Rev.  St.  1887,  §  3234. 

8  Dig.  of  St.  1 894,  §  7392. 
4  Civ.  Code,  §  1276,  pi.  4. 
6  Mills'  Ann.  St.  1891,  §  4653. 

6  Rev.  Code,  1874,  p.  509,  §  3. 

7  Rev.  St.  Fla.  1892,  §  1795. 

8  Rev.  St.  1887,  §  5727,  pi.  4. 

9  St.  &  Curt.  Ann.  St.  1896,  p.  4026,  §  2. 

10  Burns'  Ann.  St.  1894,  §  2746. 

11  Code,  1897,  §  3274. 

12  Gen.  St.  1897,  ch.  110,  §  2. 

13  St.  1894,  §  4828. 

14  Code,  1888,  Art.  93,  §  310.  Before 
this  revision  the  requirement  was,  like 
that  of  the  English  Statute  of  Frauds, 
"  three  or  four." 

15  How.  St.  1882,  §  5789. 

16  Gefi.  St.  1891,  §  5629. 

17  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  4488. 

18  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  8870. 

19  Cons.  St.  1893,  §  1186. 

20  Rev.  St.  1885,  §3002. 

21  Gen.  St.  1896,  p.  3760,  §  22. 

22  Banks  &  Bro.  Rev.  St.  (9th  ed.) 
1896,  p.  1887,  §  40,  pi.  4. 

23  Code,  1883,  §  2136. 

24  Rev.  Code,  1895,  §  3648,  pi.  4. 


26  Rev.  St.  1890,  §  5916. 

26  St.  1891,  §  6805,  pi.  4. 

27  Code,  1887,  §  3069. 

28  Pepper  &  Lewis'  Dig.  1896,  p.  1439, 
§  32.  But  the  witnesses  in  this  State  are 
not  required  to  subscribe  the  will :  Frew  v- 
Clarke,  80  Pa.  St.  170,  178,  and  numerous 
Pennsylvania  cases  there  cited. 

29  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  665,  §  13. 

80  Terr.  Code,  1884,  §  691  of  Civ.  Code, 
pi.  4. 

31  Code,  1884,  §  3003. 

82  Rev.  St.  1895,  §  5335. 

38  Rev.  St.  1898,  §  2735. 

84  Code,  1887,  §  2514. 

86  Gen.  St.  and  C.  1891,  §  1459. 

86  Code,  1891,  ch.  77,  §3. 

87  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2282. 

88  Rev.  St.  1887,  §  2237. 

89  Gen.  St.  1888,  §  538. 

40  Code,  1895,  §  3272. 

41  Rev.  St.  1883,  p.  608,  §  1. 

42  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  747,  §  1. 
48  Pub.  St.  1891,  ch.  186,  §  2. 
44  Rev.  St.  1893,  §  1988. 

46  St.  1894,  §  2349. 

46  Voorhies'  Rev.  C,  1889,  art.  1574 
et  seq. 

69 


*67,*68     FORM,   EXECUTION,   AND    ATTESTATION    OP    WILLS.  §  -10 


With  the  exception  of  Arkansas,1  and  New  York,-  whose  statutes 
are  held  not  to  require  attestation  by  signing  in  the  presence  of  the 
Attesti  testator,  and  of  Pennsylvania,3   where    it  is  held  that 

witnesses  the  witnesses  are  not  required  to  subscribe  their  names 

prSeTiliVf11       at  all,  and  with   the   exception   of   holographic   wills, 
the  testator.        authorized  in  some  of  the    States  without  attestation,4 
the  attesting  witnesses  are  required  to  subscribe    the    will   in   the 
presence  of  the  testator.     It  seems  to  be  unnecessary  to  cite  any  of 
the  numerous  cases    so  holding.5     To  constitute  "presence  "  in  the 
sense  of  the  English  Statute  of  Frauds  and  of  the  American  statutes 
on  the  subject  of  wills,  it  is  essential  that  the  testator  should  be 
mentally  capable  of  recognizing  the  act  which  is  being  performed 
before  him;  for  if  this  power  be  wanting,  his  corporeal  pres- 
ence would  not  suffice.6    It  is  not  essential  that  the  *  testator    [*  G8] 
should  actually  see  the  witness  attest  the  will;  but  he  must 
be  in  such  a  situation  that  he  might  see,  and  it  will  then  be  pre- 
sumed that  he  did  see.7     The  design  of  the  statute  is  said  to  be  to 
prevent  the  substituting  of  a  surreptitious  will.8 

In  Louisiana,9  South  Carolina,10  and  Vermont,11  the  statute  requires 
But  in  most  tae  attesting  witnesses  to  subscribe,  not  only  in  the  pre- 
Stat'es,  not  ne-  sence  of  the  testator,  but  also  of  each  other;  and  in  New 
presence  o"  6  Jersey  the  statute  requiring  publication  in  the  presence 
each  other.         0f  two  witnesses  "  present  at  the  same  time,  who  shall 


1  Rogers  v.  Diamond,  13  Ark.  474,486  ; 
Abraham  v.  Wilkins,  17  Ark.  292,  325. 

2  Lyon  v.  Smith,  11  Barb.  124,  126; 
Ruddon  v.  McDonald,  1  Bradf.  352. 

3  Frew  v.  Clarke,  80  Pa.  St.  170. 

4  As  to  which  see  post,  §  43. 

5  It  is  not  enough  that  the  witness 
subsequently  acknowledges  his  signature 
in  the  testator's  presence,  if  affixed  in  his 
absence;  Pawtucket  r.  Ballon,  15  R.  I. 
58  ;  Chase  v.  Kittredge,  1 1  Allen,  49. 
But  see  Cook  v.  Winchester,  81  Mich. 
581,  and  authorities  cited  pro  and  con  on 
the  effect  of  the  witnesses'  subsequent 
acknowledgment. 

6  "  Thus,  if  the  testator,  after  having 
signed  and  published  his  will,  and  before 
the  witnesses  have  subscribed  their  names, 
falls  into  a  state  of  insensibility  (whether 
permanent  or  temporary),  the  attestation 
is  insufficient":  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *87, 
citing  Right  v.  Price,  1  Dougl.  241,  and 
other  English  authorities.  "It  would 
seem  that  a  lunatic  or  person  sleeping 
could  not  l"-  considered  present":  Lacy, 
J.,  in  Baldwin  v.  Baldwin,  81  Va.  405,410. 

i  Walker  v.   Walker,  67    Miss.  529; 
Witt  r.  Gardner,  158  111.  I7fij  Edelen  v. 
To 


Hardy,  7  Harr.  &  J.  61,  67  ;  Graham  v. 
Graham,  10  Ired.  L.  219,  221  ;  Wright 
v.  Lewis,  5  Rich.  212,  217  ;  Lamb  v.  Girt- 
man,  33  Ga.  289,  291,  293;  Spaulding  v. 
Gibbons,  5  Redf.  316,  319;  Allen's  Will, 
25  Minn.  39 ;  Riggs  v.  Riggs,  135  Mass. 
238;  Etchison  v.  Etchison,  53  Md.  348, 
357;  Maynard  r.  Vinton,  59  Mich.  139; 
Baldwin  v.  Baldwin,  81  Va.  405  ;  Ayers 
v.  Ayers,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  565.  "An  attesta- 
tion made  in  the  same  room  with  the 
testator  is  prima  facie  good  ;  and  where 
the  attestation  is  shown  to  have  taken 
place  in  a  different  apartment,  it  is  prima 
facie  bad : "  Watson  v.  Pipes,  32  Miss. 
451,  467. 

8  Hill  v.  Barge,  12  Ala.  687,  696;  Cra- 
vens v.  Faulconer,  28  Mo.  19,  21  ;  Ambre 
v.  Weishaar,  74  111.  109,  118;  Nock  v. 
Nock,  10  Gratt.  106,  112;  Swift  v.  Wiley, 
1  B.  Mon.  114,  117,  distinguishing  be- 
tween the  "attesting"  and  the  "sub- 
scribing "  of  a  will ;  Reynolds  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 1  Speers,  253,  255;  Ayers  v.  Ayers, 
43  N.  J.  Eq.  565. 

9  Voorhies'  C.  1889,  art.  1581. 
1°  Rev.  St.  1893,  §  1988. 

U  Rev.  St.  1894,  §  2349. 


§40 


ATTESTATION. 


68,  *  60 


subscribe  their  names  thereto  as  witnesses  in  presence  of  the  tes- 
tator," is  held  to  require  that  all  shall  be  together  when  the  declara- 
tion is  made.1  The  same  construction  has  been  given  to  the  word 
"  presence "  in  respect  of  the  witnesses  between  themselves,  as  to 
that  of  the  testator; 2  and  in  the  absence  of  a  statutory  provision  to 
that  effect  it  is  not  necessary  that  they  should  sign  in  each  other's 
presence.8  In  the  absence  of  clear  proof  that  the  witness  or  wit- 
nesses signed  before  the  signing  of  the  testator,  it  should  be  presumed 
that  the  testator  signed  first.4  But  it  is  held  that  it  is  essential  to 
the  due  execution  of  the  will  that  the  signature  of  the  testator  should 
precede,  in  point  of  time,  the  signatures  of  the  attesting  witnesses, 
even  if  the  signing  and  attestation  be  on  the  same  occasion  and  part 
of  the  same  transaction,5  though  on  the  latter  point  the  authorities 
are  not  unanimous.6 

It  is  required  by  statute  in  some  of  the  States  that  the  sub- 
[*  69]  scription  *  of  the  attesting  witnesses,  like  that  of  the  testator, 
be  at  the  end  of  the  instrument.     Where  such  is    ...    .  .. 

Attestation 

the  law,  the  will  becomes  void  if  the  testator,  after  good  in  any 
proper  signature  and  attestation,  adds  a  disposing  j^j^  l^te ' 
clause,  which  is  again  signed  by  him,  but  not  attested.7  requires  it  to  be 
In  the  absence  of  statutory  direction,  it  is  not  material 
in  what  part  of  a  will  the  subscribing  witnesses  sign  their  names,  if 
it  is  done  after  the  subscription  and  acknowledgment  by  the  testa- 
tor, and  with  the  purpose  of  attesting  it  as  subscribing  witnesses.8 

Under  the  English  Statute  of  Frauds  it  was  held  sufficient  that  the 
witnesses  subscribed  their  names  as  such,  at  the  testator's  request, 


1  Ludlow  v.  Ludlow,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  597, 
599 ;  Ayers  v.  Ayers,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  565, 
569. 

-  "  It  is  sufficient  if  the  testator  and 
witnesses  are  all  in  the  same  room  when 
the  signatures  of  all  the  witnesses  are 
made,  and  are  there  for  the  purpose  of 
taking  part  in  the  execution  of  the  will, 
and  have  an  opportunity  to  see  all  the 
witnesses  sign  the  will,  if  they  choose  to 
turn  their  eyes  in  that  direction  " :  sylla- 
bus in  Blanchard  v.  Blanchard,  32  Vt. 
62. 

3  Cravens  v.  Faulconer,  28  Mo.  19,  21  ; 
Parramore  v.  Taylor,  1 1  Gratt.  220,  249 ; 
Abraham  v.  Wilkins,  17  Ark.  292,  324, 
etseq.;  Gaylor's  Appeal,  43  Conn.  82,  84, 
et  seq. ;  Hoysrodt  v.  Kingman,  22  N.  Y. 
372,  373;  Dewey  v.  Dewey,  1  Mete- 
(Mass.)  349,  351 ;  Flinn  v.  Owen,  58  HI. 
Ill,  114;  Hoffman  v.  Hoffman,  26  Ala. 
535,  546;  Moore  v.  Spier,  80  Ala.  129, 
133;    Smith's   Will,   52    Wis.   543,  547; 


Welch  v.  Adams,  63  N.  H.  344 ;  Johnson 
v.  Johnson,  106  Ind.  475. 

4  Allen  v.  Griffin,  69  Wis.  529,  533. 

5  Jackson  v.  Jackson,   39   N.  Y.  153 
161 ;   Brooks   v.    Woodson,    87    Ga.   379 
Ragland  v.  Huntington,  1    Ired.  L.  561 
see  also  English  cases  cited  by  Gray,  J., 
in   Chase   v.  Kittridge,  11  Allen,  49,  on 
p.  56. 

6  The  order  of  signing  was  held  imma- 
terial in  such  case,  in  O'Brien  v.  Gallagher, 
25  Conn.  229  ;  Swift  v.  Wiley,  1  B.  Mon. 
114,  117;  Miller  v.  McNeill^  35  Pa.  St. 
217;  Rosser  v.  Franklin,  6  Gratt.  1,  26; 
Kaufman  v.  Caughman,  49  So.  Car.  159, 
167. 

7  Hewitt  v.  Hewitt,  5  Redf.  271,  274, 
affirmed  in  Hewitt's  Will,  91  N.  Y.  261 ; 
Re  Case,  4  Dem.  124. 

8  Fowler  v.  Stagner,  55  Tex.  393,  400 ; 
Roberts  v.  Phillips,  4  El.  &  Bl.  450,  453 ; 
Peake  v.  Jenkins,  80  Va.  293,  296  ;  Franks 
v.  Chapman,  64  Tex.  159. 

71 


*  69,  *  70        FORM,   EXECUTION,   AND    ATTESTATION   OF   WILLS. 


40 


Testator  must 
sign  or  ac- 
knowledge 
signature  in 
presence  of 
witnesses. 


And  declare 
testamentary 
character  of 
instrument. 

Attesting  wit- 
nesses sign  an- 
into  attestandi. 


without  seeing  his  signature  or  being  informed  of  the 
nature  of  the  instrument.1  But  by  the  Wills  Act,  and 
under  American  statutes  generally,  it  is  required  that 
the  testator  shall  sign,  or  acknowledge  his  signature, 
in  presence  of  the  attesting  witnesses;2  and  it  is  held  in 

England  that  where  the  attesting  witnesses  are  unable  to  see  the 

signature,  and  the  testator  gives  no  explanation  of  the  instrument, 

the  signature  is  not  properly  acknowledged.8 

In  most  of  the  States  they  must  know,  also,  that  he  signed  the 

instrument  as  and  for  his  last  will;  to  which  end  it  is  enacted  by 
statute  in  Arkansas,4  California,6  Georgia,6  New  Jersey,7 
and  New  York,8  that,  in  addition  to  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  his  signature,  the  testator  must  publish  or  de- 
clare in  the  presence  of  the  attesting  witnesses  that  the 
instrument  by  him  executed  is  intended  as  his 
will.9    In   *  these  and   other   States   it  is  held  [»70] 

*  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  7392. 
6  Civ.  Code,  §  1276. 

6  But  acknowledgment  of  the  signa- 
ture is  a  sufficient  publication :  Webb  v. 
Fleming,  30  Ga.  808. 

7  Gen.  St.  1896,  p.  3760,  §  22. 

8  2  Banks  &  Bro.  Rev.  St.  (9th  ed.)  p. 
1877,  §  40,  pi.  3. 

9  It  is  held  under  these  statutes  that 
such  publication  may  be  made  sponta- 
neously, or  by  answering  questions  put 
by  the  scrivener  or  others,  or  in  any  way, 
by  signs  or  gestures,  or  circumstances, 
communicating  to  the  witnesses  that  he 
so  understands  it :  Rogers  v.  Diamond,  13 
Ark.  474;  Denny  v.  Pinney,  60  Vt.  524; 
Brinckerhoof  v.  Remsen,  8  Pai.  488,  497, 
et  seq. ;  Lewis  v.  Lewis,  13  Barb.  17,  24; 
Tunison  v.  Tunison,  4  Bradf.  138,  144; 
McKinley  v.  Lamb,  64  Barb.  199,  203,  et 
seq.;  In  re  Hunt,  110  N.  Y.  278;  Comp- 
ton  v.  Mitton,  12  N.  J.  L.  70,  73,  et  seq. ; 
Ludlow  v.  Ludlow,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  597; 
especially  when  written  by  the  testatrix  : 
Re  Beckett,  103  N.  Y.  167 ;  and  it  may  be 
made  on  different  occasions,  and  when 
the  witnesses  are  apart  from  each  other : 
Barry  v.  Brown,  2  Dem.  309 ;  but  the 
testamentary  character  of  the  paper  must 
not  be  inferred  from  previous  conversa- 
tion ;  the  declaration  must  be  made  at  the 
time  of  making  or  acknowledging  the  sig- 
nature: Walsh  v.  Laffan,  2  Dem.  498, 
citing  numerous  New  York  cases;  unless 
such  previous  conversation  be  so  referred 
to  by  the  testator,  at  the  time  of  the  exe» 


1  Wms.  Ex.  [87],  with  English  author- 
ities. 

2  The  attesting  witnesses  need  not  see 
the  physical  act  of  signing ;  it  is  enough, 
generally,  that  the  testator  acknowledges 
that  the  instrument  with  his  name  at- 
tached is  his  will,  although  the  witnesses 
neither  saw  him  subscribe  his  name  in 
person,  nor  another  sign  his  name  at  his 
request  and  in  his  presence:  Walton  v. 
Kendrick,  122  Mo.  504,  525,  and  authori- 
ties referred  to  in  the  opinion  (which  dis- 
approves Burwell  v.  Corbin,  1  Rand.  131) ; 
Hobart  v.  Hobart,  154  111.  610,  holding 
that  the  testator  need  not  specially  ac- 
knowledge the  signature,  if  he  acknowl- 
edges the  will  to  be  his,  and  distinguishing 
the  statute  from  that  of  New  York  and 
some  other  States,  where  such  is  required, 
and  which  are  referred  to  below.  So  also 
the  silence  and  presence  of  the  testator 
gives  consent  to  the  declarations  on  the 
part  of  the  person  superintending  the 
execution  of  the  will,  and  amounts  to  an 
acknowledgment:  Harp  v.  Parr,  168  111. 
459,  and  cases  cited  on  p.  475  of  the 
opinion. 

«  Goods  of  Hammond,  3  Sw.  &  Tr.  90, 
92.  See  Lewis  v.  Lewis,  13  Barb.  17,  and 
English  casea  there  cited  and  commented 
mi  In  America,  by  the  terms  of  the 
statutes  in  man;  States,  it  is  necessary 
that  the  attesting  witnesses  should  either 
nee  tie-  testator  sign  the  instrument,  or 
that  he  should  acknowledge  his  signature 
to  them. 

72  - 


§40 


ATTESTATION. 


*70,  *71 


that  the  attesting  witnesses  must  subscribe  their  names  animo 
attestandi,1  but  that  no  affirmative  declaration  to  that  end  is  neces- 
sary; any  indication  by  the  testator  to  the  witnesses  of  his  knowl- 
edge that  the  instrument,  to  be  attested  by  them  is  meant  for  his  last 
will,  is  sufficient.2  In  Georgia,8  Illinois,4  Indiana,5  Iowa,6  Massa- 
chusetts,7 South  Carolina,8  and  Virginia,9  it  is  held  that  publication 
to  the  witnesses  is  not  necessary  to  the  validity  of  the  will.  The 
rule  in  England,  both  before 10  and  after  u  the  statute  of  1  Vict.  c. 
26,  is  clearly  established,  that  the  witnesses  need  not  know  the 
character  of  the  paper  attested  by  them ;  the  theory  being  that  the 
attestation  was  to  the  sir/nature,  not  to  the  document  proposed  as 
a  will.  The  same  doctrine  is  held  in  Alabama,12  Connecticut,18 
Georgia,14  Indiana,15  Iowa,16  Maine,17  Maryland,18  Minnesota,19  Penn- 
sylvania,20 South  Carolina,21  Virginia,22  and  Wisconsin.23 
[*  71]        *  It  is  not  necessary  to  use  any  particular   form  in  the 


cution,  as  to  make  it  an  essential  part  of 
the  communication:  In  re  Beckett,  103 
N.  Y.  167,  176;  Robbins  v.  Robbins,  50 
N.  J.  Eq.  742.  In  Matter  of  Mackey,  44 
Hun,  571,  it  is  said  that  it  is  impossible 
under  the  statute  to  acknowledge  the  tes- 
tator's signature,  unless  the  witness  see 
the  signature  sought  to  be  acknowledged  ; 
s.  c.  110  N.  Y.  611,  followed  in  Matter  of 
Landy,  148  N.  Y.  403,  the  court  holding 
that  the  attesting  witnesses  must  either 
see  the  testator  subscribe  his  name,  or 
with  the  signature  visible  to  them,  ac- 
knowledge it  to  be  his. 

1  As  in  Louisiana  :  Buutin  v.  Johnson, 
28  La.  An.  796  ;  Vermont :  Roberts  v. 
Welch,  46  Vt.  164,  168;  Virginia:  Peake 
v.  Jenkins,  80  Va.  293. 

2  So  held  in  Arkansas :  Rogers  v.  Dia- 
mond, 13  Ark.  474  ;  Delaware  :  Smith  v. 
Dolby,  4  Harr.  350,  351  ;  Kentucky  :  Ray 
v.  Walton,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  71,  74;  Up- 
church  v.  Upchurch,  16  B.  Mon.  102,  112, 
citing  earlier  Kentucky  cases  ;  Maine :  Cil- 
ley  v.  Cilley,  34  Me.  162, 164;  Missouri : 
Odenwaelder  v.  Schorr,  8  Mo.  App.  458  ; 
Grimm  v.  Tittman,  113  Mo.  56,  65  ;  New 
Jersey  :  Ayers  v.  Ayers,  43  N.  J.  Eq  565, 
571 ;  but  what  is  said  must  lead  to  the  single 
inference  that  the  document  is  testator's 
will;  Darnell  v.  Busby,  50  N.  J.  Eq.  725; 
New  York:  Matter  of  Hunt,  110  N.  Y. 
278,  281  ;  Lane  v.  Lane,  95  N.  Y.  494  ; 
Matter  of  Austin,  45  Hun,  1;  Ohio: 
Randebaugh  v.  Shelley,  6  Oh.  St.  307, 
315;  Vermont:  Dean  v.  Dean,  27  Vt. 
746,  751.     It  is  sufficient  if  the  draughts- 


man in  presence  of  the  testatrix  announces 
to  the  attesting  witnesses  that  the  instru- 
ment is  her  will :  Denny  v.  Pinney,  60 
Vt.  524  ;  Oregon  :  but  mere  silence  is  in- 
sufficient: Luper  v.  Werts,  19  Oreg.  122. 

8  Webb  v.  Fleming,  30  Ga.  808,  812. 

*  Dickie  v.  Carter,  42  111.  376,  386,  et 
seq. 

5  Brown  v.  McAlister,  34  Ind.  375; 
Turner  v.  Cook,  36  Ind.  129,  136. 

6  Hulse's  Will,  52  Iowa,  662. 

'  Osburn  v.  Cook,  1 1  Cush.  532. 

8  Verdier  v.  Verdier,  8  Rich.  135,  142. 

9  Beane  v.  Yerby,  12  Gratt.  239,  244. 

10  Wyndham  v.  Chetwynd,  1  Burr. 
414,  421  ;  Wright  v.  Wright,  7  Bing.  457. 

11  Keigwin  v.  Keigwin,  3  Curt.  607  ; 
Faulds  v.  Jackson,  6  Notes  Cas.  Sup.  1. 

12  Barnewall  v.  Murrell,  108  Ala.  366, 
382. 

13  Canada's  Appeal,  47  Conn.  450. 

14  Webb  v.  Fleming,  30  Ga.  808. 

15  Brown  v.  McAlister,  34  Ind.  375. 

16  Hulse's  Will,  52  Iowa,  662,  criticis- 
ing Lorieux  v.  Keller,  5  Iowa,  196. 

17  Cilley  v.  Cilley,  34  Me.  162. 

18  Higgins  v.  Carlton,  28  Md.  115; 
Etchison  v.  Etchison,  53  Md.  348.  And 
so  in  the  District  of  Columbia  :  In  re  Por- 
ter, 20  Dist.  Col.  493. 

19  Allen's  Will,  25  Minn.  39. 

21  Loy  v.  Kennedy,  1  W.  &  S.  396; 
Miller  i\  McNeill,  35  Pa.  St.  217. 

21  Verdier  v.  Verdier,  8  Rich.  L.  135. 

22  Beane  v.  Yerby,  12  Gratt.  239; 
Young  v.  Barnett,  27  Gratt.  96. 

23  Allen  v.  Griffin,  69  Wis.  529,  535. 

73 


1 


FORM,    EXECUTION,    AND    ATTESTATION    OF    WILLS. 


§40 


No  form  of  at-  attestation ; 1  the  omission  altogether  of  an  attesta- 
testation  ne-       tion  clause  is  not  fatal  to  the  will,2  and  its  recitals  may 

be  contradicted  by  parol  evidence,  if  erroneous.3  The 
witnesses,   like  the  testator,  may  subscribe  by  mark,4  or  by  their 

initials,5  if  intended  for  their  mark;  or  if  they  cannot 
may  be  by  write,  the  hand  may  be  guided  by  another  person.6 
mark,  or  ini-      j>ufc    prudence   requires    that    the   attesting   witnesses 

should  be  selected  among  persons  who  can  read  and 
write,  and  that  the  attestation  clause  should  recite  all  the  formali- 
ties required  in  the  execution  and  attestation  of  a  will,  because,  in 
the  absence  of  proof  on  these  points,  compliance  with  them  may 
be  inferred  from  their  recital  in  the  attestation  clause;7  and  such 


1  Leaycraft  v.  Simmons,  3  Bradf .  35, 
37  ;  Fatheree  v.  Lawrence,  33  Miss.  585, 
623;  Ela  v.  Edwards,  16  Gray,  91,  96; 
Chaffee  v.  Baptist  Convention,  10  Pai.  85; 
Crittenden's  Estate,  Myr.  50 ;  Robinson 
v.  Brewster,  140  111.  649;  Olerick  o.  Ross, 
146  Ind.  282. 

2  Berberet  v.  Berberet,  131  Mo.  399  ; 
Fry's  Will,  2  R.  I.  88,  91  ;  Taylor  v. 
Brodhead,  5  Redf.  624,  626,  citing  Bas- 
kin  v.  Baskin,  48  Barb.  200;  Re  Philips 
Will,  1  How.  Pr.  (n.  s.)  291;  s.  c.  98 
N.  Y.  267. 

3  Chaffee  v.  Baptist  Convention,  10 
Pai.  85,  89 ;  Taylor  v.  Brodhead,  supra. 
One  who  signs  his  name  in  the  place 
where  subscribing  witnesses  usually  sign 
may  show  that  he,  in  fact,  did  not  sign  as 
a  subscribing  witness:  Boone  v.  Lewis, 
103  N.  C.  40. 

4  Thompson  v.  Davitte,  59  Ga.  472, 
481 ;  Compton  v.  Mitton,  12  N.  J.  L.  70, 
73 ;  Jesse  v.  Parker,  6  Gratt.  57,  63 ; 
Meelian  v.  Rourke,  2  Bradf.  385,  392; 
Pridgen  v.  Pridgen,  13  Ired.  L.  259;  Ford 
V.  Ford,  7  Humph.  92,  96;  Montgomery 
v.  Perkins,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  448 ;  Derry's 
Estate,  Myr.  202;  Davis  v.  Semmes,  51 
Ark.  48.  It  has  even  been  held  in  some 
cases  that  one  witness  may  also  sign  the 
name  of  another  at  the  latter's  request, 
when  prevented  by  physical  disability 
from  signing  himself  :  Matter  of  Strong, 
2  Connoly,  574,  and  rases  cited;  and  in 
South   Carolina   the  attestation   is  valid 

though     the     DOn  Bigning     witness    could 

have  signed,  bat  does  not,  and  does  not 
tonch  t.li«-  pen,  if  bJs  name  is  Bigned  by 
another  witness  in   the  presence  of  the 

testator:  Smvthc   v.   Irirk,  46  S.  C.  299; 

but  though  one  be  competent  as  a  sub- 

74 


scribing  witness,  he  cannot  perform  the 
act  of  subscription  wholly  through  an- 
other person  who  is  legally  incompetent 
himself :  Simmons  v.  Leonard,  91  Tenn. 
183,  188  (the  witness  in  this  case  did  not 
even  make  his  mark) ;  in  any  event  the 
witness  must  touch  the  pen  making  the 
mark  in  Tennessee :  McFarland  v.  Bush, 
94  Tenn.  538.  The  Georgia  Code  pro- 
vides that  a  witness  may  subscribe  by 
mark,  "  provided  he  can  swear  to  the 
same  ;  "  it  was  held  that  this  statute  only 
means  that  he  must  be  competent  at  the 
time  of  attesting,  and  it  is  not  essential 
that  he  be  able  to  identify  the  mark  when 
the  will  is  offered  for  probate,  if  the  facts 
can  be  proved  by  other  non-attesting  wit- 
nesses :  Gillis  v.  Gillis,  96  Ga.  1. 

5  Adams  v.  Chaplin,  1  Hill  (S.  C.)  Eq. 
265,  266.  But  in  California  it  was  held 
(three  judges  giving  dissenting  opinions) 
that  the  statute  of  that  State  differs 
from  the  English  statute  in  requiring  the 
witness  to  sign  his  name  as  a  witness  at 
the  end  of  the  will ;  and  that  hence  where 
the  witness  inadvertently  signed  a  differ- 
ent name  instead  of  his  own,  although 
intending  it  to  be  his,  the  will  was  not 
legally  executed  :  In  re  Walker,  110  Cal. 
387. 

c  Campbell  v.  Logan,  2  Bradf.  90,  97. 

7  Nelson  v.  McGiffert,  3  Barb.  Ch.  158, 
162;  Hall  v.  Hall,  18  Ga.  40,  46  ;  Allaire 
v.  Allaire,  37  N.  J.  L.  312,  325,  affirmed  in 
39  N.  J.  L.  113  ;  Lewis  v.  Lewis,  13  Barb. 
17,  25;  Rugg  v.  Rugg,  83  N.  Y.  592; 
Meurer's  Will,  44  Wise.  392,  399;  1  Am. 
Pr.  R.  518,  citing  numerous  New  York 
cases ;  in  New  Jersey  it  was  held  that  the 
statement  of  facts  in  the  attestation  clause 
throws  the  burden  of  disproving  them  upon 


§  41  COMPETENCY   OF    ATTESTING   WITNESSES.  *  71,  *  72 

recital  may  also  furnish  protection  against  the  lack  of  memory  or 
wilful  fraud  of  attesting  witnesses.1 

The  date  is  not  an  absolutely  essential  part  of  a  will; a  it  may  be 
held  valid,  though  it  has  no  date,  or  a  wrong  one.  If  the  actual 
date  of  its  execution  becomes  material,  it  may  be  estab-  Date  not  es- 
lished  by  parol  proof.8  Where  the  will  is  dated,  the  sential- 
presumption  is  that  it  was  made  at  the  time  of  its  date.*  Nor 
is  it  essential  that  the  will  should  show  the  place  where  it 
[*72]  *  was  made;  this  is  a  matter  dehors  the  will,  which  may  be 
proved  like  any  other  fact.5  But  the  importance  of  showing 
in  the  will  itself  both  its  date  and  place  of  making  is  obvious :  its 
validity  may  depend  upon  either  of  these  facts,  and  if  no  proof  can 
be  made  of  them  it  may  lead  to  its  rejection.6 

It  may  be  stated,  in  this  connection,  that  where  there  is  a  change 
in  the  law  governing  the  execution  of  a  will,  made  in  the  interim 
between   its   execution    and   the    testator's   death,  the 
question  arises  as  to  which  law  governs.     It  is  held  in    governsThe 
some  States  that  the  law  in  force  when  the  will  is  exe-   execution  of 
cuted  must  be  complied  with;7  while  the  stronger  rea- 
soning  seems   to   lead  to   the    conclusion   that  the  will  should  be 
executed  in  conformity  to  the  law  in  force  at  the  testator's  death.8 

§  41.  Competency  of  Attesting  Witnesses. — The  statutes  mostly 
require  the  witnesses  to  be  ''credible"  or  "competent;  "  by  which  is 
meant  that  they  must  be  competent  persons  to  testify  in  a  court  of 

the  opponents  of  the  will  •.  Tappen  v.  Da-  ate  retrospectively :  Taylor  v.  Mitchell,  57 

vidson,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  459.     See  post,  §  218,  Pa.  St.  209 ;  Lane's  Appeal,  57  Conn.  18i 

and  cases  cited  on  page  *  475.  (the  latter  case  relying  partly  upon  a  Ver- 

1  McMeekin  v.  McMeekin,  2  Bush,  79  mont  case,  not  in  point,  because  the  change 
(in  this  case  all  the  attesting  witnesses  in  the  law  was  made  after  the  testator's 
testified  that  the  testator  had  not  a  dis-  death ;  and  English  cases,  one  of  which  is 
posing  mind) ;  Brown  v.  Clark,  77  N.  Y.  a  mere  dictum,  and  the  other  discusses  the 
369  ;  and  see  cases  post,  §  218,  p.  *475,  on  rule  governing  the  construction  of  devises, 
the  subject  of  probate  of  wills.  which  is   considered  post,  §§   419,  420); 

2  Flood  v.  Pragoff,  79  Ky.  607  ;  Austin  "  The  legality  of  the  execution  of  a  will  is 
v.  Fielder,  40  Ark.  144.  to  be  judged  of  by  the  law  as  it  stood  at 

8  Wright  v.  Wright,  5  Ind.  389,  392  ;  the  time  of  its  execution  : "  per  Clarke, 

Deakins   v.  Hollis,  7    Gill  &  J.  311,  316.  J.,  in  Quin's  Estate,  144  Pa.  St.  444,  on  p. 

But  a   holographic  will   must,  according  459;  Packer  v.  Packer,  179   Pa.  St.  580. 

to  the  statute  of  California,  be  dated  by  It  is  held  also  that  a  will  executed  by 

the  testator :   Estate  of  Martin,  58   Cal.  one  having   no    statutory    power    or  ca- 

530,  532.  pacity  to   make  a  will   (as,  for  instance, 

4  Sawyer  v.  Sawyer,  7  Jones  L.  134.  married  women),  is  not  rendered  valid  by 

5  Succession  of  Hall,  28  La.  An.  57.  a  subsequent  statute  enacted  before  his  or 

6  Phipps  v.  Earl  of  Anglesey,  7  Br.  her  death  conferring  such  right :  Mitchell 
P.  C.  443,  holding   that  two  inconsistent  v.  Kimbrough,  98  Tenn.  535,  538. 

wills  of  the  same  date,  neither  of  which  8  Sutton  v.  Chenault,  18  Ga.  1  ;  El- 
can  be  proved  to  have  been  last  executed,  cock's  Will,  4  McCord,  39  (will  of  person- 
must  both  be  rejected  on  the  ground  of  alty) ;  Lawrence  u.  Hibhard,  1  Bradf. 252; 
uncertainty.  Langly  v.  Langly,  18  R.  I.  6 J  8. 


7  Because  the  statute  should  not  o;>er- 


75 


72,  *  73        FORM,    EXECUTION,   AND    ATTESTATION    OF   WILLS.         §  41 


Competency 
refers  to 
time  of  attes- 
tation. 


justice,  not  being  disqualified  by  mental  imbecility,  interest,  crime, 
or  marital  relation.1  That  the  competency  of  the  witnesses  as 
attesting  witnesses  must  refer  to  the  time  of  attestation 
seems  clear  enough  on  principle;  else  the  validity  of 
the  will  would  be  made  dependent  on  circumstances 
beyond  the  control  of  the  testator,  and  enable  the  attest- 
ing witnesses,  by  rendering  themselves  incompetent,  to  defeat  it.2 
It  is  so  enacted  in  most  of  the  States;3  and  where  not  enacted  by 
statute,  it  is  nevertheless  generally  so  held  by  the  courts.4 

It  was  held  under  the  English  Statute  of  Frauds,  that  a  beneficial 
interest  under  the  will  disqualified  the  legatee  as  an  attesting  wit- 
ness,5 which  led  to  the  enactment  of  a  statute  to  remedy 
a  law  which  "alarmed  many  purchasers  and  creditors, 
and  threatened  to  shake  most  of  the  titles  in  the  king- 
dom that  depended  upon  devises  by  will,"  because  it 
"  would  not  allow  any  legatee,  nor  by  consequence 
a  creditor,  *  where  the  legacies  were  charged  upon  real  estate,  [*  73] 
to  be  a  competent  witness  to  the  devise."  6  This  statute7  pro- 
vided that  any  attesting  witness  to  whom  a  beneficial 
devise,  gift,  or  interest  (except  charges  on  lands  for 
payment  of  debts)  was  thereby  made  or  given,  should 
be  admitted  as  a  witness  to  the  will;  and  "such  de- 
vise, legacy,  estate,  interest,  gift,  or  appointment  shall, 
so  far  only  as  concerned  such  person  attesting  the  exe- 
cution of  such  will,  or  any  person  claiming  under  him,  be  utterly 
null  and  void;"  and  that  charges  of  debts  upon  lands  should  not 
render  the  creditor  an  incompetent  witness.  The  provisions  of  this 
statute  are  substantially  enacted  in  most  of  the  States ; 8  hence,  in 


Persons 
made  benefi- 
cial legatees 
incompetent 
as  attesting 
witnesses. 


Attesting 
witnesses 
competent 
by  statute; 
but  legacy  to 
them  made 
void. 


1  Carlton  v.  Carlton,  40  N.  H.  14,  17; 
Sullivan  v.  Sullivan,  106  Mass.  474; 
Comb's  Appeal,  105  Pa.  St.  155;  Fuller 
v.  Fuller,  83  Ky.  345;  Noble's  Will,  124 
111.  266.  A  wife  is  not  a  competent  wit- 
ness to  her  husband's  will  :  Pease  v,  Allis, 
110  Mass.  157  ;  nor  a  husband  to  his  wife's 
will:  Dickenson  v.  Dickenson,  61  Pa.  St. 
401  ;  Smith  v.  Jones,  68  Vt.  132. 

2  Workman  v.  Dominick,  3  Strobh. 
589  ;  Patten  v.  Tallman,  27  Me.  17,  27  ; 
Haven  v.  Milliard,  23  Pick.  10,  18;  Mor- 
ton v.  Ingram,  11  Ired.  L.  368  ;  Higgins  v. 
Carlton,  28  Md.  115,  140;  Smith  v.  Jones, 
supra. 

8  For  instance,  in  Alabama,  California, 
Indiana,  Kentucky,  Maine,  Massachusetts, 

Michigan,  Minnesota,  Nebraska,  Vermont, 
and  Wisconsin.  In  Georgia  the  compe- 
tency mentioned  relates  to  the  time  of 
testifying ;  bnt  it  is  also  provided  that 
76 


subsequent  disability  of  attesting  wit- 
nesses constitutes  no  bar  to  the  probate 
of  the  will.  In  Louisiana  women  are  de- 
clared incompetent  as  attesting  witnesses, 
but  may  prove  the  handwriting  of  a  tes- 
tator when  necessary  to  prove  a  testa- 
ment: Succession  of  Roth,  31  La.  An. 
315,  321. 

4  Noble  v.  Burnett,  10  Rich.  505,  518, 
et  seq.  ;  Stewart  v.  Harriman,  56  N.  II.  25, 
27  ;  Rucker  v.  Lambdin,  12  Sm.  &  M.230, 
250;  Frink  v.  Pond,  46  N.  H.  125,  126; 
Hopf  v.  State,  72  Tex.  281,  287 ;  Fisher  v. 
Spence,  150  111.  25.'!. 

6  Holdfast  v.  Downing,  2  Stra.  1253; 
Trotter  v.  Winchester,  1  Mo.  413. 

6  2  Bla.  Comm.  377. 

7  25  Geo.  II.  c.  6. 

K  In  Arkansas,  California,  Colorado, 
Connecticut,  Georgia,  Illinois,  Indiana, 
Iowa,   Kansas,  Kentucky,   Massachusetts, 


§41 


COMPETENCY   OF   ATTESTING   WITNESSES. 


73,  *74 


them,  interest  in  the  probate  of  a  will  does  not  disqualify  an  attest- 
ing witness,  but  the  fact  of  attesting  disqualifies  the  witness  from 
being  a  beneficiary  legatee  or  devisee ;  it  destroys  his  interest  in  the 
will.1  That  such  is  the  intention  with  which  these  statutes  were 
enacted,  is  evidenced  in  many  of  them  by  affirmatively  providing 
that  such  witnesses  may  be  compelled  to  testify.2 

It  is  also  provided  by  the  statutes  of  most  of   the  States,  that 
where  an  attesting  witness  is  also  heir  at  law  of  the  tes-    Except  as  to 
tator,  as  well  as  legatee,  so  that  he  would  be  entitled    heirs,  who 

7  -  .  .-,-,     would  take 

to  a  distributive  share  of   the   estate  in  case  the  will    without  the 
were  not  established,  he  is  not  only  a  competent  wit-    wjl1, 
ness,  but  may  take  under  the  will  so  much  that  would  come  to  him 
by  descent  or  distribution  as  may  not   exceed  the  amount  of  the 
devise   or    legacy   to    him.8     The    same   view   is   taken    by 
[*  74]  *  courts  in  the  absence  of  a  statutory  provision,4  and,  a  for- 
tiori, a  legatee  is  a  competent  witness  against  a  will.5 
Where  a  will  contains  a  devise  or  legacy  to  an  attesting  witness, 
but  is  attested   by  a  sufficient   number  of   competent  witnesses  in 
addition  to  such  devisee  or  legatee,   it  may  be  proved    gut  legatee 
without  his  testimony,  and  the  will  held  good,  includ-   attesting 
ing  the  gift  to  the  attesting  witness.6     It  is  so  enacted    under  will,  if 


Michigan,  Minnesota,  Missouri,  Nebraska, 
Nevada,  New  Hampshire,  New  York, 
North  Carolina,  Oregon,  Rhode  Island, 
South  Carolina,  Texas,  Vermont,  Vir- 
ginia, West  Virginia,  and  Wisconsin. 
The  English  statute  is  held  to  be  in  force 
in  the  District  of  Columbia  :  Elliott  v. 
Brent,  6  Mackey,  98.  In  Alabama  the 
statute  avoiding  a  legacy  to  an  attesting 
witness  was  repealed  in  1867  ;  and  it  is 
there  held  that  the  common-law  rule  as  to 
the  competency  of  legatees  and  devisees 
as  attesting  witnesses  was  uot  revived  by 
such  repeal,  but  that  they  were  thereby 
made  competent  witnesses,  in  accordance 
with  the  general  object  of  the  law  chang- 
ing the  competency  of  all  witnesses  as 
affected  by  interest.  Hence,  in  Alabama, 
legatees  and  devisees  are  competent  at- 
testing witnesses :  Kumpe  v.  Coons,  63 
Ala.  448,  453. 

1  Fowler  v.  Stagner,  55  Tex.  303,  398  ; 
Giddings  v.  Turgeon,  58  Vt.  106,  111; 
Grimm  <».  Tittman,  113  Mo.  56;  Harp  v. 
Parr,  168  111.  459,  473. 

2  So  in  the  statutes  of  Arkansas,  Colo- 
rado, Illinois,  Indiana,  Kentucky,  New 
York,  North  Carolina,  Rhode  Island, 
Texas,  Vermont,  Virginia,  and  West 
Virginia. 


8  So  in  Arkansas,  California,  Colorado, 
Illinois,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky, 
Michigan,  Minnesota,  Missouri,  Nebras- 
ka, New  York,  Oregon,  South  Carolina, 
Texas,  Virginia,  West  Virginia,  and  Wis- 
consin. In  Connecticut  the  devise  to  an 
attesting  heir  at  law  is  good  :  Gen.  St. 
1888,  p  134,  §  539.  So  held  in  Fortune  v. 
Buck,  23  Conn.  1,  6;  two  judges  dissent- 
ing, holding  that  the  statute  held  devise 
good  only  to  the  extent  of  the  inherit- 
ance (p.  9).  In  Vermont  the  heir  at  law 
is  excepted  from  the  provision  affecting 
devises  to  attesting  witnesses  :  St.  1894, 
§  2353.  In  Tennessee  the  statute  pro- 
vides that  the  will  shall  be  attested  by 
two  witnesses  at  least,  no  one  of  which 
shall  be  interested  in  the  devised  lands  ; 
and  it  is  held  that  a  legatee  of  personalty, 
who  is  also  an  hoir  at  law.  but  takes  no 
interest  in  the  land  under  the  will,  is  a 
competent  witness  :  Walker  v.  Skeene,  3 
Head,  1,  4. 

4  Graham  >:  O'Fallon.  4  Mo.  601  ; 
Dickey  r.  Maleohi  6  Mo  177:  Comstock 
v.  Hadlvme  Societv,  8  Conn.  254. 

5  Leslie  u.  Rims.  39  Ala.  161. 

6  Where,  as  in  New  Vork,  the  will  may 
be  proved  by  t^e  remaining  witnesses  if 
one  of  them  he  a  non-resident  the  testi 


74,  *  75 


FORM,  EXECUTION,    AND    ATTESTATION    OP   WILLS.         §  41 


by  statute  in  Arkansas,1  California,2  Colorado,3  Connec- 
ploved'Vwith-  ticut,4  Illinois,5  Indiana,6  Iowa,7  Kansas,8  Kentucky,9 
out  his  sig-  Massachusetts,10  Michigan,11  Minnesota,12  Missouri,18 
nature"  Nebraska,14  Nevada,15  New  Hampshire,16  New  York,17 

North  Dakota,18  Ohio,19  Oregon,20  Texas,21  Utah,22  Vermont,23  West 
Virginia,24  and  Wisconsin.25  In  Maine26  the  statute  provides  for 
attestation  by  three  credible  witnesses  not  beneficially  interested; 
and  in  Texas,27  if  one  of  the  attesting  witnesses  be  a  devisee  or  lega- 
tee, the  will  may  be  proved  by  the  corroboration  of  one  or  more 
other  "disinterested  and  credible"  witnesses,  and  will  then  be  good, 
including  the  gift  to  the  attesting  witness. 

It  was  a  question  under  the  Statute  of  Frauds  whether  a  witness 
rendered  incompetent  by  reason  of  his  interest  under  the  will  could 
be  restored  to  competency  by  destroying  his  inter- 
est by  means  of  a  release  or  payment  before  *  tes-  [*  75] 
tifying;  and  it  seems  that  the  law  was  finally  so 
held.28  But  such  a  witness  is  not  rendered  competent  by 
an  assignment  of  his  interest;  it  must  be  by  release.29 
This  subject  is  regulated  by  statute  in  Arkansas,30  Missouri,81  Ore- 
gon,82 and  Rhode  Island.33  In  Illinois,84  Ohio,35  and  North  Carolina 86 
it  has  been  held  that  a  release  will  not  render  competent  an  attest- 
ing witness. 

The   interest   disqualifying  a   devisee  or   legatee  is   a   beneficial 


Witness 
incompetent 
becomes 
competent 
by  releasing 
his  interest. 


mony  of  such  non-resident  is  held  unneces- 
sary, and  hence  a  legacy  to  him  is  not 
thereby  avoided  :  Cornwell  v.  Woolley, 
47  Barb.  .327. 

1  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  7435. 

2  Civ.  Code,  §  1282. 

3  2  Mills'  Ann.  St.  1891. 
*  Gen.  St.  1887,  §  539. 

5  St.  &  Curt.  Ann.  St.  1896,  p.  4039, 

§8. 

6  Burns'  Ann.  St.  1894,  §  2756. 
1   Code,  1897,  §  3275. 

B  Gen.  St.  1897,  eh.  110,  §  11. 
'■>   St.  1894,  §  4836. 
M  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  748,  §  3. 

11  How.  St.  1882,  §  5791. 

12  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  5037. 
is  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  8905. 
M  Cons.  St.  1893,  §  1189. 
ii  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  3008. 

M  Pub.  St    1891,  <li.  186,  §  3. 
"  Banks    &   Bro.    Rev.   St.  (9th  ed.) 
p.   1879,  S  50. 
i    Rev.  Code,  1895,  §  3679. 
W  Bates'  Ann.  St.  1897,  §  5925. 
no  Code,  1887, f;  30  ■ 

n  R,.v    St.  1895,  art.  5348. 
78 


22  Rev.  St.  1898,  §  2742. 

23  St.  1894,  §  2353. 

24  Code,  1891,  ch.  77,  §  18. 

25  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2284. 

26  Rev.  St.  1883,  p.  608,  §  1. 

27  Rev.  St.  1895,  art.  5349. 

23  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *70;  Deakins  v. 
Hollis,  7  Gill  &  J.  311,  315  ;  Kerns  v.  Sox- 
man,  16  Serg.  &  R.  315,  317;  Cook  v. 
Grant,  16  Serg.  &  R.  198,  208;  Weems 
v.  Weems,  19  Md.  334,  344;  Nixon  v. 
Armstrong,  38  Tex.  296. 

29  Hans  v.  Palmer,  21  Pa.  St.  296,  299, 
overruling  Search's  Appeal,  13  Pa.  St.  108. 

so  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §§  7437,  7438. 

81  Grimm  v.  Tittmann,  113  Mo.  56,  63. 

82  Code,  1887,  §3089. 

83  Attestation  becomes  valid  if  legatee 
die  before  probate  of  the  will:  Gen.  L. 
1896,  p.  668,  §  34. 

W   Fisher  v.  Spence,  150  111.  253. 

85  In  case  of  nuncupative  wills  reduced 
to  writing  and  attested  by  the  witnesses  ; 
written  wills  are  controlled  by  the  statute: 

Vroumaii  '•.  Powers,  47  Oh.  St.  191. 

"''■  Allison  v.  Allison,!  Bawks,  141, 174; 
Morton  v.  Ingram,  11   [red  368,  370. 


§  4.1  COMPETENCY   OF   ATTESTING   WITNESSES.  *  75,  *  76 

interest;  hence  a  gift  to  the  husband  or  wife  of  an  attesting  witness 
renders   such  witness    incompetent,    unless,  under   the    G;fl  to  hug_ 
law,  such  gift  is  void.1     It  was  held  in  England  that    band  or  wife 
the  statute  of  25  Geo.  II.  did  not  avoid  a  gift  to  the    dis<lualifies> 
husband  or  wife  of  an  attesting  witness ; 2  in  consequence  whereof, 
by  the  Wills  Act,  the  disqualification  to  take  beneficially  was  ex- 
tended to  the  husband  or  wife  of  an  attesting  witness. 

°  .  but  not  if 

This  feature  of  the  English  Act   is  incorporated   into    statute 
the  statutes  of  Connecticut,3  Georgia,4  Massachusetts,5   avoids  such 
South   Carolina,6  Virginia,7  and    West   Virginia.8     In 
Iowa,  under  a  general  statute  making  husband  and  wife  competent 
witnesses  for  each  other,  the  wife  of  a  legatee  is  held  to  be  a  com- 
petent attesting  witness;9  and  so  also  the  husband  of  a  devisee.10 
So  in  Minnesota,11  New  Jersey,12  and  Texas13  it  is  held  that  under 
the  statutes  of  these  States  the  husband  or  wife  of   a  legatee  is  a 
competent  attesting  witness,  and  that  the  legacy  itself  is  not  ren- 
dered void  thereby. 
[*  76]       *  For  the  same  reason,  a  devise  or  bequest  not  beneficial  to 

the  attesting  witness  does  not  disqualify  him.    A 
devise  in  trust  to  sell,  or  the  devise  of  a  power,  does  not    beneficial 
constitute  such  an  interest  in  the  devisee  as  will  either   <j?es  not 
render  him  incompetent  or  avoid  the  devise.14     Whether 
a  person  nominated  in  the  will  as  executor  is  a  competent  attesting 
witness,  or  general  witness  to  prove  the  will,  is  nega-    Executorsas 
tived  in  Alabama, 16  Delaware, 16  and  formerly  in  North    attesting 
Carolina; "  but  affirmed,  either  on  the  ground  that  the    W1  ness 

1  Fisher  v    Spence,  150  111.  253;  Gid-  3  Gen.  St.  1888,  §  539. 

dings  v.  Turgeon,  58  Vt.  106,  111 ;  Sulli-  *  In  this  State  the  husband  may  attest 

van  v,  Sullivan,  106  Mass.  474;  all  these  a  will  devising  separate  property  to  his 

cases  holding  that  the  statutes  ( but  which  wife,  but  his  credibility  is  submitted  to 

have  since  been  amended,  in  this  respect,  the  jury:  Code,  1895,  §  3275. 

iu  the  two  last-named  States)  avoid  only  5  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  748,  §  3. 

beneficiary  gifts  to  the  attesting  witnesses,  6  Rev.  St.  1893,  §  1991. 

not  to  any  other  person,  although  the  at-  7  Code,  1887,  §  2529. 

testing  witness   might   incidentally   take  8  Code,  1891,  p.  660,  §  18. 

some  benefit  from   the  devise  ;   and  that  9  Hawkins  v.  Hawkins,  54  Iowa,  443. 

therefore  the  person  benefited  by  a  devise,  10  Bates  v.  Officer,  70  Iowa,  343. 

not  himself  or  herself  the  devisee,  is  not  a  u  Holt's  Will,  56  Minn.  33. 

competent  attesting  witness.    In  the  latter  12  Lippincott  v.  Wikoff,  54  N.  J.  Eq. 

case,  Gray,  J.,  cites  the  cases  of  Jackson  107. 

v.  Woods,  1  Johns.  Cas.  163;  Jackson  v.  liJ  Gamble  v.  Butchee,  87  Tex.  642. 

Durlaud,  2  Johns.  Cas.  314,  and  Winslow  «  Tucker  v.  Tucker,   5    Ired.   L.   161, 

v.  Kimball,  25  Me.  493,  all  of  them  hold-  165  ;  Peralta  v.  Castro,  6  Cal.  354,  359; 

ing  that  the  unity  of  husband  and  wife  is  Hogan  v.  Wyman,  2  Greg.  302. 

such  that  if  either  be  a  witness  to  a  will  15  Gilbert  v.  Gilbert,  22  Ala.  529,  532, 

containing   a   devise   to   the   other,    such  on  the  ground  that  as  the  propounder  he 

devise  is  void,  and  the  witness  therefore  may  be  liable  for  costs, 

competent,  dissenting  from  this  view.    See  16  Davis  v.  Rogers,  1  Houst.  44,  63. 

also  authorities,  infra  (notes  9  to  11).  "  Morton  v.  Ingram,  11   Ired.  L.  368, 

2  Hatfield  v.  Thorp,  5  B.  &  Aid.  589, 595.  370,  holding  that  a  renunciation  of  the 

79 


*  76  FORM,   EXECUTION,   AND   ATTESTATION   OF  WILLS.  §  41 

commissions  to  which  they  are  entitled  constitute  no  "beneficial 
legacy,"  but  are  given  as  compensation  for  services  rendered,  or 
because  they  are  rendered  incompetent  to  assume  the  office,  in 
Connecticut,1  Florida,2  Georgia,3  Kentucky,4  Maine,6  Maryland,6 
Massachusetts,7  Mississippi,8  Missouri,9  New  Hampshire,10  New 
Jersey,11  New  York,12  North  Carolina,13  Pennsylvania,14  South  Caro- 
lina,15 and  Vermont.16  In  Kentucky  it  was  held  that  a  remote  con- 
tingent interest  in  the  provisions  of  a  will  does  not  disqualify  an 
attesting  witness  from  proving  it;  the  interest  in  such  case  goes  to 
the  credit,  and  not  to  the  competency,  of  the  witness.17  In  Maine 
neither  a  tax-paying  inhabitant  of  a  town  to  which  a  legacy  is  given, 
nor  a  stock-holder  of  a  corporation  which  is  a  legatee,  is  incompe- 
tent as  a  subscribing  witness  to  the  will.18 

In  England  a  direction  in  a  will  that  every  trustee  who  was  a 
solicitor  should  be  entitled  to  charge  for  professional  business  done 
for  the  estate,  was  held  to  be  void  as  to  an  attesting  witness,  on  the 
ground  that  such  provision  gives  him  a  right,  which  he  would  not 
otherwise  have,  to  charge  for  the  work  if  he  does  it,  thus  making  it 
a  beneficial  gift.19  Where  the  testator  selects  his  lawyer  or  physi- 
cian as  an  attesting  witness  it  will  be  deemed  that  he 
phy0skian°as  thereby  waives  all  objection  that  might  otherwise  be 
attesting  made  to  such  attorney  or  physician  certifying  to  facts 

learned  in  his  professional  capacity.20 

trust  will  not  remove  the  disqualification.  n  Lippincott  v.  Wikoff,  54  N.  J.  Eq. 

The  same  rule  is  applied  in  this  State  to  107. 

the  wife  of  an  executor :  Huie  v.  McCon-  12  McDonough  v.   Loughlin,   20   Barb. 

nell,    2    Jones,   L.   455,   457,   overruling  238,  245,  approved  in  In  re  Wilson,  103 

Daniel  v.  Proctor,  1   Dev.  428 ;    but  the  N.  Y.  374,  376. 

rule  is  now  changed  in  this  State  :  Verter  I3  Verter  v.  Collins,  101  N.  C.  114. 

v.  Collins,  101  N.  C.  114.  14  Frew  v.  Clarke,  80  Pa.  St.  170,  179, 

1  Hawley  v.  Brown,  1  Root,  494  (exec-  affirming  Bowen  v.  Gorauflo,  73  Pa.  St. 
utor  having  renounced).  357  ;  Jordan's  Estate,  161  Pa.  St.  393. 

2  Meyer  v.  Fogg,  7  Fla.  292,  294.  15  Harleston  v.  Corbett,  12  Rich.  604; 
8  Baker  v.  Bandroft,  79  Ga.  672.                Noble  v.  Burnett,  10  Rich.  505,  519,  hold- 

4  Orndorf  v.  Hummer,  12  B.  Mon.  619.     ing  the  statute  of  25  Geo.  II.  to  apply, 

5  Jones  v.  Tibbetts,  57  Me.  572  ;  Jones     avoiding   any    beneficial   interest   of  the 
v.   Larrabee,  47   Me.  474,  480.     For  the     executor. 

same  reason,  the  wife  of  an  executor  is  16  Richardson  t>.  Richardson,  35  Vt.  238, 

a   competent  attesting  witness :    Piper  v.  240. 

Moulton,  72  Me.  155,  158.  17  Berry  v.  Hamilton,  10  B.  Mon.  129, 

8  Dorsey  v.  Warfield,  7  Md.  65,  75  (as  138. 

a  general  witness,  having  renounced  the  18  Marston,  Petitioner,  79  Me.  25,  45, 

atorehip);    Estep  v.  Morris,  38  Md.  50. 

417,  423.  I9  In  re  Pooley,  L.  R.  40  Ch.  T).  1. 

7  Wyman  v.  Symmes,  10  Allen,  158.  20  In  re  Mullin,  110  Cal.  252,  256;  In  re 

1   Backer  v.  Lambdin,  12  Sm.  &  M.  230.  Coleman,  111  N.  Y.  220;  Pence  v.  Waugh, 

254;   Kelly  V.  Miller,  .'ft  Miss.  17,5'.).  135   Tnil.   143,    152;  In  re  Wax,   106   Cal. 

'•  Murpli*.  /.  Murphy,  24  Mo.  526.  343,  and  cases  cited  ;  Denning  v.  Butcher, 

id  Stewarl  v.  Karriman,  56  N.  11.25,27,  91  Iowa,  425,  435. 
holding  wife  "f  executor  also  competent. 
BO 


§  42  WILLS    VALID    AS   TO    PERSONAL   PROPERTY,   ETC.      *  76,  *  77 

§    42.    Wills  valid  as  to  Personal,  but  not  as  to  Real  Property-  — 

In  most  States  the  statutes  make  no  distinction  in  respect  of 
[*  77]  *  form  between  wills  disposing  of  personal  and    In  gome  State8 

those  disposing  of  real  property,  except  as  to  wills  may  be 
holographic  and  nuncupative  wills,  which  will  be  con-  g0anal  and* void 
sidered  hereafter; l  but  in  some  of  them  personal  prop-  as  to  real, 
erty  may  be  bequeathed  by  nuncupative  will.2  In 
Maryland 8  (until  the  recent  change  in  the  statute  requiring  the  same 
formality  for  all  wills4)  and  in  Tennessee,5  there  is  no  statute  on 
the  subject  of  wills  of  personalty,  hence  the  common  law  is  appli- 
cable to  them  in  these  States;  and  it  follows  that,  as  in  England 
before  the  statute  of  1  Vict.,  so  in  these  States,  a  will  held  inop- 
erative to  convey  real  estate  for  want  of  the  requisite  formalities 
may  yet  be  good  to  bequeath  personal  property.6  Thus  a  will  con- 
veying both  real  and  personal  property,  left  in  an  unfinished  state, 
is  void  as  to  either  class  of  property  if  it  appear  that  the  testator 
left  it  unfinished  while  he  was  still  deliberating  upon  its  contents; 
but  if  it  appear  that  he  intended  the  paper,  in  the  form  in  which  it 
was  found,  to  constitute  his  will,  and  was  prevented  from  complet- 
ing it  by  the  act  of  God  alone,  then  it  may  operate  as  a  valid  will 
of  personal  property,  although  no  real  property  can  pass  by  it.7 

In  many  of  the  States  personal  property  to  a  limited  amount  may 
be  bequeathed  by  will  differing  in  essential  respects  as  to  attesta- 
tion, form,  etc.,  from  wills  devising  real  estate,  or  bequeathing  per- 
sonal estate  of  greater  value.  These  will  be  considered  in  connec- 
tion with  nuncupative  wills.8 

The  distinction  between  wills  disposing  of  real  and  such  as  dis- 
pose of  personal  property  is  important  also  in  connection  with  the 
domicil  of  the  testator;  for  while  the  former  must  conform  to  the 
lex  rei  sitce,  the  latter  are  in  most  States  held  good  if  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  law  of  the  testator's   domicil,  or  of   the    State 

1  The  States  making  no  distinction  in  4  Publ.  L.  1888,  art.  93,  §  310;  all 
the  form  and  execution  of  wills  of  real  wills  must  now  be  in  writing,  signed  by 
and  of  personal  property  are  Alabama,  the  testator,  and  attested  by  two  witnesses  : 
Arkansas,  California,  Connecticut,  Dela-  Trustees  v.  College,  75  Md.  188. 

ware,    Georgia,    Illinois,    Indiana,   Iowa,  5  Franklin  v.  Franklin,  90  Tenn.  44 ; 

Kentucky,  Maine,  Massachusetts,  Michi-  Moore   v.    Steele,    10  Humph.  562,   565; 

gan,     Minnesota,    Mississippi,    Missouri,  Williams  v.  Saunders,  5  Coldw.  60,  69. 

Nebraska,  Nevada,  New  Hampshire,  New  See  compilers'  note,  Stat,  of  Tenn.,  Code, 

Jersey,  New  York,  North  Carolina,  Ohio,  1884,  §  3003. 

Oregon,     Pennsylvania,     Rhode     Island,  6  Guthrie  v.  Owen,  2  Humph.  202,  217; 

South  Carolina,  Texas,  Vermont,  Virginia,  in   Maryland  before   the  change  of  the 

West  Virginia,  and  Wisconsin.  statute :   Byers  v.  Hoppe,  61  Md.  206. 

2  As  to  which  see  post,  §  44.  '  Devecmon    v.    Devecmon,    43    Md. 
8  Hinck.  Test.  L.  §  69.     The  common  335,  344,  et  seq.     But  the  law  is  otherwise 

law  of  England  was  said  to  be  in  force  as    now ;  see  note  4,  supra. 
to  the  testamentary  disposition  of  personal  8  See  post,  §  44. 

property  :  lb.  §  85. 

VOL.   I.  — 6  81 


*  78,  *  79         FORM.    EXECUTION,   AND    ATTESTATION    OP   WILLS.        §  43 


*or  country  where  made,  or  where  the  property  may  be  found.   [*  78] 
This  aspect  of  the  subject  is  discussed  elsewhere.1 

§  43.  Holographic  "Wills.  —  Holographic  (or  olographic)  wills,  writ- 
ten wholly  by  the  testator  in  person,  differ  from  ordinary  wills  only 
States  allow-  in  requiring  less  or  no  formality  of  attestation.  Provi- 
ng wills  sion  is  made  for  such  in  the  statutes  of  many  States, 
testator  with-8  They  are  admitted  to  probate  upon  proof  of  having  been 
out  attestation.  written  by  the  testator  in  Arkansas,2  California,3  Ken- 
tucky,4 Louisiana,5  Mississippi,6  North  Carolina,7  Tennessee,8  Texas,9 
Virginia,10  and  West  Virginia.11 

The  validity  of  holographic  wills  without  attestation  of  any  kind 
renders  it  difficult,  sometimes,  to  determine  whether  the  deceased 

intended  the  paper  propounded  for  probate  to  constitute 
affectingvalid-  bis  last  will  in  the  form  in  which  it  is  found.  Hence 
ityofsuch         ^   is  provided  in  the  statutes  of   North    Carolina   and 

Tennessee  that  such  wills,  to  be  valid,  must  be  found 
among  the  valuable  papers  of  the  deceased,  or  lodged  with  some 
person  for  safe  keeping.12  If  the  paper  is  imperfect,  as  where  it 
contains  an  attestation  clause  not  signed,  or  leaving  blanks,  the  pre- 
sumption is  against  its  validity;  but  proof  of  intention  may  be 
given,  in  rebuttal  of  such  presumption,  that  the  deceased 
abandoned  the  intention  he  once  had  of  giving  effect  to  *  the  [*  79] 
paper,  or  that  he  meant  it  to  operate  in  its  then  condition,  or 
that  he  was  in  the  progress  of  finishing  it,  and  prevented  by  the  act 


1  See  post,  ch.  xvii.,  §  168;  and  also 
§  226. 

2  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  7392,  pi.  5.  Proof 
of  handwriting  must  be  made  by  three 
disinterested  witnesses. 

3  Civ.  Code,  §  1277;  without  other 
formality,  whether  it  be  made  within  or 
out  of  the  State. 

4  St.  1894,  §  4828,  excepting  holo- 
graphic  wills  from  the  requirement  of 
attestation.  But  such  a  will  must  be 
Bigned  by  the  testator  at  its  conclusion 
lii.'  an  ordinary  will:  Jones  v.  Jones,  3 
Mete.  (Ky.)  266,  270. 

5  Voorhies'  Rev.  Civ.  Code,  1889,  art. 
1588.  The  only  requirement  is,  whether 
made  in  or  out  of  the  Stair,  that  it  must 
be  entirely  written,  dated,  and  signed  by 
the  testator. 

«  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  4488,  excepting 
holographic  wills  Bigned  by  the  testator 
from  the  requirement  of  attestation. 

7  If  found  among  the  valuable  papers 
and  effects  of  the  deceased,  or  lodged  with 
iome  person  for  safe  keeping,  and  proved 

by  three  credible   witnesses  to  be  in  the 

K2 


handwriting  of  the  deceased  in  all  its 
parts:  Code,  1883,  §  2136;  Brown  v. 
Eaton,  91  N.  C.  26. 

»  Rev.  St.  1884,  §  3004.  Under  same 
conditions  as  in  North  Carolina  ;  see  supra, 
note  7.  As  to  the  quantum  of  proof  re- 
quired to  probate  an  unattested  will,  see 
Franklin  v.  Franklin,  90  Tenn.  44. 

9  Rev.  St.  1895,  §  5336,  excepting  holo- 
graphic will  from  requirement  of  attes- 
tation. 

10  Code,  1887,  §  2514. 

«  Code,  1891,  ch.  77,  §  3. 

12  Supra,  notes  7  and  8.  It  must  be 
proved,  in  addition  thereto,  that  the  paper 
was  so  deposited  or  lodged  for  safe  keep- 
ing with  the  intent  that  it  should  operate 
as  his  will  ;  and  by  three  witnesses,  not 
only  that  it  is  in  the  handwriting  of  the 
deceased,  but  also  that  his  handwriting 
was  generally  known  among  his  acquaint- 
ances: Hooper  v.  McQuary,  5  Coldw. 
129,  130,  et  eeq. ;  Marr  v.  Marr,  2  Head, 
80S;  Tate  v.  Tate,  11  Humph.  465; 
Crutcher  v.  Crutcher,  11  Humph.  377, 
380. 


§  44  NUNCUPATIVE   WILLS.  *  79 

of  God.1  And  in  Virginia  a  will  wholly  written  by  the  testator  and 
signed  by  him,  containing  an  attestation  clause  unsigned  by  wit- 
nesses, was  held  to  be  a  valid  holographic  will.2  In  California, 
where  there  was  no  formal  attestation  clause,  but  the  word  "  Wit- 
ness" followed  by  name  and  address  not  in  testator's  handwriting, 
this  was  not  regarded  as  invalidating  a  paper  as  a  holographic  will.* 

It  is  held  in  Louisiana  that  the  fact  of  names  of  witnesses  being 
appended  to  the  will  neither  invalidates  it  nor  deprives  it  of  its 
holographic  character; 4  and  that  the  probate  of  it  must  be  that  re- 
quired for  holographic  wills.5  The  requirement  of  the  code,  that 
the  holographic  will  shall  be  dated,  is  not  complied  with  by  giv- 
ing the  month  and  the  year,  leaving  a  blank  for  the  day  of  the 
month;  the  omission  cannot  be  supplied  aliunde,  and  avoids  the 
will.6  So  it  is  held  both  in  Louisiana  and  California  that  the  statute 
is  not  complied  with  if  any  part  of  the  date  is  printed.7  In  Cali- 
fornia, if  the  name  of  the  testator  appear  in  the  opening  part  of 
the  will,  it  is  valid  without  being  subscribed;8  but  that  a  paper 
printed  in  the  form  of  a  stationer's  blank,  with  the  vacant  spaces 
tilled  in  deceased's  handwriting,  is  not  a  holographic  will  in  whole 
or  in  part.9  Although  the  statutes  of  a  State  may  refer  to  and  rec- 
ognize holographic  wills,  yet  unless  it  dispenses  with  the  necessity 
of  witnesses,  they  must  be  proved  by  witnesses.10 

§  44.    Nuncupative  Will3.  —  Nuncupative    wills,    or   testamentary 
declarations  in  presence  of  witnesses  without   any  writing  by  the 
testator,   were  at  common   law  of   equal  validity  with    Nuncupative 
written  wills  for  the  disposition  of  personal  property.11    wills  affected 
13y  the  Statute  of  frauds  several  restrictions  were  placed    statute  of 
upon  them,  "  for  the  prevention  of  fraudulent  practices    Frauds- 
in  setting  up  nuncupative  wills,   which  have  been  the  occasion  of 
much  perjury."12     The  provisions  of  this  statute,  although  rendered 
inoperative  in  England  by  the  statute  of  1  Vict.  c.  26,  which  does 
away  with  nuncupative  wills  altogether,  except  as  to  soldiers  and 
mariners  in  actual  service,  are  still  in  force  in  most  of  the  American 
States,  with  more  or  less  modification. 

The  English  Statute  of  Frauds  affected  such  nuncupative  wills  only 
as  disposed  of  property  exceeding  £50  in  value;  where  the  property 

1  Forbes  v.  Gordon,  3  Phillim.  614,  628 ;  5  Succession  of  Both,  31  La.  An.  315, 
Hill  v.  Bell,   Phillips  L.   122,   124,   citing     317. 

Harrison  v.  Burgess,  1   Hawks,  384,  and  6  Heffner  i\  Heffner,  48  La.  An.  1088. 

Brown  v.  Beaver,  3  Jones,  516,  to  same  7  Robertson's  Succession,  49  La.   Aa 

effect.  868  ;  Billing's  Estate,  64  Gal.  427. 

2  Perkins  v.  Jones,  84  Va.  358,  with  a  8  Johnson's  Estate,  Myr.  5. 
citatiou  of  authorities,  Lewis,  P.,  dissenting  9  Estate  of  Band,  61  Gal.  468. 
on  the  ground  that  the  presumption  was  10  Neer  v.  Cowhick,  4  Wyom.  49. 
against  the  validity  of  the  will.  n  Wms.  Ex.  [116]. 

3  In  re  Soher,  78  Gal.  477.  12  29  Car.  II.  c.  3,  §  19. 
*  Andrews  v.  Andrews,  12  Mart.  713. 

83 


79,  *  80       FORM,   EXECUTION,   AND   ATTESTATION   OF   WILLS.        §  44 


Restrictions 
of  the  statute 
apply  to 
bequests  ex- 
ceeding cer- 
tain amounts 
on' v. 


bequeathed  amounted  to  less,  the  common  law  still 
governed.  In  a  number  of  States  this  principle  was 
adopted,  limiting  the  statutory  restrictions  on  nuncupa- 
tive wills  to  such  as  bequeath  property  exceeding  a  cer- 
tain value;  namely,  $300  in  Maryland;1  $250  in  Ten- 
nessee;2 $150  in  Nebraska3  and  Wisconsin;4 
$100  in  Maine,6  *  Mississippi,6  New  Hampshire,7  and  Penn-  [*80] 
sylvania;8  $80  in  New  Jersey;9  $50  in  South  Carolina;10 
and  $30  in  Texas.11  But  in  some  of  these  States  slight  changes 
from  the  common  law  affect  all  nuncupative  wills,  particularly  in 
the  mode  of  probate,  which  will  appear  in  connection  with  the  con- 
sideration of  that  subject.12 

In  other  States  nuncupative  wills  are  permitted  only  for  property 
not  exceeding  a  certain  value,  fixed  at  $1,000  in  California18  and 
Nevada;14  at  $500  in  Alabama16  and  Arkansas;16  $300 
in  Iowa17  and  Michigan;18  $200  in  Delaware,19  Mis- 
souri,20 and  Vermont; 21  and  $100  in  Indiana.22  In  these 
States,  by  force  of  their  statutes,  a  nuncupative  will 
disposing  of  property  in  excess  of  the  amount  so  limited 
has  been  held  void  in  toto.™  In  others  again  there  is  no  limit  to  the 
amount  of  personal  property  which  may  be  bequeathed  by  unwritten 
wills  under  the  conditions  imposed  in  the  statutes.  Among  these 
are  Colorado,24  Florida,25  Illinois,26  Kansas,27  Ohio,28  North  Caro- 
lina,29 Pennsylvania,80  South  Carolina,81  Tennessee,32  Texas,38  and 
Wisconsin.84    Yet  others  limit  the  power  to  soldiers  in  actual  service 


Nuncupative 
wills  prohib- 
ited for  prop- 
erty exceed- 
ing certain 
value. 


1  Code,  1878,  p.  421,  art.  49,  §  10.  But 
by  the  latest  revision  (Pub.  Gen.  L.  1888, 
p.  1418,  §  318)  nuncupative  wills  are 
wholly  abolished  in  Maryland,  saving, 
however,  to  soldiers  and  mariners  power 
to  dispose  of  personal  estate  as  thereto- 
fore. 

2  Code,  1884,  §  3006. 

8  Cons.  St.  1893,  §  1187. 
«  Ann.  St.  1889,  §2292. 

5  Rev.  St.  1883,  p.  610,  §  20. 

6  Ann.  Code.  1892,  §  4492. 

■  Pub,  St.  1891,  ch.  196,  §  17. 

8  Pepper  &  Lewis'  Dig.  1896,  p.  1443, 
§34. 

9  Gen.  St.  1896,  p.  3759,  §  11. 
10  Rev.  St.  1893,  §  2008. 

ii   Rev.  St.  1895,  §  5339. 
>2  Punt,  §§  45,  224. 
"  Civ.  Code,  §  1289. 
"  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  3004. 

u  Code,  1896,  §  4267. 

lr<   Dig.  <>f  St.  1894,  §  7404. 
i"  low.-i  Code,  1897,  §  3272. 
U  2  How.  St.  1882,  §  5790. 
84 


19  Laws,  1874,  p.  509,  §  5. 

20  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  8892. 

21  St.  1894,  §  2350. 

22  Ann.  St.  1894,  §  2747. 

28  Erwin  v.  Humuer,  27  Ala.  296,  299 ; 
Strieker  v.  Oldenburgh,  39  Iowa,  653. 
But  a  later  Iowa  case  holds  the  will  good 
for  all  but  the  excess  :  Mulligan  v.  Leon- 
ard, 46  Iowa,  692,  694. 

a*  Mills'  Ann.  St.,  1891,  §  4654. 

25  Except  slaves,  which  before  their 
emancipation  by  President  Lincoln  were 
treated  as  real  property  :  McLeod  v.  Dell, 
9  Fla.  451,  455;  Rev.  St.  1892,  §  1799. 

28  St.  &  Curt.  St.  1896,  ch.  148,  §  15. 

«  Kans.  Gen.  St.  1897,  p.  573,  §  69. 

28  Rev.  St.  1890,  §  5991. 

2»  Code,  1883,  §2148,13. 

80  Pepper  &  L.  Dig.  1896,  p.  1443, 
§34. 

»i   Rov.  St.  1893,  §  2008. 

82  Code,  1884,  §  3006. 

88  Rev.  St.  1895,  art.  5339. 

°*  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2292. 


§45        STATUTORY  REGULATIONS  OF  NUNCUPATIVE  WILLS.        *  80,  *  81 


and  mariners  at  sea;  for  instance,  Kentucky,1  Maryland,2  Massa- 
chusetts,8 Minnesota,4  New  York,6  Oregon,6  lthode  Island,7 
[*  81]  Virginia,8  and  *  West  Virginia.9  But  in  Georgia 10  the  statute 
expressly  authorizes  all  property,  whether  real  or  personal, 
to  pass  by  verbal  will;11  and  so  in  Louisiana,12  whose  testamentary 
system  is  largely  borrowed  from  the  civil  law.  The  Texas  statute 
providing  for  the  disposition  of  "  property  "  by  nuncupative  will  is 
construed  not  to  exteud  to  real  property.18 

§  45.  Statutory  Regulations  in  Respect  of  Nuncupative  Wills. — 
The  requisites  for  nuncupative  wills  are  imported  from  the  English 
Statute  of  Frauds  into  the  statutes  of  most  of  the  Amer- 
ican States,  with  modifications  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent.  It  is  necessary  that  the  words  spoken  by  the 
testator  be  proved  on  oath  by  competent  witnesses,14 
"  who  were  present  at  the  making  thereof."  Most  of 
them  also  require  that  the  testator  "  bid  the  persons  present,  or  some 
of  them,  bear  witness  that  such  was  his  will,  or  to  that  effect."  16 

That  the  rogatio  testium,  or  request  of  the  testator  to  bear  witness 
to  the  will  he  is  about  to  pronounce,  is  an  essential  feature  of  all 
nuncupative  wills,  is  nowhere  doubted,  even  where  the    Testator  must 
statute  contains  no  express  provision   to  that   effect.16   nesse^to^vdt- 
But  while  it  cannot  be  supplied  by  inference  from  the    ness  his  will, 
nuncupation  itself,17  it  is  not  necessary  that  particular  words  be  used, 


Nuncupative 
wills  must  be 
proved  by  wit- 
nesses who 
were  present  at 
the  making. 


1  St.  1894,  §  4830. 

2  Pub.  Gen.  L.  1888,  p.  1418,  §  318. 
8  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  748,  §  6. 

4  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  5628. 

5  2Banks&Bro.  (9th  ed.,  1896)  p.  1876, 
§22. 

6  There  is  a  provision  in  the  statutes 
of  Oregon  for  nuncupative  wills,  which 
seems  applicable  to  the  common-law 
wills  authorized  to  soldiers  and  mariners : 
see  Hill's  Ann.  L.  1887,  §  3079;  also 
§§  3080,  3081. 

7  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  666,  §  20. 

8  Code,  1887,  §  2516. 

9  Code,  1891,  p.  659,  §  5. 
1°  Code,  1895,  §  3352. 

11  Brown  v.  Carroll,  36  Ga.  568  ;  Cara- 
way v.  Smith,  28  Ga.  541. 

12  Code,  art.  1570.  See  Wood  v.  Roane, 
35  La.  An.  865  ;  Pfarr  v.  Belmont,  39  La. 
An.  294. 

18  Moffett  v.  Moffett,  67  Tex.  642. 

14  Except  in  Florida,  Georgia,  Maine, 
Nebraska,  New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey, 
South  Carolina,  Texas,  and  Wisconsin,  in 
which  States  three  witnesses  are  still  re- 
quired, the  number  is  in  others  reduced 


to  two.  In  Alabama  and  Vermont  the 
statute  does  not  mention  the  number  of 
witnesses  in  connection  with  nuncupative 
wills.  In  Louisiana  from  three  to  seven 
are  required  under  the  various  circum- 
stances mentioned  in  the  statute.  The 
witnesses  must  prove  the  words,  substan- 
tially, as  spoken,  and  on  a  contest  it  may 
be  proved  that  the  words  spoken  were 
different  from  those  written  by  them,  in 
which  case  the  will  is  void :  Bolles  v. 
Harris,  34  Oh.  St.  38,  40.  See  on  the 
accuracy  required :  Hennesy  v.  Woulfe, 
49  La.  An.  1376. 

15  This  requirement  seems  to  be  omitted 
in  California,  Iowa,  Massachusetts,  Mich- 
igan, Minnesota,  New  York,  Ohio,  Oregon, 
Rhode  Island,  Vermont,  Virginia,  and 
West  Virginia.  It  is  contained,  substan- 
tially, in  the  language  of  the  English 
statute,  in  the  other  States. 

16  Ridley  v.  Coleman,  1  Sneed,  616,  618 ; 
Brown  v.  Brown,  2  Murphy,  350 ;  Broach 
v.  Sing,  57  Miss.  115,  116;  and  see  au- 
thorities in  notes,  infra. 

17  Bundrick  v.  Haygood,'106  N.  C.  468. 
Biddle  v.  Biddle,  36  Md.  630,  643,  et  seq.i 


* 


81,  *  82      FORM,    EXECUTION,    AND    ATTESTATION    OP   WILLS.  §  45 


or  a  literal  compliance  with  the  statute  shown ;  any  form  of  expres- 
sion, however  imperfectly  uttered,  so  that  it  conveys  to  the 
minds  of  those  to  whom  it  is  addressed  the  *  idea  that  he  desires  [*  82} 
them,  or  some  of  them,  to  bear  witness  to  the  disposition  he  is 
about  to  make  of  his  property,  is  sufficient.1  It  has  been  decided  in 
Pennsylvania  that  a  look  is  not  a  sufficient  rogatio  test  turn.2  The 
animo  testandi  must  be  proved  as  clearly,  and  with  the  same  cer- 
tainty, at  least,  as  in  wills  written  and  attested  in  writing.3  In  some 
of  the  States  the  witnesses  are  expressly  required  by  the  statute  to 
prove  affirmatively  that  the  testator,  at  the  time  of  speaking  the 
testamentary  words,  was  of  sound  mind.4 

"That  such  nuncupative  will  was    made   in   the  time  of  the  last 
sickness  of  the  deceased,  in  the  house  of  his  habitation  or  dwelling, 
Must  be  made    or  where  he  or  she  hath  been  resident  for  the  space  of 
a"  testator's688    ten  ^ays  or  more  next  before  the  making  of  such  will,  ex 
dwelling.  cept  where  such  person  was  surprised  or  taken  sick  being 

from  his  own  home,  and  died  before  he  returned  to  the  place  of  his 
or  her  dwelling."  This  provision  has,  of  course,  no  application  to 
soldiers  or  mariners  ;  but  with  this  exception  has  been  substantially 
incorporated  into  the  statutes  of  nearly  all  the  States.5  The  phrase 
"  last  sickness  "  is  construed  not  to  mean  in  extremis  in  Illinois  6  and 
Tennessee,7  but  otherwise  in  Georgia,8  Pennsylvania,9  Maryland,10 
and  New  Jersey.11  In  Delaware  such  a  will  must  be  made  within 
three  days  before  the  testator's  death,  or  under  circumstances  render- 
ing it  impossible  to  make  a  written  will.12 

The  Statute  of  Frauds  prohibits  the  introduction  of  any  testimony 
Must  be  ad-  to  prove  testamentary  words  after  the  expiration  of  six 
bate^withinT  mcmths  from  the  time  they  were  spoken,  "except  the 
certain  time.       said  testimony,  or  the  substance  thereof,  were  committed 

Sampson   v.  Browning,  22  Ga.  293,  301  ;  v.   Stevens,   78    111.   287,  as  holding   that 

Dawson's  Appeal,  23  Wis.  69,  88.  the  statute  as  to  nuncupative  wills  must 

1  Weir  v.  Chidester,  63   111.  453,  455  ;  receive  a  rigid  and  strict  construction. 
Arnett  v.  Arnett,  27  111.  247,  249;  Mulli-  7  Nolan  v.  Gardner,  7  Heisk.  215. 
gan  v.  Leonard,  46  Iowa,  692,  694,  et  s?q.;  8  Scaife  o.  Emmons,  84  Ga.  619. 
I'arkison  v.   Parkison,   12   Sm.  &  M.  672,          9  Boyer   v.   Frick,  4  Watts  &  S.  357, 
678  ;  Hatcher  v.  Millard,  2  Coldw.  30,  33,  360,  where  it  is  said  that  a  nuncupative 
et  seq. ;  Smith  v.  Smith,  63  N.  C.  637,  639,  will  is  allowed  only  if  made  in  such  ex- 
et   seq.;  Long  v.   Foust,   109  N.   C.   114;  tremity   of   last   sickness   as   precludes  a 
Bourke  v.  Wilson,  38  La.  An.  320.  written  one  :   Yarnall's  Will,  4  Rawle,  46, 

2  Will  of  Meisenhelter,  15  Phila  651.  65.     See  the  case  of  Prince  v.  Hazleton, 

3  Gibson  v.  Gibson,  Walk.  364 ;  Phipps  20  Johns.  502,  510,  et  seq.,  for  a  review  of 
v.  Hope,  16  Oh.  St.  586,  595;  Lucas  v.  the  law  of  nuncupative  wills  on  this  point, 
Goff,  33  Miss.  629,  645.  before  the  restriction  of  such  wills  in  New 

1  Sm  in  Colorado,  Illinois.  Kansas,  and  York  to  soldiers  and  mariners- 
Ohio.  10  O'Neill  r.  Smith,  33  Md.  569,  573. 

■''  The  only  exceptions,  apparently,  :ire  n  Carroll  v.  Bonham,  42  N.  J.  Eq  625, 

I  ■  ■■  i.  Louisiana,  Michigan,  and  Vermont.  627. 

■   Harrington    v.   Steer,  82    [11.50,   54,  u  Laws,  1874,  p.  509,  §  5. 
b,  J.,  di    •  nting,  and  citing  Morgan 
86 


§  45        STATUTORY  REGULATIONS  OP  NUNCUPATIVE  WILLS.        *  83,  *  84 

[*  83]  to  writing  within  six  days  after  the  making  of  *  said  will." 
While  the  substance  of  this  provision  is  embodied  in  the  stat- 
utes of  most  States,  there  is  considerable  diversity  as  to  the  time  al- 
lowed for  the  reduction  of  the  testamentary  words  into  writing.  The 
Statute  of  Frauds  is  precisely  followed,  in  this  respect,  in  Alabama,1 
Florida,2  Maine,8  Mississippi,4  Nebraska,6  New  Hampshire,6  New  Jer- 
sey,7 South  Carolina,8  Texas,9  and  Wisconsin.10  In  North  Carolina  and 
Tennessee  ten  days  are  allowed  for  its  reduction  to  writing ;  if  this 
is  not  done,  it  cannot  be  proved  by  the  witnesses  more  than  sis. 
months  from  the  making.11  In  Georgia,  thirty  days  are  allowed.  In 
some  of  the  States  there  can  be  no  probate  after  six  months,  nor 
unless  the  words  be  reduced  to  writing  within  a  certain  time,  vary- 
ing from  three  to  thirty  days.12  In  Nevada  there  can  be  no  probate 
after  three  months.  The  provisions  that  there  must  be  There  must 
notice  to  the  parties  in  interest  (widow  or  next  of  kin),  ^eidnf)°^Icaend0 
and  that  "  no  letters  testamentary  or  probate  of  any  next  of  kin. 
nuncupative  will  shall  pass  the  seal  of  any  court  till  fourteen  days 
at  the  least  after  the  death  of  the  testator  be  fully  expired,"  13  are 
generally  applicable  in  all  the  States. 

Nuncupative  wills  are  watched  by  the  courts  with  a  jealous  eye. 
Aside  from  the  statutory   restrictions  placed  upon  them,  the  ease 
with  which  frauds  may  be  accomplished  in  establishing    Nuncupative 
them  demands  close  scrutiny  of  the  testimony  offered,    wills  not  fa- 
and  strict  proof  of  every  fact  upon  which  their  validity    vore   in  aw# 
is  made  to  depend.14     Where  several  witnesses  are  required  by  the 
statute,  each  one  must  prove  all  the  facts,16  and  all  must  be  present 
at  the  same  time.16 

It  has  sometimes  been  held,  that  instructions  for  the  drawing  of  a 

written  will,  declared  before  the  requisite  number  of  witnesses, 

[*  84]  may  constitute  a  valid  nuncupative  will  where  the  testator  *is 

by  the  act  of  God  rendered  incapable  of  completing  it  in  the 

1  Code,  1896,  §  4271.  12  So  in  Arkansas,  California,  Georgia, 

2  Rev.  St.  1892,  §  1800.  Indiana,  Kansas,  Missouri,  Ohio,  and  Ver- 
8  Rev.  St.  1883,  p.  610,  §  19.  mont.  In  Pennsylvania  within  six  days: 
4  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  4493.  Taylor's  Appeal,  47  Pa.  St.  31,  36. 

6  Cons.  St.  i893,  §  1188.  M  §  21  of  29  Car.  II.  c.  3. 

8  Pub.  St.  1891,  ch.  186,  §  17.  "  Dorsey  v.  Sheppard,  12  Gill  &  J.  192, 

7  Gen.  St.  1896,  p.  3759,  §  12.  198;  Werkheiser  v.  Werkheiser,  6  Watts 

8  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2293.  &  S.  184.  189  ;  Parsons  v.  Parsons,  2  Me. 
»  Rev.  St.  1895,  §  5341.  298,    300;     Rundrick    v.    Haygood,     106 

10  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2293.  N.  C.  468. 

11  If  reduced  to  writing  within  ten  1S  Morgan  v.  Stevens,  78  HI.  287 
days,  it  may  be  probated,  it  seems,  at  any  Mitchell  >■  Vickers,  20  Tex.  377,  384 
time;  but  if  not  so  put  in  writing  within  Haus  v.  Palmer,  21  Pa.  St.  296,  299 
ten  days,  it  cannot  be  proved  after  the  Lucas  v  Goff,  33  Miss.  629,  645. 
expiration  of  six  months  from  the  time  of  1,;  Tally  v.  Rutterworth,  10  Yerg.  501. 
making:  Haygood 's  Will,  101  N.  C.  574;  Rut  see,  contra,  Portwood  v.  Hunter,  6  B 
Code,  Tennessee,  1884,  §  3007.  Mon.  538. 

87 


*  84,  *  85        FORM,   EXECUTION,    AND    ATTESTATION   OP   WILLS.         §  46 

mode  contemplated  by  him  ; 1  at  least  where  it  appears  from  all  the 
circumstances  in  the  case  that  it  contains  the  final  wish  and  intention 
of  the  testator  respecting  the  property  bequeathed.2  But  this  doc- 
trine —  which  is  but  the  statement  of  the  common-law  rule  in  regard 
to  wills  of  personal  property  (not  required  to  be  in  writing)  whereby 
the  presumption  arising  against  an  unfinished  written  will  might  be 
rebutted 8  —  must  be  understood  as  being  governed  by  the  statutory 
provisions  on  the  subject,  and  not  as  giving  effect  to  an  incomplete 
written  will,  or  to  the  memorandum  of  a  scrivener,  or  the  proof  by 
witnesses  of  instructions  received  for  the  preparation  of  such,  unless 
all  the  formalities  prescribed  for  a  nuncupative  will  have  also  been 
complied  with.4 

§  46.  Wills  of  Soldiers  and  Mariners.  —  Wills  made  by  soldiers 
in  actual  military  service  and  mariners  at  sea  are  construed  with 

„.„  .  .  greater  liberality  than  nuncupative  wills  of  other  per- 
Wills  bv  sol-       °  -  . J  r  r 

diers  iu  ser-  sons.  By  the  civil  law  the  ordinary  formalities  of  exe- 
vice  and  man-    cu^innr  nuncupative  wills  were  dispensed  with  in  favor  of 

ners  at  sea  con-  .  . 

strued  with  soldiers ;  their  wills  were  held  valid,  although  they 
i  erahty.  should  neither  call  the  legal  number  of  witnesses,  nor 

observe  any  other  of  the  ordinary  solemnities  in  the  execution  of 
such  instruments.5  This  privilege  was  also  extended  to  the  naval 
service ; e  and  has  been  generally  adopted  among  civilized  nations, 
coming  to  us  through  the  common  law,  left  substantially  unaffected  by 
the  English  Statute  of  Frauds.  The  War  of  the  Rebellion  has  given 
rise  to  numerous  cases  involving  the  validity  of  soldiers'  wills,  and 
it  may  be  said  that  courts  look  upon  them  with  as  much  favor  as 
with  disfavor  upon  the  unwritten  wills  of  others. 

In  the  absence  of  statutory  regulations  on  the  subject,  the  usual 
Conditions  to  conditions  to  nuncupative  wills  are  not  applicable  to  the 
nuncupative       wiHs  of  soldiers  or  mariners  ;  the  single  question 

wills  not  AD™ 

plicabie.  being  whether  the  deceased  comes  within  *  the  class  [*  85] 

of  persons  under  consideration ;  namely,  whether  he  was  a  sol- 
Who  is  a  sol-      dier  ^n  actual  service  or  a  mariner  at  sea.7     It  is  held  on 
dier,  '  this  point  that  the  term  "  soldier"  embraces  every  grade, 

from  the  private  to  the  highest  officer,  and  includes  the  gunner,  the 

1  Mason    v.   Dnnman,    1    Munf.   456,  the  effect  of  establishing  a  nuncupative 

459;    Offutt  v.   Offutt,   3   B.    Mon.    162;  will),  282. 

Boofter  v.  Rogers,  9  Gill,  44,  5.3;  Phoebe  5  1  Redf.  on  Wills,  193,  pi.  18,  citing 

v.  Boggess,  1  (iratt.  129,  142.  Inst.  lib.  2,  tit.   11. 

a  FriersOD  v.  Beall,  7  Ga.  438,  441.  6  Ex  parte   Thompson,  4  Bradf.   154, 

8  Wms.  Ex.  [69].  157.     The  opinion  in  this  ease  contains  a 

«  Dockmn  v.  Robinson,  26  N.  H.  372,  concise  review  of   the    history  of    nun- 

Z%\,et$eq.\   Reese  v.  Hawthorn,  10  Gratt.  cupatory   wills    by   Surrogate   Bradford, 

548,  550;    Hebden's  Will,  20  N.   J.   Eq.  which  may  be  consulted  with   profit  by 

#73   476'   Male's  Case,  49  N.  J.  Eq.  266  those  interested    in   the   question    of  un- 

(denying  that  such  a  document  can  have  written  wills. 

7  Ex  parte  Thompson,  supra,  p.  158. 

88 


§  47  codicils.  *  85,  *  86 

surgeon,  or  the  general ; *  and  the  term  "  mariner  "  applies 

i.  •       4-t,  l  •         f  ,i  or  mariner. 

to  every  person  in  the  naval  service,  from  the  common 
seaman  to  the  captain  or  admiral.2  But  it  does  not  include  mariners, 
though  at  sea,  who  are  so  as  passengers,8  nor  soldiers  in  time  of 
peace,  or  when  not  in  actual  service.4  But  by  actual  service  is  not 
meant  that  he  should  be  engaged  in  or  on  the  eve  of  a  battle ;  if  he 
is  in  the  enemy's  country,  or  under  military  orders,  whether  in  camp 
or  campaign  service,  he  is  in  actual  military  service ; 5  and  so  if  he 
be  at  the  time  in  a  hospital.6 

It  may  be  repeated  here,  that,  in  the  absence  of  statutory  pro- 
visions to  the  contrary,  the  nuncupative  will  of  soldiers  and  mariners 
may  be  proved,  like  wills  of  personalty  at  common  law,  by  one 
witness.7 

§  47.  Codicils.  —  A  codicil  is  some  addition  to  or  qualification  of 
a  last  will.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  origin  of  this  species  of 
testamentary  disposition,  they  have,  in  America,  no  what  is  a 
other  function  or  office,  and  are  governed  by  the  same  cotilcl1- 
rules,  and  must  be  executed  with  the  same  formalities,  as  the  wills 
themselves  of  which  they  form  a  constituent  part.8  It 
[*  86]  is  *  prima  facie  dependent  upon  the  will;  the  destruction  or 
mutilation  of  the  will  is  an  implied  revocation  of  the  codicil.9 

One  of  the  most  important  offices  which  a  codicil  may  perform,  as 
part  of  a  pre-existing  will,  is  the  effect  ascribed  to  it  of  confirming 
or  republishing  such  will.  Being,  in  law,  part  of  a  man's  will, 
whether  so  described  in  the  codicil  or  not,  or  whether  or  not  expressly 

1  Ex  parte   Thompson,  supra,  p.  159,  6  Gould  v.  Safford,  39  Vt.  498,  507. 
citing  In  the  Goods  of  Donaldson,  2  Curt.  7  Goods   of    White,   22   L.   Rep.    110, 
386 ;     Shearman    v.    Pyke,    reported    in  114;    Gould  v.   Safford,  39   Vt.  498 ;  Ex 
Drummond  v.  Parish,   3   Curt.    539;    Re  parte  Thompson,  4  Bradf.   159. 
Prendergast,  5  Notes  of  Cas.  92.  8  "A    codicil,   duly    executed,    is    an 

2  Ex  parte  Thompson,  supra,  citing  addition  or  supplement  to  a  will,  and  is 
Morrell  v.  Morrell,  1  Hagg.  51  ;  In  the  no  revocation  thereof  except  in  the  pre- 
Goods  of  Hayes,  2  Curt.  338.  Including  cise  degree  in  which  it  is  inconsistent 
a  cook  :  4  Bradf.  159.  therewith,  unless  there  be  words  of  revo- 

3  Warren  v.  Harding,  2  R.  I.  133,  138 ;  cation.  And  it  is  an  established  prima 
a  mariner  is  "  at  sea  "  on  a  coasting  vessel,  facie  rule  of  construction,  that  an  addi- 
though  anchored  in  an  arm  of  the  sea  tional  legacy  given  by  a  codicil  is  attended 
where  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows:  Hubbard  with  the  same  incidents  and  qualities  as 
i'.  Hubbard,  8  N.  Y.  196,  199  ;  but  not  on  the  original  legacy.  Upon  the  same 
the  Mississippi  River:  Gwin's  Will,  1  principle,  a  devise  upon  condition  that 
Tuck.  44.  the   devisee   shall   comply   with   what   is 

4  Leathers  v.  Greenacre,  53  Me.  561,  enjoined  upon  him  by  the  will  must  be 
571,  citing  Drummond  v.  Parish,  3  Curt,  construed,  prima  facie,  to  he  upon  condi- 
522;  White  v.  Repton,  3  Curt.  818;  In  tion  that  the  devisee  shall  also  comply 
the  Goods  of  Hill,  1  Robertson,  276.  And  with  what  may  be  enjoined  upon  him  by 
see  Smith's  Will,  6  Phila.  104,  holding  any  codicil"  :Tilden  v.  Tilden,  13  Gray, 
that  a  soldier  at  home  on  furlough  is  not  103,  108.  Thompson  v.  Churchill,  60  Vt. 
within  the  statute.  371  ;  see,  as  to  cumulative  and  substituted 

5  Van  Deuzer  v.  Gordon,  39  Vt.  Ill,  legacies,  post,  §445,  p.  *972. 

119.  9  Wms.  Ex.  [154]  and  authorities. 

89 


*  86,  *  87        FORM,    EXECUTION,   AND    ATTESfATlON    OF   WILLS. 


§47 


Effect  of 
codicil. 


confirmatory  of  it,  it  furnishes  conclusive  evidence  of 
the  testator's  considering  his  will  as  then  existing,1 
whether  cancelled  by  obliteration  (if  it  continues  to  be  legible)  or 
otherwise.2  And  for  the  same  reason  it  operates  to  establish  a  will 
which  would  be  void  for  want  of  compliance  with  the  law  regulating 
its  execution  and  attestation,8  because  the  codicil,  speaking  and  oper- 
ating from  the  time  of  its  execution,  brings  the  will  to  it  and  makes 
it  a  will  from  the  date  of  the  codicil.4  The  codicil,  to  have  such 
N  d  n  t  b  effect,  must  self-evidently  refer  to  the  will  with  suffi- 
attached  to  cient  certainty  to  identify  it ; 5  but  it  is  not  essential 
that  the  two  papers  be  annexed  together,  or  that  the 
codicil  be  written  on  the  same  paper  or  parchment  with  the  will.6 
But  if  there  are  several  wills  of  different  dates,  the  circumstance  of 
annexation  is  powerful  to  show  that  it  was  intended  as  a  codicil  to 
the  will  to  which  it  is  annexed,  and  to  no  other.7  If  not  annexed 
to  any  will,  the  codicil,  where  no  express  date  is  mentioned,  refers 
to  the  will  latest  in  date ;  if  there  is,  to  that  of  the  date  expressed.8 

The   presumptions    pointed   out   yield,    of   course,   to   any 
express  *or  plainly  inferable  intention   of  the   testator.     A   [  *  87] 
codicil  does  not  republish  any  part  of  a  will  which  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  codicil,9  but   necessarily  revokes  it;10  nor   does  it 
necessarily  operate  as  if  the  will  had  originally  been  made  at  the 
date  of  the  codicil.11 


1  Wms.  Ex.  [212],  with  numerous 
English  authorities. 

2  A  will  revoked  by  a  later  will  may 
be  republished  by  a  codicil  executed  with 
the  ceremonies  required  by  the  statute  : 
Buffin,  C.  J.,  in  Love  v.  Johnston,  12  Ired. 
L.  355,  362 ;  Jones  v.  Hartley,  2  Whart. 
103,  110,  citing  Havard  v.  Davis,  2  Binn. 
406,  414,  418  ;  Brown  v.  Clark,  77  N.  Y. 
369,  374. 

3  Bose  t>.  Drayton,  4  Bich.  Eq.  260 ; 
Burge  v.  Hamilton,  72  Ga.  568,  622,  626  ; 
Mc<  tardy  >:  Neall,42  N.  J.  Eq.  333,  336  ; 
Murfield's  Estate,  74  Iowa,  479  ;  Barney 
v.  Hayes,  1 1  Mont.  99,  106. 

4  Murrav  v.  Oliver,  6  Tred.  Eq.  55 ; 
Stover  v.  Kendall,  1  Coldw.  557,  560; 
Payne  v.  Payne,  18  Cal.  291,302;  In  re 
Ladd,  91  Cal.  670;  Jones  v.  Shewmaker, 
35  Ga.  151,  156,  approved  in  Barge  '-. 
Hamilton,  7'2  Ga.  568;  Haven  ;;.  Foster, 
14  Pick.  534,  540;  York  v.  Walker,  12 
Mccs.  &  W.  591,599;  Cliett  ".  Oliett,  1 
Tex.  Unrep.  Cm.  408,  417,  et  seq.;  Can- 
fleld  v.  Crandall,  >  Dem.  Ill,  119. 

i  tterton  v.  Robins,  l  Ad.  &  El.  423, 

427. 


6  Harvey  v.  Chouteau,  14  Mo.  587, 
595,  citing  numerous  English  aud  Amer- 
ican authorities ;  Pope  v.  Pope,  95  Ga.  87. 

7  Bogers  v.  Pittis,  1  Add.  30,  41. 

8  Crosbie  v.  McDoual,  4  Ves.  610,  615. 

9  Per  Gould,  J.,  in  Simmons  r.  Sim- 
mons, 26  Barb.  68,  75 :  "  Between  a  codi- 
cil and  a  subsequent  will  there  is  this 
difference  of  construction  :  a  codicil  is  a 
republication  and  ratification  of  so  much 
of  the  prior  will  as  it  does  not  revoke ; 
whereas  a  new  will  (if  it  provides  for  a 
full  disposition  of  all  the  testator's  estate), 
though  inconsistent  but  in  }>art  with  the 
former  will,  and  absolutely  agreeing  in 
part,  revokes  the  whole  of  the  prior  will, 
by  substituting  a  new  and  last  disposition 
for  the  former  one."  Brant  v.  Willson,  8 
Cow.  56,  57  ;  Larrabee  v.  Larrabee,  28  Vt. 
'_>74,  278;  Neff's  Appeal,  48  Pa.  St.  501, 
507  ;  Jones  v.  Jones,  2  Dev.  Eq.  387,  390. 

"  Suovvliill  u.Snowhill,  23  N.  J.  L.447, 
454.     See  cases  post,  §  50,  p.  *96,  note  9. 

11  Per  Lord  Chancellor  Campbell  in 
Ilopwood  v.  Hop  wood,  7  II.  L.  ('as.  728, 
740;  Kendall  v.  Kendall,  5  Munf.  272, 
275;  Appeal  of  Carl,  106  Pa.  St.  635. 


90 


■§  48        REVOCATION  BY  CANCELLING,  OBLITERATING,  ETC.        *  88,  *  89 


[*88]  *  CHAPTER  VI. 

OP   THE   REVOCATION   OF   WILLS. 

§  48.    Revocation  by  Cancelling,  Obliterating,  Burning,  etc.  —  The 
power  to  revoke  a  will  is  seli'-evidently  coextensive  with  the  power 
to  make  one.     It  follows  from  the  ambulatory  quality  of   A  valid  ]ater 
the  instrument  that  a  later  will  supplants  a  former  one    revokes  a 
precisely  to  the  extent  to  which  the  later  is  iuconsistent    ormer  W1 
with  the  former.     It  is  always  the  last  will  and  testament  which  is 
valid. 

But  revocation  may  be  effected  by  other  means,  if  the  testator  do 
not  wish  a  mere  alteration  or  change  in  the  shape  of  his  testamentary 
disposition,  but  an  entire  revocation,  leaving  it  to  the    Revocation 
law  to  regulate  the  descent  of  his  property.     In  such    ^o^de*" 
case  the  revocation  is  accomplished  by  the  cancellation    struction. 
or  destruction  of  the  will,  without  more. 

Kevocation  also  follows,  by  operation  of  law,  from  any  subsequent 
act  of  the  testator  inconsistent  with  the  devise  or  bequest,  or  from 
changes  in  the  family  relations  of  the  testator  arising  By  operation 
after  the  execution  of  the  will,  unless  by  some  act  of  of  law. 
the  testator  or  provision  in  the  original  will  the  presumption  of  law 
is  rebutted.  Hence  the  subject  of  revocation  of  wills,  whether  by 
act  of  the  testator  himself  or  by  operation  of  law,  is  the  occasion  of 
many  statutory  enactments  and  legal  rules,  and  occupies  much  space 
in  the  books  treating  of  wills. 

The  statutory  enactments  in  most  States  follow  the  language,  or 
Te-enact  the  substance,  of  the  English  Statute  of  Frauds  in  respect  of 
the  revocation  of  wills  by  act  of  the  testator,  which  statutory 
provides  that  "  no  devise  in  writing  of  any  lands,  tene-  provisions, 
ments,  or  hereditaments,  nor  any  clause  thereof,  shall  be  revocable 
otherwise  than  by  some  other  will  or  codicil  in  writing,  or  other 
writing  declaring  the  same,  or  by  burning,  cancelling,  tearing,  or 
obliterating  the  same  by  the  testator  himself,  or  in  his  presence  and 
by  his  direction  or  consent, "  etc.1  But  the  testator  may,  by  his  will, 
confer  upon  another  the  power  to  change  or  cancel  any  gift  or  devise 
made  therein  ;  and  the  exercise  of  such  power  of  appointment  is  not 

a  revocation  within  the  meaning  of  such  statute.2 
£*  89]      *  To  effect  a  revocation  by  cancelling,  burning,  etc.,  it  must,  of 
course,  be  done  with  the  intention  and  for  the  purpose  of  revok- 

»  29  Car.  II.  c.  3,  §  6.  2  Dudley  v.  Weinhart,  93  Ky.  401. 

91 


*89 


REVOCATION    OF    WILLS. 


§48 


,T  insr.     This  is  so  expressed  in  the  statutes  of  most  States 

.No  revoca-  *"o  * 

tiou  by  testa-  authorizing  a  revocation  in  this  method.  If,  therefore, 
intention"!)  the  act  of  destruction  was  not  committed  animo  revocandif 
revoke.  but  by  accident,1  mistake,2  during  a  fit  of  insanity,3  or 

where  the  destruction  is  the  effect  of  handling  or  wear,4  it  is  not  the 
testator's  act,-  and  does  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  will  destroyed, 
if  its  contents  can  be  ascertained.5  For  the  same  reason,  a  revoca- 
tion obtained  by  undue  influence  on  the  mind  of  the  testator  is 
inoperative,  and  leaves  the  will  in  full  force.6  Nor  is  the  intention, 
Nor  bv  mere  purpose,  or  desire  to  revoke  an  existing  will  of  any 
intention,  effect  on  its  validity,  unless  the  desire  is  carried  into 

act  oTrevo-  effect  by  some  act  (hone,  recognized  in  law  as  a  sufficient 
cation.  indication  of  the  testator's  will.7 

It  was  held  in  a  New  York  case  that  there  was  no  revocation, 
although  a  devisee  killed  the  testator  in  order  to  pre- 
vent it,  and  that  such  devisee  took  under  the  will ; 8  but 
the  Court  of  Appeals  reversed  this  decision,  holding  that 
the  beneficiary,  by  reason  of  his  crime,  was  barred  of  all 
interest  in  the  estate  of  the  testator.9     In  a  subsequent  case  the 


Effect  of  kill- 
ing a  testator 
to  prevent 
revocation  of 
a  will. 


1  Burtonshaw  v.  Gilbert,  1  Cowp.  49, 
52  ;  Giles  v.  Warren,  L.  11.  2  P.  &  D.  401. 

2  Burns  v.  Burns,  4  Serg.  &  R.  295. 

3  An  insane  person  can  have  no  ani- 
mus revocandi:  Lang's  Estate,  65  Cal.  19  ; 
Smith  v.  Wait,  4  Barb.  28,  30 ;  Ford  v. 
Ford,  7  Humph.  92,  102  ;  Forman's  Will, 
54  Barb.  274,  298 ;  Forbing  v.  Weber,  99 
lnd.  588.     And  see  post,  §  221. 

4  1  Redf.  on  Wills,  314,  pi.  21,  citing 
Bigge  i>.  Bigge,  3  Notes  of  Cas.  601,  603; 
Clarke  v.  Scipps,  2  Rob.  563. 

5  As  to  the  proof  necessary  to  establish 
a  lost  will,  see  jiost,  §  221,  and  cases  there 
cited. 

6  Rich  v.  Gilkey,  73  Me.  595,  601  ; 
Voorhees  v.  Voorhees,  39  N.  Y.  463. 

'  Runkle  v.  Gates,  11  lnd.  95,  99; 
dark  v.  Smith,  34  Barb.  140,  142,  et  seq. ; 
Gains  v.  (Jains,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  190; 
Means  v.  Moore,  3  McC.  282,  286 ;  Hoitt 
r.  Hoitt,  63  X.  II.  475,  49.");  Wright  v. 
Wright,  5  lnd.  389;  Delafield  ©.Parish, 
25  X-  V.  9,  21  ;  Boyd  v.  Cook,  3  Leigh, 
82;  Blanchard  v.  Blanchard,  32  Vt.  62, 
64;  Ilise  v.  Fincher,  10  Ire.l.  L.  139; 
Mundy  v.  Mundy,  i.r>  N.  J.  Eq.  290; 
Woodflll  v.  Pattern,  76  lnd.  575,  579. 
Hence  i1  is  Dot  a  sufficient  revocation 
for  the  testator  to  write  upon  the  will 
"I  revoke  this  will,"  and  signing  his 
name  thereto  with  the  date,  unless  such 

92 


writing  is  also  attested  by  witnesses,  as 
required  for  the  execution  of  wills  :  Will 
of  Ladd,  60  Wis.  187.  And  where  a  tes- 
tatrix was  about  to  burn  a  will  contained  in 
an  envelope,  intending  to  revoke  it,  but  a 
third  person  fraudulently  and  unknown  to 
the  testatrix  removed  the  will  before  the 
burning  of  the  envelope,  leaving  the  tes- 
tatrix to  believe  that  the  will  had  been 
destroyed,  it  was  held  that  there  had 
been  no  revocation,  and  the  will  was  pro- 
bated:  Graham  v.  Burch,  47  Minn.  171, 
174,  citing  authorities  to  the  effect  that 
revocation  does  not  take  place,  although 
the  formal  act  is  defeated  by  fraudulent 
devices.  The  cancelling  of  two  parts  of 
a  triplicate  will  is,  however,  a  revocation 
of  the  whole  will :  Biggs  v.  Angus,  3 
Dem.  93;  and  the  destruction,  animo  revo- 
candi, of  one  of  the  two  originals  of  a  will 
executed  in  duplicate,  there  being  no  proof 
that  the  other  was  in  the  possession  of  the 
maker,  destroys  the  whole  will  :  Asinari 
v.  Bangs,  3  Dem.  385.  See  also  Snider  v. 
Brooks,  84  Ala.  53,  58  (referred  to  infra, 
pp.  *  91-92,  §48),  as  to  the  presumptions 
arising  in  ease  of  destruction  of  one  of 
several    duplicates. 

8  Preston  v.  Palmer,  42  Hun,  368. 
'■'  Riggs  v.  Palmer,  115  X.  Y.  506,  JJ 
Gray  and  Danforth  dissenting. 


§  48  REVOCATION  BY  CANCELLING,  OBLITERATING,  ETC.    *  89,  *  90 


court  points  out  that  the  gift  to  the  guilty  beneficiary  is  not  void 
per  se,  by  reason  of  his  crime,  but  that  the  will  is  valid,  and  the 
remedy  is  equitable  and  injunctive  to  prevent  him  from  claiming  the 
fruit  of  his  crime.1 

Cancellation  by  the  testator  raises  the   presumption    Cancellation 
that  the  act  was  animo  revocandi* which  may,  however,    ^"Pj 

be  rebutted  by  proof  of  circumstances  inconsistent   to  revoke. 
[*  90]  with  *  such  intention,3  and  the  declarations  of  the    Declarations 
testator  at  any  time  after  the  making  of  the  will   ~™^e°^ 
are  competent  for  this  purpose.4     But  where  the  statute    ceiiation. 
provides  the  manner  in  which  a  will  may  be  revoked,    But  not  to 
that  manner  must  be  pursued; 5  and  the  drawing  of  a  line    ^tutory"6  a 
over  the  signature,  neither  obliterating  it  nor  rendering    provision, 
it  illegible,  has  been  held  not  to  constitute  a  destruction  of  the  will 
under  a  statute  authorizing  a  revocation  by  cancelling,  the  cancellation 
being  witnessed  in  the  same  manner  as  the  making  of  a  new  will,6 
and  in  such  case  the  declarations  of  the  testator  are  not  admissible  to 
prove  a  revocation.7 

So  the  cancellation  of  a  will,  or  of  part  of  a  will,  made  with  the  in- 


1  Ellerson  v.  Wescott,  148  N.  Y.  149. 
The  better  reason  seems  to  be  with  the 
original  decision  by  the  lower  court;  for 
by  whatever  theory  the  will  is  rendered 
inoperative,  the  fact  remains  that  the 
testator  has  not  revoked  it,  and  that  the 
court  have  substituted  their  own  will  for 
that  of  the  testator.  A  similar  case  was 
decided  by  Surrogate  Bradford,  in  which 
he  held  that  where  a  testator  was  pre- 
vented from  adding  a  codicil  to  his  will 
by  the  refusal  of  the  principal  beneficiary 
therein,  who  had  it  in  his  custody,  to  pro- 
duce it  at  the  testator's  request,  for  the 
purpose  of  alteration,  such  will  was  not 
thereby  rendered  invalid :  Leaycraft  v. 
Simmons,  3  Bradf.  35.  The  surrogate 
put  his  decision  upon  the  ground  that  the 
mere  intention  to  revoke,  however  well 
authenticated,  or  by  whatever  means  de- 
feated, is  not  sufficient.  The  intention,  to 
be  effectual,  must  be  actually  carried  into 
execution.  This  case  was  cited  and  com- 
mended by  Gray,  J.,  dissenting  in  the  case 
of  Puggs  v.  Palmer,  supra,  and  remarking 
that  Surrogate  Bradford's  opinions  are  en- 
titled to  the  highest  consideration.  To 
same  effect :  Gains  v.  Gains,  2  A.  K. 
Marsh.  190.  See  the  reasoning  and  au- 
thorities cited  on  the  cognate  point  of 
descent  to  an  heir  who  murdered  the  an- 


cestor with  the  view  of  possessing  himself 
of  the  estate,  post,  §  64. 

2  Smock  v.  Smock,  11  N.  J.  Eq.  156, 
citing  numerous  English  authorities. 

3  Goods  of  Colberg,  2  Curt.  832 ; 
Perkes  v.  Perkes,  3  B.  &  Al.  489  ;  Idley 
v.  Bowen,  11  Wend.  227,  236;  Wolf  v. 
Bolinger,  62  111.  368,  372. 

4  Patterson  v.  Hickey,  32  Ga.  156, 
160;  Lawyer  v.  Smith,  8  Mich.  411,  423  ; 
Collagan  v.  Burns,  57  Me.  449, 458,  et  seq. ; 
Tynan  v.  Paschall,  27  Tex.  286,  300; 
Johnson's  Will,  40  Conn.  587  ;  Youndt  v. 
Youndt,  3  Grant's  Cas.  140;  Law  v.  Law, 
83  Ala.  432,  434,  holding  such  evidence 
admissible  to  show  a  revocation  of  the 
whole,  but  not  of  a  part  of  the  will,  and 
commenting  on  the  difference  between  the 
Alabama  and  the  English  statute. 

6  Gay  v.  Gay,  60  Iowa,  415,  citing 
Wright  v.  Wright,  5  Ind.  391  ;  Runkle 
v.  Gates,  11  Ind.  95  ;  Blanchard  v.  Blan- 
chard,  32  Vt.  62 ;  Gains  v.  Gains,  2  A.  K. 
Marsh.  190. 

G  Gay  v.  Gay,  supra,  citing  English 
authorities.  The  destruction  or  cancella- 
tion of  any  essential  formal  part  of  the 
will  is  usually,  however,  held  to  operate  a 
total  revocation  of  the  will :  see  next 
section  and  authorities  cited  there. 

7  lb.,  citing  Jackson  v.  Kniffen,  2 
Johns.  31,  and  other  authorities. 

93 


*  90,  *  91 


REVOCATION   OP   WILLS. 


§48 


Cancellation 
as  a  step 
toward  a  new 
will  which 
fails,  deemed 
no  revocation, 


tention  to  execute  a  new  will  (as  a  step  in  the  process 
of  effecting  a  change  in  the  testamentary  disposition 
already  made),  will  not  be  deemed  a  revocation,  if  the 
purpose  of  the  testator  fails.1  This  principle  is  stated  by 
Williams  to  have  resulted  in  "  the  doctrine  of  dependent 
relative  revocations,  in  which  the  act  of  cancelling,  etc.,  being  done 
D       ,  with  reference  to  another  act,  meant  to  be  an  effectual 

relative  disposition,  will  be  a  revocation  or  not,  according  as  the 

revocation.         relative  act  be  efficacious  or  not."  2     It  has  been 
extended  to  include,  as  inoperative,  *  cancellations  made  under  [*  91] 
Applied  to         the  influence  of  a  mistake  in  point  of  law,  as  well 
cancellation       as  in  point  of  a  fact.8    This  seems  to  carry  the  doctrine  as 
take  of  law        far  as  the  most  lenient  indulgence  and  anxious  solicitude 
or  fact.  to  gjve  effect;  to  t^  intention  of  testators,  unlearned  in 

the  law  or  misled  as  to  facts,  can  safely  permit.  It  is  obvious  that 
to  ignore  a  plain  act  of  cancellation  upon  the  ground  that  the  testator 
•coupled  it  with  an  intention  to  make  some  other  will,  is  to  destroy 
the  testator's  right  and  to  ignore  his  will ;  for  it  is  none  the  less  his 
will  to  undo  what  he  has  done  in  a  former  will,  because  he  con- 
templates giving  a  different  effect,  by  some  later  action,  to  the  direct 
consequence  of  a  simple  revocation.  If  a  testator,  for  instance,  com- 
ing to  the  conclusion  that  the  legatee  in  his  will  is  undeserving  of 
his  bounty,  contemplates  the  substitution  of  some  other  person  as 
legatee,  but  cancels  his  will  before  determining  who  such  person 
shall  be,  it  would  not  only  be  making  a  will  for  the  testator,  if  the 
■cancellation  were  held  inoperative,  but  to  make  such  a  will  contrary 
to  the  expressed  intention  of  the  testator.  The  testator,  by  his  act 
of  cancellation,  has  substituted  the  heir  at  law,  or  it  may  be  a  resid- 
uary legatee,  for  the  legatee  whose  legacy  he  has  cancelled ;  but  if 


i  "It  is  fairly  inferable,  where  the 
act  of  cancellation  is  associated  with  an- 
other upon  which  it  is  dependent,  and 
which  fails  of  effect,  the  prima  fade  pre- 
sumption of  an  intent  to  revoke  is  re- 
butted, and  another  presumption  arises, 
'that  the  cancellation  or  obliteration 
would  not  have  been  done,  but  in  sub- 
serviency to  the  different  testamentary 
disposition,  which  has  failed'":  per 
Smith,  C.  J.,  in  Hairston  v.  Hairston,  30 
Miss.  276,  305;  Onions  v.  Tyrer,  2  Vern. 
741  ;  Hyde  v.  Hyde,  1  Eq.  Cas.  Ahr.  409; 
Johnson  v.  Braflsford,  2  Nott  &  McC. 
272,  270;  Pringle  v.  McPhereon,  2  Brev. 
279,  289  ;  Woll  v.  Bollinger,  02  111.  368, 
373  ;  Wilbonrn  V.  Shell,  59  Miss.  205, 
207;  Williams,  C.  J., in  Jbnser.  Forman, 

B  Bush,  387,  345;    Dower   V.   Siids,  28  W, 
Va.    113,   138.     So,  also,  it   is  held  that  a 
94 


legacy  or  devise  which  is  declared  to  be 
revoked  on  the  expressed  ground  of  the 
existence  of  a  state  of  facts,  when  in  reality 
the  testator  is  mistaken  and  these  facts  do 
not  exist,  and  when  it  appears  that  the 
legacy  or  devise  would  not  have  been 
revoked  but  for  such  mistake  of  fact ;  in 
such  case  the  revocation  is  held  conditioned 
on  the  truth  of  such  facts  and  is  inopera- 
tive :  see  on  this  point  post,  §  51,  p.  *  96. 

2  Wms.  Ex  [148],  with  English  and 
American  authorities  by  Perkins;  and 
see  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,*  135, and  Bigelow's 
note  (3)  with  numerous  American  cases; 
also  Goods  of  Thornton,  L.  It.  14  Prob. 
I).  82. 

8  Perrott  v.  Perrott,  14  East,  423,  438, 
et  seq. ;  and  see  cases  cited  in  Wms.  on 
Ex.  [153],  note  R. 


§  48       REVOCATION    BY    CANCELLING,   OBLITERATING,   ETC.      *  91,  *  92 

the  cancellation  is  inoperative,  the  legacy  will  go  to  the  very  person 
to   whom   the   testator   intends   it   not    to    go.     Hence    gut  not  jn 
American  courts  will  not  refuse  to  give  effect  to  can-   America, 
cellations  made  with  the  intention  of  making  some  other   0f  cancellation 
will,  provision,  or  codicil,  where  the  cancellation  con-    is  complete, 
stitutes  a  complete  act  by  itself.1 

The  presumption  of  destruction  animo  revocandi  arises  also  when 
a  will,  which  has  been  traced  to  the  testator's  posses-  will  not  found 
sion,  cannot  be  found  after  his  death  or  is  found  torn ;    *fter,  testator's 

...  .  ,  .  ,  .  death  pre- 

but  this  presumption  may  be  rebutted  by  evidence  show-  sumed  to  be 
ing  a  contrary  or  different  purpose.2  But  if  the  will  was  revoked- 
shown  to  be  out  of  the  testator's  possession,  the  party  asserting  the 
fact  of  revocation  must  show  that  it  came  again  into  his  custody,  or 
was  actually  destroyed  by  his  direction.  If  the  will  is  executed  in 
duplicate,  the  testator  destroying  the  only  one  of  the  duplicates 
in  his  possession,  a  presumption  of  destruction  animo  revocandi 
arises,  but  is  weakened  if  both  were  in  his  possession  and  only  one 

destroyed.8 
[*  92]       *  The  destruction  of  a  will  by  a  person  other  than  the  testa- 
tor, without  his  knowledge  and  direction,  does    Destruction  or 
not,  of  course,  affect  the  legal  validity  of  such  instru-    othe^oTno^ 
ment,  a  fortiori,  if  the  destruction  took  place  after  his    effect 
decease ; 4  but  this  can  be  true  only  if  the  will  can  be  established  in 
its  original  form.     If,  for  instance,  a  legacy  be  oblit-    jf  jts  0ri°-iaal 
erated  by  a  strauger,  or  inserted  by  interlineation,  or   provisions  can 
changed  iu  effect  or  amount,  and  the  original  legacy  be     e  prove 
known,  it  may  be  proved  as  it  originally  stood.     If  made  by  the 
legatee  himself,  it  will  avoid  the  legacy  so  altered,  but  it  cannot  de- 
stroy other  bequests,  either  to  such  legatee  or  other  persons.6     It  is 

1  Townsend  v.  Howard,  86  Me.  385;  tist  Church  v.  Robbarts,  2  Pa.  St.  110; 
Banks  v.  Banks,  65  Mo.  432,  434  ;  Foster's  Appeal,  87  Pa.  St.  67,  75 ;  Scog- 
Bohanou  v.  Walcot,  1  How.  (Miss.)  336,  gins  v.  Turner,  98  N.  C.  135;  Hamersley 
339  ;  Semmes  v.  Semmes,  7  Har.  &  J.  v.  Lockman,  2  Dem.  524,  533 ;  Jaques  v. 
388,  390,  distinguishing  between  the  Horton,  76  Ala.  238,  245 ;  Bauskett  ?;. 
cancellation  of  a  will  under  the  mis-  Keitt,  22  S.  C.  187;  Collyer  v.  Collyer, 
taken   supposition  that  the  testator    had  110  N.  Y.  481. 

made   another  valid   will,  and  a   deliber-  3  Snider   v.   Brooks,   84   Ala.    53,   58. 

ate  cancellation  without    mistake   or    ac-  See  also  supra,  p.  *  89,  note  7,  as  to  the 

cident,  but  with  the  intention  of  making  destruction  of  duplicates. 
a   new   will:    Hairston    v.    Hairston,    30  *  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *  130,  citing  Haines 

Miss.   276.  „    Haines,  2  Vern.  441  ;    the   destruction 

2  Post,  %  221  ;  Minor  v.  Guthrie,  4  S.  W.  in  this  case  consisted  in  tearing  the  will 
R.  (Ky.)  179  ;  Minkler  v.  Minkler,  14  Vt.  into  small  pieces,  which  were  picked  up 
125,  127;  Beaumont  v.  Keim,  50  Mo.  28,  and  sewed  together  again. 

29  ;  Appling  v.  Eades,  1  Gratt.  286  ;  Hoi-  6  "  The  object  is  to  carry  the  will  into 

land  v.  Ferris,  2  Bradf.  334  ;  Weeks  v.  effect,  and  not  merely  to  attend  to  the 
McBeth,  14  Ala.  474  ;  Dawson  v.  Smith,  merits  or  demerits  of  those  who  claim 
3  Houst.  335,341  ;  Legare  v.  Ashe,  1  Bay,  under  it.  If  any  alteration  in  a  will 
464 ;  Clark's  Will,  Tuck.  445,  452 ;  Bap-     would  avoid  it,  the  executor  before  pro 

95 


REVOCATION   OF   WILLS.  §  49 

Proof  of  testa-  enacted  by  the  statutes  of  some  States,  that  revocation, 
tor's  direction  where  it  is  done  by  the  burning,  tearing,  etc.,  of  the  will 
or  burned,  etc.,  by  other  persons  in  the  presence  of  the  testator  and  by 
by  others.  j^g  direction,  must  be  proved  by  at  least  two  witnesses; * 

where  there  is  no  statutory  provision  to  such  effect,  it  must  clearly 
appear  in  evidence  that  the  act  of  cancellation,  if  done  by  a  person 
other  than  the  testator,  was  in  his  presence,  and  by  his  direction.2 

It  is  not  essential,  however,  that  the  destruction,  obliteration,  or 
cancellation  be  entire  or  complete  ;  if  it  be  as  complete  as  was  in  the 
Cancellation  power  of  the  testator,  it  is  sufficient  to  operate  as  a 
sufficient  to  revocation.3  Where  a  testator  directs  the  destruction 
of  his  will,  and  delivers  it  to  some  person  for  this 
purpose,  who  fraudulently  preserves  it,  the  fraud  may  be 
*  proved  by  parol ;  and  if  the  revocation  by  parol  be  autho-  [*  93] 
rized  by  the  law,  this  will  constitute  a  revocation.4 

§  49.  Partial  Revocation  by  Cancelling,  Obliterating,  etc.  —  A  will 
may  be  revoked  in  part  by  cancelling  or  obliterating  a  portion  thereof, 
„        ..      t     leaving  the  unobliterated  portions  in  force.6    Even  where 

Revocation  of  °  r 

a  part  by  ob-  a  portion  of  the  will  is  cut  out  of  it,  with  the  intention 
hteration.  Q^  annu]ijng  such  par£  only,  the  remainder,  if  enough  is 
left  to  constitute  an  intelligible  disposition,  is  a  valid  will.6  In  some 
States,  however,  a  different  rule  is  established  by  statute.7  Thus  it 
is  held  in  Alabama 8  that  a  will  cannot  be  partially  revoked,  by  a  can- 
bate  might,  by  such  alteration,  destroy  enough  that  the  failure  to  do  so  is  attribut- 
the  rights  of  all  third  persons,  which  able  to  the  fraud  of  interested  parties  :  see 
would  be  in  the  highest  degree  unreason-  authorities,  supra,  p.  *  89,  note  7. 
able  "  :  Smith  v.  Fenner,  1  Gall.  C.  C.  5  Kirkpatrick's  Will,  22  N.  J.  Eq.  463, 
170,  175.  See  also  Malin  v.  Malin,  1  465,  citing  numerous  English  authorities ; 
Wend.  625,  659;  Jackson  v.  Malin,  15  Cogbill  v.  Cogbill,  2  Hen.  &  Munf.  467, 
Johns.  293,  297;  Doane  v.  Hadlock,  42  507;  Bigelow  v.  Gillott,  123  Mass.  102, 
Me.  72,  76.  The  case  In  re  Wilson,  8  106  ;  Townshend  v.  Howard,  86  Me.  282, 
Wis.  171,  179,  apparently  contradicting  and  cases  cited;  Varnon  v.  Varnon,  67 
this  doctrine,  by  avoiding  a  will  in  Mo  Mo.  App.  534 ;  McPherson  v.  Clark, 
because  it  was  altered  by  the  legatee,  3  Bradf.  92,97,  reviewing  numerous  cases, 
will  upon  examination  he  found  to  rest  on  but  overruled  in  Lovell  v.  Quitman,  88 
agreement  of  counsel,  because  this  point  N.  Y.  377,  holding  that  cancellation  is  not 
was  not  material  in  their  case.  Com-  valid  unless  executed  and  attested  anew ; 
pare  the  remarks  of  Cole,  J.,  p.  179,  with  Bockes,  J.,  dissenting  in  Lovell  v.  Quit- 
t  hose  of  the  judge  at  nisi  prim,  p.  177.  man,    25    Hun,    537,539;    Chinmark'a 

i  So  in  Alabama,  Arkansas,  California,  Estate,  Myr.  128,  129.     But  it  must  be  a 

Iowa,  and  New  York.  cancellation  only  ;  if  it  works  an  alteration 

2  Clingan    v.    Mitcheltree,   31    Ta.  St.  either  by  an   attempted  addition  or  sub- 

25,33.    See  Dower  v.  Seeds,  28  W.  Va.  stitution  of  any  other  clause  the  attempted 

j]3   ]3R  revocation    or   change   is   invalid:  Miles' 

■  Sweet  W.  Sweet,  I  Redf.  451,  454.  Appeal,  68  Conn.   '237,   and    cases   there 

*  Card  >:  Grinman,  5  Conn.  104,168;  cited. 

Smiley  >•  Gambill,  2  Head.  164  ;  Pryor  v.  °  Brown's  Will,  l  B.  Mon.  56,  57. 

Coggin,17Ga    144,448;   W"hite v.  Casten,  7  See    infra,     referring     to     English 

1  Jones  L.   198;  hut   the  statutory   pro-  statute. 

visions  inn-!    be  complied   withj  it  is  not  8  See  Code,  1896,  §  4265. 
96 


§  49  PARTIAL   REVOCATION    BY   CANCELLING,   ETC.        *  93,  *  94 

cellation  of  the  name  of  one  or  more  legatees,  without  codicil,  or  new 
signing  and  attestation.1     So  in  New  York  there  can  be  no  partial 
revocation  by  cancellation  ; "  nor,  it  seems,  in  Ohio.8    In- 
terlineations do  not  affect  the  validity  of  a  will,  whether 
they  be  established  by  new  publication  and  attestation  or  not ; 4  but 
with  respect  to  partial  obliterations,  if  made  with  the    Dependent 
intention   of   substituting   other  words    for   those   can-    relative  can- 
celled, and  such  intention  is  frustrated,   the  same  rule 
holds  good  that  is  applied  to  cancellations  with  the  intention  of 
making  a  new  will.5     Such  cancellations  are  held  to  constitute  no 
revocation.6 

The  effect  of  alterations  in  pencil  or  ink,  respectively,  has  been 
mentioned  heretofore.7 

It  is  obvious,  however,  that  the  obliteration,  cancellation,  or  de- 
struction of  any  essential  formal  part  of  a  will,  without  which  such 
will  would  be  inoperative,  constitutes  a  revocation  of  the    „ 

..,  ...  .  .  Cancellation  of 

whole  will ;  such  act  is  inconsistent  with  any  other   an  essential 
[*94]  intention  than  that  of  destroying  the  *  validity  of   fo™  "^J"* 

the  instrument  in  its  entirety.8  So  the  tearing  of 
a  seal  from  a  will,  although  a  seal  is  not  essential  to  its  validity,  is 
deemed  a  revocation,  because  the  testator,  deeming  it  essential,  indi- 
cated his  intention  of  destroying  the  will  by  tearing  off  the  seal.9 
And  where  the  signature  is  cut  out  of  a  will  animo  revocandl,  pasting 
it  into  its  former  place  will  not  revive  the  will.10  But  under  the  Iowa 
statute,  drawing  a  scroll  over  the  signature  so  as  not  to  obliterate  it 
nor  render  it  illegible  was  held  not  to  constitute  a  revocation,  unless 
the  cancellation  is  witnessed  in  the  same  manner  as  a  new  will.11 

Since  all  interlineations  and  additions  to  a  will  not  contained  in  it 
at  the  time  of  execution  and  attestation  depend  for  their  validity 
upon  being  themselves  published  and  attested,12  it  is  important  to  as- 

1  Law  v.  Law,  83  Ala.  432,  holding  Smith,  4  East,  419;  Jackson  v.  Holloway, 
the  declarations  of  the  testator  competent  7  Johns.  394,  398 ;  Bethell  v.  Moore,  2 
to  show  that  he  intended  the  cancellation  Dev.  &  B.  L.  31 1,  316  ;  Varnon  v.  Varnon, 
to  revoke  the  whole  will,  but  inoperative  67  Mo.  App.  534. 

for  any  purpose  if  showing  an  intention  7  §  38,  p.  *  62. 

to  partially  revoke.  s  Evans's  Appeal,  58  Pa.  St.  238,  244 

2  Lovell  v.  Quitman,  88  N.  T.  377,  381,  Semmes  v.  Semmes,  7  Har.  &  J.  388,  390 
overruling  McPherson  v.  Clark,  3  Bradf.  Woodfill  v.  Patton,  76  Ind.  575,  583 ;  Sue 
92.  cession   of   Miih,  35    La.    An.  394,   397 

3  Griffin  v.  Brooks,  48  Oh.  St.  211.  Goods  of  Morton,  L.  R.  12  Proh.  D.  141 
See  also  Simrell's  Estate,  154  Pa.  St.  604.  Townshend  v.   Howard,  86  Me.  285,  and 

4  Dixon's  Appeal,  55  Pa.  St.  424,  427  ;  cases  cited.     (In  this  last-named  case  the 
Doane  v.  Hadlock,  42  Me.  72,  75  ;  Wheeler  signature  was  erased  with  a  lead  pencil.) 
v.  Bent,  7  Pick.  61  ;  Wells  v.  Wells,  4  T.  9  Avery  v.  Pixley,  4  Mass.  460,  462; 
B.  Mon.  152,  155.  and  a  fortiori  where  a  seal   is  required: 

6  See  ante,  §  48.  White's  Will,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  501. 

6  McPherson  v.   Clark,    3    Bradf.  92  ;  1°  Bell  v.  Fothergill,  L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  148. 

Gardiner   v.   Gardiner,    65    N.    H.   230;  u  Gay  v.  Gay,  60  Iowa,  415. 

Camp  v.  Shaw,  52  111.  App.  241  ;  Short  v.  18  A  clause  interlined  after  execution  is 

VOL.  I.  —  7  97 


*  94,  *  95  REVOCATION    OF   WILLS.  §  50 

certain  whether  they  were  made  before  or  after  attesta- 
asloUinterliii-  tion.1  The  ordinary  presumptions  in  cases  of  deeds  and 
eations  and  other  instruments  are  said  not  to  apply  to  wills.2  It  is  held 
in  Pennsylvania  that  alterations  in  the  testator's  hand- 
writing are  presumed  to  have  been  made  before  its  execution ;  or,  if 
afterward,  and  there  be  codicils,  then  before  the  execution  of  the  last 
codicil ; 3  and  in  New  Hampshire,4  and  Illinois  5  that  they  have  been 
made  after  execution,  but  more  usually,  in  respect  of  instruments  gen- 
erally, courts  incline  to  the  view  of  no  presumption,  imposing  upon 
the  propounder  of  the  instrument  the  burden  of  explaining  all  sus- 
picious alterations.6  Where  an  interlineation  in  a  will  is  fair  upon 
its  face,  and  it  is  entirely  unexplained,  there  being  no  circumstances 
whatever  to  cast  suspicion  upon  it,  it  would  not  be  proper  to  hold 
that  the  alteration  was  made  after  execution ; 7  and  such  interlinea- 
tions as  supply  a  blank  in  the  sense  must  be  distinguished  from  those 
that  would  indicate  a  change  of  intention.8 

In  England,  where  the  statute  regulating  wills 9  avoids  all  erasures 
and  interlineations  not  specially  signed  by  the  testator  and  attested 
by  the  witnesses,  the  presumption  is  held  to  be,  independent  of  the 
statute,  that  erasures  and  interlineations  were  made  after  execution, 
and  are  therefore  void  unless  proved  by  some  evidence  to  have  been 
made  before.10 

*  §   50.    Revocation  by  Subsequent  Will.  —  It  is   usual   to   [*  95] 
insert  in  wills,  sometimes  even  where  the  testator  has  made 
t,     , .       .„    no  prior  will,  a  clause  revoking  all  former  wills.     But 

Revoking  will  *  '  °  . 

must  beexe-  whether  there  be  an  express  revocation  or  not,  it  is  ob- 
sameformdi-  vi°us  tnat  a  w^  executed  under  the  formalities  pre- 
tiea  as  will  scribed  by  statute  to  authorize  a  valid  disposition  of  the 
property  which  it  devises  or  bequeaths  must  operate  to  re- 
voke and  annul  all  previous  inconsistent  testamentary  dispositions.11 
And  it  may  happen  that  a  will  may  effectually  revoke  a  prior  will, 
although  itself  be  inoperative  as  a  dispositive  instrument;  as  where 

void  though  made  at  the  testator's  request  material  alterations  or  erasures  have  been 

and  in  his    presence  and  the  presence  of  made,   and   the    court   cannot   determine 

t!n- witnesses,  unless  the  will  is  re-attested:  whether  they  were  made  before  or  after 

Hesterberg   v.   ("lark,    166    111.  241.     See  execution,  the  whole  instrument  should  be 

cases  supra  in  this  section.  refused    probate:   Matter  of  Barber,  92 

i    Wilson's  Will,  8  Wis.  171,  180.  Ilun,  489. 

2  l  Redf  on  Wills,  315,  pi.  2.3.  7  Crossman  v.  Grossman,  95  N.  Y.  145, 

:;  Linnard'a   Appeal,   93    Pa.  St.  313;  153. 
Wikoff's  Appeal,  15  Pa.  St.  281.  8  Voorhees  in  re,  6  Dem.  162. 

*   Burnt. am  v.  Aver,  35  N.   II.  351,  354.  »  1  Vict.  c.  126,  §  1. 

r>  ('amp  v.  8haw,  52  111.  App.  241.  w  ( looper  v.  Bockett,  10  Jur.  931,  936 ; 

r'  North  River  Meadow  Co.  v  Shrews-  Simmons  v.   Rudall,  1    Sim.   (n.  s.)    115, 

bury  Church,  22  N.  J.  L.  424  ;  Millikin  v.  136  ;  Burg'oyne  v.  Showier,  1  Rob.  5,  13. 
Martin,  66  111.  13  :  Smith  v.  United  States,        "  Ante,%46',  Reese  v.  Probate  Court, 

2  Wall.  219,  232  j    Bailey  p.   Taylor,  11  9  It.  I.  484. 
Conn  531   534.     in  doubtful  cases,  where 
98 


§  50  REVOCATION    BY   SUBSEQUENT   WILL.  *  95,  *  96 

a  will  executed  and  attested  with  the  necessary  formalities  to  be- 
queath personal  estate,  but  not  to  devise  realty,  revokes  a  prior 
will  disposing  of  personal  property,  and  devises  real  estate;  such 
will  is  sufficient  to  revoke  the  former  will,  but  not  sufficient  to  de- 
vise real  estate.  Or  where  a  testator,  having  devised  property  to  a 
person,  subsequently  devises  it  to  another  person  who- is  incapable  of 
taking,  the  devise  in  the  latter  will  must  fail,  but  it  is  sufficient  to 
revoke  the  former  devise.1  Or  a  will  may  be  made  for  .the  sole  pur- 
pose of  revoking  a  former  will.2  It  follows  from  what  has  been  said, 
that,  to  constitute  a  sufficient  revoking  will,  it  must  be  executed  and 
attested  with  the  formalities  prescribed  by  the  statute  for  the  testa- 
mentary disposition  of  the  class  of  property  disposed  of  in  the  former 
will ; 8  and  an  instrument  purporting  to  be  a  will,  containing  a  revo- 
catory clause,  cannot  be  offered  in  evidence  as  a  revocation  merely, 
without  probate  thereof.4  Thus  a  verbal  will  is  insufficient  to  revoke 
a  written  will,  unless  the  statute  authorize  the  disposition  of  the  sub- 
ject of  the  written  will  by  parol;  and  where  the  statute  creates  a 
difference  in  the  execution  and  attestation  between  wills  of  realty 
and  of  personalty,  a  will  executed  with  the  necessary  formalities  for 
one,  but  not  for  the  other  of  these  classes,  is  not  sufficient  to 
[*  96]  *  revoke  a  will  of  the  other  class.5  In  England  and  in  some 
of  the  American  States  this  principle  is  enacted  by  statute.6 
What  has  been  said  of  wills  has  self-evidently  full  application  to 
codicils.7  An  unexecuted  codicil  has  no  more  effect  to  revoke  a 
duly  executed  will  than  an  unexecuted  will  could  have ; 8  and  a 
properly  executed  codicil  revokes  so  much  of  previous  wills  and  no 
more  as  is  necessarily  inconsistent  with  the  dispositions  made  in 
the  codicil.9 

1  Hairston  v.  Hairston,  30  Miss.  276,  such  subsequent  will:  Dower  v.  Seeds, 
302  ;  Canfield  v.  Crandall,  4  Dem.  111.  28  W.  Va.  113,  133. 

2  1  Redf.  on  Wills,  346.  5  Reid  v.  Borland,  14  Mass.  208  ;  Hol- 

3  Caeman  v.  Van  Harke,  33  Kan.  333,  lingshead  v.  Sturgis,  21  La.  An.  450,  hold- 
336;  Noyes'  Will,  61  Vt.  14.  In  North  ing,  as  many  of  the  eases  do,  that  the  act 
Carolina  it  was  decided  that  the  adoption  by  which  a  testamentary  disposition  is 
of  an  illegitimate  child  by  proceedings  revoked  must  be  made  in  one  of  the 
under  the  statute  does  not  itself  operate  to  forms  prescribed  for  testaments,  and 
revoke  a  former  will,  nor  can  the  petition  clothed  with  the  same  formalities  :  Vin- 
in  such  proceeding  be  looked  upon  as  a  ing  v.  Hall,  40  Miss.  83,  107  ;  Will  of 
testamentary  paper,  so  as  to  authorize  Ladd,  60  Wis.  187;  Barry  v.  Brown,  2 
proof  of  the  intention  of   the  testator  to  Dem.  309. 

revoke  his  will :  Davis  v.  King,  89  N.  C.  6  1  Vict.  c.  26,  §  22. 

441.  1  See  ante,  §  47. 

4  Stickney  v.  Hammond,  138  Mass.  8  Heise  v.  Heise,  31  Pa.  St.  246,249; 
116,  120;  Sewall  v.  Robbins,  139  Mass.  Magoohan's  Appeal,  117  Pa.  St.  238. 
164,  167.  So  where  the  probate  of  a  will  9  Viele  v.  Keeler,  129  N.  Y.  190;  In  re 
is  revoked,  declaring  it  inoperative,  such  Ladd,  94  Cal.  670;  Pendergast  v.  Tibbets, 
will  cannot  be  relied  on  as  a  revocation  164  Mass.  270;  Jones  v.  Earle,  1  Gill,  395, 
of  a  former  will,  even  by  heirs  who  were  400  ;  Boyle  v.  Parker,  3  Md.  Ch.  42,  4t ; 
not  parties  to  the  proceedings  to  set  aside  Reichard's  Appeal,  116  Pa.  St.  232;  Stur- 


*  96,  *  97  REVOCATION    OF    WILLS.  §  51 

§  51.  Effect  of  Subsequent  upon  Prior  "Wills.  —  A  will  or  codicil 
containing  a  revocatory  clause  sufficiently  attested,  together  with 
Will  mav  be  new  testamentary  dispositions,  revokes  the  prior  will, 
valid  to  revoke  whether  its  own  dispositions  are  valid  or  not;1  if  not 
t" ne'wdisposi-  sufficiently  attested  as  a  revoking  will,  but  valid  as  to 
tion.  some  or  all  of  its  testamentary  dispositions,  it  revokes 

all  former  dispositions  pro  tanto;  ~  but  if  its  revocatory  clause  be 
valid,  and  all  other  dispositions  invalid,  its  effect  will  be  to  render 
the  testator  intestate,  as  if  he  had  made  no  will  at  all.3  But  where 
the  principle  of  dependent  relative  revocation  is  applicable; 4  that  is, 
if  the  revocation  is  conditional,  dependent  upon  the  efficacy  of  the 
Dependent  attempted  new  disposition,  and  that  fails,  the  revocation 
relative revoca-  also  fails,  leaving  the  prior  will  in  full  force.5  But  it 
tion  based  upon  should  be  remembered  that  this  principle  does  not  apply 
mistake  of  fact,  where  the  new  devise  fails,  not  from  the  infirmity  of 
the  instrument,  but  from  the  incapacity  of  the  devisee;6  nor  where 
the  testator  is  aware  of  the  insufficiency  of  the  new  disposition.7 
So,  also,  where  the  general  rule  is  recognized  that  a  revocation  of  a 
gift  based  in  terms  on  the  existence  of  conditions  which  in  fact  do 
not  exist,  will  be  inoperative  to  annul  such  original  gift.8  This 
rule  is  held  to  be  inapplicable  where  the  testator  intended  to  deter- 
mine for  himself  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  the  fact  on  which 
he  bases  the  revocation.9 

*  The  familiar  quotation  from  Swinburne,  that  no  man  can  [*  97 j 
die  with  two  testaments,10  is  to  be  understood  as  applying  to 

gis  v.  Work,  122  Ind.  134, 139  ;  Crozier  v.  6  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *  169,  citing   Eng- 

Bray,  120  N.  Y.  366.     See  as  to  the  con-  lish  cases;  also   Quiun   v.   Butler,  L.   R 

struction  of  wills  and  codicils,  post,  §  415,  6  Eq.   Cas.  225,  227;    Goods   of   Gentry. 

p.  *  873,  note  5.  L.  R.  3  P.  &  D.  80,  83. 

i  Smith   v.    McChesney,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  7  See  ante,  §  48. 

359,  362;  In   re   Cunningham,   38  Minn.  8  On  the  ground  that  the  will  show3 

169  ;  Burns  v.  Travis,  117  Ind.  44,  47.  the  testator's  intention  that  the  revocation 

2  Bond i not  v.  Bradford,  2  Dall.  266,  is  solely  conditioned  on  the  existence  of 
268;  Nelson  v.  MeGiffert,  3  Barb.  Ch.  the  fact  as  to  which  the  testator  is  in  error. 
158,  164;  the  specific  devise  in  a  codicil  See  Giddings  v.  Giddings,  65  Conn.  149, 
revokes  a  power  to  sell  the  same  land  and  English  and  American  authorities 
conferred    by  the   will:  Derby  v.  Derby,  referred  to  in  the  opinion. 

4  K.  I.  414,  429.  9  Giddings  v.   Giddings,  65  Conn.  149; 

3  Newton  v.  Newton,  12  Ir.    Ch.  118,     Hayes  v.  Hayes,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  265. 

i 24,  130;  Brown   v.  Brown,  8  El.  &   Bl.  10  "Concerning  the  making  of  a  latter 

875,  vs:..     See  Biggs  v.  Angus,  3  Dem.  93.  testament,  so  large  and  ample  is  the  lib- 

4  Ante,  §  48.  erty  of   making  testaments,  that  a  man 
0  "The  purpose  to  revoke  being  con-  may,  as  oft  as  he  will,  make  a  new  testa- 

Bidered  to  be  nol   a   distinct  independent  ment  even  until  the  last  breath;  neither 

intention,  but  subservient  to  the  purpose  is  there  any  cautel  under  the  sun  to  pre- 

of  making  a  new  disposition  of  the  prop-  vent   this   liberty:    but  no   man  can    die 

erty;  the  testator  meaning  to  do  the  one  with  two  testaments,  and  therefore  the 

so  far  only  as  he    succeeds  in  doing  the  last  and  newest   is  of   force:   so  that   if 

Other":   I  Jarm.  on    Wills,  '  [69 j   I'.arks-  there   were   a   thousand    testaments,    the 

dale  v.  Barksdale,  12  Leigh,  535,  540.  last  of  all  is  the  best  of  all,  and  maketh 
100 


§51 


EFFECT   OF   SUBSEQUENT   UPON   PRIOR   WILLS.      *  97,  *  98 


Last  will  may 
be  contained  in 
successive  in- 
struments, 
which  should 
all  receive  pro- 
bate together. 


the  conclusiveness  of  the  last  testamentary  dispositions 
made  by  the  testator ;  for  "  any  number  of  instruments, 
whatever  be  their  relative  date,  or  in  whatever  form 
they  may  be  (so  as  they  be  all  clearly  testamentary), 
may  be  admitted  to  probate  as  together  containing  the 
last  will  of  the  deceased."  *  A  subsequent  will  revokes 
only  so  much  of  a  former  will  as  is  inconsistent  with  the  last  instru- 
ment ; 2  if,  therefore,  the  later  or  latest  will  dispose  of  the  whole 
of  a  testator's  estate,  all  former  wills  are  thereby  revoked;3  but  if, 
in  the  absence  of  an  express  revocation,  a  partial  disposition  of  the 
estate  is  thereby  made,  consistent  with  the  dispositions  made  in  the 
prior  will  or  wills,  or  with  a  portion  of  them,  they  may  both  or  all 
stand  as  the  last  will  of  the  testator,  to  the  extent  to  which  the  lat- 
ter do  not  exclude  the  former.4  Of  whatever  number  of  executed 
documents  the  will  consists,  they  must  all  be  proved  together  as  con- 
stituting one  will.5  And  where  a  second  will  appoints  a  fresh  ex- 
ecutor, and  the  wills  are  not  inconsistent,  probate  may  be  granted  to 
both  executors.6  The  old  English  cases  are  of  little  value  as  author- 
ity on  this  point,  because  the  appointment  of  an  executor  there 
constituted  a  disposition  of  the  whole  of  the  personal  property  of 
the  testator,  the  residue  going  to  the  executor  appointed  if  not  other- 
wise disposed  of;  and  even  under  the  statutes  giving  the  residue  to 
the  next  of  kin  in  the  absence  of  its  testamentary  disposition,7  it 
belongs  to  the  executor  when  there  are  no  next  of  kin,  and 
[*  98]  the  testator  makes  no  disposition  of  it.8  *  Every  will,  there- 
fore, in  which  an  executor  was  appointed,  constituted  a  com- 
plete disposition  of  the  testator's  personal  property. 

The  rule,  in  America  at  least,  is  clear,  that  it  is  the  duty  of  courts 


void  the  former":  Swinb.  pt.  7,  s.  14,  pi. 
1. 

1  Wms.  Ex.  [162]. 

2  Brant  v.  Willson,  8  Cow.  56 ;  Picker- 
ing v.  Langdon,  22  Me.  413,  426. 

3  Simmons  v.  Simmons,  26  Barb.  68, 
75  ;  In  re  Fisher,  4  Wis.  254,  264 ;  Teacle's 
Estate,  153  Pa.  St.  219. 

4  Price  v.  Maxwell,  28  Pa.  St.  23,  38 ; 
Gordon  v.  Whitlock,  92  Va.  723  ;  Lemage 
v.  Goodban,  L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  57,  61,  in 
which  Sir  J.  P.  Wilde  cites  Cutto  v.  Gil- 
bert, 9  Moo.  P.  C.  131,  as  overruling 
Plenty  v.  West,  1  Rob.  Ecc.  264,  and 
similar  cases  (holding  that  the  words 
"last  will"  in  a  testamentary  paper  ne- 
cessarily import  a  revocation  of  previous 
instruments),  and  pronouncing  for  the 
validity  of  two  wills  offered  for  probate : 
Goods  of  Graham,  3  Sw.  &  Tr.  69,  71 ; 
Bartholomew's  Appeal,  75   Pa.   St.   169, 


173;  Succession  of  Mercer,  28  La.  An. 
564. 

5  Pepper's  Estate,  148  Pa.  St.  5,  and 
cases  cited. 

8  Goods  of  Leese,  2  Sw.  &  Tr.  442, 
444.  When  a  second  will  expressly  re- 
vokes a  former  will,  but  refers  to  and 
re-enacts  certain  bequests  therein,  both 
wills  are  entitled  to  probate,  but  the  per- 
son named  as  executor  in  the  first  will  is 
not  entitled  to  letters  testamentary :  Nel- 
son's Estate,  147  Pa.  St.  160. 

7  11  Geo.  IV.  and  1  Will.  IV.  c.  40. 

8  Wms.  Ex.  [1477],  citing  Taylor  v. 
Haygarth,  14  Sim.  8,  15  (but  in  this  case 
the  Chancellor  directed  the  residue  of 
personal  property  to  vest  in  the  crown  in 
the  absence  of  next  of  kin,  giving  to  the 
executors  the  proceeds  of  sale  of  real 
estate) ;  Russell  v.  Clowes,  2  Coll.  648, 
and  other  authorities. 

101 


*  98,  *  99  REVOCATION    OF   WILLS.  §  52 

to  give  effect  to  every  part  of  every  will  of  the  testator,  if  the  sev- 
eral dispositions  can  be  reconciled;  the  rule  of  construction  being, 
substantially  the  same  where  there  are  several  wills  to  be  harmo- 
nized, as  where  there  are  several  clauses  in  the  same  will,  or  in  a 
will  and  codicils.  Subsequent  wills,  indeed,  perform  the  office  of 
codicils.1 

It  is  held  that  the  revocation  of  a  will  may  be  proved  by  proving 
the  execution  of  a  subsequent  will  by  the  testator,  . 
subsequent  y  which  is  lost,  and  has  not  been,  therefore,  admitted  to> ' 
will  not  pro-  probate.2  This  rule  is  necessarily  confined  to  cases 
where  the  subsequent  will  either  expressly  revokes  the 
former,  or  contains  an  inconsistent  disposition  of  the  whole  estate, 
as  by  appointment  of  an  executor  and  residuary  legatee;3  and  the 
evidence  to  establish  its  execution,  as  well  as  its  inconsistency  with 
the  former  will,  should  be  clear  and  satisfactory,  and,  particularly 
if  by  parol,  it  must  be  stringent  and  conclusive.4  There  can  be  no- 
revocation  by  a  later  will  of  which  the  contents  are  unknown;  the 
words  "this  is  my  last  will"  are  held  not  to  import  an  inconsistency 
of  disposition  between  the  two  instruments.5 

As  an  insufficiently  attested  codicil  or  later  will  cannot  operate  as. 
a  revocation  of  a  valid  disposition,  so  a  former  will  or  part  of  a  will 
cannot  be  deemed  revoked  by  a  subsequent  bequest  so 
quesTm^iiffi- 6"    imperfectly  worded  as  not  to  admit  of  certainty  of  its 
ciently  worded    meaning; 6  but  a  codicil  directing  that  in  a  certain  con- 
tingency the  first,  otherwise  the  last,  of  two  prior 

*  wills  should  take  effect,  was  held  valid,  and  upon  the  hap-  [*  99] 
pening  of  the  contingency  the  first  will  and  the  codicil  took 
effect  together.7  Where  the  validity  of  a  later  will  revoking  a. 
former  one  is  denied  by  the  proponent  of  the  first  will,  on  the  ground 
of  incapacity  in  the  testator,  his  declarations  that  he  wished  the 
former  will  to  stand  are  incompetent.8 

§  52.  Revival  of  a  Prior  by  the  Revocation  of  a  Later  Will.  —  It 
is  a  much-disputed  question  whether  the  revocation  of  a  revoking 

1  Price  v.  Maxwell,  28  Pa.  St.  23,  38.  see  as  to  proof  of  lost  wills,  post,  §  221  ; 

2  In  re  Cunningham,  38  Minn.  169;  also  Steele  v.  Price,  5  B.  Mon.  58 ;  Kearns 
see  cases  infra,  and  see,  also,  in  connec-  v.  Kearns,  4  Harr.  83  ;  Southworth  v. 
tion  herewith,  the  discussion  on  the  pro-  Adams,  11  Biss.  256,  262. 

bate  of  lost  wills,  post,  §  221.  5  Cutto  v.  Gilbert,  supra,  reversing  the 

'■'■  Wins.    Ex.    (161],   citing    Ilelyar   v.  doctrine  announced  in  Plenty  v.  West,  1 

Helyar,  1   Cas.  temp.  Lee,  472;  Jones  v.  Bob.  Ecc.  264  ;  Ilylton  v.  Hylton,  1  Gratt. 

Murphy,  8  Watts   &   S.   275,   291,   295;  161,   165;   Nelson  v.  McGiffert,  3  Barb. 

Brown  v.  Brown,  8  El.  &  Bl.  876,  885;  Ch.  158,  164. 

Legare  o.  Ashe,  1  Bay,  464,  465;  Dawson         c  1  Redf.  on  Wills,  356,  pi.  23,  citing 

v.  Smith,  3  Bouat.  335,  887,  839 ;  Cacman  Goblet  v.  Beechey,  2  Russ.  &  Myl.  624; 

v.  Van  Mark.,  ."..".  Kan.  333,  336.  Baldwin  v.  Baldwin,  22  Beav.  413. 

*  ('nil.,  v.  Gilbert,  '.»  Moo.  P.  C.  131,         i  Bradish  v. McClellan,  100  Pa.  St.  607. 

140;  i   Redf.  "ii   Wills.  348,  pi.  9,  citing         8  Wurzell  v.  Beckman,  52  Mich.  478. 

i1      ml    v.    Davis     2    Bin.  406,  417;   and 
lo2 


§  52     EEVIVAL  OF  PRIOR  BY  REVOCATION  OF  LATER  WILL.     *  99,  *  100 

will  restored  the  validity  of  the  will  first  revoked.     It  Revocation  of 
is  so  asserted  upon  the  ground  that  wills,  being  ambula-  a  revoking  will, 
tory  in  their  nature,  cannot  take  effect  before  the  death  of  the  testa- 
tor, and  hence  the  revocation  is  itself  ambulatory,  and  may  be  can- 
celled  before  it  becomes  operative.1      In  the  common-   Ruiesin 
law  courts  of  England  it  was  so  held  as  an  absolute  pro-    England, 
position,  excluding  all  question  of  intention,  that  the  former  will 
shall  revive,2  while  the  ecclesiastical  courts  inclined  to  a  different 
doctrine,  holding  that  the  presumption  is  against  the  revival  of  the 
prior  will,  and  throwing  the  onus  on  the  party  setting  it  up  to  rebut 
this  presumption.3     A  third  view  was  finally  adopted,  according  to 
which  it  is  regarded  as  a  question  of  intention,  to  be  collected  from 
all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  unaided  and  unembarrassed  by  any 
legal  presumption,4  until  the  question  was  made  the  subject  of  par- 
liamentary action  in  the  new  Wills  Act,5  providing  that  no  will  or 
codicil,  or  any  part  thereof,  which  shall  be  in  any  manner  revoked, 
shall  be  revived  otherwise  than  by  re-execution,  or  by  a  codicil  exe- 
cuted as  required  by  the  act,  and  showing  an  intention  to  revive  the 
same.     The  language  of  this  statute,  says  Williams,  is  not  calcu- 
lated to  exclude  all  controversy  on  the  subject.6 
[*  100J       *  The  American  States  are  arrayed   on   different  sides  of 
the  question.     Chancellor  Kent  does  not  give  a  decided  opin- 
ion ; 7   but   Judge   Redfield   says,    "  The   general   rule   seems  to   be 
firmly  established  from  an  early  day,  that  a  later  will    Ruies  in 
revoked  will  not  prevent  an  earlier  and  inconsistent  one    America, 
from  remaining  in  force;    and  it  makes  no   difference  whether  the 

1  1  Redf.  on  Wills,  308,  pi.  12,  citing  375 ;  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  3  Phillim.  543, 
English  cases  and  Colvin  v.  Warford,  20     554. 

Md.  357.     See  Peck's  Appeal,  50  Conn.  5  1  Vict.  c.  26,  §  22. 

562,  565,  drawing  the  distinction  between  6  1  Wms.  Ex.  [181]  :  "Because  it  was 

the   revocatory   effect   of    a    will   which,  pnt  by  Lord  Mansfield,  in  Goodright  v. 

being  operative  as  a  written  declaration,  Glazier,  that  the  second  will  is  ambula- 

accomplishes  the   revocation   as   such,  at  tory  till  the  death  of  the  testator.     If  lie 

once,   and   is    not    itself    ambulatory   or  lets  it  stand  till  he  dies,  it  is  his  will ;  if 

dependent  upon  the  testator's  death  for  he  does  not,  it  is  not  his  will,  and  has  no 

its   validity,   and  one   which,   to   become  effect,  no  operation ;  it  is  no  will  at  all, 

valid,  must  itself  be  a  will  or  codicil,  exe-  being    cancelled    before    his    death.     If, 

cuted  with  all  the  formalities  required  for  therefore,  such   cancellation   totally   pre- 

such  instruments.  vents  its  operation,  it  may  be  argued  that 

2  Wms.  Ex.  [178],  citing  Goodright  v.  the  previous  will  remains  valid,  because 
Glazier,  4  Burr.  2512,  Harwood  v.  Good-  it  has  not  been  in  any  manner  revoked, 
right,  1  Cowp.  87, 91,  and  Moore  v.  Moore,  inasmuch  as  the  subsequent  will  in  its 
1  Phillim.  406,  419.  ambulatory  state  has  no  effect  whatever." 

3  Wms.   Ex.    [179],   citing    Moore   v.  See  infra,  p.  *  101. 

Moore,  supra,  and  the  cases  there  men-  7  "  If  the   first   will  be   not  actually 

tioned.  cancelled,  or  destroyed,  or  expressly  re- 

4  lb.,  citing  Usticke  v.  Bawden,  2  Add.  voked,  on  making  a  second,  and  the  sec- 
116;  but  see  Hooton  v.  Head,  3  Phillim.  ond  will  be  afterward  cancelled,  the 
26,  32 ;  Moore  v.  De  La  Torre,  1  Phillim.  first  will  is  said  to  be  revived  "  :    4  Kent 

Comm.  531. 

103 


*  100  *  101 


REVOCATION   OF   WILLS. 


§52 


later  will  contained  an  express  clause  of  revocation  or  not."  1  His 
authorities,  however,  are  all  English,  except  the  case  of  Colvin  v. 
Warford,  from  Maryland.2  Decisions  to  the  same  effect  in  other 
States  are  not  wanting;8  nor  such  as  hold  the  contrary  doctrine.4 
In  Massachusetts  it  is  held,  as  in  England  before  the  Act  of  1  Vict, 
c.  26,  that  it  is  a  question  of  intention ;  and  the  oral  declarations  of 
the  testator,  after  the  cancelling  of  a  will,  are  held  admissible  to 
show  whether  or  not  he  intended  to  revive  an  earlier  will.5  So  in 
Tennessee.6 

A  number  of  States  have  incorporated  in  their  statutes  the  provi- 
sions of  the  English  statute  expressly  providing 
that  no  will  *  revoked  by  a  later  will  shall  be  [*  101] 
revived  by  the  destruction  or  revocation  of  the  later  will 
alone.7  Under  these  statutes  it  was  held,  in  England,  that  there  is 
no  way  of  reviving  a  will  expressly  revoked  by  a  later  will,  but  that 
of  re-execution  (the  destruction  or  revocation  of  the  revoking  in- 
strument does  not  constitute  a  re-execution,  and  is  therefore  in- 
sufficient 8),  and  in  some  of  the  American  States,  that  it  may  be 
accomplished  by  an  expressed  intention  to  that  effect.9     In  New 


Statutes. 


i  1  Redf.  on  Wills,  308,  pi.  12.  In 
Michigan  the  distinction  is  made  that 
where  a  subsequent  will  contains  an  ex- 
press revocatory  clause  the  prior  will  is 
thereby  revoked,  although  the  second  will 
is  destroyed  or  revoked ;  whereas  if  the 
second  will  is  only  inconsistent  with  the 
first,  but  not  expressly  revocatory,  its 
destruction  by  the  testator  will  revive  the 
first :  Cheever  v.  North,  106  Mich.  390, 
relying  on  James  v.  Marvin,  3  Conn.  576, 
and  other  cases. 

2  20  Md.  357. 

:i  As  in  Kentucky:  Linginfetter v.  Liu- 
ginfetter,  Hardin,  119;  Maryland:  Colvin 
v.  Warford,  supra  ;  New  Jersey  :  Randall 
v.  Beatty,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  643,645;  North 
Carolina:  (intimated,  but  not  decided  in) 
Marsh  v.  Marsh,  3  Jones  L.  77,  78  ;  Penn- 
sylvania: I'lintham  v.  Bradford,  10  Pa. 
St.  82,  01  ;  Rudy  v.  Ulrich,  69  Pa.  St. 
177,  182;  South  Carolina:  Taylor  v. 
Taylor,  2  Nott  &  McC.  482. 

4  Georgia:  Lively  v.  Harwell,  29  Ga. 
509,  514;  Rarksdalo  v.  Hopkins,  23  Ga. 
832,  340;  Michigan:  Scott  v.  Fink,  45 
Mich.  241,  244  ;    Stevens  V.  Hope,  52  Mich. 

65,  69;  Cheever  '■.  North,  106  Midi.  390 
(referred  to  supra)  ;  Mississippi :  Bohannon 
v.  Walcott,  l  How.  (Miss.)  336,339;  New 

York  :  I'ige;s  v.  Aligns,.'!  Dim.  '.».'!  ;  Texas  : 

Hawes  v.  Nicholas,  72  Tex.  481 ;  Vir- 
ginia:    Rudisill  V.   Kodes,  29  Gratt.   147. 

1(4 


In  Connecticut,  the  case  of  James  v. 
Marvin,  3  Conn.  576,  was  in  Peck's  Ap- 
peal, 50  Conn.  562,  attributed  to  the  stat- 
ute authorizing  the  revocation  of  a  will  by 
a  writing  not  executed  with  the  formali- 
ties of  a  will,  and  the  latter  case  holds  that 
where  the  statute  requires  the  revocation 
(other  than  by  burning,  cancelling,  tear- 
ing, or  obliterating)  to  be  by  "  a  later  will 
or  codicil,"  such  later  will  is  necessarily 
ambulatory,  and  although  it  contain  a 
clause  expressly  revoking  former  wills, 
must  take  effect  as  a  will  before  the  re- 
voking clause  can  be  operative  (p.  565). 
The  destruction  or  revocation  of  the  second 
will  would  therefore  necessarily  revive, 
or  rather  leave  in  force,  the  first. 

5  Pickens  v.  Davis,  134  Mass.  252; 
Williams  !;.  Williams,  142  Mass.  515. 

6  McClure  v.  McClure,  86  Tenn.  173, 
180. 

7  For  instance,  in  Alabama,  Arkansas, 
California,  Connecticut,  Georgia,  Indi- 
ana, Kansas,  Kentucky,  Missouri,  Nevada, 
New  York,  Ohio,  Virginia,  and  West 
Virginia.  In  California  the  mere  execu- 
tion of  a  subsequent  revocatory  will  ends 
the  first  will,  and  such  will  is  not  revived, 
by  the  revocation  of  the  last  will :  In  re 
Lones,  108  Cal.  688. 

8  Major  v.  Williams,  3  Curt.  432,  434. 

9  Beaumont  v.  Keim,  50  Mo.  28,  29  ; 
Rudisill   v.   Rodes,   29    Gratt.    147,  148; 


§53  INCONSISTENT   DISPOSITION   OF  GIFT.  *  101,*  102 

York  a  distinction  is  drawn  between  an  inconsistent  codicil,  revok- 
ing part  of  the  will  by  implication,  and  the  revocation  by  will :  the 
cancellation  of  the  inconsistent  codicil  leaves  the  will  in  force,  or 
revives  the  part  revoked  by  implication,  while  the  destruction  of  a 
revoking  will  is  not  sufficient  to  revive  the  will  revoked.1 

A  difficulty  is  sometimes  experienced  in  determining  the  revoca- 
tory effect  upon  intermediate  codicils  or  wills  of  a  later  codicil, 
republishing  a  former  will.  This  question  is  one  which  must  be 
determined  by  the  intention  of  the  testator,  to  be  gathered  from  all 
the  circumstances  accessible  to  the  judge  of  probate ; 2  the  indul- 
gence in  artificial  presumptions,  such  as  that,  where  a  testator  by  a 
codicil  confirms  his  will,  the  will  together  with  all  previous  codicils 
is  taken  to  be  affirmed,  as  is  in  some  cases  asserted,3  —  or  that  the 
omission  to  mention  a  particular  codicil  in  a  clause  of  republication, 
in  which  prior  codicils  are  mentioned,  constitutes  a  revocation  of 
the  codicil  omitted,  as  has  been  held  in  others,4  —  seems  better 
calculated  to  mislead  than  to  assist  in  arriving  at  the  testator's 
purpose.6 

§  53.    Revocation  by  Inconsistent  Disposition  of  the  Testamentary- 
Gift. —  A  will  once  executed  with  the  formalities  requisite 
[*  102]  to  give  *  it  validity  remains  in  force  until  re- 
voked by  act  of  the  testator.6    The  act  of  revo-  suTjeaoTgift 
cation,   however,    may   be   performed    by   the   testator  operates  revo- 
without  his  conscious  intention  to  that  effect,  if  he  does  recovered  in 
something  from  which  the  law  presumes,  or  infers,  the  Jlfetime  of 
animum  revocandi.     Such  acts,  constituting  an  implied 
revocation,  may  consist  of  a  disposition  of  property  devised  or  be- 
queathed in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  the  testamentary  disposi- 
tion.     At  the  common  law  and  under  early  English  statutes  the 
devise   of  such  land  only   passed   under   the  will   as   the   testator 

Simmons  v.   Simmons,    26   Barb.    68,  76 ;  5  See,  on  this   subject,  post,  §   56,  on 

In  re  Lones,  108  Cal.  688.  the  republication  of  wills. 

1  In  re  Simpson,  56  How.  Pr.  125,  131.  6  Wms.  on  Ex.    [187],  quoting  Swin- 

2  Wikoff's  Appeal,  15  Pa.  St.  281,  ap-  burne,  pt.  7,  §  15,  pi.  2:  "All  these  things 
proving  Smith  i>.  Cunningham,  1  Add.  concurring,  viz.,  the  long  time,  the  in- 
448,  455.  crease  of   the  testator's  wealth,  and  the 

3  Green  v.  Tribe,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  D.  231,  prejudice  of  such  as  are  to  have  the 
235 ;  In  re  De  La  Saussaye,  L.  R.  3  P.  &  administration  of  the  testator's  goods,  the 
D.  42 ;  see  also  Wade  v.  Nazer,  1  Rob.  testament  is  not  presumed  to  be  revoked. 
Eccl.  627,  632 ;  Gordon  v.  Lord  Reay,  5  And  albeit  the  testament  be  made  in 
Sim.  274,  280 ;  Upfill  v.  Marshall,  3  Curt,  time  of  sickness,  and  peril  of  death,  when 
Eccl.  636,  640.  the  testator  does  not  hope   for  life,  and 

4  Wikoff's  Appeal,  15  Pa.  St.  281,  291  ;  afterward  the  testator  recover  health,  yet 
Neff's  Appeal,  48  Pa.  St.  501  ;  see  also,  is  not  the  testament  revoked  by  such  re- 
Burton  v.  Newbery,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  D.  234,  covery :  or  albeit  the  testator  make  his 
240 ;  Farrar  ;;.  St.  Catharine's  College,  L.  testament  by  reason  of  some  great  journey, 
R.  16  Eq.  19,  23  ;  In  re  Reynolds,  L.  R.  3  yet  it  is  not  revoked  by  the  return  of  the 
P  &  D.  35 ;  In  re  Hastings,  26  L.  T.  R.  testator." 

(n.  s.)  715. 

105 


*102,  *103 


REVOCATION    OF    WILLS. 


§53 


owned  at  the  time  of  making  it,1  and  continued  to  own  until  his 
death;  if,  therefore,  a  testator  aliened  the  devised  land,  although  he 
subsequently  acquired  a  new  freehold  interest  therein,  yet  the  devise 
was  void.2  In  equity  a  valid  agreement  or  covenant  to  convey 
operates  as  a  revocation  of  a  former  devise  of  the  same  estate  as 
effectually  as  an  executed  conveyance  at  law.3 

But  the  law  has  been  changed,  in  this  respect,  both  in  England 
and  in  nearly  all  of  the  American  States.  The  English  Statute 
of  Wills  4  provides  that  no  conveyance  of  real  estate 
made  after  the  execution  of  a  will,  or  other  act  in  rela- 
tion to  such  estate,  shall  prevent  the  operation  of  the 
will  upon  such  portion  of  the  estate  as  the  testator  may 
have  power  to  dispose  of  at  his  death,5  and  provisions 
to  the  same  effect,  or  validating  the  devise  of  lands 
acquired  after  the  will  was  made,  are  contained  in  "the  statutes  of 
most  States,  which  will  be  enumerated  in  connection  with  the  sub- 
ject of  construing  wills.6 

The  conveyance  of  real  estate  after  a  devise  thereof  oper- 
ates, *  both  at  common   law  and  under  the  statutes,    as  a  [*  103] 
revocation  of  the  devise  to  the  extent  of  the  estate  con- 
Purchase-  veyed.7     Where  the  estate  devised  is  contracted  to  be 

monev  of  land    conveyed,    and    the    purchase-money   remains    unpaid, 
contracted  by     either  wholly  or  in  part,  it  goes  to  the  personal  repre- 
1   Real  estate  acquired  by  the  testator     But  the  sworn   statement   of  the  person 


Statutory  pro- 
visions :  will 
operates  upon 
all  property  in 
possession  at 
time  of  testa- 
tor's death. 


after  making  his  will  goes  to  the  heir  : 
Coulson  v.  Holmes,  5  Sawy.  279,  281; 
Jackson  v.  Potter,  9  Johns.  312,  314. 

2  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *  147.  See  post, 
§  419,  on  the  change  produced  by  statutes 
in  this  respect. 

3  Although  the  estate  reverts  by  the 
same  instrument :  Walton  v.  Walton,  7 
Johns.  Ch.  258,  268,  citing  English  au- 
thorities. 

4  1  Vict.  c.  26,  §  23. 

6  1  Redf.  on  Wills,  333,  pi.  2. 

6  Post,  §  419. 

1  Webster  v.  Webster,  105  Mass.  538, 
542  ;  Ilawes  v.  Humphrey,  9  Pick.  350, 
361  (citing  Toller,  19;  Clarke  v.  Berkeley, 
2  Win.  720;  Coke  v.  Bullock,  Cro.  Jac. 
49;  1  Roll.  Abr.  616;  Harkness v.  Bailey, 
Prec.  Ch.  514;  Tucker  v.  Thurstan,  17 
V>  131);  see  also  Terry  v.  Edminster, 
reported  in  9  Pick.  355,  note,  citing  Viner, 
Devi  e,R.  6;  Simmons  i\  Beazel,  1 25  [nd. 
862;  Emery  v.  Dnion  Society,  79  M<  334, 
holding  that  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  in 
mhIi  case  'i"  not  go  to  the  de\  isee  of  I  lie 
land  conveyed,  bnl  to  the  re  iduum.p,  342; 
(  <,//'  .  i  Jami  "ii,  i  _<  Mo.  A]i]i.  152,  157. 
106 


claiming  to  be  the  grantee  in  such  convey- 
ance, unsupported  by  other  evidence,  is 
not  sufficient  to  deprive  the  devisee  of  his 
interest,  if  the  deed  is  lost  and  has  never 
been  recorded  :  Napton  v.  Leaton,  71  Mo. 
358,  364 ;  and  where  the  conveyance, 
which  it  is  claimed  works  a  revocation,  is 
itself  procured  by  undue  influence  or 
fraud,  the  will  remains  in  force  :  Graham 
v.  Burch,  47  Minn.  171,  174,  and  cases 
cited.  The  conveyance  by  the  testator  of 
land  devised  in  a  will  also  bequeathing 
personalty  does  not  affect  the  legacy: 
Warren  v.  Taylor,  56  Iowa,  182;  nor 
does  the  conveyance  of  a  part  of  the  land 
devised  affect  the  validity  of  the  devise  of 
the  remainder :  Swails  r.  Swails,  98  Ind. 
511,513  ;  Hoittr.  Hoitt,  63  N.  11.475,497. 
A  devise  of  ground  rents  is  annulled  by 
the  payment  of  the  ground  rent  in  one 
lump  sum  to  testator  in  his  lifetime:  llar- 
Bhawv.  Harshaw,  184  Pa  St.  401.  "A 
specific  devise  of  real  estate  can  only  be 
revoked  by  the  destruction  of  the  will  or 
the  execution  of  another,  or  by  alienation 
id  the  estate  during  the  testator's  life": 
Bumham  V.  Comfort,  108  N.  Y.  535. 


§53 


INCONSISTENT   DISPOSITION   OF   GIFT. 


103,  *  104 


sentative,  and  not  to  the  devisee,  because  under  the  doc-   testator  to  be 
trine  of  equitable  conversion  the  purchaser  is  regarded    personal  repre- 
as  a  trustee  of  the  purchase-money  for  the  vendor.1     In   sentative. 
this  latter  respect,  however,  provision  is  made  in  many  of  the  Amer- 
ican States  that  the  purchase-money  shall  go  to  the  devisee;  thus, 
by  the  statutes  of  Alabama,2  Arkansas,3  California,4  In-    TT  , 

Unless  other- 

diana,5  Kansas,6  Missouri,7  Nevada,8  New  York,9  Ohio, 1:  wise  provided 
and  Oregon,11  it  is  enacted  substantially  that  a  contract  b-vstatute- 
or  bond  for  the  conveyance  of  real  estate  previously  devised  shall 
not  be  deemed  a  revocation  of  the  devise  unless  such  intention  shall 
clearly  appear,  but  such  property  shall  pass  to  the  devisee  subject  to 
the  right  of  the  purchaser  to  enforce  specific  performance  of  the  con- 
tract of  sale  to  the  same  extent  as  it  would  be  subject  to  as 
[*104]  against  the  heirs;  and  all  purchase-money  unpaid  at  *  the 
time  of  the  testator's  death  goes  to  the  devisee,  and  may  be 
recovered  by  him  from  the  executor  if  paid  to  him. 

A  similar  provision  exists  in  many  States  touching  charges  or 
encumbrances  by  the  testator  upon  devised  real  estate,  which  are 
declared  not  to  constitute  revocations  of  the  devise,  unless  it  appear 
from  the  will  or  the  instrument  creating  the  charge  to  be  so  in- 
tended; 12  but  the  consideration  of  this  subject,  as  well  as  that  of  the 
ademption  of  legacies  in  the  testator's  lifetime,  will  be  more  appro- 
priately taken  up  in  connection  with  the  effect  of  legacies  and  mar- 
shalling of  assets.13 

Where  property  is  held  by  a  trustee,  with  power  in  the  cestui  que 
trust  to  bequeath  the  same  by  will,  the  bequest  of  such 
property  is  not  revoked  by  the  investment  of  the  same 
in  real  estate,  subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  will,  al- 
though the  testatrix  and  her  legatee,  who  is  also  her 
husband,  occupy  the  same  until  she  dies. 

The  surplus  remaining  after  a  sale  under  a  mortgage,  after  the 
testator's  death,  usually  goes  to  the  devisees,14  and  in  the  same  pro- 
portions as  the  land  would  have  gone.15 


Will  of  a  cestui 
que  trust  not 
revoked  by  act 
of  the  trustee. 


1  See  American  cases  cited,  post,  §  276 
also  Farrar   v.    Winterton,  5   Beav.  1,  8 
Moor    v.   Raisbeck,    12    Sim.    123,    138 
Gale  v.  Gale,  21  Beav.  349,353;  Donohoo 
v.  Lea,  1  Swan,  119,  121. 

2  Code,  1896,  §  4254.  It  is  held,  under 
this  statute,  that  not  only  the  unpaid  pur- 
chase-money, but  also  the  right  to  vacate  a 
deed  obtained  by  fraud,  passes  to  the  de- 
visee :  Powell  v.  Powell,  30  Ala.  697,  704. 

3  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  7397. 

4  Civ.  Code,  §  1301. 

6  Ann.  St.  1894,  §  2733. 

6  Gen.  St.  1897,  ch.  110,  §  31. 

7  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  8874. 


8  Gen.  St.  1885,  §§3012,  3013. 

9  2  Banks  &  Bro.  (9th  ed.  1896),  p. 
1879,  §  47. 

10  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  5954. 

11  Code,  1887,  §  3073. 

12  The  property  in  such  cases  passes  to 
the  devisee  subject  to  the  encumbrance  : 
so  provided  in  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Cali- 
fornia, Indiana,  Kansas,  Missouri,  Nevada, 
New  York,  Ohio,  and  Oregon. 

13  Post,  §  450.  See  also,  as  to  the  ex- 
oneration of  such  encumbrances,  post, 
§§  494,  497. 

14  Post,  §  279. 

15  Slocum  v.  Ames,  19  R.  I.  401. 

107 


*  104,  *  105  REVOCATION   OP   WILLS.  §  54 

§  54.  Revocation  by  Marriage.  —  At  common  law,  the  marriage  of 
a  feme  sole  works  the  revocation  of  any  will  previously  made  by 
Marriage  of  a  her,  although  she  survive  her  husband,1  and  although 
feme  sole  testa-   the  husbaud,  at  the  time  of  her  marriage,  agreed  that 

trix  revokes 

her  will  at  the  marriage  should  not  affect  the  will.2  The  rule  does 
common  law.  n0£  necessarily  apply  to  a  will  made  by  a,  feme  sole,  and 
operating  as  an  appointment  under  a  power  to  declare  uses.3 

As  early  as  1682  the  rule  of  the  civil  law,4  that  where  a  man 
made  his  will,  and  afterward  married  and  had  issue,  and 
Marriage  and  died  *  without  expressly  revoking  his  will,  leav-  [*  105] 
birth  of  issue  jUg  issue  and  wife  unprovided  for,  this  should 
of  testator  at  be  considered  as  an  implied  revocation  of  his  will,  was 
common  law.  introduced  into  the  courts  of  England,5  and  subsequently 
adopted  in  the  common-law  courts.0  Marriage  alone  of  a  testator, 
apart  from  the  existence  of  issue  subsequent  to  the  making  of  the 
will,  was  not  considered  as  having  the  effect  of  revoking  it.7  The 
rule  includes  not  only  testators  unmarried  at  the  time  of  making 
the  will ;  it  also  applies  to  the  case  of  one  whose  wife  subsequently 
dies,  but  who  marries  again  and  has  issue  of  his  subsequent  mar- 
riage.8 But  it  has  been  held  that  the  birth  of  a  child  alone  does  not 
revoke  a  will  made  after  marriage,  since  a  married  man  must  be 
supposed  to  contemplate  such  event;  and  that  the  circumstance  that 
the  testator  left  his  wife  enceinte  without  knowing  it,  did  not  im- 
part to  the  posthumous  birth  any  revoking  effect.9     But  the  birth  of 

1  The  reason  of  this  rnle  is  said  to  rest  5  Overbury  v.  Overbury,  2  Show.  242. 
on  the  disability  created  by  the  coverture  61  Wins.  [192];  1  Jarm.  *123;  1 
to  dispose  of  the  property  devised  or  be-  Redf.  on  Wills,  293,  pi.  2 ;  Wilcox  v. 
queathed,  whereby  the  ambulatory  quality  Bootes,  1  Wash.  (Va.)  140;  Brush  v. 
of  the  will — one  of  its  essential  features  Wilkins,  4  Johns.  Ch.  506,  510;  Bloomer 
—  is  destroyed :  Hodsden  v.  Lloyd.  2  Bro.  ».  Bloomer,  2  Bradf.  339,  345.  See  the 
Ch.  R.  534,  544 ;  Morev  v.  Sohier,  63  case  of  Johnston  v.  Johnston,  1  Phillim. 
N.  H.  507,  510;  it  would  follow  from  this  447,  468,  in  which  Sir  John  Nicholl  re- 
view that,  if  the  husband  dies  before  his  views  the  origin  of  the  rule  and  the  his- 
wife  without  having  exercised  his  marital  tory  of  its  adoption  in  England,  reaching 
rights  respecting  the  property  disposed  of  the  conclusion  that  subsequent  marriage 
by  the  will,  its  validity  is  thereby  restored  :  is  not  an  essential  ingredient  in  the  cir- 
Morton  v.  Onion,  45  Vt.  145,  152.  And  cumstances  raising  the  presumption  of 
so  where  tlie  husband  acquires  uo  right  revocation.  And  it  seems  that  such  was 
over  the  wife's  property  by  marriage,  the  the  civil  law. 

rul"  ceases  with  its  reason  :  In  re  Tuller,  7  "On  the  ground,  probably,  that  the 

79  111.  99,  101  ;  Fellows  v.  Allen,  60  N.  II.  law  had   made   for  the  wife   a   provision 

439,  442;    Webb   '•.  Jones,  36  N.  J.    F.q.  independently  of  the  act  of  the  husband, 

163;    (forest)    Southworth,  55  Mich.  173;  by    means    of    dower":     1    Jarm.    *123; 

Emery,  Appellant,  81   Me.  275;  and  see  Hulett  v.  Carey,  66  Minn.  827,  838. 

authorities  port,  §  ."»:.,  p.  *  108,  aote  n.  8  l  Redf.  on   Wills,  293,  pi.  2,  citing 

-  Carey's  I  Btate,   I'.t  Vt    230,241.  Christopher    v.    Christopher,    Dick.    445, 

3   1    Jarm.    M22;     1     Wins.    [192];     1  also  cited    in    4    Rurr.   2182;    Baldwin   v. 

Redf.  on  Wills,  294  et  •><</.  Spriggs,  65  Md.  373,  379. 

i  1    Redf.  on  Wills,  294,  citing  Just.         '"  1  Jarm.  *  122,  citing  Doe  t>.  Barford, 

Inst    lib.  2,  cap.   13,  §  5.  4  M.  &  Bel.  10.     I!ut  the  rule  of  the  civil 
108 


§  54  REVOCATION    BY   MARRIAGE.  *  105,  *  106 

issue,  without  subsequent  marriage,  in  conjunction  with  other  alter- 
ations in  the  testator's  circumstances,  has  been  held  sufficient  to 
establish  an  implied  revocation  of  the  will:1 

It  was  the  source  of  considerable  dissension  between  the  ecclesi- 
astical and  common-law  courts,  whether  the  presumption  of  revoca- 
tion rested  upon  the  implied  intention  of  the  testator  to  meet  the 
duties  devolving  on  him  from  the  new  state  of  circumstances,  or 
upon  a  rule  of  law  tacitly  annexed  to  the  execution  of  the  will,  re- 
sulting in  a  revocation  upon  marriage  and  birth  of  issue  indepen- 
dently of  his  intention.  The  latter  view  was  announced  in  the  case 
of  Marston  v.  Roe,2  by  all  the  judges  of  England  (except  Lord 
Denman,  who  was  absent),  and  Williams  says  that  there  seems  to 
be  no  doubt  that  the  principle  of  this  case  would  in 
[*  106]  *  future  be  applied  for  the  decision  of  cases  of  this  descrip- 
tion in  the  ecclesiastical  as  well  as  the  temporal  courts.3 
The  importance  of  the  distinction  arises  out  of  the  consequence  that 
in  the  former  case  evidence  was  admissible  in  support  of  the  will 
to  rebut  the  presumed  intention,4  while  in  the  latter  it  was  finally 
settled  that  no  evidence  of  the  testator's  intention  that  his  will 
should  not  be  revoked  was  admissible  to  rebut  the  presumption  of 
the  law.5 

Marriage  and  the  birth  of  issue  do  not  at  common  law  produce 
revocation  of  a  will,  if  provision  be  made  for  the  wife  and  children 
by  the  will  itself,  or,  it  is  conceived,  by  settlement  exe-    But  marriage 
cuted  previously  to  the  will.     But  it  follows  from  the    *,ld  issu«  Pr°- 
doctrine  that  revocation  is  presumed  by  the  law  from    tion  if  child  be 
marriage  and  the  birth  of  issue,  that  a  provision   for    Provldtd  for- 
wife  and  children  under  a  settlement  executed  after  the  will  cannot 
prevent  revocation,  as  it  might  have  done  if  the  question  had  been 
one  merely  of  intention.6    Nor  is  provision  for  the  wife  alone  suffi- 
cient, though  made  before  the  will;  nor,  perhaps,  a  provision  for 
children  alone,  though  made  before  the  will;  it  seems  that  the  ex- 
ception is  confined  to  a  case  where  both  wife  and  children  are  pro- 
vided for.7 

law  was  that  the  birth  of  a  child,  not  fore-  Havens  v.  Van  Den  Burgh,  1  Denio,  27, 

seen  by  the  testator,  operated  as  a  revoca-  32. 

tion  of  the  entire  testament :  Bloomer  v.  5  Marston   v.    Roe,  8  Ad.    &    El.  14  ; 

Bloomer,  2  Bradf.  339,  344.  Sherry    v    I.ozier,    1     Bradf.    437,    453 ; 

1  Delafield  v.  Parish,  1   Redf.  1,  106;  Raldwin  v.  Springs,  65  Md.  373  ;  Nutty. 
Sherry  v.  Lozier,  1  Bradf.  437,  453.  Norton,  142  Mass.  242,  245. 

2  8  Ad.  &  El.  14,  54.  6  j  Jarm.  *  124,  citing  Israeli  v.  Rodon, 
8  Wms.    Ex.    [195],   citing    Israeli   v.     2  Moo.  P.  C.  51.  as  overruling  Talbot  v. 

Rodon.  2  Moore  P.  C.  51,  63,  64  ;  Walker  Talbot,  1  Hagg  705  ;  Johnson  v.  Wells,  2 

v.  Walker,   2   Curt.   854;  Matson  v.  Ma-  Hagg.  Eccl.  561,  564;  Ex  parte  Dchester, 

grath,  1  Robert.  680  7  Ves.  348.  365. 

4  Brush  v.  Wilkins,  4  Johns.  Ch.  506,  7  1  Jarm.  *  124,  citing  Marston  w.  Roe, 

510,  reviewing   the  English   authorities;  supra,  and  Kenebel   v.  Scrafton,  2  East, 

Yerby  v.  Yerby,  3  Call,  334,  338,  et  seq.;  530,  541. 

109 


*  106,  *  107  REVOCATION    OP   WILLS.  §  55 

Several  dicta x  intimate  the  opinion  that  revocation  does  not  take 
place  where  the  will  disposes  of  less  than  the  whole  estate;  but  it 
has  never  been  so  decided,  and,  considering  that  the  inquiry  is  not 
what  the  testator  intended,  but  whether  the  wife  and  children  be  in 
fact  provided  for,  it  seems  that  revocation  would  in  all  cases  follow 
where  there  is  no  actual  provision,  although  there  might  be  an  in- 
tended or  professed  one.2 

*  A  will  once  revoked  by  marriage  and  the  birth  of  issue  is  [*  107] 
not  revived  by  the  death  of  the  child  or  children  in  the  life- 
time of  the  testator.8 

§  55.  Revocation  by  Marriage  and  Birth  of  Issue  under  English 
and  American  Statutes.  —  The  question  of  implied  revocation  by  a 
T,  ,    _,  change  in  the  condition  or  circumstances  of  the  testator 

Under  the  ° 

English  Stat-      is  now  determined  by  statute,  both  in  England  and  in  - 
ute  of  Wills.       most  of  the  American  states.     The  English  statute  of 

1837  provides,  in  this  respect,  "  that  every  will  made  by  a  man  or 
woman  shall  be  revoked  by  his  or  her  marriage,"  except  a  will  made 
in  exercise  of  a  power  of  appointment  (§  18).  And  "that  no  will 
shall  be  revoked  by  any  presumption  of  an  intention  on  the  ground 
of  an  alteration  in  circumstances  "  (§  19).  And  "no  will  or  codicil, 
or  any  part  thereof,  shall  be  revoked  otherwise  than  as  aforesaid" 
(by  marriage),  "or  by  another  will  or  codicil  executed  in  manner 
hereinbefore  required,  or  by  some  writing  declaring  an  intention  to 
revoke  the  same,  and  executed  in  the  manner  in  which  a  will  is 
hereinbefore  required  to  be  executed,  or  by  the  burning,  tearing,  or 
otherwise  destroying  the  same  by  the  testator,  or  by  some  person  in 
his  presence  and  by  his  direction,  with  the  intention  to  revoke  the 
same"  (§20). 

The  American  statutes  vary  greatly  on  this  point.  In  Colorado,4 
Connecticut,5    Georgia,6     Illinois,7    Kentucky,8    North     Carolina,9 

1  By  Lord  Mansfield  in  Brady  v.  Cubit,  8  Jarm.  *  1 26,  relying  on    Helyar  v. 

1    Doug.  31,  39;   Lord  Ellenborough,  in  Helyar,  cited  in  1   Phillim.  413;  Sullivan 

Kenebel    v.    Scrafton,  2   East,    541;    and  v.  Sullivan,  cited  in  1  Phillim.  343;  Emer- 

Tindal,  C.  J.,  in  Marston  v.  Hoe,  8  Ad.  &  son  v.  Boville,  cited  in  1  Phillim.  324. 

El.  57.  4  Scherrer    v.    Brown,   21     Colo.   481, 

a  1  Jarm.  *  1 25.     So  property  acquired  affirming  Brown  v.  Scherrer,  5  Col.  App. 

after  the  execution  of  the  will,  and  which  255,  where  the  law  is  fully  discussed. 

is  unaffected  thereby,  is  not  a  provision  5  Since  1885,  the  act  not  being  retro- 

for  the  after-born  children,  so  as  to  pre-  spective:    Goodsell's    Appeal,    55    Conn. 

vent  revocation:   Baldwin  v.  Spriggs,  65  171. 

M,|.  373.  6  Code,  1895,  §  3347.     The   language 

7  St.  &  C'urt.  St.  1896,  p.  1433,  §  10.  alone  revoked  the  previous  will  of  a  tes- 
In  this  State  it  had  been  held,  before  the  tator  disposing  <>f  the  whole  of  his  estate 
enactment  of  tins  statute,  that  marriage  without  making  provision   in  contempla- 

8  St.  1894,  §  4K32.  Although  there  he  statute  was  inapplicable  where  a  will  was 
an  ante-nuptial  contract :  Ransom  v.  Con-  made  simultaneously  with  the  marriage, 
nelly,  93   Ky.  63.     It  was  held  thai  the  l»y  a  woman,  with  the  consent  of  the  in- 

'  Code]  1883,  §2177. 

110 


55 


REVOCATION    BY   MARRIAGE,   BIRTH,    ETC. 


108 


[*108]  Khode  Island,1  *  Virginia,2  and  West  Virginia,3    Under  Ameri- 

the  marriage  of  a  man  or  woman  is  declared  tan  statutes- 
to  revoke  a  previous  will  made  by  him  or  her;  in  Alabama,4 
Arkansas,5  California,6  Indiana,7  Missouri,8  Nevada,9  New  York,1" 
Oregon,11  and  Pennsylvania,12  the  marriage  of  a  feme  sole  is  de- 
clared to  revoke  her  previous  will;  the  statute  in  California  and 
Pennsylvania13  also  providing  that  the  death  of  the  husband  before 
that  of  the  testatrix  shall  not  have  the  effect  to  revive  her  will.  In 
Ohio,14  on  the  contrary,  the  statute  provides  that  the  marriage  of  a 
testatrix  shall  not  revoke  her  will  previously  made;  and  in  Maine,15 
Wisconsin,16  Illinois,17  New  Hampshire,18  New  Jersey,19  and  Michi- 


is :  "  In  all  cases  the  marriage  of  a  testa- 
tor, or  the  birth  of  a  child  to  him,  subse- 
quent to  the  making  of  a  will,  in  which 
no  provision  is  made  in  contemplation  of 
such  an  event,  shall  be  a  revocation  of  the 
will."  This  is  held  to  mean  that  the  pro- 
vision is  made  by  the  will;  the  provision 
for  the  wife  or  child  otherwise  than  by 
the  will  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  ques- 
tion:  Deupree  v.  Deupree,  45  Ga.  414, 
439.  Though  the  statute  uses  only  the 
word  "  testator,"  it  is  held  to  apply  as  well 
to  a  testatrix  :  Ellis  v.  Darden,  86  Ga.  368. 

1  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  666,  §  16.  The  lan- 
guage of  the  former  statute  is :  "  No  de- 
vise .  .  .  shall  be  revocable  otherwise  than 
by  a  marriage  of  the  testator  subsequent  to 
the  date  thereof,  or,"  etc.  This  is  held  to 
mean,  that  the  acts  and  instruments  speci- 
fied shall  be  competent  to  revoke  a  will, 
not  that  they  shall  absolutely  have  that 
effect:  Wheeler  v.  Wheeler,  1  R.  I.  364, 
373.  Hence  marriage  constitutes  a  pre- 
sumptive revocation  only,  which  may  be 
rebutted  by  extrinsic  evidence :  Miller  v. 
Phillips,  9R.  I.   141,  144. 

2  Code,  1887,  §  2517. 

8  Code,  1891,  ch.  77,  §  6. 
*  Code,  1896,  §  4249. 

5  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  7395. 

6  Civ.  Code,  §  1300. 


tion  of  the  relations  arising  out  of  it, 
because  under  the  law  of  Illinois  husband 
and  wife  inherited  from  each  other  in 
default  of  children :  American  Board  v. 
Nelson,  72  111.  564,  affirming  Tyler  v. 
Tyler,  19-111.  151,  and  affirmed  in  Duryea 


-tended  husband,  and  he  released  by  con- 
tract all  interest  in  her  estate  :  Stewart  v. 
Mulholland,  88  Ky.  38  ;  but  it  was  subse- 
quently held,  that  a  man's  marriage  re- 


7  Burns'  Ann.  St.  1894,  §  2732. 

8  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  8873. 

9  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  3010. 

11  The  subsequent  statute  authorizing 
married  women  to  make  wills  does  not 
change  the  rule  that  the  will  of  a  feme 
sole  is  revoked  by  her  marriage :  Brown 
v.  Clark,  77  N.  Y.  369,  372.  The  statute 
uses  the  words  "unmarried  women,"  and 
is  held  to  apply  to  widows  who  remarry  : 
Matter  of  Kaufmann,  131  N.  Y.  620  ;  but 
not  to  a  married  woman  who  subsequently 
becomes  a  widow  and  then  remarries: 
Matter  of  McLarney,  153  N.  Y.  416. 

11  Code,  1887,  §3072. 

12  Pepper  &  Lewis  Dig.  1896,  p.  1450, 
§  50. 

13  And  even  if  the  husband  gives  his 
consent  prior  to  the  marriage,  in  writing, 
to  a  will  excluding  him,  the  will  is  re- 
voked ;  while  it  may  operate,  as  against 
him,  as  an  ante-nuptial  contract,  a  child 
born  after  the  marriage,  is  not  concluded- 
Craft's  Estate,  164  Pa.  St.  520. 

11  Rev.  St.  1890,  §  5958. 

15  Emery,  Appellant,  81  Me.  275. 

i6  Ward's  Will,  70  Wis.  251,  257. 

"  In  re  Tuller,  79  111.  99. 

i8  Fellows  v.  Allen,  60  N.  H.  439,  442. 

19  Webb  v.  Jones,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  163. 


v.  Duryea,  85  111.  41,  50.  Since  the  act 
of  1872,  marriage,  whether  of  a  man  or 
woman,  operates  per  se  as  a  revocation  of 
a  prior  will:  McAnnulty  v.  McAnnulty, 
120  111.  26. 


vokes  his  will,  althougk  at  the  execution 
of  the  will  he  executes  an  ante-nuptial 
contract  with  his  wife :  Stewart  i>.  Powell, 
90  Ky.  511. 

Ill 


*  108,  *  109  REVOCATION    OF   WILLS.  §55 

gan,1  it  is  so  held  on  the  ground  of  the  removal  of  the  disabilities  of 
married  women.  In  Nevada2  and  California,3  the  marriage  of  a 
man  revokes  a  will  previously  made,  if  the  wife  survives  him  and 
no  provision  has  been  made  for  her;  and  in  Georgia,4  and  South 
Carolina,5  if  the  will  contains  no  provision  for  the  future  wife  and 
children,  if  any. 

In  quite  a  number  of  States,  in  which  the  statute  prescribes  the 
manner  in  which  a  will  may  be  revoked,  a  saving  clause  is  intro- 
duced declaring  that  the  statute  shall  not  be  understood  as  control- 
ling or  negativing  a  revocation,  implied  or  presumed,  upon  the 
ground  of  a  change  in  the  testator's  circumstances;  for  instance, 
in  Kansas,6  Maine,7  Massachusetts,8  Michigan,9  Minnesota,10  Ne- 
braska,11 New  Hampshire,12  Ohio,13  Vermont,14  and  Wisconsin.16 
The  statute  of  North  Carolina,   on  the  contrary,   provides 

*  that  no  will  shall  be  revoked  by  any  presumption  of  an  [*  109] 
intention  on  the  ground  of  an  alteration  in  circumstances.16 

The  natural  effect  of  these  saving  clauses  seems  to  be,  that  in  the 
States  whose  statutes  so  provide  the  doctrine  of  the  common  law  on 
this  subject n  is  affirmatively  recognized,  and  its  rules  must  deter- 
mine the  circumstances  under  which  a  revocation  is  to  be  presumed.1* 

The  will  of  a  testator  disposing  of  the  whole  of  his  estate,  who 
marries  after  making  it,  and  dies  leaving  issue  of  such  marriage 
unprovided  for  in  the  will,  and  not  mentioned  therein  in  such  way 

1  Noyes  v.  Southworth,  55  Mich.  173.  woman  in  favor  of  her  children  by  a  former 

2  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  3009.  husband  is  not  revoked  by  her  marriage 

3  Civ.  Code,  §  1299 ;  Corker  v.  Corker,  with  a  third  after  the  death  of  the  second 
87  Cal.  643.  husband,  having  no  children  by  her  last 

*  Code,  1895,  §  3347.  marriage  :  Will  of  Ward,  70  Wis.  251. 

6  Rev.  St.  1893.  16  Code,  1883,  §  2178. 

6  Gen.  St.  1897,  ch.  110,  §  37.  "  Ante,  §  54. 

7  Rev.  St.  1883,  p.  608,  §  3.  18  Warner  v.  Beach,  4  Gray,  162,  163 ; 

8  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  748,  §  8;  under  Nutt  v.  Norton,  142  Mass.  242,  245  ;  Swan 
this  statute  it  is  held  that  the  will  of  a  v.  Hammoud,  138  Mass.  45.  Says  the 
feme  sole  is  revoked  by  her  subsequent  Supreme  Court  of  Nebraska :  "  It  is  for 
marriage :  Swan  v.  Hammond,  138  Mass.  the  court  to  determine  from  the  facts  of 
45.  each  particular  case  whether  the  testator 

9  An  implied  revocation  of  a  former  intended  the  will  to  stand  notwithstanding 
will  in  favor  of  a  wife  was  held  to  result  the  changes  in  his  condition  "  :  Baacke 
from  a  settlement  of  all  property  matters  v.  Baacke,  50  Neb.  18,  23,  holding  that 
pending  a  divorce  :  Lansing  v.  Haynes,  the  will  was  not  revoked  by  the  testator's 
95  Mich.  16.  divorce,  and  the  death  of  a  child  leaving 

10  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  5030.  Marriage  descendants.  Numerous  cases  are  referred 
without  birth  of  issue  will  not  in  this  to  in  the  opinion.  In  New  Hampshire  it 
State  revoke  his  will :  Ilulett  v.  Carey,  66  is  held  that  this  clause  "  is  to  be  taken  not 
Minn.  .'JiiH.  as  a  recognition  and  adoption  of  the  com- 

11  Cons.  St.  1893,  §  1191.  mou-law  doctrine,  but  of  the  English 
W  Pub.  St.  1891,  ch.  186,  §  15.  decisions  under  §§  5,6,  and  22  of  the 
13  Hates'  Ann.  St.  1895,  §  5953.  Statute  of  Frauds,  passed  in  1676  " :  Hoitt 
M  St.  1894,  §  2854.  v.  Hoitt,  68  N.  H.  475,  495;  Morey  v. 
16  In  this  State  the  will  of  a  married  Sohier,  63  N.  H.  507,  510. 

112 


§55 


REVOCATION   BY   MARRIAGE,   BIRTH,   ETC.       *  109,  *  110 


as  to  show  his  intention  not  to  make  such  provision,  is  declared  to 
be  revoked  by  the  statutes  of  Alabama,1  Arkansas,2  California,8 
Missouri,4  New  York,5  Oregon.6  The  birth  of  legitimate  issue  after 
making  a  will,  for  whom  no  provision  is  made,  revokes  the  will 
without  reference  to  the  question  of  marriage  under  the  statutes  of 
Connecticut,7  Delaware,8  Georgia,9  Indiana,10  Kansas,11  New  Jer- 
sey,12 and  Ohio.18 
[*  110]  *  In  Colorado  14  and  Illinois  15  the  statute  declares  that  if, 
after  making  a  will,  a  child  or  children  be  born  to  any  testa- 
tor for  whom  no  provision  is  made  therein,  the  will  shall  not,  on 
that  account,  be  revoked ;  but  unless  it  shall  appear  from  the  will 
that  such  issue  was  intentionally  disinherited,  the  devises  and  lega- 
cies by  such  will  given  shall  be  abated  in  equal  proportions  to  raise 
a  portion  for  such  child  or  children  equal  to  that  which  such  child 
or  children  would  have  been  entitled  to  if  no  will  had  been  made. 


1  Code,  1896,  §  4249.  See  Gay  v.  Gay, 
84  Ala.  38,  as  to  what  constitutes  sufficient 
provision,  and  what  evidence  is  admissible 
to  show  provision  for  a  child,  by  settlement. 

2  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  7395. 

8  Civ.  Code,  §  1298;  Sanders  v.  Sim- 
cich,  65  Cal.  50. 

4  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  8872. 

6  2  Banks  &  Bro.  Rev.  St.  (9th  ed.)  p. 
1878,  §  43.  If  the  wife  survive.  See 
Gall  in  re,  5  Dem.  374. 

6  Code,  1887,  §  3071. 

7  Gen.  St.  1888,  §  542. 

8  Rev.  Code,  1874,  p.  510,  §  11. 

9  Code,  1895,  §  3347. 

10  Burns'  Ann.  St.  1894,  §  2730.  But 
if  such  child  dies  without  issue  while  the 
mother  is  living,  the  estate  passes  under  the 
will  except  the  wife's  interest  therein  ;  and 
in  case  of  the  death  of  both,  the  child  leav- 
ing no  issue,  the  whole  estate  passes  under 
the  will,  unless  the  child  leaves  a  wife, 
who  shall  hold  such  estate  to  her  use 
so  long  as  she  remains  unmarried :  lb., 
§  2561.  Whether  under  this  section  the 
will  is  absolutely  revoked  by  the  birth  of 
the  child,  or  is  held  in  abeyance  until  its 
death  without  issue,  has  not  been  decided  : 
Morse  v.  Morse,  42  Ind.  365,  370.  The 
common-law  rule,  that  marriage  alone 
does  not  revoke  the  previous  will  of  a 
man  is  not  changed  in  this  State  :  Bowers 
v.  Bowers,  53  Ind.  430,  432.  There  is  in 
this  State  no  presumption  that  the  tes- 
tator forgot  the  descendants  of  a  deceased 
child,  which  neither  in  their  own  nor  their 

VOL.  I.  —  8 


mother's  right  are  mentioned  in  the  will : 
Culp  v.  Culp,  142  Ind.  159. 

11  Gen.  St.  1897,  ch.  110,  §  36. 

12  Coudert  v.  Coudert,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  407. 
18  Rev.  St.  1890,  §  5959.     The  statute 

"  when  the  testator  had  no  child  at  the 
time  of  executing  such  will,  and  shall 
afterward  have  a  child,"  is  construed  to 
include  a  posthumous  child  :  Evans  v. 
Anderson,  15  Oh.  St.  324,  326.  The 
will  is  not  revived  by  the  death  of 
the  child  before  that  of  the  testator  :  Ash 
v.  Ash,  9  Oh.  St.  383,  387.  A  devise  to 
testator's  wife  for  life  and  then  "  to  the 
heirs  of  her  body  begotten  "  is  not  a  pro- 
vision for  an  after-born  child :  Rhodes  v. 
Weldy,  46  Oh.  St.  234. 

14  Mills'  Ann.  St.  1891,  §  4659. 

15  St.  &  Curt.  St.  1896,  ch.  39,  1  10; 
Ward  v.  Ward,  120  111.  111.  The  pro- 
vision required  by  the  statute  need  not 
be  definite  or  certain ;  as  the  testator 
may  totally  disinherit  such  after-born 
child,  any  provision,  no  matter  how  re- 
motely contingent,  or  insignificant,  will 
prevent  the  application  of  the  statute : 
Osborn  v.  Jefferson  Bank,  116  111.  130. 
And  the  intent  to  disinherit  may  appear 
from  the  whole  will,  read  in  the  light  of 
the  surroundings  under  which  it  was 
written:  Hawke  v.  R.  R.,  165  111.  561. 
But  the  intention  to  disinherit  must  appear 
from  the  face  of  the  will ;  nor  is  it  suffi- 
cient that  the  will  shows  that  the  testator 
knew  that  a  child  was  about  to  be  born  to 
him,  if  nothing  more  appears :  Lurie  v. 
Rudnitzer,  166  111.  609. 

113 


*  110,  *  111 


REVOCATION   OF   WILLS. 


§55 


Similar  provisions,  in  effect  declaring  a  revocation  pro  tanto  upon 
the  birth  of  issue  after  the  making  of  a  will  containing  no  provision 
for  such  event,  giving  such  after-born  children  an  interest  in  the  estate 
equal  to  what  would  have  descended  to  them  in  case  of  intestacy, 
are  contained  in  the  statutes  of  Alabama,1  Arkansas,2  Cali- 
fornia, 3  Delaware, 4  Iowa, 5  Maine, 6  Massachusetts, 7  *  Michigan, 8  [*  111] 


1  Code,  1896,  §  4251. 

2  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  7399.  Whether 
the  omission  of  the  child  is  accidental  or 
intentional :  Brautou  v.  Branton,  23  Ark. 
569,  572. 

3  Civ.  Code,  §§  1306,  1307.  The  use 
of  the  word  "  children  "  in  the  introduc- 
tory clause  of  a  will  is  not  indicative  of 
an  intention  to  exclude  the  children  of  a 
deceased  daughter  not  named :  Estate  of 
Utz,  43  Cal.  200,  203.  But  the  term 
"  children  "  may,  if  the  intent  be  apparent, 
be  sufficient  to  show  intentional  omission 
of  all  descendants :  Rhoton  v.  Blevin,  99 
Cal.  645.  Parol  evidence  is  not  admissible 
to  show  that  a  testator  intentionally 
omitted  a  child  ;  it  must  appear  from  the 
will  itself :  Estate  of  Garraud,  35  Cal. 
336,  339 ;  In  re  Stevens,  85  Cal.  322,  328. 
And  the  mere  mention  in  the  will  of  one 
closely  related  by  blood,  or  intimately  as- 
sociated in  family  relations  with  the 
omitted  heir,  is  insufficient  to  show  that 
the  omission  was  intentional :  In  re  Sal- 
mon, 107  Cal.  614.  The  issue  not  named 
in  the  will  of  an  intentionally  disinherited 
daughter,  who  was  living  at  the  making 
of  the  will,  do  not  acquire  any  rights  by 
the  death  of  such  daughter  before  the 
testator:  Barter's  Estate,  86  Cal.  441  ; 
the  purchaser  of  realty  under  a  sale  by 
the  executor  under  a  power  in  the  will 
does  not  take  a  good  title  as  against  pre- 
termitted children  :  Smith  v.  Olmstead,  88 
Cal.  582.  —  The  object  of  the  statute  in 
regard  to  pretermitted  heirs  is  not  to  com- 
pel the  testator  to  make  provision  for  a 
child,  but  solely  to  protect  children  against 
forgetfulness  or  oversight ;  and  parol  evi- 
dence is  inadmissible  to  show  a  mistake 
of  the  testatrix  in  devising  lands  not 
owned  by  her:  Matter  of  C'allaghan,  119 
Cal.  57 1 . 

*    Warren    V.    Morris,  4    Del.   Ch.  289, 

306,  The  testamentary  title  is  not  dis- 
turbed by  this  statute,  bnt  each  devisee 
and  legatee  is  charged  with  a  proportional 
contribution  to  make  up  an  estate  for  the 

1 1  i 


post-testamentary  child  equal  to  what  it 
would  have  received  if  there  had  been  no 
will :  lb.,  p.  307. 

6  Iowa  Code,  1897,  §  3279.  This  stat- 
ute mentions  posthumous  children  only. 
It  is  held,  however,  as  a  principle  of 
law,  that  the  birth  of  a  child  to  the  tes- 
tator after  making  his  will  and  before 
his  death  operates  as  an  implied  revo- 
cation :  McCullum  v.  McKenzie,  26  Iowa, 
510;  Negus  v.  Negus,  46  Iowa,  487; 
Alden  v.  Johnson,  63  Iowa,  124.  But  the 
omission  may  be  shown  to  be  intentional 
by  parol  testimony  :  Lorieux  v.  Keller,  5 
Iowa,  196,  203.  It  is  also  held  in  this 
State  that  the  birth  of  an  illegitimate 
child  recognized  by  the  father  has  the 
same  effect  upon  the  father's  previous 
will :  Milburn  v.  Milburn,  60  Iowa,  411. 

6  Rev.  St.  1883,  p.  608,  §  9.  A  devise 
to  the  widow  during  her  life  and  widow- 
hood, "  to  revert  to  his  heirs  upon  her 
death  or  marriage,"  is  not  a  provision  for 
a  posthumous  child  under  this  statute.  It 
will  take  as  if  the  father  had  died  intes- 
tate: Waterman  v.  Hawkins,  63  Me.  156, 
160. 

7  Tub.  St.  1882,  p.  750,  §  22.  If  it  is 
evident  from  the  will  that  the  child  was 
in  the  contemplation  of  the  testator,  it 
does  not  take  under  this  statute  :  Prentiss 
v.  Prentiss,  11  Allen,  47,  49,  approving 
Wild  v.  Brewer,  2  Mass.  570 ;  aud  the 
omission  may  be  shown  to  be  intentional 
by  parol  testimony  :  Buckley  v.  Gerard, 
1 23  Mass.  8,11;  Lorings  v.  Marsh,  6 
Wall.  337,  347.  See  Ilurly  v.  O'Sullivan, 
137  Mass.  86,  aud  Coulaiii  v.  Doull,  133 
U.S.  216. 

8  How.  St.  1882,  §  5809.  The  statute 
also' provides  a  pro  rata  intestacy  when  a 
child  or  issue  of  a  deceased  child  is  by 
accident  or  mistake  not  provided  for  ;  it 
is  held  thereunder  that  giving  a  mere 
keepsake  in  the  will  to  such  a  person, 
though  by  name,  is  not  a  provision  which 
avoids  the  application  of  the  statute: 
Stebbins'  Estate,  94  Mich.  304,  also  hold- 


§55 


REVOCATION    BY    MARRIAGE,    BlliTH,    ETC. 


*111 


Minnesota,1  Missouri,2  Nebraska,3  Nevada,4  New  Hampshire,5  New 
Jersey,6  New  York,7  Oregon,8  Rhode  Island,9  South  Carolina,1* 
Tennessee,11  Texas,12  Utah,13   Virginia,14  Washington,15  West  Vir- 


ing  parol  evidence  competent  to  show 
intentional  omission ;  but  the  naming  of 
the  children  as  a  class,  with  a  direction 
for  their  support,  is  sufficient  to  render 
the  statute  inapplicable  :  Forbes  v.  Dar- 
ling, 94  Mich.  621. 

1  Gen.  St.  1891,  §§  5634-5636. 

2  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  8877.  The  statute 
of  Missouri  requires  the  child  to  be 
"  named  "  in  the  will ;  hence  the  declara- 
tion that  one  of  his  children  shall  take  no 
part  of  his  estate  is  sufficient  to  prevent 
revocation  as  to  such  child  :  Block  v. 
Block,  3  Mo.  594 ;  it  is  held  that  when- 
ever the  mention  of  one  person,  by  a  nat- 
ural association  of  ideas,  suggests  another, 
it  may  reasonably  be  inferred  that  the 
latter  was  in  the  mind  of  the  testator 
and  was  not  forgotten  or  unintentionally 
omitted  ;  hence  specific  bequests  by  name 
to  the  minor  children  of  testator's  living 
daughter  is  a  sufficient  reference  to  the 
daughter  to  prevent  the  operation  of  the 
statute  as  to  her:  Woods  v.  Drake,  135 
Mo.  393  ;  and  the  mention  of  a  deceased 
child  is  sufficient  as  to  the  descendants 
of  such  child  without  naming  them : 
Guitar  v.  Gordon,  17  Mo.  408,  411;  so 
the  naming  of  a  son-in-law,  though  not 
designated  as  such,  is  equivalent  to  the 
naming  of  the  daughter:  Hockensmith  v. 
Slasher,  26  Mo.  237,  239;  the  naming  of 
children  as  a  class  includes  all  who  an- 
swer the  description  at  the  time  the  will 
takes  effect :  Allen  v.  Claybrook,  58  Mo. 
124,  132.  Parol  evidence  is  inadmissible 
to  rebut  the  presumption  that  a  child 
not  named  was  unintentionally  omitted  : 
Thomas  v.  Block,  113  Mo.  66.  If  the 
child  or  children,  or  their  descendants, 
had  an  equal  proportion  of  the  testator's 
estate  bestowed  upon  them  in  the  testa- 
tor's lifetime,  they  take  nothing  by  virtue 
of  this  statute  :  Rev.  St.  §  8878. 

3  Cons.  St.  1893,  §  1207.  The  inten- 
tion to  disinherit  must  appear  ou  the  face 
of  the  will :  C.  B.  &  Q.  R,  R.  v.  Wasser- 
man,  22  Fed.  Rep.  872. 

4  Including  issue  of  a  deceased  child  : 
Gen.  St.  1885,  §§  3013-3016. 

5  Gen.  St.  1891,  ch.  186,  §§  10, 11.  It  is 
only  where  the   property  not  devised   or 


bequeathed  is  insufficient  to  satisfy  the 
share  of  such  child  that  the  statute  ap- 
plies:  Mclntyre  v.  Mclntyre,  64  N.  H. 
609. 

6  Gen.  St.  1896,  p.  3760,  §  19.  A  pro- 
vision for  "children  born  and  to  be  born" 
is  sufficient  to  avoid  the  implied  revoca- 
tion :  Stevens  v.  Shippen,  28  N.  J.  Eq. 
487,  535. 

7  2  Banks  &  Bro.  Rev.  St.  p.  1879, 
§49  (9th  ed.  1896);  Matter  of  Murphy, 
144  N.  Y.  557.  A  sale  by  the  executor 
under  a  power  in  the  will  is  of  no  effect 
as  against  a  child  not  provided  for :  Smith 
v.  Robertson,  89  N.  Y.  555. 

8  Northrop  v.  Marquam,  16  Oreg.  173, 
holding  that  the  interest  of  such  preter- 
mitted child,  is  not  affected  by  a  sale 
under  a  power  in  the  will. 

9  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  666,  §  22,— 
whether  the  pretermission  was  intentional 
or  accidental.  The  provision  must  be 
made  in  the  will,  otherwise  it  cannot 
operate  against  the  child  :  Chace  v.  Chace, 
6  R.  I.  407,  411  ;  Potter  v.  Brown,  11  R.I. 
232. 

10  Rev.  St.  1894,  §§  1996,  1997. 

11  Code,  1884,  §  3033  ;  Burns  v.  Allen, 
93  Tenu.  149,  deciding  that  parol  evidence 
cannot  be  admitted  to  show  that  such 
omission  was  intentional. 

12  Rev.  Civ.  St.  1895,  §§  5343,  5344,— 
if  the  will  was  made  while  the  testator 
had  a  child  living.  It  is  held  in  this 
State  that  marriage  alone  of  a  testator 
does  not  revoke  his  previous  will,  —  birth 
of  issue  also  is  necessary :  Morgan  v. 
Davenport,  60  Tex.  2.30. 

13  The  presumption  is  not  conclusive 
that  the  testator  unintentionally  omitted 
the  child;  parol  evidence  is  admissible, 
including  declarations  by  the  testator,  but 
the  other  heirs  or  devisees  are  not  com- 
petent witnesses:  Atwood's  Estate,  14 
Utah  1  ;  Coulam  v.  Doull,  133  U.  S.  216. 

u  Code,  1887,  §  2528. 

15  A  gift  of  one  dollar  "  to  each  of  my 
heirs  at  law  "  is  an  insufficient  provision 
for  children  otherwise  unnamed  :  Boman 
v.  Boman,  49  Fed.  Rep.  (Cir.  C.  App.) 
329  ;  s.  c.  7  U.  S.  App.  63  ;  parol  evidence 
cannot  be  admitted  to  show  that  a  child. 
115 


*  111,  *  112 


REVOCATION   OF  WILLS. 


§55 


ginia,1  and  Wisconsin.2  In  many  of  these  States  no  distinction 
is  drawn  as  between  children  born  after  the  making  of  the  will, 
and  such  as  have  been  pretermitted,  though  in  existence 
prefei-niitted,  when  the  will  was  made;  nor  between  children  and 
and  posthu-  the  issue  of  deceased  children.  Nor  is  any  distinc- 
tion recognized,  generally,  between  children  born  dur- 
ing the  lifetime  of  the  testator  and  posthumous  children;  the  lat- 
ter are  entitled  to  the  same  rights  and  remedies  as  the  former.8 
But  in  Kentucky  the  birth  of  a  pretermitted  child  after  the  making 
of  the  will  operates  to  make  the  devises  and  bequests  of  the  will 
contingent  upon  the  death  of  such  child,  unmarried  and  without 
issue,  before  it  reaches  the  age  of  twenty-one  years.4  A  similar 
provision  exists  in  Mississippi,8  Texas,6  Virginia,7  and  West 
Virginia.8  In  Pennsylvania,  marriage  or  birth  of  issue 
*  after  the  making  of  a  will  in  which  no  provision  is  made  [*  112] 
for  the  children,  revokes  the  will  pro  tanto,  and  such  widow, 
child,  or  children  (although  born  after  the  death  of  the  testator)  are 
entitled  to  shares  and  dividends  of  the  estate  as  if  there  were  no 
will.9  And  in  Georgia  "a  will  executed  under  a  mistake  of  fact  as 
to  the  existence  or  conduct  of  the  heirs  at  law  is  inoperative  as  to 
such  heir,"  as  if  the  testator  had  died  intestate.10 

The  adoption  of  a  child  under  a  statute  making  such  adopted  child 
an  heir  of  the  party  adopting  does  not,  it  seems,  operate  to  revoke  a 
pre-existing  will.11 


not  named  or  provided  for  was  intention- 
ally omitted:  Bower  v.  Bower,  5  Wash. 
225  ;  Hill  v.  Hill,  7  Wash.  409  (also  hold- 
ing that  the  statute  applies  to  community 
property  of  testator  as  well  as  his  separate 
property). 

i  Code,  1891,  ch.  77,  §§  16,  17. 

2  Ann.  St.  1889,  §§  2286-2289;  Moon 
v.  Evans,  69  Wis.  667. 

8  Hart  v.  Hart,  70  Ga.  764 ;  Northrop 
v.  Marquam,  16  Oreg.  173. 

4  St.  1894,  §§4847,  4848. 

6  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  4489. 
«  Rev.  St.  1895,  art.  5345. 

7  Code,  1887,  §  2527. 

8  Code,  1891,  ch.  77,  §  17. 

9  Bright..  Purd.  Dig.  1883,  p.  1712, 
§  18;  and  see  note  h  for  a  collection  of 
tin;  rules  as  to  the  revocation  of  wills, 
by  marriage  and  the  birth  of  children, 
under  the  statutes  <>f  Pennsylvania,  with 
reference  to  the  adjudications.  The  ap- 
pointment <>(  tli"  wife  as  testamentary 
guardian  will  nut.  he  revoked  l>y  the  sub- 

uent  birth  of  a  ehiid  ;  Hollingsworth's 
Appeal,  rii    I 'a.  St.  518,  521.     The   rovo- 
1 16 


cation  by  marriage  is  absolute,  whether 
provision  be  made  for  her  or  not ;  but  as 
to  children,  the  revocation  depends  upon 
the  absence  of  provision  for  them:  Ed- 
wards's Appeal,  47  Pa.  St.  144,  152.  The 
statute  means  a  physical  birth,  and  not  a 
legislative  legitimation,  after  making  the 
will:  McCulloch's  Appeal,  113  Pa.  St. 
247,  255.  This  statute,  being  for  the 
widow's  benefit,  does  not  revoke  the  pro- 
visions of  a  will  as  to  her,  but  she  may 
take  under  the  will  or  the  intestate  laws, 
at  her  election :  Fidelity  Trust  Co.'s 
Appeal,  121  Pa.  St.  1.  See  collection  of 
later  cases  in  Pepper  &  Lewis  Dig.  1896, 
p.  1450,  §  50,  note. 

10  Jones  v.  Grogan,  98  Ga.  552,  554. 
It  is  not  incumbent  on  the  heir  to  show 
that  hut  for  such  mistake  he  would  have 
been  a  beneficiary :  Mallory  v.  Young, 
98  Ga.  728. 

11  Davis  v.  King,  89  N.  C.  441  ;  King 
v.  Davis,  91  N.  C.  142;  Davis  v.  Fogle, 
124  Ind.  41.  This  also  seems  inferred  in 
Kussell  e.  Russell,  84  Ala.  48,  52. 


§56 


REPUBLICATION    OF   WILLS. 


*  112,  *  113 


Requires  same 
competency  in 
testator  and 
same  formali- 
ties as  for  mak- 
ing a  new  will. 


§  56.    Republication  of  Wills.  —  A  will  which  has  become  inopera- 
tive by  reason  of  revocation,  either  express  or  implied,  may  at  any 
time  be  restored  to  its  original  validity  by  act  of  the    Republication 
testator,  if  competent  to  make  a  will;  because  the  re-    ot  revoked 
publication  or  revival  of   a  revoked  will  is  precisely 
equivalent  to  the  making  of  a  new  one.1      "In  short,"  says  Wil- 
liams, "the  will  so  republished  is  a  new  will."2     It  follows  from 
this,  that  the  same  authority  and  competency  are  re- 
quired, and  the  same  solemnities  and  formalities  must 
be  observed,  to  make  a  valid  republication,  as  are  neces- 
sary to  make  a  new  will.     Hence  a  will  of  personalty, 
which  in  the  absence  of  statutory  provisions  to  the  con- 
trary may  be  made  by  parol  act,  may  also,  after  being 
revoked,  be  revived  or  republished   by  parol,  or  by  an  unattested 
codicil  or  other  writing; 3  and  so  as  to  a  will  of  lands  not  affected  by 
the  Statute  of  Frauds.4     But  where  the  execution  of  a  will 
[*113]  requires  attestation  *by  two,  three,  or  more  witnesses,  it  can- 
not be  revived,  after  revocation,  except  by  re-execution,  or 
by  codicil  executed  in  the  presence  and  under  the  attestation  of  the 
same  number  of  Avitnesses.5 

A  codicil  will  amount  to  a  republication  of  the  will  to  which  it 
refers,  whether  it  be  attached  thereto  or  not;6  but  the  <j0(jjcn 
intention  of  the  codicil  must  always  determine,  and  if  it 
appear  from  the  face  of  the  codicil  that  it  was  not  the 
intention  of  the  testator  to  republish,  the  ordinary  pre- 
sumption derived  from  the  existence  of  the  codicil  will 
be  counteracted.7 

Since,  as  shown  above,  the  republication  of  a  will  is  tantamount 
to  the  making  of  that  will  de  novo,  it  brings  down  the  will  to  the 
date  of  its  republishing,  and  makes  it  speak,  as  it  were,  from  that 
time.8  But  it  should  be  observed  that  a  codicil  republishing  a  former 


amounts  to  re- 
publication. 

Unless  it  ap- 
pears that  such 
was  not  testa- 
tor's intention. 


1  "From  the  date  of  the  revocation, 
the  will  revoked  ceases  to  be  a  testamen- 
tary disposition  of  the  maker's  estate.  .  .  . 
And  if  the  party  who  made  it  desires  to 
make  a  testamentary  disposition  of  his 
estate,  he  must  make  a  new  will,  in  the 
manner  required  by  the  statute.  But  in 
doing  this,  he  may  use  the  same  form  of 
words  without  variations  or  with  varia- 
tions, and  the  same  written  or  printed 
document  that  was  used  at  first "  :  Bar- 
ker v.  Bell,  46  Ala.  216,  222. 

2  Wms.  [216]. 

8  Wms.  [205],  citing  Wentworth  Ex. 
Ch.  1,  p.  60. 

4  Wms.  [206],  citing  Jackson  v.  Hur- 
lock,  1  Amb.  487,  494 ;  Beckford  v.  Par- 


necott,  Cro.  Eliz.  493  ;  see  also  Havard  v. 
Davis,  2  Bin.  406,  425 ;  Jack  v.  Shoen- 
berger,  22  Pa.  St.  416,  421. 

5  Jackson  v.  Potter,  9  Johns.  312,  314; 
Love  v.  Johnston,  12  Ired.  L.  355,  361 ; 
Witter  v.  Mott,  2  Conn.  67,  69;  Musser 
v.  Curry,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  481. 

6  Ante,  §  47  ;  Van  Cortlandt  v.  Kip,  1 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  590,  593,  with  a  collection 
of  American  authorities,  affirmed  in  Kip 
v.  Van  Cortland,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.),  346,  349, 
et  seq.,  reviewing  the  English  authorities, 
per  the  Chancellor. 

7  Wms.  [213] ;  Kendall  v.  Kendall,  5 
Munf.  272,  275  ;  Wikoff's  Appeal,  15  Pa. 
St.  281,  291. 

8  Wood  v.  Hammond,  16  R.  I.  98,  112  ; 

117 


113,  *  114 


REVOCATION    OF   WILLS. 


§5G 


will,  which  had  been  altered  by  one  or  more  previous 
wVrepub-Dg9  codicils,  does  not  set  up  the  will  against  the  codicil  or 
lished  to  its       codicils  revoking  it  in  part.1     There  is  a  difference  in 

own  il'itt? 

this  respect  in  the  effect  of  a  codicil  upon  a  will  in  part 
revoked  or  changed  by  an  intervening  codicil  or  codicils,  and  its 
effect  upon  prior  inconsistent  wills;  in  the  latter  case,  the  repub- 
lication of  the  first  will  by  date  will  establish  it  as  the  valid  last 
will,  and  cancel  the  intermediate  one ;  in  the  former  case,  the  first 
will  is  established  as  affected  or  changed  by  the  subsequent 
codicils.2 

*  Another  consequence  of  treating  the  republication  as  the  [*  114] 
making  of  a  new  will  is,  that  its  operation  extends  to  mat- 
ters which  have  arisen  between  its  date  and  its  republication.3  Real 
estate  acquired  after  the  date  of  the  will,  which  under  the  common- 
law  rule  cannot  pass  under  such  will,  because  it  can  include  only 
such  as  the  testator  owned  at  the  time  of  making  the  will  and  con- 
tinued to  own  until  his  death,4  will  pass  to  the  devisee,  if  fairly 
included  by  the  language  of  the  devise,  by  a  republication  of  the 
will  after  the  property  is  acquired.5  So  the  will  of  a  widow  made 
before  or  during  coverture,  which  is  not  revived  by  the  husband's 
death,6  may  be  made  valid  by  republication;  and  a  will  executed 
under  undue  influence  is  validated  by  a  codicil  republishing  and 
confirming  it  when  the  testator  is  free  from  such  influence.7 


Hawke  v.  Enyort,  30  Neb.  149,  160; 
Murray  v.  Oliver,  6  Ired.  Eq.  55,  56  ;  Miles 
v.  Boyden,  3  Pick.  213,  216  ;  ante,  §  47. 

1  Wms.  [217].  "It  is  perfectly  true," 
says  Lord  Alvanley,  in  Crosbie  v.  Mc- 
Doual,  "  that  if  a  man  ratines  and  confirms 
hie  last  will,  he  ratifies  and  confirms  it 
with  every  codicil  that  has  been  added 
to  it"  :  4  Ves.  610,  616.  But  see  Alsop's 
Appeal,  9  Pa.  St.  374,  381,  where  it  is 
held  that  although  a  will  and  the  codicils 
form  but  one  testament,  and  speak  from 
the  date  of  the  last  codicil,  yet  they  con- 
stitute different  instruments, and  a  bequest 
of  the  residue  by  the  will  "to  the  lega- 
tees" will  be  confined  to  such  legatees 
as  are  therein  named,  and  to  such  as  are 


substituted  by  codicil  for  some  of  them ; 
and  that  legatees  uot  named  in  the  will, 
but  in  the  codicils  (except  those  substi- 
tuted in  the  codicils  for  others  named  in 
the  will),  are  not  entitled  to  participate 
in  the  distribution  of  the  residue. 

2  Crosbie  v.  McDoual,  4  Ves.  610,  616. 
See  on  this  subject  ante,  §  52,  of  the  re- 
vival of  former  by  revocation  of  later 
wills. 

3  Wms.  [218],  citiug  Wentw.Ex.  ch.  1, 
p.  62. 

4  Ante,  §  53. 

6  Haven  v.  Foster,  14  Pick.  534,  540. 

6  Ante,  §  54.  Also  ante,  §  21,  p.  *28, 
note  19. 

7  O'Neall  v.  Farr,  1  Rich.  80,  89. 


118 


§57        ORIGIN    AND    NATURE    OF    GIFTS    MORTIS    CAUSA.        *  115,  *  116 


[•115]  *BOOK   SECOND. 


OF  GIFTS  EXECUTED   IN  ANTICIPATION   OF   IMMEDIATE 

DEATH. 


CHAPTER   VII. 

DONATIONES   MORTIS   CAUSA. 

§  57.    Origin    and   Nature   of    Gifts   Mortis   Causa.  —  Alienability, 
being  one  of  the  essential  qualities  of  property,1  includes  the  right 
of  the  owner  to  control  its  post  mortem  disposition,  even    R.  ,.    , 
without  resort  to  the  solemnity  of  a  last  will  or  testa-   disposition 
ment.     As  he  may  freely  give  his  property  to  whom-    mortlscausa' 
ever  he  pleases,  his  power  in  this  respect  being  limited  only  by  the 
policy  of  the  law  in  vindicating  the  rights  of  the  family,  or  of  credi- 
tors, etc.,  so  he  may  annex  any  condition  to  his  gift  which  is  not 
contrary  to  the  policy  of  the  law.     Thus,  he  may,  in  case  of  antici- 
pation of  death  from  an  existing  illness  or  impending  peril,  transfer 
his  ownership  to  some  other  person,  on  condition  that,  if  death  do 
not  ensue  as  the  result  of  such  illness  or  peril,  the  gift  shall  revert 
to  the  donor;    which   transaction  is  known  as   donatio    Like  test  men- 
mortis   causa.      It  is  apparent  that  the   disposition   of    tary  disposi- 
property  causa  mortis  is  in  some  respects  identical  with    ambullatorvg 
testamentary   disposition,    being    ambulatory    or    revo-    contingent 
cable,  conditioned  or  contingent  upon  the  death  of  the    ancHiatde  for 
donor,   and  liable    for   his   debts;2  differing,   however,    donor's  debts, 
chiefly  in  this,  that  under  a  will  the  gift  is  completed  through  the 
interposition   of   an    executor   or   administrator,    while    ^ 

, ,         ,  .  .  .  ,  „  .  i  .  -     ,  Donor  mortis 

the  donor  mortis  causa,   himself  executing  the  gift  by    causa  his  own 
delivery    to    the    donee,     is,    so    to    speak,     his    own    execu,or- 

executor. 8 
[*  116]       *  The  legal  recognition  of  the  donatio  mortis  causa  has,  as 

the  name  indicates,  come  down  to  us  from  the  civil  law,  de~ 

1  Ante,  §  3.  8  Bloomer  v.  Bloomer,  supra  ;  Seybold 

2  Bloomer  v.   Bloomer,  2  Bradf .   339,     v.  Bank,  5  No.  Dak.  460,  469. 
346.     See   post,  §  63,   as  to   liability   for 

debts. 

119 


*  116,  *  117  DONATIONES   MORTIS    CAUSA.  §  58 

Origin  in  the  fined  in  Justinian's  Institutes  as  "a  donation  which  is 
cmi  law.  made  to  meet  the  case  of  death,  as  where  anything  is 

given  upon  condition  that,  if  any  fatal  accident  befall  the  donor,  the 
person  to  whom  it  is  given  shall  have  it  as  his  own;  but  if  the  donor 
should  survive,  or  if  he  should  repent  of  having  made  the  gift,  or  if 
the  person  to  whom  it  has  been  given  should  die  before  the  donor, 
then  the  donor  shall  receive  back  the  thing  given."  x  Its  principles 
were  incorporated  into  the  common  law  and  transplanted  with  it  to 
the  American  States,  of  whose  legal  systems  they  now  form  a  part, 
not  without  having  been  developed  by  new  and  successive  applica- 
tions and  fluctuating  and  inconsistent  decisions.2 

The  donation  of  property  causa  mortis  has  never  been  favored  in 
law.  It  was  carefully  guarded  under  the  Roman  law,  which  invali- 
Never  favored  dated  every  such  gift  unless  proved  by  five  wituesses 
m  law.  present  at  the  time,  every  one  of  whom  was  required  to 

be  a  Roman  citizen,  of  full  age,  of  good  character,  and  not  related 
to  either  donor  or  donee.3  Such  strictness  of  proof  is  not  required 
by  the  common  law ;  but  courts  regret  that  this  species  of  gift  has 
not  been  swept  away  by  the  Statute  of  Frauds,4  and  are  very  cau- 
tious to  require  positive,  clear,  and  satisfactory  evidence  in  estab- 
lishing it,  to  guard  against  fraudulent  pretences  in  claiming  the 
property  of  deceased  persons.5  But  when  found  to  be  made  in  good 
faith,  they  must  be  upheld;6  the  donee  is  not  obliged  to  disprove 
fraud,7  nor  to  prove  that  the  donor  was  of  sound  and  disposing 
mind.8 

*  §  58.  Definitions  of  the  Term.  —  The  definition  given  by  [*  117] 
Justinian 9  is  commented  upon  by  Lord  Loughborough,  who 

1  Hammond's  Sanders's  Just.,  transl.  of  gin,  16  Gray,  402,403;  Gano  v.  Fisk,  43 
Inst,  lib.  ii.  tit.  vii.,  "  De  Donationibus."  Oh.  St.  462 ;  and  see  a  collection  of 
The  gift  by  Telemachus  to  Pirams  is  authorities  on  this  point  in  13  Allen,  p.  47, 
cited  by  the  author  as  an  illustration.  note  (*) ;  Pare  her  v.  Savings  Institution 

2  Per  Matthews,  J.,  in  Basket  v.  Has-  78  Me.  470,  473  ;  Citizens  Bank  v.  Mit- 
sell,  107  U.  S.  602,  610.  chell,  18  R.  I.  739. 

3  Per  Lowrie,  J.,  in  Headley  v.  Kirby,  6  Dresser  v.  Dresser,  46  Me.  48,  67  ; 
18  Pa.  St.  326,  328.  Ellis  v.  Secor,  31  Mich.  185,  188;  Devol 

*  Per  Walton,  J.,  in  Hatch  v.  Atkinson,  v.  Dye,  123  Ind.  321;  Shackleford  v. 
56  Me.  324,  326.  Says  the  same  judge  in  Brown,  89  Mo.  546,  552 ;  Brown  v.  Brown, 
Drew  v.  Hagerty,  81  Me.  231,  243,  "  Gifts  18  Conn.  410,  414;  Bedell  v.  Carll,  33 
ciusa  mortis  ought  not  to  be  encouraged.  N.  Y.  581,  586. 

They   are   often   sustained   by  fraud  and  7  Vandor  v.  Roach,  73  Cal.  614;  s.  c. 

perjury.      It   was  an   attempt  to  sustain  15  Pac.  R.    354.     It   is   error  to  instruct 

such  a  gift  by  fraud  and  perjury  that  led  the  jury  that  the    presumption   of  law  is 

to  the   enactment    for  the   prevention   of  against  a  donatio  mortis  causa,  or  that  the 

fraud  and    perjury."  fact    must    be    proved    beyond   suspicion : 

«  Per  Gaston,  J.,  in  Shirley  v.  White-  Lewis  v.  Merritt,  113  N.  Y.  386,  390. 
bead,  1    Ircd.    Eq.    130.     To  same   effect  8  Vandor  v.  Roach,  supra;   Bedell  v. 

Grymea  ».  Hone,  49  N.  Y.  17,  23  ;  Gass  v.  Carll,  33  N.  Y.  581,  586. 
Simpson,  4  Coldw.  288,297;   Delmotto  v.  9  Ante   §57. 

Taylor,  1   Rcdf.  417;   Rockwood  v.   Wig- 
120 


§59  WHAT   MAY   BE   GIVEN   MORTIS   CAUSA.  *  117,  *  118 

points  out  the  inadequacy  of  Swinburne's  definition1  in  omitting  to 
emphasize  the  ambulatory  or  revocable  character  of  the  donatio  causa 
mortis.2  Numerous  definitions  are  given  by  various  writers  and 
judges.8  A  contributor  to  the  American  Law  Review  gives  this  as 
the  most  comprehensive  and  complete:  "It  is  a  gift  of  personal 
property  made  by  a  person  in  peril  of  death  and  in  expectation  of  an 
early  demise,  consummated  by  a  manual  delivery  of  the  subject  of 
the  gift  or  of  the  means  of  obtaining  possession  of  the  same  by  the 
donor,  or  by  another  person  in  his  presence  and  by  his  direction,  to 
the  donee,  or  to  a  third  person  for  the  donee,  and  acceptance  on  the 
part  of  the  donee,  followed  by  the  death  of  the  donor  before  the 
donee,  and  defeasible  by  reclamation,  the  contingency  of  survivor- 
ship, or  delivery  from  the  peril."  4  It  is  important  to  remember 
that  three  attributes  must  concur  to  give  validity  to  a  gift  mortis 
causa,  viz. :  First,  the  gift  must  be  induced  by  the  donor's  appre- 
hension of  impending  death;  Second,  it  must  be  conditioned  to  take 
effect  only  in  the  event  of  death  happening  from  the  peril  or  cause 
producing  the  apprehension,  and  be  revocable  until  then;  and  Third, 
there  must  be  delivery  of  the  thing  given.  If  the  transaction  lack 
any  one  or  more  of  these  elements,  it  cannot  be  supported  as  a  do- 
natio mortis  causa.6 

§  59.  By  Whom,  to  Whom,  and  of  What  a  Donatio  Mortis  Causa 
may  be  made.  —  Any  person  possessing  the  capacity  to  make  a  will 
mav  give  his  property  mortis  causa.6     Hence  a  married 

....  , .  i.  .  .  Married  women 

woman  may  in  this  way  dispose  of  her  separate  prop-    mav  s;ve  an& 
erty   without    the   consent   of  her   husband7    in   those    receive  mortis 

Ciiusd 

States  in  which  she  may  make  a  will  without 
[*  118]  such  *  consent;  but  otherwise  where  such  consent  is  neces- 
sary to  her  will; 8  and  so  she  may  receive  such  gift  to  her 
separate  use,9  even  from  her  husband;  and  the  husband  from  her.10 
A  donation  mortis  causa  may  be  made  to  one  in  trust  for  the  use 

1  Swinb.  pt.  1,  §  7,  pi.  2.  N.  Y.  17,  20;   Dole   v.  Lincoln,  31   Me. 

2  Tate  v.  Hilbert,  2  Ves.  Ill,  118.  422,  428;  Smith  v.  Kittridge,  21  Vt.  238, 
8  Wnis.  [770] ;  Lord  Cowper  in  Hedges     245 ;  Grattan  v.  Appleton,  3  Sto.  755,  763. 

v.  Hedges,  Prec.  Ch.  269 ;  2   Kent,  444 ;  6  Champney  v.   Blanchard,  39   N.   Y. 

Story,  Eq.  Jur.   §    606;    Sargent.   J.,   in  111,  113. 

Cuttiug  v.  Gilman,  41    N.    H.    147,    150,  i  Marshall  v.  Berry,  13  Allen,  43,  45; 

151  ;  Woodward,  J.,  in  Michener  v.  Dale,  and  evidence  that  the  husband  maltreated 

23  Pa.  St.  59,  63 ;  Gibson,  C.  J.,  in  Nich-  her  is  competent  to  show  a  motive  and 

olas  v.  Adams,  2  Whart.  17,  22;  Hatcher  reason  for  the  gift:  Conner  v.  Root,  11 

v.  Buford,  60  Ark.  169  ;  Leyson  v.  Davis,  Colo.  183. 

17  Mont.  220,  262,  et  seq. ;  3  Redf.  Wills,  »  Jones  v.  Brown,  34  N.  H.  439,  446; 

322,  pi.    1;  Ashe,  J.,  in  Kiff  v.  Weaver,  Whitney  v.  Wheeler,  116  Mass.  490,  492. 

94  N.  C.  274,  276;  Dickeschied  v.  Bank,  *>  Meach   v.  Meach,  24  Vt.  591,  596; 

28  W.  Va.  340,  360 ;  Henschel  v.  Maurer,  Gardner  v.   Gardner,  22   Wend.  526.     A 

34  N.  W.  R.  (Wis  )  926.  gift  inter  vivos  was  sustained  under  these 

4  Thomas  Frazer  Reddy,  21   Am.  L.  circumstances   in    Howard   v.   Meuifee,  5 

Rev.  734.  Ark.  668,  671. 

6  Wms.   [771];   Grymea  v.  Hone,  49  10  Caldwell  v.  Renfrew,  33  Vt.  213,  219. 

121 


118,  *  119 


DONATIONES   MORTIS    CAUSA. 


§59 


and  benefit  of  another, *  and  its  validity  is  not  affected  by  the  fact 
Gifi  may  be  that  the  donee  takes  it  upon  a  trust,  the  terms  and  limi- 
in  trust.  tations  of  which  are  prescribed  by  the  donor,  and  may 

vary  according  to  subsequent  events.'2  So  it  may  be  conditioned 
that  the  donee  shall  take  nothing  more  from  the  donor's  estate;8 
but  a  gift  as  a  trust  fund,  to  be  used  in  charity  at  the  entire  and 
unlimited  discretion  of  the  donee,  has  been  held  invalid,  as  being 
too  vague  and  uncertain  as  a  trust,  and  not  aided  by  the  statute  of 
43  Eliz.  c.  4,  as  a  charitable  use.4  So  the  gift  in  trust  must  fail  if 
the  persons  who  are  to  take,  or  the  proportions  to  which  they  are 
entitled,  are  not  clearly  indicated;  and  the  donee  in  such  case  does 
not  take  for  his  own  benefit.5 

Keal  estate  is  generally  held  to  be  incapable  of  being  given  mortis 
causa;6  and  the  reason  given,  to  wit,  that  it  is  incapable  of  manual 
Real  estate  delivery,  was  at  one  time  extended  to  choses  in  action, 
cannot  be  given  so  that  a  promissory  note  payable  to  the  donor  could 
not  be  the  subject  of  a  gift  mortis  causa,  because  only 
the  donor  himself,  or  his  executor  or  administrator,  could  compel  its 
payment.7  The  ancient  rule  required  an  assignment  in  writing,  or 
something  equivalent  thereto  in  the  form  of  writing, 
and  an  actual  execution  of  the  transfer  to  give  validity 
to  the  gift  of  a  chose  in  action.8  But  since  the 
equitable  doctrine  *  has  prevailed  that  choses  in  [*  119] 
action  are  assignable  by  the  delivery  of  the  evi- 
dence of  the  grantor's  right,  a  gift  mortis  causa  becomes 
valid  by  such  delivery,  and  may  be  enforced  like  any  other  assign- 
ment in  equity.9  Hence  promissory  notes  of  third  parties  may  be 
Promissory  given  mortis  cavsa  whether  indorsed  by  the  donor  or 
not;10  but  not  the  donor's  own  note  payable  after  his 


Gifts  of  choses 
in  action 
anciently  re- 
quired to  be 
by  writing. 

But  now  pass 
by  delivery. 


notes. 


1  Dresser  v.  Dresser,  46  Me.  48,  67  ; 
Pierce  v.  Boston  Savings  Bank,  129  Mass. 
425;  Estate  of  Barclay,  11  Phila.  123, 
125 ;  Emery  v.  dough,  63  N.  II.  552,  555 ; 
Southerland  v.  Southerland,  5  Bush,  591, 
591  ;  Blount  v.  Burrow,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  72, 
75  :  Rambrooke  v.  Simmons,  4  Russ.  C.  C. 
25;  Borneman  r.  Sidlinger,  15  Me.  429; 
Devol  o.  Dye,  123  Ind   321. 

2  Plough  v.  Clotigh,  117  Mass.  S3,  85. 

I  If.  in  such  case,  the  donee  violate  the 
condition,  Bhe  must  account  for  the  amount 
of  the  donation  :  Cnrrie  v.  Steele,  2  Sandf. 
642,  550. 

*  Dole  v.  Lincoln,  81  Me.  422,  484. 

•r-  Sheedy  v.  Roach,  124  Muss.  472,  477. 

•  Weach  v.  Meach,  24  Vt.  591. 

1  Bradley  u  Hunt,  5  Gill  &  J.  54,  :>*; 
Headley  v.  Kirby,  18  Pa.  St.  326 ;  San- 
122 


born  v.  Goodhue,  28  N.  H.  48,  56  (unless 
the  note  had  been  indorsed  by  the  donor). 

8  Per  Pryor,  J.,  in  Stephenson  v.  King, 
81  Ky.  425,  432  ;  2  Kent,  446. 

9  Ellis  v.  Secor,  31  Mich.  185,  188; 
Stephenson  v.  King,  81  Ky.  425,  430; 
Ashbrook  v.  Ryon,  2  Bush,  228 ;  Turpin 
1;.  Thompson,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  420;  Crook 
v.  Bank,  83  Wis.  31  ;  Leyson  v.  Davis,  17 
Mont.  220,  275,  et  seq.,  and  cases  cited. 
See  Chase  v.  Redding,  13  Gray,  418,  420, 
where  Shaw,  C.  J.,  reviews  the  cases 
showing  the  gradual  development  of  the 
present  rule. 

1°  Turpin  v.  Thompson.  2  Mete.  (Ky.) 
420;  Westerlou.  Do  Witt.  36  N.  Y.  340, 
345;  Brown  n.  Brown,  IK  Conn.  410,  413; 
Bates  v.  Kempton,  7  Gray,  382,  383. 


§60  APPREHENSION   OF   DEATH.  *  119,  *  120 

deatli  to  the  donee.1    Checks  or  drafts  of  third  persons,2  certificates 
of  deposit  payable  to  the  bearer,8  or  payable  to  order   Checks. 
and  indorsed  by  the  payee,4  or  even  without  indorse-    Certificates  of 
ment,8  bonds,6  and  notes  secured  by  mortgage  on  real    Bonds.' 
estate,7  are  proper  subjects  of  gifts  mortis  causa,  and    Mortgages. 
pass  by  delivery  without  further  writing.      So  the  donor's   bank- 
book, given  by  delivery  mortis  causa,  will  pass  to  the 
donee  the  money  certified  as  deposited  therein,  which 
he  may  recover  by  action  in  the  name  of  the  donor's  executor  or 
administrator;8  an  order  for  the  payment  of  the  money  deposited, 
together  with  an  order  on  the  donor's  agent  having  possession  of  the 
bank-book,  is  not  sufficient,  if  the  donee  fails  to  obtain  possession  of 
the  bank-book.9 

A  policy  of  life  insurance  may  be  delivered  as  a  gift  causa  mortis  ; 
but  the  assignment  of  such  a  policy  without  delivery    p0iiCy  0f  i;fe 

confers  no  right  upon  the  assignee.10    Certifi-    insurance. 
[*  120]  cates  *  of  stock  of  incorporated  companies  pass    Certificates  of 

by  delivery  mortis  causa,  without  any  writing,11    stock> 
entitling  the  donee,  as  equitable  owner,  to  an  action  to  compel  a 
proper  transfer  of  the  legal  title  to  him.12 

§  60.  Apprehension  of  Death.  —  The  first  requisite  to  a  valid  do- 
natio causa  mortis  is,  as  indicated  by  the  name,  that  it  be  made 
under  apprehension  of  the  donor's  death  from  an  existing  illness  or 

1  See  authorities  on  this  point  cited  livery  merely  may  be  recovered  by  the 
post,  §  61,  p.  *  121.  personal  representative. 

2  Gibson  v.  Hibbard,  13  Mich.  214,  7  Carrying  the  mortgage  if  properly 
217.  assigned  to  the  donee:  Chase  v.  Redding, 

3  Brooks  v.  Brooks,  12  S.  C.  422,  460 ;  13   Gray,   418;   or   even   without  assign- 
Westerlo  v.  De  Witt,  36  N.  Y.  340.     It  ment:    Borneman    v.   Sidlinger,   15    Me. 
is  not  clear,  in  the  latter  case,  whether  429,  431  ;  Drake  v.  Heiken,  61  Cal.  346; 
the  certificate  of  deposit  had  been  indorsed  Hackney  v.  Vrooman,  62  Barb.  650,  668. 
or  not.  8  Pierce    v.  Boston   Bank,   129    Mass. 

*  Basket  f.  Hassell,  107  U.  S.  602,  613,  425,  430;  Hill  v.  Stevenson,  63  Me.  364; 

citing  and  reviewing  numerous  cases.  Tillinghast    v.    Wheaton,    8    R.   I.   536 ; 

6  Conner  v.  Root,  11  Colo.  183.    "The  Curtis   v.  Portland   Bank,   77  Me.    151; 

reason  for  this  holding  seems  to  be,  that  Bidden  v.  Thrall,   125  N.  Y.  572.     But 

the  certificate,  bill,  or  note  is  the  legal  the  contrary  doctrine  is  held  in  Walsh's 

evidence  of  the  deposit  or  debt,  and  when  Appeal,   122  Pa.  St.  177,  on  the  ground 

the  owner  parts  with  the  instrument  by  that  a  bank-book  delivered   but   not   as- 

gift  or  sale,  he  parts  at  least  prima  facie  signed  will  not  transfer  the  funds   from 

with  the  debt  or  deposit :  "  per  Williams,  the  donor's  control. 

J.,  in  Walsh's  Appeal,  122  Pa.   St.  177,  9  Conser  v.  Snowden,  54  Md.  175,  179. 

188.     See  also  In  re  Dillon,  L.  R.  44  Ch.  »  Trough's  Estate,  75  Pa.  St.  115, 118. 

Div.  76.  11  Walsh  v.  Sexton,  55  Barb.  251,  256, 

6  Whether  of  a  stranger  or    of    the  relying  on  Westerlo  v.  De  Witt,  36  N.  Y. 

donee:  Lee  v.  Boak,  11  Gratt.  182,  188;  340. 

Wells  v.  Tucker,  3  Bin.  366,  370;  War-  12  Grymes  v.  Hone,  49  N.  Y.    17,   22; 

ing  v.  Edmonds,  11  Md.  424,  433.     But  in  Leyson  v.  Davis,  17  Mont.  220,  283,  et  seq. 

Overton  v.  Sawyer,  7  Jones  L.  6,  it  is  held  and  cases  cited, 
that  a  bond  or  sealed  note  given  by  de- 

123 


*  120,  *  121  DONATIONES   MORTIS   CAUSA.  §  60 

peril.1  If  a  gift  is  made  with  the  view  that  it  take  effect  upon  the 
donor's  death,  but  while  in  ordinary  health  and  not  in 
made°uuder  immediate  apprehension  of  death,  it  may  be  a  valid  gift 
apprehension  inter  vivos,  but  cannot  be  mortis  causa.'1  So  a  gift  made 
in  expectation  of  immediate  death  from  consumption 
cannot  be  supported  as  mortis  causa  if  the  donor,  after  making  the 
gift,  sufficiently  recover  to  attend  to  his  ordinary  business,  although 
he  subsequently  die  from  the  same  disease.3  But  it  is  not  necessary 
that  there  should  be  an  expression  of  the  donor's  apprehension  of 
death;  if  the  gift  is  made  during  his  last  illness,  or 
of  death  may  while  in  danger  of  death  from  any  other  cause,  it  will 
be  presumed.  ^e  presumed  to  have  been  made  in  apprehension  of 
death.4  Nor  has  the  rule  applicable  to  nuncupative  wills,  according 
to  which  the  legacy  is  valid  only  when  made  under  circumstances 
rendering  it  impossible  to  make  a  written  will,  any  application  to 
gifts  mortis  causa.5 

The  validity  of  the  gift  is  not  affected  by  the  time  intervening 
between  the  delivery  and  the  happening  of  the  donor's  death ;  the 
only  condition  is  that  there  be  no  recovery  from  the  illness,6  or 
escape  from  the  peril  then  impending,7  which  induced  the  gift.  In 
some  cases  arising  out  of  the  late  civil  war  it  was  held  that 
Enlisting  as  a  tne  obligations  *  assumed  by  one  enlisting  as  a  [*121] 
soldier.  soldier  exposed  him  to  such  peril  as  would,  on 

that  ground,  support  a  donatio  mortis  causa;9  in  other   cases  this 
is  held  differently.9 

1  Knott  v.  Hogan,  4  Mete.  (Ivy.)  99;  Guile,  117  N.  Y.  343.  If  death  intervenes 
Thompson  v.  Thompson,  12  Tex.  327,  from  a  sudden  and  unforeseen  cause,  be- 
330;  Shirley  v.  Whitehead,  1  Ired.  Eq.  fore  such  recovery  or  escape,  but  while 
130,  132;  Dole  v.  Lincoln,  31  Me.  422,  still  in  apprehension  of  death  therefrom, 
429 ;  Ogilvie  v.  Ogilvie,  1  Bradf.  356,  the  gift  will  be  good  :  Ridden  v.  Thrall, 
357  ;  Conser  v.  Snowden,  54  Md.  175,  185;  55  Hun,  185,  190;  says  Earl,  J.,  in  affirm- 
Parcher  v.  Savings  Institution,  78  Me.  ing  this  case  on  appeal :  "  When  the  gift 
470 ;  Dickeschied  v.  Bank,  28  W.  Va.  is  made  in  apprehension  of  death  from 
340,  367.  some  disease  from  which  the  donor   did 

2  BLmchard  v.  Sheldon,  43  Vt.  512,  not  recover,  and  the  apparent  immediate 
citing  earlier  Vermont  cases;  Irish  v.  cause  of  death  was  some  other  disease 
Nutting,  47  Barb.  370,  384 ;  Zeller  v.  with  which  he  was  afflicted  at  the  same 
Jordan,  105  Cal.   143.  time,  the  gift  becomes  effectual  ":  Bidden 

a  Weston  v.  Ilight,  17  Me.  287;  Rob-  v.  Thrall,  125  N.  Y.  572,  581. 
son  v.  Robson,  3  Del.  Ch.  51,  67.  7  Dexheimer  v.   Gautier,    5    Roberts. 

*  Delmotte  v.  Taylor,  1  Redf.  417,421  ;  (N.  Y.)  216,  223;  Milligan,  J.,  dissenting 

Fir.-t  National  Bank  v.  Balcom,  35  Conn,  in  Gass  v.  Simpson,  4  Coldw.  288,  300; 

851,358;  Merchant  <\  Merchant,  2  Bradf.  Gourley  v.  Linsenbigler,  51  Ta.  St.  345, 

432,442;  Rhodes  v.  Childs,  64  Pa.  St.  18,  350. 
2.i;  Meach  r.  Meach,  24  Vt.  591,  599.  "Virgin   n.   Gaither,  42   111.  39,  40; 

■<  Nicholas  v.  Adams,  2  Whart.  17;  Baker  v.  Williams,  84  Ind. 547,  549 ;  Bar- 
Ridden  v.  Thrall.  125  N.  Y.  572.  ber,  J.,  dissenting  in  Dexheimer  v.  Gautier, 

■  Grymee  <     Hone,  49  N.  Y.  17,  21;  5  Roberts.  (N.  T.)216, 223;  Gassy.  Simp- 

the  donor  in  this  case  died  five  months  son,  4  Coldw.  288,  298,  et  sea. 
after  the  delivery  of  the  gift :  Williams  v.  ,J  See  authorities,  p.  120,  n.  9 

1 24 


§61 


DELIVERY    OF   THE    THING    GIVEN. 


*  -lOl      *  100 

±  —  i ,        i  — 


Since  the  gift  mortis  causa  is  conditioned  to  take  effect  upon  the 
donor's   death   by  the  existing  disorder  or  peril,  it  is    Ambulator 
obvious  that  it  is  revocable,   before  the  happening  of   during  donor's 
that  event,  at  his  pleasure; 1  and  if  it  be  inferable  from     ' e' 
the  circumstances  that  an  irrevocable  gift  was  intended,  it  can  be 
sustained  only  as  a  gift  inter  vivos.2 

§  61.  Delivery  of  the  Thing  Given.  —  There  can  be  no  valid  gift 
causa  mortis  without  actual  manual  tradition  or  delivery  of  the  thing 
given,  or  some  act  equivalent  thereto.3  Hence  the  ^o  valid  trift 
promissory  note  of  the  donor  made  payable  to  the  without  actual 
donee  after  the  donor's  death  is  not  a  donatio  mortis  eneT- 
causa  of  the  amount  promised  to  be  paid ;  the  delivery  of  the  note 
in  such  case  is  only  the  delivery  of  a  promise,  not  of  the  thing  con- 
stituting the  gift.4  So  of  a  certificate  of  deposit  payable  to  order, 
and  indorsed  so  as  to  be  payable  after  the  donor's  death;  it  is  not 
good  as  a  donatio  causa  mortis  for  the  want  of  delivery  of  the  thing 
given.5  That  the  subject  of  the  intended  gift  is  not  within  reach 
authorizes  no  exception  to  the  rule,6  and  the  statement    XT 

*  '  JVo  exception 

by  the  donor  to  the  donee  of  the  place  in  which  the  sub-    of  things  not 

ject  of  the  gift  could  be  found,  and  that  one,  present  at    within  reach' 

the  time,  would  give  it  to  the  donee,  is  not  sufficient,  if  the  thing 

is  not  actually  so  given  before  the  donor's  death.7     So  de- 

[*  122]     livery  to  an  agent,  with  *  instruction  to  him  to    Deliver}'  to 

deliver  the  gift  to  the  donee  in  the  event  of  the   d°nor's"agent 
°  .  ,  not  good  as 

donor's  death,  is  not  sufficient  to  support  the  gift  mortis   mortis  causa; 

causa;6  such  delivery,  with  direction  to  deliver  abso-   but  may  be 

lutely,    although    not   before    the    donor's   death,   will    mtermvos- 


1  Rhodes  v.  Childs,  64  Pa.  St.  18,  23; 
Wells  v.  Tucker,  3  Bin.  366,  371 ;  Jones 
v.  Brown,  34  N.  H.  439,  446;  Uoran  v. 
Doran,  99  Cal.  311.  Hardwicke,  Ch.,  in 
Ward  v.  Turner,  2  Ves.  Sen.  431,  433; 
Parish  v.  Stone,  14  Pick.  198,203;  Emery 
v.  Clough,  63  N.  H.  552,  554. 

2  Authorities,  supra;  Matthews,  J.,  in 
Basket  v.  Hassell,  107  U.  S.  602,  614; 
Wms.  Ex.  [772].    See  post,  §  62. 

8  Authorities,  ante,  §§  57  et  seq.,  and 
post.  Almost  every  case  turning  upon 
this  subject  contains  an  announcement 
of  the  law  to  this  effect :  Zimmerman  v. 
Streeper,  75  Pa.  St.  147,  154;  Phipps  v. 
Hope,  16  Oh.  St.  586,  594. 

*  Bowers  v.  Hurd,  10  Mass.  427;  Par- 
ish r.  Stone,  14  Pick.  198,  204  ;  Raymond 
v.  Sellick,  10  Conn.  480,  485;  Holley  v. 
Adams,  16  Vt.  206;  Craig  v.  Craig,  3 
Barb.  Ch.  76,  116;  Flint  v.  Pattee,  33 
N.  H.  520,  522 ;  Sanborn  v.  Sanborn,  65 
N.  H.  172. 


5  Basket  v.  Hassell,  107  U.  S.  602,  614, 
citing  numerous  English  and  American 
cases;  Harris  v.  Clark,  3  N.  Y.  93,  113, 
overruling  Wright  v.  Wright,  1  Cow.  598, 
in  which  the  contrary  had  been  held ; 
Trenholm  v.  Morgan,  28  S.  C.  268 ;  Dunn 
v.  Bank,  109  Mo.  90. 

6  Case  v.  Dennisou,  9  R.  I.  88 ;  Eger- 
ton  v.  Egerton,  17  N.  J.  Eq.  419,  422. 

7  McGrath  v.  Reynolds,  1 1 6  Mass.  566, 
569 ;  Wilcox  v.  Mattesou,  53  Wis.  23,  26. 

8  Walter  v.  Ford,  74  Mo.  195  ;  Smith 
v.  Ferguson,  90  Ind.  229,  233  ;  Newton  v. 
Snider,  44  Ark.  42 ;  Daniel  v.  Smith,  64 
Cal.  346,  350;  McCord  v.  McCord,  77 
Mo.  166,  174;  Barnes  v.  People,  25  111. 
A  pp.  136.  A  delivery  to  the  donor's  agent 
does  not  complete  the  gift  until  there  is 
an  actual  delivery  to  the  donee ;  and  un- 
til such  time  the  agent's  authority  is  revo- 
cable, and  is  revoked  by  the  donor's  death  : 
Telford  v.  Pattou,  144  111.  611,  623. 

125 


*  122,  *  123  DONATIONES   MORTIS    CAUSA.  §  61 

constitute  a  perfect  gift  inter  vivos ; 1  it  has  been  held  that,  if 
more  be  thus  delivered  than  the  agent  is  directed  to  deliver,  the 
excess  is  not  a  gift,  either  inter  vivos  or  mortis  causa,  and  passes  to 
the  donor's  administrator.2  Not  only  must  the  delivery  be  actual 
and  complete,  so  that  the  donor  has  no  further  control  or  dominion 
over  the  thing  given,  but  the  donee  must  take  and  retain  possession 
until  the  donor's  death.  If  the  donor  again  has  possession,  the  gift 
is  nugatory.3 

Delivery  to  a  third  person  with  direction  to  deliver  to  the  donee, 
~  ,.  absolutely  to  belong  to  him   if  the  donor  should  die 

Delivery  may  J  ° 

be  to  a  third  without  making  any  change,  is  sufficient,4  although  the 
don^e!  f°r  the  delivery  by  tne  tnird  person  be  not  made  until  after  the 
donor's  death.5 
The  delivery  must  be  as  complete  and  perfect  as  the  nature  of  the 
property  will  admit  of.  Words  alone,  no  matter  how  clearly  they 
w    ,     ,  may  express  the  donor's  intention,   are  not  sufficient.6 

Words  alone  •>  L  ' 

cannot  consti-  Thus,  the  gift  of  a  check  to  an  infant,  putting  it  into 
tute  delivery,  ^ig  han(jSj  and  saying,  "  I  give  this  to  baby  for  him- 
self," is  not  valid,  if  the  check  is  found  among  the  donor's  papers 
after  his  death.7  So  the  delivery  is  not  sufficient  if  the  donor  re- 
tains any  control  or  dominion  over  the  subject  of  the 
good  if  "donor  gift,8  as  where  one  directs  the  key  of  a  trunk  to  be 
retains  control  taken  from  the  place  where  it  is  kept,  goods  to  be 
placed  in  the  trunk,  and  the  key  to  be  returned  to  its 
place;  this  is  not  a  delivery,  although  the  directions  of  the 
owner  are  promptly  executed,  *and  he,  in  his  last  sickness,  [*123] 
apprehending  death,  expresses  the  desire  to  make  the  trunk 

and  its  contents  a  gift  mortis  causa.9    Nor  is  the  delivery 

or  interest  in  .  °  .  .".,."' 

any  part  of  sufficient  if  the  donor  reserve  any  interest  in  the  thing 
tlie  ^lft-  given,  or  in  any  part  thereof; 10  as,  for  instance,  where  he 

stipulates  for  a  redelivery  to  him.11    But  the  gift  is  not  avoided  by  a 

1  Hill  v.  Stevenson,  63  Me.  364,  367  ;  relinquishment    of     dominion    over     the 

Minor   i\     Rogers,   40    Conn.    512,    518;  property  to  the  trustee  for  the  purposes  of 

Meriwether  v.  Morrison,  78  Ky.  572.  the  trust:  Telford  v.  Patton,  144  111   611, 

-  Beals  v.  Crowley,  59  Cal.  665  (three  623. 

of  the  judges   dissenting  on   the   ground  6  See  authorities,  supra,  as  to  delivery, 

that  the  excess  may  he  considered  a  gift  and  see  Yancey  v.  Field,  85  Va.  756,  and 

to  the  agent:  p.  668).  cases    cited;      McMahan    v.     Bank,     67 

3  Dunbar  v.  Dunbar,  80  Mo.  152.  Conn.  78. 

*  Dole  v.   Lincoln,  31    Me.   422,   429;  "  Jones  v.  Lock,  L.  R.  1  Ch.  App.  25, 

Wells  r.    Tucker,  3   Bin.  366,  370;   Cou-  28. 

taut  v.  Schuyler,!   Pai.  316,318;  Borne-  8  McDowell    v.    Murdock,    1     TsTott   & 

man   v.   Sidlinger,  15  Me.  429;  Emery  v.  McC.  237,  240;  Barnum  v.  Reed,  136  111. 

Clough,  63  X.  H.  552,  555;  Woodburn  v.  388. 

Woodburn,  123   111.  608.  9  Coleman  v.  Parker,  114  Mass.  30,  33. 

'■  Sessions  v.  Moseley,  4  Cush.  87,91;  10  Daniel  v.  Smith,  75  Cal.  548 ;  Barnum 

.[ B    Deyer,  16  Ala.  221,  225;  Kilby  v.  Reed,  136  111.  388. 

r.  Godwin,  2  Del.  Ch.  61,  70.    The  <ir-  »  Redell  v.  Dobree,  10  Sim.  244,251; 

cumstances  Bhould,  however,  show  a  full  Hawkins   v.  Blewitt,  2    Esp.  663;    Far- 
1 26 


§61 


DELIVERY    OF   THE    THING    GIVEN. 


123 


direction  that  the  donee  shall  provide  for  the  funeral  expenses  and  a 
monument  for  the  donor  out  of  the  sum  given.1 

It  seems  to  have  been  held  in  an  early  case  that  delivery  by  sym- 
bol was  sufficient;2  but  Kent,  in  his  Commentaries,3  calls  attention 
to  the  circumstance  that  the  symbol  in  that  case  was  No  delivery 
the  same  as  delivery  of  the  article,  and  that  it  was  the  "^  symbo1 
only  case  in  which  a  symbol  is  admitted.  The  current  of  authority 
is  certainly  very  strong  against  the  sufficiency  of  symbolical  deliv- 
ery4 unless  it  be  tantamount  to  actual  delivery.     Thus,       .         , 

J  .    .  „         .  unless  it  be 

the  delivery  of  the  key  of  a  room  containing  furniture  tantamount  to 
is  such  a  delivery  of  the  furniture  as  will  support  a  actual  delivery, 
donation  of  it  mortis  causa,6  not  because  the  delivery  of  Key  to  a  ware- 
the  key  is  a  symbolical  delivery  of  the  property,  but  be- 
cause it  is  the  means  of  obtaining  possession.6  Where  the  subject 
of  the  gift  is  capable  of  manual  tradition,  such  as  coin,  bank-notes, 
bonds,  a  watch,  or  the  like,  the  delivery  of  the  key  of  a  trunk,  chest, 
or  box  containing  it  is  not  a  valid  delivery.7  A  late  Key  to  a  trunk 
case,  decided  in  Kentucky,  holds  that  the  arbitrary  rule  or  b()X- 
formerly  existing,  requiring  an  assignment  (of  a  chose  in  action) 
and  delivery  of  the  identical  thing  in  order  to  make  valid  a  gift 
mortis  causa,  has  long  since  been  abandoned;  and  that,  accordingly, 
the  intention  to  give,  with  the  actual  delivery  of  the  written  evi- 
dence of  the  right  to  the  thing,  although  in  possession  of  another, 
under  the  belief  of  the  donor  that  it  perfects  the  gift,  constitutes  a 
valid  gift  causa  mortis.8 


quharson  v.  Cave,  2  Coll.  356,  365 ;  Barnes 
v.  People,  25  111.  App.  136. 

1  Larrabee  v.  Hascall,  88  Me.  511, 
518. 

2  Jones  v.  Selby,  Prec.  Ch.  300,  303. 
8  2  Kent,  *  446. 

4  2  Kent,  *  446 ;  Cutting  v.  Gilman,  41 
N.  H.  147,  152;  and  see  Gouldiug  v. 
Harbury,  85  Me.  227  ;  Keepers  V.  Fidelity 
Co.,  56  N.  J.  L.  302,  306,  et  seq. 

5  Smith  v.  Smith,  Str.  955  •  Hatch  v. 
Atkinson,  56  Me.  324,  330,  Coleman 
v.  Parker,  114  Mass.  30,  33.  Jones  v. 
Brown,  34  N.  H.  439,  445. 

0  Ward  v.  Turner,  2  Ves.  Sen.  430, 
443  ;  Colman  v.  Parker,  114  Mass.  30,  33  ; 
Miller  v.  Jeffress,  4  Gratt.  472,  479  ;  Cooper 
v.  Burr,  45  Barb.  9,  34 ;  Debinson  v. 
Emmons,  158  Mass  592  (key  to  a  trunk, 
which  was  under  the  immediate  control  of 
the  parties). 

7  Hatch  v.  Atkinson,  56  Me.  324,  331  ; 
McGrath  v.  Reynolds,  116  Mass.  566,  568, 
citing  earlier  cases ;  Keepers  v.  Fidelity 
Co.,  56  N.  J.  L.  302  (delivery  of  a  key  to 


a  trunk  not  under  the  immediate  control 
of  the  parties).  Says  Fauntleroy,  J.,  in 
delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court  in  a 
recent  case :  "  Constructive  delivery  is 
always  sufficient  when  actual  manual 
delivery  is  either  impracticable  or  incon- 
venient. The  contents  of  a  warehouse, 
trunk,  box,  or  other  depository  may  be 
sufficiently  delivered  by  delivery  of  the 
key  of  the  receptacle."  Thomas  v.  Lewis, 
89  Va.  1,  62,  citing  a  number  of  author- 
ities ,  in  this  case  also  the  statute  declar- 
ing all  gifts  invalid  unless  the  donee  take 
actual  possession,  and  also  declaring  that 
where  the  donor  and  donee  reside  together, 
possession  at  the  place  of  residence  is  in- 
sufficient, was  held  not  to  apply  to  gifts 
causa  mortis. 

8  Stephenson  v.  King,  81  Ky  425,  435, 
citing  and  commenting  upon  numerous 
cases ;  see  Southerland  v.  Sontherland,  5 
Bush,  591,  594;  Ellis  v.  Secor,  31  Mich. 
185,  188;  Champney  v.  Blanchard,  39 
N.  Y.  Ill,  116;  McDowell  v.  Murdock,  1 
Nott  &  McC.  237,  239.  See  as  to  the 
127 


♦124  DONATIONES   MORTIS   CAUSA.  §  61 

*  It  is  not  the  possession  of  the  donee  that  is  material,  but  [*  124] 
the    delivery  to  him   by  the  donor;  delivery  stands  in  the 
Possession  pre-    place  of  nuncupation,  and  forms  part  of  the  gift.1    Hence 
viously  or  sub-    pr0of   of   previous   possession   as   bailee,    or    of   after- 

sequentlv  no-1.1-  .       x  .  '     .  , 

proof  of "de-  acquired  possession  as  donee,  is  not  sufficient  of  itself 
livery,  to  prove  delivery, 2  and  it  is  a  question  of  fact,  in  such 

case,  whether  there  has  been  a  delivery  sufficient  to  support  the 
Declarations       gift> 8  declarations  made  by  the  deceased  subsequently 
in  proof  of         to   the   alleged   gift  were  held  competent  evidence  to 
e.nery.  prove  such  delivery,  when  made  to  the  donee,4  but  not 

when  made  to  a  third  person.5  There  is  no  distinction  in  this  re- 
spect between  gifts  inter  vivos  and  mortis  causa.6  The  doctrine  of 
the  necessity  of  delivery  to  a  valid  donation  causa  mortis  is  in  some 
instances  carried  to  the  extent  of  denying  the  possibility  of  such  a 
Debt  of  donee  gift  where  its  subject  is  a  debt  owing  by  the  donee  to 
forgiven  causa   the  donor,  or  a  thing  held  by  the  donee  as  bailee  or 

tiiovtis* 

trustee  of  the  donor,  because  a  debt  or  duty  cannot  be 
released  by  mere  parol,  without  consideration;  and  where  there  is 
nothing  to  surrender  by  delivery,  there  can  be  no  gift  mortis  causa.'1 
But  the  more  prevalent  doctrine  is,  that  where  the  donee  is  in  pos- 
session of  the  subject  of  the  gift,  the  empty  ceremony  of  giving  it 
up  to  the  donor  and  redelivering  it  to  the  donee  is  not  necessary  to 
give  validity  to  the  transaction.8  The  destruction  of  a  bond  by  the 
obligee,  accompanied  by  his  declaration  that  the  money  is  the  obli- 
gor's, is  a  good  discharge  of  the  debt  mortis  causa* 

Whether  a  vaild  gift  mortis  causa  can  be  made  in  writing,  or 
by  deed,   is  not  clear  on  authority.     There  are  some  dicta  on  the 

assignment  of  choses  in  action,  ante,  §  59,  livery  for  the  express  purpose  of  consum- 

pp.  *  1 18,  *119  mating  the  gift;    a  previous  and  contin- 

1  Miller  v  Jeffress,  4  Gratt.  472,  480.  nous  possession  by  the  donee  is  insufficient. 

2  McCord  v.  McCord,  77  Mo.  166,  174  ;  Says  the  court  in  this  case,  p.  243,  "  We 
Kenney  v,  Public  Administrator,  2  Bradf.  are  aware  that  some  text-writers  have 
319,321  ;  .Miller  v.  Jeffress,  supra;  Cut-  assumed,  that  where  the  property  is  al- 
ting  r  Oilman,  41  N.  H.  147,  152.  ready  in  the   possession   of   the  donee,  a 

8  Hunt  v.  Hunt,  119  Mass.  474,  475.  delivery  is  not  necessary.     But  the  cases 

4  Dean  v.  Dean,  43  Vt.  337,  343.  cited  in  support  of  the  doctrine  nearly  all 

6  Rockwood  v.   Wiggin,  16  Gray,  402,  relate  to  gifts  inter  vivos,  and  not  to  gifts 

403.  causa  mortis." 

6  Camp's  Appeal,  36  Conn.  88,  93;  8  If  there  he  proof  of  the  relinquish- 
Irons  v.  Smallpiece,  2  B.  &  Aid.  551  ;  ment  of  all  claim  to  and  interest  in  the 
Carpenter  v.  Dodge,  20  Vt.  595  ;  Sessions  subject  of  the  gift:  Wing  v.  Merchant, 
V.  Mosely,  4  Cash,  87  ;  Appeal  of  Fross,  57  Me.  383,386,  Tenbrook  v.  Brown,  17 
105  Pa.  St.  258,  267;  Westerlo  v.  De  Ind.  410,  413;  Hunt  v.  Hunt,  119  Mass. 
Witt,  86  N.  Y.  340.  474 ;   Champney  v.  Blanchard,  39  N.  Y. 

7  Miller  ».  Jeffress,  4  Gratt.  472,480;  ill,  116;  Stevens  v.  Stevens,  5  Th.  &  C. 
French    r.    Raymond,  19   Vt.  623,  626.  87. 

Bee  also   Drew   v.   Hagerty,  81    Me.  231,         '•'  Gardner  v.  Gardner,  22  Wend.  526 ; 

242,  in  whirl,  it  is  held  that  in  order  to  Darland   V.   Taylor,   52    Iowa,   503,  506. 

constitute  a  valid  gift  mortu  causa  of  a  See  also    Brinckerhoff    >•.    Lawrence,  2 

bank-book,   there    must   be  an    actual   de-  Sandf.  Ch.  400,  410,  and  authorities  cited. 
128 


§  62  REVOCABILITY   OF   GIFTS   MORTIS   CAUSA.      *  125,  *  126 

[*125]  *  subject  in  English  cases; *  but  Williams  is  of   Giftscauja 

the  opinion  that,  since  such  instruments  are  mortis  by  deed 
testamentary  in  their  nature  and  admitted  to  probate  in  wn  mg* 
as  such,  they  would  not,  unaccompanied  by  delivery,  be  allowed  to 
operate  as  donations  mortis  causa.2  The  same  view,  and  for  the 
same  reason,  is  announced  by  Euffin,  C.  J.,  in  North  Carolina;8  and 
in  Massachusetts  it  is  held  that  gifts  causa  mortis  cannot  be  effected 
by  formal  instruments  of  conveyance  or  assignment,  because  sym- 
bolical or  constructive  delivery  is  not  sufficient,  actual  delivery  or 
its  equivalent  being  required.4  If  a  gift  be  made  by  deed,  although 
while  under  the  apprehension  of  death  from  existing  illness,  it  may 
be  valid  as  a  gift  inter  vivos,  which  cannot  be  revoked  and  is  not 
avoided  by  the  grantor's  recovery  from  his  illness.5  In  such  cases 
equity  will  grant  relief  by  setting  aside  the  conveyance  upon  very 
slight  evidence  of  mistake,  misapprehension,  or  misunderstanding 
on  the  part  of  the  donor.6  But  there  are  also  cases  holding  that 
there  may  be  a  valid  gift  causa  mortis  by  deed  in  writing,7  and  that 
in  such  case  actual  delivery  is  not  essential.8 

§  62.    Revocability  of    Gifts  Mortis  Causa.  —  It  has  already  been 
stated,9  that  an  essential  feature  of  the  gift  mortis  causa  is  its  am- 
bulatory nature  before   consummation   by  the  donor's    Gift  revocable 
death.     Not  only  may  the  donor,  while  living,  revoke    by  act  of  the 
the  gift  at  his  pleasure,10  and  give  it  to  another,11  but     onor' 
revocation  follows  impliedly  in  several  instances  without  the  donor's 

affirmative  action.      Thus,   the  recovery  of   the   donor         .    ,  . 

.  ....         revoked  by 

from  the  illness  or  delivery  from  the  peril  which  in-    recovery  of 

duced  the  gift  works  its  revocation, 12  although   donor ' 
[*  126]  the  *  recovery  be  temporary,  and   death  may  finally  ensue 

from  the  same  cause.18  The  death  of  the  donee  b  deathof 
occurring  before  that  of  the  donor  likewise  operates  a  donee  before 
revocation,  similar  in  effect  to  the  lapsing  of  a  bequest   donor's  deatnJ 

1  Lord  Hardwicke  in  Ward  v.  Turner,  327;    Kemper  v.   Kemper,   1    Duv.   401. 
2  Ves.  Sen.  431,  440 ;  Johnson  v.  Smith,  1  In   both   of  these  cases,   however,  there 
Ves.  Sen.  314  ;  Lord  Rosslyn  in  Tate  v.  had  been  actual  delivery  of  the  gift. 
Hilbert,  2  Ves.  Jr.  Ill,  120.  8  Meach   v.  Meach,    24  Vt.    591,  598; 

2  Wins.   Ex.   [780],   and    authorities  ;  Ellis  v.  Secor,  31  Mich.  185,  193. 
Kigden  v.  Vallier,  2  Ves.  Sen.  252,  258.  9  Ante,  §  57. 

8  Smith  v.   Downey,  3    Ired.    Eq.  268,  10  Parker  v.  Marston,  27  Me.  196,  203; 

276.  Wigle  v.  Wigle,  6  Watts,  522 ;  Emery  v. 

*  McGrath  v.  Reynolds,  116  Mass.  566,  Clough,  63  N.  H.  552,  554  ;  Bunn  v.  Mark- 

568.  ham,  7  Taunt.  224,  231  ;  Ward  v.  Turner, 

5  Gilligan  v.  Lord,  51  Conn.  562,  568  ;  2  Ves.  Sen.  431,  433 ;  Wells  v.  Tucker,  3 
McCarty  t\  Kearnan,  86  HI.  291.  Bin.  366,  373;  Parish  v.  Stone,  14  Pick 

6  Per    Redfield,   C.  J.,  in     Meach  v.  198,  203. 

Meach,   24   Vt.   591,  593;    Houghton   v.  u  Parker  v.  Marston,  supra. 

Houghton,  34  Hun,  212,  214,  citing  other  12  Ante,  §  60. 

authorities.  is  See  ante,  §  59. 

7  Thompson    v.    Thompson,    12    Tex. 

vol.  i.  —  9  m 


*  126,  *  127  DON ATIONES   MORTIS   CAUSA.  §63 

by  the  death  of  the  legatee  before  that  of  the  testator.1  And  it  has 
by  birth  of  been  held  that  the  donatio  mortis  causa  partakes  of  the 
issue  to  donor,  nature  of  legacies  to  the  extent  of  being  revocable  by 
the  subsequent  birth  of  issue  to  the  donor.2 

A  donatio  mortis  causa  cannot  be  revoked  by  last  will  or  testa- 
ment, although  there  be  a  different  testamentary  disposition  of  the 
Not  by  last  specific  thing  given  mortis  causa,  because  the  will  speaks 
wU1;  as  of  the  moment  of  the  testator's  death,   which  has 

vested  the  previous  gift  irrevocably  in  the  donee.8  But  the  gift  of  a 
but  gift  of  a  legacy  t°  one  who  has  received  a  gift  mortis  causa  may 
legacy  may  be  raise  the  presumption  that  the  former  is  a  substitution 
for  the  latter;4  and  the  donee  may  sometimes  be  com- 
pelled to  choose  between  them,  not  being  entitled  to  both.5 

The  gift  causa  mortis  is  defeasible  by  reclamation,  or  any  act  of 
the  donor  inconsistent  with  the  gift  and  indicating  his  purpose  to 
resume  possession  thereof.6  Hence  the  gift  is  revoked  by  the  de- 
mand of  the  donor  for  a  redelivery,  although  the  donee  refuse  to 
surrender  it.7 

§  63.  Liability  of  Gifts  Mortis  Causa  to  Creditors  and  Family  of 
the  Donor.  —  Like  gifts  inter  vivos  and  legacies,  gifts  mortis  causa 
„..,        ..         are  subject  to  defeasance  in  favor  of  the  donor's  credi- 

Gifts  mortis  J 

causa  liable  to  tors,  because,  as  against  them,  one  cannot  give  away 
donor's  debts,  ^  pr0perty.8  Donees  causa  mortis  take  their  title  to 
the  property  subject  to  the  contingent  right  of  the  administrator  to 
reclaim  it,  and  are  bound  to  have  it  forthcoming  when  re- 
quired for  the  payment  *  of  debts ; 9  or  subject  to  be  taken  by  [*  127] 
.   .  ,      creditors  in  satisfaction  of  their  claims  existing 

but  not  to  sub-  ° 

sequent  credi-  at  the  time  the  gift  was  made ; 10  but  subsequent  credi- 
tors'  tors  have  recourse  only  upon  proof  of  fraudulent  intent 

under  existing  or  anticipated  insolvency.11    The  donee  is  not  affected 

1  Merchant  v.  Merchant,  2  Bradf.  432,  5  Johnson  v.  Smith,  1  Ves.  Sen.  314. 
444  (mentioning,  as  the  three  conditions          6  Emery  v.  Clough,  63  N.  H.  552,  554 ; 
annexed  to  the  gift   under  the  civil  law,  Marshall  v.  Berry,  13  Allen,  43,  46. 
either  of  which   would  defeat   the  dona-  7  Merchant  v.  Merchant,  2  Bradf.  432, 
tion,  1.  the  recovery  of  the  donor;  2.  re-  444. 

pentance  of  the  gift;  3.  death  of  the  donee  8  Emery  v.  Clough,  63  N.  H.  552,  554. 

before    the    donor's     decease:    p.    445);  3  Mitchell  v.  Pease,  7   Cush.  350,  353, 

Michener  v.  Dale,  23  Pa.  St.  59,  63  ;  Wells  citing  Toll.  233  (4th  ed.)  ;  Dunn  v.  Bank, 

v.   linker,  3  Bin.  ar.r,,  370.  109  Mo.  90,  100;  Tate  v.  Hilbert,  2  Ves. 

2  Bloomer  v.  Bloomer,  2  Bradf.  339,  Jr.  Ill,  120;  the  case  of  Holland  v.  Cruft, 
348.  20  Pick.  321,328,    announces  the  Massa- 

8  Merchant  V.  Merchant,  2  Bradf.  432,  chusetts   law    in    relation  to   conveyances 

443  ;  Nicholas  v.  Adams,  2  Wliart.  17,  22  ;  inter  vivos  in  fraud  of  creditors. 

Sanborn  0.  Goodhne,  28  N.  II.  48;  Emery  10  Chase  v.  Redding,  13  Gray,  418,  420; 

v.  Clough,  63   \.    II.  552,   554;  Brunson  Borneman  v.   Sidlingcr,  15  Me.  429,  431  ; 

P.Henry,   140   Ind.   455,  464;    Tloehn    v.  Michener  v.  Dale,  23  Pa.  St.  59,  64. 

Btrnttman,  71  Mo.  App   399,  406.  n  Such  is  the   law  as  to  conveyances 

4  Jones  V.  Selby,  I'rec.  Cli.  300,  304.  inter  vivos,  and  there  is  no  distinction  in 
130 


§  Go  LIABILITY   OF   GIFTS   MORTIS   CAUSA,  ETC.      *  127,  *  128 

by  the  decree  of  the  probate  court  charging  the  administrator  with 
the  property,  and  ordering  distribution; 1  nor  is  the  gift   and  o,    toth 
avoided  by  the  insolvency  of  the  donor's  estate  further    extent  of  such 
than  may  be  necessary  for  the  payment  of  debts.2     If,     e  ts' 
therefore,  the  donee  will  offer  to  pay  such  debts  as  may  be  legally 
established,   the  administrator  cannot  maintain  an   action  against 
him  for  the  restitution  of  the  gift.8 

To  what  extent  such  gifts  will  be  permitted  to  interfere  with  the 
rights  of  widows  and  infant  children  of  the  donor,  does  not  appear 
very  clearly.  This  subject  has  not  received  the  atten- 
tion from  courts  and  legislatures  which  its  relation  to  Wjd0w  and  mi- 
the  obligations  arising  from  marriage  and  the  birth  of  nor  children 
issue  seems  to  demand.  Surrogate  Bradford  held  this  agains 
method  of  disposing  of  one's  property  to  be  testamentary  to  the 
extent  of  bringing  it  within  the  operation  of  the  statute  of  Connecti- 
cut declaring  a  will  revoked  by  the  subsequent  birth  of  a  child  not 
therein  provided  for,4  because  "in  the  nature  and  reason  of  things 
there  seems  no  substantial  ground  for  not  applying  the  same  prin- 
ciple to  unwritten  as  to  written  legacies."  So  in  Arkansas  it  was 
held,  on  a  full  discussion  of  the  question  and  the  authorities  bearing 
thereon,  that  the  widow  could  not  be  deprived  of  her  statutory  dower 
in  the  personalty  by  any  gift  causa  7nortis  made  by  her  deceased 
husband  in  his  lifetime,  independent  of  any  intention  of  fraud  on 
his  part,  the  principal  reason  given  by  the  court  for  its  decision 
being  that,  so  far  as  the  widow's  dower  rights  were  concerned,  the 
deceased  died  "possessed  of  the  property  so  conveyed."6  It  has,  on 
the  other  hand,  been  expressly  held  that  the  right  of  the  widow  is 
to  the  property  of  which  the  husband  died  seised  or  possessed ;  and 
because  gifts  mortis  causa  have  their  full  effect  in  the  lifetime  of 
the  donor,  they  do  not  impair  the  rights  of  the  widow.6     Upon 

which  Judge  Redfield  remarks:  "It  seems  to  us  very  ques- 
[*  128]  tionable,  *  whether  a  man  of   substance   can   be  allowed  to 

dispose  of  his  whole  estate,  and  leave  his  widow  a  beggar, 
by  the  means  of  this  species  of  gift,  which  is  clearly  of  a  testamen- 
tary character,  where  the  statute  expressly  provides  that  the  widow 
may  waive  the  provisions  of  the  will  and  come  in  for  her  full  share 
of  the  personal  estate,  under  the  statute,  by  way  of  distribution. 

this  respect  between  such  and  donations  *  Bloomer  v.  Bloomer,  2  Bradf.  339, 

mortis  causa :  Marshall  v.  Berry,  13  Allen,  348. 

43,  46.     See  on  this  point,  and  as  to  the  6  Hatcher  v.  Buford,  60  Ark.  169,  180. 

question   whether  the   administrator   has  6  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Chase  v.  Redding,  13 

power  to  cause   such   conveyances  to  be  Gray,  418;  Cranson  v.  Cranson,  4  Mich. 

set  aside,  or  whether  the   creditors  must  230;  Wells,  J.,  in  Marshall  v.  Berry,  13 

resort  to  chancery,  post,  §  296.  Allen,  43,  46,  applying  same  principle  to 

1  Lewis  v.  Bolitho,  6  Gray,  137,  138.  the   wife's  gifts  without  consent  of  the 


2  Seybold  v.  Bank,  5  No.  Dak.  460,  469.     husband. 
8  Chase  v.  Redding,  13  Gray,  418,  422. 


131 


*  128,  *  129        DONATIONES  MORTIS  CAUSA.  §  63 

No  similar  statute  has  ever  existed  in  England  in  favor  of  widows, 
and  that  question  could  not  therefore  arise  there.  And  it  is  pos- 
sible the  American  courts  have  felt  too  reluctant  to  recognize 
the  difference,  in  this  respect,  between  the  widow  and  next  of 
kin."1 

The  question  has  repeatedly  engaged  the  attention  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Missouri,  and  was  uniformly  decided  in  the  spirit  of  the 
illustrious  judges  above  quoted.  Judge  Norton,  delivering  the 
unanimous  opinion  of  the  court,2  quotes  the  language  of  Judge 
Scott 8  as  follows :  "  Although  dower  is  given  in  personal  estate  by 
our  statute,  yet  it  was  not  thereby  intended  to  restrain  the  husband's 
absolute  control  of  it  during  his  life,  to  give  and  dispose  of  it  as 
he  wills,  provided  that  it  be  not  done  in  expectation  of  death  with  a 
view  to  defeat  the  widow's  doiver.  The  husband  may  do  as  he  pleases 
with  his  personal  property  subject  to  this  restriction.  After  the 
enjoyment  of  the  property  in  the  most  absolute  manner  during 
almost  his  entire  life,  the  law  will  not  permit  him,  at  the  approach 
of  death,  and  with  the  view  to  defeat  his  wife's  dower,  to  give  it 
away.  If  such  a  disposition  were  allowed,  the  efficacy  of  the  statute 
conferring  dower  would  depend  on  the  whim  or  caprice  of  the  hus- 
band."4 The  court  held,  however,  that  the  widow  has  no  claim 
against  the  general  estate  for  the  property  so  disposed  of,  her  relief 
being  in  equity  to  set  aside  the  fraudulent  disposition,  and  to  charge 
the  grantee  with  a  trust  in  her  favor. 

In  Louisiana  gifts  causa  mortis  cannot  exceed  a  certain  proportion 
of  the  estate.5  In  New  Hampshire  the  gift  must  be  proved  by  the 
testimony  of  two  indifferent  witnesses,  upon  petition  by  the  donee 
to  the  probate  court,  filed  within  sixty  days  after  the  donor's 
death.8  In  Pennsylvania  it  was  held  that  the  mere  gift  *  of  [*  129] 
all  the  property  of  one  since  deceased,  to  take  effect  after  his 
death,  is  not  valid  as  a  donatio  causa  7)iortis,  whether  accompanied 
by  delivery  or  not; 7  not  because  a  man  may  not  so  dispose  of  all  his 
property,  but  because  there  is  no  specific  reference  to  the  property, 
and  because  the  language  is  testamentary,  and  the  delivery  only 
constructive;  it  is  no  objection,  therefore,  that  such  a  gift  comprises 
the  principal  part  of  the  donor's  estate.8 

It  seems  that  the  principles  governing  the  construction  of  wills 


1  3  Reilf.  on  Wills,  323,  pi.  3,  note  7.  v.  Tucker,  32   Mo.   464  ;   and   the  same 

2  Iu  Straat  v.  O'Neil,  84  Mo.  68,  71,  doctrine  has  been  announced  in  the  case 
approved  in  Dunn  v.  Bank,   109  Mo.  90,  of  Davis  v.  Davis,  5  Mo.  183." 

101.  b  Ante,  §  17. 

8  In  Stone  v.  Stone,  18  Mo.  389.  8  Pub.  St.  1891,  p.  523,  §  18;  Emery  v. 

4  "  This  case  "  [Stone  v.  Stone,  supra],  Clongh,  63  N.  II.  552,  553. 
says  Judge   Norton,  in   Straat   v.  O'Neil,  7  Headley  v.  Kirby,  18  Pa.  St.  326. 

tupra,   "was    followed    in    the   cases   of         e  Michener  v.  Dale,  23  Pa.  St.  59,  64. 
Tucker  v.  Tucker,  29  Mo.  350,  and  Tucker 
132 


§  63  LIABILITY   OF   GIFTS   MORTIS   CAUSA,  ETC.  *  129 

are  applicable  to  gifts  mortis  causa,  and  that  the  presumption  against 
fiduciary  advisers  attending  testators  is  equally  valid  against  a 
clergyman  who  receives  a  gift  mortis  causa  while  attending  the 
donor  in  extremis.1 

»  Per  Sugden,  Ch.,  in  Thompson  v.  Heffernan,  4  Dm.  &  W.  285,  291. 


130,  *  131      DESCENT   AND    DISTRIBUTION    OF   PROPERTY.  §  64 


*PART  SECOND.  r*130] 

OF  THE  DEVOLUTION  BY   OPERATION  OF  LAW. 


CHAPTER    VIII. 

DESCENT   AND   DISTRIBUTION   OF   PROPERTY    OF   INTESTATES. 

§.  64.  Nature  and  Origin  of  the  Rules  of  Descent  and  Distribu- 
tion. —  In  default  of  the  testamentary  disposition  of  the  property 
Principle  of  of  a  deceased  person,  the  law  disposes  of  the  same  pre- 
devoiution.  cisely  as  the  deceased  himself  would  do  if  acting  ration- 
ally, and  without  motive  or  influence  of  an  extraneous  nature.  The 
family  of  a  person  have  claims  upon  him  while  living  which  are 
recognized,  and  to  a  great  extent  enforced,  by  the  law :  a  man  may 
be  compelled  to  provide  for  his  wife  and  children  the  necessaries  for 
their  support  and  comfort,  and  for  the  proper  education  of  his  chil- 
dren. But  he  may  freely  alien  any  of  his  property  during  his  life- 
time, even,  as  has  been  shown,1  on  the  very  point  of  death,  or  dispose 
of  the  same  by  last  will,  subject  only  to  such  restrictions  as  the  law 
imposes  for  the  protection  of  the  wife  and  surviving  minor  children.2 
The  statutory  law  of  England  and  America  (except  in 

Jl  lie  Tumilv  3.S  ,    ,  ,_  II* 

the  basis  of  the  State  of  Louisiana)  allows  gilts  and  devises  or 
devolution.  bequests,  in  derogation  of  the  interest  of  his  own  family, 
to  a  greater  extent,'  perhaps,  than  any  other  of  the  civilized  nations  ; 
nevertheless,  its  presumptions  and  intendments,  whenever  occasion 
exists  for  the  application  of  such,  are  in  favor  of  the  family.  Thus 
it  is  the  family  which  furnishes  the  basis  and  content  of  the  law 
regulating  the  devolution  of  the  property  of  intestates.8 

*  This  subject  is  so  thoroughly  treated  in  the  statutes  of  [*  131] 
every  State  of  the  Union  that  there  is  neither  room  nor  occasion 

for  an  extensive  general  discussion  of  its  principles  apart 
eroedby501  from  a  reference  to  their  provisions.  But  it  may  be  neces- 
statutes,  gary  tQ  bear  in  mind  that  in  most  of  the  States  the  stat- 

'  Ante,  %  59.  only  makes  such  a  will  for  the  intestate 

2  Ante,  §§  R,  17.  as  a  father,  free  from  the   partiality  of 

8  "Tlio  Statute  of  Distribution   dues  affections,  should  himself  make;  and  this 

not  break   Into  any  settlement  made  by  I  may  call  a  Parliamentary  Will":  Lord 

the  father;   it  only  meddles  with  what  Raymond,  in  Edwards  v.  Freeman,  2  P. 

was  left  undisposed  of  by  him,  and  that  Wms.  435,  443. 

184 


§64 


NATURE   AND   ORIGIN   OF   THE   RULES. 


131 


utes  of  descent  and  distribution  are  subject,  and  to  be  construed  with 
reference,  to  the  law  concerning  dower,  tenancy  by  the  curtesy,  part- 
nership, homesteads,  and  exemption,  and  particularly  to  the  peculiarly 
American  provisions  in  favor  of  the  widow  and  minor  children  for 
their  immediate  support,  which  will  be  noticed  hereafter.1     It  may 
also  serve  the  purposes  of   both  students   and   practi-   mostiy  foilow- 
tioners  to  notice  that,  while  the  American   statutes  of    jpe  English 
descent  and  distribution  are  exceedingly  diverse  in  their    Descents  and 
details,  they  are  in  the  main  modelled  after  and  mostly    Distribution, 
approximate  in  their  general  results,  the  English  Statute  of  Distri- 
butions,2 which  in  its  turn  is  mainly  borrowed  from  the    which  is  uken 
civil  law,3  so  that  the  construction  and  practice  under  it   from  the  civil 
have  been  governed,  to  a  great  extent,  by  the  principles    aw' 
of  the  civil  law.4 

In  connection  with  the  provision  of  the  civil  law  excluding  from 
the  succession  an  heir,  either  by  testament  or  to  an  intestate,  who 
takes  or  attempts  the  life  of  a  person  to  whom  he  should  succeed,6 
an  interesting  diversity  of  opinion  has  sprung  tip  in  the  United 
States,  and  it  was  held  by  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  that  the 
common  law,  in  the  absence  of  a  specific  enactment,  and 
in  disregard  of  the  Statute  of  Descents,  operated  a  like 
exclusion  in  such  cases.6  This  view  finds  support  in 
the  opinions  of  writers  in  law  publications  of  the  high- 
est standing  ; 7  and  was  followed  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Nebraska.8  But  the  case  of  Riggs  v.  Palmer  was  decided  by  a 
divided  court, — two  of  the  seven  judges  dissenting  on  the  ground 
that  the  statute  prescribes  the  method  by  which,  and  by  which  only, 


Whether  the 
murderer  of  a 
testator  or  an- 
cestor can  suc- 
ceed to  the 
inheritance. 


1  See  post,  §§  77  et  seq. ;  dower,  §§  105 
et  seq.;  curtesy,  §  121 ;  partnership,  §§  123 
et  seq. ;  homestead,  §§  94  et  seq. 

2  22  &  23  Car.  II.  c.  2,  §  10.  "  The 
provisions  of  this  law  stand  in  striking 
contrast  with  the  canons  of  descent  of  the 
common  law.  Primogeniture,  the  prefer- 
ence of  males  over  females,  the  blood  of 
the  first  purchaser,  the  rule  that  property 
never  ascends,  the  exclusion  of  the  half 
blood,  —  all  these  fundamental  rules  of 
the  common  law  are  violated  by  the  Stat- 
ute of  Distributions.  Its  great  object  was 
equality " :  Carr,  J.,  in  Davis  v.  Rowe,  6 
Rand.  355,  361. 

3  2  Kent,  422. 

*  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  422,  pi.  3  ;  at  least 
as  to  the  proximity  of  degrees  of  kindred  ; 
1  Wms.  [419],  citing  Mentney  v.  Petty, 
Prec.  Ch.  593,  and  other  English  cases. 
It  will  appear  infra  that  the  statutes  of 
most  States  so  provide. 


5  Domat,  Civ.  L.  (translated  by  Stra- 
han)  art.  2551. 

6  Says  Earl,  J.,  speaking  for  the  ma- 
jority of  the  court  in  Riggs  v.  Palmer, 
115  N.  Y.  506,  511:  "No  one  shall  be 
permitted  to  profit  by  his  own  fraud,  or 
to  take  advantage  of  his  own  wrong,  or  to 
found  any  claim  upon  his  own  iniquity,  or 
to  acquire  property  by  his  own  crime." 

7  See  30  American  Law  Review,  130; 
4  Harv.  Law  Review,  394;  8  lb.  170. 

8  Shellenberger  v.  Ransom,  31  Neb.  61, 
74.  This  case  was  an  action  for  the  par- 
tition of  lands  conveyed  by  the  father  of  a 
tenant  in  common  whom  he  had  murdered 
for  the  purpose  of  possessing  himself  of 
her  property ;  the  court  refused  to  try  the 
question  whether  the  grantee  was  an  in- 
nocent purchaser,  on  the  ground  that  a 
father  could  not  succeed  to  the  estate  of 
a  daughter  whom  he  had  murdered. 

135 


*  131  DESCENT  AND   DISTRIBUTION   OF  PROPERTY.  §  64 

a  duly  executed  will  can  be  revoked ;  that  the  provisions  of  the  civil 
law  are  not  applicable  as  against  the  positive  enactments  of  the 
legislature,  and  that  it  is  not  the  province  of  courts  to  assume  the 
functions  of  the  legislative  department  of  the  government.1  The 
ruling  of  the  majority  was  subsequently  explained  by  the  court  as 
holding,  not  that  the  killing  of  the  testator  by  the  devisee  revoked  or 
avoided  the  will,  but  that,  the  devise  remaining  valid,  the  court 
intervened  by  equitable  and  injunctive  action  to  prevent  the  mur- 
derer from  reaping  the  fruit  of  his  crime.2 

Meanwhile  the  case  of  Shellenberger  v.  Ransom  was  pending  on  a 
motion  for  rehearing,  and  when  it  was  finally  decided,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Nebraska,  in  a  unanimous,  emphatic  opinion,  reversed  its 
former  decision,  and  sided  with  the  dissenting  judges  in  Riggs  v. 
Palmer,  holding  that  the  courts  cannot  annul  the  positive  enactment 
of  the  legislature  by  reading  into  it  the  limitations  of  the  civil  law,  or 
the  promptings  of  humanity.3  The  same  principle  was  announced 
in  Ohio,  in  the  case  of  Deem  v.  Millikin,4  in  which  Schanck,  J., 
quotes  from  Judge  Redfield : 5  "It  is  scarcely  necessary,  we  trust, 
at  this  late  day,  to  say  that  the  judicial  tribunals  of  the  State  have 
no  concern  with  the  policy  of  legislation,"  and  suggests  that  even 
a  legislative  body,  careful  to  respect  both  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of 
the  constitution,  might  have  grave  reasons  to  hesitate  to  attach  to 
felonies  any  of  the  consequences  of  the  corruption  of  blood.  The 
Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania  held  itself  bound,  after  a  careful  and 
exhaustive  review  of  the  authorities,  by  the  statutes  and  constitu- 
tion of  the  State,  to  refuse  to  make  any  innovation  on  the  law  of 
descents  by  decreeing  a  forfeiture  of  the  inheritance  of  a  parricide, 
holding  that  the  constitution  positively  inhibits  any  attainder  of 
treason  or  felony  by  the  legislature,  or  any  forfeiture  of  estate  or 
corruption  of  blood,  except  during  the  life  of  the  offender.6  The 
same  conclusion  was  reached  in  North  Carolina,  where  it  was  de- 
cided that  a  widow,  guilty  of  the  murder  of  her  husband,  was  not 
for  that  reason  debarred  of  her  dower  in  his  estate,  because  this 
would  be  a  forfeiture  of  property  for  crime,  and  forfeitures  of  prop- 
erty are  unknown  to  our  law.7  There  seems  to  be  no  escape  on 
principle  from  the  conclusion  that  at  common  law,  and  under  the 
statutes  and  constitutions  of  the  various  States  of  the  Union,  courts 
are  not  warranted  in  disregarding  the  course  of  descent  and  distri- 
bution, or  the  conclusiveness  of  duly  executed  wills,  to  divert  the 
succession  from  the  murderers  of  ancestors  or  testators,  and  authori- 

1  Per  J.I.  Gray  and  Danforth,  dissent-  8  Shellenberger  v.  Ransom,  41  Neb. 
Lag,  in  ltiggs  v.  rainier,   115  N.  Y.  506,     631. 

515.  4  6  OhioOt.  Ct.  357,  360. 

2  Ellorson  v.  Westoott,  148  N.  Y.  149,  5  In  the  case  of  Re  Powers,  25  Vt.  261, 
154.     See  remarks  on  this  case  ante,  §  48,     265. 

p.  *  90.  6  Carpenter's  Estate,  170  Pa.  St.  203. 

1  Owens  v.  Owens,  100  N.  C.  240. 
136 


§65 


RIGHTS   OF   CHILDREN. 


*  131,* 132 


ties  strongly  preponderate  in  this  direction.1  This  question  has 
been  made  the  subject  of  statutory  enactment  in  several  States ; 
so,  for  instance,  in  Mississippi,  where  the  person  causing  or  pro- 
curing the  death  of  another,  in  any  way,  cannot  inherit  from  such 
other,  but  the  inheritance  descends  as  if  the  person  causing  or 
procuring  the  death  had  never  been  in  existence ; 2  and  in  Texas, 
where  the  statute  provides  that  no  conviction  shall  work  corrup- 
tion of  blood  or  forfeiture  of  estate,  nor  shall  there  be  any  for- 
feiture by  reason  of  death-  by  casualty,  and  the  estate  of  those  who 
destroy  their  own  lives  shall  descend  or  vest  as  in  the  case  of  natural 
death.8 

It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind,  that  the  distribution  of  per-    „         . 

'  r  Personal  prop- 

sonal  property  of  an  intestate  must  be  according  to  the  erty  descends 

law  of  the  country  or  State  of  which  he  was  a  domiciled  theTaw^f'the 

inhabitant  at  the  time  of  his  death,4  without  regard  to  owner's  dom- 

the  place  of  either  the  birth,  or  death,  or  the  situation  1C1 ' 
of  the  property  at  the  time  ;  but  that  real  estate  descends  according 

to  the  law  of  the  place  where  it  is  situated.6     Nor  can  real  estate 

the  descent  be  governed  by  a  statute  not  in  force  on  the  *he°lawn^e£° 

day  of  the    intestate's   death ; 6   and   so   a  vested   re-  «'<«. 

mainder  descends  under  the  law  in  force  at  the  time  of  _ 

L'Gsccnt  is 

the  vesting  of  the  estate  in  expectancy,  not  affected  by   governed  by 
the  law  governing  descents  at  the  termination  of  the   * 

intervening  estate.7 
[*  132]       *  The  term  "  descent "  is  usually  applied  to  the 

devolution  of  real  estate,  and  "  distribution "  to  that  of  per- 
sonal property  j  and  in  most  States  a  distinction  is  still  observed 
in  the  devolution  of  these  two  classes  of  property,  arising,  no 
doubt,  out  of  the  former  tenure  of  real  estate  under  the  feudal 
system.8 

§  65.  Rights  of  Children.  —  The  legitimate  result  of  the  ethical 
union  of  the  sexes  is  the  continuance  of  the  race,  which  is  thus  seen 
to  depend  for  its  permanency  upon  the  marriage  institution  and  its 


force  at  the 
time  of  intes- 
tate's death. 


1  It  is  noticeable,  that  in  most  of  the 
cases  so  holding  the  murderers  had  been 
convicted  and  executed.  See  a  discussion 
of  cases  in  39  Central  L.  J.  217  :  32  lb.  333. 

2  Ann.  Code,  Miss.  1892,  §  1554. 

3  Sayles'  St.  1897,  art.  1692. 

4  Post,  ch.  xvii.;  also  §  565,  p.  *1239 
and  cases  there  cited. 

6  Post,  §  1 68,  and  authorities. 

6  Sawer  v.  Beal,  36  Kans.  555,  558. 

7  Curtis  v.  Fowler,  66  Mich.  696,  698. 

8  Ante,  §§  12-16.  Says  Scott,  J.,  In  Re 
Fort's  Estate,  14  Wash.  10,  14,  in  constru- 
ing the  meaning  of  "  inheritance "  as 
used  in  a  statute :  "  The  old-time  refined 


or  sentimental  reason  for  the  distinction 
drawn  between  the  descent  of  lands  and 
the  descent  of  personal  property  does  not 
exist  in  this  country.  When  the  rule 
originated,  real  estate  did  not  change 
hands  as  frequently  as  it  does  at  the  pres- 
ent day  with  us,  but  was  usually  kept  in 
the  same  family  on  the  male  side  from 
generation  to  generation.  Here  land  is 
looked  upon  more  as  a  commodity  and  a 
common  subject  of  bargain  and  sale. 
Titles  pass  frequently,  and  owners  are 
continually  changing."  So  "  descent "  was 
held  to  include  personalty  in  Hudnall  v- 
Ham,  172  HI.  76. 

137 


*  132,  *133      DESCENT   AND   DISTRIBUTION   OF   PROPERTY.  §  G6 

direct  result,  the  Family.  As  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  is  the 
highest  law  of  all  living  things,  so  it  is  an  overruling  necessity  for 
the  State  to  vindicate  and  preserve  the  Family,  whose  extinction  it 
could  not  survive.  In  recognition  of  this  necessity  all  States  have 
at  all  times  secured  to  the  several  members  of  a  family  in  the  strict 
sense  (father,  mother,  and  minor  children)  the  enjoyment  of  their 
common  property  (by  representation  through  its  head)  ;  and  the  civil, 
canon,  and  common  law,  as  well  as  the  English  and  American  stat- 
utes regulating  the  descent  and  distribution  of  the  property  of  de- 
Children  in  ceased  intestates,  are  unanimous  in  placing  children  and 
first  degree  the  descendants  of  deceased  children  of  the  intestate  in 
the  first  degree  as  heirs.  The  apparent  exception  to 
this  at  common  law,  and  under  the  statutes  of  some  of  the  States 
following  it,  of  a  husband  taking  the  personal  property  of  a  deceased 
wife  in  exclusion  of  her  children,  is  not  an  exception  in  reality  ;  for 
at  common  law  the  personal  property  of  a  wife  is  that  of  her  hus- 
band, so  that  it  cannot  strictly  be  said  that  she  died  intestate  as 
to  such,  because  she  had  none  to  leave.  Nor  is  it,  strictly  con- 
sidered, an  exception  to  this  rule  to  allow  the  husband  of  a  de- 
ceased wife  to  enjoy  her  lands  during  his  lifetime,  or  to  accord 
to  a  widow  her  dower  estate  ;  for  in  either  case  the  surviving  parent 
is  bound,  as  the  head  of  the  remaining  family,  for  the  support  of 
the  minor  children,1  and  the  property  thus  still  goes  to  the  benefit 
of  such. 

It  is  not  necessary,  therefore,  to  recite  the  provisions  of  the  stat- 
utes of  the  several  States  as  to  their  respective  shares  of  inheritance 
Children  take  oi  the  real  or  personal  estate  of  a  deceased  parent.  In 
real  and  per-  a]i  0f  the  States  children  inherit  both  real  and  personal 
in  equal  estate  in  equal  shares,  the  descendants  of  deceased  chil- 

shares,  dren  taking  by  representation,  or  stocks   (2}er 

descendants       *  stirpes),   that  is,  the  children   of   a   deceased  ["*133] 

of  (IcCGftSGd  • 

children,  by  child  or  descendant  taking  collectively  such  share 
representation.  ag  ^g  deceased  child  or  other  descendant  would  have 
taken  if  alive  at  the  time  of  the  intestate's  death.  Where  the  share 
to  which  the  children  are  entitled  is  affected  by  provisions  in  favor 
of  the  father  or  mother, the  modification  will  be  noticed  in  connection 
with  the  rights  of  such  parent. 

Adopted  children  acquire,  by  the  act  of  adoption  in  accordance 
Adopted  with  the  statute,  if  so  provided,  the  same  rights  as  if 

children.  they  were  the  issue  of  the  adopting  parents.2 

§  60.  The  Surviving  Husband  as  Heir.  —  Upon  the  death  intes- 
Hasband  takes  tate  of  a  married  woman,  the  husband  is  entitled,  at 
trty  to  the  ex-    common  law  and  affirmed  by  the   Statute  of  Frauds,8 

1  School,  Dom.  ReL  §§  236,  237.  see  post,  §  69;  Woerner,  American  Law 

s  Ah  to  the  coiiHcijueDces  of  adoption,    of  Guardianship,  §§  10,  11 

3  29  Car.  II.  c.  3,  §  25. 
138 


§G6 


THE    SURVIVING    HUSBAND    AS    HEIR. 


*133 


to  all  her  personal  property,1  whether  she  left  surviv- 
ing children  or  descendants  or  not ;  and  so  by  the  stat- 
utes of  Delaware,2  Georgia,3  Kentucky,4  Oregon,6  and 
Pennsylvania.6  He  is  entitled  to  take  as  heir,  if  there 
be  no  child  nor  descendant,  nor  brother  or  sister,  nor 
father  or  mother,  nor  any  next  of  kin,  under  the  statutes 
of  Alabama,7  Arkansas,8  Florida,9  Louisiana,10  Maine,11 
Maryland,12  Massachusetts,18  Tennessee,14  Virginia,15 
and  West  Virginia.16  Together  with  children  or  descend- 
ants in  California,17  Colorado,18  Connecticut,19  Florida,20 


elusion  of  chil- 
dren at  com- 
mon law  and 
in  some  States. 

In  other  States, 
when  there 
are  no  chil- 
dren, parents, 
brothers,  or 
sisters,  or  their 
descendants. 
In  others,  to- 
gether with 
children  or  de- 
scendants. 


1  "  If  he  obtain  possession  of  the  wife's 
personal  property  without  suit,  aud  with- 
out taking  administration,  he  is  entitled 
to  hold  it  subject  to  the  claims  of  her 
creditors ;  aud,  in  case  another  persou 
takes  administration,  he  will  hold  the 
property  iu  trust  for  the  husband  or  her 
representatives  after  payment  of  her 
debts  "  :  Bellows,  J.,  in  Weeks  v.  Jewett, 
45  N.  H.  540,  541,  citing  numerous  Eng- 
lish and  American  cases.  See,  as  to  the 
husband's  right  to  administer,  post,  p. 
*  516,  note  10;  also  p.  *642,  notes  4  and 
following. 

2  Laws,  Rev.  1874,  p.  548,  §  32. 

3  Except  the  separate  estate  without 
limitation  or  remainder  over,  which  can 
and  does  take  effect  if  she  leave  also 
children  or  descendants,  of  which  the 
husband  and  each  child,  or  the  descend- 
ants of  a  deceased  child  take  an  equal 
share,  descendants  per  stirpes :  Code,  1895, 
§  3354. 

*  St.  1894,  §  1403,  pi.  3. 
6  Code,  1887,  §  3099,  pi.  4. 

6  Pep.  &  Lewis  Dig.  1896,  p.  2408,  §  1, 
pi.  3.  As  to  the  husband's  right  when 
the  wife  dies  partially  intestate,  see  Lee's 
Appeal,  124  Pa.  St.  74. 

7  Code,  1886,  §  1915.  Under  the  Code 
of  1896,  the  husband  takes  in  preference 
to  next  of  kin,  after  children,  father  and 
mother,  and  brothers  and  sisters :  §  1453. 

8  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  2476. 

9  If  no  children,  husband  takes  the 
whole  real  and  personal  estate :  Rev.  St. 
1892,  §  1820. 

10  Usufruct  of  the  estate  until  re-mar- 
riage :  Voorhies'  Rev.  C.  art.  915. 

11  If  issue,  one-third ;  if  none,  one- 
half ;  if  no  kindred,  the  whole:  St.  (Sup- 
plement) 1895,  ch.  75,  §  1,  pi.  1. 


12  If  no  descendants  or  kindred,  hus- 
band takes  the  whole  estate  :  Publ.  Gen. 
L.  1888,  art.  46,  pi.  23. 

13  If  no  kindred,  all  her  real  estate  in 
fee:  Publ.  St.  1882,  ch.  124,  §  1.  If  no 
descendants  living,  the  real  estate  not  ex- 
ceeding $5,000  in  value  in  fee,  and  curtesy 
in  all  other  real  estate  :  lb.,  amended  by 
St.  1887,  ch.  290.  See  Lincoln  v.  Perry, 
149  Mass.  368,  374. 

14  St.  1884,  §  3272. 

15  Code,  1887,  §  2548,  pi.  10. 

16  Code,  1891,  ch.  78,  §  1,  pi.  x. 

17  One-half  of  the  real  and  personal 
estate,  if  there  be  no  issue,  or  one  child, 
or  the  issue  of  a  deceased  child ;  one-third, 
if  there  be  more  than  one  child  or  issue  of 
more,  or  child  and  issue  of  deceased  child 
or  children:  Civ.  Code,  §  1386.  When  no 
issue,  father,  mother,  brother,  or  sister,  the 
surviving  husband  takes  the  whole  estate 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  descendants  of  a 
deceased  sister :  In  re  Ingram,  78  Cal. 
586. 

18  One-half  of  real  and  personal  estate 
if  there  be  descendants  ;  all,  if  no  descend- 
ants: Ann.  St.  1891.  §  1524.  In  this 
State  dower  and  tenancy  by  curtesy  are 
abolished  :  lb. 

19  If  married  prior  to  April  20,  1877, 
estate  by  the  curtesy:  Gen.  St.  1874,  p. 
392,  §  28.  If  married  on  or  after  April 
20,  1877,  or  if  there  be  a  contract  to  take 
under  such  statute  (Gen.  St.  1887,  §  624), 
usufruct  of  one-third  of  real  and  personal 
estate  during  life,  or  if  there  be  no  will, 
absolutely,  and  if  there  be  no  children, 
then  one-half  absolutely:  Gen.  St.  1S87, 
§623. 

20  Child's  share,  if  there  be  such  :  Rev. 
St.  1892,  §  1820. 

139 


134 


DESCENT   AND   DISTRIBUTION   OF   PROPERTY. 


§G6 


*  Illinois.1  Indiana,2  Iowa,8  Kansas,4  Mississippi,6  Nevada,6  [*  134 j 
New  Hampshire,7  North  Dakota,8  South  Carolina,9  South 
Dakota,10  and  Texas.11  In  Missouri,  the  whole  estate  descends  to 
the  husband  if  the  wife  leaves  no  children,  or  descendants,  father, 
mother,  brother,  or  sister,  or  descendants  of  such.12  If  the  wife 
In  the  absence  die  without  leaving  issue  or  descendants,  the  husband 
tLdwhoiedeSte  takes  the  whole  estate  in  GeovsW3  Minnesota,14  Ohio,15 


1  One-third  of  the  personalty  goes  to  hus- 
band if  there  is  also  a  child  or  children  or 
descendants ;  if  no  kindred,  husband  takes 
all :  St.  &  Cart.  St.  1896,  ch.  39,  IF  1.  The 
change  from  the  common-law  rule,  whereby 
personal  property  follows  the  person  of  its 
owner  and  is  distributed  pursuant  to  the 
law  of  his  domicil,  applies  only  to  property 
in  the  State  of  Illinois  :  Cooper  v.  Beers, 
143  111.  25,  31. 

2  One-third  of  the  real  estate,  subject 
to  wife's  debts  contracted  before  the  mar- 
riage. If  she  left  a  will,  the  husband  may 
elect  to  take  under  it:  Burns'  Ann.  St. 
1894,  §  2642.  If  the  wife  die  intestate, 
leaving  no  child,  but  father  or  mother  or 
both,  three-fourths  of  the  estate,  real  and 
personal,  goes  to  the  husband ;  if  less  than 
one  thousand  dollars  in  value,  all :  lb., 
§  2650.  If  there  are  no  children,  and  no 
father  or  mother,  the  whole  estate  goes 
to  the  husband  :  lb.,  §  2657.  If  husband 
at  the  time  of  his  wife's  death  shall  be 
living  in  adultery,  he  takes  no  part  of  her 
estate:  lb.,  §  2657;  Bradley  v.  Thixton, 
117  Ind.  255,  257.  If  husband  abandons 
his  wife  without  just  cause  and  makes  no 
provision  for  her  support,  he  shall  take  no 
part  of  her  estate :  lb.,  §  2659  ;  Ilinton  v. 
Whittaker,  101  Ind.  344,  346. 

8  One-third  in  value  of  legal  or  equitable 
real  estate;  dower  and  estate  in  curtesy 
abolished:  McClain's  Ann.  Code,  1888, 
§  3644.  The  husband  takes  one-third  ab- 
solutely under  this  section,  and  the  wife 
cannot  deprive  him  of  it  by  will :  May  v. 
Jones,  87  Iowa,  188.  This  section  is  con- 
strued as  including  personal  as  well  as  real 
property :  lb.,  p.  194. 

1  One  half  in  value  of  all  real  estate  of 
which  the  wife  had  a  legal  or  equitable  in- 
terest during  the  marriage  to  be  set  aside 
by  the  probate  court:  Gen.  St.  1889,  §2611, 
applicable  to  husband :  §2619.  Estates  of 
dower  and  curtesy  abolished. 

6  Child's  share,  if  there  be  descendants, 

140 


all,  if  there  be  none :   Ann.  Code,  1892r 
§  1545. 

6  One-half,  if  there  be  also  one  child  or 
descendants  of  one  ;  one-third,  if  there  be 
more  than  one  child,  or  descendants ;  one- 
half  if  no  issue,  but  a  father;  all,  if  no- 
issue  and  no  father,  mother,  brother,  or 
sister:  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  2981. 

7  In  addition  to  curtesy,  one-third  of 
the  personalty,  if  issue  surviving,  one-half, 
if  none :  Publ.  St.  1891,  ch.  195,  §  12.  On 
waiving  curtesy  and  homestead,  one-third 
of  realty  in  fee  if  issue  by  him  surviving ; 
one-third  for  life,  if  issue  surviving,  but 
not  by  him  ;  one-half  in  fee,  if  no  issue : 
lb.,  §  13. 

8  If  one  child  or  descendants  of  one, 
one-half ;  if  more  than  one  child,  or  de- 
scendants, one-third;  if  no  issue,  but 
father,  one-half ;  if  no  issue  and  no  father, 
but  mother,  brother,  or  sister,  one-half ;  if 
none  of  these,  the  whole  estate :  Rev.  Code, 
1895,  §3742. 

9  Same  share  that  a  widow  is  entitled 
to,  —  i.  e.,  of  the  real  or  personal  estate, 
one-third,  if  there  be  child  or  children  ;  one 
moiety,  if  there  be  no  lineal  descendants 
but  father  or  mother,  and  brother  or  sis- 
ter of  the  whole  blood  ;  two-thirds  if  no 
lineal  descendants,  father,  mother,  brother, 
or  sister,  nor  lineal  ancestor :  Rev.  St. 
1894,  §  1980,  pi.  8. 

10  Same  as  in  North  Dakota :  Rev.  Code, 
1887,  §  778. 

11  If  child  or  children,  or  descendants, 
one-third  of  personal  estate,  and  a  life  es- 
tate in  one-third  of  the  lands  ;  if  no  child 
or  descendant,  all  the  personalty  and  one- 
half  of  the  real  estate ;  if  no  descendants 
and  no  father,  mother,  brothers,  or  sisters 
or  their  descendants,  the  whole  estate. 

U  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  4465. 
«  Code,  1895,  §  3354. 
W  Rev.  St.  1891,  §  5677,  changing  the 
prior  law. 
16  If  no  children  or  their  legal  ropresen- 


§  67  THE   WIDOW   AS    HEIRESS.  *  134,  *  135 

Vermont,1  and  Wisconsin : 2   one-half   of   the   realty  in 

,  ,     ,„       „      „     ,,  .        t.t-  or  one-half. 

Michigan;3    and   one-half    of    all   the   estate    in    Mis- 
souri.4    In  the  absence  of  any  statutory  provision,  he      Curtesy 
is    entitled   by  the  common    law  to  his  estate  by  the 
curtesy ;  in  some  of  the  States  this  is  affirmatively  announced  by 

statute.6 

§  67.  The  Widow  as  Heiress.  —  It  is  not  proposed,  in  this  con- 
nection, to  treat  of  the  dower  and  other  common-law  rights  of  the 
widow,  nor  of  the  provisions  made  in  the  several  American  States 
for  the  immediate  support  of  herself  and  family  upon  the  death  of 
her  husband,  all  of  which  will  be  considered  in  its  proper  place ; 6 
but  only  to  point  out  her  rights  as  an  heiress  of  her  husband. 

At  the  common  law,  the  widow  was   originally  entitled  to   her 

reasonable  part  of  the  goods  and  chattels  of  her  deceased  husband, 

which  was  one-half  if  he  died  without  issue  surviving,  and 

[*  135]  *  one-third  if  he  left  children  or  descendants.7    Whether  this 

was  really  the  common  law,  or  the  custom  of    Reasonable 
particular  places,  as  has  been  asserted,8  is  not  now  profit-    part  at  com- 
able  to  examine,  for  the  English  Statute  of  Distributions    mon  a 
fixes  the  distributive  share  to  which  the  widow  is  entitled  by  the  same 
rule,  and  the  statutes  of  most  States  are  so  explicit  on  this  point  that 
questions  will  rarely  arise  which  depend  upon  this  rule  of  the  common 
law  for  their  solution.     But  if  such  question  does  arise,  as  it  may 
in  cases  for  which  the  statute  makes  no  provision,  the  common  law, 
as  modified  by  English  statutes  adopted  prior  to  the  settlement  of 
the  colonies,  is  presumed  to  control  so  far  as  it  is  applicable  to  the 
condition  and  policy  of  American  States.9 

The  widow  is  entitled  to  the  whole  of  her  deceased   K  husband  die 
husband's   estate,    if    he    died   without   leaving    either   without  issue 
descendants  or  other  kin,  under  the   statutes  of   Ala-   inherits  the 
bama,10  Arkansas,11  Florida,12  Louisiana,18  Maine,14  Massa-   whole  estate 

tatives  living,  the  whole  estate  for  life:  4  Laws,  1895,  p.    169,  §   4518a.      The 

Bates'  An.  St.  1897,  §  4158,  pi.  2 ;  if  no  amended  section  is  entitled  "  Dower,"  and 

person  entitled  to  inherit  under  this  sec-  is  inserted  among  the  provisions  for  aower. 

tion,  then  the  whole  estate  by  inheritance :  5  Post,  §  121. 

lb.,  §  4160.  6  As  to  dower,  see  post,  §§  105  et  seq.; 

1  All  the  real  estate  not  exceeding  in  in  regard  to  the  support  of  the  family, 
value  $2,000,  and  one-half  of  all  in  excess  §§  77  et  seq. 

of  $2,000,  unless  he  elect  to  take  the  ten-  7  1  Wms.  Ex.  (7th  Am.  ed.)  [2]. 

ancy  by  the  curtesy.    If  the  wife  leave  no  8  Wms.  3. 

kindred  capable  of  inheriting,  the  husband  9  Clark  v.  Clark,  17  "Nev.  124,  128. 

takes  the  whole  estate:  St.  1894,  §  2544.  10  Code,    1886,   §    1915,  1   5.     Under 

Same  as  to  personalty :  §2546.  Code,  1896,  she  takes  after   parents  and 

2  Sanb.  &  B.  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2270,  pi.  brothers  and  sisters:  §  1453. 
2.  Same  as  to  personal  property  :  lb.,  ll  Dig.  of  St.  1 894,  §  2476. 
§  3935.                                                                           12  Rev.  St.  1892,  §  1820. 

8  How.   Ann.   St.    (Supplement)    1890,  18  Voorhies'  Rev.  Code,  art.  915,  917. 

§  5772  a,  changing  prior  law.  14  Rev.  St.  1883,  p.  610,  §  1. 

141 


135,  *  136       DESCENT   AND   DISTRIBUTION    OF   PROPERTY. 


§67 


chusetts,1  Minnesota,2  Mississippi,3  Nebraska,4  North  Carolina,5  Ten- 
nessee,6 Vermont,7  Virginia,8  and  West  Virginia ; 9  and  to  one-half  in 
Michigan ; 10  the  widow  takes  the  estate  if  the  husband  died  without 
leaving  descendant,  father,  mother,  brother,  or  sister  or  descendants  of 
in  the  absence  such,  in  Missouri ;  n  if  he  died  without  leaving  lineal  de- 
sLudlmsr  scendants  in  Georgia,12  Kansas,13  and  Wisconsin.14  She 
together  with  is  entitled  to  the  whole  or  a  proportionate  part  of  the 
other  heirs.  estate,  according  to  the  existence  of  descendants  or  other 
heirs,  in  the  States  of  California,15  Colorado,16  Connecticut,17 
Delaware,18  Georgia,19  Illinois,20  Indiana,21  *  Idaho,22  Iowa,'23  [*136] 


I  If  no  issue,  the  real  estate  in  fee  not 
exceeding  $5, QUO  in  value,  and  also  one- 
half  of  the  other  real  estate  for  life,  or  she 
may  elect  to  take  dower  in  such  other  real 
estate ;  if  no  kindred,  the  whole  estate  : 
PubL  St.  1882,  ch.  124,  §  3. 

2  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  5677,  pi.  2,  changing 
the  prior  statute. 

3  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  1545. 

4  Comp.  St.  1881,  ch.  23,  §§  30,  176. 
The  act  of  March  29,  1889,  repealing 
these  sections,  and  incorporated  in  the 
statutes  of  1893,  was  held  unconstitutional 
on  the  ground  that  it  embraced  more  than 
one  subject :  Trumble  v.  Trumble,  37  Neb. 
340. 

6  Code,  1883,  §  1281,  rule  8. 

6  St.  1884,  §  3272. 

7  St.  1894,  §§  2544,  2546. 

8  Code,  1887,  §  2548. 

9  Code,  1891,  ch.  78,  §  1,  pi.  x. 

10  St.  (Supplement),  1889,  §  5772  a, 
changing  the  law  which  prior  thereto 
was  the  same  as  in  Missouri. 

11  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  4455. 

12  Code,  1882,  §  2484. 

II  (Jen.  St.  1889,1  2611. 

14   Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2270,  pi.  2. 

W  Civ.  Code,  §  1386  :  If  one  child,  or 
descendants  of  one,  the  widow  takes  one- 
half  of  the  estate  ;  if  more  than  one,  one- 
thinl  ;  if  no  issue,  one-half;  and  if  neither 
issue  nor  father,  mother,  brother,  or  sister, 
or  their  issue,  the  whole  estate. 

W  Mills*  Ann.  St.  1891,  §  1524.  One- 
half,  if  the  husband  left  child  or  descend- 
ants; the  whole,  if  he  left  no  child 
surviving. 

17  If  married    prior  to  April  20,   1877, 

one-third  of  the  personal  estate  forever; 

and  if  there  are  mi  children  or  represen- 

of  such,  one  half  of  the  personal 

estate  forever,  and   if  nol   otherwise  en- 

i  ■  ! 


dowed  before  marriage,  one-third  of  the 
real  estate  during  her  life  ;  if  married  on 
or  after  April  20,  1877,  one-third  in  value 
of  the  real  and  personal  property  for  life, 
and  if  there  is  no  will,  then  one-third  ab- 
solutely, and  if  there  is  no  child  or  repre- 
sentative of  such,  one-half  absolutely : 
Gen.  St.  1887,  §§  623,  626. 

18  If  there  be  child  or  children,  one- 
third  of  the  personalty,  and  life  estate  in 
one-third  of  the  realty  ;  if  no  child  or  chil- 
dren, but  other  kin,  one-half  of  the  per- 
sonalty, and  life  estate  in  one-half  of  the 
realty ;  if  no  kindred,  all  the  personalty 
and  a  life  estate  in  all  the  realty  :  Laws, 
Rev.  1874,  p.  548,  §  32. 

19  If  she  renounce  dower,  the  widow  is 
entitled  to  a  child's  share  in  the  estate,  if 
the  number  of  shares  do  not  exceed  five ; 
if  more  than  five  shares,  she  is  entitled  to 
one-fifth  of  the  estate  :  Code,  1895,  §  3354. 

20  If  no  descendant,  one-half  of  the  real 
and  all  of  the  personal  estate  forever ;  if 
child  or  descendant,  one-third  of  the  per- 
sonal estate  absolutely ;  if  no  kindred, 
the  whole  estate  :  St.  &  C.  St.  1896,  ch.  39, 
f  1,  cl.  4,  5. 

21  One-third  of  the  real  estate  in  fee 
simple  free  from  demands  of  creditors, 
if  of  less  value  than  $10,000;  one-fourth 
if  exceeding  $10,000  and  under  $20,000; 
one-fifth,  if  exceeding  $20,000 :  Ann.  St., 
Rev.  1894,  §  2640. 

22  If  one  child  or  issue  of  such,  or  if  no 
child,  one-half  the  estate  ;  if  more  than  one 
child  <if  issue,  one-third  ;  if  no  issue  nor  kin- 
dred, the  whole  :  Rev.  St.  1887,  §  5702. 

28  If  no  issue,  one-half  ;  if  no  issue,  and 
no  father  or  mother,  or  descendants  of 
BUch,  the  estate  goes  to  the  wife,  or  to  her 
heirs  if  she  is  dead  ;  and  if  he  had  more 
than  one  wife,  either  dead  or  surviving  in 
lawful  wedlock,  equally  to  the  one  living 


§67 


THE   WIDOW   AS   HEIRESS. 


136 


Kansas,1  Kentucky,2  Maine,3  Maryland,4  Mississippi,5  Nebraska,8 
Nevada,7  New  Hampshire,8  North  Dakota,9  Ohio,10  Oregon,11  Penn- 
sylvania,12 Rhode  Island,18  South  Carolina,14  South  Dakota,15  Texas,18 


and  the  heirs  of  the  dead  ;  if  all  are  dead, 
then  the  heirs  take  by  right  of  representa- 
tion :  McClain's  Ann.  Code,  1888,  §§3659, 
3662.  It  is  held,  in  this  State  (by  three 
judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  two  dissent- 
ing), that  a  husband  cannot  by  a  will, 
made  either  before  or  after  marriage, 
deprive  his  widow  of  her  share  in  his  per- 
sonal estate  :  Ward  v.  Wolf,  56  Iowa,  465, 
affirmed  in  subsequent  cases. 

1  One-half  in  value  of  real  estate  owned 
by  the  husband  at  any  time  during  cover- 
ture :  Gen.  St.  1889,  §  2599;  not  affected 
by  will :  lb.,  §  2608 ;  if  no  issue,  the  whole 
estate:  lb.,  §  2611. 

2  If  issue,  widow  takes  one-third ;  if 
no  issue,  one-half  of  the  personal  estate 
after  payment  of  debts  :  St.  1894,  §  1403, 
pi.  4 ;  not  affected  by  advancements  to  the 
heirs :  lb.,  §  1408  ;  if  there  is  neither  pa- 
ternal nor  maternal  kindred,  the  whole  real 
estate  goes  to  the  wife  :  lb.,  §  1393,  pi.  9. 

3  If  issue,  one-third  ;  if  none,  one-half; 
if  no  kindred,  the  whole  :  St.  (Supplement), 
1895,  ch.  75,  §  1,  pi.  1. 

4  If  no  descendant  or  kindred,  the  whole 
estate  to  the  wife ;  and  if  she  be  dead,  to 
her  kindred ;  if  the  intestate  had  more 
wives  than  one,  and  all  died  before  him, 
then  to  the  kindred  of  both  equally  :  Publ. 
Gen.  L.,  1888,  art.  46,  pi.  23. 

6  Child's  share,  where  the  intestate  left 
a  child  or  children  ;  if  he  left  none,  the 
whole  estate  goes  to  the  widow  in  fee  sim- 
ple, after  payment  of  debts  :  Ann.  Code, 

1892,  §  1545. 

6  If  no  issue,  the  real  estate  descends 
to  the  widow  during  her  life  :  Cons.  St., 

1893,  §  1123,  pi.  30,  p.  365,  cl.  2.  If  no 
issue  nor  kindred,  the  whole  estate  goes  to 
the  widow :  lb.,  cl.  8. 

7  If  one  child,  or  issue  of  such,  one- 
half  ;  if  more  than  one  child  or  descend- 
ant, one-third;  if  no  issue,  one-half;  if 
neither  issue  nor  father,  mother,  brother, 
or  sister,  the  whole  estate  to  surviving 
wife:  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  2981. 

8  In  addition  to  dower  and  homestead, 
if  she  waives  provision  under  the  will,  one- 
third  of  the  personal  estate,  if  there  is 
issue  living  ;  one-half,  if  no  issue  ;  also,  if 
she  waive  provision  by  will,  and  releasing 


her  dower  and  homestead  right,  one-third 
of  the  real  estate  of  which  he  died  seised, 
if  there  is  issue  surviving ;  one-half,  if 
none:  Publ.  St.  1891,  §§  10,  11.  It  was 
held  under  the  statute  previous  to  the 
above  that  the  widow  was  not  entitled  to 
take  dower  and  homestead  in  addition  to 
the  estate  thus  given,  but  as  included 
therein :  Burt  v.  Randlett,  59  N.  H.  1-30. 
The  present  statute  seems  to  be  framed  in 
accordance  with  this  decision. 

9  Surviving  wife  one-half,  if  there  be 
only  one  child  or  issue  of  such  ;  one-third 
if  more  than  one  child,  or  issue  of  such  ; 
if  no  issue,  the  whole  of  the  estate  not  ex- 
ceeding $5,000,  and  of  the  excess  one-half ; 
if  neither  issue  nor  father,  mother,  brother, 
or  sister,  the  whole  estate :  Rev.  Code, 
1895,  §  3742,  pi.  1,  2. 

10  Real  estate  coming  to  the  intestate 
by  descent,  devise,  or  gift  from  an  ances- 
tor goes  to  the  widow  for  her  natural  life, 
if  there  are  no  children  or  their  legal  rep- 
resentatives living.  Estate  that  came  not 
by  descent,  devise,  or  gift,  vests  in  the 
widow  on  the  intestate's  death  :  Rev.  St. 
1890,  §§  4158,  4159. 

11  If  no  issue,  wife  takes  the  whole 
estate ;  if  there  be  issue,  one-half  of  the 
personalty:  Code,  1887,  §  3098. 

12  Bright.  Purd.  Dig.  p.  929,  §  2  :  If 
there  be  issue,  one-third  of  the  real  estate 
for  life,  and  one-third  of  the  personalty 
absolutely ;  if  no  issue,  but  other  heirs, 
one-half  of  the  real  and  personal  estate. 

18  Publ.  St.  1882,  p.  489,  §  9 :  If  no 
issue,  one-half  of  the  personal  estate;  if 
there  be  issue,  one-third. 

14  One-third,  if  there  be  one  or  more 
children  ;  one  moiety,  if  no  child  ;  two- 
thirds,  if  there  be  no  child,  or  descendant, 
father,  mother,  brother,  or  sister,  nor 
child  of  such,  nor  lineal  ancestor :  Rev. 
St.  1893,  ch.  77,  §  1980. 

15  If  the  decedent  leave  only  one  child  or 
issue  of  such,  one-half;  if  more  than  one 
child,  or  issue  of  such,  one-third  ;  if  no  issue, 
but  a  father,  brother,  or  sister,  the  widow 
takes  one-half ;  if  neither  issue,  nor  father, 
mother,  brother,  or  sister,  the  whole  estate 
goes  to  the  widow  :  Comp.  L.  1887,  §  3381. 

16  If  the  intestate  left  a  child  or  descend- 

143 


*  136,  *  137       DESCENT   AND   DISTRIBUTION   OF   PROPERTY.  §68 

Utah,1  Vermont,2  Virginia,8  "Washington,4  West  Virginia,5  Wiscon- 
sin,6 and  Wyoming.7  In  some  of  the  States  these  provisions  include, 
or  take  the  place  of,  dower.  Whether  the  widow  is  included  in  a 
testamentary  provision  to  testator's  "heirs,"  "next  of  kin,"  etc.,  is 
considered  in  connection  with  the  rules  in  expounding  wills.8 

*  §  68.  The  Father  as  Heir.  —  The  degree  of  propinquity  [*  137] 
between  parent  and  child  is  obviously  the  same  whether  con- 
sidered in  the  descending  or  ascending  direction.  But  the  principle 
determining  the  devolution  of  property  does  not,  in  this  first  degree 
at  least,  rest  upon  the  ties  of  consanguinity  so  much  as  upon  the 
recognition  of  the  natural  dependence  of  the  child  upon  the  parent. 
So  long  as  the  children  are  minors,  this  dependence  is  obvious ;  and 
to  ignore  their  claim  to  share  in  the  distribution  of  the  deceased 
father's  estate  would  be  clearly  irrational.  And  the  relation  between 
parent  and  child,  even  after  the  period  of  minority,  is  usually  such  as 
to  plainly  indicate  the  wisdom  of  the  rule  which  upon  the  death  of 
the  parents  secures  to  the  children  that  estate,  which  they  may  have 
assisted  in  acquiring  or  increasing,  and  with  which  they  have  become 
familiar. 

These  considerations  are  not  so  decisive  in  the  case  of  the  death  of 
a  child.  In  the  usual  course  of  nature  the  parent  neither  expects 
nor  depends  upon  an  accession  to  his  means  from  such  an  event. 
And  although  the  bonds  and  relations  which  unite  the  several  mem- 
bers of  the  family  are  such  as  to  demand  the  devolution  of  the  prop- 
erty, which  any  of  them  may  leave  at  his  death  to  the  others,  there 

ant,  one-third  of  the  personal  estate,  and  widow  is  entitled  to  all  the  personalty  that 

an  estate  for  life  in  one-third  of  the  land  ;  came  to  the  husband  by  his  marriage  with 

if  no  child  or  descendant,  all  the  personal  her  prior  to  April  4,  1877,  that  may  remain 

estate,  and  one-half  of  the  lands;  and  if  in  kind,  and  if  there  be  issue  by  a  former 

neither  child  nor  descendant,  nor  surviving  marriage,  to  one-third,  and  if  no  issue,  to 

father  nor  mother,  nor  brother  nor  sister,  one-half,  of  the  residue  ;   the  real  estate 

nor  their  descendants,  the  surviving  wife  she,  or  in  case  of  her  death,  her  heirs,  take 

shall  he  entitled  to  the  whole  estate :  Rev.  all,  if  there  be  no  kindred:    Code,  1887, 

St.  1895,  art.  1688,  1689.  §  2548,  pi.  10;  §  2557,  pi.  3,  4. 

1  If  only  one  child,  or  descendants  of         *  Same  as  in  Utah :  Hill's  St.  &  Codes 

one,  one-half;  if  more  than  one  child,  or  of  Washington,  1891,  §  1480. 
descendants,  one-third;    if  no  issue,  one-  5  Same  as  in  Virginia  :  Code,  1891, ch. 

half;     if    no    issue,    nor   father,    mother,  78,  pi.  1,  subd.  x.,  pi.  9  (excepting  as  to 

brother,  or   sister,  the  whole:   Comp.  L.  the  estate  that  came  to  the  husband  by 

1888,  §  2741,  pi.  1,  4.  his  marriage  with  her). 

-  If  there  be  no  issue,  and  the  widow         6  If  the  intestate  leave  no  lawful  issue, 

does  not  elect  to  take  dower,  or  waives  the  whole  of  the  real  estate  goes  to  the 

provision  for  her  by  will,  she  is  entitled  to  widow  :  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2270,  pi.  2. 
the  whole  estate  not  exceeding  $2,000,  and         7  If    the  intestate  leave  children   or 

to  one-half  the  remainder  j  and  if  there  be  descendants,  one-half  to   surviving  wife; 

no  kindred  competent  to  inherit, she  takes  if  none,  three-fourths;  and  if  not  exceed- 

the  whole  estate :  St.  1894,  §  2544.  ing  $10,000  in  value,  all.     Dower  and 

8  If  then-  is  issue  by  the  widow,  she  is  curtesy  abolished:  Rev.  St.  1887,  §  2221. 
entitled  to  one-third  of  the  personalty;  if         8  Post,  §  423. 

no  Issue,  nor  issue  by  a  former  wife,  the 
144 


§  68  THE   FATHER   AS   HEIR.  *  137,  *  138 

is  but  a  faint  preponderance  in  favor  of  any  of  the  individuals  con- 
stituting the  family.  If  the  brothers  and  sisters  are  still  in  their 
infancy,  the  rational  course  of  devolution  would  seem  to  point  to  the 
father  as  the  natural  head  and  usually  the  supporter  of  the  family;  x 
or  in  case  of  his  prior  decease,  to  the  mother ;  and  only  in  case  of  the 
prior  decease  of  both,  to  the  brothers  and  sisters.  But  even  these  con- 
siderations lose  significance  as  the  members  of  the  family  grow  older 
and  become  independent,  gradually  loosening  the  bonds  which 
£  *  138]  connect  them  with  *  the  original  stock  as  they  found  new  fami- 
lies themselves.  Hence,  while  there  is  perfect  unanimity  in 
according  the  first  claim  to  the  inheritance  to  the  children  of  the  in- 
testate, including,  with  almost  equal  consensus,  the  descendants  of 
deceased  children  by  right  of  representation,  legislators  differ  as  to  who 
should  be  preferred  if  there  are  no  children,  or  issue  of  children. 

Thus  at  common  law,  the  father,  as  well  as  any  lineal  ascendant, 
is  cut  off  from  the  inheritance  in  lands,  while  in  the    At  common 
United  States  the  course  of  descent  is  directed  with    Iaw' lineal 
greater  regard  to  the  exigencies  of  the  family  relation,    cannot  inherit 
the  father  and  mother  being  recognized  as  the  natural   land- 
representatives  of  the  family  next  after  husband  and  wife.     In  de- 
fault of  any  child  or  descendant,  the  residue  of  an  intestate's  estate, 
after  payment  of  his  debts  and  expenses  of  administra-   In  default  f 
tion,  and  subject  to  the  provisions  for  the  immediate    issue,  father 
relief  of  the  family  and  the  paramount  claims  of  hus-    inhents- 
band  or  wife,  are  directed  to  go  to  the  father,  and  if  he  be  dead,  to 
the  mother,  and  if  she  be  dead,  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  and  the 
descendants  of  deceased  brothers  or  sisters  by  representation,    in 
Arkansas,2  Colorado,8  Minnesota,4  New  York,5  North  Dakota,6  and 
South  Carolina;7  to  the  father,  and  if  he  be  dead,  the  mother  to- 
gether with  brothers  and  sisters  and  descendants  of  such  by  represen- 
tation, in  Florida,8  Maine,9  Nebraska,10  Nevada,11  New  Hampshire,12 
Oklahoma,18  Oregon,14  Rhode  Island,15  South  Dakota,16  and  West  Vir- 
ginia;17 to  the  father  and  mother  in  common  in  Alabama,18  Arizona,19 

1  As  to  the  descent  of  the  property  of  13  St.  1890,  §  6893. 
minors  dying  without  issue  and  unmarried,  14  Code,  1887,  §  3098. 

see  infra,  §  70.  «  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  733,  §  1. 

2  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  2470.  »  Comp.  L.  1887,  §  3381. 
8  Mills'  Ann.  St.  1891,  §  1524.                          «  Code,  1891,  ch.  78,  §  1. 

*  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  5677.  M  Code,  Ala.  1896,  §  1453,  pi.  2.    If  only 

5  2  Banks  &  Bro.    (9th  ed.)    1896,  p.     one   parent,  one-half    to   such,  and    one- 
1824,  §§  5,  6.  half  to   brothers  and  sLters;    but   if  no 

6  Code,  1895,  §  3742.  brother  or  sister  or   descendant,   all  to 

7  Rev.  St.  1893,  §  1980.  such  parent. 

8  Rev.  St.  1892,  §  1820.  "  But  if  either  be  dead,  then  one-half 

9  Rev.  St.  1884,  ch.  75,  §  1.  to  the  survivor,  and  the  other  half  to  the 

10  Cons.  St.  1893,  §  1123-30.  decedent's   brothers  and  sisters  or  their 

11  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  2981.  descendants  by  representation  in  common  ; 

12  Pub.  St.  1891,  ch.  196,  §  1,  pi.  2,  3.  if  no  brother  or  sister  nor  descendant  of 
VOL.  I.  —  10  145 


•~8,   *  139     DESCENT   AND   DISTRIBUTION    OF   PROPERTY. 


§68 


Father  and 
mother  jointly 
or  in  common. 
Father  inherits 
equally  with 
brothers  and 
sisters. 
Father  post- 
poned to  broth- 
ers and  sisters. 
Father,  mother, 
brothers  and 
sisters,  and 
descendants 
equally. 


California,1  Idaho,2  Indiana,8  Iowa,4  Kansas,5  Ken- 
tucky,6 Massachusetts,7  Michigan,8  Montana,9 
Pennsylvania,10  *  Texas,11  Utah,12  Vermont,13  [*139] 
Washington, 14  Wisconsin, 15  and  Wyoming. 16  The 
father  takes,  if  the  intestate  leaves  no  issue,  subject 
to  the  rights  of  husband  or  wife  equally  with  brothers 
and  sisters  in  Georgia.17  He  is  postponed  to  the  brothers 
and  sisters  in  Connecticut,18  Delaware,19  Mississippi,20 
New  Jersey,21  North  Carolina,22  Ohio,28  and  Tennessee.24 
Father,  mother,  brothers  and  sisters  and  their  descend- 


such,  the  whole  to  the  father  or  mother : 
Rev.  St.  1887,  f  1459. 

1  If  no  issue,  one-half  to  father  and 
mother,  or  to  the  survivor,  the  other  half 
to  husband  or  wife ;  if  neither  father  nor 
mother,  the  other  half  to  brothers  and 
sisters  and  descendants  of  such  by  re- 
presentation ;  if  no  husband  or  wife, 
nor  brother  or  sister  or  descendant  of 
such,  the  whole  estate  to  the  father  and 
mother  or  survivor  of  them;  Civ.  Code, 
§  1386. 

2  One-half  to  husband  or  wife,  the 
other  half  to  father  and  mother  in 
equal  shares,  or  if  one  be  dead,  the 
•whole  of  the  other  half  to  the  survivor ; 
if  no  father  or  mother,  this  half  goes  to 
brothers  and  sisters,  and  their  descendants 
by  representation  ;  if  there  be  no  husband 
or  wife,  the  whole  to  father  and  mother 
in  equal  shares,  or  if  either  be  dead,  the 
whole  to  the  other:  Rev.  St.  1887, 
§  5702. 

3  To  father  and  mother  as  joint  tenants, 
or  if  either  be  dead,  to  the  survivor  the 
one-half,  the  other  half  to  brothers  and 
sisters,  aud  their  descendants  by  repre- 
sentation ;  if  neither  father  nor  mother, 
then  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  and  de- 
Bcendante  of  deceased  brothers  or  sisters 
by  representation,  in  common  ;  if  no 
brothers  or  sisters  nor  descendants,  then 
to  father  and  mother  in  common,  or  if 
either  be  dead,  then  to  the  survivor :  Rev. 
St.  1894,  §§  2624,  2625. 

4  If  no  issue,  half  to  wife,  half  to 
parents  ;  if  bo  wife,  all  to  parents  ;  if  one 
be  dead,  the  whole  to  the  other;  if  both 
be  (lead,  to  their  heirs  :  Ann.  Code,  1888, 
§  S659. 

•'  If    no  issue  or  wife,  the   whole  estate 

eoei  to  the  parenti,  or  the  survivor,  if 
one  lie  dead  ;  if  both  bo  dead,  then  to  the 
l»f. 


heirs  of  the  last  survivor:  Gen.  St.  1889, 
§§  2611,  2612. 

6  St.  1894,  §  1393,  pi.  2,  3. 

7  Publ.  St.  1882,  ch.  125,  §  1. 

8  How.  Ann.  St.  (Supplement,  1890) 
§  5772  a. 

9  To  survivor,  if  one  be  dead ;  Const. 
&  Codes,  1895,  §  1852. 

10  Life  estate  during  their  joint  lives 
and  the  life  of  the  survivor,  in  the  real 
estate ;  the  personalty  to  them  absolutely ; 
and  if  there  be  no  brothers  or  sisters  of 
the  whole  blood,  nor  descendants  of  such, 
then  the  whole  estate  absolutely,  to  father 
and  mother,  or  the  heirs  of  the  survivor 
if  one  be  dead  :  Pepper  &  Lewis'  Dig. 
1896,  p.  2410,  §  5. 

11  If  only  father  or  mother  survive,  one- 
half  to  such  father  or  mother,  and  one- 
half  to  brothers  and  sisters :  Gen.  St. 
1895,  art.  1688. 

12  Rev.  St.  1898,  §  2828.  If  either  be 
dead,  all  to  survivor. 

"  St.  1894,  §  2544. 

«  St.  &  Codes,  1891,  §  1480. 

15  Sank  &  B.  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2270. 

16  Three-fourths  to  husband  or  wife, 
one-fourth  to  father  and  mother,  or  the 
survivor  if  one  be  dead:  Rev.  St.  1887, 
§  2221. 

«  Code,  1895,  §  3355,  pi.  6. 

18  In  common  with  the  mother :  Gen. 
St.  1887,  §  630. 

19  Rev.  Code,  1874,  ch.  85,  §  1. 

20  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  1543. 
2*  Gen.  St.  1896,  p.  1194,  §  3. 

22  In  the  real  estate :  Code,  1 883,  §  1 281 , 
rule  6.  The  personalty  goes  to  the  next 
of  kin  in  the  absence  of  a  widow  and 
children  :  lb.,  §  1478,  par.  5. 

23  Bates'  Ann.  St.  1897,  §§  4158,  4159. 

24  Code,  1884,  §§  3268  et  seq. 


§  69       THE   MOTHER   AS    HEIRESS  ;    ADOPTED    CHILDREN.      *  139,  *  140 


ants   by  representation   take  equal  shares  in  Illinois,1    Father  post- 
Louisiana,2  and  Missouri.8     The  father  is  postponed  to    poned  to 
the  mother  in  Utah.4 

The  effect  on  the  inheritance  of  the  father,  of  the  distinctioa 
made  in  many  States   between   ancestral   estates   and    .,  ..    ,     .  .. 

.  J  .  .  father  s  right 

estates   acquired   by  the  intestate   otherwise   than   by    in  ancestral 
descent,  devise,  or  gift  from  an  ancestor,  will  be  con-    estates- 
sidered  in  connection  with  the  descent  to  brothers  and  sisters.5 

§  69.  The  Mother  as  Heiress;  Adopted  Children. — 
The  mother,  as  will  appear  from  the  preceding  section 
discussing  the  order  in  which  the  father  is  entitled  to 
inherit  from  his  child,  is  preferred  to  the  father  in 
Utah  only,  but  in  some  States  takes  equally  with  him.6 
In  other  States,  she  is  postponed  to  the  father,  taking 
in  preference  to  brothers  and  sisters  and  their  descend- 
ants,7 or  takes  equal  shares  with  them;8  and  in  some 
States  she  is  postponed  to  them  also.9  In  Illinois, 
Louisiana,  and  Missouri,  father,  mother,  brothers  and 
sisters,  and  their  descendants,  take  equally.  The 
mother  takes  in  preference  to  the  father  in  Utah. 

The  course  of  descent,  where  the  intestate  leaves  neither  issue  nor 
parents,  is  in  some  States  indicated  by  directing  the  estate  to  pass 
as  if  the  parents  had  survived  the  intestate  and  died  in    t. 

-Ltesccnt  to 

possession  of  the  portion  coming  to  them,  one-half  go-    heirs  of 
ing  to  the  heirs  of  each.     In  such  case  the  heirs,  how-   Parents- 

ever,  inherit  not  from  such  father  or  mother,  but  directly 
[*  140]  from  the  intestate.10    And  where  the  estate  is  directed  to  *go 


Mother  takes 
equally  with 
father. 

Postponed  to 
father,  but  pre- 
ferred to  broth- 
ers and  sisters, 
or  equal  with 
them. 

Postponed  to 
brothers  and 
sisters. 

Father,  mother, 
brothers  and 
sisters,  equally. 


1  Except  that  if  either  parent  be  dead, 
the  survivor  takes  a  double  share  :  St.  & 
C.  St.  1896,  p.  1426,  pi.  1. 

2  One-half  to  parents,  and  one-half  to 
brothers  and  sisters :  Voorhies'  Rev. 
Civ.  C.  1886,  art.  903  et  seq. 

8  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  4465. 

4  But  if  no  mother,  then  the  father 
takes  one-half  in  preference  to  the  issue 
of  deceased  brothers  or  sisters :  Comp.  L. 
1888,  §  2741. 

5  Post,  §  70. 

6  In  Arizona,  California,  Connecticut, 
Idaho,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky, 
Louisiana,  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Min- 
nesota, Pennsylvania,  Texas,  Vermont, 
Washington,  Wisconsin,  and  Wyoming. 

7  So,  for  instance,  in  Arkansas,  Colo- 
rado, Minnesota  (since  1891),  Nevada, 
New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey  (a  life  es- 
tate, remainder  to  brothers  and  sisters), 


New  York,   North   Carolina,  and   North 
Dakota. 

8  In  California,  Florida,  Maine,  Mis- 
sissippi, Nebraska,  Oklahoma,  Oregon, 
South  Carolina,  South  Dakota,  Virginia, 
and  West  Virginia. 

9  But  preferred  to  more  remote  kin 
in  Alabama,  Delaware,  Georgia,  Missis- 
sippi, Ohio,  and  Tennessee. 

10  Hence  the  property  descending  is 
not  controlled  or  affected  by  ownership  in 
the  deceased  parents ;  it  passes  to  their 
legal  heirs,  not  to  their  devisees  or  lega- 
tees :  Lash  v.  Lash,  57  Iowa,  88,  90.  This 
decision  seems  inconsistent  with  the  case 
of  Moore  v.  Weaver,  53  Iowa,  1 1 ,  where 
the  widow  of  a  deceased  father  of  the  in- 
testate was  allowed  to  take  the  share  to 
which  she  would  have  been  entitled  if  her 
husband  had  survived  the  intestate.  See 
also  Leonard  v.  Lining,  57  Iowa,  648,  in 
consonance  with  Lash  v.  Lash. 

147 


140 


DESCENT   AND   DISTRIBUTION   OP   PROPERTY. 


§69 


in  moieties,  one  to  the  next  of  kin  of  the  father,  and  the  other  to 
the  next  of  kin  of  the  mother,  each  moiety  will  pass,  as  if  it  were 
an  independent  estate,  to  the  next  of  kin  in  its  respective  line,  with- 
out regard  to  their  relative  nearness  to  the  intestate.1 

Provision  is  made  in  several  States  for  the  legal  adoption  of  chil- 
dren by  others  than  their  parents,  whereby  they  become  members  of 
the  family  of  the  person  or  persons  so  adopting,  and  by 
force  of  the  statute  entitled  to  all  the  rights  accorded 
by  the  law  to  natural  children,  including  the  right  of 
inheritance.2  So  far  as  their  own  footing  in  this  re- 
spect is  concerned,  it  is  precisely  equal  to  that  of  other 
lawful  children;3  and  hence  they  take  no  share  of  an  estate  willed 
to  others,  if  they  are  intentionally  omitted  in  the  will.4 
resentation  It  has  been  held  that  the  right  of  inheritance  does  not 
through  them.    ex^en(j  ^o   inheritance  by  representation  through  the 

But  the  right  to  inherit 


Children  by 
adoption  in- 
herit like  nat- 
ural children 
from  adopting 
parents, 


adopting  father,  from  another  person. 

1  McKinny  v.  Abbott,  49  Tex.  371, 
375 ;  Jones  v.  Barrett,  30  Tex.  637,  642. 

2  See  Woerneron  Guardianship,  §§  10, 
11,  where  the  law  in  connection  with  the 
adoption  of  children  and  the  right  of  in- 
heritance by,  through,  and  from  them  is 
fully  discussed.  In  Ohio  there  is  a  stat- 
ute providing  that  any  person  of  sound 
mind  may  by  written  declaration  filed  in 
the  probate  court  appoint  another  to  stand 
toward  the  declarant  as  heir  at  law  at  his 
death ;  thereupon  such  appointee  has  the 
same  rights  as  a  child  of  declarant :  Bird 
v.  Young,  56  Ohio  St.  210. 

3  Vidal  v.  Commagere,  13  La.  An. 
516;  Burrage  v.  Briggs,  120  Mass.  103; 
Newman's  Estate,  75  Cal.  213  ;  Warren  v. 
Prescott,  84  Me.  483  ;  Fosburgh  v.  Rogers, 
114  Mo.  122;  Johnson's  Appeal,  88  Pa. 
St.  346,  353  ;  Lunay  v.  Vantyne,  40  Vt. 
501  ;  Wagner  v.  Varner,  50  Iowa,  532 ; 
Hosser's  Succession,  37  La.  An.  839.  In 
Buckley  v.  Frasier,  153  Mass.  525,  it  was 
held  that  a  child  by  adoption  is  "  issue  " 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Statute  of  De- 
scents ;  so  also  in  Atchison  v.  Atchison, 
89  Ky.  489,  holding  that  it  was  to  be  so 
regarded  in  determining  the  right  of  the 
adoptive  mother  as  widow ;  to  same  effect 
in  Indiana:  Markover  v.  Krauss,  132  Ind. 
294,  holding  the  rights  of  a  widow  by  a 
second  marriage,  where  there  were  chil- 
dren jointly  adopted  by  the  husband  and 
tir.-it  wife,  to  be  fixed  as  if  such  adopted  chil- 
dren were  children  <»f  the  first  wife  (two 
judges  dissenting)  ;  see  also  Patterson  v. 

148 


Browning,  146  Ind.  160;  so,  also,  in  Mis- 
souri the  adopted  child  determines  the 
rights  of  the  widow  as  if  a  natural  child 
of  the  deceased  :  Moran  v.  Stewart,  1 22 
Mo.  295;  s.  c.  132  Mo.  73.  But  where 
the  child  is  adopted  by  the  husband 
merely,  it  does  not  by  reason  thereof  be- 
come the  heir  of  the  wife :  Sharkey  v. 
McDermott,  16  Mo.  App.  80;  Keith  v. 
Ault,  144  Ind.  626.  In  Alabama  a  devise 
to  "  children  "  in  a  will  excludes  a  child 
adopted  subsequently  thereto :  Russell  v. 
Russell,  84  Ala.  48.  A  child  by  adoption 
cannot  inherit  from  the  parent  by  adop- 
tion, unless  the  act  of  adoption  has  been 
in  strict  accord  with  the  statute  :  Renz  v. 
Drury,  57  Kans.  84  and  cases  cited ; 
McCollister  v.  Yard,  90  Iowa,  621,  628, 
distinguishing  this  case  from  one  where 
the  fault  in  failing  to  properly  adopt  lay 
with  a  public  officer,  who  failed  to  prop- 
erly record  the  deed,  which  had  been  held 
not  to  avoid  the  adoption. 

4  Bowdlear  v.  Bowdlear,  112  Mass. 
184;  Sharkey  v.  McDermott,  16  Mo.  App. 
80,  87. 

5  Quigley  v.  Mitchell,  41  Oh.  St.  375  ; 
Estate  of  Sunderland,  60  Iowa,  732  (two 
of  the  judges  in  this  case  dissenting,  hold- 
ing that  there  was  no  distinction  in  this 
respect);  Keegan  v.  Geraghty,  101  111. 
26;  Barnhizel  v.  Ferrell,  47  Ind.  335. 
Schouler,  in  his  work  on  Domestic  Rela- 
tions, says,  "An  adopted  child  usually 
inherits  from  the  adopting  parent,  and 
vioe  versa ;  but  otherwise  as  to  collateral 


§  69      THE   MOTHER   AS   HEIRESS  ;    ADOPTED   CHILDREN.      *  140,   *  141 


from  an  adopted  child  is  not  always  given  to  the  per-  inneritance 
sons  adopting.  In  Missouri  it  is  held  that  the  heirs  of  from  adopted 
the  adopted  child  are  its  relations  by  blood,  and  not  cu  ren' 
those  by  adoption,  although  the  estate  descending  had  been  derived 
from  the  adopting  parent.1  In  Indiana  the  syllabus  of  a  case  an- 
nounced the  same  principle,  as  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
that  State;2  but  the  court,  in  later  cases,  point  out  that  they  had 
never  so  decided,  and  establish  the  principle  that  the  adopt- 
[*  141]  ing  parents  take  in  preference  to  *  the  natural  parents.8 
This  seems  to  be  the  more  consistent  and  reasonable  doc- 
trine; and  it  was  intimated,  though  not  decided,  that  the  rule  includes 
property  which  came  to  the  adopted  child  from  any  source  other 
than  by  inheritance  from  kinsmen  of  its  own  blood.4  But  where  the 
adopted  child,  dying  before  the  adopting  parents,  leaves  issue,  such 
issue  take  as  if  they  were  grandchildren,6  as  was  the  rule  under  the 
Roman  law.6 

The  right  of  an  adopted  child  given  by  the  statute  of  one  State 
follows  it  and  is  valid  in  all  other  States.7  But  while 
the  right  to  inherit  is  undoubtedly  secured  by  the  statute 
to  the  full  extent  of  that  of  natural  children,  yet  the 
identity  of  the  child  is  not  thereby  changed;  hence  a 
devise  to  one  for  life,  "with  remainder  to  her  children," 
does  not  include  an  adopted  child  of  such  life  tenant;8 
and  so  the  exemption  from  the  inheritance  tax  secured 
to  children  does  not  extend  to  adopted  children.9 

A  statute  of  Massachusetts  providing  that  "  no  person  shall,  by 
being  adopted,  lose  his  right  to  inherit  from  his  natural  parents  or 
kindred,"  was  held  not  to  entitle  an  adopted  child,  who  was  also  a 
grandson  of  the  adopting  father,  to  inherit  from  his  grandfather 


Right  of  inher- 
itance given  by 
statute  follows 
adopted  child 
in  all  other 
States. 

Identity  of 
child  not 
changed  by 
the  adoption. 


kindred  "  :  §  232,  note  5.  Helms  v.  Elli- 
ott, 89  Tenn.  446;  Warren  v.  Prescott,  84 
Me.  483  (by  statute). 

1  Reinders  v.  Koppelmann,  68  Mo.  482, 
494. 

a  Krug  v.  Davis,  87  Ind.  590. 

3  Davis  v.  Krug,  95  Ind.  1  ;  Paul  v. 
Davis,  100  Ind.  422. 

4  Humphries  v.  Davis,  100  Ind.  274. 
But  property  inherited  from  the  natural 
parents  descends  to  them  as  their  kindred : 
Hole  v.  Robbins,  53  Wis.  514. 

6  Power  v.  Hafley,  85  Ky.  671  ;  Gray 
v.  Holmes,  57  Kans.  217  (holding  that  the 
widower  and  child  of  a  deceased  adopted 
child  inherited  as  heirs  of  the  adopter), 
221. 

6  Per  Merrick,  C.  J.,  in  Vidal  v.  Com- 
magere,  13  La.  An.  516,  517;  Martin,  C. 
J.  in  Gray  v.  Holmes,  57  Kans.  217,  221. 


7  Estate  of  Sunderland,  60  Iowa,  732 ; 
Ross  v.  Ross,  129  Mass.  243  ;  "Van  Matre 
v.  Sankey,  148  111.  536  (to  the  extent  that 
such  status,  or  the  rights  flowing  there- 
from, are  not  inconsistent  with  or  opposed 
to  the  laws  and  policy  of  the  State  where 
it  is  sought  to  be  availed  of),  559  ;  Melvin 
v.  Martin,  18  R.  I.  650  ;  Gray  v.  Holmes, 
57  Kans.  217  (holding  that  the  method  of 
adoption  in  the  respective  States  might  be 
different,  if  the  rights  thereby  conferred 
were  substantially  the  same),  219. 

8  Schafer  v.  Eneu,  54  Pa.  St.  304, 306 ; 
a  similar  decision  was  made  under  the 
Massachusetts  statute,  where  the  re- 
mainder was  limited  to  the  "heirs  at 
law":  Wyeth  v.  Stone,  144  Mass.  441. 

9  Commonwealth  v.  Nancrede,  32  Pa. 
St.  389. 

149 


*  141,*  142  DESCENT   AND    DISTRIBUTION    OF   PROPERTY.  §70 

in   the   twofold   capacity  of   son   and   grandson,    but   only    in    the 
former.1 

§  70.  Brothers  and  Sisters:  Heirs  of  the  Whole  and  of  the  Half 
Blood.  —  The  next  degree  in  the  order  of  succession  is  that  of 
brothers  and  sisters  and  their  descendants.  These  are  not  in  the 
descending  or  ascending  line  of  propinquity,  but  are  collateral  to 
the  intestate.  Since  the  brothers  and  sisters  themselves  are  mem- 
bers of  the  immediate  family  to  which  the  intestate  belonged,  they 
are  (where  the  intestate  left  no  children,  and  after  the  husband  and 
wife)  more  nearly  interested  in  the  intestate's  property  than  any 
other  relatives  except  the  father  and  mother,  aside  from  the  ques- 
tion of  consanguinity.  Hence  the  law  casts  upon  them  the  descent 
of  such  property,  if  there  are  no  children,  subject  to  the  rights  of 
husband  or  wife,  if  any,  and  generally  in  connection  with  father  or 
mother,  or  both.  If  any  of  them  died  before  the  intestate,  leaving 
descendants,  these  represent  their  deceased  parents  and  take, 
in  all  cases,  the  share  of  such  parent  collectively;  *that  is,  [*  142] 
all  the  children  of  a  deceased  brother  or  sister  take  together 
the  share  which  the  deceased  brother  or  sister  would  have  taken  if 
he  had  survived  the  intestate.  And  in  many  States  the  principle  is 
extended  further:  if  any  of  the  children  of  a  deceased  brother  or 
sister  died  before  the  intestate,  his  children  take  collectively  the 
share  which  he  would  have  taken  if  he  had  survived;  and  so  on 
in  every  generation  of  descendants  from  a  deceased  brother  or 
sister. 

Brothers  and  sisters,  and  their  descendants  by  repre- 
S'lIJdSers  sentation  as  above  stated,  take,  in  default  of  children, 
take  in  default  and  subject  to  the  rights  of  husband  or  wife,  to  the  exclu- 
Bubject  to^ms-  sion  of  parents  and  more  remote  kindred  in  Connecticut,2 
band  or  wife's  Delaware,8  Mississippi,4  New  Jersey,6  North  Carolina,6 
Ohio,7  Pennsylvania,8  and  Tennessee;9  postponed  to  the 
father,  but  together  with  the  mother,  excluding  more  remote  kin- 
dred, in  Florida,10  Georgia,11  Indiana,12  Maine,13  Nebraska,14  Ne- 
vada,16 New    Hampshire,16   Oklahoma,17  Oregon,18  Rhode   Island,19 

1  Delano  v  Bruerton,  148  Mass.  619.  nieces,  and  also  to  the  parents:  Pepper 

2  Gen   St.  1887,  §  0.30.     But  only  those  &  Lewis'  Dig.  1896,  p.  2411,  §  6. 
of  the  full  blood  ;  those  of  the  half  blood  »  Code,  1884,  §§  3268  et  seq. 
arc  postponed  to  parents.  10  Hev.  St.  1892,  §  1820. 

:i  Rev.  Code,  1874,  eh.  85,  §  1.  n  Code,  1892,  §  2484. 

1   Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  1543.  >a  Rev.  St.  1894,  §  2625. 

•■  Like  Connecticut:  Gen.  St.  1896,  p.  18  Rev.  St.  1884,  ch.  75,  §  1. 

1193,  §  2.  "  Cons.  St.  1893,  §  1123-30. 

r>  As  to  real  estate:  Code,  1883,  §  1281.  15  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  2981. 

1   Mates'  Ann.  St.  1897,  §  4159.  "'    1'ubl.  St.  1891,  ch.  196,  §  1,  pi.  2,  3. 

1  Subject  to  parents'  life  .•state  in  the  17  St.  1890,  §  6893. 

realty,  real  and  personal  estate  to  brothers  18  Code,  1897,  §  3098. 

and  sisters  of  the  full  blood  ;  those  of  the  Vi  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  733,  §  1. 
half  blood  are  po  bponed  to  nephews  and 
150 


70 


BROTHERS   AND   SISTERS. 


*  142,  *  143 


[*  143]  South  Carolina,1  South  Dakota,2  Texas,3  Virginia,4  *and 
West  Virginia; 5  postponed  to  both  parents,  if  both  be  living, 
but  together  with  the  survivor,  if  one  be  dead,  in  Alabama,6  Ari- 
zona; 7  postponed  to  both  parents  in  Arkansas,8  California,9  Colorado,10 
Idaho,11  Kentucky,12  Massachusetts,13  Michigan,14  Minnesota,15  New 
York,16  North  Dakota,17  Wisconsin,18  and  Washington.19  If  there  be 
no  descendants,  the  brothers  and  sisters  and  their  descendants  by 
representation  take,  subject  to  the  rights  of  husband  or  wife,  together 
with  father  and  mother,  each  an  equal  part,  in  Illinois,20  Missouri,21 
and  Wyoming;22  in  Louisiana  father  and  mother  take  one-half  to- 
gether, and  brothers  and  sisters  and  their  descendants  by  represen- 
tation the  other  half.23 

Brothers  and  sisters  having  the  same  father  and  mother  are  re- 
lated to  each  other  by  the  whole  blood ;  if  they  have  the  same  father 
but  a  different  mother,  or  the  same  mother  but  a  different  father, 
they  are  related  to  each  other  by  the  half  blood.  This  difference  in 
the  consanguinity  of  collateral  kindred  has  given  rise  to  some  diver- 
gence in  the  laws  of  different  countries  regulating  the  devolution  of 
property.  Under  the  artificial  system  of  the  common  law,  collateral 
kindred  of  the  half  blood  were  entirely  excluded  from  the  inher- 
itance of  land,24  while  in  the  distribution  of  the  personalty  no  distinc- 
tion is  recognized  between  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  whole  blood 
and  those  of  the  half  blood;  "for  they  [the  half  blood]  are  of  the 


i  Rev.  St.  1893,  §  1980. 

2  Comp.  L.  1887,  §  3381. 

3  If  both  parents  survive,  the  estate 
goes  to  them ;  but  if  only  one  parent  sur- 
vive, then  one  half  to  such  parent,  and 
the  other  half  to  brothers  and  sisters : 
Gen.  St.  1895,  art.  1688. 

*  Code,  1887,  §  2548. 
6  Code,  1891,  ch.  78,  §  1. 

6  Code,  Ala.  1896,  §  1453. 

7  Rev.  St.  1887,  T[  1459. 

8  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  2470,  pi.  2. 

9  Civ.  Code,  §  1386. 
W  St.  1891,  §  1524. 

11  Rev.  St.  1887,  §  5702. 

12  St.  1894,  §  1393. 

13  Publ.  St.  1882,  ch.  125,  §  1. 

14  How.   Ann.  St.  1890  (Supplement), 
§  5772a. 

15  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  5677. 

16  2  Banks  &  Bro.  (9th  ed.    1896)   p. 
1824,  §§  5,  6. 

17  Rev.  Code,  1895,  §  3742. 

18  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2270. 

19  1  Hills'  Ann.  St.  1891,  §  1480. 

30  But  if  one  parent  be  dead,  the  other 


takes   a  double  portion  :    St.  &  Curt.  St. 
1896,  p.  1426,  §  1,  pi.  2. 

21  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  4465. 

22  If  no  husband  or  wife,  and  no 
children  nor  descendants:  Rev.  St.  1887, 
§  2221. 

23  Voorhies'  Rev.  Code,  1888,  art. 
903  et  seq. 

24  Blackstone  makes  a  gallant  attempt 
to  justify  this  feature  of  the  English  law 
of  descent,  or  at  least  to  palliate  its  harsh- 
ness. "  It  is  certainly  a  very  fine-spun 
and  subtle  nicety,"  he  says  (2  Comm. 
230),  "but  considering  the  principles  upon 
which  our  law  is  founded,  it  is  not  an  in- 
justice, nor  always  a  hardship ;  since  even 
the  succession  of  the  whole  blood  was 
originally  a  beneficial  indulgence."  His 
candor,  however,  induces  him  to  admit 
that  this  element  of  the  common  law  is 
not  his  ideal  of  the  perfection  of  human 
reason.  "  I  must  be  impartial  enough 
to  own  that,  in  some  instances,  the  prac- 
tice is  carried  further  than  the  principle 
upon  which  it  goes  will  warrant."  (lb, 
231.) 

151 


*  143,  *  144      DESCENT   AND   DISTRIBUTION   OF   PROPERTY. 


70 


tween  heirs  of 
the  whole  and 
of  the  half 
blood. 

Rules  as  to  an- 
cestral estates. 


kindred  of  the  intestate,  and  only  excluded  from  inheritances  of 
land  upon  feudal  principles."  1 

In  the  American  States  there  is  but  little  difference  between  the 
rules  of  descent  of  real,  and  of  the  distribution  of  personal  property, 
Distinction  be-  save  as  ^°  ^ne  "S^ts  of  surviving  husband  or  widow ; 2 
but  there  is  a  noticeable  divergence  among  the 
several  States  as  to  the  rules  affecting  the  *  inher-  [*  144] 
itance  of  kindred  of  the  whole  and  of  the  half 
blood.  In  respect  of  ancestral  estates,  that  is  to  say, 
estates  acquired  by  the  intestate  by  gift,  devise,  or 
descent,3  the  distinction  in  blood  between  full  and  half  brothers  ana 
sisters  is  implied  in  the  discrimination  between  the  descent  of 
ancestral  and  other  estates,  since  the  States  recognizing  this  dis- 
~    ,  ,.       „     tinction  exclude  from  the  inheritance  all  descendants  of 

Excluding  all 

not  of  the  an-  the  intestate  not  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor  from  whom 
cestor's  blood.  ^  estate  came>  whether  brothers  and  sisters  of  the 
half  blood  take  equally  with  those  of  the  whole  blood  in  respect  of 
estates  acquired  by  the  intestate  otherwise  than  by  gift,  devise,  or 
descent,  or  not.  It  is  so  enacted  by  statute,  for  instance,  in  Ala- 
bama,4 Arkansas,5  California,6  Delaware,7  Idaho,8  Indiana,9  Mary- 
land, 10  Michigan, n  Minnesota, 12  Montana, 18  Nebraska, 14  Nevada  ,15  New 
Jersey,16  New  York,17  North  Dakota,18  Ohio,19  Oklahoma,20  Penn- 


1  2  Bla.  Comm.  505 ;  Crooke  v.  Watt, 
Show.  P.  C.  108,  cited  hi  Wms.  [1511]; 
8.  c.  2  Vera.  124.  But  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  this  and  subsequent  decisions 
on  this  point  were  made  upon  the  Statute 
of  Descents. 

2  In  Pennsylvania  there  is  a  difference 
in  the  rights  of  brothers  and  sisters  of  the 
whole  blood  and  of  the  half  blood  to  the 
real  estate,  but  not  to  the  personal  estate 
of  an  intestate:  Pepper  &  L.  Dig.  1896, 
p.  2411,  §  6,  pi.  4,  5. 

3  4  Kent,  *  404.  The  technical  term 
"  ancestor  "  is  here  used  in  its  technical,  not 
its  popular  sense.  See  as  to  the  devolution 
of  ancestral  estates,  post,  §  73. 

*  Code,  Ala.  1896,  §1457.  This  statute 
is  construed  as  applying  to  those  of  the 
same  degree  only,  by  virtue  of  the  statutory 
words  "  as  against  those  of  the  same  decree," 
distinguishing  the  decision  from  decisions 
in  other  States,  based  on  their  respective 
statutes:  Cox  v.  Clark,  93  Ala.  400; 
reaffirmed  in  Coleman  v.  Foster,  112  Ala. 
506. 

&   Dig.  of  St.  1H94,  §  2481. 

8  Civ.  Code,  1885,  §   1394. 

1  Code,  1874,  ch.  85,  §  1. 
152 


8  Rev.  St.  1887,  §5705. 

9  Ann.  St.  1894,  §  2627.  This  statute 
has  been  held  to  apply  to  heirs  in  the  same 
degree  only,  so  that  if  there  be  no  brother 
or  sister  of  the  whole  or  half  blood  of  the 
intestate  having  the  blood  of  the  an- 
cestor, a  half  brother  not  of  the  blood 
of  the  ancestor  takes  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  kindred  of  the  blood  of  a  more 
remote  degree :  Pond  v.  Irwin,  113  Ind. 
243.  Except  as  to  ancestral  estates, 
brothers  of  the  half  blood  take  equally 
with  those  of  the  full  blood  :  Anderson 
v.  Bell,  140  Ind.  375. 

1°  Publ.  Gen.  L.  1888,  art.  46. 

"  Howell's  Ann.  St.  1882,  §  5776  a. 

12  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  5678. 

18  Codes  &  St.  1895,  §  1860. 

14  Cons.  St.  1893,  §  1128. 

16  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  2984. 

10  Gen.  St.  1896,  p.  1194,  §  5. 

17  2  Banks  &  Bro.  (9th  ed.)  1896,  p. 
1825,  §§  8etseq. 

18  Kev.  Code,  1895,  §  5751. 

»  Bates'  Ann.  St.  1897,  §  4158, 
pi.  3. 

a°  St.  1890,  ch.  88,  art.  iv.  §§  6,  7. 


§70 


HEIRS    OF    WHOLE    AND    HALF    BLOOD. 


144 


sylvania,1  Rhode  Island,2  South  Dakota,8  Tennessee,4  Utah,6  and 
Wisconsin.6  The  kindred  "not  of  the  blood  of  the  ancestor,1'  which 
these  statutes  exclude  from  the  inheritance,  are  sometimes  held  to 
be  limited  to  the  next  of  kin  of  the  half  blood  of  the  intestate.7 
The  distinction  between  ancestral  and  other  estates  is 
ignored,  either  tacitly,  or,  as  in  some  instances,  by 
express  enactment;  as,  for  instance,  in  Arizona8  and 
Texas.9  Brothers  and  sisters  of  the  half  blood  are, 
in  most  of  the  above-named  States,  entitled  to  the 
same  shares  of  the  inheritance  as  those  of  the  whole 
blood,  except  as  they  are  affected  by  the  doctrine 
of  ancestral  estates ;  while  in  many  States  brothers  and 
sisters  of  the  half  blood  take  half  shares,  and  those 
of  the  whole  blood  whole  shares,  as,  for  instance,  in 
Arizona,  Colorado,10,  Florida,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,11 
Missouri,  Texas,  Virginia,  and  West  Virginia;  but  if, 
in  such  States,  there  be  only  half  brothers  or  sisters 
entitled  to  the  inheritance,  they  take  whole  shares ;  and 
where  half  brothers  and  sisters,  entitled  to  half  shares 
only,  take  together  with  ascendants,  such  ascendants 
take  double  shares.12  In  some  of  the  States  brothers 
and  sisters  of  the  half  blood  are  not  distinguished  in 
the  statutes  of  descent  from  those  of  the  whole  blood, 
as  in  Illinois,  Iowa,  Michigan,  and  New  Hampshire; 
while  in  others  they  are  expressly  put  in  the  same  class, 
if  in  the  same  degree  of  propinquity  to  the  intestate;  as, 
for  example,  in  Kansas, 13  Maine, 14  Massachusetts, 15  Ore- 
gon,16 Vermont,17  and  Washington.18  In  some  States 
brothers  and  sisters  of  the  whole  blood,  and  the  de- 
scendants of  deceased  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  whole 
blood  by  representation,  constitute  a  class  entitled  to  the  inherit 


Distinction  be- 
tween ancestral 
and  other  es- 
tates ignored. 

Half  brothers 
and  sisters 
take  same  as 
those  of  the 
whole  blood  in 
non-ancestral 
estates. 

Half  brothers 
and  sisters 
half,  whole 
brothers  and 
sisters  whole, 
shares. 

No  distinction 
between  broth- 
ers and  sisters 
of  the  half  and 
whole  blood. 

Half  blood  in 
same  class  with 
whole  blood. 

Brothers  and 
sisters  of  the 
whole  blood 
and  their  de- 
scendants as  a 
class  preferred 
to  half  brothers 
and  sisters. 


1  Pepper  &  L.  Dig.  1896,  p.  2413,  §11. 
3  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  734,  §  6. 

3  Comp.  L.  1887,  §  3401,  pi.  7,  8. 

4  Code,  1884,  §  3269. 

5  Rev.  St.  1898,  §  2840.  See  Amy  v. 
Amy,  12  Utah,  278,  335. 

6  St.  1889,  §  2272. 

7  See  post,  §  73,  as  to  the  devolution  of 
ancestral  estates. 

8  Rev.  St.  1887,  §  1461. 

9  Rev.  St.  1895,  art.  1690.  An  ex- 
ception is  made  in  this  State,  in  the  case 
of  an  adopted  child,  so  much  of  whose 
property  as  has  come  to  him  from  such 
adopting  person  reverts  back  to  the  donor. 

10  Children  and  descendants  of  the 
half  blood  inherit  the  same  as  those  of  the 


whole  blood  ;  but  collateral  relatives  of  the 
half  blood  only  half  shares :  Mills'  Ann. 
St.  1891,  §  1526. 

11  Brothers  and  sisters  german  take 
in  the  two  (paternal  and  maternal)  lines  ; 
other  brothers  and  sisters  in  the  paternal 
or  maternal  line  only,  as  the  inheritance 
may  come  through  the  paternal  or  ma- 
ternal line:  Voorhies'  C.  C.  1889,  art 
120. 

12  Eev.  St.  Mo.  1889,  §  4468. 

13  Gen.  St.  1889,  §  2620. 

14  Rev.  St.  1883,  ch.  75,  §  2. 

15  Publ.  St.  1882,  ch.  125,  §  2. 

16  Hill's  Ann.  St.  §  3103. 

17  St.  1894,  §  2545. 

18  Hill's  St.  &  Codes,  §  1480,  pi.  7. 

153 


*  144,  *  145      DESCENT   AND    DISTRIBUTION   OP   PROPERTY.  §  70 

ance  in  preference  to  half  brothers  and  sisters  and  their  descendants 
as  a  class;  so  in  Connecticut,1  Delaware,2  Maryland,3  Mississippi,4 
New  Jersey,5  Ohio,6  and  Pennsylvania.7  In  this  State,  brothers 
and  sisters  of  the  whole  blood  exclude  nephews  and  nieces;  and 
these,  if  descended  from  full  brothers  or  sisters  deceased,  exclude 
brothers  and  sisters  of  the  half  blood.8  In  Wyoming  children  and 
descendants  of  the  half  blood  take  same  as  those  of  the  whole  blood; 
but  collaterals  of  the  half  blood,  if  there  be  also  collaterals  of  the 
whole  blood,  only  one  half  of  the  measure  of  collaterals  of  the 
whole  blood.9  It  seems  well  settled  in  England  and  America, 
that  when  brothers  and  sisters  are  mentioned  in  a  statute, 
the  half  blood  are  included,  unless  there  be  some  contravening 
provision.10 

*  A  distinction  is  also  made,  in  the  statutes  of  many  States,  [*  145] 
between  the  descent  of  the  estates  of  adults  and  of  minors  not 

having  been  married,  in  recognition  of  the  iutegrity  of 
tates^  minors  the  family.  The  property  of  a  minor,  before  the  law 
not  having         permits  him  to  dispose  of  it  at  his  own  will,  and  before 

he  has  contracted  new  relations  and  obligations  by  mar- 
rying, is  substantially  the  property  of  the  family  of  which  he  is  a 
member,  and  on  his  death  should  descend  to  the  other  members  of 
such  family.11  Hence  these  statutes  direct  the  reversion  of  the  prop- 
erty of  such  a  minor  to  the  donor,  or  to  the  parent  from  whom  it 
came,  if  still  living,  or,  if  the  estate  consists  of  his  distributive 
share  of  a  parent's  estate  to  the  brothers  and  sisters  or  representa- 
tives of  deceased  brothers  and  sisters,  just  as  if  they  had  inherited 
directly  from  such  deceased  parent,  or  as  if  the  minor  had  died  before 
his  father.12  Statutes  of  such  and  similar  import  are  found  in  Arkan- 
sas, California,13  Connecticut,14  Florida,15  Kentucky,16  Maine,17  Massa- 

1  Gen.  St.  1887,  §  632.  v.  Watt,  2  Vera.  124 ;  Gardner  t\  Collins, 

2  Rev.  Code,  1874,  ch.  85,  §  1.  2  Pet.  (27  U.  S.)   58,  87  ;    Baker  v.   Chal- 

3  Publ.  Gen.  St.  1888,  art.  46,  pi.  19,  fant,  5  Whart.  477,479;  Clay  v.  Cousins, 
20.  1  T.  B.  Mon.  75,  76 ;  Clark  v.  Sprague,  5 

4  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  1544.  This  Blackf.  412,  414;  Beebee  v.  Griffing,  14 
statute  has  been  construed  as  excluding  N.  Y.  235  ;  Rowley  v.  Stray,  32  Mich. 
brother  or  sister  of  the  half  blood  in  favor  70,  75. 

of  descendants  of  deceased  brothers  and  n  Nash  v.  Cutler,  16  Pick.  491,  499. 

sisters  of  the  whole  blood,  when  all  broth-  ia  Estate  of  North,  48  Conn.  583,  586, 

ers  and   sisters  of  the  whole    blood  had  citing  other  cases. 

died  before  the  testator:  Scott   v.  Terry,  13  Deering's  Civ.  C.  §  1338,  pi.  7,  8. 

?,1  Miss.  65.  14  Gen.  St.  1887,  §  632.     See  North's 

'->  (Jen.  St.  1896,  p.  1194,  §  5.  Estate,  48  Couu.  583. 

r<  Rev.  St.    1K90,   §  4159;    Stemble   v.  16  Rev.  St.  1892,  §  1821. 

Martin,  50  Oh.  St.  495,  519.  16  St.  1894,  §    1401.      See  Walden  c. 

7   Peppet    &    L.    Dig.    1896,    p.   2412,  Phillips,  86  Ky.  302;  Smith  v.  Smith,  2 

§  8.  Bush,  520. 

«  Br.  Pnrd.  Dig.  p.  931,  §  25.  »   Rev.    St.    1883,   ch.   75,    §    1,    pi.    vL 

9  Rev.  St.  1KH7,  §  2223.  See  Benson  v.  Swan,  60  Me.  160. 
W  Tracy  v.  Smith,  2  Lev.  173  ;  Crooke 
154 


§  71  DESCENDANTS   TAKING    BY   REPRESENTATION.       *  145,  *  146 

chusetts,1  Michigan,2  Minnesota,8  Nebraska,4  Nevada,5  Oklahoma,8 
Oregon,7  Virginia,8  Washington,9  Wisconsin,10  and  possibly  others. 
They  apply,  generally,  to  property  inherited  from  one  of  the  intes- 
tate's parents  only;  "where  the  inheritance  is  taken  from  a  more 
remote  ancestor  by  right  of  representing  a  nearer  ancestor,  it  cannot 
be  regarded  as  coming  from  the  latter; 12  and  if,  in  such  case,  there 
be  no  brothers  or  sisters  surviving  the  death  of  the  minor,  the  ordi- 
nary rules  of  descent  govern.18  In  the  absence  of  statutory  discrimi- 
nation, the  rule  is  the  same  whether  the  estate  is  real  or  personal.14 
An  exception  to  the  general  rules  of  descent,  cognate  in  its  nature 
to  the  above,  has  also  been  made  in  respect  of  the  devolution  of 
property  granted  to  an  intestate  in  consideration  of  love  Reversion  of 
and   affection,    which,    in   case   of    the   death   of   such    property  grant- 

.....  •        i  ■  i     ,  ,  i         e"  in  consider- 

grantee  without    issue,    is   directed   to   revert    to    the    ation  of  love 
orantor  15  anc^  affect'011- 

[*  146]  *.§  71.  Descendants  taking  by  Representation.  —  The  re- 
ciprocal relationship  between  husband  and  wife,  parents  and 
children,  and  between  the  children  themselves,  or  brothers  and  sis- 
ters, exhausts  the  sphere  of  those  intimate  bonds  which  unite  the 
family  proper,  in  its  primary  and  most  restricted  sense.  The  de- 
scendants of  the  children,  or  of  the  brothers  and  sisters,  are  not 
included  in  this  sphere,  because  they  belong  to  a  distinct  family, 
which,  although  closely  allied  to  the  former  as  springing  from  one 
of  its  members,  owes  its  integrity  to  the  addition  of  a  new  ingredi- 
ent: the  child  or  brother  or  sister  has  married;  the  issue  of  such 
marriage  is  equally  allied  to  the  family  of  its  father  and  of  its 
mother.  Hence,  during  the  lifetime  of  the  child,  sister  or  brother, 
parent  of  the  issue  of  the  new  family,  the  law  looks  upon  such  issue 
as  not  belonging  to  the  original  family  of  either  of  its  parents,  and 
excludes  it  from  the  inheritance  left  upon  the  death  of  any  of  its 
members,  the  parent  himself  being  entitled  thereto.  But  if  the 
parent  of  the  new  family  died  before  the  intestate  member  of  the 
old  family,  the  law  recognizes  such  issue  as  being  entitled  to  what 

1  Goodrich  p.  Adams,  138  Mass.  552.        deceased     leaves    only    living    children: 

2  How.  Ann.  St.  1890,  §  5772  a.     See     Stitt  v.  Bush,  22  Oreg.  239,  241. 
Burke  v.  Burke,  34  Mich.  451.  8  Code,  1887,  §  2556. 

8  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  5677,  pi.  7,  8.  9  Hill's  St.  &  C.  1891,  §  1480. 

*  Cons.  St.  1893,  §§  1123-30.  1°  St.  1889,  §  2270,  pi.  5,  6.    Shuman  v. 

6  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  2981.  Shuman,  80  Wis.  479,  481. 

6  St.  1890,  ch.  88,  art.  iv.  §§  6,  7.  "Decoster     v.    Wing,    76     Me.   450; 

7  Hill's  Ann.   St.   1887,   §  3098,  pi.  6.  Cables  v.  Brescott,  67  Me.  582;  Bower  v. 
It  is  held  that  the  statute  of  this  State,  Dougherty,  83  Ky.  187. 

omitting  a  part  of  the  English  Statute  of         12  Sedgwick  v.  Minot,  6  Allen,  171. 
Distribution,  after  which  it  is  modelled,         18  Decoster  v.  Wing,  supra  ;    see  Good- 
applies   only   to  persons    dying    leaving    rich  v.  Adams,  138  Mass.  552. 
children   and    also    issue  of    a  deceased        14  Decoster  v.  Wing,  supra. 
child,    and   doeB    not    apply   where     the         15  Ann.  St.  Ind.  1894,  §  2628;    Amoj 

v.  Amos,  117  Ind.  37. 

155 


**  146-148        DESCENT    AND   DISTRIBUTION    OF   PROPERTY. 


§71 


Right  to  take 
by  representa- 
tion in  all 
descendants 
of  children; 
in  some  States 
to  descendants 


the  deceased  child,  brother  or  sister,  would  have  been 
entitled  to  if  he  had  survived  the  intestate.1  Thus  the 
issue  of  deceased  children,  brothers  and  sisters,  are  sub- 
stituted for  or  put  into  the  place  of  their  parents  in  the 
line  of  inheritance,  that  is,  they  represent  them,  and  are 
of  broThersaud  therefore  said  to  take  by  representation.  The  right  to 
sisters;  tsike  by  representation  is  secured  to  the  descendants  of 

m  others  to  i 

children  of         children  in  all  the  States ;    and  to  the  descendants  of 
andhsisterserS     brothers  and  sisters  in  many  of  them,  through 

all  descending  generations,  *  while  in  others  the  [*  147] 
right  to  take  by  representation  is  limited  to  the  children  of 
brothers  and  sisters.2 

*  The  rule  prohibiting  representation  of  collaterals  further  [*  148] 
than  by  children  of  the  intestate's  brothers  and  sisters,  is 
adopted  from  the  English  Statute  of  Distribution,  and  has  been 
frequently  asserted,  both  in  England  and  America.  In  the  case  of 
Carter  v.  Crawley,3  arising  a  few  years  after  its  passage,  its  lan- 
guage was  construed,  and  the  reasons  upon  which  the  enactment  was 
supposed  to  stand,  fully  stated.4  The  construction  then  put  upon  it 
has  been  the  English  law  ever  since.5 


1  Ante,  §  70. 

2  The  question  whether  the  right  to 
take  by  representation  exists  or  not,  has 
an  important  bearing  in  ascertaining  the 
heirship  of  persons  related  to  the  intestate 
in  a  remote  degree,  which  is  fairly  illus- 
trated by  the  facts  of  a  case  decided  lately 
in  Georgia.  T.,  dying  intestate  as  to  a 
portion  of  her  estate,  left  surviving  grand- 
children of  an  aunt,  and  also  great-grand- 
children of  a  deceased  brother,  claiming 
through  W.,  their  mother,  the  grandchild 
of  the  brother,  who  had  died  before  the 
intestate.  The  statute  of  Georgia  fixes 
the  order  in  which  certain  of  the  relatives 
of  intestates  are  entitled  to  the  inheritance 
nominatim,  and  then  provides  "  that  the 
more  remote  degrees  of  kindred  shall  be 
determined  by  the  rules  of  the  canon  law, 
as  adopted  and  enforced  in  the  English 
courts  prior  to  the  4th  of  July,  1776."  It 
also  provides  for  representation  as  far  as 
grandchildren  of  brothers  and  sisters. 
According  to  the  rales  .of  the  canon  law, 
the  grandchildren  of  the  aunt  were  in  the 
third,  and  the  great .-grandchildren  of  the 
brother  in  the  fourth  degree,  and  it  was 

accordingly  decided  that  the  former  were 

entitled  to  the   inheritance.     If   W.,  the 
grandchild  of  the  brother,  had  been  alive 


at  the  time  of  the  intestate's  death,  she 
would  have  taken  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
other  branch,  by  representation  of  her 
grandfather,  who  was  a  brother.  But 
since  the  statute  cut  off  representation 
after  grandchildren  of  deceased  brothers 
and  sisters,  her  own  childreu  could  take 
nothing  by  representation.  If  the  degree 
of  kinship  in  this  case  had  been  computed 
according  to  the  rules  of  the  civil  law,  the 
great-grandchildren  of  the  brother  would 
have  been  in  the  same  degree  with  the 
grandchildren  of  the  aunt,  and  would 
have  been  entitled  equally  with  them,  — 
aside  from  the  question  of  representation, 
—  per  capita:  Wetter  v.  Habersham,  CO 
Ga.  193. 

3  T.  Itaym.  496. 

4  "  In  respect  of  the  intestate  it  may 
be  thought  an  obligation  upon  every  man 
to  provide  for  those  which  descend  from 
his  loins ;  and  as  the  administrator  is  to 
discharge  all  other  debts,  so  this  debt  to 
nature  should  likewise  exact  a  distribution 
to  all  that  descend  from  him  in  the  lineal 
degrees,  be  they  never  so  remote.  And 
because  those  which  are  remote  have  not 
so  much  of  his  blood,  therefore  the  meas- 
ure should  be  according  to  the  stocks, 
mure  or  less  as  they  stand  in  relation  to 


■'■  Wins.  ESx.  [1512]  and  numerous  authorities  were  cited. 


1 56 


§71 


DESCENDANTS   TAKING    BY    REPRESENTATION. 


148 


The  right  to  take  by  representation  in  the  collateral  line  is  limited 
to  the  children  or  grandchildren  of  brothers  or  sisters  in  Alabama,1 
Connecticut,2  Georgia,8  Maine,4  Maryland,5  Massachusetts,6  Michi- 
gan,7 Mississippi,8  Nebraska,9  New  Hampshire,10  New  Jersey,11 
Pennsylvania,12  South  Carolina,18  and  Vermont.14 

It  remains  to  notice  another  consequence  of  the  rule  allowing  the 
children  of  deceased  parents  to  take,  the  parent's  share  by  repre- 
sentation,  applicable   equally   to  lineal   and  collateral 
heirs  taking  by  representation.     If  the  heirs  all  stand 
in  the  same  degree  of  consanguinity  to  the  intestate, 
and  take  in  their   own   right  (none  of  them   by  rep- 
resentation), they  take  equal  shares  each  (per  capita); 
hence  the  three  children  of  a  deceased  sister  of  the  in- 
testate and  the  only  child  of  a  deceased  brother  take 
each  one-fourth  part  of  the  estate,  in  disregard  of  the    >? their  own 
number  of  those  who  may  spring  from  a  common  par- 
ent, because  in  establishing  the  degree  of  kinship  they  do  not  rep- 
resent such  parent.15     But  if  some  or  one  of  the  heirs  claim  in  their 


Heirs  take  per 
capita  if  all 
within  the 
same  degree 
of  consanguin- 
ity ;  per  stirpes, 
if  by  represen- 
tation, where 
there  are  heirs 
also  who  take 


i  Code,  1896,  §  1455. 

2  Gen.  St.  1887,  §  632. 

8  Code,  1895,  §  3855,  pi.  5. 

4  Davis  v.  Stinson,  53  Me.  493. 

5  Publ.  Gen.  L.  1888,  art.  46,  pi.  27; 
McComas  v.  Amos,  29  Md.  132,  138. 

6  Bigelow  v.  Morong,  103  Mass.  287; 
Conant  v.  Kent,  130  Mass.  178;  Publ.  St. 
1882,  ch.  125,  §  1,  pi.  5.  The  phrase, 
"  brothers  and  sisters  and  to  the  issue  of 
any  deceased  brother  or  sister,  by  right  of 
representation  "  is  held  not  to  apply  when 
there  is  no  brother  or  sister  surviving  be- 
cause the  statute,  in  such  case,  provides 
in  clear  words  that  the  estate  of  the  in- 
testate shall  go  "  to  his  next  of  kin  in 
equal  degree." 

7  On  the  same  ground  as  Conant  v. 
Kent,  supra;  Van  Cleve  v.  Van  Fossen, 
73  Mich.  342. 


8  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  1543. 

9  Douglas  v.  Cameron,  47  Neb.  358. 

10  Publ.  St.  1891,  ch.  196,  §  3. 

11  It  is  held  in  this  State  that  the 
statute  securing  the  inheritance  to  the 
next  in  degree  of  consanguinity  abolishes 
the  common  law  rule  of  representation, 
departing  from  Den  v.  Smith,  2  N.  J.  L.  2, 
which  held  that  the  term  "issue"  of 
brothers  and  sisters  included  all  their  de- 
scendants in  whatever  degree  :  Schenk  v. 
Vail,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  538,  540 ;  Beasley,  C. 
J.,  in  Taylor  v.  Bray,  32  N.  J.  L.  182,  191. 

32  Pepper  &  L.  Dig.  1896,  p.  2412,  §  10. 
Extended  to  grandchildren  in  1855: 
Perat's  Appeal,  102  Pa.  St.  235,  258. 

18  Rev.  St.  1893,  §  1980,  pi.  4. 

14  Hatch  v.  Hatch,  21  Vt.  450. 

15  Jansen  v.  Bury,  Bunb.  157. 


him.  Upon  this  reason  representations 
are  admitted  to  all  degrees  in  the  lineal 
descent.  There  is  no  such  obligation  to 
the  remote  kindred  in  a  collateral  line, 
therefore  they  are  not  regarded  but  in 
respect  of  proximity  as  they  are  next  of 
kin,  it  being  to  be  supposed  every  man 
would  leave  his  estate  to  his  next  kin- 
dred: but  the  children  of  those  that  are 
deceased  come  not  within  this  reason,  for 
they  are  a  degree  more  remote.  .  .  . 
Now  the  case  of  a  brother's  children  is  of 
a  mixed  consideration:  1.   In  respect  of 


the  obligation,  for  the  intestate  was  a 
kind  of  parent  to  his  brother's  children, 
and  in  that  respect  marriages  between 
them  are  forbidden.  2.  There  is  no 
danger  that  the  subdivisions  should  be 
very  many  and  the  estate  reduced  into 
very  small  parts  ;  for  brothers  and  sisters 
cannot  be  many,  as  cousin-germans  and 
other  remote  degrees  may,  therefore  there 
may  be  reason  to  admit  brothers'  children 
to  distribution  by  representation,  and  re- 
ject all  farther  degrees":  Carter  v. 
Crawley,  supra. 

157 


*  148,  *  149        DESCENT   AND   DISTRIBUTION   OP   PROPERTY.  §  71 

own  right,  — that  is,  by  virtue  of  their  degree  of  consanguin- 
ity, —  and  the  *  claim  of  others  rests  upon  the  representation  [*  149] 
of  a  deceased  parent  or  ancestor,  who,  if  living,  would  be  in 
that  degree,  then  the  latter  take  per  stirpes,  —  that  is,  collectively  as 
much  as  the  deceased  parent  or  ancestor  would  have  taken,  —  while 
the  former  take  per  capita.  The  whole  estate  in  such  case  is  to  be 
divided  by  the  sum  of  the  number  of  those  claiming  in  their  own 
right  plus  the  number  of  stirps  represented  by  descendants,  the 
descendants  collectively  of  each  stirps  taking  his  share.  So  that  the 
thirty-two  nephews  and  nieces  of  an  intestate,  and  the  twenty-five 
grand-nephews  and  grand-nieces  and  unknown  heirs  of  a  deceased 
niece,  take,  the  former  per  capita,  the  latter  per  stirjyes.1 

The  question  sometimes  arises,  whether  advancements  made  to, 
or  debts  owing  the  intestate  by,  heirs  who  die  before  the  intestate, 
leaving  children  who  thereby  become  heirs,  are  to  be 
heirs'  bv 'repre-  deducted  from  the  distributive  shares  of  these  children. 
sentation  for  it  seems  clear  on  principle,  and  is  supported  by  the  pre- 
advancements  ponderance  of  adjudged  cases,  that,  in  the  absence  of 
to,  their  a  statutory  regulation,  a  distinction  must  be  drawn  be- 

Ancestors. 

tween  advancements  and  debts ;  and  also  between  heirs 
taking  in  their  own  right,  and  those  taking  by  representation. 
Heirs  taking  in  their  own  right  directly  from  the  intestate  by  virtue 
of  their  propinquity  of  blood,  not  being  liable  for  the  debts  of  their 
ancestors,  and  these  because  such  ancestors  died  before  the  intestate, 
having  no  interest  in  the  inheritance,  so  that  there  is  no  connection 
or  correlation  between  the   inheritance   and   the   debt,   take  their 

1  Copenhaver  v.  Copenhaver,  9  Mo.  as  does  the  statute  of  Charles  II.,  cut  off 
App.  200.  The  statutory  provisions  in-  representation  among  collaterals  after 
terpreted  in  this  case  are  as  follows :  brothers'  and  sisters'  children,  the  last- 
Descent  is,  first,  to  the  intestate's  children  quoted  section  applies,  which  determines 
or  their  descendants,  in  equal  parts;  that  those  standing  in  a  remoter  degree 
second,  if  there  be  no  children  or  descend-  take  by  representation.  This  case  was 
ants,  then  to  his  father,  mother,  brothers  affirmed  in  78  Mo.  55,  and  followed  in 
and  sisters,  and  their  descendants,  in  equal  Aull  v.  Day,  133  Mo.  337. 
parts,  &c.  A  further  section  declares  This  rule  is  supported  by  numerous 
that  "  when  several  lineal  descendants,  all  English  and  American  authorities,  and  is 
of  equal  degree  of  consanguinity  to  the  universal  in  the  direct  lineal  descent,  but 
intestate,  or  his  father,  mother,  brothers  controlled  by  the  provision  found  in  many 
and  sisters,  or  his  grandfather,  grand-  of  the  statutes  of  descents  (mentioned 
mother,  uncles  and  aunts,  or  any  ancestor  above)  which  cut  off  representation  in  the 
living,  and  their  children,  come  into  parti-  collateral  line  after  brothers'  and  sisters' 
tion,  they  shall  take  per  capita, — that  is,  children,  or,  in  some  States,  their  grand- 
by  persons;  where  a  part  of  them  are  children.  See  2  Bla.  Comm.  217  ;  4  Kent 
dead  and  part  living,  and  the  issue  of  Comm.  390;  Cox  v.  Cox,  44  Ind.  3G8, 
those  dead  havearight  to  partition,  such  370;  Crump  v.  Faucett,  70  N.  C.  345; 
issue  shall  take  per  stirpes, — that  is,  the  Blake  v.  Blake,  85  Ind.  G5 ;  Nichols  v. 
share  of  the  deceased  parent."  The  court  Shepard,  G3  N.  H.  391  ;  Preston  v.  Cole, 
held,  that  since,  by  the  first  section  quoted,  64  N.  II.  459;  Sedgwick  v.  Minot,  6 
the  descendants  of  brothers  and  sisters  Allen,  171,  174;  Balch  v.  Stone,  149 
are  distributees,  and  the  statute  does  not,  Mass.  39;  Garrett  v.  Bean,  51  Ark.  52. 
158 


§72 


COMPUTATION   OP   THE   NEXT   OF   KIN. 


*149,  *150 


shares  free  from  any  deduction  on  account  of  debts  owing  by 
[*  150]  their  parents  or  ancestors  to  the  intestate.1  But  heirs  *  tak- 
ing by  representation  take  not  in  their  own  right,  but  in 
virtue  of  the  right  transmitted  to  them  by  the  deceased  heir;  hence 
it  may  be  said  that  they  can  take  no  more  than  the  latter  could  have 
taken  if  he  had  survived  the  intestate.2  The  same  result  follows 
where  the  statute  declares  that  the  issue  of  a  deceased  heir  shall 
take  such  share  only  as  would  have  descended  to  the  parent  if  living 
at  the  death  of  the  intestate.8  The  distinction  between  debts  owing 
by  an  heir  and  advancements  made  to  him  by  the  intestate  is  sharply 
drawn ;  in  some  States  debts  so  owing  cannot  be  deducted  from  the 
share  of  the  heir  in  the  real  estate,  and  from  the  personal  estate 
only  by  way  of  set-off,4  but  the  true  principle  seems  to  be  that  a 
debt  owing  by  au  heir  constitutes  part  of  the  assets  of  the  estate,  as 
much  as  that  of  any  other  debtor,  for  which  he  should  account  be- 
fore he  can  be  allowed  to  receive  anything  out  of  the  other  assets ; 5 
and  it  is  so  held  in  the  United  States.6  This  p'oint  is  also  discussed 
in  connection  with  the  subject  of  advancements.7 

§  72.  Computation  of  the  Next  of  Kin.  —  It  is  thus  seen,  that  in 
all  the  States  brothers  and  sisters  and  the  children  of  deceased 
brothers  and  sisters  are  placed  in  the  first  degree  of  col- 
lateral heirs,  and  that  in  the  most  of  them  all  their 
descendants  are  relegated  to  the  same  degree  by  repre- 
sentation upon  the  death  of  intermediate  ancestors. 
The  further  order  of  succession  is  indicated  in  some 
States   by   the   statutes   themselves,    mostly   placing   grandfathers, 

of 


Brothers  and 
sisters  and 
their  descend- 
ants in  first 
class  of  collat- 
eral heirship. 


1  Post,  §  554,  p.  *  1216 ;  Kendall  v. 
Mondell,  67  Md.  444;  Ilgenfritz's  Ap- 
peal, 5  Watts,  25 ;  Barnum  v.  Barnum, 
1 1 9  Mo.  63 ;  Carson  v.  Carson,  1  Met. 
(Ky.)  300  (this  case  turned  upon  a  statute 
giving  to  the  issue  of  a  legatee  dying 
before  the  testator  the  estate  willed  to 
the  legatee,  but  involves  the  same  prin- 
ciple);  Simpson  v.  Simpson,  16  111.  App. 
170,  holding  that  the  release  by  an  heir 
of  all  claim  and  right  as  such  in  favor  of 
his  co-heirs  would  be  enforced  in  equity  if 
he  survived  the  intestate,  or  as  an  exe- 
cuted contract  binding  on  his  heirs  if  not, 
but  cannot  operate  to  deprive  his  children 
of  their  right  to  inherit  if  he  die  before 
the  intestate.  To  same  effect :  Bishop  v. 
Davenport,  58  111.  105.  In  Louisiana  this 
principle  is  established  by  several  deci- 
sions:  Destrehan  v.  Destrehan,  16  Mart, 
(vol.  4,  n.  s.)  557,  578 ;  Succession  of 
Morgan,  23  La.  An.  290;  Calhoun  v. 
Crossgrove,  33  La.  An.  1001.  See  also, 
as  to  the  marital  rights  of  a   surviving 


wife    in  this    connection,   Succession 
Piffet,  39  La.  An.  556,  564. 

2  Earnest  v.  Earnest,  5  Rawle,  213, 
218;  Martin  v.  Martin,  56  Ohio  St.  333. 

3  As,  for  instance,  in  Pennsylvania  : 
McConkey  v.  McConkey,  9  Watts,  352. 
The  authorities  on  this  question,  whether 
the  issue  of  a  predeceased  legatee,  who  by 
statute  take  the  legatee's  lapsed  legacy,  are 
to  be  considered  as  taking  directly  from  the 
testator,  or  as  representing  the  deceased 
legatee,  are  not  in  entire  harmony :  see 
on  this  point  post,  §  435,  p.  *  940. 

4  Proctor  v.  Newhall,  17  Mass.  81,  93  ; 
Hancock  v.  Hubbard,  19  Pick.  167;  Dear- 
born v.  Preston,  7  Allen,  192,  195. 

6  Courtenay  v.  Williams,  3  Hare,  539, 
553,  holding  that  the  debt  should  be  de- 
ducted although  barred  by  the  Statute  of 
Limitations. 

6  See  cases  cited  post,  §  564,  where  the 
subject  of  set-off  to  legacies  and  distribu- 
tive shares  is  discussed. 

7  Post,  §  554. 

159 


**  150-152        DESCENT   AND   DISTRIBUTION    OF   PROPERTY.  §  72 

L        j  grandmothers,  uncles,  and  aunts  in  the  next  class,  to- 

pointed  out  gether  with  descendants  by  representation,  or  placing 
by  statute.  these  in  a  postponed  class,  as  the  case  may  be ; 1 
but  more  generally  *  a  mode  of  ascertaining  the  next  of  kin,  [*  151] 
in  degrees  more  remote  than  that  of  brothers  and  sisters  and 
their  descendants,  is  pointed  out,  either  by  the  statute,2  or  by  refer- 
ring to  the  rules  of  the  common8  or  the  civil  law,4  of  which  it  is 
therefore  necessary  to  take  further  notice. 

Blackstone  treats  of  consanguinity  under  two  heads,  the  lineal 
and  the  collateral.  Lineal  consanguinity  is  that  which  subsists  be- 
Lineal  and  tween  persons  of  whom  one  is  descended  in  a  direct  line 
collateral  con-  from  the  other,  as  between  the  intestate  and  his  father, 
sanguimty.  grandfather,  great-grandfather,  and  so  upward  in  the 
ascending  line;  or  between  the  intestate  and  his  son,  grandson, 
great-grandson,  and  so  downward  in  the  direct  descending  line. 
Every  generation,  either  upward  or  downward,  constitutes  a  differ- 
ent degree.  This  is  the  only  natural  way  of  reckoning  the  degrees 
in  the  direct  line,  and  is  common  to  the  civil,  canon,  and  common 
law.5  Collateral  kindred  descend  from  the  same  stock  or  ancestor, 
but  not  one  from  the  other.  The  ancestor  is  the  stirps,  or  root,  the 
stipes,  trunk  or  common  stock,  from  which  these  relations  are 
branched  out.  The  method  of  computing  the  degrees  of  collateral 
kindred  is  the  same  at  the  common  law  as  at  the  canon  law,  from 
which  it  has  been  adopted  into  the  common  law,6  and  begins  with 
the  common  ancestor,  reckoning  downward ;  in  whatever  de- 
gree the  claimant  is  distant  *  from  the  ancestor  common  to  [*  152] 
him  and  the  intestate,  that  is  the  degree  in  which  they  are 

1  So  in  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Florida,  chusetts,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Missis- 
Georgia,  Missouri,  Rhode  Island,  Texas,  sippi,  Nebraska,  Nevada,  New  Hampshire 
Virginia,  and  West  Virginia.  (Kelsey  v.  Hardy,  20  N.  H.  479,  481,  the 

2  Arkansas  (but  in  cases  not  provided  statute  being  silent),  New  Jersey  (as  held 
for  by  the  statute  the  common  law  is  to  in  Taylor  v.  Bray,  32  N.  J.  L.  182,  191, 
govern),  California,  Colorado,  Florida,  and  Schenck  v.  Vail,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  538, 
Georgia  (Wetter  v.  Habersham,  60  Ga.  542;  but  it  is  held  in  New  Jersey  that  the 
193),  Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,  rule  of  the  common  law,  that  inheritance 
Maryland,  Missouri,  New  York  (in  cases  cannot  lineally  ascend,  has  not  been  abol- 
not  provided  for  by  statute  the  inheritance  ished,  though  modified  to  the  extent  of 
is  to  descend  by  the  rules  of  the  common  letting  in  the  father  and  mother:  Taylor 
law),  Rhode  Island  (see  Pierce  v.  Pierce,  v.  Bray,  supra,  p.  186;  the  great-uncle 
14  It.  I.  514),  South  Carolina,  Tennessee,  and  cousin  of  an  intestate  are  of  equal 
Texas,  Virginia,  West  Virginia,  and  consanguinity,  and  both  inherit  equally : 
Wisconsin.                                                  .  Smith  v.  Gaines,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  297),  Ohio 

3  Arkansas  (in  cases  not  provided  for  (as  held  in  Clayton  v.  Drake,  17  Oh.  St. 
by   statute),   New    York    (same),    North  367, 371),  Oregon,  and  Vermont. 
Carolina  (as  modified  by  the  statute).  5  2  Bla.  Comm.  202,  and  authorities. 

4  In  Alabama,  Connecticut,  Delaware,  6  This  assertion  has  been  doubted :  see 
Illinois,  Indiana  (although  the  enactment  Beasley,  C.  J.,  in  Schenck  v.  Vail,  24  N. 
was  omitted  iM  late  revisions,  it  is  held  J.  Eq.  538,  5.r>(),  who  suggests  that  the 
utill  to  be  the  law  in  this  State  :  Cloud  v.  authority  vouched  by  Blackstone  does  not 
Bruce,  61    Ind.    171,    !7.'i),   Maine,  .Massa-  sustain  him  in  this  dogma. 

160 


§  72  COMPUTATION  OP  THE  NEXT  OP  KIN.     *  152,  *  153 

related.1  But  if  there  are  more  degrees  between  the  intestate  and 
the  ancestor  than  between  the  ancestor  and  the  claimant,  then  the 
degrees  are  reckoned  between  the  intestate  and  the  ancestor;  or,  in 
other  words,  in  counting  upward  from  the  intestate  to  the  ancestor, 
and  downward  from  the  ancestor  to  the  heir,  the  longer  of  these 
two  lines  indicates  the  degree  of  consanguinity. 

The  civilians  count  upward  from  the  intestate  to  the  common 
ancestor,  and  from  him  downward  to  the  heir,  reckoning  one  degree 
for  each  step  taken,  adding  the  degrees  in  the  ascend-    computat;on 
ing  line  to  those  in  the  descending  line,  and  the  sum   according  to 
indicates  the  degree  of  consanguinity  between  the  in-   x  e  C1V1  ians" 
testate  and  the  person  whose  heirship  is  to  be  established. 

The  different  results  obtained  in  adopting  either  of  these  two 
methods  of  computing  the  degrees  of  consanguinity  is  illustrated  by 
Blackstone  in  tracing  the  kinship  between  King  Richard  mU9tratjon  of 
III.  and  King  Henry  VII.  of  English  history,  their  the  difference 
common  ancestor  being  Edward  III.  From  him  (aba-  incomPuting- 
vus)  to  Edmond,  Duke  of  York,  the  pro avus  is  one  degree;  to  Rich- 
ard, Earl  of  Cambridge,  the  avus,  two;  to  Richard,  Duke  of  York, 
the  pater,  three;  to  King  Richard  III.,  the  intestate,  four;  and  from 
King  Edward  III.  to  John  of  Gant  is  one  degree;  to  John,  Earl  of 
Somerset,  two;  to  John,  Duke  of  Somerset,  three;  to  Margaret, 
Countess  of  Richmond,  four;  to  King  Henry  VII.,  five;  "which 
last-mentioned  prince,  being  the  farthest  removed  from  the  common 
stock,  gives  the  denomination  to  the  degree  of  kindred  in  the  canon 
and  municipal  law.  Though,  according  to  the  computation  of  the 
civilians,  .  .  .  these  two  princes  were  related  in  the  ninth  degree; 
for  from  King  Richard  III.  to  Richard,  Duke  of  York,  is  one  de- 
gree; to  Richard,  Earl  of  Cambridge,  two;  to  Edmond,  Duke  of 
York,  three;  to  King  Edward  III.,  the  common  ancestor,  four;  to 
John  of  Gant,  five;  to  John,  Earl  of  Somerset,  six;  to  John,  Duke 
of  Somerset,  seven;  to  Margaret,  Countess  of  Richmond,  eight;  to 
King  Henry  VII.,  nine."2 

Under  these  several  methods  of  computation  very  different  collat- 
eral relatives  are  placed  in  the  same  degree  of  propinquity;  the 
grandfather's  grandfather,  for  instance,  is  in  the  fourth  de- 
[*  153]  gree ;  *  under  the  rules  of  the  civil  law,  the  grand-uncle, 
cousin-german,  and  grand-nephew  are  equally  in  the  fourth 
degree;  while  according  to  the  canon  or  common  law,  the  great- 
grand-uncle,  the  grandfather's  cousin,  his  cousin's  son  and  grand- 
son, the  grand-uncle's  great-grandson,  the  uncle's  grandson,  and  the 
brother's  great-grandson  are  all  equally  in  the  fourth  degree.  To 
avoid  the  division  of  an  inheritance  into  unduly  small  fractions,  and 
to  simplify  the  rules  of  descent,  the  statutes  mostly  provide  that, 
where  two  or  more  of  the  same  degree  of  consanguinity  claim  as  next 

1  2  Bla.  Comrn.  206.  a  2  Bla.  Comm.  207. 

VOL.  i.  — 11  161 


*  153,  *  154       DESCENT   AND   DISTRIBUTION   OF   PROPERTY. 


§73 


tates  pass  to 
the  heirs  of  the 
blood  of  t:ie 
ancestor. 


of  kin,  those  who  trace  their  blood  through  the  nearest  lineal  ances- 
tor shall  be  preferred  to  those  whose  ancestor  is  more  remote  from 
the  intestate.1 

§  73.  Devolution  of  Ancestral  Estates.  —  It  has  already  been  no- 
ticed, in  connection  with  the  relative  rights  of  brothers  and  sisters 
Ancestral  es-  °f  the  whole  and  of  the  half  blood,2  that  some  of  the 
States  distinguish,  in  the  devolution  of  property,  be- 
tween that  which  has  been  acquired  by  the  intestate 
himself,  and  such  as  he  may  have  inherited  or  acquired 
by  gift  or  devise  from  some  ancestor  or  person  from  whom  the  estate 
is  derived.  The  inheritance  is  directed  to  pass,  in  such  cases,  to 
lineal  and  collateral  heirs  of  the  blood  of  such  ancestor,  in  Ala- 
bama,3 Arkansas,4  Connecticut,5  Indiana,6  Maryland,7  Michigan,8 
Nebraska,9  Nevada,10  New  Jersey,11  New  York,12  Ohio,13  Pennsyl- 
vania,14 Rhode  Island,15  Tennessee,16  Utah,17  and  Wisconsin,18  and 
probably  other  States. 

The  term  "  ancestor "  used  in  these  statutes  is  not  to  be  under- 
stood as  applicable  only  to  progenitors  in  the  usual  accepta- 
tion, *  but  in  its  technical  significance,  one  from  whom  an  [*  154] 
estate  came  directly  —  not  mediately  —  to  the  intestate  by 

gift,  devise,  or  descent; 19  so  that  in  this  sense  the  hus- 

the  one  from      band    maybe  his  wife's  ancestor.20     It  is  the  correla- 

whom  an  es-       tive  to  the  term  "heir,"21  the  ''commune  vinculum,"  as 

Duncan,  J.,  expressed  it,22  "whether  the  estate  ascends 

or  descends." 


1  So  in  Arkansas,  California,  Colorado, 
Delaware,  Florida,  Kentucky,  Maine, 
Maryland,  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Min- 
nesota, Missouri,  Nevada,  New  York, 
Oregon,  Rhode  Island,  Virginia,  West 
Virginia,  and  Wisconsin.  It  will  be 
noticed  that,  where  representation  is  al- 
lowed, the  same  result  is  reached  by  that 
means,  differing  only,  perhaps,  in  respect 
of  the  privity  between  the  persons  repre- 
senting and  those  represented,  which  is  an 
incident  In  representation.     See  ante,  §  71, 

and  authorities 

-  Ante,  §  70. 

'■  Code,  1896,  §  1457.  See  Stallworth 
v.  Stallworth,  29  Ala.  70,  80;  Eatnian  v. 
in,  n.3  Ala.  478. 

1  Dig  of  St.  1894,  §  2481  ;  Beard  v. 
Mosely,  30  Ark.  517,  citing  other  Arkan- 

D.  St.  1887,  §  032;  Clark's  Appeal, 
5  Conn.  'J07. 

r'  Ann.  St.  Ind.  1894,  g  2626. 
7  Pnbl  Gen.   L.  Md.,  art,  46,  §§  Set 
■e</.;  Gamer  «.  Wood,  71  Md.  37. 
162 


8  How.  St.  1882,  §  5776  a,  p.  1505. 

9  Cons.  St.  Neb.  1893,  §  1127. 

10  Gen.  St.  Nev.  1885,  §  2984. 

11  Rev.  St.  N.  J.  1895,  p.  1194,  §  5; 
Speer  v.  Miller,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  492 ;  Miller 
v.  Speer,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  567. 

12  2  Banks  &  Bro.  (1896,  9th  ed.)  pp. 
1825  et  seq. 

13  2  Bates'  Ann.  St.  1897,  §  4158; 
Stannard  v.  Case,  40  Oh.  St.  211. 

14  Pepper  &  L.  Dig.  p.  2413,  §11; 
Pirot's  Appeal,  102  Pa.  St.  235;  Henszy 
v.  Gross,  185  Pa.  St.  353. 

15  Gen.  L.  1890,  p.  734,  §  0. 
io  Code,  1884,  §3209. 

*7  Amy  v.  Amy,  12  Utah,  278,  334. 

18  Shuman  v.  Sluunan,  80  Wis.  479. 

19  Buckingham  v.  Jacques,  37  Conn. 
402,  404. 

20  Cornett  v.  Hough,  130  Ind.  387,  391. 
2i  Cent.  Diet. ;  Webster  ;  Abb.  L.  Diet. 
22  In  Bevan  v.  Taylor,  7  Serg.  &  R., 

397,  404,  (pioted    in  Lewis  v.  Gorman,  5 
Pa,  St.  104,  166. 


§  73  DEVOLUTION   OF   ANCESTRAL   ESTATES.  *  154 

From  its  nature  personal  property  cannot  always  be 
traced  back  to  an  ancestor;  hence  it  is  held,  in  the  ab-   cestrai  estate'" 
sence  of  statutory  provision  on  the  point,  that  the  rule    usually  applies 
affecting  ancestral  property  is  applicable  only  to  real 
estate.1 

It  is  also  to  be  noted,  that  the  distinction  between  the  devolution 
of  ancestral  and  other  estate  is  not  usually  construed  as  diverting 
the  descent  of  an  ancestral  inheritance  from  the  near- 
est of  kin,  but  only  from  those  not  of  the  ancestor's    estate  not 
blood  who  are  in  the  same  degree  of  kinship  with  others    diverted  from 

°  x  next  of  kin. 

who  are  of  the  ancestor's  blood.2  Thus,  if  the  statute 
classifies  the  heirs  by  designation  of  relationship,  and  not  by  com- 
putation of  degrees  of  kindred,  computation  can  be  resorted  to  only 
if  no  persons  are  found  to  answer  to  the  designation  of  the  statute.8 
And  where  a  statute  directs  ancestral  estate  of  a  descendant  who 
leaves  brothers  or  sisters  of  the  paternal  as  well  as  of  the  maternal 
side,  to  go  to  the  half  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  line  from  which 
the  estate  descended,  until  such  line  shall  be  exhausted,  the  half 
brothers  and  sisters  of  the  other  line  will  be  let  in,  if  there  be  no 
brothers  or  sisters  of  the  whole  or  half  blood  of  the  side  of  the 
parent  from  whom  the  inheritance  came,  to  the  exclusion  of  remoter 
kin  of  the  ancestor's  blood.*  On  the  same  ground,  next  of  kin  of 
the  whole  blood  of  the  intestate  take  his  ancestral  as  well  as  other 
estate  in  equal  shares,  whether  of  the  blood  of  such  ancestor  or  not, 
under  a  statute  directing  the  estate  to  pass  to  the  next  of  kin  (held 
to  mean  the  next  of  kin  of  the  intestate)  unless  the  inheritance  came 
by  descent,  devise,  or  gift  from  an  ancestor,  in  which  case  all  those 
who  are  not  of  the  blood  of  such  ancestor  must  be  excluded.8 

Another  restriction,  put  upon  those  statutes  in  a  similar  course  of 

1  Henderson  v.  Sherman,  47  Mich.  267,     ured  by  some  arbitrary  standard  or  mode 


274 ;  Jenks  v.  Trowbridge,  48  Mich.  94 
Kelly  v.  McGuire,  15  Ark.  555,  594 
Estate  of  Kirkendall,  43  Wis.  167,  175 


of  computation.  .  .  .  One's  child  is  no 
nearer  of  kin  to  him  than  his  mother, 
though  by  the  statute   he  is  two  degrees 


Shuman  v.  Shuman,  80  Wis.   479.     But  nearer  in  the  line   of  descent;    and  the 

this  rule  may  be  changed  by  statute,  as  it  same   may  be   said   of  a  grandparent  as 

is,   it   seems,   in    Connecticut :     Clarke's  compared   with  a  brother  or  sister.  .  .  . 

Appeal,  58  Conn.  207    (followed,  as  an-  It  is  only  when  all  the  preferred  classes 

nouncing    the    law    of    Connecticut,    in  fail   that   a    computation   of    degrees   of 

Welles's  Estate,  161  Pa.  St.  218, 224)  ;  see  kindred  becomes  necessary." 
also  Rountree   v.  Pursell,   1 1   Ind.  App.         4  Nesbit  v.  Bryan,  1  Swan,  468  ;  Chaney 

522,  544.  v.  Barker,  3  Baxt.  424. 

2  Ryan  v.  Andrews,  21  Mich.  229,  234.  6  In  re  Pearsons,  110  Cal.  524.  The 
8  "It  is  obvious,"  says  Cooley,  J.,  in  property  in  this  case  came  from  the 
Rowley  v.  Stray,  32  Mich.  70,  74,  "  that  intestate's  mother,  and  was  divided 
when  under  the  statute  an  estate  passes  to  among  the  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  in- 
designated  relatives,  it  does  so  because  of  testate's  mother  and  the  sisters  of  the 
the  particular  relationship,  and  not  because  intestate's  father.  To  the  same  effect ' 
the  persons  who  take  are  of  kin  to  the  in-  Robertson  v.  Burrell,  40  Ind.  328. 
testate  within  any  certain  degree,  meas- 


*  154,  *  155 


DESCENT   AND    DISTRIBUTION    OF   PROPERTY. 


§74 


reasoning  confines  their  application  to  estates  descended,  from  the 
immediate  ancestor  of   the  intestate,   unless  something 
in  the  language  or  context  conditions  a  reference  to  one 
more   remote.1     The    rule   is   the   same   in   respect   of 
property  devised  2  or   given.3     The  course  of  descent, 
in  determining  whether  an  estate  is  ancestral  or  not,  is 
controlled  by  the  legal  title,4  that  title  under  which  the 
intestate  immediately  held,5  and  the  statutes  are  to  be 
construed  upon  legal  rather  than  equitable  principles.6 
§  74.    Posthumous  Children.  —  Posthumous  children,  born  within 
the  usual  period  of  gestation  after  the  death  of  the  intestate,  are 
entitled  to  inherit  from  an  intestate  father  in  the  same 
manner  as  if  they  were  born  during   his  lifetime  and 
had  survived  him.7     This  rule  is  said  to  be   the  same 
under  the  common   and  the  civil  law,8  and  is 
*  based  upon  the  principle  that  a  child  in  ventre  [*  155] 
sa  mere  is  in  rerum  natura,  as  much  so  as  if  born  in  the 
father's  lifetime,9  and  is  so  considered  for  all  purposes  which  are 
for  his  benefit.10     But  while  the  rule  is  recognized  in  all  the  States 
in  favor  of  the  intestate's  own  children,  being  affirma- 
tively enacted  by  statute  in  most  of  them,11  it  is  in  some 
of  them  limited  to  the  intestate's  children,  and  no  other 
persons  not  in  being  before  the  intestate's  death  are 
allowed  to  participate  in  his  estate  by  inheritance.12 
The  ordinary  period  of  gestation  is  fixed  by  medical  writers  at  ten 


Ancestral 
estate  is  only 
such  as  came 
to  the  intestate 
from  an  imme- 
diate ancestor 

under  a  legal 
title. 


Posthumous 
children  in- 
herit equally 
with  other 
children. 


This  rule  is 
confined,  in 
some  States,  to 
the  intestate's 
own  children. 


1  Gardner  v.  Collins,  2  Pet.  58,  91,  94  ; 
Clark  v.  Shailer,  46  Conn.  119,  121  ;  Cur- 
ren  v.  Taylor,  19  Ohio,  36;  Morris  v. 
Potter,  10  R.  I.  58,  70 ;  Wheeler  v.  Clut- 
terbuck,  52  N.  Y.  67,  70;  Amy  v.  Amy,  12 
Utah,  278,  335,  with  authorities  pro  and 
con. 

2  West  v.  Williams,  15  Ark.  682,  693  ; 
White  v.  White,  19  Oh.  St.  531. 

3  Oliver  v.  Vance,  34  Ark.  564,  568  ; 
Brewster  v.  Benedict,   14  Ohio,  368,  385. 

4  Patterson  v.  Lamson,  45  Oh.  St.  77 ; 
Shepard  v.  Taylor,  15  R.  I.  204;  s.  c.  16 
R.  I.  166,  178. 

6  Brower  v.  Hunt,  18  Oh.  St.  311,342. 
8  Armington     v.    Armington,   28    Ind. 

74,  76;  Patterson  v.  Lamson,  supra. 

7  i  Kent  Comm,  412,  adding  that  such 

is  the  universal  rule  in  this  country.  But 
the  role  Jh  universal  only  as  stated  in  the 
text;  namely,  between  the  intestate  and 
his  own  children.  See  infra,  as  to  the 
States  distinguishing  between  the  intes- 
tate's children  and  other  heirs. 
164 


8  1  Bla.  Comm.  130,  quoting  the  civil- 
law  maxim,  Qui  in  utero  sunt,  in  jure  civih 
intelliguntur  in  rerum  natura  esse,  cum  de 
eorum  commodo  agatur. 

9  Wallis  v.  Hodson,  2  Atk.  116;  Mor- 
row v.  Scott,  7  Ga.  535,  537;  Hill  v. 
Moore,  1  Murph.  233,  251. 

1°  Doe  v.  Clarke,  2  H.  Blackst.  399, 401 ; 
Hall  v.  Hancock,  15  Pick.  255,  258;  Mor- 
row v.  Scott,  7  Ga.  535. 

11  In  California,  Delaware,  Georgia, 
Illinois,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Louisiana, 
Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Ne- 
braska, New  Jersey,  New  York,  North 
Carolina,  Oregon,  Pennsylvania,  Virginia, 
West  Virginia,  and  Wisconsin. 

12  Shriver  v.  State,  65  Md.  278,  283.  In 
Alabama,  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Florida, 
Missouri,  Ohio,  Rhode  Island,  Texas,  and 
perhaps  other  States,  the  statute  expressly 
inhibits  inheritance  by  posthumous  chil- 
dren other  than  those  of  the  intestate. 


§  15  ILLEGITIMATE   CHILDREN.  *  155,  *  156 

lunar   months;   but  there  are  many  well-authenticated 
cases  in  which  it  was  extended  much  longer.1     It  is  in   the  ordinary 
some  States  fixed  by  statute  at  ten  months,  during  which    Per>d  of  ees- 
the  legitimacy  of  the  issue  is  presumed. 

Questions  sometimes  arise  in  respect  of  the  validity  of  the  dispo- 
sition of  property  in  which  a  child  is  interested,  after  the  father's 
death  and  before  its  birth.     It  is  held  that  a  disposition 
made  of  the  property  for  its  preservation  or  protection    ^op^ty'after 
will  be  binding  upon  the  child,  although  it  was  not  rep-   father's  death 

l    i    •      i-v.  i  ■  £        j_i  ■  -l  and  before 

resented  in  the  proceeding  tor  the  conversion,  because  ^irtll  0f  c^u, 
the  posthumous  child  did  not  possess,  until  born*  any 
such  estate  in  the  property  as  could  affect  the  power  of  the  court 
to  convert  it  if  necessary.2  Parties  in  being,  possessing  an  estate  of 
inheritance,  are  regarded  as  so  far  representing  all  persons  who,  be- 
ing afterward  born,  may  have  interests  in  the  same,  that  a  decree 
binding  them  will  also  bind  the  after-born  parties ; 3  and  that  a  court 
of  equity  may  bar,  by  its  decree  for  sale,  the  interest  of  unborn 
contingent  remaindermen,  who,  of  course,  could  not  be  made  par- 
ties.4 But  a  sale  of  the  real  estate  before  the  birth  of  a 
[*  156]  *  posthumous  child  does  not  deprive  it  of  its  interest  in  such 
land.5  In  a  number  of  States  the  statute  provides  that 
"  posthumous  children  are  considered  as  living  at  the  death  of  their 
parents."* 

§  75.    Illegitimate  Children.  —  According  to  the   common  law  an 
illegitimate  child  is  filius  nullius,  and  can  have  no  father  known  to 
the  law ; 7  he  has  no  inheritable  blood,  and  can  therefore 
be  the  heir  to  neither  his  putative  father  nor  mother,    II'.efflt>mate 

-,  ,  ,  ,     .  child  has  no 

nor  any  one  else,  and  can  have  no  heir  but  of  his  own    inheritable 
body.8    The  rigor,  not  to  say  cruelty  of  the  civil  law,    J[~dlaa^ora- 
which  denied  even  maintenance  to  the  fruit  of  incestu- 
ous intercourse,9  and  of  the  common  law,  allowing  a  bastard  no 

1  Wharton  &  Stille  Md.  Jurispr.,  §§  41  from    Blackstone:    "And    really,"    says 

et  seq.  Blackstone,  with  warmth,  as  if  to  atone 

a  Rnotts  v.  Stearns,  91  U.  S.  638.  for  a  long  and  fallacious  argument  against 

8  lb.,  referring  to  the  case  of  Faulkner  legitimation    hy     subsequent     marriage, 

v.  Davis,  18  Gratt.  651.  "any  other  distinction   but   that  of  not 

4  Bofil  v.  Fisher,  3  Rich.  Eq.  1.  As  to  inheriting,  which  civil  policy  renders 
the  doctrine  of  representation  of  persons  necessary,  would,  with  regard  to  the  inno- 
not  in  esse  by  living  parties  in  interest,  cent  offspring  of  his  parents'  crimes,  be 
see  Woerner  on  Guardianship,  §  75,  p.  odious,  unjust,  and  cruel  to  the  last 
249.  degree  ;  "  and  then  adds  :  "  And  so  might 

5  Pearson  v.  Carlton,  18  S.  C.  47.  the    commentator    of    the  commentaries 

6  Catholic  Association  v.  Firnane,  50  stigmatize  the  efforts  of  those  who  have 
Mich.  82,  85.  nothing   better  to   urge    against   human 

7  Taney,  Ch.  J.,  in  Brewer  u.Blougher,  rights  than  the  importance  of  preserving 
14  Pet.  178,  198.  the  symmetry  of  the  law  unimpaired." 

8  1  Bla.  Comm.  459 ;  2  Kent  Comm.  9  1  Bla.  Comm.  458. 
212;  Schoul.   Dom.   Rel.  §  277,  quoting 

165 


156,  *  157       DESCENT    AND    DISTRIBUTION    OF    PROPERTY. 


§75 


rights  but  such  as  he  himself  acquires,1  and  renders 
of  this  ride7  legitimation  impossible,  although  the  parents  marry 
relaxed  in  the     after    birth,2  has   been   much   relaxed    in   the   several 

States  of  the   Union.3     Thus  they  are  almost  univer- 
sally allowed  to  inherit   from  the  mother  and  through  the 
mother;4  and  in  Connecticut,  where  the  *  statute  gives  the  [*  157} 
estate  to  the  "children"  of  an  intestate,  without  in  any  way 
qualifying  the  word,  it  has  been  held  that  illegitimate  children  were 

thereby  included.5  In  some  of  the  States  the  illegiti- 
inherit  if  mate  offspring  may  also  be  enabled  to  inherit  from  the 

acknowledged    father,  if  the  latter  acknowledge  him  in  writing  in  the 

presence  of  a  competent  witness;6  and  the  subsequent 


1  Even  his  name  must  be  acquired  by 
reputation  :  Co.  Litt.  3. 

2  1  Bl.  Comm.  454. 

3  Woerner  on  Guardianship,  §  12. 

4  So  by  positive  enactment  in  Ala- 
bama, Arkansas,  California,  Florida, 
Georgia,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Kansas, 
Kentucky,  Maine,  Maryland,  Massachu- 
setts, Michigan,  Minnesota,  Missouri, 
Mississippi,  Nebraska,  Nevada,  New 
Hampshire,  New  Jersey  (if  she  leave  no 
lawful  issue),  New  York  (in  default  of 
legitimate  issue),  North  Carolina  (if  no 
legitimate  issue,  and  cannot  represent  the 
mother),  Ohio,  Oregon  (but  does  not  rep- 
resent the  mother),  Pennsylvania,  Rhode 
Island,  Tennessee,  Texas,  Vermont,  Vir- 
ginia, West  Virginia,  and  Wisconsin. 

In  Massachusetts  the  law  constituting 
illegitimate  children  heirs  of  the  mother 
and  of  any  "  maternal  ancestor  "is  strictly 
construed;  the  term  "ancestor"  is  con- 
strued to  mean  progenitor,  and  it  is  con- 
sequently held  that  neither  a  bastard  nor 
his  issue  can  take  from  the  mother's  col- 
lateral kindred:  Pratt  v.  Atwood,  108 
Mass.  40 ;  nor  they  through  her :  Haraden 
v.  Larrabee,  113  Mass.  430,  432.  In 
Rhode  Island  illegitimates  are  put  upon 
the  same  footing  with  legitimates  as  to 
the  mother:  Briggs  t*.  Greene,  10  R.  I. 
405.  497.  To  same  effect:  Burlington 
v.  I'osl.y,  6  Yt.  83,  88;  Garland  v.  Harri- 
son, 8  Leigh,  308,370;  Bales  v.  Elder,  118 
111.  430;  .Jenkins  v.  Drane,  121  111.  217.  — 
In  Illinois  the  statute  confers  upon  illegi- 
timates and  their  lawful  issue  inheritable 
blood,  as  respects  the  mother  and  any 
maternal  ancestor,  or  other  person  from 
whom  the  mother  might  inherit  if  living: 
J  li.  r  v.  P.ales,  1^7  111.  425.  In  Kentucky 
ICG 


it  is  held  that  the  lawful  children  of  a 
deceased  bastard  inherit  from  the  bastard 
brother  of  such  parent  by  the  same 
mother,  although  such  bastard  brother 
died  before  the  death  of  the  parent : 
Sutton  v.  Sutton,  87  Ky.  216.  The 
mother  being  dead,  her  collateral  kindred 
cannot  inherit  from  the  bastard :  Croan 
v.  Phelps,  94  Ky.  213,  holding  that  the 
widow  takes  all  in  such  case.  A  bastard 
is  incapable  of  inheriting  from  or  trans- 
mitting to  a  legitimate  child  of  his  putative 
father :  Blankenship  v.  Ross,  95  Ky.  306 
(holding  the  mother  and  bastard  brother  to 
be  sole  heirs,  though  the  estate  was  devised 
by  devise  from  the  putative's  father,  and 
the  deceased  died  an  infant).  In  Florida 
bastards  are  legitimate  only  so  far  as  the 
mother  is  concerned ;  they  cannot  inherit 
from  collateral  kindred  upon  the  mother's 
side:  Williams  v.  Kimball,  35  Fla.  49.  In 
Maine  in  certain  circumstances  the  bastard 
may  inherit  from  the  lineal  or  collateral 
kindred  of  father  or  mother  (since  1887): 
Misser  v.  Jones,  88  Me.  349. 

6  Heath  v.  White,  5  Conn.  228,  232 ; 
Dickinson's  Appeal,  42  Conn.  491,  504,  et 
seq.,  holding  that  bastards  have  inheritable 
blood  to  transfer  collaterally  as  well  as 
lineally  ;  Brown  v.  Dye,  2  Root,  280,  de- 
ciding that  illegitimate  children  of  the 
same  mother  may  inherit  from  each  other. 
But  the  word  "  children  "  in  the  statute  of 
Illinois  was  held  to  mean  lawful  children, 
and  not  to  do  away  with  the  common-law 
rule,  according  to  which  illegitimate  chil- 
dren cannot  inherit :  Blacklaws  v.  Milne, 
82  111.  505  ;  Orthwein  v.  Thomas,  127  111. 
554.  See,  however,  Rogers  v.  Weller,  & 
Bias.  166,168,  170. 

6  So  provided  in  California,  Iowa  (if 


75 


ILLEGITIMATE    CHILDREN. 


157,  *  158 


marriage  of  the  parents  legitimates  their  issue,  if  acknowledged  by 
the  father,  in  nearly  all  the  States,  cancelling  all  dis-  Marria  of 
tinction  between  such  children  and  those  begotten  and  parents  legiti- 
born  in  lawful  wedlock.1  If  an  illegitimate  child  is  mates  bastard- 
once  legitimated  by  the  subsequent  marriage  of  the  parents  in  a 
State  whose  laws  attach  such  effect  to  such  marriage,  the  legitimacy 
follows  the  child  everywhere,  and  entitles  him  to  the  right  of 
inheritance.2 

In  some  of  the  States,   illegitimate  children  take  as  heirs  from 
father  or  mother,  if  there  are  no  other  heirs  capable  of 
taking,   so  that  they  exclude  the   State  only.8 
[*  158]  The  *  word  "heirs  "  in  such  case  is  not  confined 

to  children;  it  includes  all  who  may  inherit  under  the  law.4 

It  is  also  to  be  observed,  that  in  some  States  the  issue  of  mar- 
riages which  are  null  in  law  are  in  every  respect  legitimate,  and 
inherit  and  transmit  by  descent  as  if  born  in  lawful  wedlock.5 


Inherit  in  de- 
fault of  other 
heirs. 


the  paternity  be  notoriously  acknowledged, 
or  acknowledged  in  writing,  or  proved 
during  the  intestate's  lifetime :  as  to  evi- 
dence sufficient  to  establish  notorious 
recognition,  see  Blair  v.  Howell,  68  Iowa, 
619),  Maine,  Michigan  (the  acknowledg- 
ment must  be  recorded  like  a  deed),  Min- 
nesota, Nebraska,  Nevada,  Tennessee, 
Vermont,  and  Wisconsin. 

The  statute  of  Vermont,  legitimating 
a  bastard  adopted  by  the  putative  father 
''  as  respects  the  father,"  is  held  not  to 
enable  such  bastard  to  inherit  by  repre- 
senting him :  Safford  v.  Houghton,  48 
Vt.  236,  238.  In  Iowa  the  acknowledg- 
ment need  not  be  by  formal  avowal,  it 
may  be  by  letters  recognizing  him  as  a 
child  :  Crane  v.  Crane,  31  Iowa,  296,  303  ; 
and  so  in  California :  Blythe  v.  Ayres, 
96  Cal.  532  (holding  that  the  statute  re- 
quiring acknowledgment  in  writing,  in 
presence  of  a  competent  witness,  was  com- 
plied with  by  letters  written  in  the  pres- 
ence of  a  competent  witness,  who  does  not 
sign  as  an  attesting  witness) :  582  ;  and  in 
Iowa  the  birth  of  an  illegitimate  child 
after  making  a  will,  if  acknowledged  by 
the  father  revokes  such  will :  Milburn  v. 
Milburn,  60  Iowa,  411.  A  bastard  duly 
legitimized  inherits  not  only  lineally  but 
also  collaterally  :  McKamie  v.  Basker- 
ville,  7  S.  W.  K.  (Tenn.)  194. 

1  In  Indiana,  if  a  man  marries  a 
woman,  although  he  then  denies  that  a 
child,  with  which  she  is  pregnant,  is  his 
own,  as   charged  by  her,  and  afterward 


cohabit  with  her,  the  child  is  nevertheless 
his  legitimate  heir:  Bailey  v  Boyd,  59 
Ind.  292,  298.  See  also  Blythe  v.  Ayres, 
96  Cal.  522,  holding  a  child  legitimated 
by  the  law  of  California,  where  the  father 
was  domiciled,  though  neither  the  child 
nor  its  mother  had  ever  been  in  the 
United  States  until  after  the  father's 
decease.  In  Kentucky  it  is  held  that 
the  statute  does  not  apply,  where  a  mar- 
ried man  has  children  by  a  woman  not 
his  wife,  and  afterwards  marries  her,  the 
first  marriage  tie  having  been  severed: 
Sams  v.  Sams,  85#Ky.  396. 

2  Miller  v.  Miller,  91  N.  Y.  315;  Smith 
v.  Kelly,  23  Miss.  167;  Scott  v.  Key,  11 
La.  An.  232;  Ross  v.  Ross,  129  Mass. 
243 ;  Van  Voorhis  v.  Brintnall,  86  N.  Y. 
18;  Goodman's  Trust,  L.  R.  17  Ch.  Div. 
266.  But  see  Lingen  v.  Lingen,  45  Ala. 
410.  Also  Woerner  on  Guardianship, 
§  12. 

8  As  in  Indiana,  where  an  illegitimate 
child  inherits  from  and  through  the 
mother  as  if  born  in  lawful  wedlock : 
Parks  v.  Kimes,  100  Ind.  148,  153;  and 
from  the  father  in  default  of  legitimate 
children,  if  there  be  no  heirs  within  the 
United  States  capable  of  taking  ;  Louisi- 
ana, where  natural  children  take  in 
default  of  lawful  descendants,  ascendants, 
collateral  kindred,  and  husband  or  wife. 

4  Borroughs  v.  Adams,  78  Ind.  160. 

5  Green  v.  Green,  126  Mo.  17;  Dyer 
v.  Brannock,  66  Mo.  391,  418;  Harris  v. 
Harris,  85  Ky.  49  ;  and  this  although  the 

167 


*  158,  *  159      DESCENT    AND    DISTRIBUTION    OF   PROPERTY.  §  75 

In  States  recognizing  neither  lawful  marriages  nor  property  rights 
in  slaves,  the  laws  of  descent  did  not,  of  course,  apply  to  them. 
A  statute  passed  after  their  emancipation,  declaring 
Legitimacy  of  ^^  chiiciren  0f  colored  parents  born  before  a  day  named 
of  persons  living  together  as  man  and  wife  should  be 
legitimate  children,  with  all  the  rights  of  heirs  at  law  and  next  of 
kin  with  respect  to  the  estate  of  such  parents,  was  held,  in  North 
Carolina,  as  entitling  them  to  inherit  from  such  parents  only,  but 
not  from  any  other  person.1  So  in  Florida,  where  the  slave  marriage 
terminated  before,  or  was  never  recognized  by  the  parties  after,  they 
became  free  persons,  the  offspring  thereof  have  no  inheritable  blood, 
and  they  can  inherit  no  property  acquired  by  their  ancestors  after 
emancipation.2  And  in  Tennessee  the  right  of  direct  inheritance 
only,  and  not  the  right  of  collateral  inheritance,  is  conferred  by  such 
an  act.8 

Upon  the  death  of  a  bastard  intestate,  his  descendants  take  as  if 
he  were  legitimate.  In  most  States  his  mother,  in  default  of  de- 
scendants, and  those  tracing  kinship  through  her,  in- 
descendants  herit  from  him.4  Where  the  statute  declares  that  ille- 
inherit  from  gitimate  children  shall  be  deemed  legitimate  as  between 
themselves  and  their  representatives,  and  that  their 
estates  shall  descend  accordingly  in  the  same  manner  as  if  they  had 
been  born  in  wedlock,  and,  in  case  of  death  without  issue,  to  such 
person  as  would  inherit  if  all  such  children  were  born  in  wedlock, 
it  is  held  that  the  estate  of  such  illegitimate  dying  intestate  without 
issue  shall  descend  to  his  or  her  brothers  and  sisters  born  of  the 
body  of  the  same  mother,  and  their  representatives,  whether  legiti- 
mate or  illegitimate.5 

In  Illinois,  by  act  of  April  9,  1872,  "in  case  of  the  death  of  an 
illegitimate  intestate  leaving  no  child  or  descendant  of  a  child,  the 
whole  estate,  personal  and  real,  shall  descend  to  and  absolutely  vest 
in  the  widow  or  surviving  husband."6  The  widow  might,  under 
the   administration   law,  renounce  the  will,  and  take  as  if 

*  the  husband  had  died  intestate.7     Under  these  statutes  it  [*  159] 
was  held  that  the  widow  of  an  illegitimate  testator,  renounc- 
ing the  will,  took  the  testator's  entire  estate,  thus  putting  it  in  her 
power  to  render  her  husband's  will  nugatory.8 

marriage  was  contracted  elsewhere :  Leon-  Island,   Tennessee,    Vermont,    Virginia, 

ard  v.  Broewell,  99  Ky.  528.  West     Virginia,     and      Wisconsin,    and 

1  Tucker  v.  Bellamy,  98  N.  C.  31.  probably  other  States. 

»  Williams  v.  Kimball,  35  Fla.  49.  5  Powers  v.  Kite,  83  N.  C.  156,  citing 

8  Shepherd  v.  Carlin,  99  Tenn.  64.  former   North    Carolina  cases.      See,    to 

4  So  in  Alabama,  Arkansas,  California,  similar  effect,  Southgaten.  Annan,  31  Md. 

Colorado,    Florida,    Georgia,   Illinois,   In-  113,115;  Estate  of  Magee,  63  Cal.  414. 

diana,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Maryland,  n  Pub.  L.  111.  1871-72,  p.  353,  §  2,  pi.  3. 

Ma  lachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,  Mis-  "  Pub.  L.  111.  1871-72,  p.  97,  §  78  (since 

■issippi,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  Nevada,  Now  repealed). 

Hampshire,  North  Carolina,  Ohio,  Rhode  8  Evans  v.   Price,   118  111.   593.     This 
168 


§  76  DESCENT   FROM,    TO,    OR   THROUGH   ALIENS.  *  159 

§  76.  Descent  from,  to,  or  through  Aliens.  —  It  is  evident  that  the 
descent  of  real  estate  from,  to,  or  through  aliens  is  affected  by  the 
question  of  alienism  to  the  extent  only  in  which  an  alien  is  capable 
or  incapable  of  owning  real  estate  under  the  law  of  the  country  or 
State  in  which  it  is  situated.  It  is  mentioned,  in  connection  with 
the  testamentary  capacity  of  aliens,1  that  public  policy  requires  that 
no  alien,  whether  friend  or  enemy,  shall  have  title  to  lands  as 
against  the  sovereignty ;  though,  at  the  common  law,  an  alien  may 
acquire  by  purchase  (including  devise),  and  even  bring  an  action  for 
lands,  and  hold  them,  until  the  government,  on  principles  of  policy, 
interfere  and,  by  office  found,  deprive  him  of  his  title,2  or  until  his 
death,  when,  as  an  alien  can  have  no  heirs,  it  escheats.8  The  com- 
mon-law incompetency  of  aliens  to  transmit  real  estate  by  descent  is 
fatal  to  the  title  of  any  one  who  claims  by  descent  through  an  ances- 
tor who  was  an  alien,  no  matter  how  remote.  The  statute  of  Wil- 
liam III.,4  which  is  in  force  in  several  of  the  United  States,  enacted 
to  cure  this  disability,  did  not  go  to  the  extent  of  enabling  title  to 
be  deduced  by  descent  from  a  remote  through  an  alien  ancestor  still 
living.6  It  is  said  to  be  a  well-settled  principle  of  the  common 
law,  however,  though  militating  against  the  view  of  Lord  Coke,  that 
the  descent  between  brothers,  or  between  brother  and  sister,  is  im- 
mediate, and  that  the  alienage  of  the  father  does  not  impede  the 
descent  between  his  children;6  but  that  a  grandson  cannot  inherit 
to  his  grandfather,  though  both  were  natural-born  subjects,  if  the 
intermediate  son  was  an  alien ;  a  distinction  in  the  law,  which,  says 
Kent,  "would  admit  one  brother  to  succeed  as  heir  to  the  other, 
though  their  father  be  an  alien,  and  yet  not  admit  a  son  to  inherit 
from  his  grandfather,  because  his  father  was  an  alien,  is  very 
subtle."7 

The  doctrine  announced  in  the  case  of  Collingwood  v.  Pace,8  is 
generally  followed  in  the  United  States,  so  far  as  it  is  not  controlled 
by  statute,  to  the  extent  of  declaring  descent  from  a  brother  to  be 
immediate,  not   depending  on  the  fact  whether  the  parents  at  the 

construction  was  denied  by  the  minority  6  Qn  the  ground  maintained  by  Lord 

of  the  court  (the  judges  stauding  four  to  Hale,  in   Collingwood  v.  Pace,  that   the 

three),  on  the  ground  among  others,  that  father,  although  a  medium  differens  sangui- 

it  involves  an  unwarrantable  exercise  of  nis,  is  not  a  medium  differens  hcereditatis, 

power  by  the  legislature,  and  is  therefore  and  that  alienism  in  the  latter  line  only 

obnoxious  to  the   constitution:  Evans  v.  impedes   the   descent:  per   Pratt.   J.,   in 

Price,  dissenting  opinion,  1 18  111.  663.  McGregor  v.  Comstock,  3  N.  Y.  408,  411 ; 

1  Ante,  §  19.  Luhrs  v.  Eimer,  80  N.  Y.  171,  179.     Kent, 

2  2  Kent,  53 ;  Jackson  v.  Lunn,  3  Johns,  in  his  Commentaries,  says  that  Lord 
Cas.  109,112;  Johnson  v.  Hart,  3  Johns.  Hale's  opinion  is  rendered  "somewhat 
Cas.  322,  325.  perplexing  and   obscure  by  the  subtlety 

3  As  to  escheat,  see  post,  §§  131  et  seq.  of  his  distinctions  and  the  very  artificial 

4  11  &  12  Wm.  III.  c.  6.  texture  of  his  argument":  2  Kent,  55. 

5  McCreery  v.   Somerville,   9   Wheat.  7  2  Kent,  55,  56. 
354,  355.                                                                      8  i  vent.  413. 

169 


159 


DESCENT    AND    DISTRIBUTION    OP    PROPERTY. 


§76 


time  of  their  decease  were  capable  of  holding  or  transmitting  the 
estate  or  not,  because  the  estate  was  not  vested  in  them; 1  it  is  even, 
in  some  cases,  carried  to  its  logical  result  and  applied  wherever  the 
heir  is  entitled  under  the  statute  in  virtue  of  his  own  kinship  to  the 
decedent,  in  which  case  the  parent  or  other  intermediate  ances- 
tor might  be  a  necessary  link  to  establish  the  consanguinity,  — the 
medium  differens  sanguinis  suggested  by  Lord  Hale,  whose  status  as 
alien  or  citizen  is  entirely  indifferent  to  the  title  of  the  heir,  — con- 
trasted with  the  claim  of  one  dependent  upon  representation  of  some 
ancestor  —  medium  differens  hcereditatis  —  whose  incapacity  would 
be  fatal  to  the  claimant's  title.2  In  some  cases,  however,  descent 
between  cousins  and  more  remote  kindred  is  held  to  be  mediate,  and 
the  alienism  of  an  intermediate  ancestor  to  impede  the  course  of 
descent.3 

The  fluctuations  of  the  law,  giving  place  both  in  England  and 
America  to  a  more  liberal  policy  in  respect  of  the  rights  of  aliens 
to  acquire,  hold,  and  transmit  property,  and  subsequently  undergo- 
ing a  reaction  in  the  United  States  in  the  direction  of  restricting 
such  rights  has  been  discussed  in  treating  of  the  testamentary 
capacity  of  aliens,  to  which  the  reader  is  referred,  to  avoid  unneces- 
sary repetition.4  But  it  is  still  the  law,  in  the  greater  number  of 
the  States  at  least,  that  alienism  constitutes  no  absolute  bar  to  the 
right  of  inheritance,  nor  is  the  alienism  of  an  ancestor  allowed  to 
impair  the  title  of  a  claimant  to  real  estate,5  though  recent  legisla- 
tion in  some  of  them  tends  to  the  restoration  of  the  common-law 
rule.6 


1  Wilcke  v.  Wilcke,  102  Iowa,  173; 
McGregor  v.  Comstock,  3  N.  Y.  408; 
Luhrs  v.  Eimer,  80  N.  Y.  171,  179. 

2  Lash  v.  Lash,  57  Iowa,  88  ;  McGregor 
v.  Comstock,  supra ;  Luhrs  v.  Eimer,  supra. 

8  Jackson  v.  Green,  7  Wend.  333  (hefore 
the  incorporation  of  the  statute  of  Wm. 
III.,  into  the  New  York  law  of  descent) ; 
Beavan  v.  Went,  155  111.  592,  600,  holding 
that   a  citizen    cannot    inherit   from    or 


through  an  alien ;  Levy  v.  McCartee,  6  Pet. 
102  ;  Furenes  v.  Mickelson,  86  Iowa,  508. 

4  Ante,  §  19. 

5  Campbell's  Appeal,  64  Conn.  277, 
292,  holdiug  that  the  common-law  rule  of 
excluding  from  the  inheritance  all  who 
trace  their  descent  through  uninheritable 
blood  was  never  in  force  in  Connecticut. 

6  Beavan  v.  Went,  155  111.  592,  602, 
two  judges  dissenting. 


170 


§  77     NATURE  AND  OFFICE  OF  STATUTORY  ALLOWANCES.     *  160,  *  161 


[*160]  *  CHAPTER   IX. 

PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OF   THE   FAMILY. 

§  77.    Nature   and    Office  of    Statutory  Allowances    for    the    Pro- 
visional Support  of  the  Family.  —  It  has  already  been  noticed  that 
the   power  of  testamentary  disposition   is   limited,  in    param0unt 
some  respects,  by  the  policy  of  the  law, *  which  places    r'ght  of  sur- 
certain  rights  beyond  the  caprice  of  a  testator.     One  of   toTemporarV 
these  is  the  right  of  the  surviving  members  of  his  family    alimony, 
to  the  necessary  means  of  subsistence,  raiment,  and  shelter  during 
the  period  immediately  succeeding  his  death,  which  the  law  enforces 
not   only   against   any   inconsistent,    testamentary   disposition,    but 
equally  against  creditors,  heirs,  and  distributees,  whose  rights,  like 
those  of  legatees,  are  controlled  by  and  postponed  to  the  provisions 
made  for  the  surviving  family  in  this  respect. 

These   provisions,    like    the   kindred   subject  of  the    homestead 
exemption  laws,  are  of  purely  American  origin.     They  owe  their 
existence  to  a  humane  and  benevolent  consideration  of   Protection  of 
the  distress  and  helplessness  of   widows  and   orphans    the  Family  a 

r  *  necessity  ot 

newly  bereft  of  their  protector  and  supporter,  and  to  a  the  State, 
wise  public  policy,  recognizing  the  true  relation  of  the  State  to  the 
Family  as  its  organic,  constituent  element.  "The  protection  of  the 
Family,"  says  Thompson  in  his  valuable  work  on  Homesteads  and 
Exemptions,  "  from  dependence  and  want  is  the  expressed  object  of 
nearly  all  the  homestead  and  exemption  laws;  the  immunities 
enacted  by  these  statutes  are  extended  to  this  association  of  persons, 
or  to  the  head  thereof,  for  the  benefit  of  all  its  members."  2  "The 
relation  of  husband  and  wife,  parent  and  child,  is  the  unit  of  civili- 
zation, and  the  State  has  thought  to  encourage  that  relation  by  pro- 
tecting it  from  absolute  want,  arising  from  the  vicissitudes  of 
life."3 

The  common   law  secures   to  the  widow  her   dower,  and  to  the 
widow  and  children  their  pars  ratwnabUis  (corresponding  to 
[*  1611  *  dower  and  distribution  under  American  stat-    XT       u 

*•  J  .  JNo  such  pro- 

utes),    but   no   provision   whatever    is    therein    vision  at  com- 
found  to  meet  the  exigencies  arising  immediately  upon   mon  law' 
the  death  of  the  head  of  a  family,  save,  perhaps,  the  clause   in 

1  ^»<e,  §§  6  et  seq.;  §  17.  3  Bond,  J.,  In  re  Lambson,  2  Hughes 

a  Thomp.  Homest.  &  Ex.,  §  40.  233. 

171 


*  161,  *  162      PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OF   THE   FAMILY.  §  77 

Magna  Charta  securing  to  the  widow  the  right  to  remain  in  her 
husband's  capital  mansion  for  forty  days  after  his  death,  within 
which  time  her  dower  was  to  be  assigned.1  These  rights  are  secured 
to  the  widow  to  an  equal  extent  in  all  the  States,  aside  from  the 
subject  now  under  consideration,  and  in  addition  to  the  exemption 
from  execution  of  certain  property  necessary  to  the  family  during 
the  lifetime  of  the  husband,  and  which  are  in  many  instances  con- 
tinued in  favor  of  the  widow  or  minor  children  upon  his  death.2 

These  provisions  for  the  protection  of  the  family  constitute  no 
gift  to  the  widow  to  repair  any  seeming  injustice  in  the  Statute  oi 
Temporary  Distribution  or  the  will  of  her  husband,  but  are  in- 
protection  to       tended   to  furnish  to  her  and  her  minor  children   the 

surviving 

family.  means  of  temporary  maintenance  out  of  the  estate  of 

the  deceased  husband  until  their  interest  therein  can  be  set  out 
to  them,8  not  only  protecting  so  much  against  the  claims  of 
creditors,4  but  also  against  the  heirs,  or  distributees,  legatees,  and 
personal  representatives.  Depending  wholly  upon  the  enactments 
Varying  in  of  the  several  legislatures,  they  vary  greatly,  not  only 
arTofmethod  of  m  magnitude,  but  also  as  to  the  mode  in  which  this 
application.  bounty  is  secured  to  them;  intended,  in  some  cases, 
"  merely  to  furnish  the  family  with  a  reasonable  maintenance  for  a 
few  weeks,  and  with  some  articles  of  necessary  furniture  when  not 
otherwise  provided  with  them,  .  .  .  temporary  in  its  nature  and 
personal  in  its  character,  conferring  no  absolute  or  contingent  right 
of  property  which  can  survive  her  or  go  to  her  personal  representa- 
tives;"5 in   others,    assuming   such   liberal   proportions   as 

*  not  only  to   effectually  protect  a  family  against  sudden  [*  162] 
impoverishment  by  reason  of  the  death  of  its  natural  pro- 
vider, but  seriously  affecting  the  interests  of  creditors.9    In  Missouri 

1  Thomp.  Homest.  &  Ex.,  §  933 ;  Hub-  remain  in  the  homestead,  retain  the  furni- 
bard  v.  Wood,  15  N.  H.  74,  78.  ture  and  utensils  exempt  from  execution, 

2  As  by  express  enactment  in  Califor-  and  have  a  support  from  the  estate  com- 
ma, Colorado,  Kansas,  Mississippi,  Nevada,  mensurate  with  their  circumstances  aud 
Oregon,  Rhode  Island,  Virginia,  and  necessities,  until  such  time  as  they  can 
perhaps  other  States.     But  in  so  far  as  come  into  the  estate." 

these  exemptions  extend  to  the  head  of  a  4  Post,  §  83.     In  Connecticut,  whose 

family,  they  protect  the  widow  and  minor  statutes  expressly  authorize  creditors  to 

children  in  all  of  them.  intercept  legacies,  distributive  shares,  and 

8  Foster  v.  Foster,  36  N.  H.  437,  438;  debts    payable    out   of  the   estate   of    a 

Woodbury  v.   Woodbury,   58  N.   H.  44;  deceased  person  by  garnishment  process, 

Pulling  v.  Durfee,  85   Mich.  34;  Baker's  it  is  held  that  the  allowance  to  the  widow 

Appeal,  56   Conn.  586,  588;  says  Searles,  cannot  be  so  attached  :  Barnum  v.  Bough- 

.].,  In   re   Walkerley,    77    Cal.   642,   645,  ton,  55  Conn.  117.     See  also  the  case  of 

"  instead   of    requiring    the    widow  and  Livingston  v,  Langley,  3  S.  E.  R.  (Ga.) 

children  <>f  deceased   persons,  who  have  909,  giving  the  widow  preference  to  a  fund 

estates  and  homes,  to  dwell  in  the  open  claimed  by  her  husband's  sureties. 

uir,  to  subsist  npon  meal  which  they  cannot  B  Adams  v.  Adams,  10  Met.  (Mass.)  170, 

obtain,  and  drink  which  they  cannot  reach,  1 71. 

the  law  humanely  provi  L<  a  thai  they  may  °  In  California,  Kansas,  Missouri,  and 

172 


§  78  EXTENT   AND   MODE   OF   ALLOWANCE.  *  162,  *  163 

the  property  so  allowed  vests  in  the  widow  or  children  immediately 
upon  the  death  of  the  husband  or  father,  without  formal  election,1 
may  be  assigned  by  the  widow  by  deed  with  or  without  considera- 
tion,2 and  passes  to  her  administrator,  as  against  the  heirs  or  hus- 
band's creditors.8  By  a  recent  statute  the  widower  of  a  deceased 
wife  who  dies  intestate,  owning  personal  property  in  her  own  name, 
is  entitled  to  the  same  remedies  and  reliefs  in  her  estate  as  a  widow 
is  in  her  husband's  estate.4  These  statutory  provisions  do  not  form 
part  of  the  widow's  distributive  share  as  next  of  kin,  unless 
so  expressed  by  the  statute.6 

§  78.    Statutory    Provisions    touching    the    Extent    and    Mode     of 
the  Allowance.  —  In  some  of  the  States,  the  quantum  of  the  allow- 
ance is  not  fixed  by  statute,  but  left  to  the  discretion  of   Temporary 
the  probate  court.     In  California6  and  Nevada7  the  pro-    allowance 

r  r  before  grant 

bate  judge  is  required  to  make  a  temporary  allowance  of  letters. 
for  the  reasonable  support  of  the  widow  and  minor  children  before 
the  grant  of  letters;  and  upon  the  return  of  the  inventory,  or 
subsequently,  he  is  to  set  apart  for  the  use  of  the  family  all  personal 
property  which  is  by  law  exempt  from,  execution  or  attachment 
against  a  debtor;  and  if  this  is  not  sufficient   for  the    ... 

.    ,  „    .,         P        .,         ,  ,  ,         ,  , .    .         i     Allowance  in 

maintenance  of  the  family,  to  make  such  additional  discretion  of 
reasonable  allowance  out  of  the  estate  as  may  be  neces-  Probate  court 
sary  during  the  progress  of  the  settlement,  —  not  longer,  in  case  of 
insolvent  estates,  than  one  year.  In  Connecticut,8  Iowa,9  Maine,10 
Massachusetts,11  New  Hampshire,12  Texas,18  and  Vermont,14  the 
entire  amount  to  which  the  widow  or  minor  children,  or  both,  are 
thus  entitled,  is  determined  by  the  judge  of  probate,  except 
[*163]  that  in  all  cases  the  wearing  apparel,15  and  generally  *  the 

some  other  States,  very  generous  provision  10  Rev.  St.  1883,  p.  552,  §§  21  et  seq. 

is  made  for  the  surviving  family.    See  post,  u  Gen.  St.  1882,  ch.  135,  §§  1,2,  p.  770. 

§  78.  m  In  cases  where  there   is  no  widow,  but 

1  Hastings  v.  Meyer,  21  Mo.  519.  minor  children,  the  allowance  is  limited 

2  McFarland  v.  Baze,  24  Mo.  156.  not  to  exceed  $50  each. 

3  Cummings  v.  Cummings,  51  Mo.  261,  12  Publ.  St.  1891,  ch.  195,  §  1. 
263.  is  Rev.  st.  1888,  §  1984 

4  Laws,  1895,  p.  35,  §  110  a.     Missouri  "  Gen.  St.  1880,  §  2109. 

seems  to  stand  alone  among  the  States  in  15  What  constitutes  wearing  apparel, 

this  respect.  or  rather  what  does  not  constitute  such, 

5  Hence  a  bill  of  sale  hy  the  widow  of  lias  been  judicially  decided  in  Vermont. 
"  all  the  personal  property  owned  by  her  Neither  the  watch,  chain,  key,  and  seals, 
as  heir  at  law  of  her  husband "  does  not  nor  the  finger-ring  usually  worn  hy  a 
include  such  allowance :  Estate  of  Moore,  person  when  living,  nor  the  sword  and 
57  Cal.  446,  447.  See  somewhat  similar  sword-belt  which  an  officer  in  the  United 
decisions  cited  post,  §  85,  p.  *  175,  note.  States  Navy  wore  in  accordance  with  the 

6  Civ.  Proc,  §  1464.  regulations  of  the  Navy  Department,  can 

7  Gen.  St.  Nev.  1885,  §  2789.  be   considered    wearing    apparel    within 

8  Gen  St.  1888,  §  604.  Haven's  Ap-  the  meaning  of  the  statute  securing  the 
peal,  69  Conn   684.  wearing    apparel    of    a    decedent   to  his 

8  Code.  1S97,  §3314  widow:    Sawyer   >\  Sawyer,   28    Vt.  249, 

173 


*  163,  *  164      PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OF   THE    FAMILY.  §78 

ornaments  of  the  family,  are  reserved  to  the  widow.  In  Mich- 
igan,1 Nebraska,2  North  Carolina,8  Oregon,4  Rhode  Island,6  and 
Wisconsin,6  this  discretion  of  the  court  is  limited  to  determine  the 
amount  necessary  for  sustenance,  while  other  articles  of  personal 
property  are  secured  to  the  widow  or  family  expressly,  or  permitted 
to  be  selected  by  them.  In  Mississippi7  and  Missouri8  the  articles 
allowed  as  the  absolute  property  of  the  widow  are  specifically 
enumerated,  including  provisions  for  the  support  of  the  family  for 
one  year;  but  if  such  provisions  are  not  on  hand,  the  probate  court, 
or  in  Mississippi  the  commissioners  appointed  to  set  out  the  widow's 
share,  are  to  make  a  reasonable  appropriation  out  of  the  assets  to 
supply  the  deficiency.  In  Virginia,9  the  "dead  victuals"  are 
reserved  for  the  use  of  the  family  if  desired  by  any  member 
thereof,  and  live  stock  may  be  killed  for  that  purpose 
appointed0/^  "  before  the  sale.  In  Georgia 10  and  Tennessee  n  commis- 
si, apart  a  suf-  si0uers  are  appointed  to  set  apart  a  sufficiency  of  the 
the  support  of  estate  for  the  support  of  the  widow  and  her  family  for 
the  family.  twelve  months,  in  property  or  money.  In  other  States 
the  amount  and  specific  articles  of  property  allowed  to  the  widow 
and  family,  and  in  several  instances  to  the  surviving  husband  and 
his  minor  children,  are  distinctly  enumerated,  varying  in  kind, 
amount,  and  nature  of  the  title  by  which  it  is  held.  In  Alabama 12 
the  statute  allows  certain  articles  enumerated  absolutely,  in  addition 
to  which  the  widow  or  guardian  of  infant  heirs  may  select  other 
property  to  the  amount  of  one  thousand  dollars,  which,  however,  if 
the  estate  is  solvent,  must  be  accounted  for  as  so  much  received  on 
account  of  distribution  or  legacy.  In  Pennsylvania  the  widow  or 
children  of  any  decedent  are  allowed  to  retain  $300  worth  of  assets 
of  the  estate;  but  this  statute  is  held  to  be  founded  on  the 
father's  liability  for  the  support  of  his  *  family,  and  does  not  [*  164] 
extend  to  the  children  of  a  woman  deceased.18  In  Maryland, 
prior  to  1884,  a  widow  was  entitled  to  select  property  to  the  amount 
of  $150,  out  of  any  personal  property  inventoried;  but  by  act  of  the 


Redfield,  C.  J.,  dissenting  except  as  to  6  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  725,  §  4.     As  to  the 

the  watch.     But  otherwise  of  the  epau-  jurisdiction  of  the  court  in  Rhode  Island, 

lets,  which  are  part  of  the  coat,  and  a  see  Babcock  v.  Probate  Court,  18  R.  I. 

bosom  pin,  which  is  attached  to  the  shirt,  555. 

and  must  go  with  the  principal  (p.  252).  6  2  Comp.  St.  1889,  §  3935. 

Rings  and  jewelry  are   not  wearing  ap-  7  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  1877. 

parel:    Frazier  v.  Barnum,   19  N.  J.  Eq.  8  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  105. 

310,  318.  9  Code,  1887,  §  2649. 

1  2  HOW.  St.  1882,  §  5847.  10  Code,  1895,'§  3465. 

2  Cons.  St.  1893,  §  1235.  "  Code,  1884,  §§  3125    et  seq. 

»  Code,  1883,  p.  811,  §§  2116  et  seq.  "  Code,    1896,  §§  2072,  2073;  Hunter 

*  Code,  1887,  §   1126.      See  as  to  the  t>.  Law,  68  Ala.  365,  367. 

duty  of   the  court   on   the  filing  of  the  in-  1:l  King's  Appeal,  84  Fa.  St.  345. 

ventorv,  tfcAtee  V.  Mi- A  tee,  23  Oreg.  469. 
174 


§  79       RULES  GOVERNING  THE  AMOUNT  OP  ALLOWANCE.       *  164,  *  165 

legislature  her  selection  is  now  confined  to  the  kitchen  and  house- 
hold furniture.1 

§  79.    Rules  governing  the  Amount  of  the  Allowance.  —  In  exer- 
cising the  discretion  vested  in  probate  courts  and  in  commissioners 
appointed    by   them   to   designate   and   set    apart    the    Discretion  of 
property  and  money  allowed  for  the  provisional  mainte-    probate  court 
nance  of  the  family,  they  are  not  to  proceed  in  an  arbi-    appellate 
trary   or    capricious    manner,     setting    up    their    own    courts- 
fanciful  views  or  unsupported  individual  opinions  as  the  criterion  by 
which  to  measure  the  rights  of  the  family  on  the  one  hand,  and  of 
creditors,  heirs,  or  legatees  on  the  other;  but  they  exercise  a  sound 
judicial  discretion,  subject  to  be  reviewed  and  corrected  on  appeal.2 
It  is  the  duty  of  the  appellate  court  in   most   States   to  hear  and 
determine  the  question  anew,  and  to  make  such  allowance  in  lieu  of 
the  allowance  made  by  the  probate  court  as  to  it  may  appear  reason- 
able and  proper,  as  if  constituting,  pro  hac  vice,  the  probate  court.3 
Unless,  however,  the  award  made  in  the  probate  court  be  appealed 
from,  it  is  conclusive,  and  cannot  be  questioned  collaterally,  how- 
ever  disproportionate   it   may  seem  or   be.4     In   some    Appeal  not 
States  no  appeal  is  allowed  from  the  order  of  allowance,    allowed. 
on  the  ground  that  the  object  of  the  order  is  to  serve  an  immediate 
necessity  and  might  be  defeated  if  appeal  were  allowable,5  or  on  the 
ground  that  the  award  is  a  ministerial  act.6     And  these  orders  and 
the  amounts  of  the  allowances  being  largely  in  the  discretion  of  the 
probate   court,  the   appellate   courts   will   not   interfere,    unless   it 
appear  that  such  discretion  has  been  improperly  exercised.7 

Where  the  whole  question  as  to  the  magnitude  of  the  allowance, 
as  well  as  the  time  during  which  it  is  to  apply,  is  left  undetermined 
by  the  statute,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the  policy  and  inten- 
tion of  the  law  is  to  furnish  a  temporary  supply  for  the  wants  of  the 
family  while  the  estate  is  in  process  of  administration,  until  the 
debts  are  paid  and  the  distributive  shares  of  the  widow  and  heirs 
are  ascertained,  or,  in  case  of  insolvency,  to  furnish  support  to  the 
helpless  until  new  arrangements  can   be  made   to   enable  them  to 

gain  a  livelihood.8 
[*  165]       *  In  determining  the  amount  necessary  for  such  purpose, 

1  Crow  v.  Hubard,  62  Md.  560.  made ;  but  the  appellate  court  ruled  that, 

2  Piper  v.  Piper,  34  N.  H.  563,  566 ;  if  the  widow  had  expended  the  amount 
Applegate  v.  Cameron,  2  Bradf.  119.  allowed,  she  could  not  be  held  to  account 

8  Cummings  v.  Allen,  34  N.  H.   194,  for  it :  Harshman   v.  Slonaker,  53  Iowa, 

198 ;  Gilman  v.  Gilman,  58  Me.  184,  191  ;  467,  468. 
Washburn  v.  Washburn,  10  Pick.  374.  5  Leach  v.  Leach,  51  Vt.  440. 

4  Litchfield     v.    Cudworth,    15     Pick.  6  Pope  v.  Hays.  30  Ga.  539. 

23;  Boyden  v.  Ward,  38  Vt.  628;  Drew  7  Lire  Lux,  100  Cal.  593,  605  ;  Power's 

v.  Gorden,    13   Allen,  120;  Richardson  v.  Estate,  92  Mich.  106. 
Merrill,  32  Vt.  27.     In  Iowa  an  allowance  8  Washburn  v.  Washburn,  supra  ;  Dale 

of  $800  was  reduced  to  $350  after  the  ex-  v.  Bank,  155  Mass.  141. 
piration  of  the   year    for   which    it  was 

175 


*  165,  *  166      PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OF   THE   FAMILY.  §  79 

regard  may  be  had  to  the  state  of  the  health,  age,  and  habits  of 
~,     .,     ..        the  widow,  the  number  and   age   of   the  children   im- 

Considerations  7  ° 

governing  the  mediately  dependent  upon  her,  as  well  as  the  value  of 
allowance.  tjie  estate  and  of  her  dower  and  distributive  share 
therein.1  It  may  also  be  considered  whether  or  not  she  is  accustomed 
to  hard  labor,  and  thus  enabled  to  support  herself,  or  if  by  reason 
of  ill  health  or  other  circumstances  she  is  unable  to  do  so.  A 
smaller  amount  will  be  proper  in  the  former  case  than  that  which 
may  be  necessary  in  the  latter.2  When  the  statute  fixes  the  time 
for  the  duration  of  which  the  allowance  is  to  be  made,  it  must,  of 
Comfort  of  course,  be  sufficient  to  secure  the  reasonable  comfort  of 
the  family  to      the  family  during  the  whole  of  such  period,  if  used  with 

ordinary  prudence  and  economy.  If  the  estate  is  large, 
apparently  solvent,  and  the  allowance  merely  an  anticipation  of  the 
widow's  distributive  share,  a  more  liberal  allowance  will  be  justified 
than  where  it  is  small  or  insolvent;  and  what  would  be  a  reasonable 
allowance  for  one  accustomed  to  privation  and  labor  might  be  very 
unreasonable   for   one  raised  in  affluence.8     The  discretion   of   the 

probate  judge  has  been  held  to  include  the  power  of 
may  refuse  refusing  an  allowance  altogether,  where  the  condition 
allowance.  0f  ^e  wjfe  as  ^0  separate  property  of  her  own,  or  the 
amount  of  her  distributive  share  in  the  estate,  or  what  she  may 
realize  from  her  dower  in  the  real  estate,  renders  such  an  allowance 
unnecessary,  or  the  more  pressing  necessities  of  the  heirs  or  legatees 
would  make  it  unjust.4  In  several  States,  the  statute  expressly 
vests  in  the  probate  court  the  power  to  refuse  an  allow- 
ance altogether;5  but  in  some  States,  where  *  the  statute  [*  166] 
provides  for  such  reasonable  allowance  as  the  probate  court 
shall  deem  necessary,  it  is  held  that  the  discretion  relates  only  to 
the  quantum  of  the  allowance,  and  that  he  cannot  refuse  it  alto- 
gether.6 

1  Buffum  v.  Sparhawk,  20  N.  H.  81,  be  made  if  necessary,  and  may  when  made 

84;    Duncan    v.  Eaton,   17    N.    II.  441;  be  subsequently  diminished  or  increased : 

Mathes  v.  Bennett,  21  N.  H.  188;  Beet's  Code,  1897,  §3314;  in  Michigan,  if  the 

Estate,  79  Iowa,  185,  190.  provision   made  by  a  testator  be  insuffi- 

-  Brown   v.   Hodgdon,  31  Me.  65,70;  cient:    How.  St.  1882,  §  5814;  in  Nevada, 

Wash  hum  v.  Washburn,  10  Bick.  374.  if  the  widow  have  sufficient  maintenance 

8  Thompson  on  Homesteads,  §  948.  from  her  own  property,  the  allowance  is 

4  Hollenbeck  v.   Bixley,  3  Gray,  521,  to  be  made  in  favor  of  minor  children: 

524;  Kersey  j\  Bailey,  52  Me.  198.     But  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  2796.     In  Maine  and  New 

the  ground    upon   which   the  decision  in  Hampshire,  the  allowance  is  likewise  con- 

this  case  is   based   addresses  itself  rather  ditioned,  that  the  testator  make  no  ade- 

to  the  question  whether  the  applicant  was  quate  provision  by  will,  or  that  the  widow 

rr-ally  the  widow  of  the  decedent  within  waive  such  provision,  or  applies  to  intos- 

the  provisions  of  I  he  statute,  —  a  question  tate  or  insolvent  testate  estates. 
vcrv  different   from    that    of    the    proper  6  Sawyer   v.   Sawyer,  28  Vt.   245.     In 

exercise    01  a  legal   discretion.     See  also  this  case,  an  allowance  of  $500  out  of  an 

Walker,  Appellant,  88  Me.  77.  estate  to  which  the  brother  and  sister  of 

1  So  in   Iowa,  the  allowance  is  only  to  the  intestate  were  heirs  was  affirmed  to 
170 


§  80  HOW   FAR  LIBERALITY  SHOULD   GOVERN.      *  166,  *  167 

It  may  not  be  superfluous  to  remark,  in  connection  with  the 
amount  allowable  to  the  widow,  that  this  is  generally  determined 
by  the  law  in  force  at  the  time  of  the  husband's  death,  but  that, 
as  in  similar  collisions  between  the  rights  of  creditors  and  others, 
the  rights  of  creditors  cannot  be  impaired  by  subsequent  legislation; 
consequently,  the  surviving  widow's  claim  is  determined,  as  to  the 
debts  of  the  husband,  by  the  law  in  force  at  the  time  they  were 
contracted,  and  cannot  be  enlarged  by  later  enactments. 

§  80.  To  what  Extent  Liberality  should  govern  the  Court.  — 
The  tendency  of  courts  has  generally  been  to  give  full  effect  and 
realization  to  the  humane  and  enlightened  policy  which    _ 

_  .,".  otjitutcs  con- 

dictated  these  enactments,  by  construing  their  pro-  strued  with 
visions  in  the  same  spirit  of  liberality  and  considera-  llberalltv- 
tion.  Not  so  as  to  make  them  a  cloak  to  cover  up  a  substantial 
invasion  of  the  rights  of  creditors,  but  so  as  to  resolve  all  reasonably 
doubtful  questions  in  favor  of  the  widow  and  children.1  Thus, 
where  the  statute  extended  this  allowance  to  "the  widow  and  chil- 
dren of  any  deceased  person,"  it  was  held  that  the  widow  was  entitled 
whether  there  were  children  or  a  child,  or  not;2  and  whether  the 
testator  bequeathed  property  to  her  in  his  will  or  not,8  and  that  the 
allowance  may  be  a  sum  of  money  in  lieu  of  articles  of  provision, 
although  the  testator  may  have  left  an  ample  supply  of  provisions 
for  her  use,4  and  whether  the  estate  is  solvent  or  insolvent.6  Where 
the  statute  gave  the  right  of  election  to  a  widow  for  whom  a  testator 

had  provided  in  his  will,  and  a  testator  provided  that  "  she 
[*  167]  shall  have  her  dower  out  of  my  estate  in  the  *  same  manner 

she  would  be  entitled  to  if  this  will  had  not  been  made,"  it 
was  held  that  the  widow  had  the  right  to  claim  the  provision  made 
for  her  by  law,  upon  waiving  her  claim  under  the  will.6  In  con- 
struing a  statute  giving  to  the  widow  such  beds,  bedsteads,  bedding, 
and  household  and  kitchen  furniture  "as  may  be  necessary  for 
herself  and  family,  and  provisions  for  a  year  for  herself  and  family," 
the  court  say :  "  It  cannot  be  supposed  that  the  legislature,  when  it 
used  the  words  'necessary  furniture'  and  'provisions  for  a  year,' 
designed  to  use  the  words  in  a  rigid  and  unbending  sense,  to  be  con- 

a  widow  shown  to  be   in  possession  of         8  McReary  v.  Robinson,  12  Sm.  &  M. 

a  pension  of  $240   per  annum   from  the  318. 

United  States,  and  living  with  a  wealthy  4  Nelson  v.  Smith,  12  Sm.  &  M.  662. 

father,  who   would   not,  it    was   argued,  "  It   is  intended  as   a   humane  provision 

charge  her  for  her  board.     In   Bacon  v.  for  the   widow  and   her   children,  when 

Probate  Judge,   100  Mich.  183,  189,  the  she  is  presumed  to  be  left  in  a  condition 

court  says  that  the  right  to   the   year's  in   which   she   is   unable   to  provide  for 

allowance   was   vested   and  could  not  be  herself  "  :  Turner  v.  Turner,  30  Miss.  428, 

withheld  by  the  probate  court,  citing  cases  431. 

from  Ohio  and  Georgia.     See  further  on         5  Loury    v.    Herbert,    25    Miss.    101. 

this  point  post,  §  87.  Post,  §  83. 

1  Thompson  on  Homest,  §  936.  «  Crane  v.  Crane,  17  Pick.  422,  427. 

2  Sawyer  v.  Sawyer,  28  Vt.  245. 

vol.  i. —  12  177 


*  167,  *  168      PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OP   THE   FAMILY.  §  Si 

strued  in  all  cases  without  reference  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
parties.  If  that  were  so,  we  should  be  obliged  to  say  that  many- 
articles  of  furniture  to  be  found  in  all  comfortable  houses  were  not 
absolutely  indispensable,  and  that  the  provisions  for  a  year  might 
be  reduced  to  a  certain  amount  of  bacon  and  corn  meal.  ...  So, 
too,  in  regard  to  the  word  family.  .  .  .  We  are  of  opinion  that  the 
legislature  intended,  by  the  word  family,  to  include  such  persons  as 
constituted  the  family  of  the  deceased  at  the  time  of  his  death, 
whether  servants  or  children  who  had  attained  their  majority.  .  .  . 
It  was  the  design  of  the  legislature  to  furnish  the  necessary  suste- 
nance for  such  household  for  one  year  after  the  death  of  the  husband, 
and  to  enable  the  widow  to  keep  what  death  had  spared  of  her 
domestic  circle  unbroken  during  that  time,  notwithstanding  the  loss 
of  her  husband.  This  is  the  humane  construction,  and  is  most 
consistent  with  the  kindly  and  liberal  spirit  which  marks  all  our 
legislation  in  regard  to  widows."1 

It  has  been  held  in  New  York,  that  this  allowance  is  not  limited 
to  cases  where  the  deceased  was  a  resident  of  the  State  in  which 
the  assets  are  administered; 2  but  the  authorities  are  not 
nonresident  unanimous.3  Expressions  in  the  spirit  indicating  the 
decedents  take  desire  of  courts  to  give  full  effect  to  the  liberal  enact- 
according  to1"  nients  of  the  legislature,  are  met  with  in  numerous 
the  lex  cases,    although     instances     are     not     lacking 

domicilii 

*  in  which  these  laws  have  been  construed  with  [*  168] 
technical  strictness.     This  subject  is  again   referred   to  in 
connection  with  the  separate  property  of  the  widow.4 

§  81.  Cases  illustrative  of  the  Amount  of  Allowance  deemed 
Reasonable.  —  It  is  obvious  that,  while  statutes  with  respect  to  the 
widow's  awards  should  be  liberally  construed,  yet  the  allowances 
should  be  within  the  bounds  of  reason,  and  the  construction  given 
them  should  be  reasonable.5  It  may  be  of  assistance  to  widows, 
executors,  and  administrators,  and  to  attorneys  and  courts,  to  collate 
some  of  the  cases  illustrative  of  what  appellate  courts  deem  reason- 
able, and  what  unreasonable,  allowances,  in  the  method  observed  by 
Mr.  Thompson,  in  his  valuable  Treatise  on  Homesteads  and  Exemp- 
tions.6 Thus  it  was  held  in  a  late  Illinois  case,5  that  the  court 
would  not  be  justified  in  approving  the  report  of  commissioners 
showing  on  its  face  the  attempt  to  force  results,  and  to  make  up  to 

1  Strawn  v.  Strawn,  53  111.  263,  274.  this  beneficent  provision,  it  is  hard  to  find 
Bee  aleo  Sanderlin  v.  Sanderlin,  1  Swan,  any  reason  for  narrowing  the  charities 
441;  Cheney  p.  Cheney,  73  Ga.  66.  of  the  law  by   judicial   interpretation": 

2  Kapp    v.    Public    Administrator,    2  p.  260  of  the  opinion. 
Bradf.  258.     Says  the  surrogate:   "The         8  Post,  §  89. 
benevolent  design  of  the  statute   has  a         4  Post,  §  87. 

•object,  whether  the  deceased  was  an  in-  6  Boyer  v.  Boyer,  21  111.  App.  534,537. 

habitant  or  not;  and  so  long  as  the  legis-  8  §  952. 

latnre   have  not  confined  the  benefit  of 
178 


§  81       CASES  ILLUSTRATIVE  OF  AMOUNT  OF  ALLOWANCE.      *  168,  *  169 

the  widow  an  amount  not  warranted  by  a  proper  valuation  of  the 
property  allowed  her  by  the  statute.  In  this  case  the  deceased  left 
an  estate  in  personalty  of  over  $135,000  in  value;  the  commissioners 
appraised  the  personalty  secured  by  statute  to  the  widow  at  $806.50, 
and  estimated  the  amount  to  be  allowed  her  at  $7,075,  which  award 
was  rejected  by  the  county  court  to  whom  the  report  was  made; 
whereupon  the  widow,  administratrix,  appealed  to  the  circuit  court, 
and  asked  leave  to  substitute  a  new  estimate  of  the  commissioners, 
awarding  her  $6,629,  which  the  circuit  court  refused,  and  affirmed 
the  action  of  the  county  court  in  rejecting  the  original  report.  On 
appeal  to  the  appellate  court,  the  action  of  the  circuit  was  confirmed 
in  both  respects,  on  the  ground  that,  whether  the  circuit  had  power 
to  act  upon  a  new  report  from  the  commissioners  or  not,  the  new 
report  must  be  rejected  as  well  as  the  original  one,  as  being  unreas- 
onable and  excessive. 

Several  cases  from  New  Hampshire  indicate  the  unwillingness  of 
its  court  of  last  resort  to  allow  undue  partiality  to  be  shown  to  the 
widow,  at  the  cost  of  either  creditors,  children,  or  collateral  distribu- 
tees. Thus,  where  an  estate  amounted  to  $2,250,  the  debts  to 
$575,  and  there  were  no  lineal  descendants,  an  allowance  of  $600 
to  the  widow  was  on  appeal  cut  down  to  $200. l  Where  the  whole 
estate  was  worth  $11,000,  and  that  out  of  which  the 
[*  169]  *  widow  was  entitled  to  dower  $2,000,  an  allowance  of 
$2,000  was  on  appeal  reduced  to  $300. 2  Out  of  an  estate 
worth  $25,000,  there  being  no  debts  except  voluntary  bonds  to  two 
sons,  disputed,  and  without  valuable  consideration,  the  land  assigned 
as  dower  yielding  a  net  income  of  $200  per  year,  $1,250  allowed  by 
the  probate  court  was  reduced  to  $750. 3  So  in  an  insolvent  estate, 
amounting  to  $6,400,  in  which  the  widow  had  been  allowed  $600, 
and  her  dower  was  worth  $643,  besides  owning  a  house  in  her  own 
right  worth  $566,  a  further  allowance  was  held  unreasonable,4  and 
set  aside. 

In  Massachusetts  an  allowance  of  $895,  beside  her  wearing 
apparel,  was  deemed  reasonable  for  a  widow  of  "elevated  quality 
and  degree."  (Her  husband  had  been  sheriff  of  the  county  at  the 
time  of  his  death,  and  for  many  years  a  major-general  of  militia, 
"an  office  of  much  distinction  and  trust." 5)  In  another  case,  where 
the  real  estate  amounted  to  $4,000,  the  personal  estate  to  $6,000, 
and  the  only  heir  was  the  intestate's  father,  an  allowance  of  $3,000 
was  cut  down  to  $1,000,  considering  that  the  widow  would  get 
$500  on  distribution,  as  the  one-fourth  of  the  residue  after  paying 
debts.6    And  in  a  later  case,  where  it  appeared  that  an  intestate's 

1  Foster  v.  Foster,  36  N.  H.  437.  4  Cummings  v.  Allen,  34  N.  H.  194, 

2  Duncan  v.  Eaton,  17  N.  H.  441.  197. 

8  Kingman  v.  Kingman,  31  N.  H.  182,         5  Crane  v.  Crane,  17  Pick.  422,  428. 
J91-  6  Washburn  v.  Washburn,  10  Pick.  374 

179 


*  169,   *  170      PROVISIONAL    ALIMONY   OF   THE    FAMILY.  §  81 

estate,  wholly  personalty,  amounted  to  over  $163,000,  but  was 
insolvent;  that  the  widow  had  a  private  income  of  $1,200  a  year; 
that  there  were  no  children,  and  that  she  and  her  husband  had  been 
living  without  charge  with  her  father;  and  that  they  were  persons 
of  high  social  standing,  accustomed  to  a  costly  mode  of  living,  —  an 
allowance  of  $5,000  by  the  probate  judge  was  reduced  on  appeal  to 
$500. 1 

In  Maine  the  widows  seem  to  fare  better.  Out  of  an  estate  in 
which  the  personalty  was  insufficient  to  pay  the  debts,  leaving  $700 
to  be  paid  out  of  the  proceeds  of  real  estate  valued  at  $2,000,  the 
widow  (of  a  packet  master  sailing  between  Eastport  and  Belfast) 
was  allowed  $500. 2  In  another  instance,  the  widow  of  one  whose 
estate  amounted  to  between  $500,000  and  $600,000  was  allowed  by 
the  probate  judge  $75,000,  which  sum,  on  appeal  by  one  of  the 
executors,  was  by  the  appellate  court  increased  to  $85,000.* 

More  liberal  views  are  entertained  in  some  other  States.  Thus  it 
is  held  in  Georgia  that  "  the  wise  and  liberal  policy  of  our  legisla- 
tion certainly  designed  to  include  in  the  year's  support  something 
more  than  a  bare  subsistence,  with  clothes  and  shelter, 
*and  perhaps  the  means  of  locomotion  for  the  family."  [*170] 
Hence  it  is  error,  in  passing  upon  the  report  of  the  commis- 
sioners setting  aside  the  year's  support,  to  reject  evidence  to  show 
the  amount  of  outlay  made  by  the  decedent  in  the  maintenance  and 
education  of  his  adult  children,  the  gifts  made  to  them  upon  attain- 
ing their  majority,  and  the  advances  made  to  some  of  them,  for 
which  they  were  not  required  to  account.4  An  allowance  of  $5,000 
made  by  the  ordinary,  in  addition  to  certain  household  and  kitchen 
furniture  and  other  personal  property,  was  on  appeal  to  the  Superior 
Court  reduced  by  the  verdict  of  a  jury  to  $2,500;  and  it  was  held  by 
the  Supreme  Court  that  the  rejection  of  the  evidence  above  alluded 
to,  and  of  the  expense  of  keeping  minors  at  school  and  college, 
unduly  restricted  the  jury,  and  a  new  trial  was  ordered.6 

In  California  the  widow  of  a  decedent  whose  estate  was  valued 
at  ten  million  dollars,  mainly  community  property  and  free  of  debt, 
was  allowed  $2,500  per  month  out  of  the  estate,  and  the  Supreme 
Court  refused  to  disturb  the  allowance.6 

In  Illinois  the  "family  "  for  which  provision  is  to  be  made  by  the 
allowance  is  held  to  include  not  only  the  widow  and  minor  children, 
but   also  adult  children  living  with  her,   a  woman   who   had  been 

1  Dale  v.  Bank,  155  Mass.  141.     It  is  to  whole  of  her  interest  in  the  personalty  of 

be  noted  that  two  of  the  judges  dissented,  the  estate. 

-  Brown  v.  Bodgdon,  31  Me.  65,  70.  4  Cheney  v.  Cheney,  73  Ga.  66,  70. 

■  Gilman  v.  Gilman,  58  Me.  184,  191.         6  Cheney  v.  Cheney,  supra;  see  cases 

It  should  be  remembered,  however,  that  cited  by  the  court,  p.  71,  to  show  that 

under  the  statutes  of  Maine  (Rev.  St.  ch.  such  claims  are  favorably  considered  by 

65,  §  21  ;  ch.  75,  §  '.))  this  allowance  was  courts. 

not  a  temporary  one,  but  constituted  the  °  In  re  Lux,  114  Cal.  73. 

180 


§82 


THE    ALLOWANCE   IN   TESTATE    ESTATES.  *  170,  *  171 


raised  in  the  family,  the  superintendent  of  the  farm  under  the 
widow's  control,  the  housekeeper,  cook,  and  other  house  servants. 
An  allowance  of  $400  for  beds  and  bedding,  of  $1,600  for  furniture, 
and  of  $1,642  for  a  year's  provisions,  was  held  reasonable  out  of  an 
estate  valued  at  $500, 000. x 

§  82.  The  Allowance  in  Testate  Estates.  —  It  will  appear  from 
the  cases  already  cited,2  that,  as  a  general  rule,  the  widow  and 
children  are  the  recipients  of  this  bounty,  whether  the 
husband  or  father  died  testate  or  intestate.3  It  is  held 
in  some  States,  that,  where  there  is  a  will  making  pro- 
vision for  the  widow,  she  is  not  entitled  to  the  allow- 
ance unless  she  renounce  the  provisions  of  the  will.4 
This  denial  rests  upon  the  doctrine  that  a  person  can- 
not take  under  a  will  and  also  claim  rights  contradictory  to  or  in 

conflict  with  it,6  and  must  necessarily  follow  in  every  case 
[*  171]  where  this  *  doctrine  is  applicable,  as  in  one  of  the  cases 

cited,  where  the  widow  had  actually  enjoyed  and  consumed 
the  property  provided  by  will  for  her  year's  support,  or  where  the 
provision  in  the  will  is  sufficient  to  meet  the  immediate  wants  of 
the  family;  it  has  also  been  denied  in  cases  where,  by  reason  of 
sufficient  separate  property  of  the  widow,  or  for  any  other  reason, 
such  wants  do  not  exist.6  But  where  the  testamentary  provision  is 
not  expressed  or  clearly  intended  to  be  in  lieu  of  the  statutory  allow- 
ance, the  requirement  to  renounce   the  will  seems  to  ignore  and 


Unless  directed 
by  statute, 
there  is  no 
difference 
whether  the 
estate  is  testate 
or  intestate. 


1  Strawn  v.  Strawn,  53  111.  263,  272. 
See  Boyer  v.  Boyer,  21  111.  App.  534,  cited 
ante,  p.  *  168. 

2  Ante,  §  80. 

8  In  re  Walkerley,  77  Cal.  642 ;  Baker 
v.  Baker,  57  Wis.  382 ;  Turner  v.  Turner, 
30  Miss.  428  ;  Turner  v.  Fisher,  4  Sneed, 
209 ;  Compher  v.  Compher,  25  Pa.  St.  31  ; 
Ruffin,  C.  J.,  in  Kimball  v.  Doming,  5 
Ired.  L.  418,  420;  McReary  v.  Robinson, 
12  Sm.  &  M.  318;  Nelson  v.  Wilson,  61 
Ind.  255 ;  In  re  Lux,  supra ;  Haven's  Ap- 
peal, 69  Conn.  684. 

4  Turner  v.  Turner,  supra ;  Brown  v. 
Hodgdon,  31  Me.  65,  68 ;  Crane  v.  Crane, 
17  Pick.  422,  426;  Estate  of  McManus, 
14  Phila.  660. 

6  Little  v.  Birdwell,  27  Tex.  688,  691 ; 
Pearson  v.  Darrington,  32  Ala.  227 ; 
Langley  v.  Mayhew,  107  Ind.  198,  criticis- 
ing prior  Indiana  cases ;  Godman  v.  Con- 
verse, 43  Neb.  463,  reversing  s.  c.  38  Neb. 
657. 

6  Leavenworth  v.  Marshall,  19  Conn. 
408,  418.  So  where  a  widow,  under  the 
law  of  Louisiana,  accepted  a  succession 


"  purely  and  simply,"  the  widow  was  not 
entitled  to  the  $1,000  allowed  out  of  her 
husband's  estate,  because,  by  accepting 
the  succession,  it  ceased  to  exist ;  she  be- 
came the  owner  of  the  property,  and 
hence  liable  for  its  debts :  Claudel  v. 
Palao,  28  La.  An.  872.  If  the  testator 
makes  provision  for  his  widow  and  speci- 
fically disposes  of  all  the  residue  of  his 
estate,  so  that  the  assertion  by  the  widow 
of  her  statutory  claim  would  defeat  some 
material  provision  thereof,  she  will  be 
required  to  elect:  Shafer  v.  Shafer,  129 
Ind.  394.  But  a  general  residuary  devise 
or  bequest  is  of  itself  insufficient  to  com- 
pel an  election  :  Shipman  v.  Keys,  127 
Ind.  353.  Whenever  it  is  reasonably  clear 
that  the  provisions  of  the  will  were  in- 
tended to  be  in  lieu  of  the  provision  made 
for  the  widow  by  law,  if  she  accepts  the 
former  she  thereby  waives  the  latter ;  and 
the  intention  need  not  be  declared  in 
words,  but  may  be  deduced  from  clear  and 
manifest  implication,  if  the  claim  under 
the  law  would  be  plainly  inconsistent  with 
the  will :  Hurley  v.  Mclver,  119  Ind.  53. 
181 


*171,  *  172      PROVISIONAL    ALIMONY    OP   THE    FAMILY.  §83 

defeat  the  very  object  and  intent  of  the  law,  which  is  "  merely  to 
furnish  her  with  a  temporary  allowance,  by  which  she  can  support 
herself  and  dependent  children  until  her  interest  in  the  estate  can 
be  set  out  to  her;  "  and  the  more  rational  view  seems  to  be  that  she 
is  entitled  to  the  allowance  in  addition  to  the  provision  made  for 
„,    ,     ,     .      her  in  the  will,1  and  that  the  husband  cannot  deprive 

The  husband  '  --int.il 

cannot  by  his  his  widow  of  the  allowance  provided  lor  by  the  statute 
widowPoTthese  ^y  any  Provision  in  his  will.2  In  some  States  the 
statutory  courts  seem  to  go  to  the  extreme  of  holding  that  she 

is  entitled  both  to  her  statutory  allowance  and  a  pro- 
vision in  the  will  expressed  to  be  given  in  lieu  of  such  allowance.8 
In  Missouri  the  allowance  to  the  widow  is  expressed  by  statute  to 
be  "in  addition  to  dower,"  a  part  of  which  (property  selected  by  her 
not  exceeding  the  appraised  value  of  $400)  is  to  be  deducted  from 
her  distributive  share  in  the  estate  (also  given  under  the  dower  act 
and  not  under  the  Statute  of  Descents  and  Distributions)  if  in 
excess  of  $400,  but  is  not  liable  for  debts.4  Under  this  statute  it  is 
held  that  this  allowance  to  the  widow  is  no  part  of  her  dower 
proper,  although  in  the  nature  of  dower  in  being  absolute  against 
creditors  and  the  right  of  the  husband  to  dispose  of  by  will;6 
she  is  therefore  entitled  to  such  allowance,  whether  she 
*  stands  by  the  husband's  will  or  rejects  it  to  take  under  the  [*  172] 
law ; 6  and  unless  a  contrary  intention  plainly  appear  from 
the  language  of  the  will,  any  bequest  to  her  will  be  deemed  to  be  in 
addition  to,  and  not  in  lieu  of,  such  allowance.7  The  recent  pro- 
vision of  the  statute  extending  to  the  husband  of  a  deceased  wife 
the  same  allowances  as  a  widow  has  in  her  deceased  husband's 
estate,  is  expressed  to  apply  only  "if  the  wife  shall  die  intestate."  8 
§  83.  The  Allowance  with  Respect  to  the  Solvency  or  Insol- 
vency of  the  Estate.  —  The  right  of  the  widow  and  children  is  para- 

i  Meech  v.  Weston,  33  Vt.  561  ;  Delt-  3  Peeble's  Estate,  157  Pa.  St.  605; 
zer  v.  Scheuster,  37  111.  301  ;  Loring  t\  Collier  v.  Collier,  supra  ;  see  also  Blake- 
Craft,  16  Ind.  110;  Vedder  r.  Saxton,  46  man  v.  Blakeman,  64  Minn.  315,  p.  317. 
Barb.  188  ;  Williams  v.  Williams,  5  Gray,  4  Bev.  St.  §§  105-110. 
24  ;  Bane  v.  Wick,  14  Oh.  St.  505;  Ship-  5  It  is  "for  the  immediate  sustenance 
man  v.  Keys,  127  Ind.  353,  citing  and  of  the  widow,  as  is  dower  for  her  support 
harmonizing  prior  Indiana  decisions:  during  life;  yet  it  differs  from  it  in  that 
Whiteman  v.  Severn,  71  Ind.  530,  534;  it  is  made  from  the  personalty  owned  at 
Pulling  >•.  Durfee,  85  Mich.  34,  40,  citing  his  death,  and  it  becomes  her  absolute 
prior  Michigan  cases ;  Wilson  v.  Morris,  94  property":  Bryant  v.  McCune,  49  Mo. 
Tenn.  547  :  sec  also  In  re  Lux,  1 14  Cal.  73.  546,  547. 

•'  Collier  v.  Collier,  3  Oh.  St  369,  375 ;  8  Register  v.  Hensley,  70  Mo.  189,  195. 

Ward    '•.   Wolf,  50   Iowa,  4  65;  Baker  v.  7  In  re  Klostermann,  6  Mo.  App.  314, 

Baker,  57    Wis.  382,  392;    Chandler    i».  316;  Schoeneich  v.  Reed,  8  Mo.  App.  856, 

Chandler,  87  Ala.  300,  303;  Peet's  Estate,  362;  Hasenritter  v.  Hasenritter,  77  Mo. 

79  [owa,  185,  I'll,  except  in  New  Jersey,  162;  Schwatken  v.  Dandt,  53  Mo.  App.  1 

where  the  expressed  '>r  implied  intention  H  Laws,  1895,  p.  35,  §  no  a. 
of  ilii-  t<   tator  governs:  Carj  v.  Monroe, 
:  i  \.  J.  Eq.  632,  637. 


§83 


ALLOWANCE   WITH    RESPECT   TO    SOLVENCY.  *  172,  *  173 


mount  to  that  of  creditors,  and  hence  does  not  depend    The  allowance 
upon   the   solvency   or   insolvency  of  the   estate.1     In    is  not  depend- 

r  .  „  oio  ...  -,,         ent  upon  the 

many,  if  not  most,  of  the  States,  provision  is  made  by  solvency  of  the 

statute  that  where  the  estate  does  not  exceed  in  value  estate- 
a  certain  specified  amount,2  or  the  amount  to  which  the  widow  or 

children  are  entitled  absolutely,  no  administration  shall  Estates  not 

be  necessary,  but  all  the  property  of  the  estate  is  to  be  exceeding  in 

assigned   and    turned    over   to    the    widow,    or   if    no  amount 

widow,  to  the  children.3     It  is  held  in  Illinois4  that  in  allowed  to  the 

'  widow  not  ne- 

such  case  the  widow  must  pay  the  funeral  expenses,  cessary  to  be 
and  in  Indiana 5  the  funeral  expenses  and  expenses  of  administered- 
last  illness,  out  of  the  assets  so  received  by  her.  In  some  States  the 
allowance  is  to  be  deducted  from  the  widow's  distributive  share,  if 
the  estate  is  found  to  be  solvent,6  but  generally  it  is  left  to  the 
widow,  either  by  express  enactment  or  implication,  in  addition  to 
her  distributive  share  if  the  estate  is  solvent7  and   is   in  no  case 

liable  for  debts  of  the  decedent.     It  follows  that  the  property 
[*  173]  is  secured  to  *the  widow  and  children  irrespective  of  the 

value  of  the  estate.8    In  Iowa  it  was  held  that  where  it  is 


1  Griesemer  v.  Boyer,  13  Wash.  171, 
176. 

2  In  California,  if  under  $1,500,  prop- 
erty all  goes  to  widow ;  if  under  $3,000,  in 
the  discretion  of  the  probate  court :  2  Civ. 
Proc.  §  1469.  In  Georgia,  if  under  $500  : 
Code,  1895,  §  3465  j  Stewart  v.  Stewart,  74 
Ga.  355.  In  Indiana,  $500 :  Burn's  Ann. 
St.  1894,  §§2575,  2576.  In  Michigan,  $150 
2  How.  St.  1 882,  §  5847.  In  Nevada,  $500 
Gen.  St.  1885,  §  2795.  In  Utah,  $1,500 
Stone's  Estate,  14  Utah,  205.  In  Ver- 
mont, $300:  Gen.  St.  1880,  §2114.  In 
Washington,  $1,000:  Code,  1891,  §971. 
In  Wisconsin,  $150,  in  addition  to  the 
specific  allowances  :  Ann.  St.  1889,  p.  2070, 
pi.  4.     See  post,  p.  *  436. 

3  So  in  Alabama :  Gamble  v.  Kellum, 
97  Ala.  677.  Arkansas:  Dig.  St.  1894, 
§  3;  Illinois.  St.  &  C.  Rev.  St.  1896, 
p.  292,  §  59  ;  Missouri:  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  2; 
and  Oregon:  Gen.  L.  1887,  §  1129. 

4  McCord  v.  McKinley,  92  111   11. 

5  Green  v.  Weever,  78  Ind.  494. 

6  So  in  Alabama,  Florida,  Maryland 
(property  selected  by  the  widow  not  ex- 
ceeding $150  in  value,  and  if  she  have  no 
children  $75  in  value,  is  to  be  deducted 
out  of  her  distributive  share,  unless  the 
decedent  left  real  estate  exceeding  $1,000 
in  value),  Missouri  (where  the  $400  in 
property  to  be  selected  by  the  widow  is  to 


be  deducted  out  of  her  distributive  share 
in  the  estate  if  there  be  any,  but  not  the 
other  property  or  money  allowed),  and 
New  Hampshire. 

7  In  Arkansas,  if  the  estate  is  solvent, 
the  widow  may  select  property  not  exceed- 
ing the  value  of  $150  in  addition  to  the 
amount  allowed  her  without  reference  to 
solvency :  Dig.  St.  1 884,  §  63.  In  Califor- 
nia (2  Civ.  Proc.  §  1466),  Michigan  (How. 
St.  §  5847),  Nebraska  (Gen.  St.  1887,  ch. 
23,  §  176),  Nevada  (Comp.  L.  1873,  §  604), 
and  Wisconsin  (Rev.  St.  1878,  §  3935),  the 
allowance  for  the  support  is  limited  in 
cases  of  insolvent  estates  to  one  year.  In 
Georgia  the  appraisers  are  directed,  in 
estimating  the  amount  to  be  set  apart 
for  the  support  of  the  family,  to  take  into 
account,  among  other  things,  the  solvency 
or  insolvency  of  the  estate.  In  Maine 
(Code,  1883,  p.  552)  and  Oregon  (Gen.  L. 
1887,  §  1128)  the  court  may  make  an 
additional  allowance  if  the  estate  turn  out 
to  be  solveut,  or  additional  property  be 
discovered.  In  Indiana  it  is  held  that  the 
widow  takes  the  allowance  in  addition 
to  her  distributive  share  :  Cheek  v.  Wilson, 
7  Ind.  354. 

8  Curd  v.  Curd,  9  Humph.  171  ;  Johnson 
v.  Corbett,  1 1  Paige,  265,  276 ;  Compher 
v.  Compher,  25  Pa.  St.  31  ;  Hill  v.  Hill,  32 
Pa.  St.  511;  Pride  v.  Watson,  7  Heist 

183 


*  173,  *  174      PROVISIONAL    ALIMONY   OF   THE   FAMILY.  §  84 

ascertained  that  an  estate  is  insolvent,  and  that  after  the  final  settle- 
ment there  will  remain  no  sum  whatever  in  the  hands  of  executors 
for  the  widow  or  children,  there  is  no  provision  of  law  that  would 
justify  an  order  directing  the  executors  to  pay  a  portion  of  the  assets 
to  the  widow  for  her  support  and  that  of  the  minor  children.1 

§  84.  How  affected  by  Marriage  Settlements.  —  It  is  obvious  that 
property  which  may  be  the  subject  of  a  marriage  contract,  whether 
Waiver  of  ante  or  post  nuptial,  is  no  less  under  the  control  and 

allowance  for  operation  of  law  than  property  which  passes  by  descent 
family,  in  an      or  under  a  will,  and  it  has  been  held  that  the  existence 

ante-nuptial  0f  a  marriage  contract,  by  which  the  widow  had  re- 
contract,  IS  -I        -i-i       -i    •  1 

against  public  leased  all  claims  upon  her  husband's  estate,  is  no 
policy.  defence  to  her  claim  for  an  allowance  out  of  his  estate 

for  necessaries.2  In  New  York  it  was  held,  that  where  the  pro- 
vision in  an  ante-nuptial  agreement  was  an  annuity  to  the  widow  for 
life  in  lieu  of  dower  or  any  portion  of  his  estate,  and 
*  the  husband  by  will  gave  her  an  annuity  during  her  widow-  [*  174] 
hood  only,  he  has  failed  to  perform  upon  his  part,  and 
the  widow  is  not  precluded  from  claiming  the  property  allowed 
to  her  by  statute.8  The  true  principle,  however,  seems  to  be, 
that  these  laws  rest  upon  a  sound  public  policy,  and  that  contracts 
running  contrary  thereto  are  for  that  reason  and  to  that  extent  void. 
It  is  the  policy  of  the  law  to  preserve,  as  far  as  possible,  the  integ- 
rity and  continuity  of  the  family,  and  to  protect  it  even  against  the 
thoughtlessness  and  improvidence  of  men  and  women.  In  this  view 
the  homestead  laws,  and  laws  exempting  property  from  sale  under 
execution  and  attachment,  are  enacted,  and  courts  have  decided 
contracts  waiving  this  exemption  prospectively  to  be  void,  as  being 

232,   234  ;  Hopkins  v.  Long,  9  Ga.  261  ;  or  give  effect  to  its  provisions,  and  that  on 

McNulty  v.  Lewis,  8  Sm.  &  M.  520  ;  Loury  appeal  the  Supreme  Court  of  probate  can 

v.  Herbert,  25  Miss.  101  ;  Mason  v.  O'Brien,  exercise  no  general  equity  powers,  but  is 

42   Miss.   420,  427 ;    Silcox  v.  Nelson,   1  bound  to  make  only  such  decree  as  the 

Ga.  Dec.  24  ;  Hays  v.  Buffington,  2  Ind.  probate  court  should  have  made.     It  leaves 

369.  the  question   itself  untouched  and  unan- 

1  In  re   Hieschler,  13  Iowa,  597.      It  swered,  and  rests  upon  the  reasons  given  in 

does  not  appear  from  the  report  of  this  an  earlier  case,  —  Sullings  i>.  Richmond,  5 

case  whether  the  widow  and  children  had  Allen,  187,  191,  —  which  allowed  a  widow 

received  anything  for  their  support  or  not,  her  distributive  share  in  an  estate  notwith- 

and  hence  it  does  not  establish  the  propo-  standing    her    ante-nuptial    agreement  to 

sition   that  neither  a   widow   nor   minor  accept  certain   provisions  therein  in  the 

children  are  entitled  to  an  allowance  for  place  of,  and  as  a  substitute  for,  her  dower 

their  temporary  support.  and   every   other   claim   by  her   upon    his 

a  Blackinton  v.  Blackinton,  110  Mass.  estate,  —  to  wit,   that  the  probate  court 

461.      Bat    the   ground    on    which    this  had   no  authority  to  enforce  a  marriage 

decision  ifl  bused  is  the  purely  technical  contract.    The  case  of  Tarbell  v.  Tarbell, 

one,  that    the    executors'  defence   to  the  referred  to  in  a  note,  was  decided  on  the 

widow's  claim  cannot  be  availed  of  in  the  same  principle, 
probate   court,    for   the   want  of    equity         8  Sheldon  v.  Bliss,  8  N.  Y.  31. 
powers  to  try  the  validity  of  the  contract 
184 


§  84  HOW   AFFECTED    BY   MARRIAGE   SETTLEMENTS.      *  174,  *  175 

contrary  to  public  policy,1  and  also  that  a  waiver  of  exemption  by  a 
deceased  debtor  will  not  avail  the  creditor  as  against  the  widow  and 
minor  children  of  the  debtor.2  The  principle  has  equal  application 
to  widows  and  orphans  when  the  provision  made  for  them  by  law  is 
threatened  or  assailed  by  a  marriage  contract.  It  was  accordingly 
decided  in  Illinois,  that  the  special  allowance  made  by  statute  for 
the  widow  of  a  deceased  person  is  as  much  for  the  advantage  of  the 
children  of  the  deceased  as  for  his  widow,  and  cannot  be  affected  by 
an  ante-nuptial  contract.  "The  law,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Scott,  "also 
charges  the  husband's  estate  with  the  support  of  his  widow  and  his 
children  residing  with  her,  for  the  period  of  one  year  after  his  death, 
at  least  to  the  extent  of  certain  articles  of  property,  or  their  value 
in  money.  This  latter  right  is  one  created  by  positive  law,  and 
attaches  in  all  cases,  whether  there  is  sufficient  property  or  not  to 
pay  the  debts  of  the  decedent.  Being  a  statutory  right,  it  is  one 
of  which  the  husband  cannot  deprive  his  wife  and  children,  any 
more  than  he  can  relieve  himself  of  his  obligation  to  support  them 
while  living.  It  is  in  no  case  affected  by  the  widow  renouncing  or 
failing  to  renounce  the  benefit  of  the  provisions  made  for  her  in  the 
will  of  her  husband,  or  otherwise.  Our  laws  on  this  subject  have 
always  been  liberal,  but  the  tendency  of  more  recent  legislation 
is  to  enlarge,  rather  than  to  abridge,  the  beneficial  provisions  in  this 
regard.  .  .  .  It  is  an  absurd  conclusion  that  any  ante-nuptial  agree- 
ment can  deprive  the  children  of  the   means   of  support,  in  their 

tender  years,  which  the  law  has  given.  .  .  .  We  are  at  a 
[*  175]  loss  to  understand  how  this  humane  provision  of  *  the  law 

for  the  family  of  a  deceased  party  can  be  affected  by  an  ante- 
nuptial contract,  however  broad  and  comprehensive  in  its  terms."3 
It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  this  right  on  the  part  of  a 
widow  to  repudiate  an  executory  marriage  contract  no  longer  exists 
after  she  has  deliberately  accepted  its  terms;  in  other  words,  she 

1  So  in  New  York,  Iowa,  Kentucky,  ford,  96  Cal.  433.  In  Missouri  it  is  held 
Wisconsin,  Tennessee,  and  Louisiana,  that  an  ante-nuptial  agreement  between 
See  Thomp.  on  Homest.,  §  441,  and  cases  husband  and  wife,  that,  upon  the  death  of 
there  quoted  and  cited.  either,  the  other  should  claim  no  interest 

2  Wiggins  v.  Mertins,  111  Ala.  164.  in  the    estate  of    the    deceased,   is    not 

3  Phelps  v.  Phelps,  72  111.  545.  But  in  binding  on  the  widow  in  a  suit  by  her 
Pennsylvania,  where  a  husband  and  wife  for  the  statutory  allowance,  where  she  has 
entered  into  a  written  agreement  to  sepa-  received  nothing  as  a  consideration  for  the 
rate,  whereby  each  for  a  valuable  consid-  alleged  agreement :  Mowser  v.  Mowser, 
eratiou  relinquished  whatever  marital  87  Mo.  437.  It  has  also  been  held  that  a 
rights  either  might  have  in  the  other's  widow's  statutory  allowance  is  not  barred 
estate,  and  such  separation  was  actual  and  by  an  ante-nuptial  contract  releasing  all 
continuous,  it  was  held  that  after  his  death  rights  in  the  estate,  "  whether  of  dower  or 
the  wife  could  not  claim  the  exemption  distributive  share,  or  otherwise :  "  Pulling 
allowed,  as  a  member  of  the  family  :  v.  Durfee,  85  Mich.  34 ;  nor  where  she 
Speidel's  Appeal,  107  Pa.  St.  18.  Similarly  releases  "all  her  statutory  estate":  Baker's 
in  California  :  In  re  Noah,  73  Cal.  583 ;  Appeal,  56  Conn.  586. 

8.  c.  88  Cal.  468  ;  Wickersham  v.  Comer- 

185 


*  175,  *  176      PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OP   THE    FAMILY. 


§85 


cannot  both  execute  and  repudiate  the  contract,1  and  the  children 
are  bound  by  her  election.  So  it  seems  that  where  there  are  no 
children,  the  widow  is  bound  by  her  contract  and  has  no  election 
unless  given  by  statute.2 

§  85.    How  affected  by  Liens  or  Preferred  Debts  of  the  Decedent. 

In  some  cases  it  is  held  that  the  wife  is  entitled  to  her  year's 

allowance  out  of  her  husband's  estate  in  preference  to  a 
lien  of  a  mortgage  given  by  the  deceased  husband  in  his 
lifetime.8  So,  in  Texas4  and  Georgia,5  it  takes  pre- 
cedence over  the  lien  of  a  judgment  rendered  against 
the  decedent  in  his  lifetime,  but  not,  in  Texas,  over 
the  landlord's  lien  for  rent  on  the  deceased  tenant's 
crops,  or  vendor's  lien.6  In  Pennsylvania,  since  the 
exemption  act  of  1850,  the  widow's  claim  is  good  against 
all  debts  which  were  not  liens  prior  to  that  act;7  no 
lien,  whether  that  of  a  judgment  creditor  of  the  deceased 
who  had  loaned  him  money  to  pay  for  a  house 
*and  lot  of  which  he  died  seised,8  or  of  a  mechanic  on  the  [*  176] 
house  which  he  erected,  or  any  lien  whatever  save  that  for 
unpaid   purchase-money,  takes  precedence  of  the  allowance  to  the 


Widow  entitled 
to  her  year's 
allowance  in 
preference  to  a 
mortgagee, 
or  judgment 
creditor. 

In  Texas, 

Georgia, 

Pennsylvania. 

No  lien  has 
precedence  ex- 
cept vendor's. 


i  Weaver  v.  Weaver,  109  111.  225,  234, 
citing  Brenner  v.  Gauch,  85  111.  368,  and 
Cowdrey  v.  Hitchcock,  103  111.  262,  272,  to 
same  effect.  But  Walker  and  Scott,  JJ., 
dissent,  holding  that  Phelps  v.  Phelps  es- 
tablishes as  law  that  the  statutory  widow's 
award  cannot  he  waived ;  the  waiver  is 
simply  void.  So  it  is  held  that  a  fair  ante- 
nuptial agreement  to  relinquish  the  right 
to  an  allowance  is  not  void,  but,  when 
carried  out,  it  will  be  enforced  against  the 
widow  in  the  proper  tribunal:  Staub's 
Appeal,  66  Conn.  127  ;  Paine  v.  Hollister, 
139  Mass.  144 ;  Heald's  Appeal,  22  N.  EL 
265. 

2  Scott,  J.,  in  Phelps  v.  Phelps,  72  111. 
545,  550;  to  similar  effect,  Speidel's  Ap- 
peal, 107  Pa.  St.  18;  see  also  the  opinion 
in  Staub's  Appeal,  supra;  Paine  v.  Hol- 
lister, supra,  and  Tiernan  v.  Binns,  92  Pa. 
St.  24 «. 

b  c.,if.  0.  Elfe,  23  Ga.  235.  The  stat- 
ute under  which  this  decision  was  ren- 
dered provides  for  an  allowance  out  of 
the  estate  immediately  after  the  death  of 

the  testator  or  intestate,  "notwithstand- 
ing any  debts,  dnes,  <>r  obligations  of  said 
testator  or  intestate,"  and  the  court  de- 
cided, iii  consonance  with  nnmerons  pre- 
vious decisions  of  that-  State,  that  "a 
mortgage  in  this  State  is  nothing  more 
186 


than  a  security  for  the  payment  of  a  debt; 
and  that  the  title  to  the  mortgaged  prop- 
erty remains  in  the  mortgagor,  until  fore- 
closure and  sale,  in  the  manner  pointed 
out  by  statute."  The  principle  announced 
was  subsequently  affirmed  in  Elfe  v.  Cole, 
26  Ga.  197,  Benuing,  J.,  dissenting.  Ull- 
mann  v.  Brunswick  Co.,  96  Ga.  625.  The 
allowance  takes  precedence  over  a  mort- 
gage to  secure  a  debt,  but  not  over  a 
conveyance  passing  the  title  subject  to  re- 
demption on  payment  of  the  debt :  Burek- 
halter  v.  Planters'  Bank,  100  Ga.  428,  432. 
But  of  course  the  allowance  does  not  take 
precedence  of  a  lien  attaching  to  the  title 
when  the  deceased  acquired  it :  Murphy 
v.  Vaughan,  55  Ga.  361. 

*  Giddings   v.    Crosby,    24    Tex.   295, 
299. 

6  Commercial  Bank  v.  Burckhalter,  98 
Ga.  730. 

6  Champion  v.  Shumate,  90  Texas,  597. 
i  Hill  v.  Hill,  42  Pa.  St.  198,  204; 
Baldy's  Appeal,  40  Pa.  St.  328.  It  seems 
that  in  these  cases  no  lien  existed  on  any 
specific  property,  and  from  the  language 
of  Thompson,  J.,  in  the  latter  case  it  is  to 
be  inferred  that  the  creditor  had  obtained 
no  judgment  before  the  intestate's  death 
But  see  the  cases  infra. 

8  Nottes's  Appeal,  45  Pa.  St.  361. 


§  85       AFFECTED  BY  LIENS  OR  DEBTS  OF  DECEDENT.      *  176 

widow.1    But  in  a  late  case  it  was  held  that  any  mortgage,  whether 

for  purchase-money  or  not,  takes  precedence  of  the  widow's  claim, 

but  not  the  lien  of  a  judgment.2     In   Alabama,   while 

her  claim  is  paramount  to  the  rights  of  a  creditor  who 

holds  a  waiver  of  exemption  of  personalty  by  the  decedents8  and  to 

the  rights  of  the  personal  representative  for  the  general  purposes  of 

administration,  and   to  preferred    debts  of  the  estate,   it  does   not 

override   liens   created   by   the   law,    or  by  act  of  the 

deceased  husband.4     In  California  the  order  setting  out 

a  parcel  of  land  for  the  support  of  the  minor  children  of  a  decedent 

does   not  divest  the   lien  of  a  mortgage  given   by  the 

decedent  to  secure  the  purchase-money.5      In   Indiana 

a  chattel  mortgage  executed  by  the  decedent  in  his  lifetime  creates 

a  lien  superior  to  the  widow's  claim,6  but  her  right  is  not  defeated 

because  the  property  of  her  deceased  husband  is  held  under  a  levy 

made  by  the  sheriff  before  his  death.7     In  Colorado  the 

lien  of  a  chattel  mortgage  is  superior  to  the  widow's      ° ora  °" 

allowance.8     In  Iowa  the   widow's   claim   has    prefer-    iowa. 

ence  over  a  creditor  who  furnished  materials  for  the 

erection   of  a  house,  and   omitted   to   obtain  a  mechanic's  lien  by 

reason  of  the  administrator's  assurance  that  it  was  not  necessary.9 

Since   the   property  allowed  to   the  widow  is  not,   in  most  States, 

treated  as  assets  of  the  estate,  it  would   seem  to  follow  that  the 

widow  is  entitled  to  it  in  preference  to  creditors  of  any  kind,  whether 

for  ordinary  debts  of  the  decedent,  expenses  of  last  illness,  or  even 

funeral  expenses  and  charges  for  settling  the  estate ; 10  but  in  Illinois, 

where  she  might  take  certain  enumerated  articles,  or  in  lieu  thereof 

money,   it  was  held  that,  if  she  elected  to  take  money,  she  made 

herself   a  general  creditor  of  the   estate,   remitted   to 

take  her  share  with  other  creditors.11    In  Tennessee  the 

1  Hildebrand's  Appeal,  39  Pa.  St.  133.  7  Dixon  v.  Aldridge,  127  Ind.  296. 
"  It  is  remarkable,"  says  Woodward,  ren-         8  Bennett  v.  Reef,  16  Colo.  431. 
dering  the  opinion  in  this  case,  "that  the          9  Estate  of  Dennis,  67  Iowa,  110. 

.  .  .  statute  under  which  the  widow  claims  10  Kingsbury  v.  Wilmarth,  2  Allen, 
says  nothing  about  liens  except  liens  for  310;  Whitehead  v.  McBride,  73  Ga.  741  ; 
the  purchase-money  of  real  estate.  These  Denton  v.  Tyson,  118  N.  C.  542.  This  is 
are  not  to  be  impaired  by  the  widow's  not  the  case  in  Texas  :  see  statutes  re- 
election of  real  estate.  .  .  .  And  expressio  ferred  to  in  Champion  v.  Shumate,  90 
unius  exclusio  alterius :  Because  no  other  Tex.  597,  602. 

lien  was  mentioned  or  referred  to  by  the  n  Cruce  v.  Cruce,  21   111.  46.     In  this 

legislature,   they   meant    that    no    other  case  there  were  debts  of  the  first,  second, 

should     prevail    against    the      widow."  third,  and  fourth  class,  —  the  third  class 

Graves'  Estate,  134  Pa.  St.   377.  being  trust-money,  in  which  were  allowed 

2  Kauffman's  Appeal,  112  Pa.  St.  645,  and  placed  the  claims  of  two  wards  whose 
citing  numerous  authorities.  money  the  intestate  had  in  hand  at  the 

8  Wiggins  v.  Mertins,  111  Ala.  164.  time  of  his  death,  and  the  fourth  general 

4  Loeb  v.  Richardson,  74  Ala.  311,  314.  creditors,  the  court  held  that  the  widow 
6  Fairbanks  v.  Robinson,  64  Cal.  250.  was  a  general  creditor,  and  that,  as  there 
*  Recker  v.  Kilgore,  62  Ind.  10.  were  not  sufficient  personal  assets  to  pay 

187 


176,  *  177      PROVISIONAL    ALIMONY   OF   THE    FAMILY. 


§86 


widow  takes  the  same  title  or  interest  in  the  property  assigned  for 
her  year's  support  as  the  husband  had,  and  she  can  recover  no  more 
than  he  could;  hence  where  she  takes  a  claim  for  wages  due  her 
husband's  estate,  she  takes  it  subject  to  any  set-off  the  debtor  may 
have  against  it.1 

*  §  86.    When   the    Allowance   takes   Effect.  —  The   right  [*  177] 
of  the  widow  to  the  money  or  property  allowed  for  her  and 
Right  vests  on     ner  family's  temporary  support  is  held  in  some  States  <• 
husband's  to  be  absolute,  and  to  vest  at  once  upon  the  husband's  ' 

confirmation  by  death.2  In  others,  it  is  held  to  vest  upon  confirmation 
probate  court.  or  allowance  by  the  probate  court,8  or  selection  by  the 
widow  or  guardian  of  minor  children,4  and  may  then  be  recovered 
by  her  personal  representative;5  and  if  the  allowance  to  her  is  of 
such  articles  as  she  may  have  chosen,  and  if  they  are  sold,  although 
by  her  consent,  but  without  a  waiver  of  her  claim  to  an  allowance, 
she   is  entitled  to   the   avails  thereof.6     The  probate  court  has  no 


the  third  class,  the  real  estate  might  be 
sold,  out  of  the  proceeds  of  which  the 
claim  of  the  widow  might  be  satisfied,  if 
sufficient  mone}'  remained  after  paying 
the  third  class  in  full. 

1  Railway  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  90  Tenn. 
185. 

2  So  held  in  Kellogg  v.  Graves,  5  Ind. 
509;  Brown  v.  Joiner,  77  Ga.  232;  s.  c. 
80  Ga.  486;  Benjamin  v.  Laroche,  39 
Minn.  334,  per  Mitchell,  J.,  concurring; 
Mallory  v.  Mallory,  92  Ky.  316  ;  Hastings 
v.  Myers,  21  Mo.  519  ;  McFarland  v.  Baze, 
24  Mo.  156,  holding  that  it  passes  at  once 
upon  the  husband's  death,  discharged  of 
the  lien  of  the  debts,  and  may  be  assigned 
by  her  by  deed  even  without  considera- 
tion:  Cummings  v.  Cummings,  51  Mo. 
261  ;  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  41  Vt.  467,  de- 
ducing this  consequence  from  the  peculi- 
arity of  the  statute,  which  authorizes  the 
probate  court  to  assign  to  the  widow  her 
share  of  the  estate,  not  less  than  one-third 
after  payment  of  debts,  &c,  and  holding 
that  her  share  is  governed  by  the  same 
rules  as  the  share  which  passes  to  the 
heir;  Whitley  v.  Stephenson,  38  Miss. 
113;  York  v.  York,  38  111.  522,  526;  Brat- 
ney  v.  Curry,  33  Ind.  399;  Bayless  v. 
Bayless,  4  Coldw.  359,  361.  She  may  sue 
for  the  property  assigned  her  in  her  own 

name  :  Railway  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  90  Tenn. 

185.     Anil  the  failure  t<>  die  ;in   inventory 

and  appraisement  of  the  personal  prop- 
erty, as  required  by  law,  does  noi  deprive 
the   widow  of  this   right:    Adkinson    t\ 

188 


Breeding,   56   Iowa,   26,   27;    Hardin    v. 
Pulley,  79  Ala.  381. 

3  Runyan's  Appeal,  27  Pa.  St.  121 ; 
Kauff man's  Appeal,  112  Pa.  St.  645.  In 
this  State  the  widow  waives  her  right  if 
she  do  not  claim  her  exemption  within 
a  reasonable  time,  or  if  she  remarries  be- 
fore making  a  demand :  post,  §  92,  p.  *  190. 

4  Mitcham  v.  Moore,  73  Ala.  542,  545. 
In  such  case,  no  title  to  any  particular 
property  vests  until  the  selection  is  made : 
Little  v.  McPherson,  76  Ala.  552 ;  Carey 
v.  Monroe,  54  N.  J.  Eq.  632,  636  ;  though 
the  right  to  the  exemption  vests  immedi- 
ately on  the  death  of  the  decedent :  Har- 
din v.  Pulley,  79  Ala.  381,  386.  When 
the  estate  does  not  exceed  the  amount 
allowed,  and  there  is  no  administration, 
a  selection  is  unnecessary,  the  right  of 
exemption  attaching  to  the  whole  uncon- 
ditionally ;  possession,  retention,  and  use 
constitute  a  sufficient  election :  Gamble 
v.  Kellum,  97  Ala.  677.  In  Indiana  the 
widow's  right  to  take  property  at  the 
appraised  value,  not  exceeding  $500,  con- 
tinues up  to  the  time  of  sale,  although 
she  has  made  a  partial  selection  before 
the  return  of  the  inventory  ;  in  such  case, 
injunction  will  lie  to  prevent  an  executor 
from  selling,  where  the  property  is  needed 
and  cannot  be  replaced  by  her :  Denny  v. 
Denny,  113  Ind.  22. 

*  Dorah  v.  Dorah,  4  Oh.  St.  292.  See 
In  re  Lux,  114  Cal.  73. 

r'  Kingsbury  v.  Wilmarth,2 Allen, 310; 
in  Missouri,  at  any  time  before  such  pro- 


§  86  WHEN   THE    ALLOWANCE   TAKES   EFFECT.        *  177,  *  178 

power  to  authorize  an  executor  to  sell  the  articles  provided  by  law 
for  the  support  of  the  widow  and  her  family,  and  she  may,  notwith- 
standing such  order,  maintain  trespass  against  the  executor,1  or 
trover,2  or  hold  him  responsible  as  a  wrong-doer,  but  not  on  his  bond,3 

or  compel  the  delivery  to  her  of  the  proceeds.4  The  abso- 
[*  178]  lute  title  of  the  widow,  and  in  the  *  absence  of  a  widow,  of 

the  minor  children,  to  the  property  allowed  them  for 
temporary  support,  follows  of  necessity  in  all  of  those  States  in 
which  it  is  assigned  to  the  widow  or  children  without  further 
administration,  when  it  appears  that  the  total  value  of  the  estate 
does  not  exceed  the  amount  so  allowed;  for  the  abandonment  of 
further  administration  rests  solely  upon  the  ground  that  there  is  no 
property  to  administer,  because  what  property  the  decedent  may 
have  left  is  the  property  of  the  widow  or  children,  in  which  no  other 
person  has  any  interest.5  But  in  some  States  it  is  held  that,  if  the 
widow  die  before  it  is  allotted  to  her,  her  right  thereto  abates,  and 
it  cannot  be  claimed  by  her  administrator.6  "This  allowance  for 
necessaries,"  say  the  commissioners  revising  the  statutes  of  Massa- 
chusetts, "  is  not  intended  to  compensate  the  widow  for  any  apparent 
injustice  to  which  she  may,  in  any  case,  be  exposed  by  the  statute 
rules  of  distribution,  or  by  the  will  of  her  husband;  but  merely 
to  furnish  her  with  a  reasonable  maintenance  for  a  few  weeks,  and 
with  some  articles  of  necessary  furniture,  when  she  is  not  otherwise 
provided  with  them."  It  was  held,  in  accordance  with  this  view, 
that  the  death  of  the  widow  pending  an  appeal  by  the  executors 
from  an  allowance  made  to  her  by  the  court  of  probate  put  an  end  to 
her  claim.7  These  decisions  have,  of  course,  no  application  to  the 
widow's  distributive  share  in  her  husband's  estate,  which  vests  in 
her  at  once  upon  the  decease  of  her  husband  and  passes  to  her  repre- 
sentatives, although  she  has  not  come  into  the  enjoyment  of  the 

ceeds  are  paid  out  for  debts,  or  in  distri-  5  Ante,  §  83,  p.  *  172. 

bution;  but  it  cannot  be  claimed  out  of  6  cox  v_  Brown,  5  Ired.  L.  194  •  Kim- 

the  partnership  estate  of  a  firm  of  which  ball  v.  Deming,  5  Ired.  L.  418  ;  Ex  parte 

her   deceased    husband   was   a   member :  Dunn,  63  N.  C.  137  ;  Simpson  v.  Cureton, 

Julian  v.  Wrightsman,  73  Mo.  569,  571,  et  97  N.  C.  112,  116  ;  Tarbox  v.  Fisher,  50 

seq. ;   nor,  where  the   widow   omitted   to  Me.  236,  238 ;  Carey  v.  Monroe,  54  N.  J. 

make  her  claim  before  the  personalty  was  Eq.  632 ;  Succession  of  Tugwell,  43  La. 

exhausted  in  the  payment  of  debts,  can  it  An.   879.      In    California  the    allowance 

be  allowed  to  her  out  of  the  surplus  in  not  yet  accrued  at  her  death  abates,  but 

the  administrator's  hands  from  the  pro-  so  much   as  had   then  accrued  and  was 

ceeds  of  sale  of  real  estate :  Kitchey  v.  unpaid  goes  to  her  estate :    In  re  Lux, 

Withers,  72  Mo.  556,  559.  114  Cal.  73. 

1  Carter  v.  Hinkle,  13  Ala.  529,  533.  *  Adams  v.  Adams,  10  Met.  170.     Con- 

2  Graves  v.  Graves,  10  B.  Monr.  31.  versely,  if  not  appealed  from,  her  right 
8  Morris  v.  Morris,  9  Heisk.  814,  822.  is  conclusively  established :  Drew  v.  Gor- 
4  Grofton  v.  Smith,  66  Miss.  408.     See  don,  13  Allen,  120. 

post,  §  91,  as  to  her  right  to  the  proceeds 
where  the  property  is  sold. 

189 


*  178,  *  179      PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OF   THE   FAMILY.  §  87 

property  before  her  decease;1  nor  where  the  property  vests  in  the 
widow  upon  the  husband's  death.2 

§  87.  Separate  Property  of  the  Widow  affecting  the  Allowance. 
—  The  object  sought  to  be  accomplished  by  the  enactment  of  these 
0        ,  laws,  —  to  meet  the  actual  wants  and  necessities  of  the 

Separate  prop-  ' 

*rty  of  the  widow  and  her  family,  —  and  the  impossibility  of  fram- 

consldereYin6  ^S  a  general  l*w  determining  with  accuracy  the   cir- 

guiding  the  cumstances  constituting    such    necessity,    have 

judge,  bat  is  no  *  induced  the  legislature  iu  many  States  to  refer  [*179] 

bar  to  the  ai-  ^e   solution   of   this   question   to   the  probate 

lowance  unless  .   ,  ..  •.        t  ,• 

so  expressed  in  court,  with  no  limitation  upon  its  discretionary  power 
the  statute.  gave  sucn  general  injunctions  as  "  having  regard  to 
all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,"  or  to  "the  solvency  or  insolvency 
of  the  estate,"  "to  make  such  reasonable  allowance  as  may  be  neces- 
sary," "the  amount  necessary  for  sustenance,"  "a  sufficiency  for  the 
support  of  the  widow  and  her  family  for  twelve  months,"  etc. 
"Though  no  general  rules/'  says  Shaw,  C.  J.,  "have  or  can  be 
established  regulating  this  judicial  discretion,  yet,  to  some  extent, 
the  considerations  of  justice  and  expediency  on  which  the  law  is 
founded  are  plain  and  obvious,  and  from  them  we  may  infer  the 
intention  of  the  legislature.  The  case  supposes  the  death  of  a  hus- 
band leaving  a  widow.  In  the  great  majority  of  the  cases  he  will 
have  been  a  housekeeper;  in  many,  a  parent;  in  many,  leaving 
children  helpless  and  dependent.  In  many  cases  the  widow,  by  the 
decease  of  her  husband,  may  become  the  head  of  a  household  and 
family;  new  duties  aud  obligations  may  rest  upon  her,  causing  an 
immediate  demand  for  necessaries,  sometimes  even  before  letters  of 
administration  can  be  granted.  The  purpose  of  the  statute,  we 
think,  is  to  make  a  personal  allowance  to  her  to  meet  these  neces- 
sities. But  no  one  of  these  circumstances  constitutes  a  condition  to 
this  allowance,  or  a  decisive  test  of  its  fitness.  The  parties  may  not 
have  been  housekeepers,  or  even  living  together  at  the  time  of  the 
husband's  decease.  She  may  have  been  absent  at  a  hospital  or 
infirmary,  for  the  recovery  of  her  health,  bodily  or  mental,  and  stand 
in  immediate  need;  or  she  may  be  on  a  visit  to  her  friends;  or  by 
mutual  consent  and  for  their  common  benefit  they  may  seek  employ- 
ment in  different  places,  —  as,  for  instance,  the  husband  at  sea.  the 
wife  in  a  school  or  factory.     But  these  are  all  '  circumstances  '  — 

1  Johnson  r.  Johnson,  41  Vt.  467,  469 ;  erty   allowed   her  goes    to    her  personal 

the   statute   fixed    the    minimum    of    the  representative  or   assigns,  who  may  make 

allowance  at    not    less  than  one  third  of  the  selection,  where  one  is  necessary,  the 

the  residne,  l>nt  the  probate  court  must  same  as  she  might  do  if  living.    The  only 

designate  the  amount  effect  of  the  selection  is  to  give  precision. 

:  ff««h'tifi  ■■  Myers, 2]  M>>  519;  Ben-    so  to  speak,  to  the  property  which  has 

janiin  p.  Laroche,  M  Minn.  S34,  in  which     already    become    hers    on    the  husbands 
Mitchell,  J.   (concurring),  says:    "If  she     decease." 
dies  before   making  a   selection,  the  pr«>p- 
190 


§  88  WHAT   CONSTITUTES    A    FAMILY.  *  179,  *  180 

and  they  are  often  numerous  and  various  —  to  be  taken  into  consid- 
eration by  the  judge  to  determine  whether  any  allowance  shall  be 
made,  and,  if  any,  what.  The  amount  of  money  left  by  the  hus- 
band, and  the  amount  of  the  separate  estate  and  means  of  the  wife, 
are  also  important  circumstances  bearing  upon  the  question  of  her 
necessities."1  The  possession  of  separate  property  by  the  widow, 
coupled  with  the  circumstance  that  there  were  no  children,  induced 

the  court  in  this  case  to  withhold  an  allowance.  So  in 
[*  180]  Texas  the  *  allowance  is  upon  condition  that  the  widow  and 

children  have  no  adequate  separate  property,  and  hence  it 
was  refused  to  children  who  had  separate  property  of  the  value  of 
$2,493.50; 2  but  a  minor  emancipated  by  his  parents  and  earning 
wages  sufficient  for  his  support  is  not  excluded  thereby  from  the 
year's  support.8  In  Louisiana  it  may  be  shown,  in  derogation  of 
her  claim,  that  she  has  separate  property.4  In  New  Hampshire  the 
amount  of  dower  to  which  the  widow  is  entitled  must  be  considered 
in  determining  upon  her  allowance.5  So  in  Maine  the  probate  court 
may  properly  take  into  consideration  the  value  of  the  widow's 
private  estate,  not  derived  from  her  husband.6  But  in  other  States, 
and  particularly  where  the  articles  of  property  allowed  are  enumerated 
by  statute,  the  widow  and  children  are  entitled  to  this  allowance 
irrespective  of  any  separate  property  she  or  they  may  own.  This 
view  has  never  been  questioned  in  Missouri,  and  was  held  in  Ver- 
mont,7 California,8  Washington,9  Alabama,10  and  Mississippi.11  She 
takes  also  independent  of  what  she  receives  under  her  husband's 
will.12  In  Nevada  the  statute  provides  that  the  amounts  allowed 
for  the  support  of  the  family  go  to  the  children  if  the  widow  have 
sufficient  property  of  her  own.18 

§  88.    What  Constitutes  a  Family.  —  The  terms  used  to  designate 
the  recipients  of  this  bounty  are  commonly  "widow"   a  family  in  the 
"widow   and   children,"   or  "widow  and  her  family."    popukrWse 
The  number  of  persons  constituting  a  family  is  some-    theperaons 

1  Hollenbeck  v.  Pixley,  3  Gray,  521,  6  Duncan  v.  Eaton,  17  N.  II.  441. 

525.  6  Walker,  Appellant,  83  Me.  17. 

a  Sloan  v.  Webb,  20  Tex.  189.  »  Sawyer  v.  Sawyer,  28  Vt.  245,  248. 

8  Cooper  v.  Pierce,  74  Tex.  526.  8  jn  re  lUX;   10q  caj    593^  G03 .  jn  re 

4  Succession  of  Aaron,  11  La.  An.  671.  Lax,  114  Cal.  73. 

The  statute  provides   that    one  thousand  9  Griesemer  v.  Boyer,   13    Wash.    171 

dollars  may  be  applied  to  the  relief  of  a  (in  which  case  the  widow  took  insurance 

widow  in  necessitous  circumstances  ;  and  provided  for  her  by  the  husband). 

it  is  held  that  where  she  may  be  entitled  10  Johnson  v.  Davenport,  42  Ala.  317; 

to  this  or  a  greater  sum  in  her  own  right,  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  51  Ala.  493. 

and  there  is  a  controversy  with  respect  n  Coleman   v.   Brooke,   37    Miss.    71  ; 

thereto,  she  may  receive  this  sum  out  of  Whitley  v.    Stephenson,   38    Miss.    113; 

the  estate  on  giving  bond  to  refund  if  she  Wally  v.  Wally,  41  Miss.  657. 

recover,  or  by  assigning  an  equivalent  part  12  In  re  Lux,    114    Cal.    73;    Haven's 

of  the  judgmeut  when  obtained  to  the  es-  Appeal,  69  Conn.  684. 

tate:  Succession  of  De  Boisblanc,  32  La.  18  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  2797. 
An.  17,  citing  earlier  Louisiana  cases. 

191 


*  180,  *  181      PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OF   THE   FAMILY.  §  88 

•who  live  to-       times  an   important   circumstance  in   ascertaining   the 
gether  in  one      proper  amount  to  be  allowed  for  their  maintenance  and 

house  and  r     r  _  ^  «,^u. 

under  one  head  support,  and  it  is  therefore  necessary  that  the  legal 
or  manager.  meaning  of  the  term  be  understood.  It  may  be  difficult 
to  define  the  word  accurately  and  scientifically,  so  as  to  include  all 
the  specific  significations  to  which  it  is  applied;  but  its  popular 
meaning,  and  the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  in  the  statutes  under 
consideration,  seem  to  be  plain  and  unmistakable.  Webster's 
primary  definition  is,  "the  collective  body  of  persons  who  live  in 
one  house,  and  under  one  head  or  manager."  This  definition  was 
adopted  by  Lindsay,  J.,  in  construing  the  constitution  of  Texas  as 
to  its  exempting  from  sale  under  execution  the  homestead  of  the 
head  of  a  family.  "  It "  (meaning  the  homestead),  he  says, 
*"is  intended  to  be  made,  by  this  constitutional  provision,  [*181] 
the  inviolable  sanctuary  of  the  family :  not  merely  the  head 
of  the  family,  but  of  all  its-members,  whetherconsistingof  husband, 
wife,  and  children,  or  any  other  combination  of  human  beings,  living 
together  in  a  common  interest  and  having  a  common  object  in  their 
pursuits  and  occupations.  Such  a  combination  of  persons,  so  cir- 
cumstanced, necessarily  constitutes  a  family." 1  This  definition  is  in 
harmony  with  the  etymological  origin  of  the  word,  as  well  as  its 
present  popular  acceptation.  Webster  indicates  its  derivation  from 
the  Latin  famulus,  a  servant;  thus  familia,  family,  would  indicate 
a  body  or  society  of  persons  serving  each  other,  ministering  to  each 
other's  necessities,  wants,  and  comforts.  As  in  ancient  Borne 
familia  included  all  of  the  slaves  of  a  household,  a  household 
establishment,  family  servants,  domestics,  so  the  word  "  family  "  in 
modern  times  includes  not  only  parents  and  children,  or  husband 
and  wife,  but  also  brothers  and  sisters  and  other  relations,  as  well 
as  servants  and  dependants,  living  together  in  a  household  establish- 
ment, governed  or  controlled  by  one  person,  who  is  its  head  or  man- 
ager. In  this  sense  husband  and  wife  constitute  a  family; 2  a  wid- 
owed sister  and  her  brother  for  whom  she  keeps  house;8  a  son  who 
provides  for  his  widowed  mother  and  children,  who  live  with  him;4 
a  father  and  his  indigent  daughter  with  her  three  minor  children 
living  with  him ; 5  a  brother,  and  an  unmarried  sister  and  two 
brothers  under  twenty-one  years  of  age,  having  no  means  of  their 
own  and  supported  by  the  brother; 6  a  widow  and  the  children  of  her 
deceased  husband  by  a  former  wife;7  a  father  and  his  infant  son 
dependent  upon  him  for  support;8  a  widow  with  five  orphan  chil- 
dren of  a  deceased  sister,   who  had   been  members  of  the  family 

I  Wilson  v.  Cochran,  81  Tex.  677, 679 ;         6  BlackweU    v.    Broughton,    56     Ga. 

Rock  v.  Haas,  1  K)  111.  .V_>k,  583.  390. 

*  Kite  lull  v.  Bargwin,  21  111.  40,  45.  6  McMurray  v.  Shuck,  6  Bush,  111. 

3  Wade  v.  Jones,  20  Mo.  75.  "  Sanderlin  v.  Sanderlin,  1  Swan,  441. 

«   ConnanghtOD  ''.  Sands,  32  Win.  387  ;  8  Cantrcll  v.  Conner,  51  How.  Pr.  45. 

M.-u  b  v.  Lazenby,  41  Ga.  153. 
102 


§  89  ALLOWANCE  TO  THE  WIDOW  ALONE.     *  181,  *  182 

during  her  husband's  lifetime,  and  two  other  children  of  a  sister  of 
her  late  husband.1  But  the  mere  aggregation  of  individuals  who  are 
not  dependent  on  each  other  has  been  held  not  to  constitute  a  family 
in  the  sense  of  these  statutes;  neither  an  unmarried  man,  who  has 
only  servants  and  employees  living  with  him,2  nor  a  father  having 
a  family  in  another  State,  and  accompanied  by  a  son  who 
[*  182]  is  not  dependent  *upon  him,3  nor  a  single  person  living  by 
himself,4  can  be  considered  as  the  head  of  a  family;  and, 
conversely,  the  relation  of  parent  and  child,  with  its  consequent 
condition  of  dependence,  constitutes  a  family,  although  the  members 
may  not  live  together  or  under  the  same  roof.5  A  widow  is  entitled 
to  the  year's  allowance  for  herself  and  step-children  with  her  at  the 
time  of  the  husband's  death,  although  the  children  be  afterward, 
without  her  consent,  taken  away ;  and  in  such  case  no  part  of  the 
allowance  should  be  paid  to  the  children's  guardian.6  And  servants, 
as  well  as  adult  children,  but  not  boarders,  are  included  under  the 
word  "family,"  in  fixing  the  amount  of  allowance  for  a  year's  sup- 
port.7 In  North  Carolina  the  statute  defines  the  meaning  of  the 
word  "family,"  as  used  in  relation  to  the  rights  of  widows,  to  include 
beside  the  widow  every  child  either  of  the  deceased  or  of  his  widow, 
and  every  other  person  to  whom  the  deceased  or  widow  stood  in 
place  of  a  parent,  who  was  residing  with  the  deceased  at  the  time  of 
his  death,  and  whose  age  did  not  then  exceed  fifteen  years.8 

It  will  appear  hereafter,  in  the  discussion  of  the  subject  of  dower,9 
that  a  wife  against  whom  the  husband  obtains  a  decree  of  divorce 
for  her  misconduct  is  not  entitled  to  dower  in  his  estate. 
She  is  likewise  barred  of  any  right  to  the  provisions  1V0rce  wie* 
made  by  statute  for  the  support  of  the  deceased  husband's  surviving 
family. 10 

§  89.  Allowance  to  the  Widow  alone.  —  Although  the  statute 
provide  this  allowance  for  "the  widow  and  children  constituting 
the  family  of  the  deceased,"  the  widow  alone  may  take,  n  there  are  no 
if  there  are  no  children.11  And  under  a  statute  provid-  minor  children, 
ing  that,  "if  there  be  no  infant  children  residing  with  take  theaiiow- 
the  widow,  and  there  be  adult  or  infant  children  not  ance  alone- 
residing  with  her,  the  provision  contained  in  this  section  for  the 
widow,  or  the  value  of  such  portion  thereof  as  she  receives,  shall 
be  charged  to  her  in  the  distribution,"  it  was  held  that  the  title  to 

1  Ex  parte  Brien,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  33.  8  Code,  1883,  §  2119. 

2  Garaty  v.  Du  Bose,  5  S.  C  493.  9  Post,  §  109. 

8  Allen  v.  Manasse,  4  Ala.  554.  10  Because  she   cannot  be   considered 

4  Calhoun  v.   McLendon,  42  Ga.  405  ;  as  being  included  in  such  family :    Dob- 
Rock  v.  Haas,  110  111.  528,  533.  son  v.  Butler,  17   Mo.  87,  90.     See  infra, 

5  Sallee  v.  Waters,  17  Ala.  482.  §  89,  on  this  point. 

6  Vincent  v.   Vincent,   1    Heisk.  333;  n  Little  v.  McPherson,   76  Ala.  552; 
Sanderlin  ».  Sanderlin,  1  Swan,  441 .  Sawyer  v.  Sawyer,  28  Vt.  245,  247  ;  Brown 

7  Strawn  v.  Strawn,  53  111.  263,  274.  v.  Brown,  33  Miss.  39. 

VOL.   I.  — 13  193 


182,  *  183      PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY    OF   THE    FAMILY. 


§89 


such  allowance  vested  in  the  widow  if  there  were  no  infant 
♦children  residing  with  her,  and  no  adult  or  infant  children  [*183] 
Allowance  to      n0*  residing  with  her.1     Where  the  allowance  is 
the  widow  and    to  the  widow  and  children,  it  must  be  paid  directly  to 
abietolhe         the  widow;  the  children  are  entitled  to  no  part  of  it.a 
widow.  jn   x0Wa  the  property  allotted  to  the  widow  does  not 

become  her  absolute  property,  but  is  to  be  used  by  her  so  long  as 
there  is  a  family,  and  when  it  is  no  longer  needed  for  the  support 
of  such  family  it  reverts  into  the  general  assets  of  the  estate.8  In 
Illinois  the  widow's  award  becomes  her  absolute  property  and  dis- 
posable as  she  sees  fit,  free  from  all  claims  by  the  children,4  and  the 
award  made  by  the  appraisers  cannot  be  apportioned  between  her 
and  the  children  of  decedent  by  the  probate  court.5  In  Mississippi 
it  is  held  that,  where  the  children  do  not  live  with  the  widow,  but 
are  provided  for  by  a  guardian,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  probate  court  to 
apportion  the  amount  allowed  between  the  widow  and  children ; 8  and 
Re-marriage  where  there  is  no  child,  the  widow's  interest  in  the 
abates  property  allotted  to  her  exempt  from  execution  ceases 

ullowiinct1 

upon  her  marriage  to  another  husband.7     A  similar  rule 

1  Newman  v.  Winlock,  3  Bush,  241. 

2  Nevin's  Appeal,  47  Pa.  St.  230. 
Says  Strong,  J. :  "  It  was  assumed  her 
affection  for  the  children  would  be  a  suf- 
ficient safeguard  for  their  interests.  In 
most  cases  the  widow  is  the  mother  of 


the  children.  If  she  be  but  a  step-mother, 
they  are  generally  safe  in  her  regard,  not 
only  for  them,  but  for  the  deceased. 
Certainly  it  would  not  tend  to  the  pro- 
motion of  domestic  harmony  to  invite 
the  children  (or  relatives  of  the  first  wife 
using  the  names  of  the  children)  to  assail 
the  character  of  their  father's  widow, 
though  but  a  step-mother,  and  contest  her 
right  to  administer  a  bounty  given  by 
the  law  for  herself  and  her  deceased  hus- 
band's family.  Were  such  a  door  open, 
there  is  reason  to  believe  it  would  not 
[infrequently  call  forth  some  of  the  worst 
passions, and  the  bounty  of  the  legislature, 
instead  "f  being  a  blessing,  would  prove 
a  curse."  (p.  232.)  To  the  same  effect 
Johnson  v.  Corbett,  11  Paige,  2G5.  In 
Tennessee  the  exemption  provided  for  by 
the  statute  rests  in  the  widow  for  herself 
and  in  trust  for  the  benefit  of  decedent's 
children;  the  ownership  is  fur  the  benefit 
of  all,  and    npOD    the  death  of   any  one   of 

them  while  the  property  is  yet  on  hand 
the  interest  of  snch  one  passes  to  those 
surviving :  Bneed  v.  Jenkins,  90  Tenn. 
137,  142;  hut  where  there  are  no  minor 
194 


children  it  vests  in  her  absolutely  :  Comp- 
ton  v.  Perkins,  92  Tenn.  715.  In  Maine 
the  court  may  divide  the  allowance  between 
the  widow  and  minors  by  a  former  wife, 
but  is  not  bound  to  do  so  :  Peters,  C.  J., 
in  Davis  v.  Gower,  85  Me.  167.  In  Georgia 
it  is  held  that  a  widow  may  sell  land  set 
apart  as  a  year's  support,  on  behalf  of 
herself  and  children,  when  this  is  neces- 
sary for  their  support :  Cox  v.  Cody,  75 
Ga.  175.  Though  she  remarries:  Swain 
v.  Stewart,  98  Ga.  366.  But  where  she  re- 
marries, sells  the  laud,  and  takes  title  in 
herself  and  husband,  the  sale  is  invalid: 
Vaudigrift  v.  Potts,  72  Ga.  665.  While 
the  widow  remains  on  the  land  and  derives 
her  support  from  it,  the  minor  children, 
when  they  attain  their  majority,  cannot 
coerce  partition,  nor  otherwise  disturb  her 
occupation  :  Roberts  v.  Dickerson,  95  Ga. 
727. 

8  Gaskell  v.  Case,  18  Iowa,  147  ;  Wil- 
mington v.  Sutton,  6  Iowa,  44 ;  Schaffner 
V.  Grut/.macher,  6  Iowa,  137;  Paup  v. 
Sylvester,  22  Iowa,  371  ;  aud  she  has  no 
right  to  sell  such  property  and  appro- 
priate the  proceeds  :  Meyer  v.  Meyer,  23 
Iowa,  359. 

4  Weaver  v.  Weaver,  109  111.  225,  234. 

6  Scoville's  Estate,  20  111.  App.  426, 
429,  and  cases  cited. 

0  Womack  v.  Boyd,  31  Miss.  443. 

7  Carpenter  v.  Browulee,  38  Miss.  200. 


§  89  ALLOWANCE  TO  THE  WIDOW  ALONE.    *  183,  *  184 

prevails  in  California.1  In  Georgia  a  different  rule  is  applied,  and 
the  re-marriage  of  the  widow  does  not  deprive  her  of  her  right  to  the 
allowance.2  A  woman  who  has  been  divorced  from  her  husband  is 
self-evidently   not   entitled   to   this  allowance,  or  any    Divorced  wife 

share  in  the  estate  of  her  former  husband ;  having  not  entitled  to 
[*  184]  ceased  to  be  his  wife  during  his  *  lifetime,  she   an  allowance- 

cannot  be  considered  his  widow  after  his  death.8  In  Penn- 
sylvania the  same  rule  is  applied  to  a  woman  who  has  been  divorced 
a  mensa  et  thoro,4  to  a  woman  who  had   deserted  her   XT 

i  iri-ii-i  ■"0r  one  wn0 

husband  more  than  twelve  years  before  his  death  with-  had  deserted 
out  reasonable  cause,6  and  to  a  wife  who  had  left  her  fora'tongtime 
husband  and  renounced  all  conjugal  intercourse  a  con- 
siderable time  before  his  death.6  So  in  Iowa  the  court  holds  that 
the  family  relation  must  have  an  actual  existence,  as  distinguished 
from  one  that  exists  theoretically  only,  and  that  none  such  exists 
where  husband  and  wife  lived  apart  for  seven  years  prior  to  his  death, 
he  boarding  with  others  and  neither  contributing  nor  being  asked  to 
contribute  to  her  support.7  On  the  other  hand,  a  New  York  court, 
under  somewhat  similar  circumstances,  arrived  at  a  contrary  con- 
clusion, construing  the  statute  of  New  York.8  And  so  in  Missouri 
a  widow  is  entitled  to  her  allowance  whether  or  not  she  be  living 
with  her  husband  at  the  time  of  his  death,  and  though  she  may  have 
abandoned  him  without  cause.9  In  Massachusetts  also  the  allow- 
ance may  be  given,  although  the  widow  at  the  time  of  her  hus- 
band's death  is  living  separate  and  apart  from  him.10  In  North 
Carolina  and  Indiana  the  statute  provides  that  a  married  woman  who 
commits  adultery  and  does  not  live  with  her  husband  at  the  time 
of  his  death  loses  her  right  to  the  year's  allowance.11 

1  Hamilton's  Estate,  66  Cal.  576,  hold-  opinion  of  Lowrie,  J.,  in  2  Am.  L.  Reg. 
ing  that  the  allowance  terminates  on  re-     (1854),  510. 

marriage  without  further  order  of  court.  6  Odiorne's    Appeal,   54   Pa.    St.   175. 

2  Swain  v.  Stewart,  98  Ga.  366.  There  So  also  where  the  separation  was  by  con- 
was  in  this  case  a  minor  child,  but  the  tract :  Speidel's  Appeal,  107  Pa.  St.  18. 
opinion  of  the  court  proceeds  on  the  theory  Similar  decisions  are  found  in  other 
that  since  the  widow  obtains  a  vested  in-  States :  In  re  Noah,  73  Cal.  583 ;  s.  c.  88 
dividual  right  at  the  husband's  death,  she  Cal.  468 ;  Young  v.  Hicks,  92  N.  Y.  235. 
cannot  be  deprived  thereof  by  her  second  7  Linton  v.  Crosby,  56  Iowa,  386. 
marriage,  and  no  intimation  is  made  by  8  Matter  of  Shedd,  60  Hun,  367,  ex- 
the  court  that  a  different  rule  would  apply  pressly  declining  to  follow  the  construe- 
in  the  absence  of  minors.  tion  placed  on  the  Iowa  statute. 

3  Dobson  v.  Butler,  17  Mo.  87,  90.  9  It  is  sufficient  if  she  be  the  wife  at  the 

4  Hettrick  v.  Hettrick,  55  Pa.  St.  290.  time  of  his  death :  Mowser  n.  Mowser,  87 
The  reason  given  is,  that  it  was  the  pur-  Mo.  437  ;  King  v.  King,  64  Mo.  App. 
pose  of  the  act  to  make  an   immediate  301. 

provision   for  the  wants    of    the   family  10  Chase    v.  Webster,  168    Mass.  228, 

when  the  head  of  it  is  removed  by  death,  231.     In  this   case   there   was  a  divorce 

and  has  no  application  where  the  family  nisi,  but  not  absolute, 

relation  did  not  exist.  n  Leonard  v.  Leonard.  107  N.  C.  171. 

5  Tozer   v.    Tozer.   extract   from    the  In  Indiana  she  must  have  left  her  hus- 

19.5 


*  184,  *  185       PROVISIONAL    ALIMONY   OF   THE    FAMILY.  §  89 

The  rules  generally  governing  the  disposition  of  property  of  a 
decedent  situated  in  a  State  other  than  that  of  his  domicil  at  the 
Nor  non-res-  time  of  his  death,  demand  that  his  personal  property 
ident  widows,  shall  be  disposed  of  according  to  the  law  of  his  last 
domicil,  after  payment  of  any  debts  he  may  owe  in  the  State  of  the 
rei  sitce ; 1  and  where  the  provisions  of  the  statute  securing  the 
allowance  are  not  applicable  to  the  widow  of  a  deceased  resident  of 
another  State,2  it  would  seem  that  such  allowance  must  be  made  in 
the  State  of  the  domicil,  and  satisfied  out  of  the  property  there;  or 
if  there  are  not  sufficient  assets  there,  then  out  of  the  assets  in  the 
ancillary  administration,  upon  application  to  the  ancillary  adminis- 
trator.3 It  will  be  noticed  that  in  such  case  the  claims  of  the 
creditors  in  the  State  where  the  property  is  found  must  take  pre- 
cedence of  such  allowance.4  In  Alabama5  and  Pennsylvania,6  the 
non-resident  widow  of  a  deceased  resident  is  not  entitled  to  these 
provisions.  In  New  York,  however,  it  was  decided  that  even  an 
alien  widow,  who  had  never  been  in  this  country,  is  entitled  to  this 
allowance;7  and  in  Louisiana,  where  the  widow  "if  in  needy  circum- 
stances" is  allowed  the  usufruct  of  $1,000  in  lieu  of  a  home- 

*  stead,  it  was  allowed  to  one,  although  neither  she  nor  the  [*  185] 
children  had  ever   been  domiciled  in  Louisiana.8     So  it  is 

held  in  Georgia,  that  where  a  resident  of  Georgia  died,  leaving  a 
widow  and  minor  children  who  had  never  resided  within  the  State, 
and  had  not  been  living  with  decedent  for  eleven  years  prior  to  his 
death,  that  they  were  nevertheless  entitled  to  the  statutory  allow- 
ance out  of  his  estate,  as  against  creditors.9     It  is  also  held,  in  this 

band  and  be  living  in  adultery  at  the  time  6  Spier's    Appeal,    26     Pa.    St.    233  ; 

of  his  death  to  forfeit   her  right  to  the  Coates'  Estate,   12    Phila.    171  ;    Piatt's 

statutory  allowance  on  the  ground  of  liv-  Appeal,  80  Pa.  St.  501,  504.     But  even  in 

ing  separate  and  in  adultery:  Zeigler  v.  this  State,  where  it  appears  that  the  wife 

Mize,  132  Ind.  403.  was  left   in  the   foreign   country  by  the 

1  Medley  v.  Dunlap,  90  N.  C.  527 ;  husband,  expecting  to  follow  him  here  so 
.Smith  v.  Howard,  86  Me.  203,  208 ;  see,  soon  as  he  could  provide  her  a  home,  and 
on  the  question  of  domicil,  post,  ch.  xvii.  that  she  was  at  all  fimes  willing  to  join 

2  As  is  held  in  Missouri  :  Richardson  him,  but  the  husband,  after  his  arrival 
)-.  Lewis,  21  Mo.  App.  531,  535;  Austin's  conceals  from  her  the  knowledge  of  his 
Estate:  73  Mo.  App.  61;  Mississippi:  whereabouts  and  bigamously  marries 
Barber  v.  Ellis,  68  Miss.  172  ;  Tennessee  :  another  woman,  on  his  death  the  foreign 
Graham  v.  Stull,  92  Tenn.  673;  Maine:  widow  is  nevertheless  entitled  to  her 
Smitli  v.  Howard,  86  Me.  203,  211 ;  North  allowance  :  Grieve's  Estate,  165  Pa.  St. 
Carolina:  Medley  v.  Dunlap,  supra;  126.  This  case  distinguishes  the  prior 
though  she  subsequently  became  a  resi-  cases  on  the  ground  that  in  all  of  them 
dent  of  the  State:  Simpson  v.  Cureton, 97  the  separation  was  the  voluntary  act  of 
N.  C.  1 1 2.  the  wife. 

'■'■  Medley  »■    Dunlap,    supra,    p.  529 ;          7  Kapp    v.    Public    Administrator,    2 

Shannon  v.  White,  109  Mass.  146.  Bradf.  258. 

<  Simpson  v.  Cureton,  97  N.  C.  112,  8  Succession  of  Christie,  20  La.  An. 
115;   see  also  Smith  V.   Howard,  86  Me.     383,  on  the  ground  that  the  lex  domicillii 

203,  211.  of  the  husband  controlled. 

*  Pearson  >.,  parte,  7G  Ala.  521.  •  Farris  v.  Battle,  80  Ga.  187. 
196 


8  90  ALLOWANCE   TO^THE    CHILDREN   ALONE.  *  185    *  186 

State,  that  the  wife  of  a  non-resident  intestate  may  sue  there  for  her 
year's  support,  yet  the  amount  of  the  recovery  is  controlled  by  the 
lex  domlcllllL1  In  Washington,  also,  the  court  says  that  the  non- 
residence  of  the  widow  of  a  deceased  resident  will  not  deprive  her 
and  the  minor  children  of  the  right  of  an  allowance.2 

§  90.    Allowance  to  the  Children  alone.  —  As  the  widow  alone,  if 
there  are  no  children,    may   claim   the   allowance  under  a  statute 
securing  it  to  the  widow  and  children,  so  the  children 
alone   are   entitled  if  there  is  no  widow.     Their  right   Ch'!<?ni"  a!?ne 

°  entitled  to  the 

does  not  depend  upon  the  assertion  of  it  by  the  allowance,  if 
mother. 3  And  where  the  children  of  a  former  wife  no  W1  ow> 
live  separate  from  the  widow,  under  the  control  of  their  guardian, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  probate  court  to  make  such  an  apportionment 
between  the  widow  and  the  children  as  will,  under  the  circum- 
stances, and  taking  into  account  the  sum  necessary  for  the  support 
of  each,  be  just  and  equitable.4  In  such  case  the  Posthumous 
posthumous  child  of  a  decedent  is  entitled  to  a  share  in  children, 
the  sum  allowed  for  the  year's  support.6  And  so  the  widow  is 
entitled  under  a  statute  securing  her  certain  specific  exemptions 
where  there  were  infant  children  residing  with  her,  if  she  be  enceinte 
at  the  time  of  the  husband's  death,  and  afterwards  delivered  of  a 
child.6  The  administrator  of  the  joint  estate  of  a  children  of  dif- 
deceased  husband  and  his  first  wife,  under  the  law  of  ferent  mothers. 
Texas,  cannot  appropriate  the  entire  allowance  for  one  year's  sup- 
port, though  furnished  from  the  community  property  of  the  first 
marriage,  to  the  exclusive  use  of  the  children  of  the  first  marriage, 
where  there  are  also  minor  children  of  the  deceased  husband  by  the 
second  marriage;  and  the  fact  that  the  mother  of  the  children  of 
the  second  marriage  left  the  homestead,  and  permitted  the  children 
of  the  first  marriage  to  occupy  it,  does  not  debar  the  former  from 
their  pro  rata  interest  in  the  amount  of  the  allowance.7  The  chil- 
dren of  a  widow  who  dies  intestate,  a  house-keeper  and   ~.  MJ 

i  .,,  ,  Children  of 

head   of  a  family,  are   entitled  to  the  property    a  deceased 
[*  186]  *  which  the  law  sets  apart  for  the  support  of  a   wldow- 

widow  and  children,   the   same  as  if  the  intestate  were  a 
widower.8     And  the  children  have  such  a  substantial  interest  in  the 

1  Mitchell  v.  Ward,  64  Ga.  208,  Jack-  Whitcomb  v.  Reid,  31  Miss.  567 ;  Wood- 
son, J.,  dissenting.  bridge  v.  Woodbridge,  70  Ga.  733. 

a  Griesemer  v.  Boyer,  13  Wash.  171,  *  Womack  v.  Boyd,  31  Miss.  443.    See 

176.     The   statement  of  facts,   however,  ante,  §  89,  p.  *  183,  showing  that  in  most 

seems  to  show   that  the   widow  became  States  the  allowance  is  payable  to  the 

non-resident  after  the   husband's   death,  widow  alone  (if  the  children  live  with  the 

though  the  court  does  not   base  its  re-  widow). 

marks  on  that  ground,  and  cites  Farris  v.  6  Womack  v.  Boyd,  supra. 

Battle,  supra,  and  Succession  of  Christie,  6  Husbands  v.  Bullock,  1  Duv.  21. 

supra,  as  authorities.  7  Harmon  v.  Bynum,  40  Tex.  324. 

3  Edwards    v.   McGee,   27   Miss.    92 ;  8  Lesher  v.  Wirth,  14  111.  39  ;  Himes'a 

197 


*  186  PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OF   THE   FAMILY.  §  91 

property  set  apart  for  the  widow's  support  that  a  marriage  contract, 
in  which  the  widow  had  waived  such  an  allowance,  is  held  void  as 
to  them.1  But  where  the  widow  and  minor  children  are  entitled  to 
occupy  the  ordinary  dwelling-house  and  the  messuage  thereto  free 
of  rent  for  one  year,  and  the  guardian  of  the  minor  children  removes 
them  from  her,  he  cannot  maintain  an  action  against  her  to  recover 
any  part  of  the  rental  value  of  the  premises  for  such  year.2  Ii> 
Georgia  the  minor  child  of  a  married  woman  whose  husband  survives 
her  cannot  have  a  year's  support  assigned  out  of  her  estate.3  So  it 
is,  in  Alabama,  held  that  the  statutory  provisions  in  favor  of  the 
widow  or  minor  children  of  a  decedent  do  not  apply  in  favor  of  the 
minor  children  out  of  the  mother's  estate.4     In  New 

SkieTout'of  York  it}  is  held  that'  while  tne  widow  is  entitled  to  her 
an  insolvent  reasonable  sustenance  out  of  the  estate  of  her  deceased 
husband,  whether  solvent  or  insolvent,  no  provision  is 
made  for  the  sustenance  of  the  children  of  an  insolvent  decedent, 
the  statutory  provision  being  confined  to  the  widow.5  The  same  is 
held  to  be  the  law  in  North  Carolina.6  In  Tennessee,  when  minor 
children  have  no  guardian,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  administrator  to 
preserve  out  of  the  estate  their  year's  support.7 

§  91.  Out  of  what  Property  to  be  allowed.  —  Since  the  adminis- 
tration of  estates  is  ordinarily  confined  to  the  personal  property 
The  allowance  ^e^  by  a  decedent,  and  the  executor  or  administrator 
is  generally  is  usually  his  personal  representative,  his  real  estate 
personal  e°state  passing  at  once  to  the  heirs,  devisees,  or  dowress,  the 
only-  allowance  for  the  temporary  support  of  the  widow  and 

family  is  rarely  a  charge  upon  the  real  estate,  but  granted,  generally, 
out  of  the  personal  property  left  by  the  decedent  only.8  Hence 
money  representing  the  proceeds  of  real  estate  cannot  be  allowed  to 
the  widow  under  this  claim,9  although  she  be  entitled  to  all  the 
personalty  of  the  estate,  leaving  the  expenses  of  administration  to 
be  deducted  out  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  real  estate, 10  and  even 

Appeal,  94  Pa.  St.  381,  383 ;  Rev.  St.  Mo.  Mo.  155  ;  Hale  v.  Hale,  1  Gray,  518,  523  ; 

§  110.  Motier's   Estate,  7    Mo.   App.   514.     See 

1  Phelps  v.  Phelps,  72  111.  545.  See  also  Ilaniniersley,  J.,  in  Haven's  Appeal, 
ante,  §  84.  69  Conn.  684,  698. 

2  Weaver  v.  Low,  29  Ind.  57.  9  Paine   v.   Paulk,  supra ;   Drowry   v. 
8  Such   child    takes   equally  with   the     Bauer,  supra ;  Ritchey  v.  Withers,  72  Mo. 

father  as  distributee  :   Phelps  v.  Daniel,  556  ;  Jewell  v.  Knettle,  39  Mo.  App.  262 ; 

86  Ga.  363.  Lloyd's  Estate,  44  Mo.  App.  670  ;  Bowling 

4  Davenport  v.  Brooks,  92  Ala.  627.  v.  Shepard,  91   Ky.  273;  Loftis  v.  Loftis, 

r<  Johnson  v.  Corbett,  11  Paige,  265.  94  Tenn.  232;  Denton  v.  Tyson,  118  N. 

6  Cox  v.  Brown,  5  Ired.  I,.  194;  Kim-  C.  542. 

ball  v.  Deming,  5  Ired.  L.  41g.  10  Braze r    v.    Dean,     15    Mass.    183; 

7  Rhea  v.  Greer,  86  Tenn.  59.  See  Denton  v.  Tyson,  supra.  See  as  to  the 
post,  §  92,  p.  *  191.  priority  of  the  widow's  claim,  ante,  §  85, 

8  Jelly  V.  Elliott,  1  Ind.  119;  Paine  v.  p.*  176. 
Paulk,  39  Me.  15;  Drowry  v.  Bauer,  68 

198 


§91 


OUT   OP   WHAT   PROPERTY   TO    BE   ALLOWED.       *  186,  *  187 


if  the  personalty  had  been  specifically  devised;1  and  where,  having 
a  right  to  select,  and  she  selects  a  judgment  founded  upon  a  promis- 
sory note,  inventoried  among  the  effects  of  the  estate,  which 
[*  187]  had  been  partially  satisfied  by  a  levy  upon  real  and  *  per- 
sonal estate,  she  is  entitled  to  the  proceeds  of  the  levy  upon 
the  personal  estate,  and  to  a  release  from  the  executors  of  the 
unredeemed  real  estate.2  And  under  these  circumstances  she  is  also 
entitled  to  the  interest  accrued  upon  the  note  after  the  date  of  the 
inventory  and  appraisement.8  Where  the  statute  enu- 
merates the  specific  property  to  which  the  widow  is 
entitled,  the  allowance  must  be  out  of  such  articles 
actually  on  hand  at  the  time  of  the  husband's  death, 
and  no  property  or  money  not  on  hand  can  be  assigned 
to  her.4  But  if  the  articles  so  enumerated,  or,  where 
she  has  the  right  to  select,  the  articles  so  selected,  are  sold  by  the 
executor  or  administrator,  she  is  entitled  to  the  proceeds  B  t  -f  ]d 
of  the  sale.5  Where  the  statute  fails  to  designate  the 
specific  nature  of  the  allowance,  it  may  be  allotted  in 
money.6  In  Illinois,  however,  it  was  held,  that  if  the 
widow  elected  to  take  her  allowance  in  money,  she 
thereby  became  a  general  creditor  of  the  estate,  and  must  share  with 
other  creditors ; 7  but  she  may  cause  the  real  estate  to  be  sold  to  raise 
the  necessary  money  to  pay  her  statutory  allowance;8  in  Iowa,  if 
the  personalty  is  inadequate,  real  estate  may  be  sold  to  raise  the 
allowance ; 9  so  in  Minnesota,  when  the  personalty  is  insufficient, 
the  allowance  may  be  made  out  of  the  proceeds  of  real  estate  sold, 
or  out  of  the  rents  and  profits,10  and  in  Pennsylvania  her  allowance 
of  $300  may  be  out  of  personal  or  real  estate,  and  re-  Allowance  can- 
mains  charged  on  the  real  estate  until  paid.11  It  is  self-  not  be  made  out 
evident  that  there  can  be  no  allowance  to  the  widow  or  belonging^"0 
children  out  of  property  to  which  the  decedent  had  no   tne  deceased. 


Articles  specifi- 
cally allowed 
by  statute  can- 
not be  supple- 
mented out  of 
other  property 
if  not  on  hand. 


the  widow  may 
take  the 
proceeds, 
or  sell  them 
herself. 


1  Brown  v.  Hodgdon,  31  Me.  65. 

2  Gilman  v.  Gilman,  54  Me.  531. 

8  Gilman  v.  Gilman,  supra,  p.  536. 

4  Bayless  v.  Bayless,  4  Coldw.  359 ; 
Johnson  v.  Henry,  12  Heisk.  696  ;  See  v. 
See,  66  Mo.  App.  566. 

8  Cummings  v.  Cummings,  51  Mo.  261. 
In  Alabama  it  is  held  that  to  cut  off  the 
widow's  claim,  the  sale  must  be  such  as 
the  administrator  is  authorized  to  make : 
Chandler  v.  Chandler,  87  Ala.  300,  304. 
In  Georgia,  where  the  Code  (§  2571)  is 
construed  as  including  real  estate  in  the 
property  which  may  be  set  apart  for  the 
year's  support  of  the  family,  it  is  held 
that,  where  land  has  been  so  set  apart,  it 
may  be  sold  without  further  order  of  the 
ordinary,  and  the  proceeds  applied  for  the 


support  of  the  family :  Miller  v.  Defoor, 
50  Ga.  566;  Tabb  v.  Collier,  68  Ga.  641  ; 
Cleghorn  v.  Johnson,  69  Ga.  369.  A  sale 
by  the  widow  fairly  made  will  pass  the 
title  to  the  land  to  the  purchaser :  Steed  v. 
Cruise,  70  Ga.  168,  176. 

6  McNulty  v.  Lewis,  8  Sm.  &  M.  520 ; 
Hoar,  J.,  in  Drew  v.  Gordon,  13  Allen, 
120,  122;  Ex  parte  Reavis,  50  Ala.  210; 
Estate  of  McReynolds,  61  Iowa,  585. 

7  Cruce  v.  Cruce,  21  111.  46.  See  this 
case,  ante,  §  85,  p.  *  176,  note  11. 

8  Deltzer  v.  Scheuster,  37  111.  301 . 

9  Newans  v.  Newans,  79  Iowa,  32. 

10  Blakeman  v.  Blakeman,  64  Minn. 
315. 

11  Detweiler's  Appeal,  44  Pa.  St.  243 
See  also  Graves'  Estate,  134  Pa.  St.  377. 

199 


*  187,  *  188      PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OP  THE   FAMILY  §92 

title  at  the  time  of  his  death.1  The  widow's  right  extends  only  to 
property  possessed  by  deceased  at  the  time  of  his  death,  and  in 
Connecticut  it  was  held  that  the  husband  may  make  a  contract,  on 
sufficient  consideration  to  bequeath  his  personalty  to  another  which 
will  be  enforced.2  In  Illinois  it  is  held  that  there  is  noth- 
ing in  the  *  statute  respecting  the  estates  of  deceased  persons  [*  188] 
that  in  the  slightest  degree  prevents  a  husband  from  dispos- 
ing of  his  personal  property  free  from  any  claim  of  his  wife,  whether 
by  sale,  gift  to  his  children,  or  otherwise,  in  his  lifetime.8  In  some 
States  the  husband's  right  of  disposition  of  his  personalty  during 
his  lifetime  is  carried  to  the  extent  of  permitting  him  to  defeat  his 
wife's  statutory  allowance  by  a  gift  causa  mortis;*  but  in  most 
States  the  more  rational  doctrine  prevails  that  such  disposition  is 
invalid  as  against  the  widow  if  made  in  expectation  of  death  and 
with  a  view  to  defraud  the  widow  of  her  statutory  rights  in  the 
personalty.5  The  allowance  is  not  to  be  made  out  of  a  grandfather's 
estate,  but  only  out  of  that  of  a  deceased  father  or  mother.6 

§  92.  Time  and  Procedure  to  obtain  the  Allowance.  —  Where 
the  widow  herself  administers  the  estate,  she  can  easily  avail  her- 
Allowance  se^  °f  the  benefit  of  the  provisions  made  in  her  favor 
should  be  made  by  simply  taking  credit  in  her  settlement  with  the  court 
for  the  amount  allowed  her  by  order  of  court,  the  award 
of  appraisers  or  commissioners,  or  the  amount  fixed  by  the  statute. 
In  such  case,  also,  she  will  rarely  suffer  in  consequence  of  neglect 
or  tardiness  in  taking  the  necessary  steps  to  secure  her  allowance. 
But  in  many  cases  it  is  impracticable  for  her  to  administer,  either 
from  age,  infirmity,  ignorance,  or  inability  to  give  bond,  and  then, 
from  the  exigency  of  her  situation  and  the  very  nature  of  the 
relief  secured  to  her  by  the  statutes  under  consideration,  a  speedy 
and  summary  remedy  to  obtain   her   rights   is  indispensable,7  and 

1  Summerford  v.  Gilbert,  37   Ga.  59  ;  surviving  partner,  administering  on  the 

Burckhalter  v.  Planters'  Bank,   100  Ga.  estate  of  his  deceased  partner,  has  prema- 

428,431  ;  Murphy  &  Co.  v.  Rulh,  24  La.  turely  paid  debts  out  of  his  own  funds: 

An.   74  ;  the   allowance   should  be  made  Little  v.  McPherson,  76  Ala.  552. 

from  property  belonging  unqualifiedly  to  2  Crofut  v.  Lay  ton,  68  Conn.  91,  101. 

the  estate  and  not  from  such  as  is  in  con-  8  Padfield  v.  Padfield,  78  111.  16. 

troversy:    Eddy's    Estate,    12    Phil.    17;  4  See  cases  cited  ante,  §  63. 

Baucus  v.  Stover,  24  Hun,  109,  114.     In  6  See  authorities  cited  ante,  §  63.     But 

Missouri  the   allowance   cannot  be  made  before  a    disposition   will  be  avoided,  it 

out  of  the  estate  of  the  partnership  of  should  be  shown  to  be  testamentary  in  its 

which  the  deceased  was  a  member  :  Julian  character  and  clearly  in  fraud  of  the  wife's 

v.  Wri^htsman,  73  Mo.  569  ;  but  in  Massa-  "  dower  "  right  in  the  personalty  .  Crecelius 

chusetts  it  lias  preference  over  partnership  v.  Ilorst,  89  Mo.  356,  359. 

creditors  against  the  partnership  property  8  Succession  of   Geisler,  32  La.   An. 

left  by  a  deceased  surviving  partner:  Bush  1289,  overruling  Succession  of  Coleman, 

p.  Clark,  127  Mass.  111.     In  Alabama,  the  27  La.  An.  289. 

ri^bt  of  the  widow  to  claim  exemption  of  7  It  was  held  in  Michigan,  that  where 

her  husband's  share  in  partnership  prop-  the  action  of  the  probate  judge  in  denying 

erty  is  not  lost  or  waived,  although  the  allowances  has  been  reversed  on  appeal. 
200 


§92        TIME   AND   PROCEDURE   TO    OBTAIN    ALLOWANCE.      *  188,  *  189 

is  in  most  States  provided  by  enabling  the  widow  to    in  summary 
obtain  her  allowance  by  simple  motion  or  petition,  if   ProceedlDs- 
the  court  or  commissioners  should  omit  to   grant  it  without   such 
motion.1     Notice  to  the  administrator  is  not  in  every    Notice  to  ad- 
State   necessary,2  but   is  in  some   States   required  by   ministrator. 
statute,3  and  the  safer  course  and  better  practice  is  undoubtedly  for 

the  court  to  require  notice   to  be  given,  at    least  in  cases 
[*  189]  where  a  considerable  amount  is  in  *  question.4 

The  administrator  is  not  required  to  wait  for  by  administra- 
an  order  of  court,  but  may  make  the  necessary  expendi-  ^j™111}0111 
tures  as  the  exigencies  occur,  and  the  court  will  allow 
such  sums  as  maybe  reasonable  in  the  settlement;5  or  the  widow 
may  simply  retain  the  property  she  is  entitled  to,  which  the  admin- 
istrator will  not  be  permitted  to  recover ; 6  but  the  probate  court  has 
exclusive  jurisdiction  in  such  case,7  and  if  she  claim  and  retain 
property  not  secured  to  her,  he  may  assert  his  right  thereto  against 
her  and  her  vendee ; 8  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  court  may  order 
the  property  to  be  assigned  to  her.9  In  Illinois  the  appraisers  fix 
the  widow's  award,  and  the  probate  court,  while  it  may  for  good 
cause  shown  order  another  appraisement  or  remove  the  appraisers,10 
had  no  power  to  modify  the  award  Or  estimate,  nor  substitute  the 
judgment  of  the  court  for  that  of  the  appraisers.11  So  in  Colorado, 
(whose  statute  was  adopted  from  the  Illinois  code)  the  probate 
court  may  approve  the  report  of  the  commissioners;  but  the  court 
has  the  authority  to  entertain  an  application,  presented  after  such 
approval,  and  order  a  new  appraisal.12 

the  fact  that  a  motion  is  pending  to  set  notice  to  the  administrator,  would  be  void : 

aside  the  order  of  reversal  is  no  valid  rea-  Freeman  v.  Probate  Judge,  79  Mich.  390 ; 

son  for  the  probate  judge  further  delaying  hut  verbal  notice  is  sufficient,  at  least  if 

the  setting  off  of  these  allowances :  Curtis  the  administrator  appears:  Bacon  v.  Pro- 

v.  Probate  Judge,  35  Mich.  220.  bate  Judge,  100  Mich.  183. 

1  Calvity.  Calvit,  32  Miss.  124;  Connell  5  In  re  Lux,  100  Cal.  606;  s.  c.  114 
v.  Chandler,  1 1  Tex.  249.  But  the  allow-  Cal.  89  ;  Crow  v.  Pratt,  119  Cal.  131,  136  ; 
ance  cannot  he  made  until  she  has  Sawyer  v.  Sawyer,  28  Vt.  245,  248 ; 
accounted  for  funds  in  her  hands  :  Church-  Frierson  v.  Wesberry,  11  Rich.  L.  353; 
ill  v.  Bee,  66  Ga.  621.  Clayton  v.  Wardell,  2  Bradf.  1,  7  ;  Fellows 

2  Morgan   v.   Morgan,  36    Miss.  348 ;  v.  Smith,  130  Mass.  376. 

Leach  v.  Pierce,  93  Cal.  614,  619.  6  Eans   v.   Eans,   79   Mo.  53,   65.     In 

3  Goss  v.  Greenaway,  70  Ga.  130,  132.  Texas,  the  allowance  must  be  made  by  the 
In  such  case  the  administrator  is  a  neces-  court,  and  the  property  cannot  be  selected 
sary  party:  McElmurray  v.  Loomis,  31  by  the  beneficiaries:  Chifflet  v.  Willis,  74 
Fed.   Rep.   395;  and   objections   may   be  Tex.  245,  251. 

made  at  or  before  the  term  for  which  the  7  Griswold  v.  Mattix,  21  Mo.  App.  282, 

notice  is  given :  Parks  v.  Johnson,  5  S.  E.  285. 

R.  (Ga.)  243.  8  Ben  ,..  Hall,  76  Ala.  546. 

4  Cummings  v.  Allen,  34  N.  H.  194;  9  Heller  v.  Leisse,  13  Mo.  App.  180, 182. 
Wright  v.  Wright,  13  Allen,  207 ;  Heck  v.  10  Boyer  v.  Boyer,  21  111.  App.  534. 
Heck,  34  Oh.  St.  369  ;  Palomares's  Estate,  n  Scoville's   Estate,  20   111.  App.  426, 
63  Cal.  402.      In    Michigan  it  has   been  and  cases  cited. 

said  that  such  an  order,  made  without        u  Lipe  v.  Fox,  21  Colo.  140. 

201 


*  189,  *  190      PROVISIONAL    ALIMONY   OF   THE   FAMILY.  §  92 

Where  the  entire  estate  is  not  greater  than  what  is  allowed  to  a 
widow  without  administration,  she  may  defend  her  title  in  equity, 
although  the  probate  court  has  made  no  order  in  the  matter;1  and 
where  the  amount  is  less  than  the  widow's  allowance,  she  can  main- 
tain an  action  against  a  mere  intruder,  though  there  has  been  no 
administration.2     Where   an  application   by  the    widow   or   minor 

children  is  necessary  at  all,  it  should  be  made  as  early 
necessary011' '  as  possible,  since,  as  a  general  rule,  it  cannot  be  enter- 
shouid  be  tained  when  the  time  for  which  the  temporary  allowance 

or  the  allow-      was   intended   has   expired.3     Thus   it  was   held  that 
ance  may  be       after  a  lapse  of  four  years  from  the  husband's  death  the 

probate  court  had  not  the  power  to  grant  the  allow- 
ance,4 much  less  after  thirty  years.8  In  North  Carolina  it  was 
held  that  the  application  must  be  made  during  the  first  term  of  the 
court  after  the  grant  of  letters,  and  that  a  petition  filed  two  years 
thereafter  was  too  late;6  but  where  no  letters  were  granted  until 
eight  years  after  the  husband's  death  the  widow  was  held  entitled 
to  her  allowance  during  the  term.7     The  allowance  must  be  made 

with  reference  to  the  state  of  the  family  at  the  time  of 
allowance  de-  deceased's  death,  not  of  the  application.8  In  Massachu- 
termjned  by  setts  a  delay  of  two  years  and  eight  months  was  held 
family  at  time  n°t  to  make  it  impossible,  as  a  matter  of  law,  to  decree 
of  death.  an  allowance ; 9    and   in   Michigan   the   allowance   was 

permitted  after  the  remarriage  of  the  widow,  nearly  two  years 
after  the  first  husband's  death,  no  assets  having  come  into  the 
administrator's  hands  before  that  time.10  In  Indiana,  where 
the  *  widow  is  authorized  to  select  "  at  the  time  of  the  valua-  [*  190] 
tion  "  certain  articles  of  property,  it  was  held  that  it  was 
not  the  duty  of  the  executor  or  administrator  to  set  apart  and  tender 
the  property,  and  that,  if  she  does  not  select  before  it  passes  into 
other  hands,  she  must  be  deemed  to  have  waived  her  privilege.11  So, 
in  Mississippi,  it  was  decided  that  the  authority  to  grant  and  appor- 
tion such  allowance  between  the  widow  and  children  resided  exclu- 
sively in  the  probate  court,  and  that  all  parties  claiming  rights  in 
such  apportionment  must  be  held  to  the  presentation  of  their  claims 
before  the  report  of  the  appraisers  shall  have  been  confirmed  by  the 
probate  court  under  the  provisions  of  the  statute,  or  else  be  deemed 

i  Hampton  v.  Physick,  24  Ark.  561.  7  Ex  parte  Rogers,  63  N.  C.  110.     See 

2  Roberta  v.  Messenger,  134  Pa.  St.  298.  Rizer's  Estate,  15  Phila.  547. 

'  ( (nlinarily,  the  application  should  be  8  In  re  Hayes,  112  N.  C.  76  ;  Porter  v. 

:m   soon   as  the   inventory   of  the  Porter,  165  Mass.  157. 

.   tate  is  returned  :  Kingman  v.  Kingman,  9  Lisk  v.  Lisk,  155  Mass.  153. 

-.1    X.  EL  182;  but  a  delay  of  twenty-five  10  Bacon  v.  Probate  Judge,  100  Mich. 

la/a  is  not  unreasonable:  Tb.,  p.  187.  183. 

'   Hubbard  V.  Wood,  IS  N.  H.  74.  u  Johnson  v.  Robertson,  7  Blackf.  425  ; 

«  Mather  V.  Bennett,  21  N.  EL  188.  Tucker  v.  llendersou,  63  Ala.  280,  282. 
6  Gillespie  v.  Ilymans,  4  Dev.  119. 
202 


§  92       TIME   AND   PROCEDURE  TO   OBTAIN   ALLOWANCE.      *  190,  *  191 

to  have  waived  them  in  favor  of  those  bsneficiaries  whose  claims 
are  presented;  and  that  hence  a  chancery  court  has  no  power  to 
grant  relief  to  children  petitioning  for  a  portion  of  such  award 
against  the  widow,  to  whom  it  had  been  made.1  But  where  such 
award  had  been  set  out  by  the  appraisers,  and,  the  estate  turning 
out  to  be  insolvent,  the  commissioners  of  insolvency  declined  to 
take  cognizance  of  her  claim  for  the  year's  support,  it  was  held 
that  the  claim  might  be  asserted  at  any  time  before  the  final  settle- 
ment of  the  estate,  the  time  for  asserting  it  not  having  been  limited 
to  the  year  succeeding  the  decedent's  death,  or  to  any  particular 
time.2  In  Pennsylvania  it  has  been  repeatedly  decided  that  the 
right  of  a  widow  to  retain  real  or  personal  property  of  her  husband's 
estate  of  the  value  of  $300  is  a  personal  privilege  which  she  may 
waive;  and  that  it  is  waived  entirely  by  an  unreasonable  delay,3  or 
by  her  re-marriage  before  making  demand,4  or  if  she  neglect  to 
demand  an  appraisement,  and  pro  tanto  if  she  retain  less  than  the 
value  of  $300.'  But  where  a  husband  deserted  his  wife,  and  the 
separation  continues  without  fault  of  the  husband,  she  is  not  required 
at  her  peril  to  take  notice  of  his  death ;  and  if  she  make  her  appli- 
cation within  reasonable  time  after  learning  of  his  death,  although 
eighteen  months  afterward,  and  after  the  real  estate  had  been  sold, 
the  account  on  the  estate  had  been  filed,  and  the  auditors  to  dis- 
tribute appointed,  it  must  be  allowed.6  In  Alabama7  and 
[*  191]  *  Texas  it  is  the  imperative  duty  of  the  judge  of 

probate  to  make  the  allowance,  upon  or  without  tcMiiake  allow, 
the  motion  of  the  widow; 8  and  the  widow  and  children  ance  without 
do  not  forfeit  or  lose  their  right  to  the  same  from  app 
their  neglect  to  apply,  or  the  failure  of  the  chief  justice  (probate 
judge)  to  make  it  in  time;  but  if  the  estate  is  solvent,  it  is  too  late 
to  make  such  application  when  the  estate  is  ready  for  partition  and 
distribution.  "The  time  during  which  the  statute  intends  to  secure 
the  property  to  the  widow  and  children  has  then  passed,  and  a 
subsequent  right  to  it,  by  virtue  of  such  allowance,  is  expressly 
repudiated."9  In  Illinois  the  widow's  claim  is  held  not  to  be 
included  in  the  statutory  provision  requiring  demands  to  be  pre- 
sented against  a  decedent's  estate  within   two  years,  and   may  be 

1  Dease  v.  Cooper,  40  Miss.  1 14.  6  Terry's  Appeal,  55  Pa.  St.  344,  346  ; 

2  McNulty  v.  Lewis,  8  Sni.  &  M.  520,  Rank's  Estate,  12  Phila.  67 ;  Hurley's 
526.  Estate,  12  Phila.  47. 

8  Kerns'  Appeal,  120  Pa.  St.  523.  7  Mitcham  v.  Moore,  73  Ala.  542,  545. 

4  Machemer's  Estate,  140  Pa.  St.  544,  8  Connell  v.  Chandler,  11  Tex.  249. 
548.  But  where  an  allowance  has  been  made 

5  Somers's  Estate,  14  Phila.  261 ;  and  the  widow  for  many  years  forbears 
Andress's  Estate,  14  Phila.  263 ;  Davis's  the  enforcement  of  it,  she  will  be  estopped 
Appeal,  34  Pa.  St.  256 ;  Burk  v.  Gleason,  from  asserting  it :  Tiebout  v.  Millican,  61 
46    Pa.    St.    297 ;    Baskin's    Appeal,  38  Tex.  514. 

Pa.  St.    65;   Hufman's   Appeal,   81    Pa.  9  Little  v.  Birdwell,  27  Tex.  688,  691. 

St.  329 ;  Lawley's  Appeal,  9  Atl.  R.  327. 

203 


* 


191,  *  192      PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OF  THE   FAMILY.  §93 


allowed  although  not  presented  within  two  years.1  In  Missouri,  by 
the  terms  of  the  statute,  the  allowance  may  be  claimed  at  any  time 
before  it  is  paid  out  in  discharge  of  debts,  or  distributed;  but  where 
the  personal  assets  are  exhausted  before  the  claim  is  made,  it  can- 
not be  allowed  out  of  the  proceeds  of  real  estate  sold  for  the  pay- 
ment of  debts.2  The  issue  of  fact,  whether  the  claimant 
Issue  of  fact       js  ^}ie  widow  of  the  decedent,  cannot  be  tried  by  iury 

whether  3DDli"  */    «i      « 

cant  is  the  in   the   probate    court.3     Where    a    decision    granting 

denM  "^not606*  ^e^ers  in  favor  of  a  petitioner  who  claims  to  be  the 
triable  by  jury  widow,  is  appealed  from  on  the  ground  that  she  is  not 
court!  p  te  the  widow,  and  bond  given  to  stay  proceedings,  it  was 
held  that  pending  such  appeal  the  probate  court  cannot 
make  an  allowance  to  the  alleged  widow.4  In  Wisconsin  a  widow 
was  allowed  her  statutory  allowance,  notwithstanding  she  had, 
within  a  year,  surrendered  the  estate  devised  to  her,  for  the  benefit 
of  creditors,  including  her  exemptions.5  In  Tennessee  where,  in 
case  there  is  no  widow,  the  minor  children  under  fifteen  years  are 
entitled  to  a  year's  support,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  administrator,  if 
such  minors  have  no  guardian,  to  preserve  for  them  a  year's  sup- 
port, and  he  is  personally  liable  for  his  failure  to  do  so,  although 
such  year's  support  was  not  assigned  within  one  year  after  the 
decedent's  death,  nor  until  the  administrator  had  disbursed  the 
entire  assets.6 

§  93.    Additional  Allowances.  —  Whether  a  second  claim  for  the 

widow's  allowance  can  be  entertained  or  granted,   must   obviously 

depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  original  allowance.     If 

additional  ai-      this  was  intended  for  immediate  relief  only,  and  was 

lowance,  if  the    crranted  before  there  was  an  opportunity  of  determining 

amount  ongi-       °  «      ,  ■,-,  .         ■,  •   ■,     .-,  •  .  n 

naiiy  allowed  the  extent  of  the  allowance  to  which  the  situation  of 
tTbe1  Partial1  the  widow  an^  her  family,  the  value  of  the  property  left 
only.  by  the   deceased,  the   amount  of  debts,  and  other  cir- 

cumstances entitled  her,  it  is  apparent  that  such  allowance  cannot 
be  looked  upon  as  an  adjudication  upon  the  matter,  and  that,  in 
the  absence  of  a  restraining  statute,  the  probate  court  has  power  to 
make  a  new  allowance  upon  proper  proof  of  the  circumstances  justi- 
fying it.7  In  many  States,  the  statute  expressly,  or  by  ne- 
cessary implication,  *  grants  the  power  to  make  additional  [*  192] 
allowances.8    But  where  it  is  allowable  out  of  the  personal 

1  Miller  v.  Miller,  82  111.  463.  property  not  exceeding  the  value  of  $150, 

2  Aide,  §  86;  Ritchey  v.  Withers,  72     in   addition    to    the    amount    absolutely 
Mo. 656,  559.  allowed,  if  the  estate  is  solvent:  Dig.  St. 

;:  Bradley P.Woemer, 46 Mo. App. 871.  1894,  §75.     In   California,  if  the  amount 

■'  State  o.  Lichtenberg,  i  Wash.  231,  set  apart  be  insufficient  for  the  support 

6  Henry's  Estate,  65  Wis.  551.  of  the  widow  and  children,  or  either,  the 
«  Rhea  o.  Greer,  86  Tenn.  59.  probate    court    makes    such    additional 

7  Hale  v.  Hale,  1  Gray,  518.  allowance  out  of  the  estate  as  may   he 

8  In  Arkansas  the  widow  may  select  necessary   during  the  process  of  settle 

204 


§93 


ADDITIONAL   ALLOWANCES. 


*  192,  *  193 


estate  only,  there  can  be  no  further  allowance  when  that  is  exhausted, 
although  it  be  in  the  payment  of  debts.1  And  if,  upon  the  appraise- 
ment of  the  specific  articles  to  which  the  widow  is  entitled,  she  elect 
to  take  money  in  lieu  thereof,  this  election  concludes  her  in  the 
absence  of  fraud,  and  she  cannot  afterward  have  a  larger  allowance.3 
And  so,  if  the  widow  has  drawn  her  support  from  her  husband's 
estate  during  the  year  succeeding  his  death,  although  it  was  not 
formally  set  apart  to  her,  and  although  she  rendered  valuable  ser- 
vices to  the  estate  during  that  period,  she  is  entitled  to  no  further 
allowance  by  way  of  the  year's  support.3  The  petition  for  further 
allowance  must  show  that  the  former  provision  is  insufficient  or 
exhausted.4  The  appraisers  appointed  to  set  out  for  the  use  of  the 
widow  and  minor  children  their  temporary  allowance  are  ministerial 
officers,  and  their  acts  may  be  revised  by  the  court,6  but  in  some 
States  the  court  cannot  modify  the  appraisement  and  substitute  its 
own  judgment  for  that  of  the  appraisers.6  Nor  can  the  circuit  court, 
on  appeal,  exercise  any  power  which  the  probate  court  could  not 

have  exercised.7  A  court  of  probate  which  is  without  power 
[*  193]  *  to  revoke  or  revise  its  own  decrees  and  judgments,  cannot 

set  aside  its  own  allowance  and  decree  a  smaller  sum,  unless 
the   original   judgment   was   reversed,    or   reformed   on   appeal,  or 


ment:  2  Civ.  Proc.  §  1466;  Roberts's 
Estate,  67  Cal.  349 ;  In  re  Lux,  1 00  Cal. 
593.  In  Georgia,  if  the  estate  is  kept 
together  longer  than  one  year,  the  allow 
ance  is  to  be  renewed  by  the  original  or 
by  newly  appointed  appraisers :  Code, 
1895,  §  3466.  In  Iowa  the  allowance  may 
by  subsequent  order  be  diminished  or  in- 
creased :  Code,  1 897,  §  3314.  In  Maine,  if 
the  will  be  in  litigation,  the  court  may 
make  allowances  from  time  to  time  :  Rev. 
St.  ch.  65,  §  23  ;  otherwise  the  court  has 
jurisdiction  to  make  but  one  allowance  : 
Davis  v.  Gower,  85  Me.  167  ;  unless  the 
estate  prove  solvent  after  a  representation 
of  insolvency,  or  new  assets  be  discovered  : 
Paine  o.  Forsaith,  84  Me.  66.  In  Michigan 
the  judge  is  to  allow  such  amount  for 
maintenance  as  he  may  deem  necessary, 
in  case  of  insolvency  for  not  longer  than 
one  year:  How.  St.  1882,  §  5847  (it  is 
held,  that  after  one  year,  in  testate  estates, 
the  probate  judge  may  use  his  discretion 
as  to  continuing  the  allowance  until  her 
share  is  assigned  her  :  Pulling  v.  Probate 
Judge,  88  Mich.  387,  390).  So  in 
Nebraska:  Gen.  St.  1887,  ch.  33,  §  176. 
In  Nevada  the  widow  and  minor  children 
remain  in  possession  of  the   homestead, 


wearing  apparel,  and  household  furniture, 
and  such  reasonable  provisions  for  their 
support  as  the  probate  judge  may  allow. 
On  return  of  the  inventory,  or  subse- 
quently, the  judge  may  on  his  own 
motion  or  on  application  set  apart  for  the 
use  of  the  family  all  property  exempt  from 
execution ;  and  if  this  be  deemed  insuffi- 
cient for  their  support,  the  probate  judge 
may  make  additional  reasonable  allow- 
ance during  the  pendency  of  the  settle- 
ment, but  not  longer  than  one  year  if  the 
estate  is  insolvent :  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  2791. 
In  Vermont  the  maintenance  is  to  be 
out  of  the  personal  or  income  of  real 
estate,  but  never  longer  than  until  the 
widow's  share  in  the  estate  be  assigned 
her:  Gen  St.  1880,  §  2109.  So  in  Wis- 
consin: 2  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  3935. 

1  Hale    v.    Hale,   supra ;    Ritchey    v. 
Withers,  72  Mo  556 

2  Telford  v.  Boggs,  63  111.  498. 

8  Blassingame  »•   Rose,  34  Ga.  418 

4  Luther's  Estate,  67  Cal.  319. 

5  Applegate     v     Cameron,    2    Bradf. 
119. 

6  Miller   v.   Miller,   82   111.    463.     See 
ante,  p.  *  189. 

7  Telford  v.  Boggs,  63  111.  498. 

205 


*193  PROVISIONAL   ALIMONY   OP   THE   FAMILY.  §  93 

adjudged  void.1  But  where  the  probate  judge  refuses  to  grant  an 
application  to  adjudge  an  estate  insolvent  for  the  want  of  sufficient 
evidence  to  support  it,  he  may,  on  a  new  application  supported  by- 
sufficient  evidence,  grant  the  same.2  And  an  order  allowing  certain 
amounts  to  be  paid  periodically  during  the  settlement  of  the  estate 
may  be  modified  so  as  to  reduce  the  future  payments,  if  it  be  shown 
that  the  circumstances  have  changed;  but  without  such  proof  an 
order  reducing  the  allowance  made  is  an  abuse  of  discretion.8  In 
Michigan  the  allowance  may,  in  the  sound  discretion  of  the  probate 
judge,  be  added  to,  modified,  or  rescinded  at  any  time.4 

1  Pettee  v.  Wilmarth,  5  Allen,  144;  In    most  it  can  only  stop  future  allowances 
re  Stevens,  83  Cal.  322.  from  the  time  of  presenting  the  petition  : 

2  Buckman  v.  Phelps,  6  Mass.  448.  Ford  v.  Ford,  80  Wis.  565. 

8  Baker  v.  Baker,  51    Wis.  538,   548.  4  Freeman  v.  Probate  Judge,  79  Mich. 

The  order  should  not  be  retroactive;  at    390;  Power's  Estate,  92  Mich.  106. 


206 


§   94  HOMESTEAD   RIGHT   OF   SURVIVING    FAMILY.        *  194,  *  195 


[*194]  *  CHAPTER  X. 

EXEMPTION    OF   THE    HOMESTEAD. 

§  94.    Nature  of  the  Homestead  Right  of    the    Surviving   Family. 

—  The   policy   which   dictates    provision    for   the   support   of    the 
family  immediately  after  the  death  of  its  natural  pro- 
vider and  protector  also  requires  the  homestead  to  be    and  children  in 
secured  to  the  surviving  husband  or  widow  and  minor    caBeofimprovi- 

°  .  dence  or  mis- 

children.  The  obvious  intent  of  homestead  laws  is  no  fortune,  as  well 
less  to  secure  a  home  and  shelter  to  the  family,  when  fhe  ^th  of 
bereft  of  its  father  or  mother,  beyond  the  reach  of  finau-  the  head  of  the 
cial  misfortune,  which  even  the  most  prudent  and  saga-  ami^# 
cious  cannot  always  avoid,1  than  to  protect  citizens  and  their  families 
from  the  miseries  and  dangers  of  destitution 2  by  protecting  the  wife 
and  .children  against  the  neglect  and  improvidence  of  the  father  and 
husband.3  The  homestead  exemption  would  be  divested  of  its  most 
essential  and  characteristic  feature,  if,  upon  the  death  of  the  head 
of  the  family,  it  should  be  withdrawn  from  the  widow  and  children ; 
hence  nearly  all  the  statutes  upon  this  subject  provide  for  its  con- 
tinuance to  the  surviving  constituents  of  the  family.  It  has  been 
held  that  "  the  exemption  is  not  to  the  debtor,  as  such,  but  to  the 
head  of  a  family.  The  subject  of  the  protection  is  the  family, — 
the  head  of  the  family  being  referred  to  as  its  representative.  It 
would  be  an  unreasonable  and  unnatural  conclusion  to  hold  that  this 
provision  was  not  intended  for  the  security  of  families  deprived  of 
their  natural  protector.  That  the  head  of  the  family  roust  be  the 
debtor,  in  order  to  secure  such  protection,  is  neither  within  the 
letter  nor  within  the  spirit  of  the  law.  Whenever  there  is  a  family 
and  a  family  homestead,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  there  is  a  head  to 
the  family,  or  one  peculiarly  charged  with  responsibility  for 
[*  195]  the  protection  of  the  family ;  and  the  homestead  is  to  be  *  re- 
garded as  the  family  homestead  of  the  head  of  such  family, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution."4 

The  homestead  exemption  descending  to  widows  and   minors    is 
not  strictly  an  estate,  or  property,  given  as  such  to  those  entitled  to 

1  Wassell  v.  Tunnah,  25  Ark.  101,  103.  555,  558;  Miller  v.  Marx,  55  Ala.  322. 

2  Franklin  v.  Coffee,  18  Tex.  413,  415.  Stone,  J.,  tracing  the  origin  of  homestead 

3  Cook  v.  McChristian,  4  Cal.  23,  26.  laws  in  Alabama  and  the  United  States 

4  Willard,  J.,  in  In  re  Kennedy,  2  S.  generally. 
C.  216,  227 ;  see  "Roff  v.  Johnson.  40  Ga. 

207 


*195 


EXEMPTION    OP   THE    HOMESTEAD. 


§94 


Homestead  not  ^  under  the  homestead  law;  but  rather  a  privilege, 
an  estate,  extended  to  the  beneficiaries  thereof,  protecting  them 

but  an  exemp-    in  the  enjoyment  of  property  to  which  it  applies  against 

the  claims  of  creditors  or  the  rights  of  adult  heirs;  even 
if  regarded  as  an  estate  in  legal  contemplation  "it  is  of  that  peculiar 
kind  which  exists  rather  as  incidental  to,  than  independent  of, 
other  estates:"  *  as  creditors  could  not  enforce  their  demands  out  of 

the  property  constituting  the  homestead  during  the  life- 
againstcred-      time   of    the    debtor,    so    no    creditor,    either    of    the 

ltors  and  heirs.  '  7 

decedent,  or  of  any  member  of  the  surviving  family, 
nor  adult  heirs,  can  enforce  them  after  his  death,  so  long  as  there 
is  a  family,  or,  in  most  States,  a  widow.2  So  it  is  held,  that  the 
husband's  right  of  curtesy  in  the  homestead  of  his  wife,  during  the 
minority  of  her  children,  yields  to  their  right  to  occupy  the  home- 
stead.3 In  some  States  the  exemption  ceases  with  the  reason  for  it, 
Statutes  treat-  wnere  one  nas  no  family.4  This  right  of  the  widow 
and  minor  children  is  treated  as  an  exemption,  continu- 
ing during  the  minority  of  the  children  and  the  life  or 
widowhood  of  the  widow  by  the  statutes  of  Alabama,5 
Arizona,6  Arkansas,7  California,8  Colorado,9  Georgia,10 


ing  the  home 
stead  as  an 
exemption  dur 
ing  minority 
and  widow- 
hood. 


1  Granger,  C.  J.,  dissenting,  in  Strong 
v.  Garrett,  90  Iowa,  100,  104. 

2  Black  v.  Curran,  14  Wall.  463,  469; 
Burns  v.  Keas,  21  Iowa,  257  ;  Hicks  v.  Pep- 
per, 1  Baxt.  42,  44  ;  Myrick,  J.,  in  Estate 
of  Moore,  57  Cal.  437,  442,  444;  Hill  v. 
Franklin,  54  Miss.  632,  635 ;  Trotter  v. 
Trotter,  31  Ark.  145,  151. 

3  Thompson  v.  King,  54  Ark.  9,  11  ; 
Littell  v.  Jones,  56  Ark.  139,  145 ;  Loeb 
v.  McMahon,  89  111.  487,  490. 

*  Hill  v.  Franklin,  54  Miss.  632,  635 ; 
Kidd  v.  Lester,  46  Ga.  231.  See  as  to  what 
constitutes  a  family,  ante,  §  88  ;  post,  §  96. 

6  The  homestead  is  exempt  from  ad- 
ministration by  the  terms  of  the  statute, 
and  the  widow  and  minor  child  or  children 
have  the  right  of  occupation  until  it  is 
ascertained  whether  the  estate  is  solvent 
or  insolvent ;  and  if  insolvent,  it  vests  in 
them  absolutely:  Code,  1886,  §  2543; 
Millet  r.  Marx,  55  Ala.  322,  341  ;  Dossey 
V.  I'ittman,  81  Ala.  381,  383;  Katman  v. 
Katman,  83  Ala.  478.  Rut  the  insolvency 
must  be  declared  during  the  minority  of 
the  children  claiming  an  absolute  fee; 
tin-    declaration   after  majority    does    not 

revive  and  enlarge  the  homestead  estate 

which  terminated  with  the  minority: 
Baker  <  Keith,  72  Ala.  121.  If  there  are 
no  children,  the  fee  in  such  case  passes  to 


the  widow,  and  on  her  death  descends  to 
her  brothers  and  sisters  to  the  exclusion 
of  those  of  the  deceased  husband :  Wil- 
kins  v.  Walker,  115  Ala.  590. 

6  In  this  State,  if  the  homestead  be 
community  property,  it  descends  to  the 
survivor;  but  if  from  the  separate  prop- 
erty of  either  spouse,  it  goes  to  the  heirs, 
subject  to  the  power  of  the  probate  court 
to  assign  it  for  a  limited  period  to  the 
family  of  the  deceased:  Rev.  St.  1887, 
§  1100. 

7  Dig.  St.  1894,  §  3694.  It  is  held  in 
this  State,  that  where  one  dies  seised  of  a 
homestead,  leaving  minor  children,  these 
have  two  distinct  estates  in  the  land, 
existing  at  different  times  and  incapable 
of  merger ;  the  estate  of  homestead,  with 
the  right  of  entry  on  the  ancestor's 
death ;  and  the  inheritance,  with  right  of 
entry  on  the  death  of  the  youngest  child  : 
Kessinger  v.  Wilson,  53  Ark.  400,  403. 

8  C.  Civ.  Pr.  1885,  §  1474.  The  estate 
passes  subject  to  the  power  of  the  probate 
court  to  assign  it  for  a  limited  period  to 
the  use  of  decedent's  family ;  l'helan  v. 
Smith,  100  Cal.  15S,  165. 

9  Mills'  Ann.  St.  1891,  §  21. 

10  One  entitled  may  take  the  constitu- 
tional or  statutory  homestead  at  option, 
but     cannot     take     both  :      Johnson      v. 


5  94 


HOMESTEAD   RIGHT    OF   SURVIVING    FAMILY.       *  195,  *  196 


Idaho,1  Kansas,2  Kentucky,8  Louisiana,4  Maine,5  Massachusetts,6  Michi- 
gan,7 Minnesota,8  Mississippi,9Missouri,10New  Hampshire,11  New 
[*196]  Jersey,12 New  York,13 North  Carolina,14 North  Dakota,15*  Ohio,14 


Roberts,  63  Ga.  167.  During  the  widow- 
hood of  the  widow,  whether  there  be  any 
family  living  with  her  or  not,  and  the 
life  of  any  member  of  the  family  in  the 
legitimate  sense,  no  remainder  or  rever- 
sionary interest  is  subject  to  levy  and 
aale :  Herslam  v.  Campbell,  60  Ga.  650, 
652. 

1  On  the  death  of  the  owner  the  home- 
stead goes  to  the  heirs  or  devisees  subject 
to  the  power  of  the  probate  court  to  as- 
sign it  for  a  limited  period  to  the  family  : 
Rev.  St.  1887,  §  3073. 

2  Gen.  St.  1889,  §  2593  ;  Vandiver  v. 
Vandiver,  28  Kans.  501  ;  Vining  v.  Willis, 
40  Kans.  609,  620 ;  Dayton  v.  Donart,  22 
Kans.  256,  268. 

3  St.  1894,  §  1707 ;  Gay  v.  Hanks,  81 
Ky.  552 ;  Myers  v.  Myers,  89  Ky.  442, 
445. 

4  Const.  1879,  art.  219;  Voorhies' 
Rev.  St.  1876,  §  1694.  Homestead  laws 
in  this  State  are  held  to  be  in  derogation 
of  the  common  law,  and  therefore  to  be 
strictly  construed  :  Galligar  v.  Payne,  34 
La.  An.  1057. 

5  Rev.  St.  1883,  ch.  81,  §  66. 

6  Publ.  St.  1882,  p.  739,  §  8. 

7  2  How.  St.  1882,  §  7721. 

8  McCarthy  v.  Van  der  Mey,  42  Minn. 
189. 

9  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  1551. 

10  Formerly  the  law  was  construed  as 
vesting  the  fee  to  the  homestead  in  the 
widow,  subject  to  the  cotenancy  of  all  the 
children  during  minority:  Skouten  v. 
Wood,  57  Mo.  380,  383  ;  Rogers  v.  Marsh, 
73  Mo.  64, 69.  But  the  General  Assembly, 
in  their  session  next  following  the  first  of 
these  decisions,  limited  the  widow's  inter- 
est to  an  exemption  during  her  life: 
Laws  Mo.  1875,  p.  60,  §  1  ;  Rev.  St.  1889, 
§  5439.  A  decision,  that  under  this  stat- 
ute the  widow  had  the  mere  right  of  occu- 
pancy, which  was  lost  by  removal  from 
the  premises  (Kaes  v.  Gross,  92  Mo.  647, 
655),  was  subsequently  overruled,  and  it 
was  then  held  that  the  statute  vests  in  the 
widow  an  estate  for  life,  and  in  the  chil- 
dren during  their  minority :  West  v. 
McMulleu,  112  Mo.  405,  411,  to  the  enjoy- 
VOL.  I.  — 14 


ment  of  the  rents  and  profits  of  which 
neither  the  widow  nor  minor  children  lost 
their  right  by  removal  from  the  premises : 
Hufschmidt  v.  Gross,  112  Mo.  649,  655; 
nor  by  the  re-marriage,  and  gaining  a  new 
home  with  her  new  husband,  of  the  widow : 
West  v.  McMulleu,  supra;  Ailey  v.  Bur- 
nett, 134  Mo.  313,  317.  But,  apparently 
to  meet  this  construction  of  the  statute  in 
the  recent  cases  above  cited,  the  legisla- 
ture in  1895  enacted  that  "  the  children 
shall  have  the  joint  right  of  occujmtion 
with  the  widow  until  they  shall  arrive 
respectively  at  their  majority,  and  the 
widow  shall  have  the  right  to  occupy  such 
homestead  during  her  life  or  widowhood, 
and  upon  her  death  or  remarriage  it  shall 
pass  to  the  heirs  of  the  husband,"  etc.: 
Laws  Mo.  1895,  p.  186,  §  2. 

11  Publ.  St.  1891,  ch.  128,  §  2.  The  ex- 
emption in  this  State  constitutes  a  life 
estate  which  the  widow  may  convey : 
Lake  v.  Page,  63  N.  H.  318 ;  but  not  be- 
fore it  has  been  set  out  and  separated 
from  the  residue :  Gunnison  v.  Twitchell, 
38  N.  H.  62,  66;  Bennett  v.  Cutler,  44 
N.  H.  69. 

12  3  Gen.  St.  1895,  p.  2997,  T  63,  §  1. 

13  Code,  Civ.  Pr.  §  1400. 

14  Const.,  art.  x.  The  right  of  the 
widow  to  the  homestead  is  held  paramount 
to  that  of  the  children,  by  virtue  of  dower : 
Watts  v.  Leggett,  60  N.  C.  1977,  cited  and 
followed  in  Gregory  v.  Ellis,  86  N.  C. 
579,  583. 

15  A  life  estate  in  the  homestead  de- 
scends to  surviving  spouse,  and  if  none,  to 
children  an  estate  during  minority :  Rev. 
Code,  1895,  §  3626. 

16  Bates  Ann.  St.  1897,  §  5437.  The 
homestead  act  of  this  State,  as  amended 
May  1, 1871,  was  held  to  limit  the  widow's 
right  to  such  time  as  a  minor  child  lived 
with  her  :  Taylor  v.  Thorn,  29  Oh.  St.  569, 
575.  But  the  language  of  the  statute 
construed  in  this  case,  "  who  shall  have 
left  a  widow  and  a  minor  child  or  chil- 
dren," is  changed  in  the  revision  of  1890, 
§  5437,  by  substituting  the  word  or  for 
and. 

209 


196 


EXEMPTION    OF   THE    HOMESTEAD. 


§94 


Oklahoma,1  South  Carolina,2  South  Dakota,8  Tennessee,4  Utah,6 
Virginia,6  Washington,7  West  Virginia,8  Wisconsin,9  and  Wyom- 
ing.10 It  does  not,  therefore,  affect  the  rights  of  either  creditors 
Ontermina-  or  heirs  on  the  expiration  of  the  time  to  which  the 
tion,  heirs  and  exemption  is  limited;  the  property  constituting  the 
homestead  then  passes  to  those  entitled  to  it  under 
devise  or  descent,  subject  to  the  claims  of  creditors,11  as  if  no 
homestead  had  intervened.12     In  Arkansas18  and  North  Carolina1* 

„..,  ,  the  widow,  having  a  homestead  in  her  own  right,  is 
\\  mow  not  eu-  °  .  °      ' 

titled  if  not  in  not  entitled  to  the  exemption  of  that  of  her  deceased 
need-  husband ;  and  in  Louisiana 15  a  widow  in  necessitous  cir- 

cumstances, whose  homestead  does  not  amount  to  the  value  of  one 
Allowance  in  thousand  dollars,  may  have  such  amount  paid  to  her  out 
lieu  of  home-  of  the  succession  as,  together  with  her  homestead  and 
other  exemption,  will  equal  one  thousand  dollars.16  In 
Texas  there  is  to  be  an  allowance  out  of  the  decedent's  estate,  in 
favor  of  the  widow  and  minor  children,  in  lieu  of  a  homestead,  not 
exceeding  five  thousand  dollars,  if  no  such  homestead  can  be  set 
apart  in  kind.17 

Homestead  de-  But  in  some  of  the  States,  the  homestead  is  not  a  mere 
seending  as  an  exemption  in  favor  of  the  widow,  but  passes  to  her 
in  fee.  an  absolute  estate  in  fee,  in  derogation  of  the  rights 


1  St.  1890,  §  1375. 

2  Under  the  act  of  1880  (17  Stat.  513) 
the  homestead  descends  under  the  Statute 
of  Distribution  on  the  death  of  the  widow, 
but  the  exemption  as  against  creditors 
continues  :  "  It  appears  that  the  intentiou 
was  to  declare  the  property  exempted 
forever  discharged  from  liability  for  debt," 
says  Chief  Justice  Mclver,  rendering  the 
opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Stewart 
v.  Blalock,  45  S.  C.  61,  67. 

3  Comp.  Code,  1887,  §  2463. 

4  Code,  1884,  §  2943.  Before  1878, 
the  homestead  right  depended  on  occu- 
pation :  Hicks  v.  Pepper,  1  Baxt.  42,  44 ; 
but  now  the  statute  makes  it  a  life  estate, 
vesting  in  the  surviving  spouse  on  death 
of  either,  and  on  death  of  both,  an  estate 
in  the  children  during  minority :  Jarman 
v.  Jarman,  4  Lea,  671,  676. 

6  Comp.  L.  1888,  §  4113;  Knudson  v. 
Hannberg.  8  Utah,  203,  208. 

6  Code,  1887,  §  3649. 

7  Code,  1896,  §  5458. 

"  (ode,  1891,  ch.  41,  §  34. 
9  Sanb.  &  Berryman,  Ann.  St.    1889, 
5  2271. 

>"   Rev.  St.  1887,  §  2781. 
11  See    discussion    of     this    subject    in 
210 


connection  with  the  sale  of  real  estate  for 
the  payment  of  debts,  post,  §  483.  See 
also  post,  §  102. 

12  Post,  §  102;  Booth  v.  Goodwin,  29 
Ark.  633,  636,  affirming  earlier  cases ; 
Taylor  v.  Thorn,  29  Oh.  St.  569,  574; 
Heard  v.  Downer,  47  Ga.  629,  631  ;  Chal- 
mers v.  Turnipseed,  21  S.  C.  126,  138  ; 
Garibaldi  v.  Jones,  48  Ark.  230;  Grawell 
v.  Seybolt,  82  Cal.  7  ;  Strong  v.  Garrett, 
90  Iowa,  106. 

13  Dig.  St.  1894,  §  3694. 

14  Wharton  v.  Leggett,  80  N.  C.  169, 
arguendo,  quoting  art.  x.,  §  5,  of  the  con- 
stitution. 

16  Voorh.  Rev.  St.  1876,  §  1694. 

16  See  Succession  of  Lessassier,  34  La. 
An.  1066;  Stewart  v.  Stewart,  13  La.  An. 
398;  McCall  v.  McCall,  15  La.  An.  527; 
Succession  of  Wellmeyer,  34  La.  An.  819; 
Coyle  v.  Creevy,  34  La.  An.  539. 

17  Rev.  St.  1895,  §§  2048  et  seq. ;  Clift 
v.  Kaufman,  60  Tex.  64,  67.  The  right 
thereto  is  not  forfeited  by  subsequent 
marriage :  lb.,  p.  66,  citing  Pressley  v. 
Robinson,  57  Tex.  453,  460.  But  it  will 
be  deemed  abandoned,  if  not  claimed  for 
many  years:  Tiebout  v.  Millican,  61  Tox. 
514. 


§  94  HOMESTEAD   RIGHT   OF   SURVIVING    FAMILY.      *  196,  *  197 

not    only   of  creditors,    but   also    of   the  heirs.      Such   i3 
[*  197]  the   homestead  law   in  *  Vermont,1  where   the  widow  and 

minor  children  take,  by  virtue  thereof,  the  same  estate  in 
the  homestead  "of  which  the  deceased  died  seised,"2  the  children, 
however,  until  their  majority  only.  The  statute  of  Missouri, 
patterned  after  the  Vermont  statute,  was  likewise  con-  Homestead  law 
strued  to  vest  the  homestead  in  the  widow  in  fee  simple  in  Missouri, 
absolutely,  subject  only  to  cotenancy  of  the  children  during  minor- 
ity, until  the  law  was  amended.8  In  Illinois  the  homestead  law, 
prior  to  the  act  of  1873,  secured  a  mere  exemption  to  the  debtor,  so 
that  when  he  conveyed  without   formal  waiver  of  the  . 

homestead,  the  effect  was  to  convey  his  title  to  the  land; 
but  as  to  the  right  to  the  homestead,  the  operation  of  the  deed  was 
suspended  until  the  exemption  was  extinguished  in  some  mode  recog- 
nized by  the  statute.4  But  by  the  act  of  1873  a  radical  change  was 
wrought  in  the  quality  of  the  holding  of  the  homestead  by  the  house- 
holder. By  that  act  he  became  invested  with  an  estate  in  the  land 
measured  and  defined  by  the  value,  and  not  by  the  extent  or  quantity 
of  his  interest  in  the  land  or  lot.5  And  when  the  interest  of  the 
householder  in  the  premises,  whether  in  fee,  for  life  or  years,  does 
not  exceed  one  thousand  dollars  in  value,  the  homestead  estate 
comprises  and  embraces  his  entire  title  and  interest,  "leaving  no 
separate  interest  in  him  to  which  liens  can  attach,  or  which  he  may 
alien,  distinct  from  the  estate  of  homestead."  6  When  the  value  of 
the  property  to  which  the  estate  attaches  is  more  than  one  thou- 
sand dollars,  the  excess  is  unaffected  by  the  statute ; 7  whether 
there  are  creditors  or  not;  and  a  court  of  equity  may  decree  the 
payment  of  the  value  to  the  widow,  and  compel  her  to  accept  the 
same  in  lieu  of  her  homestead.8  The  estate  of  homestead  devolves 
on  the  widow  ex  instanti  upon  the  death  of  the  husband,  for  her 
benefit  and  that  of  the  minor  unmarried  children.  Major  or  mar- 
ried heirs  have  no  interest  in  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  home- 
stead.9 In  Alabama  the  homestead  remains  in  the  possession  of 
the  widow  and  minor  children,  exempt  from  administration  until  it 
is   ascertained  whether  the   estate   is  solvent  or  insolvent,  and  if 

1  St.  1894,  §  2183  ;  Day  v.  Adams,  42  6  Browning  v.  Harris,  99  111.  456,  459 ; 
Vt.  510,  516.                                                        Hartman  v.  Schultz,  101  111.  437  ;  Kitter- 

2  Construed  to  mean  as  well  the  par-     lin  v.  Milwaukee,  supra. 

ticular    estate,  legal    or    equitable,   held  7  Kitterlin  v.  Milwaukee,  supra. 

by  the    husband,  as   also   the  extent  to  8  Wilson  v.  Illinois  Trust  Co.,  166  HI. 

which  it  was  free   from   debts  :    Day  v.  9,  12,  following  the  principle  laid  down  in 

Adams,  supra ;   White   v.  White,  63  Vt.  Hotchkiss  v.  Brooks,  93  111.  386,  adjusting 

577,  580.  the  homestead  right  of  a  wife  as  against 

3  See  supra, note  on  p.  *  195  (Missouri),  the  husband's  grantee. 

4  Eldridge  v.  Pierce,  90  HI.  474,  479.  9  Kyle  v.  Wills,  166  111.  501,  511. 
6  Kitterlin  v.  Milwaukee,  &c,  134  111. 

647. 

211 


*  197  EXEMPTION   OP   THE   HOMESTEAD.  §  94 

In  Alabama.  found  to  be  insolvent,  the  homestead  vests  absolutely  in 
Utah.  the  widow  and  minor  children.1     So  in  Utah;2  and  in 

Texas :  If  the  estate  is  solvent,  the  homestead  descends  like  other 
property,  except  that  it  is  not  subject  to  partition  during 
the  lifetime  of  the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  or  so  long 
as  they  or  the  minor  children  occupy  the  same; 3  but  if  insolvent,  it 
descends  in  like  manner,  but  discharged  of  the  claims  of  creditors.4 
In  Florida  the  exemption  descends  to  the  widow  and  heirs,  minors  and 
adults,  discharged  from  the  decedent's  debts,6  whether 
such  heirs  live  upon  the  homestead  or  not; 6  or  whether 
or  not  they  live  in  the  State.7     In  Iowa,  also,  the  surviving  spouse 
may  occupy  the  homestead  until  the  distributive  share 
has  been  set  apart,  or  in  lieu  thereof  retain  the  home- 
stead for  life ;  and  if  there  be  no  survivor,  it  descends  to  the  issue  of 
either  unless  otherwise  directed  by  will,  and  is  held  by  such  issue 
exempt  from  their  parents,  and  their  own  antecedent  debts.8    So  in 
,  „  ,     ,         Nebraska  the  homestead,  on  the  death  of  its  owner,  vests 

In.  rs  GDV&flkfl 

in  the  surviving  spouse  for  life,  and  afterward  in  his  or 
her  heirs  forever,  exempt  from  any  debts  created  by  either  spouse  pre- 
vious to  or  at  the  time  of  such  husband  or  wife's  death.9  In  South 
In  South  Carolina,  also,  the  widow's  interest  in  fee,  under  the 

Carolina.  Statute  of  Distributions,  is  her  homestead,  set  apart  to 

her  and  her  children  out  of  her  husband's  estate,  and  is  forever  freed 
from  debts  contracted  after  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  contain- 
,  „.   .  .    .     ing  the  homestead  grant.10    In  Mississippi  the  homestead 

In  Mississippi. 

descends  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  of  the  owner 
and  children  in  common ;  and  if  there  be  no  children  of  the  decedent, 
to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  and  if  no  survivor,  to  the  children; 

1  See  supra,  p.  *195,  note  5.  been  held  that  the  right  of  the  issue  does 

2  Knudson  v.  Hannberg,  8  Utah,  203.  not  depend  on  occupancy  of  the  surviving 

3  Const.  Tex.  1876,  art.  xvi.,  §  52.  parent;    also  that    a   non-resident   adult 

4  Zweruemann  v.  Von  Rosenberg,  76  heir  is  entitled  to  his  share,  although  he 
Tex.  522,  525,  and  Lacy  v.  Lockett,  82  has  given  a  note  waiving  his  homestead 
Tex.  190,  193,  Stayton,  C.  J.,  dissenting  right  before  the  parent's  death:  Maguire 
in  both  cases,  holding  that  the  interest  in-  v.  Kennedy,  91  Iowa,  272  ;  the  surviving 
herited  by  adult  heirs  fixes  upon  them  husband  or  wife  may  select  the  distributive 
liability  for  debts  of  the  ancestor  to  the  share  of  one-third  (exempt  from  decedent's 
extent  of  the  value  inherited.  The  debts)  out  of  property  other  than  the 
majority  view  was  adhered  to  in  Cameron  homestead  and  thereby  surrender  the 
v.  Morris,  83  Tex.  14,  17.  homestead  right  as  to  himself  or  herself; 

6  Const.  1887,  art.  x.,  §  2.  but  by  so  doing  the  children  will  uever- 

6  Miller  v.  Finnegan,  26  Fla.  29,  32,  37.  theless  have  their  homestead  rights  against 

7  Scull  v.  Beattv,  27  Fla.  426,  436.  creditors  :  Coulson's  Estate,  95  Iowa,  696. 
■  Bev.    St.    1888,    §§    3182,   3183.      It  9  Durland  v.   Seiler,  27    Neb.   33,  37. 

appears  from  this  statute  that  a  testamen-  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  debt  sought  to 

t.irv    disposition    defeats    the    homestead  be  enforced   in  this  case  was  for  the  un- 

•  l:ii in  of  the  issue;  that  the  homestead  paid  purchase-money  in  question.  Schny 
cannot  be  claimed  in   addition  to  the  dis-  ler  v.  Hanna,  31  Neb.  307. 

tril.ut.ivc  share  of  the  survivor  ;  and  it  has         10  Sec  BUpra,  p.  *  196,  note. 
212 


§  94  HOMESTEAD    RIGHT    OF   SURVIVING   FAMILY.       *  197,  *  198 

and  if  no  children  or  survivor,  the  exemption  ceases,  and  the  home- 
stead passes  like  other  property.  But  if  the  surviving  husband  or 
wife  own  a  place  of  residence  equal  in  value  to  the  homestead  of 
the  decedent,  and  shall  have  no  children,  but  the  deceased  shall  have 
children  by  a  former  marriage,  then  the  homestead  of  the  decedent 
shall  descend  to  such  children.1 

In    Arizona,    California,    Louisiana,    Nebraska,    Nevada, 
[*198]  Texas,  and    Washington    the    law   recognizes   *a  kind    of 
property  known  in  the  civil  law  as   community  property,2 
which   to   some   extent   affects   the   disposition  of  the    Homesteadin 
homestead  on  the  death  of  either  of  the  tenants  in  com-    community 
munity.     Like  the  common-law  estate  by  the  entirety,    ProPerty- 
it  exists  between  husband  and  wife,  and  generally  descends  to  the 
survivor  on  the  death  of  either  or  to  the  survivor  and  heirs  of  the 

decedent.    In  California  a  statute  vesting  the  homestead 

,,,..-,  •    ■        i_  In  California. 

in  community  property  absolutely  in  the  surviving  hus- 
band or  wife  on  the  death  of  one  of  the  spouses  free  from  debts  or  lia- 
bilities contracted  before  was  held  to  deprive  the  children  of  any 
homestead  right  against  claims  accruing  subsequent  to  such  death,  and 
to  subject  the  estate  in  the  hands  of  the  survivor  to  be  disposed  of  as 
he  or  she  sees  fit,  although  it  has  been  set  apart  as  a  homestead  by 
the  probate  court;8  but  §  1465  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  of 
that  State  is  held  to  direct  the  setting  apart  of  a  homestead  "for 
the  use  of  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  the  minor  children," 
and  by  the  provisions  of  §  1468  "  the  one-half  of  such  property  shall 
belong  to  the  widow  or  surviving  husband,  and  the  remainder  to 
the  child  "  or  children;  and  it  is  held  that  under  this  statute  a  sur- 
viving widow  has  no  power  to  convey  her  interest  in  the  community 
property  so  as  to  deprive  herself  or  the  children  of  the  right  or  duty 
to  claim  the  same  as  the  family  homestead;  nor  can  her  grantee 
take  as  tenant  in  common  so  as  to  defeat  such  right; 4  the  homestead 
is  one  of  the  burdens  upon  the  community  property  subject  to  which 
the  surviving  wife  takes  her  interest  therein.5  In  Texas  it  is  held 
that  on  the  death  of  a  connubial  partner  the  interest  of 
the  deceased  in  the  community  property  goes  to  the 
heir,  but,  if  a  homestead,  subject  to  the  homestead  rights  of  the  sur- 
viving partner;  and  where  that  is  abandoned,  the  heir  is  entitled  to 
partition.6    But  the   survivor   has  the  power  to  sell  a  community 

1  Peeler  v.  Peeler,  68  Miss.  141,  hold-  death,  the  statutory  allowance:  In  re 
ing  that  "  children  "  does  not  apply  to  Burdick,  76  Cal.  639,  two  judges  dissenting 
grandchildren.  642. 

2  As  to  the  nature  of  community  prop-  4  Phelan  v.  Smith,  100  Cal.  158,  164 ; 
erty,  see  post,  §  122.  Hoppe  v.  Fountain,  104  Cal.  94,  100. 

8  Herrold  v.  Been,  58  Cal.  443,   446;  6  In  re  Still,  117  Cal.  509. 

Watson  v.  His  Creditors,  58  Cal.  556 ;  6  Bell  v.  Schwartz,  37  Tex.  572,  574 ; 
Bollinger  v.  Manning,  79  Cal.  7,  11;  that  a  widow  has  not  occupied  it  for  two 
although   it   exceed,  at  the  time   of  the    years  does  not  make  out  a  case  of  aba» 

213 


*  198,  *199  exemption' of  the  homestead.  §  95 

homestead,  whether  the  estate  be  solvent  or  not,  and  the  children 
have  no  interest  in  the  homestead  as  such,  as  against  the  surviving 
parent,  by  virtue  of  the  homestead  right  of  the  deceased  parent.1 
In  Washing-  ^n  Washington  the  widow  cannot  claim  a  homestead  in 
ton.  her  deceased  husband's  separate  property  which  he  has 

conveyed  by  will  to  another.2 

In  Delaware,  Indiana,  Maryland,  Oregon,  Pennsylvania,  and 
Rhode  Island  the  statutes  contain  no  special  provisions  touching 
homesteads  further  than  including  their  exemption  from  sale  under 
execution  in  the  amount  of  property  which  the  head  of  a  family 
may  select  as  exempt. 

§  95.  What  Tenement  constitutes  the  Homestead  descending. 
—  The  homestead  thus  transmitted  to  the  surviving  family  of  one 
H  m  st  ad  is  dying  is  ^ne  homestead  in  fact,  —  the  dwelling-place 
the  actual  occupied   by   the   family,    with   all    the   land   and   its 

dwelling-place.  appui.tenances  to  tne  extent  allowed  by  the  statute,3 
including  the  crops  growing  thereon4  at  the  time  of  the  death.5 
Subsequent  appreciation  or  depreciation  in  the  value  of  the  property 
does  not  affect  the  tenure.6  Unless  so  expressed  by  statute, 
the  survivors  *do  not  acquire,  in  consequence  of  such  death,  [*199] 
the  right  to  select  a  homestead  out  of  the  body  of  the 
decedent's  estate;7  and  where  the  statute  confers  such  right,  the 
homestead  must  be  set  out  and  determined  by  the  proper  tribunals 
in   accordance   with   the   statutory   provisions.8     Nor   is   the   mere 

donment:    Carter  v.   Eandolph,  47    Tex.  McKinney,  56  Ala.  41  ;  Dexter  v.  Strobach, 

376,    381  ;    the   constitution  protects   the  56  Ala.  233 ;  In  re  Crowley,  71   Cal.  300, 

surviving  husband  or  wife  in  the  right  to  305  (confining  the  right  to  the  premises 

the   homestead,   whether    as   against  the  on  which  husband  and  wife  resided  when 

heirs  of  the  deceased,  or  the  creditors  of  their  declaration  was  filed);  Maloney  v. 

the  survivors,  so  long   as   such   survivor  Hefer,  17  Pac.  R.  (Cal.)  539. 
occupies  the  homestead  as  such:  Eubank  8  Cameto    v.   Dupuy,  47  Cal.    79,  80; 

v.  Landram,  59  Tex.  247,  248.  Hatorff  v.  Wellford,  27  Gratt.  356,  364  ; 

1   Ashe  r.  Yungst,  65  Tex.  631,  citing  Roff   v.   Johnson,   40   Ga.   555,    561.     In 

numerous  cases,   p.   6.36;    Fagan    v.  Me-  Alabama    the    widow    of    the    deceased 

Whirter,  71  Tex.  567.  owner  of  a  lot   and   storehouse,  not  oc- 

-  Eyres'  Estate,  7  Wash.  291.  cupied  as  a  dwelling,  the  family  residing 

:J  The  willow  is  liable  for  rent  of  prem-  at  the  time  of  his  death  in  a  rented  house, 

ses    occupied    in     excess   of    the    home-  is  entitled   to  select  the  storehouse  as  a 

Btead  allowance:  Titcomb's  Estate,  Myr.  homestead,    llartsfield    v.    Harvoley,   71 

55;    but  not  otherwise,  aim   repairs  and  Ala.    231.      By  the   statute  of   Alabama 

permanent   improvements  will   be  appor-  (Code,  §  2544)  if  the  homestead  occupied 

fcioned  equitably  between  the  widow  and  by  the  family  at  the  time  of  the  decedent's 

heirs:  Engelhardt  v.  Ynng,  76  Ala.  531,584.  death  is    mortgaged,  so  as  to  be  of  no 

*   Vaughns.  Vaughn,  88  Tenn.  742.  value  to  the  widow  and  minor  childreu, 

c>  Bassaman    v.     I'd  well,  21   Tex.  664,  they    may  select   another    out    of    other 

600;   David  v.  David,  66  Ala.  49.  realty:  Kteiner  v.  McDaniel,  110  Ala.  409. 

''  Parisot  v.  Tucker,  65  Miss.  489,  442 ;  So  in  California  premises  suitable  for  a 

In  Tf  Burdick,  76  Cal.  039.  homestead  may  lie  set  apart  to  the  widow, 

:   Wiseman  v.    Parker,  73  Miss.  378;  although  theretofore  solely  used  for  busi« 

Hoback  v.  Hoback,  88  Ark.  899 ;  l'ettus  v.  ness  purposes :  In  re  Sharp,  78  Cal.  488. 
21  i 


95       WHAT  TENEMENT  CONSTITUTES  THE  HOMESTEAD.       *  199,  *  200 


intention  of  the  decedent  to  occupy  a  particular  tract  of  land  as  a 
homestead,  who  died  before  such  intention  was  carried  into  effect, 
sufficient  to  entitle  the  widow  to  the  exemption  of  such  tract  as  a 
homestead.1  A  fortiori,  the  widow  cannot  abandon  the  homestead 
occupied  by  the  deceased  and  his  family  at  the  time  of  his  death, 
and  select  another,  as  against  the  rights  of  creditors.2  The  aban- 
donment of  a  homestead  by  the  widow  or  minor  children  has  been 
held  to  destroy  their  homestead  right  in  the  premises; 8  but  however 
proper  the  application  of  such  principle  may  be  during  the  lifetime 
of  the  debtor,4  it  is  necessary  to  observe  that  the  Absence  of 
temporary  absence   of  his   widow  does   not   constitute    widow  no 

it  -.li  i       t_  ^.t-  -u-1       abandonment. 

abandonment,  either  by  her  or  the  minor  chii- 
[*200]  dren,8  and   that   the   tendency   *of   courts    is   to   relax   the 

requirement  of  literal  occupation  by  the  widow,6  and  to  dis- 
pense with  it  altogether  in  the  case  of  orphan  minors.7 


1  Keyes  v.  Bump,  59  Vt.  391,  395  ; 
Goodall"  v.  Boardman,  53  Vt.  92,  101; 
Drucker  v.  Kosenstein,  19  Fla.  191,  195; 
Talmadge  v.  Talmadge,  66  Ala.  199,  201 
(the  deceased  was  a  resident  of  Illinois 
at  the  time  of  his  death,  and  his  family 
were  denied  a  homestead  in  Alabama 
because  the  intention  to  acquire  a  domicil 
there  was  defeated  by  his  death)  ;  or 
after  it  is  sold :  Fant  v.  Talbot,  81  Ky. 
23.  But  in  Engelhardt  v.  Yung,  76  Ala. 
534,  541,  it  was  held  that  where  a  house 
and  lot  was  purchased  with  the  intention 
and  for  the  purpose  of  improving  and 
repairing,  and  making  it  a  permanent 
residence,  the  death  of  the  purchaser  be- 
fore the  consummation  of  his  purpose  did 
not  prevent  its  being  regarded  as  a  home- 
stead, and  as  such  exempt  from  the  payment 
of  debts.  And  so  where  deeds  exchanging 
homesteads  have  been  executed,  but  actual 
occupancy,  by  one  of  the  parties,  is  defeated 
hy  reason  of  his  sickness  and  death,  his 
widow  may  yet  be  entitled  to  her  home- 
stead rights  in  the  intended  new  homestead : 
Goode  v.  Lewis,  118  Mo.  357. 

2  Chambers  v.  McPhaul,  55  Ala.  367 ; 
Rogers  v.  Ragland,  42  Tex.  422,  443  (re- 
versing s.  c.  34  Tex.  617),  approved  in 
Hendrix  i>.  Hendrix,  46  Tex.  6,  8.  But 
while  she  cannot  do  so  as  against  the 
rights  of  the   creditors  before  the  death 


6  Locke  v.  Rowell,  47    N.  II.  46,    49; 
Phipps    v.   Acton,    12    Bush,    375,    377  ; 


of  the  husband,  yet  she  may  exchange 
the  homestead  derived  from  him  for 
another  as  against  her  own  creditors : 
Schneider  v.  Bray,  59  Tex.  668,  670. 
See  post,  §  98,  as  to  the  widow's  right  to 
alienate  the  homestead  descended  to  her. 

8  Hicks  v.  Pepper,  1  Baxt.  42, 45  ;  Car- 
rigan  v.  Rowell,  96  Tenn.  185,  190;  King- 
man v.  Higgins,  100  111.  319,  325  ;  McCor- 
mack  v.  Kimmel,  4  111.  App.  121  ;  Farnan 
v.  Borders,  119  111.  228  ;  Burch  v.  Atchison, 
82  Ky.  585  ;  Paul  v.  Paul,  136  Mass.  286; 
and  a  sale  is  an  abandonment :  Garibaldi 
v.  Jones,  48  Ark.  230,  237.  The  recent 
statute  of  Alabama,  providing  that  the 
widow  and  minor  children  shall  not  forfeit 
their  homestead  right  by  a  removal,  so 
long  as  they  remain  residents  of  the  State, 
is  held  not  to  be  retroactive ;  Banks  v. 
Speers,  97  Ala.  560,  568. 

4  Thompson  on  Homest.  §§  263-287. 

5  Carter  v.  Randolph,  47  Tex.  376,  381 
(where  the  widow  had  not  occupied  the 
homestead  for  two  years  after  the  hus- 
band's death);  Pratt  v.  Pratt,  161  Mass. 
276;  Titman  v.  Moore,  43  111.  169,  173; 
Franklin  v.  Coffee,  18  Tex.  413,  416; 
Evans  v.  Evans,  13  Bush,  587 ;  Euper  v. 
Alkire,  37  Ark.  283  ;  Clements  v.  Lacy, 
51  Tex.  150;  Cox  v.  Harvey,  1  Tex. 
Unrep.  Cas.  268,  273-275. 


Brettun  v.  Fox,  100  Mass.  234,  236  ;  Deer* 
ing  v.  Beard,  48  Ivans.  16;  Hufschmidt  v. 


7  Thomp.  on  Homest.,  §  242  ;  Booth  v. 
Goodwin,  29  Ark.  633,  634,  and  Althei- 


mer  v.  Davis,  37  Ark.  316,  both  of  these 
cases  holding    that    minors   can    neither 
215 


200,  *  201 


EXEMPTION    OF   THE    HOMESTEAD. 


§95 


The  widow  and  children  take  the  same  estate  which  the  deceased 
husband  or  father  possessed  in  the  homestead,  and  no  greater;1 
Same  estate  ^  the  estate  is  less  than  a  fee,  it  ceases  with  the  expira- 
descends  that  tion  of  the  term.2  The  mere  use  of  the  premises  as  a 
fatherpos-  homestead  has  been  held  sufficient  to  shelter  the  pos- 
sessed, session  against  creditors ; 3  but  there  must  be  some  title, 
right,  or  interest  in  the  land  upon  which  the  homestead  is  claimed.4 
Possession  Possession  alone,  without  ownership  in  the  land  as  a 
a<°ain"°para°  basis  for  the  homestead  claim,  cannot  be  set  up  to 
mount  title.  defeat  a  recovery  in  ejectment  under  a  paramount 
legal  title ; 5  nor  can  the  widow  or  minor  children  claim  exception 
Equitable  title  from  the  bar  of  limitation.6  An  equitable  title  to  land 
sufficient.  js  iie]ti  [n  most  States  sufficient  to  support  the 
homestead  against  all  the  world  but  the  *  holder  or  beneficiary  [*  201] 
of  the  legal  title ; 7  while  in  others  the  right  is  not  allowed 


l  Smith  v.  Chenault,  48  Tex.  455,  461  ; 
McGrath  v.  Sinclair,  55  Miss.  89,  93; 
Deere  v.  Chapman,  25  111.  610;  Helm  v. 
Helm,  30  Gratt.  404  (holding  that,  where 
a  husband  died  without  leaving  children, 
and  not  having  claimed  a  homestead,  the 
widow  is  not  entitled  to  such),  406 ;  Es- 
tate of  Lessassier,  34  La  An.  1066 ;  Baillif 
v.  Gerhard,  40  Minn.  172  (holding  that 
where  the  homestead  was  abandoned  the 
premises  do  not  pass  to  the  surviving  hus- 
band or  wife) ;  Howell  v.  Jones,  91  Tenn. 
402  (holding  that  the  widow  had  no  home- 
stead in  land  to  which  her  deceased  hus- 
band had  only  a  reversionary  interest  at 
his  death)  ;  Staff ard  v.  "Woods,  144  111. 
203  (in  which  it  is  held  that  anything 
having  the  legal  effect  of  terminating  the 
original  householder's  right  of  possession 
under  the  contract  by  which  he  obtained 
title  terminated  the  homestead). 


2  Brown  v.  Keller,  32  111.  151,  154  ; 
Weber  v.  Short,  55  Ala.  311,  318  (over- 
ruling Pizzala  v.  Campbell,  46  Ala.  35, 
which  held  that  a  homestead  right  could 
not  exist  in  leasehold  estate). 

8  Brooks  v.  Hyde,  37  Cal.  366,  372, 
commenting  on  Calderwood  v.  Tevis,  23 
Cal.  335,  which  denies  homestead  protec- 
tion to  property  wrongfully  possessed; 
see  also  Jones  v.  Hart,  62  Miss.  13. 

4  Smith  v.  Smith,  12  Cal.  216,  223  ; 
Randal  v.  Elder,  12  Kans.  257,  261; 
Stamm  v.  Stamm,  11  Mo.  App.  598; 
Berry  v.  Dodson,  68  Miss.  483. 

6  McClurken  v.  McClurken,  46  111.  327, 
330. 

6  Smith  v.  Uzzell,  61  Tex.  220. 

7  Allen  v.  Hawley,  66  111.  164,  168; 
Blue  v.  Blue,  38  111.  9,  18;  Macmanus  v. 
Campbell,  37  Tex.  267  ;  McKee  v.  Wil- 
cox, 11  Mich.  358,  361 ;  Fyffe  v.  Beers,  18 


Gross,  1 1 2  Mo.  649  ;  she  may  rent  it  out 
and  receive  the  rents,  and  the  possession 
of  the  tenant  will  be  her  possession  :  Gari- 
baldi v.  Jones,  48  Ark.  230 ;  West  v. 
McMullen,  1 1 2  Mo.  405.  So  while  a  lease 
for  life  is  generally  an  abandonment,  this 
is  not  the  case  where  the  lessor  reserves 
the  right   to    return   to    the    homestead: 


Gates  v.  Steele,  48  Ark.  539.  Where,  how- 
ever, a  portion  of  a  tract  of  land  is  rented 
out  before  it  is  occupied  as  a  homestead, 
the  fact  that  the  remainder  is  subsequently 
so  occupied  will  not  stamp  the  portion 
leased  as  a  homestead:  In  re  Crowey,  71 
Cal.  300. 


waive  nor  abandon  their  homestead 
rights;  Johnson  v  Gaylord,  41  Iowa,  362, 
367;    Ball  '■■   Fields,  81    Tex.    553    (in 

which  the  minor  children  resided  with 
theil  mother,  who  had  been  divorced  from 
decedent);  Showers  ».  Robinson,!'!  Mich. 
502;  Farrow  v.  1 'arrow,  13  Lea,  120,  124, 
21G 


holding  that  occupation  by  the  minor  chil- 
dren at  the  time  the  right  accrues  is  meant 
by  the  statutory  requirement  "  occupy- 
ing the  same " :  Rhorer  v.  Brockhage, 
86  Mo.  544,  548.  See  also  Shirack » 
Shirack,  44  Kans.  653. 


§95 


WHAT   TENEMENT    CONSTITUTES   THE    HOMESTEAD. 


201 


to  attach  until  the  owner  has  the  legal  title.1     Whether  the  home- 
stead during  the  lifetime  of  the  parents  may  be  supported  by  an 
estate   held  jointly,  or  in  common,  or  in   partnership 
with  others,  is  held  differently  in  different  States,  and   tenancy  in 
the  authorities  conflict   sometimes  in  the  same   State.    common- 
The  subject  is  exhaustively  treated  in  Thompson's  work  on  Home- 
steads and  Exemptions.2     But  the  widow  and  minor  children  have 
been  accorded  a  preference  in  this  respect  over  the  deceased  tenant 
in  common,  being  entitled  to  a  homestead  out  of  the  common  estate. 
This  was  so  held  in  Illinois,3  but  denied  in  California.4     But  though 
exclusive  possession  by  one  of  several  tenants  in  common  may  be 
held  to  permit  of  homestead  rights  in  such  tenant,  yet  there  cannot 
be  two  separate  homestead  estates  in  the   same  land  at  the   same 
time.5 

In  Arkansas  it  is  held  that  on  the  death  of  a  tenant  in  common 
the  right  to  a  homestead  descends  to  his  widow  and  children.6  In 
Texas  the  widow's  right  to  a  homestead  in  land  owned  jointly  by 
two,  who  executed  a  deed  of  trust  to  secure  a  joint  debt,  and  one  of 
whom  subsequently  bought  the  interest  of  the  other,  was  held  to 
attach  only  to  the  interest  her  deceased  husband  owned  when  the 
deed  of  trust  was  executed.7 

The  right  transmitted  to  the  surviving  members  of 
the  family  is  determined  by  the  law  as  existing  at  the 
time  of  the  death  of  the  person  from  whom  it  descends ; 
no  subsequent  change  of  the  law  will  affect  their 
rights.8     But  as  to  creditors,   it  must   be   remembered 


Law  of  the 
time  of  the 
decedent's 
deatli  controls 
descent  of 
homestead. 


Iowa,  4,  1 1 ;  Doane  v.  Doane,  46  Vt.  485, 
493;  Cheatham  v.  Jones,  68  N.  C.  153; 
Hartman  v.  Munch,  21  Minn.  107  ;  Tar- 
rant v.  Swain,  15  Kans.  146,  149;  Mc- 
Cabe  v.  Mazzuchelli,  13  Wis.  478,  482.. 
In  Alabama  the  homestead  may  be  claimed 
without  regard  to  the  nature  or  character 
of  the  title,  whether  legal  or  equitable,  or 
of  the  estate,  whether  in  fee,  for  life,  or 
for  years :  Tyler  v.  Jewett,  82  Ala.  93. 

1  Thurston  v.  Maddocks,  6  Allen,  427, 
428  ;  Holmes  v.  Winchester,  infra ;  Garaty 
v.  Du  Bose,  5  S.  C.  493,  499;  but  later 
South  Carolina  decisions  seem  inclined  to 
follow  the  weight  of  authority,  and  hold 
that  there  may  be  a  homestead  in  land 
held  by  an  equitable  title  :  Munro  v.  Jeter, 
24  S.  C.  29,  36  ;  Ex  parte  Kurz,  24  S.  C. 
468,  471. 

2  §§  180  etseq.  See  also  Smyth,  Home- 
stead &  Exemp.,  §§  120  et  seq.;  Snedecor 
v.  Freeman,  71  Ala.  140  et  seq.  ;  Sims  v. 
Thompson,  39  Ark.  301,  304 ;  Holmes  v. 
Winchester,  138  Mass.  542;   Trowbridge 


v.  Cross,  117  111.  109,  denying  the  right  of 
homestead  in  partnership  property ;  Capek 
v.  Kropik,  129  111.  509;  Fitzgerald  v. 
Fernandez,  71  Cal.  504,  507,  denying 
homestead  rights  to  tenants  in  common, 
or  joint  tenants,  unless  the  claimant  shall 
be  in  the  exclusive  possession  of  the  land  ; 
Oswald  v.  McCaulley,  6  Dak.  289,  vindi- 
cating homestead  rights  in  undivided 
lands,  on  the  ground  that  exemption  may 
be  claimed  of  any  property  subject  to  sale 
on  execution:  Ward  v.  May  field,  41  Ark. 
94,  citing  earlier  Arkansas  cases. 

3  Capek  v.  Kropik,  supra ;  see  Brokaw 
v.  Ogle,  170  111.  115. 

4  Matter  of  Carriger,  107  Cal.  618,  re- 
viewing earlier  California  cases. 

5  Brokaw  v.  Ogle,  170  111.  115,  and 
cases  cited  from  other  States  in  the 
opinion. 

6  Ward  v.  May  field,  supra. 

1  Griffie  v.  Maxey,  58  Tex.  210. 
8  Kegister  v.  Hensley,  70  Mo.  189,  194; 
Yeates  v.  Briggs,  95  111.  79,  83 ;  Taylor  v. 
217 


*  201,  *  202  EXEMPTION   OF   THE    HOMESTEAD.  §  96 

Rights  of  cred-  that  their  rights  cannot  be  impaired  after  tne  debt  is 
paired  after"  contracted ;  so  that  a  homestead  or  other  exemption  law 
creation  of  is  in  derogation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  in  so  far  as  it  attempts  to  withdraw  from  the 
reach  of  the  creditor  property  which  was  within  his  reach  before;1 
although  it  was  held,  formerly,  that  a  State  law  divesting  a  vested 
right  was  not  for  that  reason  unconstitutional.2 

*  Where  the  law  requires  a  declaration  of  a  debtor's  [*  202] 
intention  to  hold  certain  property  as  a  homestead  to  be 
recorded,  the  making  and  recording  of  such  declaration  by  a  widow, 
after  the  debtor's  death,  will  not  protect  the  homestead  against 
debts  contracted  by  the  deceased  husband.8  And  see,  on  this  point, 
the  discussion  of  the  effect  of  encumbrances  on  the  homestead  of 
widow  and  children.4 

§  96.  Homestead  Rights  of  the  Widow.  —  The  rights  of  the 
widow  to  the  property  constituting  her  homestead  are  to  be  dis- 
Homestead  tinguished  according  to  the  nature  of  her  relation  to  the 
"fv'h  'id  ^r0P~  same-  If  sne  be  the  owner  of  the  property  in  fee, 
fee,  which  she   may   occupy  as   the   head   of   a   family   or 

otherwise,  the  law  makes  no  distinction  between  her  and  homestead 
tenants  in  general,  either  as  to  the  liability  of  such  property  for  her 
own  debts,  or  as  to  any  incidents  affecting  her  right  to  the  same, 
or  in  the  But  if  the  property  passed  to  her   from  her   deceased 

homestead  of  husband,  not  by  devise  or  the  law  of  descent,  or  as 
husband.  dower,  but  by  the  statute,  so  as  to  be  enjoyed  by  her  as 

a  homestead,  she  holds  such  property  exempt  from  the  claims  of 
creditors,  her  late  husband's  as  well  as  her  own,6  and  mostly,  also, 
against  her  husband's  heirs.  This,  as  has  been  shown,  is  the  law 
in  most  States,6  giving  her  the  enjoyment  of  the  homestead,  whether 
there  be  a  child  or  children  or  not,  either  for  the  period  of  her 
natural  life,  or  as  long  as  she  may  remain  unmarried,  subject  to  the 
cotenancy  of  minor  children.  It  was  held  in  Florida,  however,  that 
under  a  constitution  securing  a  homestead  to  the  heirs  of  a  deceased 

Taylor,  53  Ala.  135;  Munchus  v.  Harris,  Blum   v.  Carter,   63   Ala.   235,  237;   De 

69  Ala.  506,  508  ;  Slaughter  w.  McBride,  Witt   v.    Sewing   Machine    Co.,   17  Neb. 

69  Ala.  510;  Emmett  v.  Einmett.  14  Lea,  533  ;  Hosford  v.  Wynn,  22  S.  C.  309,  310; 

369,   370;    Threatt   v.   Moody,  87    Tenn.  Davis    v.    Dunn,    74    Ga.    36;    Long    v. 

143;   Gruwell  v.  Seybolt,  82  Cal.  7,   10;  Walker,   105    N.   C.   90,   98;    White    v. 

Davidson  v.  Davis,  86  Mo.  440.     But  as  White,  63  Vt.  577;  Stewart  v.  Blalock, 

to  the  manner  of  asserting  and  contesting  45  S.  C.  61,  65. 

the  right,  the  statute  at  the  time  governs:  2  Watson  v.  Mercer,  8  Pet.  88,   110; 

Dossey  v.  Pitman,  81  Ala.  881,  883.  Beers  v.  Ilaughton,  9  Pet.  329,  359. 

i  Gunn    v.   Barry,    15   Wall.   610,  621,  8  Bernhardt  v.   Bernhardt,  21   W.  Va. 

reversing   same   case,   44    Ga.    351,  353;  76,  82  ;  Wray  v.  Davenport,  79  Va.  19,  25. 
Edwards  v.  Kearzey,  96  0.  8.  595;  Dunn         i  Post,  §  100. 
v.   Stevens,  62    .Minn.    880;    Munchus   v.  6  K eyes  v.  Cyrus,  100  Cal.  322. 

Harris,    supra  ;    Slaughter    v.    McBride,         °  Ante,  §  94. 

suprn;   Cochran  V.  Miller,  74   Ala.  .r>0,  57; 
218 


§96 


HOMESTEAD   RIGHTS   OF   THE   WIDOW.  *  202,  *  203 


owner,  the  widow  has  no  homestead ; 1  but  the  present  constitution 
extends  the  benefit  of  the  homestead  to  the  widow.     If  there  be  no 

children  at  all,2  or  no  minor  children,8  she  takes  the  home- 
[*  203]  stead  *  as  the  remaining  constituent  of  the  family  for  whose 

protection  the  law  is  intended.  In  some  States,  Exceptions  in 
however,  this  view  is  not  deemed  warranted  by  the  8ome  Sub- 
language of  the  constitution  or  statute;  it  has  been  held  in  North 
Carolina  that  a  widow  is  not  entitled  to  the  homestead  where  the 
husband  left  adult  or  minor  children;4  nor  where  he  left  minor 
children,  but  no  debts,  the  homestead  law  being  intended  to  furnish 
protection  against  creditors,  but  not  against  heirs.5  So  in  Alabama,6 
Georgia,7  Illinois,8  Michigan,9  Utah,10  and  Virginia,11  the  widow  is 
denied  the  right  of  homestead  as  against  heirs  or  their  assigns.12  In 
Kentucky 18  and  Iowa, u  either  spouse  may,  upon  the  death  of  the 
other,  occupy  the  homestead  regardless  of  the  question  which  was 
the  owner  of  the  fee,  and  whether  there  was  issue  or  not;  and  in 
Illinois  the  homestead  is  continued  for  the  joint  and  several  benefit 

8  Turner  v.  Bennett,  70  111.  263,  267  ; 
Egglestou  v.  Eggleston,  72  111.  24 ;  Sontag 
v.  Schmisseur,  76  111.  541. 

9  Robinson  v.  Baker,  47  Mich.  619; 
the  court  intimate,  however,  that  the 
widow  should  have  her  dower  and  home- 
stead right  saved  to  her  in  the  homestead 
land  whenever  it  can  be  done  consistently 
with  justice  :  p.  624  ;  Patterson  v.  Patter- 
son, 49  Mich.  176.  Neither  widow  nor  chil- 
dren are  entitled  to  the  homestead  right 
unless  the  estate  is  insolvent  and  in  debt: 
Zoellner  v.  Zoellner,  53  Mich.  620 ;  where 
the  right  attaches,  and  the  estate  is  indi- 
visible and  exceeds  the  homestead  allow- 
ance in  value,  it  cannot  be  sold  in  parti- 
tion proceedings  :  lb.,  p.  626. 

10  Knudson  v.  Hannberg,  8  Utah,  203, 
(If  the  value  exceeds  the  amount  exempt 
from  execution.) 

11  Barker  v.  Jenkins,  84  Va.  895. 
"  Fight  v.  Holt,  80  111.  84. 
18  Ellis  v.  Davis,  90  Ky.  183. 
14  Burns   v.  Keas,  21    Iowa,  257,  258 ; 

Nicholas  v.  Purczell,  21  Iowa,  265  ;  Dodds 
v.  Dodds,  26  Iowa,  311.  In  this  State 
the  widow  is  not  entitled  to  both  dower 
and  homestead ;  hence,  if  the  homestead 
be  either  sold  upon  the  widow's  applica- 
tion, or  assigned  to  her  in  fee  as  dower, 
she  occupies  her  own  homestead,  and  no 
longer  the  one  coming  to  her  from  her 
deceased  husband  by  reason  of  his  death: 
Meyer  v.  Meyer,  23  Iowa,  359,  373. 

219 


1  Wilson  v.  Fridenburg,  19  Fla.  461, 
466. 

2  Moore  v.  Parker,  13  S.  C.  486,  489; 
Glover  v.  Hill,  57  Miss.  240,  242;  Eus- 
tache  v.  Rodaquest,  1 1  Bush,  42,  46 ; 
Rhorer  v.  Brockhage,  13  Mo.  App.  397, 
affirmed  86  Mo.  544 ;  Groover  v.  Brown, 
69  Ga.  60,  64;  Allen  v.  Russell,  39  Oh. 
St.  336  ;  Gay  v.  Hanks,  81  Ky.  552. 

3  Estate  of  Ballentine,  45  Cal.  696, 
699 ;  s.  c.  Myr.  86 ;  Keyes  v.  Hill,  30  Vt. 
759,  765 ;  Brown  v.  Brown,  68  Mo.  388 ; 
Yoe  v.  Hanvey,  25  S.  C.  94,  97  ;  Riley  v. 
Smith,  5  S.  W.  R.  (Ky.)  869  ;  Armstrong's 
Estate,  80  Cal.  71 ;  when  the  children  be- 
come of  full  age,  the  widow  is  entitled  to 
have  the  homestead  set  off  for  her  exclu- 
sive use  and  occupancy :  Rockhey  v. 
Rockhey,  97  Mo.  76. 

4  Wharton  v.  Leggett,  80  N.  C.  169, 
171 ;  Savior  v.  Powell,  90  N.  C.  202.  An 
act  of  the  legislature  extending  the  home- 
stead right  was  held  unconstitutional : 
Wharton  v.  Taylor,  88  N.  C.  230. 

6  Hager  v.  Nixon,  69  N.  C.  108,  110. 
But  the  homestead,  when  once  laid  off, 
though  to  the  widow  after  the  husband's 
death,  cannot  be  divested  in  favor  of  the 
heir,  by  the  payment  of  the  debts,  but 
will  enure  to  the  widow's  benefit  during 
widowhood:  Tucker  v.  Tucker,  103  N.  C. 
170. 

6  Thornton  v.  Thornton,  45  Ala.  274. 

7  Kemp  v.  Kemp,  42  Ga.  523,  526. 
(Neither  widow  nor  children.) 


*  203,  *  204  EXEMPTION    OF   THE   HOMESTEAD.  §  96 

of  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  and  of  the  minor  children ;  *  but  in 
Missouri,  if  the  wife  be  the  owner  and  die,  no  homestead  descends 
to  either  husband  or  minor  children.2  In  Wisconsin  the  exemption 
continues  after  the  owner's  death,  not  only  in  favor  of  the  widow 
and  children,  but  of  devisees  also,  and  heirs.3 

The  widow  may  also  hold  the  homestead  property  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  minor  children,  or  as  having  become  the  head  of  the 
Widow's  home-   family  upon  the  death  of  her  husband.     In  such  case,  > 
stead  r'ghts  as    whatever  may  be  the  effect  of  her  acts  upon  her  own 
family.  rights  to  or  interest  in  the  homestead,  she  cannot  waive, 

renounce,  release,  or  in  any  manner  affect  the  interest  of  the  chil- 
dren secured  to  them  by  the  statute.4     As  against  creditors, 

#  the  right  of  possession  is  in  a  minor  child  of  the  deceased,  .[*  204] 
whether  the  mother  is  legally  the  widow  or  not;5  and  where 

the  statute  does  not  allow  dower  and  homestead  in  the  same  estate, 
she  may  either  waive  or  hold  her  dower,  as  to  herself,  and  claim 
the  homestead  in  behalf  of  her  children.6  But  acting  for  herself 
alone,  she  may  bind  herself  by  any  acts  of  omission  or  commission, 
in  the  same  manner  as  any  other  person  sui  juris  ;  she  is  bound  in 
a  partition  proceeding,  if  she  fail  to  claim  her  homestead,  by  the 
decree  rendered,  and  her  right  to  such  is  thereby  barred.7 

It  seems  hardly  necessary  to  mention,  that  neither  a  woman  not 
No  homestead  lawfully  married,8  nor  a  wife  who  prior  to  her  husband's 
rights  descend  death  has  been  notoriously  unfaithful  to  him  and  is  not 
member  of  the  a  member  of  his  family  at  the  time  of  his  death,9  or  has 
family.  abandoned  him,10  nor  one  who  has  been  divorced,11  can 

1  Capek  v.  Kropik,  129  111.  509,  519.  6  Hence,  where  the  deceased  left  one 

2  Kevte  v.  Peery,  25  Mo.  App.  394.  minor  child,  the  allowance  to  the  widow 
This  case  arose  under  a  statute  construed  and  child  cannot  be  assailed  by  creditors 
as  vestinf  an  absolute  fee  in  the  widow  to  on  the  ground  that  the  alleged  widow  was 
her  deceased  husband's  homestead,  before  not  the  lawful  wife  :  Lockhart  v.  White, 
the  amendment  cutting  down  her  interest  18  Tex.  102,  109. 

therein  to  a  life  estate.  The  present  stat-  6  Adams  v.  Adams,  46  Ga.  630,  631. 
ute  does  not,  in  terms,  vest  a  homestead  7  Wright  v.  Dunning,  46  111.  271,  275; 
by  descent  in  the  husband :  Rev.  St.  1889,  Hoback  v.  Hoback,  33  Ark.  399,  404. 
§  5439  ;  but  in  the  case  of  Kendall  v.  8  Owen  v.  Bracket,  7  Lea,  448 ;  and 
Powers,  96  Mo.  142,  the  court  decide  that  though  living  at  the  time  the  debt  was 
the  husband  may  have  a  homestead,  as  created  with  the  man  she  afterwards  mar- 
head  of  a  family,  in  a  life  estate,  or  in  ries,  on  her  premises:  Rock  v.  Haas,  110 
property  the  title  to  which  is  vested  in  his  111.  528,  534. 

wife     This  case  is  affirmed  in  Richter  v.  9  Estate  of  Cometo,  Myr.  42, 44 ;  Prater 

Bohnsack,  144  Mo.  516,  holding,  however,  v.  Prater,  87  Tenn.  78,  86. 

that  uinler  the  statute  the  husband  has  no  10  Dickman  v.  Birkhauser,  16  Neb.  686  ; 

homestead  in  his  deceased  wife's  residence,  Puke  v.  Reed,  64  Tex.  705,  713;  nor  can 

in  which  he  has  no  curtesy,  and  no  legal  or  a  husband  claim  a  homestead  in  his  wife's 

equitable,  or  marital  interest  of  any  kind,  estate  after  abandoning  her:    Hector  v. 

»  Johnson  v.  Harrison,  41  Wis.  381,  385.  Knox,  63  Tex.  618. 

4  See  authorities  on   this  point  cited,  "  Stamm  v.  Stnmm,  11   Mo.  App.  598; 

poif,  |  99,  p.  *  208,  note.  Wiggin   v.   Bnzzell,   58  N.  II.  329,  330; 
220 


§  96  HOMESTEAD    RIGHTS   OP   THE    WIDOW.  *  204,  *  205 

claim  a  homestead  against  the  husband's  real  estate.     But  where 
a  wife,  whose  husband  has  abandoned  her,  has  secured  a  homestead 
under  the  statute  providing  for  such  case,  she  will  be    But  may  if 
entitled  to  such  homestead,  although  she  subsequently    wife  ^e  di* 
obtained  a  divorce  from  her  husband.1     Nor  does  a  wife    husband's 
lose   her  homestead  rights  if  she  leaves  her  home   by    fault- 
reason  of  the  husband's  cruelty; 2  and  in  an  action  by  her  to  recover 
lands  claimed  as  homestead,  if  the  defendant  allege  that  she  of  her 
own  wrong  had  deserted  her  husband,  she  may  show  that  she  left 
him  because  of  his  cruelty,  although  such  facts  were  not  alleged  in 
the  pleadings.8    In  Kansas,  where  the  homestead  is  occupied  by  the 
widow  and  children  of  decedent,  her  remarriage  does  not  destroy 
the  homestead  character  of  the  premises,  and  the  statute  provides 
that  the   homestead   in  such   case   may  be   divided,  one-half   each 
to  the  widow  and   children.4     It   may  also   be  mentioned,  as   was 
held  in  South  Carolina,5  that  the  widow  is  entitled  to  a  homestead 
in  her  husband's  lands,  though  she  and  her  children  possess  realty 

of  their  own. 
[*  205]  *  Where  the  widow's  right  to  a  homestead  is  made 
dependent  upon  the  existence  of  a  family,  not  defined  in  the 
statute  creating  the  right,  it  is  difficult  sometimes  to  determine 
what  constitutes  a  family.  This  subject  is  treated  in  connection 
with  the  provisional  alimony  for  the  family,6  and  the  reasons  and 
authorities  given  there  as  determining  the  question  apply  with  equal 
force  to  the  subject  of  homesteads.  It  is  held,  in  this  respect,  that 
one  person  cannot  constitute  a  family,  nor  a  person  and  his  or  her 
children  permanently  separated  from  him  or  her ; 7  and  that  a  man 
or  woman,  never  having  been  married,  or  having  once  been  married 
and  having  no  family,  cannot  claim  a  homestead.8  But  in  Georgia 
the  widow  of  a  decedent  and  step-mother  of  his  minor  children, 
standing  to  them  in  loco  'parentis,  was  held  to  become  the  head  of 
the  family  and  entitled  as  such  to  a  homestead  in  his  realty  for  the 
benefit  of  herself  and  the  minors.9 

For  the  reasons   mentioned  in   connection   with   the   provisional 

Hall  v.  Fields,  81  Tex.  553 ;  even  if  for  the  head  of  a  family :  Vanzant  v.  Vanzant, 

husband's  fault:    Stahl  v.  Stahl,  114  111.  23  111.  536,  542. 

375.     But  a  divorce  a  mensa  et  thoro  will  2  Keyes  v.  Scanlan,  63  Wis.  345  ;  Lamb 

not  debar  her  right :  Castlebury  v.  May-  v.  Wagan,  27  Neb.  236. 

nard,  95  N.  C.  281,  285.  8  Bradley  v.  Deroche,  70  Tex.  465. 

l  Blandy  v.  Asher,  72  Mo.  27,  29 ;  so  *  Brady  v.  Banto,  46  Kans.  131. 

in   the    community  property,   where   the  5  Ex  parte  Brown,  37  S.  C.  181. 

wife  obtains  a  divorce  and  the  custody  of  6  Ante,  §  88. 

the    children,   she    retains   a    homestead  7  Rock  v.  Haas,  110  HI.  528,  533. 

during  life  :  Tiemann  v.  Tiemann,  34  Tex.  8  Rock  v.  Haas,  supra. 

522,  525.    A  divorced  woman,  if  the  meri-  9  Holloway  v.   Holloway,  86  Ga.  576, 

torious  party,  and  intrusted  with  the  cus-  and   see  numerous  cases  there  cited,  p 

tody  of  the  children,  is  entitled  to  enjoy  579. 
the  homestead  as  if  she  were  a  widow  and 

221 


205 


EXEMPTION    OF    THE    HOMESTEAD. 


§9- 


alimony  of  the  family 1  and  in  treating  of  the  widow's  right  to 
dower,2  non-resident  widows  or  minor  children  can  have  no  right  to 
a  homestead  under  the  exemption  laws  of  the  husband's  or  father's 
domicil  at  the  time  of  his  death.3  But  since  the  husband's  domicil 
draws  to  it  the  domicil  of  his  wife,  the  involuntary  absence  from 
the  State,  or  an  absence  not  amounting  to  abandonment  or  desertion 
of  the  husband  would  not,  it  seems,  militate  against  her  homestead 
rights ; 4  hence  the  mere  fact  of  her  never  having  been  in  the  State 
does  not  debar  her.6 

§  97.  The  Homestead  as  affected  by  the  Widow's  Dower.  —  At 
common  law  the  widow  is  entitled  to  the  usufruct  during  her  life- 
Dower  belongs  time  of  one-third  of  all  the  real  estate  of  which  the 
husband  was  seised  during  the  coverture,  without  regard 
to  the  existence  of  minor  children,  or  the  condition  of 
decedent's  family.6  This  principle  is  substantially 
embodied  in  the  statutes  of  the  several  States.  The 
purpose  of  the  homestead  acts  is  to  secure  a  home  for  the  family, 
including  the  widow  within  the  scope  of  its  beneficial  intent  only  in 
so  far  as  she  may  represent,  or  constitute  a  member  of,  the  family. 
It  is  therefore  a  question  whether  the  widow  is  intended  to  enjoy 
the  benefit  of  both  these  provisions  cumulatively,  or  whether  her 
claim  to  or  acceptation  of  the  one  excludes  her  interest  in  the  other. 
Statutes  giving  In  most  of  the  States  this  question  is  determined  by  the 
statutes  themselves ;  and  as  these  differ  from  each  other, 
so  a  different  conclusion  is  reached  in  the  different  States 
by  the  courts  called  upon  either  to  construe  doubtful  phraseology  of 
statutes,  or  to  announce  the  principle  governing  where  the  statutes  are 
silent.    In  Alabama,7  Arkansas,8  Florida,9  Illinois,10  Massachusetts,11 

bert,  135  111.  27,  holding  that  the  widow- 
may  have  both  dower  and  homestead  in 
the  same  premises,  but  that  dower  cannot 


to  the  widow 
absolutely; 
homestead 
only  as  repre- 
senting surviv< 
ing  family. 


homestead  in 
addition  to 
dower. 


1  Ante,  §  89,  p.*  184. 

2  Post,  §  108. 

8  Prater  v.  Prater,  87  Tenn.  78 ;  Stan- 
ton v.  Hitchcock,  31  N.  W.  (Mich.)  395; 
Alston  v.  lTlmann,39  Tex.  157,  159;  Suc- 
cession of  Norton,  18  La.  An.  36. 

4  Lacey  v.  Clements,  36  Tex.  661. 

5  Lacey  v.  Clements,  supra. 

6  See,  as  to  Dower,  post,  §§  105  et  seq, 

7  McCuan  v.  Turrentine,  48  Ala.  68, 
70,  citing  earlier  Alabama  cases ;  but 
Only  as  against  creditors;  for  unless  the 
widow  pr<i\e  the  estate  to  be  insolvent, 
she  will  get  merely  her  dower:  Thornton 
v.  Thornton,  45  Ala.  274,  275.  On  the 
widow's  abandonment  of  the  homestead, 

h«-r    right    to    dower    becomes    operative  : 
Norton  V,  Norton,  94  Ala.  481,  486. 

6  Horton  v.  Hillard,  58  Ark.  298. 

,J  Godwin  v.  King,  SI  Ela,  525. 
10  Walsh  v.  Eleia,  r.o  111.  477;  Buraen  v. 
Ooodipeed,  60  111.  277,  281 ;  Jones  v.  Gil- 


be  asserted  in  the  property  held  as  home- 
stead until  the  homestead  ceases,  when 
the  right  to  have  dower  assigned  revives ; 
and  that  she  cannot  take  homestead  and 
also  have  the  equivalent  of  dower  in  the 
whole  estate  taken  out  of  the  residue. 

11  Cowdrey  v.  Cowdrey,  131  Mass.  186, 
188,  citing  earlier  Massachusetts  cases; 
conveyance  "  in  order  to  release  her  rights 
under  the  homestead  exemption  act"  does 
not  bar  her  dower,  although  the  deed  con- 
tain full  covenants  of  seisin  and  of  war- 
ranty: Tirrel  ?;.  Kenney,  137  Mans.  30; 
but  if  she  obtains  an  assignment  of  dower 
in  the  same  land,  and  conveys  her  interest 
to  another,  she  thereby  waives  and  relin- 
quishes her  right  of  homestead  :  Bates  v. 
Bates,  97  Mass.  392,  395. 


§98 


widow's  right  to  sell  homestead. 


*  205,  *  206 


Michigan,1  Missouri,2  Nebraska,8  New  Hampshire,4  South  Carolina,8 
Tennessee,6  Vermont,7  Virginia,8  and  Wisconsin,9  the  right 
[*  206]  of  homestead  is  held  to  be  cumulative  to  *  and  independ- 
ent of   dower,  so  that  a  widow  may  have  both;   while  in 
Iowa,10  Georgia,11  and  North  Carolina,12  she  is  put  to  her    „ 
election  to  take  one  or  the  other,  but  is  not  entitled  to    quiring  her  to 
both.     The  wife's  release  of  dower  in  an  ante-nuptial        t- 
contract  does  not  affect  her  right  to  a  homestead  in  the  husband's 
property  after  his  death.13 

§  98.    The  Widow's  Right  to  sell  the  Homestead.  —  Whether  the 
widow  can  assign,  convey,  or  sell  her  right  to  the  homestead  is  a 
matter  of  some  doubt,  and  the  authorities  are  not  har-    There  can  be 
monious.     The   language   of   the   statute   securing  the    nosaleofa 

°      °  °  mere  exemp- 

right  to  the  widow  must  be  decisive,  of  course,  and  in  tion. 
many  instances  leaves  no  doubt  in  this  respect;  but  it  is  not  always 
clear  enough  to  enable  courts  to  reach  a  conclusion  without  recourse 
to  construction.  If  the  right  to  the  homestead  consists  of  the  mere 
exemption  from  compulsory  sale  for  debts,  or  even  of  a  present  right 
to  possession  as  against  heirs,  it  seems  to  result  that  the  right  ceases 
as  soon  as  the  owner  thereof  abandons  the  homestead,  or  surrenders 
possession  to  a  grantee,  and  then  the  owner  of  the  fee  is  entitled  to 
possession.14     In  such  case  a  sale  would  pass  no  right  whatever  to 


1  Showers  v.  Robinson,  43  Mich.  502, 
510. 

2  Gragg  v.  Gragg,  65  Mo.  343,  345; 
Seek  v.  Hayues,  68  Mo.  13,  17.  In  this 
State,  if  the  widow's  interest  in  the  home- 
stead exceeds  or  equals  in  value  her  dower 
in  the  entire  estate,  then  she  can  have  no 
dower ;  if  it  be  less,  she  is  to  have  the  dif- 
ference set  off  to  her  in  dower :  Bryan  v. 
Rhoades,  96  Mo.  485,  489.  Under  the  law 
previous  to  1875,  the  widow  took  the  fee 
of  the  homestead,  and  she  might  claim  it, 
though  dower  had  been  assigned  and  con- 
veyed by  her  to  another :  Wheelock  v. 
Overshiner,   110  Mo.   100. 

8  Guthman  v.  Guthman,  18  Neb.  98. 

4  Burt  v.  Randlett,  59  N.  H.  130. 

6  Jefferies  v.  Allen,  29  S.  C.  501,  508. 

6  Merriman  v.  Lacefield,  4  Heisk.  209, 
222  ;  Jarman  v.  Jarman,  4  Lea,  671. 

7  Chaplin  v.  Sawyer,  35  Vt.  286.  (In 
Day  v.  Adams,  42  Vt.  510,  516,  it  is  held 
that  on  the  husband's  death  the  homestead 
vests  in  the  widow  in  fee). 

8  Scott  v.  Cheatham,  78  Va.  82,  83. 

9  Bresel  v.  Stiles,  22  Wis.  120,  126. 

10  Dower  is  abolished  in  Iowa ;  but  the 
widow's  "  distributive  share  "  takes  its 
place :   Schlarb  v.  Holderbaum,  80  Iowa, 


394 ;  Wilcox  v.  Wilcox,  89  Iowa,  388 
(holding  the  placing  of  a  mortgage  on 
her  distributive  share  to  be  an  election 
and  to  estop  her  from  claiming  homestead, 
though  she  continued  on  the  premises) ; 
Zwick  v.  Jones,  89  Iowa,  550  (holding  the 
general  rule  to  be  that  where  the  surviv- 
ing husband  or  wife  has  occupied  the 
homestead  for  a  reasonable  length  of 
time,  without  having  the  distributive 
share  set  out,  an  election  to  take  the 
homestead  is  presumed).  Hunter  v.  Hun- 
ter, 95  Iowa,  728  (holding  no  election  by 
estoppel  where  her  possession  of  the  prem- 
ises may  be  attributed  to  her  holding  as 
life-tenant). 

11  Adams  v.  Adams,  46  Ga.  630. 

12  Watts  v.  Leggett.  66  N.  C.  197,  201  ; 
but  if  the  homestead  is  laid  off  in  the  life- 
time of  the  husband,  she  may  take  dower 
in  the  remaining  estate  :  McAfee  v.  Bettis, 
72  N.  C.  28,  30. 

13  Mack  v.  Heiss,  90  Mo.  578,  582.  See 
Ditson  v.  Ditson,  85  Iowa,  276,  holding 
that  under  the  facts  in  that  case  the  widow 
could  not  claim  homestead. 

"  McDonald  v.  Crandall,  43  111.   231, 
238;  Eldridge  v.  Pierce,  90  111.  474,  480, 
citing  numerous  Illinois  cases  ;  Barber  v 
223 


*  206,  *  207  EXEMPTION   OF   THE   HOMESTEAD.  §  98 

the  vendee,  because  the  great  object  of  the  law,  to  secure  a  fixed 
home  for  the  family,  would  be  defeated  by  permitting  the  alienation 
But  the  right  of  that  home.1  It  is  held  in  Kansas,  however,  that  a 
of  the  widow      saie  Dy  the  widow  of  the  homestead  before  its  abandon- 

agamst  heirs  . 

may  be  con-  ment  as  such  confers  upon  the  vendee  the  right  to  hold 
veyed.  ^e  pr0perty  free  from  all  debts  of  the  deceased  husband 

(except  such  as  are  not  excluded  by  the  homestead  law),  although 
the  property  be  afterward  abandoned  by  the  widow  and  children.2 
Where  the  statute  creates  a  new  estate,  which  is  given  to 
the  widow,  in  *  derogation  of  the  rights  not  only  of  creditors,  [*  207] 
but  also  of  heirs  and  devisees,  there  the  enjoyment  of  such 
estate  includes  the  power  to  transfer,  lease,  or  sell  it,  and  hence  the 
widow's  vendee  or  assignee  takes  the  same  title  which  she  had.3 
A  fortiori,  the  right  of  alienation  exists  where  the  statute  confers 
the  property  upon  the  widow  in  fee,  or  by  such  absolute  title  as  the 
husband  held  before  his  death.4 

A  distinction  has  also  been  drawn  between  the  debtor's  voluntary 
exchange  of  exempt  property  for  property  not  exempt,  and  such 
exchange  for  other  property  also  exempt.5  Such  a  distinction  can 
throw  but  little  direct  light  on  the  subject  under  consideration, 
which  is  not  the  rights  of  homestead  tenants  in  general,  but  of  those 
conferred  by  the  death  of  the  head  of  a  family;  but  is  of  interest  in 
emphasizing  the  dual  capacity  in  which  a  widow  may  hold  home- 
stead rights.  As  to  the  power  to  alienate  the  homestead  during 
the  lifetime  of  both  parents  of  a  family,  see  the  remarks  of  Judge 

Williams,  74  Ala.  331,  333.  A  fortiori,  the  worth  v.  Kimhrough,  79  Ky.  332,  the  rule 
homestead,  if  regarded  as  an  exemption,  is  stated  to  be  that,  where  the  homestead 
before  it  is  set  out  by  metes  and  bounds,  right  is  derivative,  the  legal  title  is  in  the 
is  not  the  subject  of  sale  by  a  widow :  heirs,  subject  to  the  right  of  occupancy ; 
Best  v.  Jenks,  123  111.  447,  459;  Miller  v.  but  where  it  is  original,  the  title  is  in  the 
Schnebly,  103  Mo.  368,  377  (overruled  on  party  claiming  the  homestead,  with  the 
the  ground  that  the  statute  created  an  right  to  dispose  of  it  as  well  as  its  pro- 
estate  and  not  merely  an  exemption,  in  ceeds.  See  also  Holbrook  v.  Wightman, 
Weathersford  v.  King,  119  Mo.  51).  31  Minn.  168,  170;  Watkins  v.  Davis,  61 
1  Garibaldi  v.  Jones,  48  Ark.  230,  237 ;  Tex.  414,  416;  Graham  v.  Stewart,  68 
Whittle  v.  Samuels,  54  Ga.  548,  550.  It  Cal.  374,  378;  Mack  v.  Heiss,  90  Mo.  578, 
seems,  however,  that  no  one  except  minor  583;  Weatherford  v.  King,  119  Mo.  51. 
children  can  question  the  validity  of  a  4  Thus  it  is  held  in  Illinois,  that  the 
widow's  sale  of  the  homestead:  Drake  v.  homestead  descending  to  the  surviving 
Kinsell,  38  Mich.  232,  237.  husband  or  wife  is  a  freehold  estate  : 
-  Dayton  v.  Donart,  22  Kans.  256,  270.  Snell  v.  Snell,  123  111.  403,  406,  which 
3  MrCarthey  v.  Van  der  Mey,  42  Minn,  they  may  lease  for  any  term  not  extend- 
189;  Eldridge  v.  Pierce,  supra,  distinguish-  ing  beyond  his  or  her  life,  or  convey  by 
ing  between  a  statute  creating  a  new  es-  deed  after  it  has  been  set  out :  White  v. 
tate  and  one  securing  only  an  exemption:  Plummer,  96  111.  supra  /  Brownings,  llar- 
j).  480;  White  v.  Plummer,  96  111.  394,  ris,  99  111.456,463;  but  not  before:  Best 
.'','ri,  Mr.  Justice  Craig  dissenting  on  the  v.  Jenks,  123  111.447,459. 
ground  that  the  Statute  docs  not  intend  5  Schneider  v.  Bray,  59  Tex.  668,  670, 
more  than  a  mere  exemption:  ]».  400  ;  citing  numerous  cases j  Watkins  v.  Davi^ 
Plummer  v.  White,  101  111.474.    InAllens-  61  Tex.  414,  416. 

224 


§  99  HOMESTEAD   RIGHTS   OF   MINOR   CHILDREN.         *  207,  *  208 

Thompson  in  his  work  on  Homesteads  and  Exemptions,  which 
throw  great  light  on  the  nature  of  the  widow's  right  in  this  respect, 
and  his  diligently  collected  authorities  on  this  point.1 

§  99.    Homestead    Rights    of    Minor    Children.  —  Children    during 
the  period  of  their  legal   infancy  are   the  peculiar  objects   of   the 
protection  intended  by  the  homestead  laws;   while   in    Minor  children 
some  of  the  States  a  widow  is  denied  a  homestead  against   homestead  in 
the   claims   of   heirs,2   minor  children   are   entitled  to    all  States. 

such  in  all  the  States  in  which  homestead  laws  exist, 
[*  208]  *  whether  the  father,  the  mother,  or  both  parents  have  died. 

Thus  it  has  been  held  that,  upon  the  death  of  a  man  who  had 
acquired  a  plantation  and  lived  upon  it,  while  his  wife  and  children 
lived  in  another  State,  the  homestead  right  existed  in  his  children, 
although  the  wife  died,  and  neither  she  nor  the  children  had  ever 
lived  upon  the  plantation.3  Upon  the  death  of  the  owner  of  a 
homestead  leaving  children,  some  of  whom  are  of  age  and  one  a 
minor,  it  vests  alone  in  the  minor  child  until  its  majority ; 4  and 
the  guardian  of  one  minor  child  is  as  much  the  head  of  a  family,  so 
as  to  entitle  him  to  the  homestead  and  exemption,  as  if  the  family 
embraced  more  than  one  minor  child.5  That  minor  children  do  not 
lose  their  homestead  rights  in  consequence  of  an  abandonment  of 
the  premises  or  residence  elsewhere,  has  already  been  mentioned.6 
Touching  the  power  of  a  probate  or  other  court  to  order  the  sale  of 
a  minor's  homestead  interest  for  his  support  and  education,  the 
authorities  are  neither  clear  nor  unanimous.  The  question  is  dis- 
cussed in  the  author's  work  on  Guardianship.7 

The  distinction  between  the  personal  rights  of  the  widow  as  such, 
or  considered  as  &  constituent  member  of  the  family,  and  the  authority 
vested  in  her  as  the  representative,  or  head,  of  a  family,  Widow  cannot 
must  be  kept  in  sight  in  ascertaining  whether  her  acts  deprive  them 
in  respect  of  the  homestead  are  binding  upon  the  minor  -  er  ac  ' 
children  or  not.  Where  the  homestead  rights  are  given  to  the  chil- 
dren, or  the  widow  and  children,  or  to  the  family,  it  is  obvious  that 
no  release,  waiver,  sale,  or  abandonment  by  the  widow  can  deprive 
the  children  of  their  rights,  if  there  be  a  practical  necessity  or  occa- 
sion to  assert  them.8     Although  the  widow's  interest  in  the  home- 

1  Thomp.  on  Homest.,  §§  452-534.  8  Miller  v.  Marckle,  27  111.  402,  405  ; 

2  See  ante,  §  97.  Harmon   v.   Bynum,   40   Tex.  324,  326  ; 

3  Johnston  v.  Turner,  29  Ark.  280.  Johnston  v.  Turner,  29  Ark.   280,   292  ; 

4  Simpson  y.  "Wallace,  83  N.  C.  477, 481,  Showers  v.  Robinson,  43  Mich.  502,  513; 
citing  earlier  North  Carolina  cases.  Phelan  v.  Smith,  100  Cal.  158,  166 ;  Hoppe 

5  Rountree  v.  Dennard,  59  Ga.  629,  v.  Fountain,  104  Cal.  94;  Wilson  v.  Friden- 
630;  Little  v.  Woodward,  14  Bush,  585,  burg,  19  Fla.  461,  471 ;  Shelton  v.  Hurst, 
588;  Meacham  v.  Edmonson,  54  Miss.  746,  16  Lea,  470;  Roberts  v.  Ware,  80  Mo. 
749 ;  Hudson  v.  Stewart,  48  Ala.  204,  206.  363  ;  Rhorer  v.  Brockhage,  13  Mo.  App. 

6  Ante,  §  95.  397,  401,  404,  affirmed  86  Mo.  544.     See 

7  Woerner  on  Guardianship,  §  75,  p.  250.  also  as  to  Iowa :  Coulson's  Estate,  95  Iowa, 

VOL.    I.  —  15  225 


*  208,  *  209 


EXEMPTION    OF   THE   HOMESTEAD. 


§99 


stead  may  cease  upon  her  marriage,  yet  the  rights  of  her  minor 
children  are  not  thereby  affected.1  So  where  the  husband  succeeds 
to  the  homestead  as  tenant  by  the  curtesy  consummate,  if  he  desert 
his  family,  it  continues  in  favor  of  any  minor  child  residing 
upon  the  premises.2  In  North  Carolina  *  it  has  been  held  [*  209] 
that  where  a  guardian  ad  litem  failed  to  interpose  the  minor 
children's  claim  to  the  homestead  in  a  proceeding  by  an  administra- 
tor to  sell  the  real  estate  of  his  intestate  for  the  payment  of  debts, 
the  purchaser  at  the  administrator's  sale  nevertheless  takes  subject  to 
the  homestead  rights  of  the  children 8  if  timely  objection  be  made ;  but 
not  on  collateral  attack,  after  third  parties  have  become  interested.4 

Lawful  children  by  a  former  husband  of  a  woman  who  lived  with 
the  decedent  many  years,  but  was  not  married  to  him,  are  not 
entitled  to  a  homestead  in  decedent's  lands,  although  he  recognized 
them  as  his  children  in  his  homestead  declaration,  and  described 
himself  as  the  father  of  a  family  comprising  them,  but  had  not 
legally   adopted   them.6 

Some  curious  and  intricate  complications  involving  the  homestead 
rights  of  children  and  widows  arising  out  of  successive  marriages 
are  disposed  of  in  the  cases  of  Pressley  v.  Eobinson  6  and  Putnam  v. 
Young.7 


696.  But  in  Kentucky  it  seems  that  in 
case  the  homestead  is  devised  by  the  tes- 
tator, and  his  widow  does  not  renounce 
the  will  and  claim  homestead,  the  minor 
children  cannot  claim  it  either:  Hazelett  v. 
Farthing,  94  Ky.  421.  So  in  Tennessee  the 
widow  can  abandon  the  homestead  rights 
for  herself  and  her  minor  children  by  re- 
moving to  another  State  and  acquiring 
a  domicil  there  :  Corrigan  v.  Rowell,  96 
Tenn.  185.  And  so  in  Illinois  the  widow's 
consent  to  a  sale  of  the  homestead  is  bind- 
ing upon  the  minor  children  of  the  de- 
ceased, and  extinguishes  their  interests 
therein,  except  where  she  stands  in  the 
relation  of  step-mother  :  Hayack  v.  Will, 
169  111.  145;  but  there  must  be  an  order 
of  court :  Lagger  v.  Association,  146  111. 
283,  303.  The  interest  of  children  in  the 
homestead  reserved  by  their  mother  on  a 
gale  by  her  as  administratrix  lasts  only 
while  they  are  minors  and  ocenpy  the  same: 
Louden  <:.  Martindale,  109  Mich.  235. 

i  Heard  v.  Downer,  47  6a.  629,  631  ; 
In  re  Stile,  H7Cal.  509;  lingers  v.  Mayes, 
fit  Mo.  520  (holding  that  ejectment  would 
lie  on  behalf  of  the  minor  against  his 
mother's  vendee) ;  see  also  Brady  v.  Banta, 
46  Kana.  181,  [>•  186. 

a  Laws  Of  111.  1*71-72,  p.  478,  §2,  chan- 
226 


ging  the  law  as  held  in  Wolf  v.  Wolf,  67 
111.  55,  56,  that  between  a  father  and  the 
minor  children  the  question  of  homestead 
could  not  arise.  It  is  now  held  that  the 
homestead  right  of  a  minor  child  is  para- 
mount to  the  husband's  curtesy :  Loeb  v. 
McMahon,  89  111.  487,  490.  So  in  Arkan- 
sas: Thompson  v.  King,  54  Ark.  9,  11. 

3  Allen  v.  Shields,  72  N.  C.  504,  506. 
Rodman,  J.,  comments  severely  upon  the 
practice  of  leaving  the  rights  of  minor 
children  to  the  protection  of  a  guardian 
ad  litem  appointed  upon  the  suggestion  of 
the  adverse  party  :  "  Too  often  such  an 
appointment  is,  to  use  the  language  of  an 
old  lawyer  quoted  by  Blackstone,  commit- 
tere  agnum  lupo."  As  to  the  sale  of  realty 
to  pay  debts,  when  there  is  a  homestead, 
see  post,  §  102. 

4  Morrisett  v.  Ferebee,  120  N.  C.  6. 
The  facts  of  these  cases  appear  to  be  very 
similar,  and  although  different  conclusions 
are  reached  by  the  court,  the  former  case 
is  not  cited. 

5  Romers's  Estate,  75  Cal.  379.  But 
an  adopted  child  during  minority  is  en- 
titled to  the  exemption  :  Cofer  v.  Scrog- 
gins,  98  Ala.  342. 

•  57  Tex.  453. 
'  57  Tex.  4G1. 


§  100  AS  AFFECTED  BY  ENCUMBRANCES.      *  209,  *  210 

§  100.    Homestead    Rights    of    Widow    and    Children    as    affected 
by  Encumbrances.  —  The  statutes  of  most  States  provide  that  the 
homestead   exemption   shall   not   apply   against    debts    Homestead 
created  in  the  purchase  or  erection  of  the  homestead,  or   ^vendor's"* 
against  mortgagees  under  mortgages  duly  entered  into    lien; 
by  both  husband  and  wife.     That  the  homestead  property  is  liable 
for  the  purchase-money  for  which   the  owner  became  indebted   in 
acquiring  it  is  not  only  just,  but  inevitable,  since  upon  any  other 
condition  its  acquisition  would  become  impossible  in   all  or  most 
cases  in  which  the  purchaser  has  not  sufficient  means  to  pay  the  full 
price  at  once.     It  is  equally  apparent  that  such  homestead  descends 
to   the   surviving   family  subject  to  the  vendor's   lien,  and  to  the 
claims  of  those  who  furnished  money,  materials,  or   labor  for  its 
erection.1      And,    generally,   the   homestead    descends    to  liens  which 
charged  with  such  debts  of  the  deceased  owner  as  could   ^7 against" 
have  been  enforced   against  it  in  his  lifetime,    the  deceased. 
[*210]  but  discharged  of  any  which  could  not  have  been  *so  en- 
forced.2    "It  is  the  policy  of  our  law  not  to  exempt  home- 
steads from  sale  on  execution  to  satisfy  debts  contracted  before  the 
homestead  was  acquired."  8    But  it  is  held  in  Texas  that    otherwise  in 
a  deed  of  trust  to  secure  a  debt  does  not  operate  as  an   some  States, 
absolute  transfer  of  the  property  to  which  it  refers,  and  is  in  legal 
effect  but  a  mortgage  with  power  of  sale;  that  the  exercise  of  this 
power  must  be  sought,  after  the  debtor's  death,  through  and  by  aid 
of  the  court,  and  that  such  deed,  whatever  rights  it  secures  to  the 
creditor  during  the  debtor's  lifetime,  after  his  death  secures  only 
priority  over  such  claims  against  the  estate  as  by  the  statute  it  is 
entitled  to  in  the  course  of  administration;  from  which  it  follows 
that  funeral  expenses,  expenses  of  last  sickness,  expenses  of  admin- 
istration,  as  well  as  the  allowance  to  the  widow  and   children  in 
lieu  of  homestead  and  other  property  exempt  from  forced  sale,  are 

1  Ante,  §  95;  Farmer  v.  Simpson,  6  W.  Va.  686,  701,  in  which  it  is  decided 
Tex.  303,  310;  Clements  v.  Lacy,  51  Tex.  that  the  homestead  exemption  dates  from 
150,  159  ;  Commercial  Bank  v.  Corbett,  5  the  time  of  recording  a  declaration  to  that 
Sawy.  543,  547  ;  Fournier  v.  Chisholm,  45  effect  hy  the  owner,  and  that  it  will  not 
Mich.  417;  Palmer  v.  Simpson,  69  Ga.  avail  against  debts  contracted  before  the 
792,  798.  And  it  was  held,  where  land  recording  of  such  declaration,  in  favor  of 
subject  to  a  vendor's  lien  was  exchanged  either  the  husband,  his  widow,  or  minor 
for  other  land,  the  vendor's  right,  to  avoid  children  after  his  death)  ;  Warhmund  v. 
circuity  of  action,  followed  into  the  land  Merritt,  60  Tex.  24,  27  ;  Mabrv  v.  Harri- 
thus  received  in  exchange,  unaffected  by  son,  44  Tex.  286,  294 ;  Douglass  v.  Boyl- 
homestead  rights  of  the  vendee  :  Williams  ston,  69  Ga.  186,  citing  earlier  Georgia 
v.  Samuels,  90  Ky.  59.  cases ;  Cook  v.  Roberts,  69  Ga.  742 ;  Tyler 

2  Harpending  v.  Wylie,  13  Bush,  158,  v.  Jewett,  82  Ala.  93. 

162;    Rogers   v.    Marsh,  73  Mo.  64,  69;  3  Strong  v.  Garrett,  90  Iowa,  100,  104. 

Moninger  v.  Ramsey,  48  Iowa,  368 ;  Rein-     As  to  the  liability  of  homesteads  for  pre» 
hardt  v.  Reinhardt,  21  W.  Va.  76,  82  (on     existing  debts,  see  ante,  §  95. 
the  authority  of  Speidel  v.  Schlosser,  13 

227 


*  210,  *  211  EXEMPTION   OF   THE   HOMESTEAD.  §  100 

all  entitled  to  priority  over  such  deed  of  trust  or  mortgage,  except 
where  it  represents  the  vendor's  lien.  Hence  the  existence  of  a 
deed  of  trust,  although  joined  in  by  the  wife,  is  no  bar  to  the 
widow's  right  of  homestead.1  And  in  Louisiana  the  mortgagor  of 
property  exempt  as  a  homestead  is  allowed  to  sell  it  free  from  the 
mortgage,2  and  to  defend  the  homestead  against  the  claims  of  a  prior 
mortgagee.3  In  Virginia  the  homestead  exemption  does  not  protect 
against  a  demand  for  damages  for  breach  of  promise  to  marry,  on 
the  ground  that  such  demand  is  not  a  debt,  but  a  quasi  tort.4 

The  right  to  redeem  by  paying  off  the  mortgage  or  paramount 
debt  seems  plainly  to  follow  from  the  nature  of  the  homestead 
Eight  to  re-  right  of  widow  or  children ; 5  and  if  the  administrator 
deem  by  pay-     redeem  the  mortgage  with  assets  of  the  estate, 

*  they  take,  without  contribution,  the  whole  [*  211] 
estate;6  but  if  this  is  not  done,  the  widow  redeeming  will 
stand  as  assignee  of  the  mortgage  until  others  interested  shall  pay 
their  legal  proportion.7  So  it  is  held  that  the  duty  of  contribution 
between  widow  and  heir  is  mutual  and  reciprocal,  and  when  one 
extinguishes  a  lien  on  the  property,  the  other  must  contribute.8     It 

_  follows  that  the  widow  and  children  are  entitled  to  a 

Homestead  .  „       _  ... 

right  in  equity  homestead  in  the  equity  of  redemption  in  the  real  estate 
of  redemption,  against  an  persons  except  the  mortgagee  and  his 
assigns ; 9  and  that  if  the  equity  of  redemption  is  acquired  by  the 
mortgagee,  the  mortgage  debt  is  to  be  shared  between  the  widow  and 
him  in  the  proportion  of  the  value  of  the  mortgaged  property  held 
by  each.10     If  the  lands  are  encumbered,  or  cannot  be  partitioned 

1  McLane  v.  Paschal,  47  Tex.  365,  369 ;  2  Van  Wickle  v.  Landry,  29  La.  An. 

Robertson  v.  Paul,  16  Tex.  472  (announ-  330,  Spencer,  J.,  dissenting,  p.  332. 

cing  the  law  as  above,  but  allowing  the  3  Fuqua  v.  Chaffe,  26  La.  An.  148. 

creditor's    demand    as   being   a  vendor's  4  Burton  v.  Mill,  78  Va.  468,  481. 

lien) ;  Reeves  v.  Petty,  44  Tex.  249,  251  5  Norris  v.  Moulton,  34  N.  H.  392,  399. 

(refusing  to   decide    the   "troublesome"  6  lb. 

question    as    to    the     homestead     rights  7  Norris  v.  Morrison,  45  N.  H.  490,  501 . 

against  a  mortgagee) ;    Petty  v.  Barrett,  8  Jones  v.  Gilbert,  135  111.  27,  32.     See 

37  Tex.  84  ;  Blair  v.  Thorp,  33  Tex.  38,  also  McGowan  v.  Baldwin,  46  Minn.  477. 

48  (approving  Robertson  v.  Paul,  supra) ;  9  Norris  v.  Morrison,  supra;  Calmes  v. 

Batts  v.  Scott,  37  Tex.  59,  66 ;  Armstrong  McCracken,  8  S.  C.  87, 97, 100 ;  Homestead 

v.  Moore,  59  Tex.  646,  648  ;  Hall  v.  Fields,  Association  v.  Ensloe,  7  S.  C.  1  ;  Burton  v. 

81  Tex.  553,  561.     The  statute  now  pro-  Spiers,  87  N.  C.  87,  citing  earlier  cases,  p. 

rides  that  the  probate  court  shall  not  set  91,  and  holding  that  upon  cessation  of  the 

aside  as  exempt  any  property  upon  which  homestead    right   by  reason   of   the   sale 

liens  have  been  given  by  the  husband  and  under  the  deed  of  trust,  the  debtor  would 

wife,  <>r  upon  which  vendor's  liens  exist,  be  entitled  to  the  exemption  of  any  of  his 

ontil  the  debts  secured  thereby  have  been  property  to   an   equal    value;   Raber  v. 

discharged;  and  if  the  probate  court  sets  Grind,  110  111.  580,  589.     The  court  may 

aside  such  property,  its  action  is  invalid  as  decree  other  lands  to  be  sold  before  that 

against  the  creditor :  Fossettu.  McMahou,  on  which  the  homestead  is  located:  La 

HO  Tex.  652.  Rue  v.  Gilbert,  18  Kaus.  220,  222. 

10  Norris  v.  Morrison,  supra, 
228 


§  101  INCONSISTENT   DISPOSITION.  *  211,  *  212 

without  material  injury,  they  may  be  sold,  and  the  homestead  set 
apart  out  of  the  proceeds.1    So  if  the  homestead  be  de-   0r  in  proceeds 
stroyed  by  fire,  and  the  administrator  collect  the  insur-    of  insurance. 
ance   thereon,  he   will  hold  the   money  as  trustee   for  the  widow, 
creditors,  and  heirs,  and  the  widow  is  entitled  to  the  use  of  the 
insurance-money  for  life.2 

A  contrary  view  has  been  reached  in  Missouri,  where  it  is  held 
that  the  statute  gives  a  homestead  in  land,  but  not  in  the  proceeds 
of  the  sale  of  land,  the  court  expressly  disclaiming  the  Different  rule 
applicability  of  the  equitable  rule  of  treating  money  as  in  Missouri, 
land  and  land  as  money;  3  and  this  principle  was  applied  by  the  Court 
of  Appeals  to  the  case  of  a  widow,  refusing  her  any  share  of  the 
proceeds  of  the  sale  of  the  homestead  after  discharging  the  mortgage 
debt.4  But  where  the  land  is  sold  in  proceeding  for  partition,  the 
value  of  the  homestead  may  be  computed  according  to  the  North- 
ampton tables,  and  the  value  paid  to  the  widow  and  children  out  of 
the  proceeds  of  the  sale.5  In  a  subsequent  case,  the  court  dis- 
tinguish between  the  claim  to  the  surplus  remaining  after  satisfying 
a  debt  out  of  the  proceeds  of  sale  of  a  homestead  under  a  mortgage 
given  by  the  owner  (as  denied  in  the  case  of  Casebolt  v.  Donaldson) 
and  the  assertion  of  the  homestead  right  in  the  mortgaged  premises 
while  the  mortgage  subsisted ;  holding  that  in  such  case  the  debtor  was 

entitled  to  a  homestead  right  in  the  equity  of  redemption.6 
[*  212]         *§101.    Homestead    Rights    as    affected    by  Inconsistent 

Disposition  of    the  Estate    by  the  Deceased    Owner.  —  The 
right  of  the  surviving  widow  and  minor  children  to  the    Homestead 
homestead  premises  is  obviously  paramount  to  that  of   "f ^ "esta-Ub" 
the  deceased  husband  or  father  to  dispose  of  them ;  else    mentary 
it  would  be  in  his  power  to  defeat  the  intent  and  pur-     lsP0Sltl0n' 
pose  of  these  laws.7     Hence  a  testamentary  disposition  of  the  home- 
stead estate  inconsistent  with  the  rights  of  the  surviv-    Principles  gov- 
ing  members  of  the   family  is  void.8     The  homestead   appbfabiTto 
estate  bears  great  resemblance  to  dower  in  this  respect,    homesteads. 


1  Estate  of  McCauley,  50  Cal.  544,  546 
Johnson  v.  Harrison,  41  Wis.  381,  385 
McTaggert  v.  Smith,  14  Bush,  414,  416 
Jackson   v.  Reid,  32    Oh.    St.   443,  446 


6  State  v.  Sligo  Iron  Co.,  88  Mo.  222, 227. 

7  See  ante,  §  94  ;  Eaton  v.  Robbins,  29 
Minn.  327,  329  ;  Jar  man  v.  Jarman,  4  Lea, 
671 ;  Rockhey  v.  Rockhey,  97  Mo.  76,  78; 


Merritt  v.  Merritt,  97  111.  243,  249  ;  Garner  Kleimann  v.  Gieselmann,  1 1 4  Mo.  437, 444 ; 

v.  Bond,  61  Ala.  84,  88  ;  Griffin  v.  Maxey,  Schorr  v.  Etling,  124  Mo.  42,  46. 
58  Tex.  210,  216;   Swandale  v.  Swandale,  8  Schneider  v.  Hoffmann,  9  Mo.  App. 

25  S.  C.  389.     See  also  Colvin  v.  Hauen-  280;  Eprason  v.  Wheat,  53  Cal.  715  ;  In  re 

stein,  110  Mo.  575,  583.  Davis,  69  Cal.  458  ;  Hall  v.  Fields,  81  Tex. 

2  Culbertson  v.  Cox,  29  Minn.  309,317.  553  ;  Bell  v.  Bell,  84  Ala.  64  ;  Succession 

8  Casebolt  v,  Donaldson,  67  Mo.  308,  of  Hunter,  13  La.  An.  257 ;  Brettun  v.  Fox, 

312  ;  Woerther  v.  Miller,  13  Mo.  App.  567.  100  Mass.  234 ;  Valentine,  J.,  in  Martindale 

4  Woerther  v.  Miller,  13  Mo.  App.  567,  v.   Smith,  31   Kans.  270,  273  ;  Brokaw  v. 

570.  McDougall,  20  Fla.  212,  226  ;  Hendrix  w 

6  Graves  v.  Cochran,  68  Mo.  74,  76.  Seaborn,  25  S.  C.  481. 

229 


*212 


EXEMPTION   OP   THE   HOMESTEAD. 


§101 


and  many  principles  governing  the  latter  are  applied  by  analogy  to 
the  former.1  So  the  widow  may  be  compelled  to  elect  between  a 
Election  testamentary  provision  and  her  right  to  the  homestead, 

between  where  the  two  are  clearly  inconsistent.2     But  the  power 

and  devise.  to  devise  the  homestead  may  be  vested  in  the  husband  by 
statute,  and  he  may  charge  such  a  devise  with  conditions,  as  is  held 
to  be  the  law  in  Wisconsin.8 

It  may  be  stated,  also,  that  in  most  States  the  alienation  of 
Alienation  of  homesteads  without  the  consent  of  both  husband  and 
homestead  by  wife  {s  heid  unavailing  to  prevent  them  from  claiming 
does  not  de-        the    protection   of   the    homestead    law.4      But    where 


1  Per  Bakewell,  J.,  in  Daudt  v  Musick, 
9  Mo.  App.  169,  175  ;  Best  v.  Jenks,  123 
111.  447,  459,  et  seq.  So  the  wife's  right  to 
homestead  is  held  to  be  inchoate  like  in- 
choate dower,  until  it  is  assigned  and  set 
off  in  severalty :  Norris  v.  Moultou,  34  N. 
H.  392,  397;  Gunnison  v.  Twitchell,  38 
N.  H.  62,  66  ;  Tidd  v.  Quinn,  52  N.  H. 
341 ;  and  when  set  apart  in  lands  encum- 
bered, the  widow  may  require  its  exoner- 
ation by  sale  of  other  property  to  pay  the 
debt  as  in  case  of  dower  assigned :  Burton 
v.  Spiers,  87  N.  C.  87,  93. 

2  The  widow  cannot  take  a  bequest 
clearly  intended  to  be  in  lieu  of  a  homestead, 
in  addition  to  her  statutory  homestead,  but 
must  elect  between  the  two  :  McCormick 
v.  McNeel,  53  Tex.  15,  22 ;  Meech  v.  Meech, 
37  Vt.  414,  419  ;  Stunz  v.  Stunz,  131  111. 
210,  218;  Davidson  v.  Davis,  86  Mo.  440 
(overruled  in  Kaes  v.  Gross,  92  Mo.  647, 
659,  and  in  Rockhey  v.  Rockhey,  97  Mo.  76, 

—  at  least  where  there  are  minor  children 

—  on  the  ground  that  the  statute  negatives 
the  husband's  right  to  compel  his  widow  to 
elect).  But  accepting  letters  testamentary 
under  a  will  constituting  her  a  legatee 
does  not  tend  to  show  that  she  waived  her 
statutory  homestead,  if  the  will  does  not 
clearly  make  the  bequest  in  lieu  of  the 
homestead  :  Sulzberger  v.  Sulzberger,  50 
Cal  385,  387.  And  unless  the  contrary 
appears  from  the  will,  the  presumption  is, 
that  a  legacy  or  devise  is  intended  as  a 
bounty,  and  not  as  a  purchase  or  satisfac- 
tion of  homestead  or  statutory  provisions 
for  the  wife;  McGowan  v.  Baldwin,  46 
Minn.  177  ;  Hatch's  Estate,  62  Vt.  300; 
Schorr  v.  Etling,  124  Mo.  42;  Stokes  v. 
Pillow,  <',4  Ark.  I.  Hut  where  the  home- 
stead is  a  mere  exemption  from  execution 
for  debts  there  is  no  occasion  for  election 

280 


by  the  widow :  Aken  v.  Geiger,  52  Ga.  407. 
Her  representatives  are  bound  by  her 
election  to  take  under  the  will:  Wills' 
Estate,  63  Vt.  1 1 6. 

8  Turner  v.  Scheiber,  89  Wis.  1. 

*  Garuer  v.  Bond,  61  Ala.  84,  87 ;  Al- 
ford  v.  Lehman,  76  Ala.  526 ;  Thimes  v. 
Stumpff,  33  Kans.  53  ;  Barber  v.  Babel,  36 
Cal.  11,  15  ;  Goodrich  v.  Brown,  63  Iowa, 
247;  Ayres  v.  Probasco,  14  Kans.  175, 
190;  Connor  v.  McMurray,  2  Allen,  202; 
Amphlett  v.  Hibbard,  29  Mich.  298,  304  ; 
Hoge  v.  Hollister,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  606; 
Rogers  v.  Renshaw,  37  Tex.  625  ;  Hait  v. 
Houle,  19  Wis.  472  ;  Ferguson  t\  Mason, 
60  Wis.  377,  386;  Hall  v.  Harris,  113  111. 
410 ;  White  v.  Curd,  86  Ky.  191,  194.  In 
Illinois  the  statute  was  held  to  require  the 
wife's  joining,  even  where  the  conveyance 
was  from  the  husband  to  the  wife  : 
Kitterlin  v.  Milwaukee  Ins.  Co.,  134  111. 
647  ;  and  if  the  homestead  so  attempted  to 
be  conveyed  is  under  $1 ,000  (possession  not 
changed  or  given  pursuant  to  the  deed)  the 
conveyance  is  void,  but  if  exceeding  that 
amount  the  excess  only  passes :  Anderson 
v.  Smith,  159  111.  93.  But  in  Virginia  the 
husband's  waiver  of  the  homestead  right 
is  held  to  bind  the  widow :  Scott  v. 
Cheatham,  78  Va.  82,  87,  citing  Reed  v. 
Union  Bank,  29  Gratt.  719,  which  holds 
the  wife  bound  by  the  husband's  waiver. 
And  if  the  wife  voluntarily  joins  with  her 
husband  in  alienating  the  land,  she  loses 
her  homestead  right,  though  the  husband 
secretly  intends  so  to  reinvest  the  funds  as 
to  defraud  her  of  her  homestead  rights  ; 
Beck  v.  Beck,  64  Iowa,  1  55,  Adams  and 
Beck,  J.J.,  dissenting.  In  some  States  a 
debtor's  declaration  of  his  intention  to 
claim  a  homestead  is  required,  the  omission 
of  which  cannot  be  supplied  by  the  widow's 


§  102  AS   AFFECTED    BY    ADMINISTRATION.  *  213 

[*  213]  *  a  husband  sells  the  homestead  without  the  con-    prive  wife  or 

~    ,  .  .«  j     ,,  .»  ,  ,-.        minor  children 

sent   or   his   wife,  and   the   wile  subsequently    0f  homestead 
acquires  it  under  execution  against  him  on  a  judgment   rignt- 
for   alimony,  he   and   his  vendee  are  estopped   from   claiming  the 
homestead  as  exempt,  as  against  her;1  nor  can  the  guardian  of  an 
insane  widow,  or  anybody  but  the  widow  herself,  waive  her  home- 
stead rights.2     It  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  neither   Nor  „enerauv 
the  minor  children's  nor  the  widow's  right  to  the  home-    a  marriage 
stead  can  be  barred  by  an  ante-nuptial  contract.8     But   contract- 
in  a  late  case  decided  in  Missouri  it  was  held  that  by  an  ante-nuptial 
contract  mentioning  a  waiver  of  dower,   but  not  of  homestead,  the 
widow  relinquished  her  dower,  but  not  her  homestead  rights,  thus 
leaving  the  inference  that  a  waiver  or  relinquishment  of  her  home- 
stead rights  would  have  been  deemed  binding  upon  her.4     And  in 
California,  when  the  wife,  by  post-nuptial  contract,   "relinquishes 
all  right  as  his  wife,  in  law  or  equity,  or  by  descent,  and  each  party 
shall  have  hereafter   no  claim  upon  the  other  for  support  or  sus- 
tenance,"  she  is  held  not  entitled  to  have  a  homestead   set   apart 
from  the  husband's  separate  property.5 

An  exception  to  the  absolute  right  of  the  widow,  as  against  a 
testamentary  disposition  of  the  homestead  by  her  deceased  husband, 
is  maintained  in  Mississippi,  where  the  statute  is  construed  as 
giving  the  right  to  an  exemption ist  to  dispose  of  the  property 
exempted  from  execution  by  law;  and  it  is  held  that  such  property 
(including  the  homestead)  descends  only  in  case  of  intestacy,  al- 
though it  is  not  liable  to  be  sold  for  debts.6 

§  102.  Homestead  rights  as  affected  by  Administration  —  It 
follows  from  the  absolute  nature  of  homestead  rights,  that  the 
homestead  can  in  no  view  constitute  assets    in   the  hands  of   the 

declaration:  see  ante,§  95, p.  * 202.  So  in  haffy,  63  Iowa,  55,  62.  In  Kansas  the 
Missouri  a  married  woman  who  does  not.  widow  and  minor  children  can  occupy  the 
file  her  statutory  notice  of  claim  of  home-  homestead,  independent  of  an  ante-nuptial 
stead  loses  her  homestead  rights  hy  a  sale  contract,  until  it  is  susceptible  of  partition 
under  a  deed  of  trust  executed  by  the  (on  the  widow's  remarriage  or  arrival  at 
husband  alone  :  Greer  v.  Major,  114  Mo.  age  of  all  the  children)  :  Hafer  v.  Hafer, 
145,  154,  overruling  prior  cases  to  the  33  Kans.  449.  464  ;  when  subject  to  parti- 
contrary,  tion  and  distribution,  however,  her  contract 

1  Keyes  v.  Scanlan,  63  Wis.  345.  will  be  enforced :  Hafer  v.  Hafer,  36  Kans. 

2  Ratcliff  v.  Davis,  64  Iowa,  467.  524. 

3  McMahill  v.  McMahill,  105  111.  596,  «  Mack  v.  Heiss,  90  Mo.  578,  582. 
€01,  citing  McGee  v.  McGee,  91   111.  548,  5  Wickersham  v.  Comersford,  96  Cal. 
553,   distinguishing   between    dower  and  433. 

homestead  in  this  respect.    See  also  Phelps  6  Norris  v.  Callahan,  59  Miss.  140,  142, 

v.  Phelps,  72111.  545,  drawing  a  similar  dis-  citing  Turner  v.  Turner,  30   Miss.  428; 

tinction  between  dower  and  the  provisional  Nash  v.  Young,  31    Miss.  134;  Kelly  v. 

support  of  the  family.    In  Iowa  it  was  held  Aired,  65  Miss.  495,  giving  the  right  to 

that    the   words   "  rights  of  dower    and  devise  the  homestead  to  the  wife,  from 

inheritance"    in  a  marriage   contract   do  which,  however,  the  husband  may  dissent 

not  include  homestead :   Mahaffy  v.  Ma-  and  claim  his  distributive  share. 

231 


214 


EXEMPTION    OF   THE   HOMESTEAD. 


5  102 


Sale  by  the 
administrator 
does  not  affect 
the  homestead 
rights  of  widow 
or  minors. 


Homestead  not   *  administrator,  since  it  vests  in  the  widow  and  [*  214] 
administrator's    children  free  from  the  husband's  debts,  differing 
hands.  [n  this  respect  even  from  the  property  allowed  for  the 

provisional  support  of  the  family.1  Its  use  is  reserved  to  the  family 
during  the  whole  period  of  administration ; 2  the  authority  of  the 
probate  court  over  it  is  limited  to  segregating  it  from  that  part  of 
the  decedent's  estate  which  is  subject  to  administra- 
tion; when  that  is  done,  its  jurisdiction  ceases.3  Hence 
a  sale  of  the  homestead  by  the  administrator  will  not 
divest  the  rights  of  the  widow  and  children,  unless  it  is 
made  to  pay  debts  contracted  before  the  homestead  was 
acquired,  or  any  privileged  debts  to  which  it  may  be  subject;4  and 
in  such  case  the  burden  of  proof  that  the  homestead  was  liable  for 
such  debts  is  upon  the  purchaser.5  The  conveyance  of  a  homestead 
Conveyance  of  cannot  be  set  aside  as  fraudulent  by  a  creditor,  if  the 
fraudofad  "*  creditor  could  not  subject  the  property  to  sale  while 
creditors.  in  the  debtor's  hand.6     But   where  the  reversion  may 

be  sold,  subject  to  the  rights  of  the  homesteaders,  there  may  be  a 
fraudulent  conveyance  of  the  fee,  subject  to  the  homestead  exemp- 
tion.7 Whether,  and  if  so,  under  what  circumstances,  a  minor's 
interest  in  a  homestead  may  be  sold  for  his  support  and  education, 
is  more  aptly  treated  in  connection  with  the  subject  of  guardianship.8 
In  most  States  when  the  right  of  homestead  occupancy  ceases  by 
the  death  of  the  widow  and  the  majority  of  the  children,  the  estate 
Rights  of  cred-  passes  to  the  heirs,  or  becomes  subject  to  the  claims  of 
itors  or  heirs  creditors,  as  though  no  intervening  homestead  right 
stead  ceases.       had  existed.9     If  the  intervention  of  the  homestead  has 


1  Sossaman  v.  Powell,  21  Tex.  664,  666, 
approved  in  Hanks  v.  Crosby,  64  Tex.  483  ; 
Carter  v.  Randolph,  47  Tex.  376,  379; 
Estate  of  Tompkins,  12  Cal.  114,  120; 
Baker  v.  State,  17  Fla.  406,  409 ;  Barco  v. 
Fennell,  24  Fla.  378. 

9  O'Docherty  v.  McGloin,  25  Tex.  67, 
72. 

8  Estate  of  James,  23  Cal.  415,  418; 
Estate  of  Orr,  29  Cal.  101  ;  Estate  of 
Hardwick,  59  Cal.  292;  Cummings  v. 
Denton,  1  Tex.  Unrep.  Cas.  181,  184. 

4  Ante,  §  95;  p.  *  201 ;  Sabalot  v.  Populus, 
31  La.  An.  854  ;  Trammell  v.  Neal,  1  Tex. 
Unrep.  Cits.  51;  McCloy  i\  Arnett,  47 
Ark.  445,  4.">4.  She  is  not  debarred  of  her 
rit'lit  simply  because  she  consents  to  the 
Bale:  Worcester's  Estate,  60  Vt.  420,  426. 

•'  Anthony  V.  Rice,  1 10  Mo.  223  ;  Rogers 
v.  Marsh,  7a  Mo.  04,  69 ,  Showers  v. 
Robinson,  13  Mich.  502,507. 

232 


6  Moore  v.  Flynn,  135  111.  74,  79; 
Horton  v.  Kelly,  40  Minn.  193.  See, 
also,  Myers  v.  Myers,  89  Ky.  442. 

7  Which  interest  may  be  subjected  to 
the  claims  of  creditors :  Schaeffer  v. 
Beldsmeier,  107  Mo.  314;  Miller  v. 
Leeper,  120  Mo.  466.  But  in  the  later 
case  of  Bank  v.  Guthrey,  127  Mo.  189, 
196,  these  two  cases  are  distinguished,  if 
not  overruled,  it  being  held  that  during 
the  debtor's  lifetime  his  homestead  realty 
cannot  be  sold  subject  to  his  homestead 
rights. 

8  See  Woerner  on  the  American  Law 
of  Guardianship,  §  75,  p.  250. 

9  Lewis  v.  McGraw,  19  111.  App.  313, 
316  ;  Chalmers  v.  Tumipseed,  21  S.  C. 
126,  138,  140  ;  Booth  v.  Goodwin,  29  Ark. 
633,  636;  Taylor  v.  Thorn,  29  Oh.  St. 
569,  574.  So  where  the  homestead  is  lost 
by  abandonment :  Barbe  v.  Hvat,  50 
Kans.  86,  90. 


§103 


SETTING   OUT   HOMESTEAD. 


*  214,  *  215 


prevented  a  creditor  from  recovering  his  debt,  the  usual  rule  against 
delay  in  subjecting  real  estate  to  the  payment  of  debts  does  not 
apply.1  In  some  of  the  States  the  land  may  at  once  be  Right  to  sell  for 
sold,  if  necessary  to  pay  the  debts,  subject  to  the  right  deh{s  subJect 
of  occupation  by  the  widow  and  children; 2  but  in  others 
such  sales  are  strongly  objected  to  and  promptly  denied,  because  they 
tend  to  sacrifice  the  interests  of    all  parties  concerned,  since  "  but 

few   purchasers   not  venturing   on   a  mere    speculation   in 
[*  215]  *  which  they  supposed  they  had  much  to  gain  and  little  to 

lose,  would  buy  property  subject  to  sueh  an  encumbrance."8 
§  103.    Procedure    in    Probate  Courts    in    setting    out  the    Home- 
stead. —  Where  the  homestead  right  of  the  widow  and  minor  chih- 
dren  is  secured  to  them  by  the  statute,  it  vests  at  once    Homestead 
upon  the  death  of  the  owner,  without  preliminary  for-    vests  in  widow 

r  ,.    .  A-r.i  r  'a.     and  children 

malities  in  any  court.  But  when,  tor  any  reason,  it  upon  the  own- 
becomes  necessary  to  set  apart  the  homestead  from  the  er's  deatb| 
remaining  real  estate  of  the  decedent,  so  as  to  designate  the  particu- 
lar parcel  or  tract  to  which  the  homestead  right  attaches,  and  may  be  set 
the  proceeding  may  generally  be  had  in  the  probate  by'th^probate' 
court  having  control  of  the  administration  of  the  estate.5  court, 
The  proceeding  is  in  rem,  and  it  has  been  held  that  all  parties 
interested  are  bound  by  it  without  personal  notice.6     The  judgment 

1  Bursen   v.   Goodspeed,    60  111.   277,     rights  is  doubted,  but  the  sale  cannot  be 

impeached  collaterally :  Showers  v.  Rob- 
inson, 43  Mich.  502,  507  ;  so  in  California 
the  sale  cannot  be  collaterally  assailed : 
Ions  v.  Harbison,  112  Cal.  266. 

4  Skouten  v.  Wood,  57  Mo.  380; 
Freund  v.  McCall,  73  Mo.  343,  346; 
Eogers  v.  Marsh,  73  Mo.  64,  69 ;  Wilson 
v.  Proctor,  28  Minn.  13,  15 ;  until  sever- 
ance the  widow  and  heirs  hold  as  coten- 
ants,  and  after  sale  by  the  administrator 
to  pay  debts,  the  purchaser  becomes  a 
cotenant ;  and  if,  as  such,  he  purchase  an 
outstanding  title,  he  cannot  deprive  her  of 
the  homestead  therein,  but  she  will  have 
the  right  to  protect  it  by  contributing  her 
share  of  the  original  encumbrance  :  Mon- 
tague v.  Selb,  106  111.  49,  56. 

8  Coughanour  v.  Hoffman,  13  Pac.  R. 
(Idaho),  231  ;  McCauley's  Estate,  50  Cal. 
544 ;  Mawson  v.  Mawson,  50  Cal.  539 ; 
Turner  v.  Whitten,  40  Ala.  530 ;  Thomp- 
son v.  Thompson,  51  Ala.  493;  Howze  v. 
Howze,  2  S.  C.  229,  232 ;  Scruggs  v. 
Foot,  19  S.  C.  274;  French  v.  Stratton, 
79  Mo.  560;  Guthman  v.  Guthman,  18 
Neb.  98 ;  Cummins  v.  Denton,  1  Tex. 
Unrep.  Cas.  181,  184. 

6  Hanley  v.  Hanley,  114  Cal.  690,  694. 
233 


281  ;  Wolf  v.  Ogden,  66  111.  224. 

2  Lunsford  v.  Jarrett,  2  Lea,  579 ; 
Poland  v.  Vesper,  67  Mo.  727,  729; 
Hannah  v.  Hannah,  109  Mo.  236 ;  Evans 
v.  Evans,  13  Bush,  587  ;  McCaleb  v.  Bur- 
nett, 55  Miss.  83,  86;  McTaggert  v. 
Smith,  14  Bush,  414;  Allensworth  v. 
Kimbrough,  79  Ky.  332 ;  Barrett  v. 
Richardson,  76  N.  C.  429,  431  ;  Flatt  v. 
Stadler,  16  Lea,  371  ;  McCarthy  v.  Van 
der  Mey,  42  Minn.  189  (prior  to  Laws, 
1889,  ch.  46,  §  63).  In  Kentucky  the 
property  may  be  sold,  but  the  home- 
steaders are  entitled  to  the  use  of  the 
proceeds  :  Myers  v.  Myers,  89  Ky.  442. 

3  Brickell,  J.,  in  Rottenberry  v.  Pipes, 
53  Ala.  447  ;  Hinsdale  v.  Williams,  75  N. 
C  430 ;  McCloy  v.  Trotter,  47  Ark.  445 ; 
Nichols  v.  Shearon,  49  Ark.  75,  82  ;  Slay- 
ton  v.  Halpern,  50  Ark.  329 ;  Oettinger  v. 
Specht,  162  111.  179;  Hartman  v.  Schultz, 
101  111.  437,  443,  citing  earlier  Illinois 
cases  (and  holding  that  there  can  be  no 
sale  where  the  property  does  not  exceed 
the  amount  allowed  for  a  homestead)  ; 
Wehrle  v.  Wehrle,  39  Oh.  St.  365 ;  Jolly 
r.  Lofton,  61  Ga.  154 ;  in  Michigan  the 
right  to  sell  lands  subject  to  homestead 


215,  *  216  EXEMPTION   OF   THE    HOMESTEAD. 


103 


of  the  probate  court  is,  in  cases  where  it  has  jurisdiction,  finai  and 
conclusive  unless  directly  attacked; 1  but  the  application  may,  unless 

exclusive  original  jurisdiction  is  vested  in  the  probate 
ordinary  court,  be  made  in  the  first  instance  to  a  court  of  plenary 

jansdiction.  jurisdiction  j 2  and  ejectment  will  lie  to  recover  posses- 
sion.3 So  the  homestead  may  be  ascertained  in  a  proceeding  to 
foreclose  a  mortgage  upon  property  including  an  unascertained 
homestead.4 

*  No  particular  formality  is  required  to  give  jurisdiction  [*  216"] 
Proceedings  in    t°  the  probate  court,  except  an  inventory  of  the 
probate  court      real  estate,  and  a  description  of  the  tract  or  parcel  of 

land  constituting  the  homestead,  and  proof  of  the  insol- 
vency of  the  estate  where  the  homestead  right  depends  on  such  fact; 5 
at  anytime  and  there  should  be  a  petition  praying  for  the  order.6 
before  widow  The  application  may  be  made  at  any  time  before  a  sale 
barred  her  by  the  administrator,7  and  even  after  a  sale  the  allow- 

ri&nt-  ance  may  be  made,8  if  by  her  acts  the  widow  has  not 


1  Cannon  v.  Bonner,  38  Tex.  487,  491  ; 
Phelan  v.  Smith,  100  Cal.  158,  171  ;  but 
the  right  of  appeal  is  given  to  any  person 
interested  in  the  decree :  Byram  v. 
Byram,  27  Vt.  295 ;  or  to  remove  the 
proceeding  to  a  higher  court  by  certiorari : 
Connell  v.  Chandler,  11  Tex.  249,  252  ;  in 
Massachusetts  the  probate  court  has  no 
jurisdiction  where  the  right  is  disputed  by 
heirs  or  devisees :  Woodward  v.  Lincoln, 
9  Allen,  239.  It  is  held  in  Alabama  that 
the  administrator  represents  the  creditor 
in  such  a  proceeding,  and  that  hence  a 
creditor  cannot  subsequently  subject  the 
homestead,  so  declared,  to  the  payment 
of  his  debt :  McDonald  v.  Berry,  90  Ala. 
464.  In  California  the  court  is  not 
bound  by  the  wishes  of  the  applicant,  but 
should  exercise  its  own  discretion  and 
good  judgment :  In  re  Schmidt,  94  Cal. 
334  ;  in  this  State  it  is  held,  that  where 
by  wilful  and  intentional  deceit  the  fact 
is  concealed  from  the  court,  that  by  a 
marriage  contract  the  widow  is  not 
entitled  to  a  homestead,  this  is  such  fraud 
in  the  procurement  of  the  judgment  set- 
ting nji.-irt  the  homestead,  that  equity  will 
set  the  same  aside  at  the  instance  of  an 
unpaid  creditor:  Wickersham  v.  Comer- 
ford,  96  CaL  vx\ ;  but  contra  where,  the 
proof  ia  not  clear  that  the   order   was 

obtained  bv  some  fraud  in  the  procure- 
ment thereof ;  for  equity  will  never  set 
Rlide  a  judgment  for  mere  error,  whether 
of  law  or  fact:  Wickersham  v.  Comer- 
234 


ford,  104  Cal.  494  ;  nor  for  fraud  in- 
volved in  the  merits,  or  in  any  matter 
upon  which  the  decree  is  rendered,  but 
only  for  extrinsic  fraud  in  the  procure- 
ment :  Fealey  v.  Fealey,  104  Cal.  354. 

2  Runnels  v.  Runnels,  27  Tex.  515, 
520;  Andrews  v.  Melton,  51  Ala.  400; 
Roff  v.  Johnson,  40  Ga.  555,  557 ;  in 
Alabama  the  jurisdiction  formerly  vested 
in  the  probate  court  is  taken  away  by  act 
of  April  23,  1873;  Pettus  v.  McKinney, 
56  Ala.  41.  In  Vermont  the  chancery 
court  has  jurisdiction  in  partition  cases 
involving  the  homestead,  when  its  sever- 
ance would  greatly  depreciate  the  value 
of  the  residue,  although  proceedings  are 
pending  in  the  probate  conrt  to  set  out  the 
homestead  :  Lindsey  v.  Austin,  60  Vt.  627. 

8  Booth  v.  Goodwin,  29  Ark.  633,  637. 

4  Coles  v.  Yorks,  31  Minn.  213. 

6  Hudson  v.  Stewart,  48  Ala.  204,  208 ; 
Tanner  v.  Thomas,  71  Ala.  233  ;  Connell 
v.  Chandler,  11  Tex.  249.  The  court 
must  act  judicially  upon  the  commis- 
sioner's report :  Turnipseed  v.  Fitzpatrick, 
75  Ala.  297  ;  see  Dossey  v.  Pitman,  81  Ala. 
381  ;  in  California  the  probate  court  does 
not  acquire  jurisdiction  unless  a  petition  is 
filed  :  Cameto  v.  Dupuy,  47  Cal.  79. 

«  Jordan  v.  Strickland,  42  Ala.  315 ; 
Median  v.  Turrcntine,  48  Ala.  68. 

7  Rottenberry  v.  Pipes,  53  Ala.  447, 
450 ;  Smith's  Estate,  51  Cal.  563,  565;  Ex 
parte  Strobel,  2  S.  C.  309,  311. 

8  McCuan  v.  Turrcntine,  48  Ala.  68, 


§  104  RIGHTS   AND   BURDENS.  *  216,  *  217 

waived  her  right,  or  estopped  herself.1  The  proceeding  in  the 
probate  court  in  setting  apart  a  homestead  does  not  affect  Such  proceed- 
the  title  by  which  the  property  is  held,  but  is  simply  to  afec^the^tie 
withdraw,  for  the  benefit  of  widow  and  children,  certain  to  the  property, 
assets  exempt  by  law  from  the  claim  of  creditors.2  Where  the 
question  of  the  homestead  right  depends  upon  the  title  to  the 
property,  and  objection  is  made  in  the  probate  court,  it  must  be 
tried  in  another  forum ; 3  and  any  person  having  an  adverse  interest 
may  appear  to  defeat  the  application.4 

§  104.  The  Rights  and  Burdens  connected  "with  the  Enjoyment 
of  the  Homestead.  —  The  owner  of  a  homestead  interest  in  lands 
has  the  right  to  protect  the  same  against  wrong  or  Ownerof  home- 
iniury  by  others  to  the  full  extent  of  his  ownership,  and    sfe,ad  risht  en- 

•  ,■,/,,      ,  .     -,   ■       -,  e  ■    i         titled  to  dam- 

IS  entitled  to  be  compensated  m  damages  tor  any  viola-   ages  for  any 

tion  of  such  right.  Thus  it  is  held  that  a  railroad  com-  inJur-v  thereto, 
pany  is  liable  for  the  damage  done  to  a  house,  by  the  unlawful 
construction  and  use  of  a  side  track  so  near  to  the  same  as  to  cause 
the  walls  to  shake  and  render  the  house  unfit  for  a  dwelling, 
to  the  widow  having  the  right  to  occupy  the  same  as 
'[*  217]  *  a  homestead,  although  it  had  not  been  ascertained  that 
there  were  no  debts  of  the  husband  for  which  the  homestead 
might  be  liable.5  In  another  case,  a  railroad  company  was  held 
liable  for  injury  to  the  land  and  crops  of  the  homestead  in  her  pos- 
session, caused  by  the  negligent  construction  of  the  railroad  across 
a  creek,  whereby  the  waters  of  the  creek  were  thrown  back  upon 
her  lands.6  But  an  action  in  assumpsit  will  not  lie  for  use  and  occu- 
pation of  the  homestead  before  the  same  has  been  set  apart  in  a 
proper  judicial  proceeding.7 

Together  with  the  rights  of  ownership,  the  law  also  casts  upon 

69;  Connell  v.  Chandler,  11    Tex.   249;         4  McLane    v.  Paschal,   62    Tex.   102, 

see   also  In   re   Still,    117    Cal.    509;    in  105. 

Texas,  however,  the  application  in  solvent  5  The  track  had  in  this  case  been  laid 

estates  must  be  made  before  the  estate  is  and  used  more  than  five  years  before  the 

ready  for  distribution  :  Little  v.  Birdwell,  death   of  the   husband ;  but  it  was  held 

27  Tex.  688,  690.  that  the  nuisance  was  a  continuous  one, 

1  Holden  v.  Pinney,  6  Cal.  234,  236.  and  that  the  widow  was  entitled  to  dam- 

2  Estate  of  Burton,  63  Cal.  36  ;  Rich  v.  ages  for  the  injury  to  her  right  of  occu- 
Tubbs,  41  Cal.  34  ;  Schadt  v.  Heppe,  45  pation  :  Cain  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co., 
Cal.  433,  437;  Coffey  v.  Joseph,  74  Ala.  54  Iowa,  255,  259,  261,  et  seq. 

271,  273.  6  "phe  wjdow  and  her  deceased  husband 

3  Riggs  v.  Sterling,  51  Mich.  157,  159 ;  had  been  jointly  owners  of  the  homestead, 
Cochrane  v.  Sorrell,  74  Ala.  310;  Farley  and  damages  were  awarded  to  the  widow 
v.  Riordon,  72  Ala.  128;  Estate  of  Chal-  in  her  own  name  for  injury  to  the  land 
mers,  64  Cal.  77 ;  Estate  of  Burton,  64  and  crops  before  she  became  the  sole 
Cal.  428.  Creditors  holding  paramount  owner :  Railroad  Company  v.  Knapp,  51 
liens  are  not  affected,  and  hence  the  pro-  Tex.  592,  599.  See  also  International  R, 
bate  court  should  assign  homestead  with-  R.  Co.  v.  Timmermann,  61  Tex.  660,  662, 
out  reference  to  any  such  hen :  Jackson  v.  7  McCuan  v.  Tanner,  54  Ala.  84. 
Sheffield,  107  Ala.  358. 

235 


*217  EXEMPTION   OP  THE   HOMESTEAD.  §  104 

the  homestead  tenant  the  burden  of  paying  the  taxes 
bear  the  bur-  upon  the  property  and  the  expenses  of  keeping  it  in 
dens  of  repair.     Hence  the  administrator  will  not  be  allowed 

ownership.  *,..,.  .    .  .  „ 

credit  in  his  administration  account  for  disbursements 
to  pay  taxes  and  repairs  of  the  homestead  property  occupied  by  the 
widow,  although  it  had  not  been  formally  selected  by  or  assigned  to 
her.1  So  it  was  held  that  where  the  homestead  is  subject  to  a  mort- 
gage joined  in  by  both  husband  and  wife,  the  homestead  life  estate 
of  the  survivor  is  subject  to  and  must  bear  its  proportion  of  the 
encumbrance,  in  case  of  a  deficiency  of  personal  assets.2  But 
the  widow  is  not  under  a  duty  to  insure  against  fire,  to  protect 
the  heir.8 

*  Wilson  v.  Proctor,  28  Minn.  13,  15.  Chalmers  v.  Turnipseed,  21  S.  C.    126, 

The  costs  may  be  apportioned  according  140. 

to  the  benefits  received :    Englehardt  v.  2  McGowan  v.  Baldwin,  46  Minn.  477. 

Yung,  76  Ala.  534,  541.     The  homestead  See  as  to  the  right  of  contribution  for  the 

tenant  has  a  right  to  the  annual  interest  discharge  of  encumbrances  on  the  home- 

or  income,  nor  should  she  be  held  respon-  stead  by  the  widow  or  heirs,  ante,  §  100, 

sible  for  any  diminution  in    the  corpus  p.* 210. 

occasioned  by  the  legitimate  use  thereof,  3  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Field,  42  111.  App. 

or  for  loss  or  destruction  not  her  fault :  392,  397. 


§  105  NATURE   AND   PURPOSE   OF   DOWER.  *  218,  *  219 


[*218]  *  CHAPTER  XL 

ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND   CURTESY. 

§  105.    Nature  and  Purpose  of  Dower.  —  However  interesting  and 
instructive  it  might  prove,  the  task  of  tracing  to  its  inception  the 
custom  of  setting  apart  for  the  use  of  the  widow  a  portion  of  her 
husband's  lands  and  tenements  after  his  death  lies  beyond  the  scope 
of  the  present  treatise,  which  must  be  confined,  in  this  respect,  to  a 
brief  statement   of  the   principles   upon   which   this   form  of   the 
devolution  of  property  rests.1    It  is  important,  however,    support  of  wife 
to  know  that  the  motive  which  led  to  its  adoption  into   "jj^Jj  [™ne 
the  common  law  of  England  was  the  intention  to  pro-   original  pur- 
vide  for  the  sustenance  of  the  wife  and  younger  chil-    Pose  of  dower- 
dren  at  a  time  when  the  husband  and  father  could  no  longer  minister 
to  their  wants,  and  as  a  compensation  for  the  inability  which  the 
common  law  imposed  on  the  wife  to  acquire  property  during  cover- 
ture.2   The   common   law,  in   accomplishment   of  this    Dower  at  com- 
purpose,  provides  that  the  widow  shall  have  the  third   mon  law 
part  of  all  the  lands  and  tenements  whereof  the  husband  was  seised 
at  any  time  during  the  coverture,  to  hold  to  herself  for  the  term  of 
her  natural  life.8    The  significance  of  this  provision  is,    secured  to  the 
that  it  places  the  right  of  the  widow  beyond  the  reach   ^e  p^^frof 
of  the  husband,  for  her  right  attaches  to  "  all    the  husband. 
[*  219]  the  lands  and  tenements  whereof  the  *  husband  was  seised 
at  any  time  during  the  coverture,"  in  which   she  had   not 
freely  relinquished  her  dower,  thus  protecting  her  and  the  surviving 

1  Scribner,  in  his  able  work  on  the  Saxons,  and  was  adopted  by  the  Normana 
Law  of  Dower,  considers  the  attempt  to  as  one  of  the  legal  institutions  of  the 
trace  it  to  its  origin  a  fruitless  one,  and  land  :  1  Scrib.  od  Dower,  8, 9.  Blackstone 
cites  a  number  of  American  decisions  in  says  that  the  introduction  of  dower  haa 
nrhich  the  judges  indicate  the  same  view :  by  some  been  ascribed  to  the  Normans, 
Nott,  J.,  in  Wright  v.  Jennings,  1  Bai.  L.  as  a  branch  of  their  local  tenures  (citing 
277,  278  ;  Lacy,  J.,  in  Hill  v.  Mitchell,  5  Wright,  192),  but  suggests  that  no  feudal 
Ark.  608,  610;  Catron,  C  J.,  in  Combs  reason  can  be  given  for  its  invention,  for 
v.  Young,  4  Yerg  218.  But  he  treats  his  that  it  was  first  introduced  in  that  ays- 
readers  to  a  very  interesting  chapter  on  tern  by  the  Emperor  Frederick  II.  ;  and 
this  subject,  referring  to  the  current  that  it  is  possibly  the  relic  of  a  Danish 
theories,  and  deducing  from  the  authori-  custom,  introduced  into  Denmark  by 
ties  that,  as  all  the  charters  coerced  by  Swein,  the  father  of  Canute :  2  Bla. 
the  English  people   from  the  princes  of  Comm.  129. 

the  Norman  line  recognize  dower  in  lands  2  Banks  v.   Sutton,   2   P.   Wms.    700, 

as  an  existing  legal  right,  it  formed  one  702 ;  2  Bla.  Comm.  130. 

of    the  ancient  customs   of    the   Anglo-  8  2  Bla.  Comm.  129. 

237 


*219,  *  220  ESTATES   OP   DOWER   AND    CURTESY.  §  106 

family  against  the  caprice  as  well  as  the  improvidence  of  the  hus- 
band. The  law,  in  its  wise  precaution,  devised  various  safeguards  to 
counteract  the  husband's  abuse  of  his  wife's  confidence  in  him  and 
prevent  him  from  obtaining  her  relinquishment  by  undue  influence.1 

The  favor  with  which  dower  is  regarded  at  the  common  law  has 
by  no  means  abated  in  the  American  States.  On  the  contrary,  the 
Dower  equally  solicitude  for  the  protection  of  the  widow  and  minor 
favored  in  children   of  a  person   dying  has    induced   considerable 

extension  of  the  right  of  dower  in  several  of  them, 
beside  those  provisions  for  the  homestead  and  temporary  support  of 
the  family,  which  have  already  been  considered,2  and  a  preference 
of  the  widow  over  the  next  of  kin  as  heiress.3  If,  possibly,  the 
tendency  of  modern  legislation  is  toward  an  extreme  in  this  direc- 
tion, which  may  encroach  upon  the  rights  of  creditors,4  it  is  never- 
theless satisfactory  to  observe  the  trend  of  public  consciousness 
toward  a  recognition  of  the  family  as  an  organic  element  of  the 
State,8  and  the  earnestness  of  the  popular  branches  of  State  govern- 
ments in  its  protection. 

§  106.  Dower  under  the  Statutes  of  the  Several  States.  —  The 
common-law  rule  as  to  the  extent  of  the  right  of  dower  is  retained 
States  securing  iri  most  of  the  States,  which,  by  express  enactment, 
dower  as  at  secure  to  the  widow  the  enjoyment,  during  the  period 
of  her  life,  of  one-third  of  all  the  lands  of  which  the 
husband  was  seised,  or  in  which  he  had  an  estate  of  inheritance,  or 
of  which  some  one  else  was  seised  to  his  use,  during  the  coverture, 
or  marriage,  and  to  which  the  widow  had  not  relinquished  her 
right  of  dower,  or  debarred  herself,  in  the  manner  and  for  the  reasons 
set  out  in  the  statute.  In  various  wordings,  the  rule  is  sub- 
stantially so  laid  down  in  Florida,6  Illinois,7  Kentucky,8 
*  Maine, 9  Massachusetts, 10  Michigan, u  Missouri, 12  Nebraska, 13  [*  220] 

1  Note    the    various    statutory  enact-  ished,  but  both  husband  and  wife  are  each 
ments   regulating   the  relinquishment   of  endowed  of  one-third  of  the  lands, 
dower  and   the  rigid  application  of  them  8  St.    Ky.   1894,    §    2132.       Surviving 
by  the  courts.  husband  or  wife  entitled  to  one-third  for 

2  Ante,  §§  77  etseq.,  94  et  seq.  life  of  all  lands  owned  during  coverture. 

3  Ante,  §  67.  9  Rev.  St.  Me.  1883,  ch.  103,  §  1. 

4  1  Scrib.  on  Dower,  eh.  i.  §  34,  hints  w  Publ.  St.  1882,  p.  740,  §  3. 
that  others  than  lineal  descendants  have  n  2  How.  St.  1882,  §  5733. 

likewise  claims  upon  the  estate  of  the  de-  V1  Kev.   St.    1889,  §§   4513  et  seq.     In 

ceased  by  the  ties  of  blood  and  the  laws  1825,  the  law  of   Missouri   (repeated   in 

of  nature.     It  seems,  however,  that,  with  1835)  subjected  the  widow's  dower  to  the 

the  exception,  perhaps,  of  claims  to  ances-  husband's  debts.    This  provision  was  in- 

tral  estates,  no  class  of  persons  is  likely  to  terpreted  as  applyiug   only  to  creditors 

suffer  from  the  liberality  <>f  legislatures  claiming  payment  of  their  just  debts,  who 

to  wife  and  children  hut  creditors.  are  to  be  preferred  to  the  widow  ;  and  that 

0  See  ante,  §  0.  "a  covenant  of  warranty  created  no  debt  in 

8  Kev.  St.  Fla.  1892,  §  1830.  the  sense  of  barring  dower  under  the  stat- 

7  St.  &  C.   Ann.  St.  1896,  Ch.  41.     In  uto  :  Bartlett  v.  Ball,  43  S.  W.  It.  783,  784. 

this  State  tenancy  by  the  curtesy  is  abol-  13  Cons.    St.   1893,  ch    12,  §§  1  et  seq, 

238 


§106 


DOWER  UNDER  STATUTES  OF  THE   SEVERAL  STATES. 


*220 


dower  is  af- 
fected by  num- 
ber of  lineal 
descendants. 


New  Jersey,1  New  York,2  North  Carolina,8  Ohio,4  Oregon,5  Khode 
Island,6  Virginia,7  West  Virginia,8  and  Wisconsin.9  In  some 
of  the  States  the  widow  is  entitled  to  different  pro-  states  in  which 
portions,  depending  upon  the  existence  or  absence  of 
lineal  descendants;  as  in  Alabama,10  Arkansas,11  and 
Pennsylvania,12  where  the  widow  is  entitled  to  dower 
in  one-half  of  the  lands  owned  by  the  husband  at  the  time  of  his 
death,  if  he  left  no  lineal  descendants,  and  to  one-third  if  there  be 
such.  In  Delaware  the  husband  must  have  had  title  or  right  in  fee 
simple.13  In  Georgia14  and  New  Hampshire16  she  takes  dower 
in  one-third  of  all  of  the  lands  of  which  the  husband 
died  seised,  or  which  came  to  him  in  right  of  his  mar- 
riage; and  in  Georgia  and  Tennessee16  the  dwelling- 
house,  except  in  cities  or  towns,  is  not  to  be  valued  in 
computing  the  dower.  In  Connecticut,17  Tennessee,18 
and  Vermont,19  the  widow  takes  one-third  during  life  of 
all  the  lands  of  which  the  husband  died  seised.  In 
the  States  of  Arizona,20  California,21  Colorado,22  Con- 
necticut,23 Idaho,24  Indiana,25  Iowa,26  Kansas,27  Minne- 


Dower  in  land 
of  which  hus- 
band died 
seised,  or 
which  came  to 
him  in  right  of 
the  marriage. 

Dower  in  land 
of  which  hus- 
band died 
seised. 


The  law  abolishing  dower  in  1889  was 
held  void  :  Trumble  v.  Trumble,  37  Neb. 
340. 

1  2  Gen.  St.  1895,  p.  1275,  §  1. 

2  2  Banks  &  Bro.  p.  1814,  §  1   (1896, 
9th.  ed.). 

s  Code,  1883,  §  2102. 

*  Bates'  Ann.  St.  1897,  §  4188. 

6  Code,  1887,  §  2954. 

8  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  922,  §  1. 

7  Code,  1887,  §  2267. 

8  Code,  W.  V.  1891,  ch.  65,  §§  1-3. 

9  Sanb.  &  B.  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2159. 

10  Code,  1896,  §  1505.  If  the  estate 
is  solvent ;  if  insolvent,  she  takes  only 
one-third,  whether  there  are  children  or 
not. 

11  Dig.  St.  1894,  §  2520. 

12  Pepper  L.  Dig.  1896,  p.  1677,  §§  1,  2. 
Expressed,  in  this  State,  to  be  "  in  lieu  of 
dower  at  common  law." 

13  Bush  v.  Bush,  5  Del.  Ch.  144, 
148. 

14  Code,  1895,  §  4687.  The  dower 
attaches  to  all  the  lands  owned  during 
coverture  and  not  conveyed  away  by  him 
or  under  judicial  sale  during  his  life : 
Hart  v.  McCollum,  28  Ga.  478,  480 ;  but 
a  purchaser  at  sheriff's  sale  after  his  death 
cannot  defend  against  the  widow's  dower 
oil  the  ground  that  the  husband  did  not 


die  seised  of  the  land :  Wiece  v.  Marbut, 
55  Ga.  613,  614. 

15  Publ.  St.  1891,  ch.  195,  §  3. 

16  Vincent  v.  Vincent,  1  Heisk.  333, 
339 ;  Puryear  v.  Puryear,  5  Baxt.  640, 
642. 

17  Gen.  St.  1888,  §  618.  In  case  of 
marriages  before  1877,  see  infra. 

18  Code,  1884,  §  3244. 

19  St.  1894,  §  2528. 

20  St.  1887,  1  1460,  giving  one-third  of 
the  personalty  and  a  life  estate  in  one- 
third  of  the  realty  to  the  surviving  hus- 
band or  wife,  if  the  deceased  leave  child 
or  children ;  and  all  the  personalty  and 
one-half  of  the  realty  if  there  be  no  child ; 
and  if  there  be  neither  child  nor  father  or 
mother,  then  the  whole  of  the  estate  by 
descent. 

21  Civ.  Code,  §  173. 

22  Ann.  St.  1891,  §  1524. 

23  In  case  of  marriage  after  1877  :  Gen. 
St.  1888,  §§  623,  2796. 

24  Rev.  St.  1887,  §  2506. 

25  1  Burns'  Ann.  St.  1894,  §  2639.  The 
act  making  the  change  cannot  affect  exist- 
ing contracts  :  Wisemann  v.  Beckwith,  90 
Ind.  185,  188. 

26  Code,  1897,  §  3366. 

27  Gen.  St.  1897,  ch.  109,  §  26;  Crane 
'-•.  Fipps,  29  Kans.  585,  586. 

239 


220,  *  221  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY. 


§106 


States  in  which 
dower  and  cur- 
tesy are  abol- 
ished; 

giving  inheri- 
tance in  lieu. 


sota,1  Mississippi,2  Nevada,3  North  Dakota,4  South 
Dakota,5  Washington,6  and  Wyoming,7  tenancy 
by  *  the  curtesy  and  dower  are  abolished  by  [*  221] 
statute;  in  lieu  whereof  the  husband  and  wife 
take  certain  shares  under  the  Statutes  of  Descent  and 
Distribution,  usually  more  advantageous,  to  the  widow  at  least, 
than  their  rights  under  the  law  of  curtesy  and  dower.8  In  such 
case  the  interest  of  the  widow  does  not,  however,  extend  to  land 
owned  and  alienated  by  the  husband  during  coverture,  but  is  confined 
to  that  which  he  owned  at  the  time  of  his  death; 9  and  the  principle 
protecting  dower  right  against  debts  incurred  during  the  husband's 
lifetime  does  not  apply.10  In  Louisiana  the  common-law  doctrine  of 
Dower  affected  dower  has  not  been  adopted,  but  there,  as  well  as  in 
muStVoT"  Texas  "  (in  which  tne  Spanish  law  prevailed  until  1839, 
property-  when  an  act  "defining  dowers"  was  passed  by  the  Re- 

public, but  repealed  on  February  5th  folloAving,  leaving  the  old  law 
in  force12),  California,13  Nevada,14  and  other  new  States,15  a  species 
of  property  unknown  to  the  common  law  is  recognized,  called  com- 
munity, a  term  applied  in  the  French  law  to  the  title  or  ownership 
of  the  property  of  two  persons  who  are  intermarried.16  The  succes- 
sion of  this  property  upon  the  death  of  either  the  husband  or  wife 


1  2  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  4001. 

2  Ann.  St.  1892,  §  2291. 

3  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  505. 

*  Rev.  Code,  1895,  §  3743. 

6  Comp.  St.  Dak.  1885,  §  3402. 

6  Code,  1896,  §§  2159,  5678;  Richards 
».  Bellingham,  47  Fed.  R.  854;  s.  c.  54 
Fed.  R  209. 

7  Code,  1887,  §  2221. 

8  See  ante,  §§  66,  67. 

9  Carr  v.  Brady,  64  Ind.  28,  establish- 
ing also  the  doctrine  that  it  is  in  the 
power  of  the  legislature  to  take  away  an 
inchoate  right  to  dower,  on  which  point 
former  Indiana  cases  are  cited.  But  the 
legislature  cannot  impair  the  vested  rights 
of  a  purchaser  from  the  husband;  the 
widow  therefore  has  no  interest  in  such 
land  on  the  husband's  death,  occurring 
after  the  change  in  the  law  took  effect: 
Taylor  v.  Sample,  51  Ind.  423,  citing  to 
same  effect  May  v.  Fletcher,  40  Ind.  575, 
and  Bowen  V.  Preston,  48  Ind.  367,  the 
latter  case  referred  to  as  containing  a  col- 
lection  of  the  authorities  on  this  point. 

In  California,  where  "all  property, 
acquired  by  cither  husband  or  wife,  ex- 
cept inch  :i-  may  be  acquired  by  gift,  he- 
quest,  devise,  or  descent,  shall  he  common 
property,"  the  entire  control  of  which  is 
240 


given  to  the  husband  with  absolute  power 
to  dispose  of  it,  and  upon  the  death  of 
husband  or  wife  one-half  of  the  common 
property  goes  to  the  survivor :  the  right 
of  the  husband  to  dispose  of  the  same  by 
will  is  denied :  Beard  v.  Knox,  5  Cal.  252, 
256. 

10  Hanna  v.  Palmer,  6  Col.  156,  160. 

«  Rev.  St.  1888,  art.  1653. 

12  Dallam's  Dig.  82.  Husband  and 
wife  take  a  life  estate  in  one-third  of  the 
property  of  the  other  spouse  deceased. 

18  Civ.  Code,  §§  164,  167,  1401,  1402. 

14  Gen.  St.  1885,  §§  500,  509. 

15  See  post,  §  122,  on  the  subject  of  com- 
munity property. 

16  "The  community  consists  of  the 
profits  of  all  the  effects  of  which  the 
husband  has  the  administration  and  en- 
joyment, either  of  right  or  in  fact,  of  the 
produce  of  the  reciprocal  industry  and 
labor  of  both  husband  and  wife,  and  of 
the  estates  which  they  may  acquire  during 
the  marriage,  either  by  donations  made 
jointly  to  them  both,  or  by  purchases,  or 
in  any  other  similar  way,  even  although 
the  purchase  he  only  in  the  name  of  one 
of  the  two,  and  not  of  both  ":  Code  La. 
1870,  §  2402;  Clark  v.  Norwood,  12  La 
An.  598. 


§  107  MARRIAGE   AS   A    REQUISITE  TO   DOWER.        **  221-223 

excludes  the  application  of  a  tenancy  by  either  curtesy  or  dower. 
In  Maryland  the  statute  does  not  define  dower;  but  it  is  provided 
that  the  statutes  of  descent  shall  not  be  construed  as  affect- 
[*  222]  ing  the  right  *  of  dower ; 1  consequently  the  right  exists  there 
as  at  common  law.2  It  was  so  in  Minnesota  before  the 
statute  of  1875  abolished  dower.8 

§  107.    Marriage    as    a   Requisite    to    Dower.  —  Marriage    is    self- 
evidently   an   essential    prerequisite   to   dowrer.     At   common    law 
marriages  not  solemnized  in  facie  ecclesice  are  held  not    Marriage  in 
to  confer  the  right  of  dower; 4  the  obvious  reason  being   church  indis- 
that  the  spiritual  courts  of  England,  which  alone  passed    dower  at  com- 
upon  the  validity  of  espousals  at  the  ancient  common   mon  law- 
law,  refused  to  recognize  marriages  not  solemnized  according  to  the 
ritual  of  the  Established  Church.      But  as  the  legality  of  marriages 
does  not  depend,  in  America,  upon  the  sanction  of  the  church,  whose 
authority  binds  only  those  who  render  a  voluntary  sub-    Le  al  marria 
mission,6  it  follows  that  all  the  incidents,  rights,  and    sufficient  in 
obligations  attach  to  a  marriage  recognized  as  valid  in      menca- 
law,  whether  solemnized  in  church,  or  as  a  civil  contract  purely,  or, 
as  is  sometimes  the  case,  in  both   forms.     Hence  it  may  be  said 
that,  in  all  the  States  in  which  dower  is  given  by  law,  it  follows 
any  marriage  which  is  held  to  be  lawful.6 

But  where  a  marriage  is  void  in  law,  although  entered  into  by 
the  female  in  the  most  perfect  good  faith  and  innocence,  she  is 
nevertheless,  among  other  harsh  consequences  attend-  No  dower  if  • 
ant  upon   an   unlawful    connection,    debarred    of   any    marriage  is 

dower   right.     The  most  common  instances  of 
[*  223]  void   *  marriages   are  those  in  which  one   or   both   of  the 

1  Hinck.  Test.  L.  §  1264.  Lords,    under    application    of    the    rule, 

2  Chew  v.  Chew,  1  Md.  163,  172.  "  semper  prcesumitur  pro  negante." 

8  Washburn  v.  Van  Steenwyk,  32  6  Carmichael  v.  State,  12  Oh.  St.  553, 
Minn.  336,  347 ;  Guerin  v.  Moore,  25  555,  citing  the  celebrated  case  of  Dai- 
Minn.  462.  rymple  v.  Dalrymple,  2  Hagg.  Cons.  R. 

*  Bish.  on  Mar.  &  Div.  277  b ;  1  Scrib.  54,  in  which  the  law  of   Scotland  is  re- 

on  Dower,  ch.  vi.  §§  8  et  seq.     In  the  case  viewed   at   great   length   and    contrasted 

of  Queen  v.  Millis,  10  CI.  &  F.  534,  upon  with  the  English  law  on  this  subject,  and 

a  full  discussion,  a  marriage  between  a  quoting  from  Lord  Stowell  (Sir  William 

member   of    the   Established    Church    in  Scott)   this   passage :    "  Marriage,  in    its 

Ireland  and  a  Presbyterian,  performed  by  origin,  is  a  contract  of   natural  law ;   it 

a  regularly  placed  minister  of  the  Presby-  may   exist    between    two    individuals    of 

terians  at  his  residence,  according  to  the  different  sexes,  although  no  third  person 

rites  of  the  Presbyterian  church,  was  held  existed  in  the  world,  as  happened  in  the 

insufficient  to  support  an  indictment  for  case  of  the  common  ancestors  of  mankind, 

bigamy,  after   cohabitation    between   the  It  is  the  parent,  not  the  child,  of   civil 

couple  so   marrying,   and   one   of  them,  society.     In   civil   society   it    becomes    a 

during  the  lifetime  of  the  other,  having  civil  contract,   regulated   and   prescribed 

married  some  one  else.    The  decision  was  by  law,  and  endowed   with  civil  conse- 

rendered  upon  an  equal  division  of  the  quences." 

6  1  Scrib.  on  Dower,  ch.  vii.  §  1. 
VOL.  I.  —  16  241 


*  223,  *  224  ESTATES    OP   DOWER  AND    CURTESY. 


§107 


parties  have  a  husband  or  wife  by  a  former  marriage,  not  dis- 
solved. In  such  case  the  woman  can  have  no  dower,  for  she  has 
not  been  a  wife.1  In  this  connection,  however,  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  no  peculiar  ceremonies  are  requisite,  either  by  the 
common  or  canon  law,  for  the  valid  celebration  of  the  marriage.2 
but  if  validated  If,  therefore,  a  man  and  woman,  whose  marriage  is  void 
because  at  the  time  of  the  marriage  ceremony  one  of 
them  had  a  spouse  by  a  former  undetermined  marriage 
living,  continue  to  cohabit  and  recognize  each  other  as 
husband  and  wife  after  the  death  of  such  first  spouse, 
this  will  either  constitute,  or  authorize  the  presumption  of,  a  valid 
marriage  between  them,  after  the  dissolution  of  the  former  marriage 
by  the  death  of  the  first  spouse.3  The  presumption  of  death  arising 
upon  the  absence  of  a  person  for  seven  years,  unheard  from,  is  also 
relied  on,  in  some  cases,  in  support  of  marital  rights,  where  the 
second  marriage  takes  place  after  the  expiration  of  this 
period;4  and  courts,  as  a  general  thing,  exact  full  and  *sat-  [*224] 


by  death  of 
former  wife  or 
husband,  and 
continued  co- 
habitation, 
dower  is  given 


1  Higgins  v.  Breen,  9  Mo.  497,  501  ; 
Smith  v.  Smith,  5  Oh.  St.  32  ;  Smart  v. 
Whaley,  6  Sm.  &  M.  308,  312  ;  De  France 
v.  Johnson,  26  Fed.  Rep.  891  ;  Jones  v. 
Jones,  28  Ark.  19,  26,  holding  that  proof 
of  cohabitation,  and  holding  each  other 
out  to  the  world  as  husband  and  wife,  are 
not  sufficient  proof  of  marriage,  where 
at  the  time  the  marriage  is  alleged  to 
have  been  contracted  there  was  a  wife  by 
a  former  marriage  living,  not  divorced. 

2  2  Kent  Coram.  *86:  "The  Roman 
lawvers  strongly  inculcated  the  doctrine 
that  the  very  foundation  and  essence  of 
the  contract  consisted  in  consent  freely 
given  by  parties  competent  to  contract. 
.  .  .  This  is  the  language  equally  of  the 
common  and  canon  law,  and  of  common 
reason." 

■-  Donnelly  v.  Donnelly,  8  B.  Mon.  113. 
117,  adjudging  dower  to  the  wife  in  such 
case.  But  it  has  since  been  held,  in 
Kentucky,  under  a  statute  so  providing, 
that  all  marriages  are  void  "  when  not 
Bolemnized  or  contracted  in  the  presence 
<>f  an  authorized  person  or  society": 
Estill  >>.  lingers,  1  Hush,  62,  64;  Fenton 
r.  I,*ef;d,  4  Johns.  52.  In  Smith  v.  Smith, 
1  Tex.  621,  it  was  held  that,  under  the 
Spanish  law  (before  the  introduction  of 
the  eoiiiiie.il  law)  prevalent  in  Texas,  a 
marriage,  though  the  husband  might  bavo 
had  a  former  wife  living,  imposed  upon 
the  second   wife,  if  ignorant  of  this  fact. 

'.'  t  2 


all  the  obligations  and  invested  her  with 
all  the  rights  of  a  lawful  wife,  so  long 
as  this  ignorance  continued ;  and  that 
under  the  Spanish  jurisprudence,  a  puta- 
tive is  converted  into  a  real  marriage  by 
the  removal  of  the  disability,  however 
that  may  be  effected.  See  also  Yates  v. 
Houston,  3  Tex.  433,  447;  Jackson  v. 
Claw,  18  Johns.  346,  349;  Adams  v.  Ad- 
ams, 57  Miss.  267,  270,  commenting  on 
and  apparently  reversing  Rundle  v.  Pe- 
gram,  49  Miss.  751,  and  Floyd  v.  Calvert, 
53  Miss.  37,  all  arising  under  the  Missis- 
sippi constitution,  legalizing  the  marriage 
of  persons  not  married,  but  cohabiting  as 
man  and  wife. 

4  Woods  v.  "Woods,  2  Bay,  476,  480. 
The  judges  were  unanimously  of  the 
opinion,  "  that  the  presumption  of  law 
in  support  of  marital  rights  was  much 
more  favored  than  a  presumption  against 
them,  especially  when  such  unfavorable 
presumption  went  to  bastardize  the  is- 
sue of  a  marriage  apparently  legal  and 
proper."  In  New  York  the  statute  pro- 
vides that  a  marriage  is  not  void,  but 
voidable,  when  entered  into  in  good  faith, 
though  one  of  the  parties  has  a  living 
spouse,  who  has  been  absent  for  five  years 
and  not  known  to  be  living ;  but  yet  the 
second  wife  is  held  not  to  be  entitled  to 
dower,  when  her  marriage  is  annulled  by 
judicial  decreo  :  Price  v.  Price,  124  N.  Y. 
589. 


MARRIAGE    AS    A    REQUISITE   TO    DOWER. 


22-1 


or  if  coerced 
by  force  or 
induced  by 
fraud. 


isfactory  proof  of  the  first  marriage,   where  it  is  sought  to  be  in- 
terposed as  a  defence  against  the  claims  of  the  wife.1 

The  consent  of  a  free  and  rational  person  constitutes  an  essential 
ingredient  of  the  marriage  contract;  hence  the  marriage    Marriage  of 
of  an  idiot  is  void,2  and  the  same  rule  prevails  where    ldl0t  vold* 
either  of  the  parties  was  insane  at  the  time  the  marriage    So  of  an  insane 
contract  was  entered  into.8     That  a  marriage  coerced  by    Person' 
compulsion,  fear,  or  violence,  or  induced  by  fraud  or  error,  is  void- 
able, rests   upon   the   same   reason ; 4  but  if  the   party 
imposed  upon  so  elects,  he  or  she  may  waive  the  wrong 
and    thereby   render    the    marriage    good.     Voluntary 
cohabitation  after  discovery  of   the  fraud  or  error,  or 
the  removal  of  the  fear,  amounts  to  such  waiver.5 

Marriages  between  persons  within  the  prohibited  degrees  of  con- 
sanguinity or  affinity,  between  persons  of  different  races,  or  where 
the  statutory  regulations  have  not  been  observed,  or  Marriages  pro- 
either  of  the  parties  is  not  of  the  required  age,  &c,  are  hlblted  b.v  la"'- 
also  held  void  or  voidable  under  the  provisions  of  some  of  the  State 
statutes,  the  details  of  which  cannot  be  considered  here.6  It  is 
self-evident  that,  if  a  marriage  be  voidable,  but  not  void,  the  wife 
will  be  entitled  to  dower  if  it  be  not  dissolved  during  the  lifetime  of 
the  husband.7 

The  validity  of  marriages  is  to  be  determined,  as  a  general  propo- 
sition, by  the  law  of  the  country  where  it  is  solemnized; 
if  valid  there,  it  will  be  valid  everywhere ;  if  void  there, 
it  is  void  elsewhere.8  Exceptions  recognized  are  polyg- 
amous and  incestuous  marriages ; 9  and  marriages  con- 
tracted elsewhere,  in  violation  of  a  local  law,  by  citizens 
subject  to  such  law.10 


Validity  of 
marriage  deter- 
mined by  law 
of  the  country 
where  solem- 
nized. 


1  Hull  v.  Rawla,  27  Miss.  471. 

2  1  Scrib.  on  Dower,  p.  123,  §  17  ;  Way- 
mire  v.  Jetmore,  22  Oh.  St.  271,  273. 

3  Jenkins  v.  Jenkins,  2  Dana,  102 ; 
Crump  v.  Morgan,  3  Ired.  Eq.  91,  94; 
Foster  v.  Means,  1  Speers  Eq.  569,  574  ; 
Powell  v.  Powell,  18  Kans.  371,  377  ; 
Stuckey  v.  Mathes,  24  Hun,  461. 

4  Bassett  v.  Bassett,  9  Bush,  696 ; 
Tomppert  v.  Tomppert,  13  Bush,  326 ; 
Willard  v.  Willard,  6  Baxt.  297. 

5  Hampstead  v.  Plaistow,  49  N.  H.  84, 
98. 

6  See  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *169  et  seq.; 
1  Scrib.  on  Dower,  chs.  iii.  to  viii.  incl. 

7  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *  169,  §  2. 

8  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *170,  §  4,  citing 
Story,  Conn,  of  L.  §  113;  Clark  v.  Clark, 
8  Cush.  385 ;  Cambridge  v.  Lexington,  1 


Pick.  505  ;  Putnam  v.  Putnam,  8  Pick.  433. 
See  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  30  Mo.  72,  88. 

9  Story,  Confl.  of  L.  §  113  a.  But  only 
if  incestuous  by  the  law  of  nature :  Sut- 
ton v.  Warren,  10  Met.  (Mass.)  451 ;  Re- 
gina  v.  Chadwick,  11  Ad.  &  Ell.  (Q.  B.) 
n.  s.  205. 

10  But  only  if  the  local  law  expressly 
invalidates  within  the  locality  the  mar- 
riage contracted  elsewhere  in  violation  of 
its  provision  :  Brook  v.  Brook,  3  Sm.  & 
G.  481 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Hunt,  4  Cush. 
49,  50;  Putnam  v.  Putnam,  8  Pick.  433, 
434.  In  many  States  marriages  contracted 
by  citizens  of  one  State  by  going  into  an- 
other State  for  the  purpose  of  evading  the 
law  of  their  domicil,  and  immediately  re- 
turning to  the  State  of  the  domicil,  are 
held  void  :  see  Stull's  Estate,  183  Pa.  St. 
625,  citing  cases  pro  and  con. 

243 


*225,  *  226  ESTATES   OP   DOWER   AND    CURTESY.  §  108 

*  §  108.    Alienage    as    Barring    the    Dower    Right.  —  The  [*  225] 

common-law  disability  of  aliens  to  transmit  or  acquire  lands 

«-.-,.        by  descent  renders  them  incapable  of  taking  as  tenants 
Effect  of  alien-     .  *  .  1.1r..ni  ° 

age  on  right  of    in  dower.     It  is   accordingly  laid  down  as   an    estab- 
dower.  lished  rule  at  common  law,  that  "if  a  man  taketh  an 

alien  to  wife,  and  dieth,  she  shall  not  be  endowed,"  and  also,  "if 
the  husband  be  an  alien,  the  wife  shall  not  be  endowed."1  This 
rule  is,  however,  rendered  almost  inoperative,  both  in  England  and 
the  United  States,  by  reason  of  the  great  changes  in  the  law  affect- 
ing the  right  of  aliens  to  enjoy,  acquire,  and  transmit  property,  both 
real  and  personal,  by  purchase,  devise,  and  descent.  This  subject  is 
treated  elsewhere,  in  connection  with  the  question  of  the  power  of 
aliens  to  devise  real  estate,  to  which  the  reader  is  referred.  There 
are  now  but  few  States  in  which  alienage  continues  to  be  a  bar  to 
the  full  enjoyment  of  real  estate  in  all  respects,2  although  the  right 
is,  in  some  of  them,  coupled  with  the  condition  of  residence,  decla- 
ration of  intention  to  be  naturalized,  or  claim  of  the  property  within 
a  limited  period  of  time.  Iu  Wisconsin  the  statute  distinguishes 
between  resident  aliens  and  non-residents  (whether  aliens  or  not) 
in  respect  of  dower,  by  limiting  the  right  of  women  residing  out 
of  the  State  to  take  dower  only  in  lands  of  which  the  husband  died 
seised.8  In  Michigan  and  Nebraska  a  similar  distinction  exists; 
and  it  is  held  in  these  States,  that  the  non-residence  contemplated 
by  the  statute  refers  not  only  to  the  time  of  the  husband's  death,4 
but  also  to  the  time  of  the  making  of  the  conveyance ;  so  that  in 
either  event  she  is  not  entitled  to  dower  in  the  lands  conveyed  by 
the  husband  during  coverture.5  So  it  is  provided  in  Kansas,  that 
the  wife  shall  not  be  entitled  to  any  interest  in  lands  to  which  the 
husband  has  made  a  conveyance,  if  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance 
she  is  not,  or.  never  has  been,  a  resident  of  the  State.6  The  law  of 
New  York  entitles  an  alien  to  dower  "  who  has  heretofore  married, 
or  who  may  hereafter  marry,  a  citizen  of  the  United  States."7 
Under  this  law  it  was  held  that  an  alien  widow,  having  married 
an  alien  prior  to  its  passage,  and  never  having  resided  in 
this  country  prior  to  her  husband's  death,  was  not  *  entitled  [*  226] 
to  dower  in  the  lands  of  which  her  husband  died  seised  as 

1  1    Scrib.  on  Dower,  p.  152,  §  3,  cit-  5  Ligare  v.  Semple,  32  Mich.  438,  443; 

ing  numerous  text-writers,  and  the  case  of  approved  and  followed  iu  Atkins  v.  Atkins, 

Fairfax  v.  Hunter,  which    is  based  upon  18  Neb.  474. 

t  be  doctrine  "  that  an  alien  can  take  lands  6  Bufhngton  v.  Grosvenor,  40  Kans.  730, 

by  purchase,  though  not  by  descent;  or,  citing  the  cases  in  the  preceding  notes,  and 

in  other  words,  he  cannot  take  by  the  act  holding  the  statute  constitutional.    In  this 

of    law,   hut    he   may    by   the  act  of   the  State  dower  is  abolished,  but  the  contin- 

party."  7  Cranch,  603,  619.  gent  interest  in  the  husband's  reaUy  is 

1  But  see  ante,  §  !'.»,  as  to  recent  flue-  governed   by  the  same    principles:   ante, 

tuations  in  the  law.  §  10G. 

■    Bennett  v.  Harms,  51   Wis.  251,  254.  '   Laws,  1845,  ch.  115,  §  3;  3  Banks  & 

♦  Pratt  v.  Tefft,  14  Mich.  191,  200.  Bro.,  Rev.  St.  1882,  p.  2170,  §  3. 

244 


§  109   MISCONDUCT  OP  WIFE  AS  BAR  TO  HER  DOWER.    *  226,  *  227 

a  citizen  of  the  United  States,1  notwithstanding  the  act  of  Congress 
providing  that  "any  woman  who  might  lawfully  be  naturalized 
under  the  existing  laws,  married  or  who  shall  be  married  to  a  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States,  shall  be  deemed  and  taken  to  be  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States."2  This  act  is  construed  as  applying  to  a 
woman  married  to  a  person  who  was  at  the  time  of  the  marriage  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  that  the  subsequent  naturaliza- 
tion of  her  husband  worked  no  change  in  her  status. 

An  Alabama  case  decides  that  the  wife  of  an  Indian  is  not  dow- 
able  of  lands  selected  by  her  husband  under  the  treaty  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Creek  tribe,  and  by  him  sold;  not,  however, 
on  account  of  any  incapacity  of  the  widow  to  take  dower,  but  because 
the  title  of  the  deceased  husband  was  such  as  would  not  support 
dower  in  his  wife.8  In  Tennessee  the  alien  widow  of  a  husband 
who  had  settled  and  acquired  real  estate  there  was  allowed  dower, 
but  not  homestead.4 

§  109.    Misconduct   of    the    Wife    as  a  Bar    to    her  Dower. —  At 
common  law  the  elopement  and  adultery  of  the  wife  did  not  operate 
as  a  bar  of  dower; 5  nor  would  equity  refuse  to  interfere    Adu]tery  and 
to  enforce  the  performance  of  marriage  articles,  though    elopement  of 
the  husband  might  have  proved  that  his  wife  is  living    under  statute' 
separate  from  him  in  a  state  of  adultery.6     But  by  the   of  Westmin- 
Statute  of  Westminster  II.,7  if  a  wife  elope  from  her 
husband  and  continue  with  an  adulterer,  she  shall  be  barred  of  her 
dower,  unless  her  husband  willingly,  and  without  coercion  of  the 
Church,  reconcile  her  and  suffer  her  to  dwell  with  him.     That  the 
husband  consented  to  the  adultery,  having  bargained  and  sold  the 
wife  to  the  adulterer,  is  no  defence  to  her.8     But  adultery  alone, 
without  elopement  from  her  husband,  does  not  debar  her  of  dower;9 
nor  elopement  alone  without  adultery ;  there  must  be  a  concurrence 
of   both   elements   of    wrong.10      No   crime   committed    by 
[*  227]  *  the  wife,  save  as  stated,  deprives  her  of  dower;  so  that 
even  one  convicted  of  being  accessory  to  the  murder  of  her 

1  Burton  v.  Burton,  26  How.  Pr.  R.  toriously  lewd   character  of  the  woman 

474.  may  be  proved  in  mitigation  of  damages  : 

8  Act  Feb.  10,  1855  ;  10  St.  at  Large,  Coot  v.  Berty,  12  Mod.  232. 
p.  664,  §  2.  9  Cogswell  v.  Tibbetts,  3  N.  H.  41,  42. 

8  Chinnubbee  v.  Nicks,  3  Port.  362.  10  Shaffer  v.  Richardson,  27  Ind.   122, 

*  Emmett   v.   Emmett,    14    Lea,   369,  126,  citing  Graham  v.  Law,  6  U.  C.  C.  P. 

373.  310,  in  which  it  was  held  that  a  woman 

6  2  Scrib.  on  Dower,  ch.  xviii.,  §  1,  cit-  who  first  deserted  her  husband  and  then 

ing  Hethrington  v.  Graham,  6  Bing.  135,  lived  in  adultery  was  not  thereby  barred 

19  Eng.  C.  L.  31.  of  her  dower;  Wiseman  v.  Wiseman,  73 

6  Seagrave  v.  Seagrave,  13  Ves.  439,  Ind.  112,  113;  a  fortiori,  where  the  hus- 
443.  band  deserts  the  wife,  and  she,  believing 

7  13  Edw.  I.  c.  34.  him  dead,  marries  another:  Payne  v.  Dot* 

8  Although,  in  an  action   of  trespass  son,  81  Mo.  145. 
by  the  husband,  his  license  and  the  no- 

245 


*  227,  *  228  ESTATES   OP   DOWER   AND   CURTESY.  §  109 

husband,    and   imprisoned    for    life,    is    entitled    to   dower   in   his 
estate.1 

The  substance  of  the  Statute  of  Westminster  is  held  to  be  the  law 
in  some  of  the  States,  whether  by  re-enactment  or  as  adopted  with 
Statute  of  ancient  English  statutes  generally;  so  held  in  Indiana,2 

SSSedTr      Missouri,3  New   Hampshire,4  North  Carolina,8   South 
adopted  in  Carolina,6  Virginia,7  and  West  Virginia.8     In   others, 

NoTm  force        ^e   statute    is   ne^  n0Tj   to   be  in  force,    as    in   Dela- 
in  others.  ware,9  Iowa,10  Massachusetts,11  New  York,12  and  Rhode 

Island.18 

Since  a  woman  can  have  dower  only  in  the  lands  of  a  deceased 
husband,  the  question  arises  what  are  the  rights  of  a  woman  who 
Divorce  for  has  been  divorced.  Lord  Coke  says,  "  Ubi  nullum  matri- 
misconduct  of     ■monium,  ibi  nulla  dos  ;  "  14  but  he  confines  the  maxim  to 

wife  generally  .,..., 

bars  her  dower,  divorces  a  vinculo  matrimonii,  and  expressly  excepts 
divorces  "a  mensa  et  thoro  only,  as  for  adultery."  In  America 
adultery  is  a  sufficient  ground  for  a  divorce  a  vinculo  ;  and  if  that  is 
granted  upon  the  husband's  petition,  the  adultery  or  other  miscon- 
duct of  the  wife  for  which  the  divorce  is  pronounced  is  thus  made, 
generally,  the  ground  debarring  her  of  dower.15  This  subject  is 
regulated  by  statute  in  most  of  the  States,  the  prominent  tenor  of 
which  is  to  allow  the  wife  her  dower  rights  in  all  cases  in  which  the 
divorce  is  granted  upon  her  petition,  and  to  annul  it  where  it  is 
granted  upon  the  husband's  petition,  with  discretionary  power,  in 
many  instances,  in  the  court  trying  the  cause,  to  dispose 
of  all  property  questions  in  the  decree  of  divorce.16  It  *  is  [*228J 
self-evident  that  a  divorce  from  bed  and  board  does  not 
defeat  dower.17 

Bishop,  in  his  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Marriage  and  Divorce, 
says :  "  Still,  in  the  absence  of  any  statutory  provision,  the  unwritten 
law  of  our  States,  in  general,  does  not  recognize  the  status  of  mar- 

1  Owens  v.  Owens,  100  N.  C.  240.    The  8  Thornburg  v.  Thornburg,  18  W.  Va. 

reasoning  of  this  case  has  been  expressly  522,  525. 

disapproved  in  New  York  and  Nebraska,  9  Rawlins  v.  Buttel,  1  Houst.  224. 

in  considering  analogous  points  :  Riggs  v.  10  Smith  v.  Woodworth,  4  Dill.  584,  587. 

Palmer,  115  N.  Y.  506;  Shellenberger  v.  n  Lakin  v.  Lakin,  2  Allen,  45. 

Hanson',  31   Neb.  01,  73.     But  this  latter  12  Schiffer  v.  Pruden,  64  N.  Y.  47,  49. 

case  was  afterwards  reversed  on  rehearing :  13  Bryan  v.  Bacheller,  6  R.  I.  543,  545. 

s.  c.  41  Neb.  631.  14  Co.  Litt.  32  a. 

-  Gaylor  v.  Me  Henry,  15  Ind.  383.  15  Moulton  v.  Moulton,  76  Me.  85. 

:;  MrAlister  v.  Novenger,  54  Mo.  251,  16  A  diligent  and  careful   compilation 

253.  of  the  statutory  provisions  on  this  subject 

*  Cogswell  v.  TibbettS,  supra.  in  the  several  States,  as  in  force  in   1887, 

I  Walters  v.  Jordan,  13  Ired.  L.  361,  will  be  found  in  a  note  appended  to  chap- 

3P4  ter  vii.  of  1  Washburn  on  Real  Property, 

r'  Bell  v.  Nealy,  l  Bai.  312.  pp.  *258  et  seg. 

7  Stegall  v.  Btegall,  2  Brock.  256.  17  Jarnigan  v.  Jarnigan,  12   Lea.  292; 

Taylor  c.Taylor,  93  N.  C.  418. 

246 


§  109    MISCONDUCT  OF  WIFE  AS  BAR  TO  HER  DOWER.    *  228,  *  229 


riao-e  in  a  woman  who  has  no  husband.  Consequently,  it  does  not 
recognize  in  her  the  existence  of  property  rights  which  hang  directly 
upon  the  status."  *  In  accordance  with  this  view,  it  has  been  decided 
that  where  a  woman  has  been  divorced  for  her  misconduct,  whether 
in  Missouri  or  elsewhere,  her  rights  depending  on  the  marriage  are 
ended  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  actually  vested  in  her,  and  that 
evidence  of  the  divorce  may  be  given,  although  obtained  in  a 
foreign  jurisdiction  and  without  actual  notice  to  her,  in  defence  of 
her  action  for  dower.2  Where  the  divorce  was  pro-  But  not  divorce 
nounced    against    the    husband    for    his    misconduct,3  for  misconduct 

°  .  ..,.,.        .  , ,  -p     •  n         of  the  husband. 

although  in  a  foreign  jurisdiction,4  the  wife  is,  usually, 
under  the  statutes,  entitled  to  her  dower ;  and  where,  pending  a  pro- 
ceeding for  divorce  by  the  wife,  the  husband  in  another  State 
obtained  a  decree  against  her,  it  was  held  that,  whether  the  foreign 
decree  was  valid  or  not,  it  could  not  affect  her  right  to  dower  in  his 
lands  in  the  State  of  the  wife's  domicil.5  In  Alabama  it  was  held 
that,  while  a  majority  of  the  adjudged  cases  and  the  strength  of 
the  argument  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  result  of  a  divorce 
from  the  bonds  of  matrimony  is  to  bar  the  wife  of  all  claim  to  dower 
in  her  husband's  estate,6  yet  under  the  statutes  of  that  State  a  divorce 
obtained  by  the  husband  on  the  ground  of  voluntary  abandonment 

does  not  bar  the  surviving  widow  of  her  right  of   dower.7 
[*  229]  But  this   ruling  was  expressly  *  disavowed  in  a  later  case, 

announcing   the  doctrine  that  a  divorced  wife   could  under 


1  2  Bish.  Mar.  &  Div.  §  170  c  (5th  ed.). 

2  Gould  v.  Crow,  57  Mo.  200,  202.  The 
statute  of  Missouri  provides  that,  "  if  any 
woman  be  divorced  from  her  husband  for 
the  fault  or  misconduct  of  the  husband, 
she  shall  not  thereby  lose  her  dower  ;  but 
if  the  husband  be  divorced  from  the  wife 
for  her  fault  or  misconduct,  she  shall  not 
be  endowed."  See,  to  same  effect,  Thorns 
v.  King,  95  Tenn.  60 ;  also  Van  Cleaf  v. 
Burns,  43  Hun,  461,  in  which  case  the 
wife  appeared  in  person  to  defend  the 
divorce  proceedings  in  another  State. 
This  case  was,  however,  reversed,  the 
court  holding  that  the  foreign  judgment 
would  not  affect  her  dower  right  in  New 
York,  at  least  not  unless  it  were  shown 
that  it  would  have  that  effect  in  the  State 
where  the  judgment  was  rendered  :  s.  c. 
118  N.  Y.  549  ;  and  in  a  subsequent  case 
it  was  held  that  the  effect  of  the  divorce 
on  lands  in  New  York,  though  obtained 
in  another  State,  must  be  determined  by 
the  law  of  New  York,  which  bars  dower 
only  if  she  be  guilty  of  adultery :  Van 
Cleaf  v.  Burns,  133  N.  Y.  540,  reversing 


s.  c.  62  Hun,  252.  In  Pennsylvania  the 
wife  is  not  barred  of  dower  by  a  divorce 
obtained  by  the  husband  in  another  State, 
on  the  ground  that  the  court  pronouncing 
the  divorce  has  no  jurisdiction  over  the 
wife,  and  that  the  decree  is  void  :  Real  v. 
Elder,  62  Pa.  St.  308,  315;  and  so  in 
South  Carolina:  McCreery  v.  Davis,  44 
S.  C.  195. 

3  Gordon  v.  Dickeson,  131  111.  141 ; 
Wait  v.  Wait,  4  N.  Y.  95.  In  Tatro  v. 
Tatro,  18  Neb.  395,  it  is  held,  that  upon  a 
divorce  being  granted  the  wife,  a  decree 
for  alimony  in  gross  will  be  presumed  to 
be  in  lieu  of  dower.  So  it  was  held  in 
Adams  v.  Storey,  135  111.  448,  that  an 
annuity  decreed  in  favor  of  the  wife,  and 
secured  by  a  lien  on  the  husband's  real 
estate,  would  be  in  lieu  of  dower. 

*  Harding  v.  Alden,  9  Me.  140,  146; 
McGill  v.  Deming,  44  Oh.  St.  645. 

5  Turner  v.  Turner,  44  Ala.  437,  450. 

6  Per  Stone,  J.,  in  Williams  v.  Hale,  71 
Ala.  83,  85.  See  collection  of  numerous 
authorities  by  Judge  Stone,  p.  86. 

7  Williams  v.  Hale,  supra. 

247 


*  229  ESTATES    OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY.  §  HO 

no  circumstances  claim  dower  at  the  death  of  her  husband.1  The 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  announces  the  same  doctrine  in 
the  following  terms :  "  It  has  been  generally  held  that  a  valid  divorce 
from  the  bonds  of  matrimony  cuts  off  the  wife's  right  of  dower  and 
the  husband's  tenancy  by  the  curtesy,  unless  expressly  or  impliedly 
preserved  by  statute."  a  The  same  view  is  taken  in  Iowa  3  New 
Jersey/  and  under  the  statute  of  Kentucky.5 

§  110.  What  Property  is  subject  to  Dower.  —  It  will  be  conven- 
ient to  consider  first  the  class  or  kind  of  property  of  which  the 
widow  is  dowable,  and  next  the  estate  or  degree  of  interest  of  the 
husband  therein  necessary  to  support  the  wife's  right  of  dower. 
Dower  ordiDa-  Dower  is  ordinarily  understood  to  be  applicable  to 
rily  applies  to     reai    property  only  ; 6  in  some  of   the  States,  however, 

rem  6Sttitc  j  .  .  . 

the  statute    provides  for  dower  in  personal    propertv, 

in  some  States  „       .         .       r  ,.  r  •  ■,   / 

given  in  per-  referring  m  some  instances  to  the  property  assigned  for 
sonalty.  ^he  temporary  support  of  the  family,  in  analogy  with 

the  ancient  custom  of  supporting  the  widow  out  of  the  estate  dur- 
ing the  period  of  quarantine,7  and  in  others  to  the  distributive  share 
allowed  her  by  law  out  of  the  personalty.  At  common  law  the 
widow  is  dowable  of  all  lands,  tenements,  or  hereditaments,  whether 
corporeal  or  incorporeal,  of  which  the  husband  was  seised  of  an 
estate  of  inheritance  during  the  coverture.8 

Mines  and  quarries  which  have  been  opened  in  the  lifetime  of 
...  ,  the  husband  are  subiect  to  the  widow's  dower.9      But 

Mines  and  J  .  .  . 

quarries.  not  so,  in  some  States,  unimproved  lands,  of  which  it 

Wild  lands.        wag  sa^  ^^  ^^  couicj  not  \ye  utilized  by  the  widow 

without  forfeiting  her  estate  in  dower,  because  by  the  principle  of 
the  common  law  the  alteration  of  the  property,  even  if  it  became 
thereby  more  valuable,  would  forfeit   the   estate  in  dower.10      But 

1  Hinson  v.  Bush,  4  South.  (Ala.)  R. 410.  owned  in  common  and  subject  to  a  lease, 

2  Barrett  v.  Failing,  111  U.  S.  523,  it  is  proper  to  set  out  to  the  widow  for  life 
citing  authorities  from  Massachusetts,  one-third  of  the  proceeds  of  her  husband's 
Ohio,  and  other  States.  share:  Clift   v.   Clift,    87    Tenn.    17.     In 

3  Marvin  v.  Marvin,  59  Iowa,  669,  ap-  Michigan  the  widow  has  dower  rights  in 
proved  in  Boyles  v.  Latham,  61  Iowa,  174.  the  lauds,  irrespective  of  whether  mines 

4  Pullen  v.  Pullen,  52  N.  J.  Eq.  9.  were  opened  before  or  after  the  husband's 
'■  McKean  v.  Brown,  83  Ky.  208.  death,  where  the  lands  could  be  used  for 

6  Dow  V.  Dow,  36  Me.  211,216;  Lamar  no  other  purpose  than  mining:  Seager's 
v.  Scott,  3  Strob.  562,  563;  Davis's  Estate,  Estate,  92  Mich.  186,  197,  referring  to 
36  Iowa,  24,  30;  Bryant  v.  McCune,  49  the  English  cases  and  their  origin,  and 
Mo,  546.  emphasizing   the   changed    conditions    in 

7  Infra,  p.  *  230,  note  I.  America.     The  interest  in  a  mining  claim, 

8  Ante,  §  106;  l  Washb.  on  It.  Prop,  prior  to  the  payment  of  any  money  for  the 
*  1 52,  §  1 .  granting  of  a  patent  for   the  land,  is  not 

'-»  Coates  v.  Cheever,  l  Cow.  460,  474;  such  an  interest  as  will  attach  the  locator's 

BillingB    V.    Taylor,    10    Pick.    460,    462;  wife's  dower  rights  to  it  against  the  loca- 

Moore  v.  Rollins,  45  Me.  493;  Lenfers  v.  tor's  vendee:  Black  v.  Elkhorn,  163  TJ.  S. 

Benke,  73   111.405,  406;  Priddy  v.  Grit  445,450. 

hih,  150  III.  560.     Where  snch  mines  are         w  Conner  v.   Shephard    15  Mass.    164 
248 


§  110  WHAT   PROPERTY   IS   SUBJECT   TO   DOWER.        *  229,  *  230 

the  reason  for  excluding  wild  lands  from  the  widow's  dower  right 
does  not  extend  to  wild  lands  which  were  used  by  the  husband 
in  connection  with  his  dwelling-house  and  cultivated  lands,  for  the 
purpose  of  procuring  fuel  and  timber  for  repairs.1  And  a 
[*  230]  different  *  rule  exists  in  most  of  the  States,  in  which  dower 
is  allotted  in  all  the  lands  of  the  husband,  whether  wild  or 
cultivated.2 

Shares  in  incorporated  companies  are  sometimes  treated  as  real 
estate,  and  subjected  to  dower.3     But,  as  a  general  rule,    Shares  of  stock 
shares  in  corporations  are  considered  as  mere  personal    "atedCcom- 
chattels,4  and  are,  as  such,  not  dowable  as  real  estate,    panies. 

Accretion   becomes   a  part   of  the   land  to   which  the   alluvion 
attaches,  and  is  thus  an  incident  of  the  ownership  of 
him  who  owns  the  land ;  hence  the  widow  of  a  riparian 
owner  is  entitled  to  dower  in  such  accretion.5 

Crops  growing  upon  lands  assigned  to  the  widow  as  her  dower 
become  her  property,  and  she  is  entitled  to  the  same  as  against 
the  executor  or  administrator ; 6  but  she  is  not  entitled 
thereto  before  the  assignment;7  and  in  Arkansas  it  is 
held  that,  where  the  husband  had  mortgaged  the  growing  crop, 
although  the  wife  did  not  join  in  the  instrument  and  died  before  the 
mortgage  was  satisfied,  it  constituted  no  part  of  his  property  at 
the  time  of  his  death,  and  the  widow  was  not  entitled  to  dower 
therein.8 

In  those   States  in  which  personal  property  is  made  subject  to 

166;  Webb  v.  Towusend,  1  Pick.  21,  22;  tings    v.    Crunckleton,    3    Yeates,    261; 

Fuller  v.  Wason,  7  N.  H.  341  ;    Ford  v.  Brown  v.  Richards,  17  N.  J.  Eq.  32,  38. 
Erskine,  50  Me.  227,  230.  3  Price  v.  Price,  6  Dana,  107  ;    Cope- 

1  White  v.  Willis,  7  Pick.  143,  144  ;  land  v.  Copeland,  7  Bush,  349,  352.  The 
but  strictly  confined  to  the  supply  neces-  decision  in  this  last  case  was  rendered  in 
sary  for  the  occupation  and  enjoyment  of  October,  1870;  in  March,  1871,  the  legis- 
the  dwelling-house  and  cultivated  lands  lature  passed  an  act  declaring  the  capital 
assigned  as  dower:  White  v.  Cutler,  17  stock  in  all  railway  companies  incorpo- 
Pick.  248,  251;  Shattuck  v.  Gragg,  23  rated  under  the  laws  of  Kentucky  personal 
Pick.  88,  91  ;  Durham  v.  Angier,  20  Me.  property. 

242,  246,  citing  and  approving  Mosher  o.  4  1    Washb.  on  R.  Prop.  *  166,  §  22; 

Mosher,  15  Me.  371  ;  Ballentine  v.  Poyner,  McDougal  v.  Hepburn,  5  Fla.  568,  572. 

2  Hayw.  110;  Owen  v.  Hyde,  6  Yerg.  334,  5  Lombard  v.  Kinzie,  73  111.  446  ;  Gale 

339 ;    Fuller    v.   Wason,  supra ;    Ford   v.  v.  Kinzie,  80  111.  132. 

Erskine,  supra.  6  Ralston  v.  Ralston,  3  G.  Gr.  (Iowa), 

2  Macaulay  v.  Dismal  Swamp  Co.,  2  533 ;  Parker  t>.  Parker,  17  Pick.  236,  240 
Rob.  (Va.)  507,  524;  Allen  v.  McCoy,  8  (even  though  the  crop  had  been  sown  by 
Oh.  418;  Campbell,  Appellant,  2  Dougl.  the  heir)  ;  Clark  v.  Bottorf,  1  Thomp.  & 
141,  142;  Hickman  v.  Irvine,  3  Dana,  121,  C.  58  (although  she  did  not  claim  them 
122;  Schnebly  v.  Schnebly,  26  111.  116,  until  after  the  administrators  had  inven- 
119;  Seager's  Estate,  92  Mich.  186;  toried  and  sold  them) ;  Vaughn  v.  Vaughn, 
Chapman    v.    Schroeder,    10    Ga.     321,  88  Tenn.  742. 

325     (not     questioned     in     New    York :  7  Budd  v.  Hiler,  27  N.  J.  L.  43,  46. 

Walker  v.  Schuyler,  10  Wend.  480)  ;  Has-  8  ptreet  >■.  Saunders  27  Ark.  554,  556 

249 


230,  *  231  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND   CURTESY. 


§110 


Dower  does  not  the  dower  of  the  widow,  a  distinction  is  recognized 
souaity  until"  between  it  and  her  dower  in  real  estate;  the  former 
husband's  may   be   sold   or  disposed   of  by  the   husband  at  his 

pleasure,  as  the  widow's  right  does  not  attach  until  his 
death.1  And  where  the  personalty,  to  which  her  dower  attaches,  is 
used  by  the  administrator  to  pay  debts  of  the  deceased,  she  may  be 
reimbursed  out  of  the  realty,  by  being  subrogated  to  the  rights  of 
such  creditor,2  and  the  administrator  has  the  same  right  of  subroga- 
tion if  he  is  compelled  to  refund  to  the  widow.8  But  where  the 
deceased  has  pledged  a  chattel,  the  widow  takes  dower  in  the  equity 
of  redemption  only.4 

*  Leasehold   estates  and  estates  for  years  are  treated  at  [*  231] 
common  law  as  personal  property,  and  the  widow  of  a  lessee 
No  dow  r  dying  is  n°fc  entitled  to  dower  therein,  although  it  be 

common  law  in  for  a  period  of  a  thousand  years,5  or  renewable  forever, 
leaseholds.  Qr  though  the  lease  contain  a  covenant  to  convey  the 
Attter  m  some    estate  in  fee  on  the  demand  of  the  lessee.6    In  some  of 

States 

the  States,  however,  dower  is  given  by  statute  in  lease- 
hold estates  of  a  given  duration.7 


1  McClure  v.  Owens,  32  Ark.  443,  445, 
citing  and  approving  Arnett  v.  Arnett,  14 
Ark.  57.  But  in  Arkansas  she  takes 
dower  as  against  creditors,  unless  the 
property  has  actually  been  levied  on : 
James  v.  Marcus,  18  Ark.  421,  422.  In 
Iowa  the  term  "  dower"  is  held  not  appli- 
cable to  personalty  :  Estate  of  Davis,  36 
Iowa,  24,  30.  In  Missouri,  the  widow  is 
allowed  $400  in  property,  to  be  selected 
by  her  at  the  appraised  value,  as  against 
creditors  absolutely,  and  this  includes 
choses  in  action  as  well  as  in  possession : 
Cummings  v.  Cummings,  51  Mo.  261,  264. 
The  term  "  dower  "  is  held  to  apply  to 
personalty  only  in  a  qualified  sense  :  Bry- 
ant v.  McCune,  49  Mo.  546,  citing  and  ex- 
plaining Hastings  v.  Meyer,  21  Mo.  519; 
see  also  Hoyt  v.  Davis,  21  Mo.  App.  235  ; 
the  widow  takes  dower  in  such  personal 
property  only  as  the  husband  was  owner 
of  at  the  time  of  his  death :  McLaugh- 
liu  v.  McLaughlin,  16  Mo.  242;  Crecelius 
v.  Horst,  H'.i  Mo.  356.  And  while  a  woman 
divorced  from  her  husband  for  his  fault  is 
entitled  to  "  dower,"  yet  such  dower  right 
does  not  include  the  ri^bt  to  personalty, 
as  if  the  husband  bad  died  :  Weindel  v. 
Weindel,  126  Mo.  640.  See  ante,  §91.  In 
Florida  the  widow's  ri^lit  to  dower  in  the 
personalty  may  be  recovered  by  her  per- 
sonal representative,  if  .slut  die  before  it 
250 


is  allotted  to  her :  Woodberry  v.  Mather- 
son,  19  Fla.  778,  7*84. 

2  Crouch  v.  Edwards,  52  Ark.  499, 502. 

3  Crowley  v.  Mellon,  52  Ark.  1,  11. 
*  Hewitt  v.  Cox,  55  Ark.  225,  236. 

5  Goodwin  v.  Goodwin,  33  Conn.  314, 
316.  In  this  case  the  lease  was  for  999 
years,  and  the  widow  was  held  not  en- 
titled to  dower,  although  in  the  same 
State  a  similar  leasehold  was  held,  under 
a  question  of  taxation,  to  be  equal  to  a 
fee  :  Brainard  v.  Colchester,  31  Conn.  407, 
411  ;  Whitmire  v.  Wright,  22  S.  C.  446, 
449  (for  999  years). 

6  Ware  v.  Washington,  6  Sm.  &  M. 
737,  741  ,  Spangler  v.  Stanler,  1  Md.  Ch. 
36.  This  case  involved  a  lease  for  99 
years,  renewable  forever,  and  containing 
a  covenant  to  make  deed  in  fee  on  request. 

7  So  in  Kansas,  previous  to  the  aboli- 
tion of  dower;  in  Massachusetts,  in  terms 
of  one  hundred  years  and  more,  so  long 
as  fifty  years  thereof  remain  unexpired : 
Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  735,  §  1  ;  Missouri,  in 
leasehold  estates  of  twenty  years  or  more  : 
Bev.  St.  1889,  §  4513;  and  it  seems  that 
in  Ohio  permanent  leases  are  treated  as 
real  estate  in  connection  with  the  law  of 
descents  :  Northern  Hank  of  Kentucky  v. 
Roosa,  13  Oli.  334,  340.  In  Arkansas, 
when;  the  widow  is  entitled  to  dower  in 
the  personalty,  she  takes  dower  absolutely 


§  111  ESTATE   NECESSARY  TO    SUPPORT   DOWER.         *  231,  *  282 

It  is  held  in  Michigan  that  a  dower  right  cannot  be  established 
in  land,  the  deed  of  which  to  the  husband  of  the  claimant  was  never 
recorded,  and  where  the  premises  have  passed  to  an  innocent 
purchaser.1 

§  111.    The  Estate  or  Interest  in  the  Property  necessary  to  sup- 
port Dower  in   the   Widow.  —  The   estate   of  the   husband    must 
have  been  one  of  inheritance ;  for,  it  is  said,  as  hers  is    Husband's 
a  mere  continuance  of  the  estate  of  the  husband,  if  his    gair  ^'support 

was  less  than  one  of  inheritance  it  cannot  ex-    dower. 
[*  232]  tend  *  beyond  his  own  life.2     And  this  whether  the  estate 
be   held   for   his  own  life,  or  for  the  life  of  another,   and 
although  he  die  before  the  cestui  que  vie.3     For  this  reason,  also, 
there  can  be  no  dower  in  an  estate  for  years,4  no  matter  how  long 
the  term  is  to  continue.5     And  the  estate  must  be  one    Rjgnt  of  seisin- 
of  which  the  husband  had  or  might  have  had  corporeal    but  not  actual 
seisin;6  it  is  not  necessary  that  there  should  have  been   se,sm- 
an  actual  seisin,  because  then  it  might  often  be  in  the  husband's 
power,  by  neglecting  to  take   such   seisin,  to  deprive  his   wife   of 
dower;  it  is  enough  if  he  had  an  actual  seisin  in  law,  with  a  right 
to  immediate  corporeal   seisin.7     It   follows,    that   the    No  dower  in 
wife  takes  no  dower  in  a  reversion  or  remainder  after   a7re™hoTdainer 
a  freehold  estate  in  another,8  unless  the  husband,  pos-   another, 
sessing  a  life  estate,  acquire  the  immediate  reversion  or  remainder 
in  fee  expectant   upon   its   termination.9     But   whether   she  takes 
dower  in  an  estate  given  to  the  husband,  by  executory  devise,  in  fee 
simple,  but  if  he  should  die  without  issue,  then  over  to  another  in 
fee,  has  given  rise  to  great  diversity  of  opinion.     In  the   leading 
English  case  on  this  point  it  was  held  that  the  determination  of  an 

in  a  lease  of   whatever  duration,   as  in  title  the  widow  to  dower :  Ellis  v.  Kygar, 

personal  property,  and  not  for  life,  as  in  90  Mo.  600,  607. 

realty  :  Lenow  v.  Fones,  48  Ark.  557.  8  Brooks    v.    Everett,  13   Allen,  457  ; 

1  Wheeler  v.  Smith,  55  Mich.  355.  Durando  v.  Durando,  23  N.  Y.  331  ;  Fisk 

2  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *  152,  §  2;  Burris  v.  Eastman,  5  N.  H.  240,  242;  Arnold 
v.  Page,  12  Mo.  358.  v.  Arnold,  8  B.  Mon.  202,  204  ;  Vanleer  v. 

8  Fisher  v.  Grimes,    1    Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  Vanleer,   3   Tenn.    Ch.    23  ;    Gardner   v. 

107,  108;  Gillis  t\  Brown,  5  Cow.  388.  Greene,  5  R.  I.  104,  108;  Cocke  v.  Phil- 

*  Ante,  §  110,  leasehold  estates.  ips,  12  Leigh,  248,  257  ;  Warren  v.  Wil- 

6  Park  mentions  a  term  for  two  thou-  liams,  25  Mo.  App.  22.     Thus  there  can 

sand  years:  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *153,  §  3.  be  no  dower  in  lands  assigned  as  dower, 

So  held  under   a  lease  for  999  years  in  the    widow's    intervening    interest    pre- 

Whitmire  v.  Wright,  22  S.  C.  446,  449.  venting  the  necessary  seisin  of  the  husband 

6  Apple  v.  Apple,  1  Head,  348,  350.  and  heir;  but  where  the  dower  of  the  an- 

7  Atwood  v.  Atwood,  22  Pick.  283,  cestor's  widow  is  unassigned,  this  does  not 
286  ;  Mann  v.  Edson,  39  Me.  25  ;  Dun-  prevent  the  vesting  of  the  estate  of  in- 
ham  v.  Osborn,  1  Pai.  634 ;  Small  v.  heritance  in  the  heir,  and  on  the  latter's 
Proctor,  15  Mass.  495,  498;  Thompson  death  his  widow  is  entitled  to  dower: 
v.  Thompson,  1  Jones  L.  430 ;  but  a  mere  Null  v.  Howell,  111  Mo.  273. 

right  of  entry  in  the  husband  for  condi-         9  Beardslee  v.  Beardslee,  5  Barb.  324, 
tion  broken,  without  more,  does  not  en-     332. 

251 


232,  *  233  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY. 


§111 


estate  by  operation  of  an  executory  devise  does  not  defeat  curtesy  or 
dower.1     This   view   was   followed   in   Pollard   v.  Slaughter,2  and 
Nickell  v.  Tomlinson,3  in  which  the    court  review  the  authorities 
and  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  has  been  generally  approved  and 
adopted   in  the  United   States.4     On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
*  contended  that  this  doctrine  unreasonably  prolongs,  by  the  [*  233] 
incidents  of  dower  and  curtesy,  an  estate  determined  by  the 
terms  of   its  creation ; 6   hence  dower  in  a  defeasible  estate  is  lost  / 
when  the  estate  is  defeated.6 

It  is  obvious  that  there  can  be  no  right  of  dower  in  estates  held 
No  dower  in  in  joint  tenancy  with  others,  until  it  reaches  the  last 
joint  tenancy,  survivor.7  But  this  estate  is  not  favored  in  America; 
it  was  never  recognized  in  Connecticut,8  and  Ohio,9  and  in  most  other 
States  has  been  abolished,  or  confined  to  trustees,  executors,  and 
persons  holding  en  auter  droit,  or  to  cases  where  the  grant  or  devise 
expressly  creates  joint  tenancies.10 

Since  there  is  no  survivorship  between  coparceners,  lands  held  in 
coparcenary,  as  well  as  those  held  in  common,  are  sub- 
naryand^om-  ject  to  dower.11  The  rule  is  to  set  off  the  dower  in 
mon  tenancies.  C0mm0I1)  unless  the  husband's  share  has  been  set  apart 
to  him  by  partition,  in  which  case  she  takes  dower  in  the  portion 
set  apart; 12  but  in  New  Jersey  she  seems  dowable  of  her  husband's 
proportion  of  the  whole  land,  notwithstanding  a  parol  partition,  or 
possession  taken  thereunder  in  severalty.13 


i  Buckworth  v.  Thirkell,  3  Bos.  & 
Pull.  652  (opin.  of  Lord  Mansfield,  note, 
p.  655). 

2  92  N.  C.  72,  75. 

3  27  W.  Va.  697,  706. 

4  Milledge  v.  Lamar,  4  Desaus.  617, 
637  ;  Northcut  i\  Whipp,  12  B.  Mon.  65, 
73;  Evans  v.  Evans,  9  Pa.  St.  190; 
Taliaferro  v.  Burwell,  4  Call,  321,  323; 
Jones  v.  Hughes,  27  Gratt.  560 ;  Hatfield 
v.  Sneden,  54  N.  Y.  280,  284;  1  Scrib. 
Dower,  p.  314,  §  31  ;  1  Washb.  It.  Prop. 
*  212,  pi.  32  et  seq.;    1    Jarm.  on  Wills, 

6  Weller  v.  Weller,  28  Barb.  588,  592  ; 
Edwards  v.  Bibb,  54  Ala.  475,  483  ;  4 
Kent  Comm.  *49,  50;  Park  on  Dower, 
*lf,r,  rt  eeq.  (but  see  *  189,  where  the 
writer  seems  to  show  that  the  authorities 
art-  against  him). 

*>  Moriarta  v.  McBea,  45  Hun,  564. 

»    Babbitt    V.    Day,  41    N.  J.    Eq.   392; 

Maybnrry  i>,  Brien,  15  Pet.  21,  37;  Cock- 
rill  v.  Armstrong,  81  Ark.  580,  584. 

*  Phelps  v  Jep  on,  I  Root,  iw,  49. 

'•  Sergeant  v.  Bteinberger,  2  Oh.  305, 
252 


affirmed  in  Miles  v.  Fisher,  10  Oh.  1,  4r 
and  Tabler  v.  Wiseman,  2  Oh.  St.  207, 210. 

10  As,  for  instance,  in  Missouri,  where, 
by  statute,  "  every  interest  in  real  estate 
granted  or  devised  to  two  or  more  per- 
sons, other  than  executors  and  trustees 
and  husband  and  wife,  shall  be  a  tenancy 
in  common,  unless  expressly  declared,  in 
such  grant  or  devise,  to  be  in  joint  ten- 
ancy": Rev.  St.  1889,  §  8844.  So  in 
Arkansas  :  Cockrill  v.  Armstrong,  31  Ark. 
580,  586  ;  and  Alabama :  Parsons  v.  Boyd, 
20  Ala.  112,  118. 

11  Harvill  v.  Holloway,  24  Ark.  19; 
Davis  v.  Logan,  9  Dana,  185,  giving,  un- 
der the  Kentucky  statute,  the  effect  of 
tenancy  in  common  to  a  joint  tenancy. 

12  Potter  v.  Wheeler,  13  Mass.  504,  506  ; 
Wilkinson  v.  Parish,  3  Pai.  653,  658 ; 
Mosher  v.  Mosher,  32  Me.  412,  414  ;  Hart 
v.  Burch,  ISO  111.  426  ;  dower  may  first  be 
set  out,  according  to  valuation,  and  parti- 
tion made  afterwards  :  Harris  v.  Coats,  75 
Ga.  415;  Clift  v.  Clift,  87  Tenn.  17,  23; 
Bee  post,  §  1 1 7,  as  to  method  of  assignment. 

13  Woodhull  v.  Longstreet,  18  N.  J.  L. 


§111 


ESTATE   NECESSARY   TO    SUPPORT   DOWER.        *  233,  *  234 


Where  a  husband  has  during  coverture  made  an  exchange  of  lands, 
the  widow  is  entitled  to  dower  in  both  parcels,  —  in  Dower  in  lands 
that  which  was  conveyed  by,  as  well  as  in  that  which    exchanged  by 

,,■,,,  ,  .       ,     the  husband 

was  conveyed  to,  her  husband,   because  he  was  seised   during 
of   both  during  coverture, x  —  unless  the  exchange  was   coverture- 

technical,  a  mutual  grant  of  equal  interests,  the  one 
[*  234]  *  in  consideration  of  the  other  and  in  writing,  in  which  case 
she  takes  in  either  of  the  parcels,  at  her  election,  but  not  in 
both.2  This  subject  is  regulated  by  statute  in  Arkansas,3  Illinois,4 
Michigan,5  New  York,6  Oregon,7  and  Wisconsin.8  Where  the 
statute  is  silent,  the  common-law  rule  is,  of  course,  to  be  applied.9 
The  widow  of  a  lunatic  takes  dower  in  lands  bought  by  the  guar- 
dian with  assets  of  his  estate,  although  such  purchase  was  unauthor- 
ized.10 

Real  estate  acquired  by  a  firm  for  partnership  purposes,  although 
held  in  law  by  the  several  partners  as  tenants  in  common,  is  never- 
theless liable  for  the  partnership  debts,  and  is  in  equity    No  dower  in 
treated  as  personal  property  for  such  purpose.     Hence,    partnership 
as   a   general    rule,   partnership   property   is   not   sub- 
ject to  the  dower  of  the  wives  of  any  of  the  partners,  except  such  as 
may  remain  after  paying  all  partnership  debts,  whether  to  creditors 
or  the  partners  themselves.11     It  is  immaterial  whether  the  title  be 
taken  in  the  firm  name,  or  in  the  name  of  one  of  the  partners.12 
In  America  it  seems  to  be  generally  held  that  real  estate    Except  jn  t^e 
remaining  after  the  payment  of  debts,  and  adjustment    residue  after 
of  the  equitable  claims  of  the  partners  between  them-    partnership 
selves  is  to  be  treated  as  real  estate;13  and  since  there    debts- 


405, 408,  Nevins,  J.,  dissenting,  416  ;  Lloyd 
v.  Connover,  25  N.  J.  L.  47,  51. 

1  Both  parties  being  regarded  as  ordi- 
nary purchasers :  Cass  v.  Thompson,  1 
N.  H.  65,  67  ;  Cruize  v.  Billmire,  69  Iowa, 
397. 

2  Shep.  Touch.  *294;  Co.  Litt.  31  b; 
Stevens  v.  Smith,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  64  ; 
Mahoney  v.  Young,  3  Dana,  588 ;  Steven- 
son v.  Brasher,  90  Ky.  23. 

8  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  2522. 

«  St.  &  C.  1896,  p.  1469,  U"  17  ;  Hart- 
well  v.  De  Vault,  159  111.  325. 

5  How.  St.  1882,  §  5734. 

8  2  B.  &  Br.  1896  (9th  ed.),  p.  1814, 
§  3  ;  Wilcox  v.  Randall,  7  Barb.  633. 

7  Code,  1887,  §  2955. 

8  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  2161. 

9  Mosher  v.  Mosher,  32  Me.  412,  415. 

10  Rannells  v.  Isgrigg,  99  Mo.  19,  28. 

11  Campbell  v.  Campbell,  30  N.  J.  Eq. 
415,  417  ;  Uhler  v.  Semple,  20  N.  J.  Eq. 


288,  294  ;  Buchan  v.  Sumner,  2  Barb.  Ch. 
165,  200;  Simpson  v.  Leech,  86  111.  286, 
citing  Dyer  v.  Clark,  5  Met.  562,  and 
Howard  v.  Priest,  5  Met.  582;  Paige  v. 
Paige,  71  Iowa,  318,  320. 

12  Willet  v.  Brown,  65  Mo.  138,  144. 
The  seeming  exception,  noticed  by  some 
text-writers,  of  a  case  where  the  partner 
so  holding  the  title  had  by  agreement 
been  charged  by  the  firm  as  debtor  for 
the  purchase-money,  is  really  no  excep- 
tion ;  the  transaction  constituted  a  sale  of 
the  real  estate  to  such  partner,  who  thus 
held  it  in  his  individual  right :  Smith  v. 
Smith,  5  Ves.  189. 

13  See  Lenow  v.  Fones,  48  Ark.  557, 
and  also  Buchan  v.  Sumner,  2  Barb.  Ch. 
165,  200,  for  an  exhaustive  review  of  the 
English  and  American  authorities  on  this 
point,  reaching  the  conclusion  stated  in 
the  text ;  Mowry  v.  Bradley,  11  R.  I.  370, 
372-   Hiscock   v.  Jaycox,   12   N.   Bankx 

253 


*  234,  *  235  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND   CURTESY.  §  HI 

is  no  power  to  sell  the  firm  real  estate  by  any  one  of  the  partners, 
except  for  the  payment  of  debts,  the  excess  realized  by  a  surviving 
partner  in  such  a  sale  over  the  necessary  amount,  although  distribu- 
table like  personal  property,  devolves  to  the  same  parties  who  would 
be  entitled  to  the  real  estate,  and  the  widow  of  a  deceased 
partner  takes  as  dowress.1     Distinctions  *  have  been  drawn  [*235] 
with  reference  to  the  nature  of  the  business  in  which  the 
firm  engaged,  allowing  dower  where  the  partners  were  buying  and 
selling  lands  on  speculation,2  or  determining  the  question  according 
to  the  agreement  or  stipulation  between  the  partners,8  and  holding 
that  in  the  absence  of  an  express  agreement  stipulating  that  lands 
acquired  by  the  partners  shall  be  applied  in  the  payment  of  partner- 
ship  debts ; 4  but   these   cases   are    in   conflict  with  the  current  of 
authorities,  and  of  no  weight.     So  it  has  been  held  in  Virginia,  con-  - 
trary  to  the  tenor  of  American  decisions  generally,  that  real  estate 
of  a  partnership  used  for  partnership  purposes  is,  in  equity,  personal 
property  for  all  purposes,  and  on  the  death  of  any  of  the  partners 
goes  to  his  personal  representative.5 

There  can  be  no  dower  in  the  estate  of  a  trustee,  although  he 
No  dower  in  holds  the  legal  seisin  and  estate,  because  the  trustee 
estate  of  a  has  no  beneficial  interest  in  the  trust;6  nor  was  dower 

allowed  in  England  before  the  Dower  Act 7  in  the  estate 
of  a  cestui  que  trust,  or  in  an  equity  of  redemption.8  In  the  United 
States  the  law  as  to  dower  in  equitable  estates  is  not  uniform. 
Seisin  of  the  legal  estate  is  required  in  Florida,9  Georgia,10  Maine,11 

Reg.  507,  517.     For   further   authorities  6  Hopkinson  v.  Dumas,  42  N.   H.  296, 

see  post,  §  126.  306;    Chestnut  v.  Chestnut,  15   111.  App. 

i  Foster's  Appeal,  74  Pa.  St.  391,  397.  442,  449  ;  King  v.  Bushnell,  121  111.  656. 

2  Markham  v.  Merrett,  7  How.  (Miss.)  '3&4  Wm.  rV.  c.  105. 
437,  445.  But  the  court  seemed  to  rest  8  See  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *160  et  seq., 
its  decision  on  the  ground  that  the  sales  showing  the  distinction  in  this  respect  be- 
were  made  rather  as  tenants  in  common  tween  the  right  of  curtesy  and  dower  in 
than  as  partners.  It  is  generally  held  equitable  estates,  and  a  brief  account  of 
that  where  realty  is  bought  by  a  firm  the  history  of  dower  in  equitable  estates, 
speculating  in  real  estate  as  a  business,  it  9  Laws,  1881,  p.  475,  §  1.  But  mort- 
is regarded  as  personalty  for  all  partner-  gages  are  held  not  to  be  present  convey- 
ship  purposes;  and  when  the  partnership  ances,  and  the  widow  has  her  dower  in 
affairs  have  been  fullv  settled,  then  only  the  mortgaged  premises,  except  as  to  the 
the  real  estate  resumes  its  legal  character-  mortgage  debt :  McMahon  v.  Russell,  17 
istics ;    and   even   then   it    has,   in    some  Fla.  698,  703. 

a  SB,    been    treated   as    personalty:    see         10  Code,   1882,   §   1763;  Bowen  v.  Col- 
post,  §   126   (last  note  of  §).  line,  15  Ga.  100;  Latham  v.  McLain,  64 

1  (ireene  v.   Greene,   1    Oh.  535,  542;  Ga.  320.     In  1884  dower  was  granted  in 

Hawley  v.  .lames,  5  Pai.  318,  454,  et  seq.;  lands  held  under  deed,  bond  for  title,  or 

Wheatley  v.  Calhoun,  12  Leigh,  264,272.  other  instrument,  where  a  portion  of  the 

4  Smith  v.  Jackson,  2  Edw.  Ch.  28,  35  ;  purchase-money  has  been  paid,  the  estate  in 

Bell  v.  I'hyn,  7  Ves.  453.  dower  being  liable  for  its  proportion  of  the 

•''   Pierce  P.  Trigg,  10  Leigh,  40f>,  422;  unpaid  purchase-money:  Code,  1895,  §4688. 
cited   approvingly    in    Parrish   v.  Parrish,         »  Rev.    St.    1883,  p.    812;    1    Scrib.  on. 

88  Va.  529,  532.  Dower,  414,  §  4. 
254 


§111 


ESTATE   NECESSARY   TO   SUPPORT   DOWER. 


*  235,  *  236 


Massachusetts,1   Michigan,2    New  Hampshire,3    Different rules 
[*236]  Oregon,4  Vermont,5  and  Wisconsin;  6  while  *an   as  to  equitable 

estate  of  inheritance,  legal  or  equitable,  is  e8tates- 
held  sufficient  in  Alabama,7  Arkansas,8  Connecticut,9  Delaware,10 
Illinois,11  Kentucky,12  Maryland,18  Missouri,14  New  Jersey,15  New 
York,16  North  Carolina,17  Ohio,18  Pennsylvania,19  Rhode  Island,20 
South  Carolina,21  Tennessee,22  Virginia,28  and  West  Virginia.24  But 
if  there  be  a  conveyance  by  the  husband  of  a  merely  equitable  estate 
during  the  coverture,  dower  is  generally  defeated  thereby,  whether 
the  conveyance  was  absolute,25  or  by  way  of  mortgage.26 


1  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  740,  §  3.  But  prop- 
erty held  under  a  defective  description  is 
subject  to  the  wife's  dower :  Hale  v. 
Munn,  4  Gray,  132,  136;  so  also  land 
recovered  in  an  action  for  specific  per- 
formance of  a  contract  of  sale :  Reed  v. 
Whitney,  7  Gray,  533,  537. 

2  How.  St.  1882,  §  5733;  May  v.  Rum- 
ney,  1  Mich.  1. 

8  Pub.  St.  1891,  p.  546;  Hopkinson  i>. 
Dumas,  42  N.  H.  296,  305. 

4  Whiteaker  v.  Vanschoiack,  5  Oreg. 
113,118. 

6  St.  Vt.  1894,  §  2528  ;  Dummerston  v. 
Newfane,  37  Vt.  9,  13.  But  the  widow 
has  dower  in  the  equity  of  redemption  of 
lands  mortgaged  by  her  husband :  §  2529. 

6  St.  1898,  §  2159,  p.  1583.  The  widow 
takes  dower  in  an  equity  of  redemption 
to  land  encumbered  before  coverture,  ex- 
cept as  against  the  mortgagee:  St.  1898, 
§  2162  ;  1  Scrib.  on  D.  414,  §  4. 

i  Code,  1896,  §  1504. 

8  Kirby  v.  Vantrece,  26  Ark.  368,  370. 

9  Pish  v.  Fish,  1  Conn.  559,  construing 
a  statute  substantially  the  same  as  the 
provision  in  Gen.  St.  1875,  p.  376,  §  1. 

10  But  only  in  intestate  estates :  Cor- 
nog  v.  Cornog,  3  Del.  Ch.  407,  415 ;  Gem- 
mill  v.  Richardson,  4  Del.  Ch.  599 ;  Bush 
v.  Bush,  5  Houst.  245,  264. 

U  Starr  &  C.  St.  1896,  p.  1457,  f  1  ; 
Sisk  v.  Smith,  6  111.  503,  513  ;  Nicoll  v. 
Todd,  70  111.  295. 

12  Harrow  v.  Johnson,  3  Mete.  (Ky.) 
578, 581  ;  Harrison  v.  Griffith,  4  Bush,  146, 
148.  The  language  of  the  statute  gives 
the  surviving  husband  or  wife  "  an  estate 
for  life  in  one-third  of  all  the  real  estate 
of  which  he  or  she  or  any  one  for  his  or 
her  use  was  seized  of  an  estate  in  fee 
simple  during  the  coverture."  &c.  :  St. 
1894,  §  2132. 


18  Publ.  Gen.  L.  1888,  ch.  45,  §  5. 

i*  Duke  v.  Brandt,  51  Mo.  221,  224; 
Hart  v.  Logan,  49  Mo.  47. 

16  Yeo  v.  Mercereau,  18  N.  J.  L.  387, 
390  ;  Cushing  v.  Blake,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  689, 
695  ;  Skellenger  v.  Skellenger,  32  N.  J. 
Eq.  659. 

16  2  Banks  &  B.  (1896,  9th  ed.)  p.  1814, 
§  1  ;  Hawley  v.  James,  5  Paige,  318,  452, 
et  seq. ;  hire  Ransom,  17  Fed.  R.  331,  333. 
The  widow  has  no  dower  in  lands  bought 
with  the  husband's  money,  but  not  con- 
veyed nor  agreed  to  be  conveyed  to  him  : 
Phelps  v.  Phelps,  143  N.  Y.  197. 

17  Code,  1883,  §  2102 ;  it  seems  the 
equitable  estate  must  be  such  as  a  court 
of  equity  can  enforce :  Efland  v.  Efland, 
96  N.  C.  488,  493. 

is  Rands  v.  Kendall,  15  Oh.  671  ;  fol- 
lowed in  Abbott  v.  Bosworth,  36  Oh.  St. 
605,  608;  Laws,  Oh.  1890,  §  4188. 

19  Shoemaker  v.  Walker,  2  S.  &  R.  554. 

20  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  922,  §  1  ;  1  Scrib. 
Dower,  421,  §  11. 

21  Bowman  v.  Bailey,  20  S.  C.  550, 
554 ;  Rev.  St.  1893,  §  1905.  But  the  hus- 
band must  have  been  in  a  position  to  de- 
mand the  legal  title,  it  seems :  Morgan  v. 
Smith,  25  S.  C.  337,  339. 

22  Code,  1884,  §  3244;  Martin  v.  Lin- 
coln, 4  Lea,  289. 

23  Code,  1887,  §  2267.  The  equitable 
estate  must  be  such  that  the  legal  estate 
might  have  been  decreed :  Rowton  v. 
Rowton,  1  Hen.  &  M.  91  ;  Wheatley  v. 
Calhoun,  12  Leigh,  264. 

24  Code,  1891,  ch.  65,  §  3. 

25  Hawley  v.  James,  5  Pai.  318,  453; 
Heed  v.  Ford,  16  B.  Mon.  114,  117  ;  Junk 
v.  Canon,  34  Pa.  St.  286  ;  Wheatley  v. 
Calhoun,  12  Leigh,  264,  274. 

26  Miller  v.  Stump,  3  Gill,  304,  310; 
Purdy   v.   Purdy,  3   Md.   Ch.    547,    550; 

255 


*  236,  *  237  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND   CURTESY. 


§111 


There  is,  at  common  law,  no  dower  in  mortgaged  estates,  be- 
No  dower  in  cause  there  is  no  seisin  in  the  husband,1  except  where 
dempTionat"  ^e  mortgage  is  f°r  years,  and  not  in  fee,  because  in 
common  law;  such  case  there  is  a  legal  reversion  to  which  it  attaches 
upon  redemption.2  In  the  United  States,  however,  the  wife  is 
but  otherwise  ^eld  dowable  of  equities  of  redemption  existing  at  the 
in  American       husband's  death,3  whether  the  estate  was  mortgaged  by 

the  husband  before,  or  by  the  husband  and 
wife  *  during  coverture ; 4  and  she  may  redeem  the  land  [*  237] 
from  existing  encumbrance  in  protection  of  her  right  to 
dower  therein,6  but  whether  she  can  require  the  personal  represen- 
tative to  apply  the  personalty  in  relief  of  encumbrances  for  the 
benefit  of  her  dower,  has  been  differently  held.6  The  release  of 
dower,  where  the  wife  joins  in  the  mortgage,  is  a  release  in  favor  of 
the  mortgagee  only,  and  only  to  the  extent  of  the  debt  secured  by 
the  mortgage ; 7  she  is  not  bound  by  the  covenants  in  the  deed, 8  and 
while  a  sale  of  the  mortgaged  premises  during  the  husband's  life- 
time is  in  some  States  allowed  to  defeat  the  wife's  inchoate  dower 


Glenn  v.  Clark,  53  Md.  580,  604 ;  Morse 
v.  Thorsell,  78  111.  600. 

1  Worsham  v.  Callison,  49  Mo.  206, 
207;  1  Scrib.  Dower,  463,  pi.  1. 

21  Scrib.  476,  pi.  21. 

3  4  Kent,  *  45 ;  Scribner  mentions 
twenty-eight  States  as  so  holding,  omit- 
ting only  California,  Colorado,  Delaware, 
Florida,  Louisiana,  Nebraska,  Nevada, 
New  Jersey,  Texas,  and  West  Virginia. 
In  Connecticut  the  widow  may  have  dower 
assigned  in  one  unencumbered  piece  of 
real  estate,  if  some  of  several  pieces  are 
encumbered  ;  and  if  some  are  encumbered 
beyond  their  value,  the  excess  is  not  to  be 
taken  out  of  the  values  of  the  other  pieces, 
but  such  pieces  are  to  be  disregarded  as  of 
no  value  :  Piatt's  Appeal,  56  Conn.  572. 
In  the  District  of  Columbia  a  widow  is 
not  dowable  of  an  equity  of  redemption  : 
In  re  Thompson,  6  Mackey,  536.  In  North 
Carolina,  when  the  lands  consist  of  several 
parcels  mortgaged  in  several  deeds  of 
trust,  dower  should  be  assigned  in  each 
piece  separately,  and  then  the  widow  can 
assert  against  each  creditor  the  right  to 
have  the  remaining  two-thirds  and  the 
reversion  in  the  one-third  covered  by  her 
dower  fir-t  subjected  to  the  payment  of 
the  mortgage  debt:  Askew  v.  Askew.  103 
N.  C.  285.     For  a  statement  of  the  law  in 

South   Carolina,  (I)  where  there  is  an  en- 

cnmbrance  on  the  land  at  the  time  of 

coverture,  and    a   judicial  sale  to  satisfy 
256 


such  encumbrance  during  coverture  ;  (2) 
where  the  land  before  and  during  cover- 
ture is  clear,  and  the  husband  put  a  mort- 
gage upon  it ;  (3)  where  the  wife  joins  in 
such  a  mortgage ;  (4)  where  the  land  is  sold 
under  such  mortgage;  and  (5)  where  a 
wife  renounces  dower  in  one  mortgage, 
and  there  are  other  mortgages,  under  all 
of  which  the  land  is  sold  during  coverture, 
see  Miller  v.  Farmers'  Bank,  27  S.  E.  (S. 
C.)  514. 

4  1  Washb.  E.  Prop.  bk.  1,  ch.  vii.  §  2, 
pi.  17;  1  Scrib.  467,  pi.  8  et  seg. ;  Turbe- 
ville  v.  Gibson,  5  Heisk.  565,  586,  602. 

5  Kissel  v.  Eaton,  64  Ind.  248,  249; 
McMahon  v.  Russell,  17  Fla.  698,  705, 
citing  numerous  authorities ;  4  Kent, 
*162;  1  Scrib.  481  et  seq.,  with  numerous 
authorities;  Kauffmanv.  Peacock,  115  111. 
212,  216;  Newhall  j;.  Lynn,  101  Mass. 
428,431. 

6  Hewitt  v.  Cox,  55  Ark.  225,  231, 
citing  cases  pro  and  con. 

'  Blain  v.  Harrison,  1 1  111.  384,  387 ; 
Smith  v.  Eustis,  7  Me.  41,  43;  Ridgway 
t>.  Masting,  23  Oh.  St.  294,  296;  unless 
otherwise  expressed  in  the  instrument  : 
Genobles  v.  West,  23  S.  C.  154,  168;  the 
wife  having  joi;  ed  in  a  deed  or  mortgage 
which  is  subsequently  avoided,  or  ceases 
to  operate,  she  is  restored  to  her  original 
position:  Hinchliffe  v.  Shea,  103  N.  Y. 
153. 

8  Carry  v.  Am.  M.  Co.,  107  Ala.  429. 


§  I'll  ESTATE   NECESSARY   TO   SUPPORT   DOWER.         *  237,  *  238 

by  treating  the  surplus  as  personal  property  to  which  dower  does  not 
attach,1  it  is  unquestioned,  even  in  the  States  so  holding,  that  she 
takes  dower  in  the  surplus  where  the  sale  takes  place  after  the  hus- 
band's death.2  A  sale  by  the  husband  of  the  equity  of  redemption, 
in  which  sale  the  wife  had  not  joined,  does  not  affect  her  right  to 
redeem.3 

The  lien  of  a  vendor  for  the  purchase-money  of  the  land  is  obvi- 
ously superior  to  the  dower  right  of  the  purchaser's  widow.4     The 
lien  is  good  against  her  whether  a  mortgage  has  been    Dower  as 
executed  to  secure   the  purchase-money  or  not,  and,  a   against  the 

•    •  •  it         vendor  s  lien 

fortiori,  whether   she   joined   therein   or   executed   the    for  unpaid  pur- 
same  under  circumstances   making   her  act  binding  or   chase-money. 
not.5     The  statute  of  Iowa  provides  that  the  vendor's  lien  shall  not 
be  recognized  after  a  conveyance  by  the  vendee,  unless  reserved  by 
conveyance  or  other  instrument  duly  recorded.     Under  this  statute 

it  was  held  that  a  contract  for  the   sale  by  the  vendee    is 
[*  238]  *  not  such  a  conveyance  as  will  defeat  the  vendor's  lien.6 

The  right  of  the  vendor,  however,   is  personal    -..,,. 

ln  ,..  ii-i       Vendor  s  hen 

to  him,  and  does  not  pass  to  his  assignee  by  the  simple   a  personal 
indorsement  of  the  note  to,  or  payment  of  the  debt  by,    sifnabieVv'in- 
a  third  person,  unless   the   lien   was   reserved  on   the    dorsementof 
face  of  the   deed;7  and,  if  lost   by  the  acceptance   of   note' 
independent  security,  can   only  be   revived  by  act  of  the  vendee.8 
The  widow  is  entitled  to  her  dower  in  the  land  after    widow  is  en- 
discharge  of  the  lien,  or  in  the  surplus  after  a  sale  to    fitled  .t0  dower 
enforce  it,  to  the  same  extent  as  in  any  other  equity  of   demption  from 
redemption ; 9  the  vendor's  title   is   a  mere   equity   to    vendor's  heu- 
charge  the  lands,  and,  until  enforced,  the  widow  is  entitled  to  pos- 
session, and   rents  and   profits.10     Where   a  widow,  possessed  of  a 
dower   interest   consummate,   purchases   the   reversionary   fee,  but 

1  But  in  some  cases  the  courts  have  ties ;  Boyd  v.  Martin,  9  Heisk.  382,  384 ; 
gone  so  far  as  to  protect  inchoate  dower  Birnie  v.  Main,  29  Ark.  591,  596;  Cocke 
in  the  surplus  ;  2  Jones  on  Mortgages,  §     v.  Bailey,  42  Miss.  81,  86. 

1694  and  authorities  ;  Matthews  v.  Duryee,         5  Wheeler  v.  Morris,  2  Bosw.  524,  535  ; 

4  Keyes,  525,  535,  relying  on  Mills  v.  Van  Glenn  v.  Clark,  53  Md.  580,  604 ;  George 

Voorhies,   20   N.    Y.   412;    De    Wolf  v.  v.  Cooper,  15  W.  Va.  666,  674;  Thomas 

Murphy,  11  R.  I.  630,  634;  Vreeland  v.  v.  Hanson,  44  Iowa,  651. 
Jacobus,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  231.  6  Noyes  v.  Kramer,  54  Iowa,  22,  25. 

2  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  bk.  1,  ch.  vii.  §  2,  7  Bowlin  v.  Pearson,  4  Baxt.  341,  343 
pi.  18  ;  Kauffman  v.  Peacock,  115  111.  212  ;  citing  Green  v.  Demoss,  10  Humph.  371 
Holden  v.  Dunn,  144  111.  413  ;  State  Bank  374  ;  linger  v.  Leiter,  32  Oh.  St.  210,  211 
v.  Hinton,  21  Oh.  St.  509,  515  ;  Chaffee  Calmes  v.  McCracken,  8  S.  C.  87,  98. 
v.  Franklin.,1 1  R.  I.  578  ;  Butler  v.  Smith,  8  Hollis  v.  Hollis,  4  Baxt.  524,  527 
20  Oreg.  126,  131.  Pettus  v.  McKinney,  74  Ala.  108,  113. 

3  McArthur  v.  Franklin,  15    Oh.  St.  9  Unger  v.  Leiter,  32  Oh.  St.  210,  212 
485,  491.  Hollis  v.  Hollis,  4  Baxt.  525  ;  Greenbaum 

*  It   is  uniformly   so  held  :    1    Scrib.     v.  Austrian,  70  111.  591. 
441,  §  44,  and  numerous  authorities;  lb.,        10  Flinn  v.  Barber,  64  Ala.  193,  196. 
p.  555,  §§  1  et  seq  ,  with  additional  authori- 

VOL.  I.  —  17  257 


*  238,  *  239  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND   CURTESY.  §111 

fails  to  pay  the  purchase-money,  it  is  obvious  that  the  vendor's  lien 
extends  only  to  the  interest  so  purchased.1 

It  is  to  be  remembered,  in  connection  with  the  subject  of  vendor's 
lien,  that  while  instantaneous  seisin,  accompanied  by  a  beneficial 
Instantaneous  interest  in  the  husband,  is  generally  held  to  be  suffi- 
^,Mn*  cient  to  confer  dower  upon  the  wife,2  yet  seisin  for  a 

seisin.  transitory  instant  only,  as  where  the  same   act  which 

gives  him  the  estate  also  conveys  it  out  of  him,  or  where  he  is  the 
mere  conduit  employed  to  pass  the  title  to  a  third  person,  does  not 
confer  the  right.8  It  is  to  this  principle  that  the  paramount  nature 
of  the  vendor's  title  is  sometimes  ascribed,  and  which  may  be  decisive 
of  the  dower  right  between  the  widow  and  a  person  claiming  title 
under  the  vendor's  lien.4 

*  An  outstanding  judgment  at  the  time  of  the  marriage,   [*  239] 
which  by  the  law  constitutes   a  lien  upon  the  land,   gives 
the  widow  a  similar  right  as  if  the  judgment  were  a  mortgage;  her 
Outstanding       claim   is   subject   to   such   lien,6   unless   the  judgment 
judgment.  happen  to  be  entered  upon  the  day  of  the  marriage,  in 

which  case  her  dower  takes  precedence.6 

It  has  been  held  that  dower  cannot  be  affected  by  a  mechanic's 
Mechanic's  lien,7  at  least  if  it  accrue  after  the  marriage  and  before 
lien-  the  death  of  the  employer; 8  but  in  Kentucky  the  widow 

was  required  to  remove  such  liens  before  her  dower  right  attached.9 

An  estate  for  years  created  by  the  husband  before  or  after  mar- 
Dower  in  riage,  whether,  if  after  marriage,  the  wife  join  therein 
rents.  0r  not,  is  no  impediment  to  her  dower;  she  takes,  in 
such  case,  dower  in  the  reversion  in  fee,  and  also  of  a  proportionate 
part  of  the  rents.10 

1  McCurdy  v.  Middleton,  82  Ala.  181,  lany,  87  Va.  444;  Rousch  v.  Miller,  39  W. 
138.  See  also  Pope  v.  Mead,  99  N.  Y.  Va.  638  ;  see  on  the  subject  of  dower  in 
201,  holding  the  converse.  lauds  exchanged,  ante,  p.  * 233. 

2  Douglass  v.  Dickson,  11    Rich.  417,  4  Smith   v.  McCarty,    119    Mass.  519, 
422;  Griggs  v.  Smith,  12  N.  J.  L.  22,  23;  citing  Webster  v.  Campbell,  1   Allen,  313, 
Stow  v.  Tifft,  15  Johns.  458,  462  ;  but  the  and  other  Massachusetts  cases. 
possession  of  land  under  a  parol  contract          6  Robbins  r.  Robbins,  8  Blackf.  174. 

of  purchase,   where  the  purchase-money,  c  Ingram  v.  Morris,  4  Harr.  111. 

though  tendered,  has  not  been  paid   n  the  7  Schaeffer  v.  Weed,  8  111.  511,  513; 

lifetime   of   the    husband,   constitutes    no  Gove   v.    Cather,  23  111.  634,    639;    Van 

seisin,   and  the   widow   is  not  dowable:  Vronker  v.  Eastman,  7  Met.  (Mass.)  157, 

Latham  v.  McLain,  64  Ga.  320,  322 ;  Lane  161  ;  [aege  v.  Bossieux,  15  Gratt.  83,  105  ; 

v.  Cniirtii.iv,  1    Heisk.  331.     Where,  how-  Bishop  v.  Boyle,  9  Ind.  169. 

ever,  the  huHband,  under  an  oral  contract,  8  I'ifer  v.  Ward,  8  Blackf.  252. 

tak<      possession   and  pays  the  purchase-  9  Nazareth   Institution  i;.  Lowe,  1   B. 

money,  be   is   the  equitable  owner,  and  Mon.  257. 

cannot,  by  causing  the  vendor  to  execute  '"  Herbert  v.  Wren,   7    Cranch,  370; 

a  deed   to  another,  deprive   his  wife  of  Williams  v.  Cox,  3  Edw.  Ch.  178;  Weir 

dower:  Everitt  v.  Everitt,  71  Iowa,  221.  v.  Humphries,  4  [red.  Eq.  264,273;  Boyd 

:;  Fontaine  v.  Boatmen's  Savings   In-  v.  Hunter,  44  Ala.  705,  719. 
Mtitution,  57  Mo.  :>:>2,  558;  Hurst  v,  Du 
258 


§  111  ESTATE   NECESSARY   TO    SUPPORT   DOWER.         *  239,  *  240 

There  is  a  conflict  of  decisions  on  the  question  whether  a  widow 
is  dowable  of  lands  taken  for  public  use  in  the  exercise  of  the 
right   of   eminent   domain.     Her   right   has   been   fre-    ~        .  , 

°  .  -11  n  t    •    ■  Dower  in  lands 

quently  denied,  on  the  ground  that  to  allow  a  division  taken  for  pub- 
of  the  property  so  taken  would  destroy  it  for  the  use  to  llc  use* 
which  it  has  been  appropriated,  and  that  private  interests  must  give 
way  to  public  convenience  and  necessity.1  But  neither  of  these 
reasons  seems  satisfactory,  because  private  property  should  not  be 
taken,  even  in  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  without 
compensation  to  those  who  are  injured  by  such  taking;  and  if  the 
assignment  of  dower  by  metes  and  bounds  would  be  destructive  of 
the  use  to  which  the  property  is  appropriated,  it  may  be  given  in 
money,  as  is  done  in  other  cases  in  which  there  can  be  no  assign- 
ment of  specific  lands.  These  considerations  are  strongly  insisted 
on  by  Reed,  J.,  in  a  case  of  this  kind  arising  in  New  Jersey,  where 

it  was  held  that  the  wife  was  a  proper  party  to  a  proceeding 
[*  240]  *  for  the  condemnation  of  the  husband's  land  to  public  use, 

because  she  was  interested  in  the  land  by  reason  of  her 
inchoate  dower.2  And  in  Massachusetts  it  is  held  that  if  land  be 
acquired  by  purchase  without  resort  to  the  power  of  eminent  domain, 
although  the  corporation  purchasing  might  have  had  recourse  to 
such  power,  the  dower  right  of  the  widow  follows  the  land,  with  all 
the  incidents  to  such  form  of  contract  between  parties.8  It  was  held 
in  Pennsylvania  that  a  borough,  having  in  the  exercise  of  eminent 
domain  condemned  land  in  which  a  widow's  dower  had  been 
assigned,  was  liable  to  the  widow  for  its  value,  although  full  com- 
pensation for  the  whole  value  of  the  land  had  been  made  in  a  pro- 
ceeding to  which  she  was  no  party.4  It  seems  to  result  from  the 
principles  underlying  the  question  that  the  widow,  whose  husband's 
property  is  taken,  with  or  without  his  consent,  for  public  use,  ought 
not  to  lose  her  dower  on  that  account.     Judge  Gantt,  in  formulating 

1  Venablei>.  Wabash  Railway,  112  Mo.  In  the  Matter  of  the  Central  Park  Exten- 

103,   Black,  J.,   dissenting;   Chouteau   v.  sion,  16  Abb.  Pr.  56,  68,  held  that  the  wid- 

Mo.  Pac.  R'y  Co..  122  Mo.  375,   Black,  ow's  right  was  transferred  from  the  land 

Ch.  J.,  and  Macfarlaue  and  Gantt,   JJ.,  to  the  money  received  therefor  ;  the  other, 

dissenting;  Baker  v.  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R'y  deciding  that,  as  between  a  wife  and  any 

Co.,  122  Mo.  396,  same  justices  again  dis-  other  than  the  State,  or  its  delegates  or 


senting;  French  v.  Lord,  69  Me.  537,  541 
Gwynne  v.  Cincinnati,  3  Oh.  24,  25 
Moore  v.  New  York,  4  Sandf.  456,  460 


agents  exercising  the  right  of  eminent 
domain,  an  inchoate  right  of  dower  in 
lands  is  such  an  interest   therein  as  will 


8.  c.  8  N.  Y.  1 10  ;  Duncan  v.  Terre  Haute,  be  protected,  and  for  which  the  widow  has 

85  Ind.  104,  106.  an  action,  modifying  Moore  v.  New  York 

2  Wheeler   v.  Kirtland,  27  N.  J.   Eq.  to   that   extent:    Simar   v.    Canaday,    53 

534,  536.     Judge  Reed  criticises  and  con-  N.    Y.  298,  304. 

dermis  the  doctrine  of  Moore  v.  New  York,  3  Nye  v.  Taunton  R.  R.  Co.,  113  Mass. 

and  Gwynne  v.  Cincinnati,  and  refers  to  277,  279. 

two  New  York  cases  in  which  the  same  4  York  v.  Welsh,  117  Pa.  St.  174. 
■was  repudiated  or  modified.    One  of  these, 

■  259- 


*  240,  *  241  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY. 


§111 


his  dissenting  opinion  in  the  case  of  Baker  v.  A.  T.  F.  &  S.  F.  R'y 
Co.,1  cites  a  number  of  cases  to  show  that  the  inchoate  right  of 
dower  is  a  valuable  right,  to  be  guarded  and  preserved  by  the  courts,2 
and  invokes  the  constitutional  inhibition  against  taking  or  disturb- 
ing private  property  without  just  compensation,  and  proceeds: 
"when  we  once  concede  that  the  inchoate  dower  is  a  valuable 
interest  in  the  land,  and  consider  that  the  common-law  idea,  that 
'the  public  shall  be  preferred  to  the  private'  is  opposed  to  the 
genius  of  our  institutions  and  the  spirit  of  our  constitution  ...  it 
is  very  hard  to  discover  a  reasonable  basis  for  the  rule  that  even 
condemnation  proceedings,  in  the  exercise  of  eminent  domain,  can 
divert  this  right  without  notice  or  compensation."3 

The  rule  at  common  law  giving  dower  in  all  lands  of  which  the 
husband  was  seised  during  coverture  implies  that  the  widow  is 
T?a  *  t  ■  a-      entitled  to  her  dower  in  all  such  lands,  although  they 

Effect  of  judi-  .  -i  -i    i         •     -i  •    •    -i  a 

cial  sale  during   had  been,  during  coverture,   sold  by  judicial   process, 
coverture.  rpj^  common  ]aw  has  been  modified,  in  this  respect,  by 

the  English   statute,5  and    in   several  of   the  American  States,  by 
statutes  giving  dower  in  the  lands  of  which  the  husband  died  seised 
or  possessed; 6  in  such  cases,  neither  a  voluntary  assignment  in  favor 
of  creditors,7  nor  the  title  passing  to  the  assignee  in  bank- 
ruptcy ,8  affects  the  wife's  dower.9    So  the  sale  of  a  *  hus-  [*  241] 

Kelso's  Appeal,  102  Pa.  St.  7,  9.  In 
Bryar's  Appeal,  111  Pa.  St.  81,  it  is  held 
that  a  purchaser  from  an  assignee  in 
bankruptcy,  subject  to  a  mortgage,  and 
who  afterwards  purchases  such  mortgage 
and  sells  under  a  judgment  recovered 
thereon,  becoming  himself  the  purchaser, 
takes  free  from  the  dower  claim  of  the 
bankrupt's  wife. 

8  Porter  v.  Lazear,  109  U.  S.  84,  86  ; 
Mattill  v.  Baas,  89  Ind.  220. 

9  In  Iowa,  however,  where  the  widow 
takes  one-third  of  all  the  real  estate  pos- 
sessed by  the  husband  at  any  time  during 
the  marriage,  which  lias  not  been  sold  on 
execution  or  other  judicial  sale,  not  re- 
linquished by  the  wife,  it  is  held  that  a 
sale  by  an  assignee  in  bankruptcy  of  the 
bankrupt's  land  is  a  judicial  sale,  and  bars 
the  widow's  claim:  Taylor  ?>.  Ilighberger, 
65  Iowa,  134 ;  Stidger  v.  Evans,  64  Iowa, 
91.  So  of  a  sale  in  partition,  although 
the  wife  is  not  made  a  party  :  Williams  v. 
Wescott,  77  Iowa,  ,132,  342.  In  Missouri 
the  wife  was  held  barred  of  her  dower  by 
a  partition  suit :  Hinds  v.  Stevens,  45  Mo. 
209  ;  but  not  by  a  suit  for  back  taxes, 
where  she  is  not  a  party :  Blevins  v. 
Smith,  104  Mo.  583. 


1  122  Mo.  396,  400.  Judge  Gantt  di- 
rects his  argument  principally  to  demon- 
strate, that  the  case  before  the  court,  as 
well  as  the  case  of  Chouteau  v.  Mo.  P. 
R'y  Co.,  supra,  is  not  distinguishable  from 
the  case  of  Nye  v.  Taunton  R.  R.,  113 
Mass.,  in  which  all  of  the  judges  present 
had  concurred.  But  he  proceeds  to  give 
his  reasons  why  the  exercise  of  the  power 
of  eminent  domain  ought  not  to  extin- 
guish dower. 

2  As  to  inchoate  dower  as  property, 
see  post,  §  112. 

3  lb.,  p.  421. 

4  Butler  v.  Fitzgerald,  43  Neb.  192, 
203,  citing  authorities. 

5  3  &  4  Wra,  rV.  c.  105. 

6  Ante,  §  106. 
"  Eberle  v.  Fisher,  13  Pa.  St.  526.     In 

Pennsylvania  the  rights  of  creditors  are 
paramount  to  the  dower  of  the  widow, 
and  the  bitter  is  barred  by  a  judicial  sale: 
Trunkey,  J.,  in  Lazear  v.  Porter,  87  Pa. 
St  513,  517;  but  this  principle  does  not 
imply   that   a   sale  of   real   estate    by   the 

e  <>f  an  insolvent  debtor  or  of  a 

bankrupt    shrill     bar    the     wife's    dower: 

'.:;/e.-ir  r.  Porter,  ntpra,  overruling  a  dic- 
tum in  Worcester  v.  Clark,  2  Grant,  84; 
260 


§112  INCHOATE   DOWER.  *  241,  *  2-12 

band's   interest  under  a  will,  the  wife  not  having   been   made   a 
party  to  the  proceeding,  does  not  debar  her  of  her  claim  to  dower 
in  the  lands  sold.1     In  Georgia  there  must  be  a  conveyance  by  the 
husband,  or  by  the  officer  of  the  law  under  a  judicial  sale,  to  bar  the 
wife  of  dower  in  any  land  owned  by  the  husband  during  coverture.2 
But  it  is  held  in  Arkansas  that  the  forfeiture  of  land  to 
the  State  for  the  non-payment  of  taxes,  and  sale  by  the    taxes.0'  ""^ 
State  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  for  redemption, 
extinguish  the  widow's  dower.8 

§  112.  Inchoate  Dower.  —  The  right  of  dower  before  its  consum- 
mation by  the  death  of  the  husband,  or  by  divorce,  is  not,  perhaps, 
capable  of  exact  and  comprehensive  definition  as  a  right 
of  property.  It  is  difficult  even  to  state  with  precision  a"we°*te 
its  nature  and  qualities.4  "Dower,"  says  Kent,5  "is  a 
title  inchoate  and  not  consummate  till  the  death  of  the  husband; 
but  it  is  an  interest  which  attaches  on  the  land  as  soon  as  there  is 
a  concurrence  of  marriage  and  seisin."  "But  still,"  says  a  Federal 
judge,6  "it  is  not  only  an  inchoate  right,  but  contingent.  It  depends 
upon  the  death  of  the  husband.  If  he  survive  his  wife,  she  has  no 
right  transmissible  to  her  heirs,  nor  during  the  life  of  her  husband 
can  she  give  it  any  form  of  property,  to  her  advantage.  ...  So 
long  as  the  husband  shall  live,  it  is  only  a  right  in  legal  contempla- 
tion, depending  upon  the  good  conduct  of  the  wife  and  the  death  of 
the  husband.  Until  the  death  of  the  husband,  the  right  —  if  it  may 
be  called  a  right  —  is  shadowy  and  fictitious,  and,  like  all  rights 
which  are  contingent,  may  never  become  vested."  Without  under- 
taking to  follow  this  question  into  its  intricate  niceties,  some  of  the 
prominent  principles  upon  which  the  adjudications  with  reference 
thereto  have  been  placed  will  here  be  mentioned. 

Although   dicta,    and  even  decisions,  are  by  no  means  wanting, 
which  question  and  deny  the  quality  of  an  estate  or  property 
[*  242]  in  *  dower  inchoate,7  yet  it  is  palpably  evident   As  a  right  of 

that  as  a  right  it  must  be  an  interest  in  land,  and   ProPertv- 
that  interest  is  property,  —  the  recognition  in  law  of  the  relation  of 
the  thing  to  the  person.6     This  is  recognized  in  the  provisions  con- 
tained in  the  statutes  of  some  of  the  States  securing  the  interest  of 
the  wife  in  case  of  sales  under  legal  proceedings  instituted  in  the 

1  Dingman  v.  Dingman,  39  Oh.  St.  172,  s.  c.  8  N.  Y.  110;  Johnston  v.  Vandyke, 
178.  6  McLean,  422;  Witthaus  v.  Schack,  105 

2  Hart  v.  McCollum,  28  Ga.  478,  481.  N.   Y.   332.      See  dissenting  opinion  of 

3  McWhirter  v.  Roberts,  40  Ark.  283,  Thomas,  J.,  in  Blevins  v.  Smith,  104  Mo. 
289.  583,  599 ;  Chouteau  v.  Mo.  P.  R.  R.  Co., 

4  2  Scrib.  on  Dower,  1  et  seq.  122  Mo.  375,  394,  and  authorities  cited. 

6  4  Kent  Comm.,  *  50.  That  dower,  before  it  is  assigned,  can- 

6  McLean,  J.,  in  Johnston  v.  Vandyke,  not  be  conveyed  by  the  widow  to  a  stranger, 
6  McLean,  422,  440.  will  appear,  post,  §  114. 

7  Moore  v.  New  York,  4  Sandf.  456;  «  Ante,  §§  1,  4,  6. 

261 


*242 


ESTATES    OF   DOWER   AND   CURTESY. 


§112 


lifetime  of  the  husband;1  and  so,  also,  means  are  pointed  out  to 
compute  the  value  of  inchoate  dower.2  The  value  of  such  dower 
right  is  also  recognized  as  a  sufficient  consideration  for  a  promissory- 
note,8  or  a  promise  to  pay  money,4  to  support  the  conveyance  to  the 
wife  of  other  lands  in  exchange  therefor;6  the  general  doctrine  is 
stated  to  be,  that  a  contract  between  husband  and  wife,  by  which 
she  receives  money  or  property  in  consideration  of  releasing  her 
contingent  right  of  dower,  will  be  sustained  in  equity.6  Courts  of 
equity  will  also  set  aside  and  declare  void  conveyances  by  the 
husband  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  dower;7  and  the  wife  may  in 
equity  maintain  an  action  to  cancel  a  deed,  as  forged,  which  pur- 
ports to  have  been  joined  in  by  her.8 

The  authorities  are  not  harmonious  on  the  question  whether 
inchoate  dower  is  subject  to  be  divested  or  modified  by  legislative 
As  affected  by  enactment.  In  many  cases  it  is  held  that  the  widow's 
afferhusband'a  right  t°  dower  is  governed  by  the  law  as  in  force  at  the 
title  vested.  time  of  the  husband's  death,9  which  involves  the  power 
of    modifying    the   right    as    it   existed   under    a    previous    law.1* 


1  Warford  v.  Noble,  9  Biss.  320 ;  Dwyer 
v.  Garlough,  31  Oh.  St.  158,  161 ;  Wester- 
field  v.  Kimmer,  82  Ind.  365,  368 ;  but  the 
act  converting  the  wife's  inchoate  dower 
into  a  vested  estate  upon  sale  to  satisfy 
a  mortgage  was  held  unconstitutional,  in 
so  far  as  it  affects  mortgages  executed 
before  its  passage  :  Helphenstiue  v.  Mere- 
dith, 84  Ind.  1. 

2  Jackson  v.  Edwards,  7  Pai.  386,  408 ; 
Bartlett  v.  Janeway,  4  Saudf.  Ch.  396, 
398;  DeWolf  v.  Murphy,  11  R.  I.  630, 
634 ;  Strayer  v.  Long,  86  Va.  557,  563  ; 
Mandel  v.  McClave,  46  Oh.  St.  407  ;  Gore 
v.  Townsend,  105  N.  C.  228.  Inchoate 
dower  being  a  substantial  right,  the  courts 
will,  in  proper  cases,  make  all  necessary 
orders  for  its  protection  :  Crosby  v.  Farm- 
ers' Bank,  107  Mo.  436. 

8  Nichols  v.  Nichols,  136  Mass.  256, 
258. 

*  Sykes  v.  Chad  wick,  18  Wall.  141. 

5  Quarles  v.  Lacey,  4  Munf.  251,  258  ; 
Bullard  v.  Briggs,7  Pick.  533,  538  ;  Bissell 
v.Taylor, 41  Mich.  702;  Singree  v.  Welch, 
32  Oh.  St.  320. 

6  2  Scrib.  on  D.  6, §  6,  and  authorities: 
Jones  v.  Fleming,  104  N.  Y.  418;  Strayer 
v.  Long,  so  Va.  557. 

7  This  subject  is  discussed  in  §  113. 

«  Clifford  v.    Bampfe,   147    N.  Y.  383. 

Bee,  ;l.m  holding  dower  inchoate  to  be  an 
appreciable  interest  recognized  in  law  as 
property  belonging  to  the  wife,  Bank  of 

262 


Commerce  v.  Owens,  31    Md.  320,  323  ; 
also  Unger  v.  Price,  9  Md.  552. 

9  Walker  v.  Deaver,  5  Mo.  App.  139, 
151;  Ware  v.  Owens,  42  Ala.  212,  215; 
Noel  v.  Ewing,  9  Ind.  37  ;  Lucas  v.  Sawyer, 
17  Iowa,  517,520;  Parker  v.  Small,  55 
Iowa,  732.  Where  the  husband  alienates 
the  property  without  a  relinquishment  by 
the  wife,  the  law  in  force  at  the  time  of 
alienation  governs  :  Peirce  v.  O'Brien,  29 
Fed.  Rep.  402,  even  if  dower  be  subse- 
quently and  before  the  husband's  death 
abolished,  and  an  "  enlarged  estate "  in 
the  realty  of  which  the  husband  died 
seised,  be  substituted :  Purcell  v.  Lang, 
97  Iowa,  610. 

10  Judge  Napton  in  the  case  of  Ken- 
nedy v.  Missouri  Ins.  Co.,  1 1  Mo.  204,  206, 
draws  the  distinction,  logical  enough  as 
far  as  it  goes,  between  the  rights  of  the 
widow  against  those  whose  interests  have 
accrued  simultaneously  with  hers,  in 
which  case  the  doctrine  is  held  applicable, 
and  her  rights  against  purchasers  and 
others  having  a  specific  lien  whose  rights 
must  be  determined  by  the  law  under 
which  they  originated.  This  case  is 
recognized  in  Thomas  v.  Hesse,  34  Mo. 
13,  24,  and  the  doctrine  established  is,  that 
the  right  of  dower,  before  its  consumma- 
tion by  the  husband's  death,  is  liable  to 
legislative  interference,  while  the  rights 
of  purchasers,  mortgagees,  and  others  in 
the  same  lands  are  protected  against  any 


§  112  INCHOATE   DOWER.  *  243,  *  244 

[*  243]  *  The  constitutionality  of  acts  destroying  inchoate  dower  in 
lands  appropriated  for  public  use  under  the  power  of  eminent 
domain  is  deduced  by  text-writers1  and  courts,2  from  the  nature  of 
dower,  as  a  positive  legislative  institution,  not  resulting  from  con- 
tract;8 and  under  this  view  it  has  been  decided,  in  numerous  cases, 
that  there  is  no  constitutional  provision  protecting  the  dower  right 
of  the  wife,  before  its  consummation  by  the  death  of  the  husband, 
from  legislative  control.4  In  a  New  York  case  the  trial  court  held 
that  the  widow's  dower,  assigned  to  her  by  metes  and  bounds  under 
a  law  subsequently,  but  during  the  lifetime  of  the  husband,  modi- 
fied by  an  act  subjecting  the  property  to  which  it  attached  to  sale 
for  the  payment  of  the  deceased  husband's  debts,  was  subject  to 
sale  under  this  act; 5  but  the  appellate  court  held  that  the  order  of 
sale  was  unjustified  where  the  dower  had  already  been  assigned,6  the 
judge  rendering  the  opinion  expressing  his  view  that  an  act  modify- 
ing the  rights  of  dower  has  no  application  where  marriage  and 
seisin  had  concurred  before  its  passage;  but  the  majority  of  the 
court  refused  to  pass  upon  the  constitutionality  of  the  retrospective 
provisions  of  such  act.7 

It  seems  to  be  the  general  impression  that  inchoate  dower  should 
be  recognized  as  a  right  entitled  to  the  same  protection  as  other 
property,  and  that  legislation  abolishing  dower,  or  materially  modi- 
fying it,  should  not  be  permitted  to  operate  retrospectively  in 
any  sense.8  Dicta  and  dissenting  opinions  to  this  effect 
[*244]  *are  often  met  with,  and  in  Missouri  it  was  at  one  time 
unhesitatingly  announced  that  the  legislature  has  no  power  to 
divest  inchoate  dower.     An  act  under  consideration  by  the  Supreme 

modification.     The    same    distinction    is  449, 455;  Randall  v.  Kreiger,  23  Wall.  137, 

recognized   in  other  cases;  for  instance,  148;  Guerin  v.  Moore,  25  Minn.  462,  464; 

Boyd  v.  Harrison,  36  Ala.  533,  538.     It  Morrison  v.  Rice,  35  Minn.  436 ;  Richards 

is  held,  also,  that  the  legislature  cannot  v.  Bellingham,  47  Fed.  R.  854,  affirmed 

affect  the  rights  of  existing  creditors  by  U.  S.  C.  C.  A.,  54  Fed.  R.  209 ;  Chouteau 

enlarging  the  widow's   right   of   dower:  v.  Pac.  R.  R.,  122  Mo.  375,  394  ;  Baker  v. 

Patton  v.  Asheville,  109  N.  C.  685.  R.  R.,  122  Mo.  396  ;  Bartlett  t\  Ball,  43 

1  2  Dillon's  Man.  Cor.  §  594.  S.  W.  R.  783. 

2  See  cases  cited,  §  111,  p.  *239,  and  6  Lawrence  v.  Miller,  1  Sandf.  516,548. 
infra.  6  Lawrence  v.  Miller,  2  N.  Y.  245^  253. 

8  The  pith  of  this  argument  is  stated  See  as  to  dower  consummate,  post,  §  115. 
to  be,  that  "  what  the   law  creates,  that  7  lb.,  p.  253. 

it  may  destroy":  2  Scrib.  on  Dower,  18,  8  2  Scrib.  on  Dower,  20,  §   18.     The 

§  14.  author  refers  to  Cord  on  Rights  of  Mar- 

4  Boyd  v.  Harrison,  36  Ala.  533,  537 ;  ried  Women,  265,  note ;  and  calls  attention 

Noel  v.  Ewiug,  9  Ind.  37,  43  ;  Strong  v.  to  the  significant  fact   that   the  English 

Clem,  12  Ind.  37,  40 ;  Moore  v.  Kent,  37  Dower  Act  (3  &  4  Wm.  IV.  c.  105)  makes 

Iowa,  20,  22,  citing  earlier  Iowa  cases ;  no   attempt,  even   under  the  exercise  of 

Barbour  v.  Barbour,  46  Me.  9,  14  ;  Merrill  Parliamentary   powers   not   restricted   by 

v.  Sherburne,   dictum  by  Woodbury,  J.,  constitutional  limitations,  to  interfere  with 

1  N.  H.  199,  214  ;  Weaver  v.  Gregg,  6  Oh.  existing  dower  rights. 
St.  547,  549;  Melizet's  Appeal,  17  Pa.  St. 

263 


*  244,  *  245  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND   CURTESY.  §  113 

Court  was  held  not  to  affect  such  right;  "and  if  it  did,"  adds  Sher- 
wood, J.,  rendering  the  opinion,  "it  would  violate  that  constitu- 
tional provision  which  forbids  that  any  one  be  deprived  of  property 
'  without  due  process  of  law, '  and  would  be  a  legislative  attempt  to 
take  the  property  of  one  person  and  bestow  it  upon  another."1  A 
case  in  Georgia,  also,  holds  that  the  wife  cannot  be  deprived  of  her 
inchoate  dower  by  an  act  of  the  legislature.2     So  in  Rhode  Island.8 

§  113.  Dower  as  affected  by  Acta  of  the  Husband.  —  It  is 
obvious  that  the  conveyance  of  any  property  before  the  marriage 
Alienation  be-  places  it  beyond  the  dower  right  of  a  subsequent  wife, 
fore  marriage,  because  it  is  not  owned  by  the  husband  during  coverture,4 
even  if  the  deed  to  property  so  conveyed  has  not  been  registered;6 
and  so  of  lands  exchanged  before  the  marriage,  or  conveyed  in  fee 
in  trust  to  uses  to  be  appointed  by  the  grantor,  although  the  appoint- 
ment be  made  after  the  marriage.6  Nor  is  the  wife  entitled  to 
dower  in  any  estate  which  was  subject  to  an  existing  claim  or  encum- 
brance against  the  husband,  either  at  law  or  in  equity,  at  the  time 
of  the  marriage,  although  the  conveyance  or  foreclosure  occurred 
subsequent  thereto,7  under  either  a  mortgage,  lease,  statute,  or 
recognizance  by  which  he  was  bound  in  good  faith  before  the  mar- 
riage.8 A  conveyance  made  on  the  day  of  the  marriage,  although  in 
point  of  time  before  the  same  took  place,  is  deemed  to  have 
been  made  during  coverture  and  will  *  not  deprive  the  wife  [*  245] 
of  her  dower.9     So,  if  a  conveyance  before  marriage  is  void, 

1  Williams  v.  Courtney,  77  Mo.  587,  levying  creditor,  and  took  a  release  to 
588,  approved  in  Burke  v.  Adams,  80  Mo.  himself  of  his  interest  in  the  premises,  it 
504,  515,  also  mentioned  in  Crosby  v.  was  held  that  the  levy  was  extinguished, 
Farmers'  Bank,  107  Mo.  436,  444  ;  but  the  debtor  became  seised,  aud  dower  at- 
disapproved  and  overruled  in  the  later  tached  to  his  widow :  Mayo  v.  Hamliu,  73 
cases  of  Chouteau  v.  R.  R.,  122  Mo.  375,  Me.  182. 

394  not  without  vigorous  protest:  see  the  8  Jackson  v.  Dewitt,  6  Cow.  316  ;  Rands 

strong  dissenting  opinion  of  Gantt,  J.,  in  v.  Kendall,  15  Ohio,  671,  678;  Sandford  v. 

Baker  v.  R.  11.,  122  Mo.  396,  p.  425.  McLean,  3  Paige,  117,  123 ;  Spiell  v.  Sloan, 

2  Rovston  v.  Royston,  21  Ga.  161,  172.  22  S.  C.  151.  The  general  rule  is  stated 
8  Talbot  v.  Talbot,  14  R.  I.  57.  to  be,  that  "the  wife's  dower  is  liable  to 
4  1  Scrib.  583,  §  1.  De  defeated  by  every  subsisting  claim  or 
•r'  Pratt  v.  Skolfield,  45   Me.  386,  389;  encumbrance  in  law  or  equity  existing  be- 

Blood  v.  Blood,  23  Pick.  80,  85.  f<->re  the  inception  of  the  title,  and  which 

*  Link    v     Edmonson     19    Mo.    487;  would  have  defeated  the  husband's  seisin": 

Whittled  v.   Mullery,   4   Cush.    138,  140;  4  Kent,  *  50. 

Baker  v.  Chase,  6  Hill,  482  ;  Tate  v.  Tate,  9  Stewart  v.  Stewart,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  48 ; 
1  Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  22,  28  ;  Gaines  v.  Gaines,  at  least  the  burden  of  proof  to  show  that 
9  B.  Mon.  295;  Firestone  v.  Firestone,  2  there  was  no  advantage  taken  of  the  con- 
Oh.  St.  415,  417.  fldential  relation  is  on  those  denying  her 
-  Gully  v  Ray,  is  B.  Mon.  107,  118;  right  to  dower:  Shea's  Appeal,  121  Pa. 
Brown  v.  Williams,  31  Me.  403,  406;  St.  302,  308.  So  a  judgment  entered  on 
Fontaine  V.  Dnnlap,  82  Ky.  321.  But  the  day  of  the  marriage  will  be  deemed 
where  a  levy  was  made  <>n  his  lands  prior  to  have  been  entered  during  coverture: 
to  his  marriage,  and  be  subsequently  con-  Ingram  v.  Morris,  4  Harr.  111.  A  con- 
veyed to  a  third  person,  who  paid  the  veyance  made  a  few  hours  before  the 
264 


§  113    DOWER  AS  AFFECTED  BY  ACTS  OF  HUSBAND.   *  245,  *  246 

or,  if  voidable,  it  is  avoided  during  coverture,  the  wife  is  of  course 
endowed.1 

A  conveyance  made  by  the  husband  on  the  eve  of  marriage,  for  the 
purpose   of  defrauding  his    intended   wife  of   her  dower  estate,    is 
void  as  to  her  right  against  the  grantee  or  purchaser   c 
from  him  with  notice;  and  she  may  recover  dower  in    in  fraud  of 
such  case  as  if  no  conveyance  had  been   made.2    And    dower- 
deeds  of  gift,  executed  before  but  not  delivered  until  after  the  mar- 
riage, are  no  impediment  to  the  right  of  dower  in  the  lands  therein 
conveyed.8     The  wife  may  protect  her  inchoate  dower  by  action  to 
set  aside  conveyances  in  fraud  of  her  dower;4  but  the  heirs  cannot 
have  it  set  aside,  because  it  is  no  fraud  against  them.5 

At  common  law,  and  in  those  of  the  States  in  which  the  widow 
is  entitled  to  dower  in  all  lands  of  which  the  husband  was  seised 
during  coverture,  the  husband,    self-evidently,  cannot   Alienation  dur- 
defeat  it  by  any  act  in  the  nature  of  an  alienation  or    ine  coverture. 
charge.6     As,  however,  a  recovery  by  judgment  against  a  husband  in 
a   real   action  defeats   the   wife's   dower,  the   husband    Collusive 
might  defraud  her  by  collusively  suffering  judgment  to   "^^"fh 
go   against    himself.     To    give    the   wife   an    efficient   husband, 
remedy  in  such  case,  the  Statute  of  Westminster  II.,  c.  4,  enacted 
that  where  the  husband  had  made  default  in  a  suit  against  him  for 
land,  the  wife  should  be  heard  to  demand  dower;  which  is  said  to 
be  but  a  recital  of  the  common  law :  "  For  the  common  law  ought  to 
be  intended  where  the  husband  had  right,  and  he  who  recovered  had 
no   right;  and  so  is  the  law  to   this   day  if   the   husband   lose  by 
default.     And  so  was  the  common  law  before  the  making  of  that 
statute ;  so  that  the  statute  is  but  the  affirmance  of  the  common  law 
on  this  point."7 

The  substance  of  this  statute  has  been  re-enacted  in  several 
[*  246]  *  States,  and  the  wife  is  protected  from  the  effects  of  collu- 
sive recovery  against  the  husband,  and  from  his  laches  in 
defending  against  improper  actions  on  general  principles  of  equity.8 

marriage  in  fulfilment  of  a  promise  based  McGrath,  70  Ala.  75,  82  ;  Jones  v.  Jones, 

on   a  valuable  consideration   given  long  64  Wis.  301. 

before,  was  held  not  to  be  fraudulent  as  3  Miller  v.  Stepper,  32  Mich.  194,  199. 

against  the  wife,  though  she  was  in  igno-  4  Babcock  v.  Babcock,  53  How.  Pr.  97, 

ranee  thereof  :  Champlin  v.  Champlin,  16  104. 

R-  I-  314.  6  Rowland  v.  Rowland,  2  Sneed,  543. 

1  1  Scrib.  on  Dower,  585,  §  7.  6  Grady  v.  McCorkle,  57  Mo.  172,  175. 

2  Cranson  v.  Cranson,  4  Mich.  230,  235 ;  1  Perk.  Prof.  Book,  §  376. 

Swaine  v.  Perine,  5  Johns.  Ch.  482,  489;  8  Gilson  v.  Hutchinson,  120  Mass.  27; 

Petty  v.  Petty,  4  B.  Mon.  215,  217  ;  Little-  Farrow  v.  Farrow,  1  Del.  Ch.  457  ;  1  Scrib. 

ton  v.  Littleton,  1  Dev.  &  B.  L.  327,  329;  on  Dower,  586,  §  15;  4  Kent,  48 ;  1  Hil- 

Rowland  v.  Rowland,  2  Sneed,  543,  545  ;  liard's  R.  Prop.,  2d  ed.,  147,  §  40;  see,  as 

Brooks  v.  McMeekin,  37  S.  C.  285 ;  Brown  to  conveyances  of  the  husband  in  fraud  of 

r.  Bronson,  35  Mich.  415,417;  Babcock  dower,  infra,  p.  *247. 
v.  Babcock,  53  How.  Pr.  97,  101 ;  Kelly  v. 

265 


*  246,  *247  ESTATES    OF   DOWER   AND   CURTESY.  §  113 

And  it  has  been  held  that  a  husband  cannot  deprive  his  wife  of 
dower  by  taking  a  conveyance  of  land,  purchased  with  his  own 
money  during  coverture,  to  himself  for  life,  with  remainder  to  his 
Dower  in  child.1     Although  the  wife  have  joined  in  a  mortgage 

eqmtv  of  re-       0£  the  husband's  lands,  her  dower  still  attaches  to  the 

demption  sold  _  .  ' 

on  execution,  equity  of  redemption  afterward  sold  under  an  execution 
against  the  husband.2 

The  weight  of  authority  seems  strongly  to  support  the  claim  of 
widows  to  dower  in  lands  conveyed  by  husband  and  wife  in  fraud  of 
Conveyances  creditors,  subsequently  avoided  by  them.8  "A  fraudu- 
Ir^!!^f  nt  lent  deed  set  aside  at  the  instance  of  creditors  cannot 
creditors.  bar  the  surviving  wife  of  dower  as  against  the  creditors 

or  purchasers  under  a  mere  decretal  sale."4  It  is  held,  also,  that 
where  the  husband  conveyed  the  property  to  his  wife  in  fee  in  fraud 
of  creditors,  such  conveyance  does  not,  on  being  set  aside  for  the 
fraud,  affect  her  dower  right,  because  there  can  be  no  merger  of  a 
less  estate  in  a  greater  where  the  latter  is  void.5  Nor  is  it  material 
that  the  wife  contracts  with  her  husband  to  relinquish  her  dower  in 
the  land,  in  consideration  of  receiving  whatever  residue  of  the  land 
there  might  be  after  satisfaction  of  the  debts  mentioned  in  the 
fraudulent  deed;  the  grant  of  the  inchoate  right  of  dower  falls  with 
the  deed,  and  the  wife  is  restored  to  her  former  rights.6  But  when 
the  widow  takes  dower,  not  as  at  common  law,  in  the  property  of 
which  the  husband  was  seised  during  coverture,  but  in  that  of 
which  he  was  seised  at  the  time  of  his  death,7  the  widow  is  not 
entitled  to  dower  in  land  fraudulently  conveyed  to  her  by  the 
husband,  and  after  his  death  set  aside  at  the  instance  of  his  credi- 
tors; because  at  the  time  of  his  death  he  was  not  seised,  and  the 
subsequent  avoidance  related  only  to  creditors,  leaving  the  convey- 
ance as  to  the  wife  in  full  force.8  Nor  is  the  wife  affected  by  the 
fraud  of  the  husband  in  consummating  his  contract  of  sale,  although 
she  unite  with  him  in  conveying  the  lands.9  So  where  the 
wife  joins  her  husband  in  a  deed  or  mortgage,  which  *  is,  [*  247] 
however,  defeated  by  a  sale  on  execution  for  a  prior  judg- 
ment, she  may  claim  her  dower.10    But  if  a  deed  is  not  entirely  void, 

i  Crecelius    v.    Horst,   11    Mo.    App.  Stowe  v.  Steele,  114  111.  382,  385;  Horton 

304.  v.  Kelly,  40  Minn.  193. 

2  Harrison  v.  Eldridge,  7  N.  J.  L.  392 ;  6  Humes  v.   Scruggs,  64  Ala.  40,  49  ; 

Barker   v.   Barker,   17   Mass.  5G4.     Ante,  Malloney  v.   Horan,    12  Abb.  Pr.  (n.  8.) 

p.  *  237.  289,  294  ;  s.  c.  49  N.  Y.  1 1 1 ,  1 1 9  ;  Wyman 

■  Binogez  v.  Perkins,  02  Wis.  499,  501.  v.  Fox,  59  Me.  100,  citing  earlier  Maine 

4    Dugan    V.    Mussoy,  G    Bush,   82,   83;  cases. 
Malloney  v.    Boran,  49  N.  Y.  Rep.   Ill,         e  Bohannan  v.  Combs,  97  Me.  446. 
119;  Richardson  v.  Wyman,  62  Me.  280,         7  See  ante,  §  106. 
2ft:t;   Lockett  v.  James,  8  Bush,  28,  30;         8  Bond  v.  Bond,  16  Lea,  306,  308. 
Robinson  V.  Bates,  8  Met.  (Mass.)  40,  43;  9  Wiswall  v.  Hall,  3  Pai.  313. 


io  Iliuchliffo  v.  Shea,  103  N.  Y.  153. 


266 


§  113    DOWER  AS  AFFECTED  BY  ACTS  OF  HUSBAND.   *  247,  *  248 

but  contains  some  element  or  clause  upon  which  it  becomes  opera- 
tive, although  fraudulent  and  void  in  other  respects,  the  relinquish- 
ment of  dower  will  be  enforced ; 1  and  in  New  Jersey  it  was  decided 
that  the  widow's  dower  is  barred  by  her  relinquishment  in  a  deed, 
although  it  be  set  aside  for  fraud.2 

Under  the  English  DoAver  Act,3  and  in  those  of  the  States  in 
which  the  widow  is  endowed  of  the  lands  of  which  her  husband 
died  seised  or  possessed,4  the  doctrine  that  the  husband  Conveyance  in 
cannot  defeat  his  wife's  dower  by  any  act  in  the  nature    v^„  ?Ld™er 

J         J  during  cover- 

of  an  alienation  or  charge  is,  of  course,  inapplicable,  ture. 
But  her  dower  rights  are  nevertheless  protected  against  the  hus- 
band's fraudulent  attempts  to  deprive  her  thereof  by  voluntary 
conveyance  or  collusive  charges  upon  his  lands  during  coverture. 
"The  notion,"  say  the  court  in  Thayer  v.  Thayer,5  "that  the  right 
of  the  wife  to  dower  in  the  husband's  lifetime  is  a  nonentity,  and 
not  susceptible  of  fraud  being  perpetrated  of  it,  is  unsatisfactory, 
and,  we  think,  unsound,  and  at  war  with  the  principles  of  justice. 
Though  the  right  may  be  inchoate,  it  should  be  protected  against 
the  mala  fide  acts  of  the  husband."  A  conveyance  without  valuable 
consideration,  with  the  intent  to  defeat  the  wife  of  her  dower,   is 

void,  and  will  be  set  aside ; 6  and  so  a  deed  to  a  stranger, 
[*  248]  although  he  paid  full  consideration,  if  he  knew  *  that  the 

intention  was  to  defeat  the  wife's  dower.7  In  Missouri, 
where  the  statute  gives  the  widow  the  right  of  election  between 
dower  as  at  common  law,  and  to  take  a  child's  part  of  the  property 

1  Cantrill  v.  Risk,  7  Bush,  158,  160,  in  predicated  upon  want  of  lawful  delivery; 
which  a  deed  was  held  void  as  to  the  McGee  v.  McGee,  4  Ired.  L.  105,  109, 
grantee,  but  operative  under  the  law  of  citing  Littleton  v.  Littleton,  1  Dev.  &  B. 
Kentucky  as  a  conveyance  in  favor  of  327,  and  Norwood  v.  Marrow,  4  Dev.  &  B. 
creditors  generally  ;  Manhattan  Co.  v.  442  ;  Killinger  v.  Reidenhauer,  6  Serg.  & 
Evertson,  6  Pai.  457,  465,  in  which  the  R.  531,  533;  McClurg  v.  Schwartz,  87  Pa. 
deed  contained  a  declaration  of  trust  St.  521,  524;  Vanleer  v.  Vauleer,  3  Tenn. 
which  constituted  a  lieu  upon  the  prem-  Ch.  23,  holding  that  the  facts  constituting 
ises.  the   fraud   must   be  set   out  in  the  bill ; 

2  Den  i'.  Johnson,  18  N.  J.  L.  87,  90;  Crecelius  v.  Horst,  11  Mo.  App.  304; 
the  New  York  case  of  Meyer  v.  Mohr,  to  Jiggitts  v.  Jiggitts,  40  Miss.  718,  721  ; 
the  same  effect,  in  19  Abb.  Pr.  299,  304,  Rabbitt  v.  Gaither,  67  Md.  94  (in  this  case 
was,  as  appears  from  the  case  of  Malloney  the  property  was  in  realty  bought  by  the 
v.  Horan,  supra,  disapproved.  See  also  husband,  but  taken  in  the  name  of  a  third 
Hinchliffe  v.  Shea,  103  N.  Y.  153,  155.  party  in  order  to  defraud  the  wife  of  her 

8  3  &  4  Wm.  IV.  c.  105.  dower).     Everitt  v.  Everitt,  71  Iowa,  221 

4  See  ante,  §  106,  as  to  the  States  in  (the  facts  being  similar  to  those  in   the 

which  the    common-law  rule  is  modified,  case  last  cited). 

The    term    "possessed,"    used    in    these  7  Brewer  v.  Connell,  11   Humph.  500. 

States,    is    synonymous   with    "  seised  "  :  This  decision  is  based  upon  the  provisions 

Stewart  v.  Stewart,  5  Conn.  317,  320.  of  the  statute  on  the  subject.     The  iuten- 

6  14  Vt.  107,  120.  tion  is  necessarily  presumed  from  knowl- 

6  Thayer   v.   Thayer,   supra ;   Ladd  v.  edge    that    the   wife's    rights   would    be 

Ladd,    14  Vt.    185,    192,   in   which   case,  defeated  by  the  conveyance:    Nichols  v. 

however,   the    invalidity   of  the   deed  is  Nichols,  61  Vt.  426,  431. 

267 


*  248,  *  249  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY.  §  114 

remaining  after  payment  of  debts,  it  was  held  that  such  election 
ratified  a  conveyance  to  a  daughter  of  land  purchased  with  the  hus- 
band's own  money,  but  in  which  he  took  only  a  life  interest,  causing 
the  remainder  to  be  deeded  to  his  daughter  by  a  former  wife,  for 
the  purpose  of  defrauding  his  wife  of  dower;  and  that  the  wife  was 
not  entitled  to  a  child's  part  in  such  land.1  The  disposition  of 
personal  property  (in  which  dower  is  given  by  statute  in  this  State) 
in  fraud  of  the  widow's  dower  therein  has  repeatedly  been  held  void 
as  to  the  widow.2 

§114.    The  Wife's  Relinquishment  of  Dower.  —  The  usual  method 
employed  at  common  law  to  bar  the  wife's  inchoate  dower  by  her 
Relinquish-        own  ac^'  was  by  levying  a  fine  or  suffering  a  recovery, 
ment  of  dower    These  are  abolished  by  statute  in  England,8  and  have 
}  rarely  been  resorted  to  in  the  United  States ; 4  the  cus- 

tom of  London,  effectually  barring  the  wife's  dower  by  means  of  a 
deed  of  bargain  and  sale  by  husband  and  wife,  properly  acknowl- 
edged by  the  wife  after  a  separate  examination  and  duly  proclaimed 
and  enrolled,  was  adopted  in  this  country  at  an  early  day.5  A 
conveyance  by  the  husband,  in  which  the  wife  joined,  is  held  suffi- 
cient, in  most  States,  to  carry  her  dower  without  a  relinquishment 
eo  nomine.6  A  pecuniary  consideration  moving  the  wife  is  not 
essential  to  bind  her.7 

*An  essential  requisite  of  the  release  or  relinquishment  [*249] 
by  the  wife  is,  in  some  of  the  States,  that  the  husband  and 

wife  must  join  in  the  deed.  An  indorsement  by  the 
wife  mustToin  w^e  uPon  the  husband's  deed,  written  several  months 
in  relinquish-  afterward,  "I  agree  in  the  above  conveyance,"  was  held 
not  to  relinquish  her  dower  in  the  premises  conveyed, 
for  two  reasons :  that  the  wife's  act  was  not  joined  in  by  the  hus- 
band, and  that  the  words  constituted  no  relinquishment  of  dowsr.* 
In  Iowa,  where  the  widow  takes  one-third  of  the  husband's  real 
estate  in  lieu  of  dower,  a  wife  who,  in  consideration  of  the  payment 

1  Crecelius  v.  Horst,  4  Mo.  App.  419.        13  ;  Jackson  v.  Gilchrist,  15  John.  89, 109  ; 

2  Ante,  §§  63,  92.  Moore  v.  Rake,  26  N.  J.  L.  574,  578 ;  Man- 
8  3  &  4  Wm.  IV.,  c.  74.                                Chester  v.  Hough,  5  Mas.  67,  68. 

4  Fines  and   recoveries  were  once  in  6  Learned  v.  Cutler,  18   Pick.  9,   11  ; 

force  in  some  of  the  States,  but  not  in  Gray  v.  McCune,  23   Pa.   St.   447,   450 ; 

others,  and  are  now  wholly  disused.     Re-  Gillilan  v.  Swift,  14  Hun,  574  ;  Meyer  v. 

eoveries   were  in   use    in    Massachusetts,  Gossett,  infra ;  Button  v.  Stuart,  41   Ark. 

but  not  fines.     They  were  both  in  use  in  101  ;    Johnson   v.   Parker,   51   Ark.  419 , 

Maryland,  but  never  in  Virginia.      Note  Smith  v.  Handy,  16  Oh.  191,  229;  Bute 

to  1  Wasbb.  R.  Prop.  *  199,  §  10,  referring  v.   Kneale,   109  111.    652    (since   the  stat- 

to  Stearns,  Real  Act.  11;  Chase's  Case,  1  ute  of   1869);    Witthaus  v.  Schack,  105 

Bland,  Cb.  206,  229.  N.  Y.  332. 

6  2  Scrib.   Dower,  2R6,  §  8;   Chase's  ~  McLane  v.  Piaggio,  24  Fla.  71,  81. 

Case,   1   Bland,  Cb.  200.  229;    Powell  v.  R  Hall   v.   Savage,  4    Mas.   273,   274; 

Monaon   Company,  8  Mas.  347,  851,  per  Shaw  v.  Rttss,  14  Me.  432,  434;  French 

Story,  J.j    Dare;  v.  Turner,   1   Dall.  11,  v.  Peters,  33  Me.  396,  408. 
268 


§  114  THE  wife's  relinquishment  of  dower.  *  249 

to  her  of  the  purchase-money  stipulated  in  a  deed  of  warranty 
executed  by  her  husband  in  which  she  had  not  joined,  orally  agreed 
that  she  would  never  make  any  claim  of  dower  in  the  land,  was 
held  estopped,  as  well  as  her  heirs,  from  claiming  dower  in  the 
land  against  the  vendee  and  his  grantees.1  But  this  decision  was 
based  upon  the  purely  equitable  doctrine  of  estoppel,  and  dissented 
from  by  one  of  the  judges  on  the  ground  that  inchoate  dower  cannot 
be  relinquished  by  parol.2  In  the  States  of  Arkansas,3  Delaware,4 
Illinois,6  Indiana,6  Kentucky,7  Maine,8  Massachusetts,9  Michigan, 
New  Jersey,10  Ohio,11  Pennsylvania,12  South  Carolina,  and  Virginia,13 
it  has  been  held  that  the  husband  is  required  to  join  in  the  wife's 
relinquishment  of  dower.  But  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  convey- 
ance should  be  simultaneously  executed  by  both,  or  even  on  the 
same  day;  it  is  sufficient  if  it  be  executed  by  her  before  it  is 
delivered,  although  it  had  before  been  executed  and 
acknowledged  by  the  husband.14  In  Alabama,  Florida,  relinquish 
Maine,15  Maryland,  Minnesota,  New  Hampshire,16  d)-gedeparate 
Oregon,  Rhode  Island,  and  Wisconsin,  the  relinquish- 
ment may  be  by  separate  deed.17  The  wife's  release  of  dower  by 
joining  in  the  husband's  deed  takes  effect  on  such  estate  only  as 
actually  passes  by  the  deed.18  It  is  held,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the 
release  conveys  no  estate,  nor  extinguishes  her  right  of  dower  for 
any  purpose  or  as  to  any  person  save  in  so  far  as  it  operates  as  an 
estoppel  against  the  releasor  in  favor  of  the  parties  and  privies 
thereto;19  but  on  the  other  hand  it  is  asserted  that  by  the  release 
her   dower  right   is   extinguished,  and   the  whole  estate,  released 

1  Dunlap  v.    Thomas,  69    Iowa,   358,  u  Williams  v.  Robson,  6  Oh.  St.  510, 
distinguishing  this  case  from  the  principle     515. 

applicable  to  cases  where  inchoate  dower         12  Ulp   v.  Campbell,   19   Pa.  St.  361, 

is  attempted  to  be  sold  independent  of  the  362. 

property  to  which  it  attaches,  as  announced  13  Sexton  v.  Pickering,  3  Rand.  468, 

in   McKee   v.    Reynolds,    26    Iowa,  578.  472. 

Where  mutual  deeds  pass  between   hus-         M  Langhorne  v.  Hobson,  4  Leigh,  224 ; 

band  and  wife  to  debar  her  dower  right,  Newell  v.  Anderson,  7   Oh.  St.  12  ;  Dun- 

which  are  held   void,  the  wife  is  notes-  das  v.  Hitchcock,  12  How.  256;  Ford  v. 

topped  to  claim  dower  by  any  act  during  Gregory,  10  B.  Mon.  175. 

coverture  tending  to  ratify  the    transac-  15  Rev.  St.  1883,  ch.  103,  §  6. 

tion ;  Shane  v.  McNeill,  76  Iowa,  459.  w  Shepherd  v.  Howard,  2  N.  H.  507. 

2  Dunlap  v.  Thomas,  supra,  p.  362.  "  2  Scrib.  Dower,  293,  §  19. 

8  Witter  v.  Biscoe,  13  Ark.  422,  430;  *8  Thus  where  prior  to  the  delivery  of 

Meyer  v.  Gossett,  38  Ark.  377,  380.  a  deed  attachments  ripen  into  a  levy  cov- 

4  Harris  v.  Burton,  4  Harr.  66,  67.  ering  part  of  the  land  described  therein, 

6  Osborn  v.  Horiue,  19  111.  124,  125.  the  release  of  dower  is  confined  to  the 

6  Scott   v.    Purcell,    7  Blackf.  66,  69 ;  land  actually  conveyed :  French  v.  Lord, 
Davis  v.  Bartholomew,  3  Ind.  485,  490.  69  Me.  537,  542. 

7  Applegate   v.    Gracy,   9   Dana,   215,  ™  Shobe  v.  Brinson,  148  Ind.  285,  288; 
217.  French  v.  Lord,  supra  ;  Kitzmiller  v.  Van 

8  French  v.  Peters,  33  Me.  396.  Rensselaer,  10  Oh.   St.  63  ;  Dearborn   v. 

9  Hall  v.  Savage,  4  Mas.  273.  Taylor,  18  N.  H.  153  ;  Blain  v.  Harrison, 
10  Dodge  v.  Aycrigg,  12  N.  J.  Eq.  82.         11  111.  384. 

269 


*  249,  *  250  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY.  £  114 

from  her  dower,  is  vested  in  the  grantee.1  In  Indiana,  where  in 
lieu  of  dower  the  widow  takes  absolutely  one-third  of  the  real  estate 
of  her  deceased  husband,  she  is  held  to  be  entitled  to  this  free  from 
all  demands  of  creditors  except  mortgages  in  which  she  has  joined; 
and  that  where  her  interest  in  the  husband's  real  estate  is  sold 
under  the  mortgage,  she  is  entitled  to  be  reimbursed  for  the  value 
of  her  share  therein  out  of  other  assets  of  the  estate,  real  or  personal, 
if  any,  in  preference  to  general  creditors.2 

*  It  has  been  held  in  Delaware 3  and  Vermont, 4  that  a  [*  250] 
married  woman  cannot  execute  a  valid  power  of  attorney 
Relinquishing  to  convey  lands,  even  in  connection  with  her  husband; 
by  attorney.  aild  in  Virginia,  that  a  deed  of  husband  and  wife,  exe- 
cuted under  a  power  of  attorney,  is  valid  as  to  the  husband,  though 
void  as  to  the  wife.5  In  Kentucky  a  non-resident  married  woman 
may  convey  by  agent  under  her  power  of  attorney,  though  not  a 
resident.6  In  Missouri,  where  the  statute  provides  that  the  wife 
may  relinquish  her  dower  by  joint  deed  with  the  husband,  and  that 
"a  married  woman  may  convey  her  real  estate,  or  relinquish  her 
dower  by  a  power  of  attorney  authorizing  its  conveyance,  executed 
and  acknowledged  by  her  jointly  with  her  husband,"  it  is  held  that  a 
power  of  attorney  executed  jointly  with  the  husband,  appointing  an 
attorney  to  join  with  her  husband  in  any  conveyance  the  husband 
may  make  of  his  real  estate,  and,  for  her,  to  execute  and  deliver  any 
such  conveyance,  and  to  relinquish  her  dower  in  any  real  estate  so 
conveyed,  is  sufficiently  in  compliance  with  the  statute,  and  a  deed 
made  by  such  attorney  in  pursuance  of  his  power  is  effectual  to  bar 
the  wife's  dower  in  the  land  conveyed.7  In  some  States  the  statute 
authorizes  the  wife  to  exercise  the  power  to  convey  by  attorney.8 

Where  a  seal   is   required   for   the  effective  conveyance  of  real 
_  ..      . .  estate,  the  relinquishment  of  dower  must  be  under  seal. 

Relinquish-  '  x 

ment  under  An  instrument,  though  otherwise  conforming  to  the 
8ea1-  law,  if  unsealed,  will   not  bar  dower.9     In  Alabama,10 

Iowa,11  and  Kentucky,12  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  real  estate 
may  be  conveyed  by  an  instrument  not  under  seal. 

The  mere  signing  and  sealing  of  the  deed  by  the  wife  without 

1  Elmendorf    v.    Lockwood,  57    N.   Y.  Indiana,  Iowa,  and  Minnesota,  such  was 
322,  Reynolds,  C,  dissenting.  the  law  before  dower  was  abolished  there. 

2  Bhobe    v.    Brinson,    148    Ind.    285,         u  Manning  o.  Laboree,   33    Me.   343; 
'  it ing  numerous  Indiana  cases.  Sargent  v.  Roberts,  34  Me.  135;  Giles  v. 

■'  Lewis  r.  Coxe,  5  Ilarr.  401.  Moore,  4  Gray,  600;  Walsh  v.  Kelly,  34 

4  Summer  v.  Conant,  10  Vt.  9,  19.  Pa.  St.  84;  Brown  v.  Starke,  3  Dana,  316; 

'•  Shanks    v.    Lancaster,  5    Gratt.    110,  Mitchell  v.  Farrish,  69  Md.  235,  241. 

118.  10  Shelton  r.  Armor,  13  Ala.  647. 

•  Qen.  St.  1887,  cli.  24,  §  36,  u  Piersou  v.   Armstrong,   1   Iowa,  282, 

7  I).-  Bat  v.  Priest,  6  Mo,  App.  531.         293. 

8  s-,  in    Ohio,    Pennsylvania,    Kb. -de        12  Gen.  St.  1887,  ch.  22,  §  2. 
A,  and   probably   other   stales;    in 

270 


§  114  THE  wipe's  relinquishment  op  dower.    *  250,  *  251 

words  constituting  a  grant  or  release  contained  therein  is  ineffectual 
to  bar   her  right;1  nor  can  the  omission   be  aided   by    Iut    tioil  t0  re_ 

the  certificate  of   acknowledgment.2     The  wife    linquishmust 
[*251]  is  *not  concluded  by  the  contents  of  a  deed    be  mdlcated' 

signed  by  her  in  blank,   if  filled  up  differently  from  what 
was  intended  when  she  signed  it,  but   may  show  the  fraud,   even 
against    an    innocent    grantee,     in    protection   of    her    butnotechni- 
inchoate  dower.8     But  the  release  is  not  required  to  be    cai  form  is 
in  technical  form ;  any  apt  words  indicating  her  inten- 
tion to  grant,  or  relinquish,  or  release  her  interest  in  the  land,  will 
bar  her  dower.4 

The  preponderance  of  authority  seems  to  hold  the  relinquishment 
of  dower  by  an  infant  feme  covert  wholly  ineffectual  to  divest  her 
right.5     No   act   of   disaffirmance    is   necessary  on  the 

o  •pip  •  i  ■ ,     r  •         i         Relinquish- 

part  Of  the  wife  before  bringing  her  suit;"  nor  is  she    mem  by  in- 
required  to  refund  to  the  purchaser  any  part  of  the  pur-    fant  Wlfe- 
chase-money   paid   by   him   for  the   premises    in   which    dower   is 
claimed.7 

In  the  absence  of  statutory  regulations  no  power  exists  whereby 
the  dower  of  an  insane  wife  can  be  divested,  or  in  any  manner 
impaired.     In  some  of  the  States  provision  is  made  for 

.        , .  ,.  ni-iiTi  r>T  Rehnquish- 

the  disencumbering  of  the  husband  s  estate  of  the  con-  ment  by  an 
tingent  dower  of  his  wife  where  the  latter  is  insane,  insaaewife- 
and  therefore  incompetent  to  act  in  her  own  behalf.8  In  Alabama,9 
in  a  case  in  which  it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  that  the 
appointment  of  a  guardian  to  an  insane  wife  was  void  for  the  want 
of  notice  to  her,  the  judge  delivering  the  opinion  remarked,  "  And 
were  it  otherwise,  I  apprehend  the  guardian  of  a  lunatic  wife 
can  have  no  authority  to  relinquish  her  dower  in  the  real  estate 
of  her  husband."  In  Illinois  it  is  held  that  a  court  of  equity  can- 
not  interfere  to  deprive  an  insane  married  woman  of  dower.10     In 

1  Lothrop  v.  Foster,  51  Me.  367,  369;  same  effect  as  if  she  were  of  full  age: 
Lufkin  v.  Curtis,  13  Mass.  223;  Powell  p.  187);  see  authorities  cited  in  2  Scrib. 
v.   Monson  Company,  3   Mas.   347,  349;     on  Dower,  301,  §§  31,  32. 

McFarland  v.  Febigers,  7  Oh.  194;  Agri-  6  Priest  v.  Cummings,  20  Wend.  338; 

cultural  Bank  v.  Rice,  4  How.  225,  241.  Hughes   v.    Watson,    10    Oh.     127,    134; 

2  Davis  v.  Bartholomew,  3  Ind.  485.  Sandford  v.  McLean,  3  Pai.  117  ;  Thomas 
8  Conover  v.   Porter,  14  Oh.  St.  450,  v.  Gammel,  6  Leigh,  9. 

453.  7  Shaw  v.  Boyd,  5  S.  &  E.  309  ;  Mark- 

4  Stearns  v.  Swift,   8  Pick.  532,  535  ;  ham  v.  Merritt,  7  How.  (Miss.)  437. 

Frost  v.  Deering,  21  Me.  156,  159;  Usher  8  So  in  the  States  of  Iowa,  Kentucky, 

v.  Richardson,  29  Me.  415,  416;  Gillilan  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Missouri,  Ohio, 

v.  Swift,   14  Hun,  574 ;    Edwards  v.  Sul-  Virginia  (see  as  to  the  necessity  of  mak- 

livan,  20  Iowa,  502.  ing  the  insane  wife  a  party  to  the  pro- 

6  Adams  v.  Palmer,  51  Me.  480,  486  ;  ceeding  in  Virginia,  Hess  v.  Gale,  93  Va. 

Applegate    v.  Conner,    93  Ind.  185  (but  467),  and  Wisconsin, 

under  the  statute  of  this  State  an  infant  9  Eslava  v.  Lepretre,  21  Ala.  504,  529. 

wife   may  now  join  her  husband  in  the  10  Ex  parte  McElwain,  29  111.  442. 
conveyance  of  his    real    estate  with    the 

271 


**  251-253  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY.  §  114 

..    .         Missouri  there    can  be    no    relinquishment   of 

dv  wife  of 

an  insane  dower  by  the  wife  of  an  insane  person,  *  because  [*  252] 

husband.  under  the  statute  dower  can  be  relinquished  only 

by  joint  deed,  etc.,  and  the  deed  of  an  insane  person  can  have  no 
validity.1  The  subject  of  dower  as  affected  by  the  insanity  of  the 
husband  or  wife  is  more  fully  considered  in  connection  with  the 
disability  of  insane  persons.2 

Under  the  statute  de  modo  levandi  fines,*  it  was  required,  if  a 
married  woman  was  made  party  to  a  fine,  that  she  should  first  be 
Separate  ex-  examined  by  four  justices  of  the  bench  or  in  eyre  to 
*&noi1i°edg-nd  ascertain  her  consent;  and  when  conveyance  by  deed 
ment.  was  substituted  instead,4  an  acknowledgment  on  a  sepa- 

rate examination  of  the  married  woman  was  required.  This  rule  is 
adopted  in  most  of  the  States  of  the  Union,  and  unless  the  execution 
of  the  deed,  as  her  voluntary  act,  be  acknowledged  by  her  upon  an 
examination  separate  and  apart  from  her  husband,  it  will,  as  to  her, 
be  absolutely  void.  The  States  of  Connecticut,  Indiana,  Iowa, 
Kansas,  Maine,  Maryland,  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Minnesota, 
New  Hampshire,  Oregon,  and  Wisconsin  are  mentioned  by  Scribner 
as  not  requiring  such  separate  examination  and  acknowledgment;6 
but  in  some  of  these  States  dower  has  been  abolished  (for  instance, 
Indiana,  Iowa,  and  Kansas),  and  in  many  of  the  other  States 
mentioned  as  retaining  the  common-law  rule,  acknowledgment  by 
the  wife  is  not  required  to  be  separate  from  the  husband. 

The  magistrate  or  officer  taking  the  wife's  renunciation  of  dower 
must  be  disinterested ; 6  but  the  fact  that  he  is  related  to  the  parties 
Statutory  re-  does  not  render  him  incompetent.7  The  relinquish- 
must'be"'8  ment  must  be  taken  by  and  acknowledged  before  an 
observed.  officer  authorized  thereto  by  the  statute,  and  within  the 

territory  of  his  jurisdiction;8  the  wife  must  be  acquainted  with  the 
contents  of  the  deed,9  and  the  officer's  certificate  must  affirmatively 
show  that  all  the   requirements    of  the   statute   have  been 
complied  with.10     The   decisions  on   this   point   *  are   very  [*253] 
numerous,  and  depend  upon  the  local  statutes.     In   all   of 

1  Hence,    where    a    married     woman  6  Withers  v.  Baird,  7  Watts,  227,  228  ; 

joined  the    guardian  of    her  insane   hus-  Seanlan  v.  Turner,  1  Bai.  L.  421,  424. 

band   in    a  deed,  she    relinquishing    her  7  Lynch  v.   Livingston,  6  N.  Y.  422, 

dower,  and  her  hiishand  and  the  guardian  433. 

conveying  the    husband's   real   estate,  is  8  Share  v.   Andersen,  7  Serg.  &  R.  43, 

not  estopped   from  claiming  her  dower,  63. 

either  at  law  or  in  equity:    Rannells  v.  9  Raverty  v.  Fridge,  3  McLean,  230. 

Gerner,  80   Mo.  474,  478,  reversing  8.  c.  10  Corporation   v.    Hammond,   1    Harr. 

9  Mo.  App.  506.  &  J.  580,  588  ;  Jourdan  v.  Jonrdan,  9  S.  & 

-  Sic  ^oerner  on  Guardianship,  §  149.  R.  268  ;  Howell  v.   Ashmore,  22  N.  J.  L. 

8  St.  18  Edw.  I.  c.  4.  261,  264;    Churchill   v.  Monroe,    1    R.   I. 

*   liv  St.  .1  &  4  Win.  TV.  c.  74.  209;    Hairston  v.   Randolphs,   12   Leigh, 

»  2  Bcrib,  on  Dower,  322,  §  2,  and  au-  445.                        * 

thoritics. 

272 


§115 


DOWER   CONSUMMATE   BEFORE   ASSIGNMENT. 


253 


them,  however,  a  compliance  with  the  statute,  at  least  substantially, 
is  required  to  be  set  forth  in  the  certificate  of  the  officer.  The 
sufficiency  of  the  acknowledgment  is  to  be  determined  solely  by 
what  appears  upon  the  face  of  the  certificate,  and  cannot  be  aided 
by  aliunde  evidence.1  But  the  certificate  is  not  conclusive  upon  the 
wife ;  she  may  contest  its  validity,  and  the  force  and  effect  of  the 
formal  proof.2 

The  wife   cannot  release  her   inchoate  dower  to  any  person  but 
the  one  who  is  entitled  to  the  lands  to  which  it  attaches ; 3  nor,  at 
common  law,  to  her  husband,4  although  it  is  now  recog-    Cannot  release 
nized  in  equity  that  a  valid   agreement  may  be  made    n°0rts0t™e1rger' 
between  husband  and  wife  for  separation  and  the  wife's    husband. 
support,5  according  to  which  she  may  relinquish  her  inchoate  dower.6 

§  115.  Dower  Consummate  before  Assignment.  —  The  dissolu- 
tion of  the  marriage  by  the  death  of  the  husband,  and  in  some  in- 
stances his  conviction  of  bigamy,7  sentence  to  imprison-  Consummation 
ment   for   life,8  divorce   a  vinculo,9  or  judicial   sale,10   ofdower- 


1  2  Scrib.  on  Dower,  364,  §  45,  and 
authorities. 

2  Per  Walker,  J.,  in  Eyster  v.  Hathe- 
way,  50  111.  521,  524;  Marsh  v.  Mitchell, 
26  N.  J.  Eq.  497,  499;  Johnson  v.  Van 
Velsor,  43  Mich.  208,  219. 

8  Reiff  v.  Horst,  55  Md.  42,  47  ;  Ches- 
nut  v.  Chesnut,  15  111.  App.  442,  446; 
Chicago  Dock  Co.  v.  Kinzie,  49  111.  289, 
293;  Pixley  v.  Bennett,  11  Mass.  298; 
Harriman  v.  Gray,  49  Me.  537  ;  Witthaus 
v.  Schack,  105  N.  Y.  332,  337;  Dunlap  v. 
Thomas,  69  Iowa,  358,  361.  "Dower 
may  be  released  to  the  owner  of  the  fee 
or  to  any  one  in  privity  with  the  fee,  under 
the  same  title  as  to  a  warrantor  in  the 
chain  of  title,  who  may  receive  the  release 
in  discharge  of  his  covenant  of  warranty 
and  for  the  benefit  of  his  grantee,  however 
remote  "  :  Hull  v.  Glover,  126  111.  122, 136. 

4  On  the  ground  of  her  disability  and 
the  presumption  that  she  is  sub  potestati 
viri :  McGill,  Ch.,  in  Ireland  v.  Ireland, 
12  Atl.  R.  (N.  J.)  184,  185  ;  In  re  Rausch, 
35  Minn.  291. 

6  Carson  v.  Murray,  3  Pai.  483,  501. 

6  Ireland  v.  Ireland,  supra ;  Jones  v. 
Fleming,  104  N.  Y.  418,  427.  See  as  to 
effect  of  agreement,  ante,  §  112. 

7  Hinck.  Test.  L.,  §  1952. 

8  Scribner  deduces  this  from  the  lan- 
guage of  the  statute  of  Michigan  (Comp. 
L.  1857,  p.  954,  §  5) :  "  When  either  party 
shall  be  sentenced  to  imprisonment   for 

VOL.  i.  —  18 


life,  .  .  .  the  marriage  shall  be  thereby 
absolutely  dissolved  without  any  decree 
of  divorce  or  other  legal  process."  In 
Howell's  Ann.  St.,  §  6240  (1882),  the  fol- 
lowing language  is  used :  "  When  the 
husband  shall  be  sentenced  to  imprison- 
ment for  life,  .  .  .  the  wife  shall  be  en- 
titled to  the  immediate  possession  of  all 
her  real  estate,  in  like  manner  as  if  he 
were  dead,"  —  which  would  justify  the 
conclusion  a  fortiori. 

9  See  ante,  §  109.  In  the  following 
States  the  widow  is  entitled  to  dower  on 
divorce  for  the  adultery,  sentence  to  im- 
prisonment, or  other  misconduct  of  the 
husband,  as  if  such  husband  were  dead : 
Indiana,  Maine,  Massachusetts,  Michigan, 
Minnesota,  Nevada,  Oregon,  and  Ver- 
mont. In  some  of  the  States  the  right  of 
dower  is  referred  to  the  court  trying  the 
action ;  in  others  the  wife  is  entitled  on 
decree  of  divorce  to  all  her  lands,  tene- 
ments, and  hereditaments.  See  note  to 
I  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *258.  Divorce  for 
"  extreme  cruelty "  by  the  husband  is, 
within  the  contemplation  of  the  Michigan 
statute,  a  ground  entitling  the  wife  to 
dower:  Rea  v.  Rea,  63  Mich.  257,  hold- 
ing, also,  that  the  right  of  a  divorced  wife 
to  dower  must  be  governed  as  far  as  prac- 
ticable by  the  same  rules  as  if  the  husband 
were  dead. 

10  Lawson  v.  DeBolt,  78  Ind.  563,  565. 
By  the  statutes  of  Indiana  (Rev.  St.  1881, 
273 


*254 


ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY. 


§115 


lex  loci  ret 
sitce. 


operates  to  *  consummate  and  perfect  the  incipient  or  [*  254] 
inchoate  right  of  dower,  converting  it  into  a  vested  estate 
which  the  widow  may  enter  upon  and  enjoy.  This  right  is  obviously 
Governed  by  governed  by  the  law  of  the  State  in  which  the  property 
is  situated,1  and  cannot  be  affected  by  any  legislation 
subsequent   to  such  consummation,   whether  there  has 

Not  affected  by    •■  •  ,  i.  a      t>    *      i.      t.  ... 

subsequent  been  an  assignment  or  not.  But  she  has  no  seism  in 
legislation.  iaw>  nor  right  of  entry  or  ownership  over  the  lands  to 
which  her  right  attaches,  until  the  ministerial  act  of  assigning  to 
her  in  severalty  the  proportion  to  which  she  may  be  entitled;  hence 
No  freehold  s^e  *s  sa*^  ^°  Bave  no  freehold  interest  in  the  lands  of 
before  assign-  her  husband  before  assignment  of  dower,8  and  can 
neither  herself  maintain  or  defend  ejectment  against 
the  heirs,  nor  join  the  heirs  in  an  action  of  ejectment  against 
others,4  unless  such  action  be  authorized  by  statute.5  It  follows 
that  until  assignment  the  dower  right  of  a  widow  cannot  be  levied 
Not  subject  to  on>  garnished,  or  sold  under  execution  against  her  or  a 
garnishment  or  subsequent  husband;6  and  that  she  has  no  interest 
before  assign-  therein  which  is  capable  of  assignment  to  another,7 
ment.  unless   the  statute   confers  upon  it  the  character  of  a 

freehold  estate.8     But  she   may  relinquish,  as  in  case  of  inchoate 

§  2508)  the  wife's  inchoate  right  to  the  tended  to  her  grantee :  Galbraith  v.  Flem- 

real  estate  of  her  husband  becomes  abso-  ing,  60  Mich.  408. 

lute  upon  a  judicial  sale  thereof,  vesting  6  Payne   v.   Becker,  22   Hun,  28,  31  ; 

the  husband's  title  in  the  purchaser.     A  Rausch    v.   Moore,   48   Iowa,    611,    614; 

voluntary  assignment   for  the  benefit  of  Harper  v.  Clayton,  84  Md.  346,  and  cases 

creditors   has   not  such   effect :    Hall    v.  cited ;  Hayden  v.  Weser,  1  Mackey,  457. 

Harrell,  92  Ind.  408;    the   title  vests  in  Aikman  v.  Harsell,  98  N.   Y.   186,    191; 


the  wife  on  the  execution  of  the  sheriff's 
deed  to  the  purchaser :  Shelton  v.  Shelton, 
94  Ind. 113. 

1  Apperson  v.  Bolton,  29  Ark.  418,  426 ; 
Mitchell  v.  Word,  60  Ga.  525,  531. 

2  Ante,  §  112. 


Moore  v.  Harris,  91  Mo.  616,  622.  In 
Missouri  the  statute  now  provides  that 
the  widow  may  assign  or  transfer  her 
unassigned  dower:  R,  S.  1889,  §  4514; 
but  this  does  not  permit  its  being  vendible 
on    execution    against     her :     Young    v. 


3  Croade   v.    Ingraham,   13   Pick.   33;     Thrasher,  61  Mo.  App.  413. 


Hilleary  v.  Hilleary,  26  Md.  274,  289; 
Reynolds  v.  McCurry,  100  111.  356,  360; 
Rayner  v.  Lee,  20  Mich.  384;  Smith  v. 
Shaw,  150  Mass.  297;  Agan  v.  Shannon, 
lo.'i  Mo.  661,  671.  Not  even  her  quaran- 
tine :  Bleecker  v.  Hennion,  23  N.  J.  Eq. 
123.  But  see  post,  §  116,  as  to  her 
quarantine. 

1  Pringle  v.  Oaw,  5  S.  &  R.  536  ;  Coles 
v.  Coles,  15  Johns,  819,  822;  McCammon 
v.  Detroit,  &<•.,  60  Mich.  442. 

>•  Yates u.  Paddock,  10  Wend.  528,531  ; 
Den  o.  Dodd,  6  N.  J.  L.  367;  Ackerman 
,-.  Staelp,  8  N.  J.  L.  125,  129.  It  is  held 
in  Michigan  thai  her  statutory  right  of 
action  before  assignment  cannot  be  ex- 


Jacks  v.  Dyer,  31  Ark.  334,  337; 
La  Framboise  v.  Grow,  56  111.  197  ;  Jack- 
son v.  Vanderheyden,  17  John.  167,  169; 
Blain  v.  Harrison,  11  111.  384  ;  Tumipseed 
v.  Fitzpatrick,  75  Ala.  297,  303  ;  Mutual 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Shipman,  50  Hun,  578; 
Hart  v.  Burch,  130  111.  426. 

8  As,  for  instance,  in  Connecticut: 
Greathead's  Appeal,  42  Conn.  374,  375 ; 
\V ouster  v.  Hunts  Co.,  38  Conn.  256,  257; 
Minnesota :  Dobberstein  V.  Murphy,  64 
Minn.  127  (authorizing  conveyance  of 
consummate  though  not  assigned  dower); 
Missouri:  Young  v.  Thrasher,  supra  (hut 
while  the  widow  may  convoy  her  unas- 
signed dower,  it  cannot  be  taken  on  exe- 


§  116  QUARANTINE   OF   DOWER.  *  254,  *  255 

dower,  before  the  husband's  death,  to  the  terre-tenant   But  equity  will 
holding  the  legal  title.1     And,  in  most  States,  equity    SSSUto?of 

will  subject  the  unassigned  dower  right  to  the  her  debts. 
[*255]  satisfaction  of  the  claims  of  *  her  creditors;2  or  they  may 
enforce  the  assignment  of  her  dower  in  order  to  subject  it  to 
their  claims.8  So  the  assignment  of  the  widow's  dower  right,  before 
allotment,  though  inoperative  at  law,  is  effectual  in  a  court  of 
equity,  and  will  in  a  proper  case  be  enforced  and  the  transferee 
protected.4 

§  116.  Quarantine  of  Dower.  —  Under  the  provisions  of  Magna 
Charta,  a  widow  "shall  tarry  in  the  chief  house  of  her  husband 
bv  fortv  davs  after  the  death  of  her  husband,  within    n 

j  j  <j  '  Ouftr&ntinB 

which  days  her  dower  shall  be  assigned  her.  .  .  .  And  under  Magna 
she  shall  have  in  the  mean  time  her  reasonable  estovers  Charta- 
of  the  common."5  Lord  Coke  interprets  this  language  to  mean 
that  dower  shall  be  speedily  assigned,  "to  the  end  the  widow  might 
not  be  without  livelihood;  "  6  and  that  estovers  signifies  "sustenance, 
or  aliment,  or  nourishment;  .  .  .  that  is,  things  that  concern  the 
nourishment  or  maintenance  of  man  in  victu  et  vestitu,  wherein  is 
contained  meat,  drink,  garments,  and  habitation."7  Lord  Coke  says 
that  it  was  certainly  the  law  of  England  before  the  Conquest,  that 
the  woman  should  continue  a  whole  year  in  her  husband's  house.8 

In  the  United  States  the  provisions  for  the  widow  in  this  respect  are, 
as  a  general  thing,  more  liberal  in  her  favor  than  those  of  the  common 


cution)  ;    Vermont:    Gorham   v.  Daniels,  St.  1889,  §  4546;  Waller  v.  Mardus,  29 

23  Vt.  600,  611;   Duramerston    v.  New-  Mo.  25  ;  and  in  Connecticut :  Greathead's 

fane,  37  Vt.  9,  13.  Appeal,  42  Conn.  374  ;  in  Iowa  this  is  left 

1  Reed  v.  Ash,  30  Ark.  775,  779  ;  Car-  an  open  question,  but  equity  will  in  no 

nail  v.  Wilson,  21  Ark.  62,   65 ;  Pope  v.  case  do  so,  where   the   petition   fails   to 

Mead,  99  N.  Y.  201  ;  Morse,  J.,  in  Gal-  show  that  the  real  estate  out  of  which  the 

braith  v.  Fleming,  60  Mich.  408,  413.  dower  is  sought  is  all  of  which  the  hus- 

a  Davison   v.   Whittelsey,   1    McArth.  band  was  seised,  or  where  all   the   per- 

163;    Tompkins    v.   Fonda,   4   Pai.   448;  sons  interested  are  not  before  the  court: 

Potter  v.  Everett,  7  Ired.  Eq.  152,  155;  Getchell  v.  McGuire,  70  Iowa,  71. 

Wilson  v.  McLenaghan,  1  McMullen,  Eq.  *  Reeves  v.  Brooks,  80  Ala.  26 ;  Wil- 

35,  39  ;  Maccubbin  v.  Cromwell,  2  Harr.  kinson  v.  Brandon,  92  Ala.  530 ;  Robie  v. 

&  G.  443,  455 ;  Strong  v.  Clem,  12  Ind.  Flanders,  33  N.  H.  524  ;  Lamar  v.  Scott, 

37;  McKeuzie  v.  Donald,  61   Miss.  452;  4  Rich.  L.  516;  Bostwick   v.  Beach,   103 

Boltz  v.  Stolz,  41  Oh.  St.  540 ;  Payne  v.  N.  Y.  414,  422. 

Becker,  87  N.  Y.  153 ;  McMahon  r."Gray,  5  Great  Ch.,  9  Hen.  III.  c.  7. 

150  Mass.  289.  6  Co.  2  Inst.  ch.  7,  Magna  Charta  (2). 

But  see,  to  the  contrary,  Saltmarsh  v.  "  The  reason  why  such   speed   is    made 

Smith,  32  Ala.  404,  408 ;  Blain  v.  Harri-  is  for  that  her  quarentine  is  but  for  forty 

son,  11   111.  384;  Maxon  v.  Gray,  14  R.  I.  days.    ...    If  she  marry  she  loseth  her 

641  ;  Harper  v.  Clayton,  84  Md.  346,  and  quarentine":  lb.  (1). 

cases  cited   (holding  that  in  the  absence  7  lb.,  ch.  7  (6). 

of  statutory   authority   or    fraud    equity  8  Co.  Litt.  32  b,   citing  Lamb,  §   120, 

has  no  such  jurisdiction).  71,  and  "  diverse  ancient  manuscripts." 

8  So  under  a  statute  in  Missouri :  Rev. 

275 


*  255,  *  256  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY. 


§116 


Quarantine  in     ^aw-     ^°  change  from  the  common  law  is  made 
the  several         in  Delaware, 1  Mary  land  ,2  Massachusetts,8  *  New  T*  256] 
States.  Hampshire,4  New  York,6  North  Carolina,6  and  *" 

Tennessee.7  In  Maine  the  period  during  which  the  widow  may- 
remain  in  the  mansion  of  the  deceased  husband  is  extended  to 
ninety  days;8  in  Arkansas,  to  two  months,  and  until  dower  is 
assigned; 9  in  Ohio,10  Oregon,11  and  Rhode  Island,12  to  one  year;  and 
in  Alabama,18  Florida,14  Georgia,15  Illinois,16  Kentucky,17  Michigan,18 
Missouri,19  Nebraska,20  New  Jersey,21  Vermont,22  Virginia,28  West 
Virginia,24  and  Wisconsin,26  no  limit  to  her  right  of  possession 
exists  until  dower  be  assigned.  These  provisions  are  generally 
additional  to  those  made  for  the  immediate  support  of  the  family; 
and  in  those  States  in  which  dower  is  abolished  by  statute,  the 
homestead  laws,  the  year's  support  allotted  to  widow  and  family, 
and  the  laws  regulating  the  descent  of  real  estate,  afford  an  ample 
equivalent  for  the  quarantine  at  common  law. 

Until  dower  be  assigned  the  right  of  the  widow  is  held  to  ex- 
tend not  only  to  the  possession,  or  occupation  free  of  rent,  of  the 
Quarantine  mansion  or  dwelling-house,  together  with  all  the  appur- 
inciudes  man-  tenant  buildings,  and  the  messuage  or  plantation  con- 
nantbEngs,  nected  therewith,26  but  that  it  constitutes  a  freehold 
plantation,  &c.    for  iife>  unless  sooner  defeated  by  the  act  of  the  heir,27 


1  Laws,  1874,  p.  515,  §  1,  par.  6 ;  p.  533, 

§  I. 

2  No  provision  is  found  in  the  statutes 
as  to  quarantine. 

3  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  740,  §  3. 

*  Publ.  St.  1891,  ch.  195,  §  2. 

5  2  Banks  &  B.  (1896,  9th  ed.)  p.  1817, 
§17;  giving  also  reasonable  sustenance. 

6  Code,  1883,  §§  2102  et  seq. 

I  Th.  &  St.  St.  §  2398;  Code,  1884, 
§  3244. 

8  Rev.  St.  1871,  p.  758,  §  14.  This  pro- 
vision seems  to  be  omitted  in  Rev.  St.  1883- 

9  See  Stull  v.  Graham,  60  Ark.  461, 477. 
And  shall  have  sustenance  out  of  the 
estate:  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §§  2536,  2537. 

10  Bates'  Ann.  St.  1897,  §  4188. 

II  Code,  1887,  §  2976,  also  giving  sus- 
tenance for  one  year. 

12  Gen.  Laws,  1896,  p.  923,  §  6. 
1     Code,  1896,  §   1515.     See  Clancy  v. 
Stevens,  <)2  Ala.  577. 

M   Rev.  St    Fla.  1892,  §  1834. 

10  Together  with  the  furniture ;  Code, 
1895,  g  4698. 

w  Riggs  v.  Girazd,  138  111.  619. 
H  St.  Kv.  1894,  §  2138. 
W  How.  St.  §5744. 
276 


w  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  4533.  See  Holmes 
v.  King,  93  Mo.  452,  458,  discussing  this 
question  and  citing  Missouri  cases. 

20  Comp.  St.  1887,  ch.  23,  §  11. 

21  Gen.  St.  1895,  p.  1276,  §  2. 

22  St.  1894,  §  2597. 

28  Code,  1887,  §  2274. 

24  Code,  1891,  p.  616,  §  8. 

M  St.  Wis.  1898,  §  3872. 

2<5  White  v.  Clark,  7  T.  B.  Mon.  640, 
642;  Inge  v.  Murphy,  14  Ala.  289,  291  ; 
Rambo  v.  Bell,  3  Ga.  207,  209  ;  Driskell  v. 
Hanks,  18  B.  Mon.  855,  864. 

27  Ackerman  v.  Shelp,  8  N.  J.  L.  125, 
129;  Inge  v.  Murphy,  supra;  Burks  v. 
Osborn,  9  B.  Mon.  579,  580  (only  as  a 
means  of  coercing  the  heirs  to  a  speedy 
assignment) ;  Bleecker  v.  Hennion,  to 
similar  effect,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  123,  124. 
Ejectment  will  lie  for  her  quarantine  be- 
fore assignment  of  dower:  Miller  v. 
Talley,  48  Mo.  503,  504.  This  estate  of 
the  widow  in  this  element  of  her  dower 
is  rather  analogous  to  a  tenancy  at  will : 
Simmons  ».  Lyle,  32  Gratt.  752,  757; 
Spinning  v.  Spinning,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  215, 
246. 


§116 


QUARANTINE   OP   DOWER. 


257 


[*  257]  *  which  she  may  occupy  by  a  tenant  as  well  as   widow  may 

by  herself;  the  occupation  of  the  tenant  is  hers,1  reilt  !t  to  a 
and  she  is  entitled  to  the  rent  paid  by  the  tenants.2 
Whether  she  can  assign  her  right  to  remain  in  the  mansion-house 
to  another  has  been  differently  held,  the  right  being  affirmed  in 
Missouri,8  and  denied  in  Alabama.4  The  right  of  quarantine,  how- 
ever, is  confined  exclusively  to  property  of  which  she  confined  to 
is  dowable,  differing  in  this  respect  from  the  right  of 
homestead;  she  may  have  the  right  of  homestead,5  but 
cannot  have  quarantine  of  dower,  in  leaseholds ; 6  nor 
does  quarantine  attach  to  property  on  which  the  hus- 
band did  not  reside  at  the  time  of  his  death,7  although  it  be  the 
only  real  estate  owned  by  him.8  Nor  can  the  widow  of  a  deceased 
tenant  in  common  exclude  the  cotenant  in  common  under 
the  right  of  quarantine.9  So  it  is  held  in  Missouri,  that, 
if  a  widow  elects  to  take  a  child's  share  in  lieu  of 
dower,  she  renounces  dower  with  all  its  incidents,  in- 
cluding quarantine.10  And  it  is  obvious  that  the  widow 
cannot,  under  the  law  giving  her  quarantine,  defend  her 
possession  against  an  adverse  or  a  paramount  title;  in 
this  respect  she  is  in  no  better  condition  than  her  husband  would 
have  been.11 


property  of 
which  she  is 
dowable, 

on  which  hus- 
band resided. 


Election  to 
take  child's 
share  defeats 
quarantine. 

Quarantine  de- 
feated by  para- 
mount title. 


1  Craige  v.  Morris,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  467, 
468;  Doe  v.  Bernard,  7  Sm.  &  M.  319, 
324;  Hyzer  v.  Stoker,  3  B.  Mon.  117; 
Trask  v.  Baxter,  48  111.  406  ;  Stokes  v. 
McAllister,  2  Mo.  163,  166. 

2  Chaplin  v.  Simmons,  7  T.  B.  Mon. 
337,  338  ;  McLaughlin  v.  McLaughlin,  22 
N.  J.  Eq.  505,  510;  8.  c.  20  N.  J.  Eq.  190; 
Reeves  v.  Brooks,  80  Ala.  26,  30.  And 
the  probate  court  has  jurisdiction  in  an 
action  by  the  widow  against  the  adminis- 
trator for  rents  collected  before  assign- 
ment: Gentry  v.  Gentry,  122  Mo.  202, 
222.  The  widow's  right  is  not  limited  to 
the  rent  paid  for  the  mansion-house  or 
messuages,  but  extends  to  the  income  from 
all  property  assigned  to  her  as  dower,  from 
the  death  of  the  husband,  which  she  may 
recover  after  assignment:  Austell  v. 
Swann,  74  Ga.  278. 

8  Jones  v.  Manly,  58  Mo.  559,  564; 
Stokes  v.  McAllister,  2  Mo.  163,  166. 

4  Barber  v.  Williams,  74  Ala.  331, 333  ; 
Wallace  v.  Hall,  19  Ala.  367,  372. 

6  Ante,  §  95. 

6  Pizzala  v.  Campbell,  46  Ala.  35,  38 
{but  in  this  case  homestead  is  also  denied 
in   a  leasehold   estate,  see  judgment  on 


rehearing,  p.  40)  ;  Voelckner  v.  Hudson, 
1  Sandf.  215,  218. 

7  Smith  v.  Smith,  13  Ala.  329,  333; 
Waters  v.  Williams,  38  Ala.  680,  684; 
McClurg  v.  Turner,  74  Mo.  45  ;  in  Indiana 
the  term  "  messuage  "  is  held  to  include  a 
few  acres  of  land,  but  not  the  whole  farm ; 
Grimes  v.  Wilson,  4  Blackf.  331,  333.  In 
Missouri  the  fact  that  the  mansion  was 
located  on  land  owned  for  life  only  by  the 
husband  does  not  defeat  the  widow's 
right  of  quarantine  in  that  part  of  the 
land  owned  by  him  in  fee,  even  when  it  is 
not  contiguous  thereto,  but  was  used  to- 
gether :  Gentry  v.  Gentry,  122  Mo.  202. 

8  Clary  v.  Sanders,  43  Ala.  287,  295. 

9  Collins  v.  Warren,  29  Mo.  236,  238. 
to  Wigley  v.  Beauchamp,  51  Mo.  544, 

546,  commenting  on  and  affirming  Matney 
v.  Graham,  50  Mo.  559,  and  overruling 
Orrick  v.  Robbins,  34  Mo.  226.  It  has 
already  been  noticed  that  in  Missouri  an 
election  to  take  a  child's  part  operates  as 
a  confirmation  of  a  conveyance  in  fraud 
of  dower  :  ante,  §  113. 

11  Taylor  v.  McCrackin,  2  Blackf.  260, 
262. 

277 


**  257-259  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY.  §  117 

It  has  been  held,  in  several  instances,  that  the  widow  is 
entitled  *  to  her   quarantine  free  of   taxes  and  interest  on  [*  258] 
encumbrances  which  must  be  charged  to  the  general  estate ; x 
Quarantine  not   but  r10^  the  estate  assigned  for  dower,  the  taxes  upon 
subject  to  which  constitute  a  charge   upon   the  property  enjoyed 

taxes-  by  her.2 

§  117.  Assignment  of  Dower.  —  The  method  of  assigning  dower 
to  the  widow  is  prescribed  by  statute  in  a  number  of  States;  at 
Dower  may  be  common  law,  and  in  the  absence  of  a  statutory  provision 
assigned  by        ^0  £ne  contrary,  it  is  not  necessary  to  resort  to  legal 

parties  with-  .  i  ■  ,  •  i  •     -■ 

out  legal  pro-  proceedings  for  this  purpose;  the  parties  may  bind 
ceedmgs.  themselves  as   effectually  in   the    matter   of   assigning 

dower  as  in  any  other  transaction.8  It  may  be  done  by  parol; 
nothing  is  required  but  to  ascertain  and  assign  her  share  to  the 
widow,  and  then  if  she  has  entered,  the  freehold  vests  in  her.4 
But  if  any  particular  course  of  proceedings  is  indicated,  this  must 
of  course  be  observed.  Thus,  in  Arkansas,5  Connecticut,6  Ohio,7 
and  Rhode  Island,8  the  assignment  must  be  in  writing.  In  Ne- 
braska, it  is  held  that  the  widow  cannot  institute  a  partition  suit 
for  her  dower.9 

Assignment  of  dower  is  distinguished  as  being  either  according  to 
or  against  common  right ;  the  former  being  the  setting  apart  of  the 
Dower  accord-  share  of  lands  to  which  the  widow  is  entitled  from  the 
aeainrtcom-  lands  constituting  the  late  husband's  real  estate  by 
mon  right.  metes   and   bounds,   when   practicable,10   to   be 

*  held  by  her  during  her  life;  the  latter  implies  a  special  [*  259] 

1  Branson  v.  Yancy,  1  Dev.  Eq.  77,  81  Austin  v.  Austin,  supra;  Shattuck  v. 
(Henderson,  J.,  dissenting,  but  not  on  the  Gragg,  23  Pick.  88,  92  ;  Boyers  v.  New- 
ground  that  the  quarantine  was  charge-  banks,  2  Ind.  388,  390 ;  Meserve  v.  Me- 
able  with  taxes  :  p.  84) ;  Graves  v.  Coch-  serve,  19  N.  H.  240,  243.  Parol  proof  of 
rane,  G8  Mo.  74,  77  ;  Simmons  v.  Lyle,  32  loss  of  papers  and  of  their  contents,  and 
Gratt.  752  ;  Felch  v.  Finch,  52  Iowa,  563,  of  possession  by  the  widow  for  a  long 
567;  Gentry  v.  Gentry,  122  Mo.  202;  time  of  the  laud,  prove  title  of  dowress  : 
Spinning  v.  Spinning,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  215,  Youndt  v.  Miller,  91  N.  C.  331,  334. 
245.  But  see  Riggs  v.  Girard,  133  111.  5  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  2554. 
619,  020.  6  2  Scrib.  on  Dower,  74,  §  5. 

a  Austell  v.  Swann,  74  Ga.  278,  281.  7  Bates'  Aim.  St.  1897,  §  5707. 

3  Austin    v.   Austin,  50    Me.    74,    77;  8  Gen.  Laws,  1896,  p.  923,  §  4. 

Gibbfl  v.   Esty,  22  Hun,  266,  269;  Lenfers  9  Hurste  v.  Hotaling,  20  Neb.  178,  182, 

v.  Benke,  78  111.  405,411  ;  Clark  v.  Muzzy,  citing  Coles  v.  Coles,  15  John.  319. 

43  N'.  H.  59  ;   Mitchell  v.  Miller,  6  Dana,  10  A  court  of  chancery  has  no  power 

79,  R3    (allotment    <>f   slaves);    Moore  v.  to  order  the  sale  of  real  estate  in  which 

Waller,  2  Rand.  418,  421  ;  McLaughlin  v.  the  widow  has  dower,  and  decree  that  she 

McLaughlin,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  190;  Campbell  receive  money  in  lieu  of  dower,  unless  it 

v.  Moore,  15  111    Ann.  129,  133  j  Peters  v.  be  first  ascertained  that  it  is  impracticable 

West,  70  Ga.  343,  348  ;  Conant  v.  Little,  to  set  out  dower  by  metes   and  bounds: 

1     Pick.  189.     But,  a  consent  decree  will  Wilson  v.  Branch,  77  Va.  65,  69  ;  see  ller- 

not  bind  mortgagee!  who  are  not  parties:  bert  v.  Wren,  7  Cr.  370,  380,  holding  that 

Lehman  v.  Rogers,  81  Ala.  363.  part  of  purchase-money  cannot  be  allotted 

*  .Ji,liTi«   v.    Kenton,   88    Mo.   64,   6^;  in  lieu  of  dower, unless  all  parties  consent. 
278 


§117 


ASSIGNMENT   OP   DOWER. 


259 


assent  or  agreement  on  the  part  of  the  widow  to  accept  it,  instead 
of  the  more  precise  and  formal  manner. 

Without  discussing  the  various  remedies  given  at  law  and  in  equity, 
and  the  procedure  pointed  out,  both  at  common  law  and  under  the 
statutes  of  the  several  States,  it  is  deemed  sufficient  here    Assignment 
to  indicate  some  of  the  salient  principles  governing  the    by  summary 
assignment  of  dower  by  summary  proceeding  in  the  courts    Procee  inS- 
controlling  the  administration  of  the  estates  of  deceased  persons,  as 
"this  convenient  method  of  proceeding  has,  in  a  great  degree,  super- 
seded the  common-law  remedy  by  action."  1 

Jurisdiction  to  assign  dower  is  vested  in  courts  having  jurisdic- 
tion of  probate  matters  in  Alabama,2  Arkansas,8  Connecticut,4 
Delaware,5  Florida,6  Illinois,7  Iowa,8  Kentucky,9  states  in  which 
Maine,10  Massachusetts,11  Michigan,12  Minnesota,13  probate^coum 
Mississippi,14     Nebraska,15    New     Hampshire,16    New 


assign  dower. 


1  2  Scrib.  on  Dower,  175,  §  1,  refer- 
ring to  4  Kent,  72;  1  Washb.  R.  Prop., 
p.  *  226  ;  1  Hilliard,  R.  Prop.,  2d  ed.,  p.  1 72, 
§52. 

2  Humes  i\  Scruggs,  64  Ala.  40,  44  ; 
Martin  v.  Martin,  22  Ala.  86,  holding  that 
its  jurisdiction  is  in  derogation  of  com- 
mon law,  and  proceedings  must  therefore 
strictly  conform  to  the  statute ;  Turnip- 
seed  v.  Fitzpatrick,  75  Ala.  297,  302,  hold- 
ing assignment  void  if  none  of  the  lands* 
are  situate  in  the  county  where  order  is 
made ;  Hause  v.  Hause,  57  Ala.  262,  show- 
ing concurrent  jurisdiction  with  courts 
of  equity.  Where  the  decree  has  to  be 
moulded  so  as  to  meet  the  justice  of  the 
case,  or  where  there  is  a  bona  fide  adverse 
claim,  the  probate  court  should  decline 
jurisdiction,  and  a  chancery  court  should 
make  the  proper  decree :  Sheppard  v. 
Sheppard,  87  Ala.  560.  See  as  to  the 
effect  of  a  decree  by  consent,  Lehman 
v.  Rogers,  81  Ala.  363. 

3  Hill  v.  Mitchell,  5  Ark.  608,  619; 
but  chancery  is  not  ousted :  Jones  v. 
Jones,  28  Ark.  19,  20;  probate  and  chan- 
cery courts  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  : 
Ex  parte  Hilliard,  50  Ark.  34. 

4  Hall  o.  Pierson,  63  Conn.  332  (point- 
ing out  when  relief  may  be  had  in  equity) ; 
Way  v.  Way,  42  Conn.  52,  53 ;  upon  the 
application  of  a  creditor  having  levied  : 
Greathead's  Appeal,  42  Conn.  374. 

5  McCaully  v.  McCaully,  7  Houst.  102; 
Layton  ».  Butler,  4  Harr.  507,  508 ;  Far- 
row v.  Farrow,  1  Del.  Ch.  457 ;  Eliason  v. 
Eliason,  3  Del.  Ch.  260,  265. 


6  Rev.  St.  1892,  §  1830.  See  Milton  v. 
Milton,  14  Fla.  369. 

7  Starr  &  Curt.  An.  St.  1896,  p.  1479, 
§  44  (in  proceedings  to  sell  real  estate  by 
order  of  the  probate  court). 

8  Shawhan  v.  Loffer,  24  Iowa,  217, 224 ; 
Olmsted  v.  Blair,  45  Iowa,  42. 

9  Shields  v.  Batts,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  12, 
15;  Rintch  v.  Cunningham,  4  Bibb,  462,* 
but  not  of  lands  alienated  by  the  husband, 
p.  463. 

10  Williams  v.  Williams,  78  Me.  82,  84. 
But  not  of  lands  alienated  by  the  husband  : 
French  v.  Crosby,  23  Me.  276,  278  ;  Austin 
v.  Austin,  50  Me.  74. 

11  Fuller  v.  Rust,  153  Mass.  46;  for- 
merly not  of  premises  mortgaged  :  Sheafe 
v.  Spring,  9  Mass.  9,  12  ;  the  assignment 
dates  from  the  approval  by  the  probate 
court  of  the  commissioner's  report :  Kearns 
v.  Cunniff,  138  Mass.  434. 

12  The  record  must  show  the  existence 
of  all  jurisdictional  facts:  and  the  court 
has  no  jurisdiction  if  the  right  to  dower  is 
disputed  by  the  heirs  :  King  v.  Merritt,  67 
Mich.  194,  211. 

18  2  Scrib  on  Dower,  188,  §  36. 

14  Not  against  strangers  to  the  estate : 
Jiggitts   v.   Jiggitts,   40   Miss.   718.  726. 

15  Comp.  St.  1887,  ch.  23,  §  8.  Dower 
and  curtesy,  abolished  in  this  State  by 
Act  of  1889. 

16  Pinkham  v.  Gear,  3  N.  H.  163, 
167;  Burnham  v.  Porter,  24  N.  H.  570, 
577. 


279 


260,  *  2G1  ESTATES    OF    DOWER    AND    CURTESY. 


§117 


probate  courts 
have  no  juris- 
diction to  as- 
sign dower. 


Jersey,1  New  York,2  *  North  Carolina,8  Oregon,4  Rhode  [*  260] 
Island,5  South  Carolina,6  Tennessee,7  Vermont,8  Virginia,9 
States  in  which  and  Wisconsin.10  In  West  Virginia  the  word  "circuit" 
appears  in  connection  with  the  court  referred  to,  which 
is  not  in  the  Code  of  Virginia;  county  and  circuit  courts 
have  concurrent  jurisdiction  of  probate  matters  in  West 
Virginia,  and  it  seems  that  jurisdiction  to  assign  dower  is  not  vested 
in  the  county  court.11  In  the  other  States  this  power  is  not  vested  in 
testamentary  courts;  in  Pennsylvania  it  has  been  so  decided.12 

The  proof  in  the  proceeding  to  obtain  the  assignment  of  dower 
must   show   marriage   with    the   person    in  whose   estate   dower  is 
claimed,13   seisin    by  the  husband,14  and  his  death,   or 
other    circumstance     by    which     the    dower    right    is 
consummated.15 

As  a  general  rule,  dower  is  assignable  according  to 
the  law  in  force  at  the  time  of  the  husband's  death;16 
but  as  to  her  right  in  property  aliened,  without  her 
joining  in  the  conveyance,  during  coverture,  she  is 
entitled  according  to  the  law  as  it  stood  at  the 
date  of  *the  alienation.17     She  is  entitled  to  dower  in  the  [*261] 


Proof  neces- 
sary in  assign- 
ment of  dower. 

Assignment 
under  law  at 
time  of  death. 

Against  alien- 
ees at  time  of 
alienation. 


1  Gen.  St.  1896,  p.  1280,  §  27. 

2  Concurrent  with  Superior  Court  and 
County  Court :  C.  C.  Pr.  §§  263,  340 ;  but 
not  where  title  is  contested :  Parks  v. 
Haidey,  4  Bradf.  15,  16. 

8  Concurrent  with  the  Superior  Court : 
Campbell  v.  Murphy,  2  Jones  Eq.  357, 
359  ;  proceedings  should  be  in  the  county 
of  the  husband's  last  residence,  but  lands 
in  adjoining  county  may  be  assigned : 
Askew  v.  Bynum,  81  N.  C.  350.  See 
Efland  v.  Efland,  96  N.  C.  488. 

4  Code,  1887,  §  2961,  when  title  is  not 
disputed. 

5  But  can  entertain  no  equitable  de- 
fences :  Gardner  v.  Gardner,  10  R.  I.  211, 
213  ;  but  see  Eddy  v.  Moulton,  13  R.  I. 
105,  and  Smith  v.  Smith,  12  R.  I.  456. 

6  Stewart  v.  Blease,  4  S.  C.  37,  40  ;  it 
may  set  aside  the  report  and  direct  as- 
signment  de   novo:   Irwin   v.    Brooks,  19 

s.  C.  oo. 

7  Rhea  v.  Meredith,  6  Lea,  605,  607  ; 
but  chancery  lias  concurrent  jurisdiction, 
when  proceeding  in  county  court  is  fraud- 
ulent, <>r  the  widow  claiming  dower  is  also 
administratrix  :  Spain  v.  Adams,  3  Tenn. 
Ch   319,  322. 

R   DanfoTth  V.  Smith,  23  Vt.  247,  257. 
'Code,    1RR7,    §    2275;    Devaughn   v. 
Dcvaughn,  19  Gratt.  556,  562. 
280 


10  2  Scrib.  on  Dower,  188,  §  36. 

11  Code,  1891,  p.  616,  §  9. 

12  Shaffer  v.  Shaffer,  50  Pa.  St.  394, 396. 

13  But  direct  proof  of  marriage  is  not 
indispensable  ;  it  may  be  proved  by  repu- 
tation, declarations,  and  circumstances 
supporting  a  presumption :  Jones  v.  Jones, 
28  Ark.  19,  22;  Jackson  v.  State,  8  Tex. 
App.  60,  62 ;  Blackburn  v.  Crawfords,  3 
Wall.  175,  187;  Van  Tuyl  v.  Van  Tuyl, 
57  Barb.  235.  See  ante,  §  107;  2  Scrib. 
on  Dower,  205,  §§  2-14. 

14  Strict  proof  is  not  required :  posses- 
sion of  the  widow  under  direct  or  mesne 
conveyance  from  the  husband  ;  or  posses- 
sion by  the  husband  with  claim  of  title, 
or  receipt  of  rents  by  him  from  the  per- 
son in  possession,  is  sufficient  prima  facie 
proof  :  Carnall  v.  Wilson,  21  Ark.  62,  67  ; 
Smith  v.  Lorillard,  10  Johns.  338,  355; 
McCullers  v.  Haines,  39  Ga.  195;  Gentry 
v.  Woodson,  10  Mo  224  ;  Morgan  v.  Smith, 
25  S.  C.  337.     See  ante,  §111. 

15  Proof  of  husband's  seisin  at  some 
time  when  the  applicant  for  dower  was 
his  wife,  and  his  subsequent  death,  makes 
a  prima  facie  case  in  her  favor :  Reich  v. 
Berdel,  120  111.  499,  501. 

l«  Ante,  §  112. 

17  Mayburry  v.  Brien,  15  Pet.  21,  38; 
Thomas  v.  Hesse,  34  Mo.  13,  24 ;   John- 


§  117 


ASSIGNMENT    OF   DOWER. 


*  261, *  262 


According  to 
value  at  time 
of  alienation. 


value  of  the  lands  at  the  time  of  the  assignment,  ex- 
cluding the  increase  in  value  by  reason  of  improve- 
ments made  thereon  by  the  vendee  or  his  grantees  after 
the  alienation  by  the  husband,  but  not  excluding  the  increased  value 
by  natural  appreciation,  or  in  consequence  of  the  improvements 
made  by  the  owners  of  adjoining  lands.1  But  where  But  if  deterio- 
improvements  upon  the  land  at  the  time  of  the  aliena-  [^to  value  at 
tion  are  subsequently  torn  down  or  deteriorate,  the  con-  time  of  death, 
verse  of  the  rule  does  not  seem  to  hold  good;  she  is  not  allowed 
dower  in  the  value  of  the  property  at  the  time  of  the  alienation,  but 
in  its  value  at  the  time  of  the  husband's  death.2  But  the  widow 
is  entitled  to  dower  in  the  value  of  the  premises  at  the  time 
of  the  assignment,  where  improvements  have  been  erected  after 
a  sale  by  the  administratrix  under  order  of  the  court,  for  the  pay- 
ment of  her  deceased  husband's  debts,  and  before  the  assignment  of 
dower.8 

Where  the  nature  of  the  property  in  which  dower  is  to  be  assigned 
precludes  its  setting  apart  by  metes  and  bounds,  as  where  the 
husband  was  seised  in  common,  or  in  coparcenary,  the 
widow  takes  her  dower  in  the  husband's  share  of  such 
property  in  common  with  the  heir  and  other  tenants ; 4 
in  a  mill  she  may  be  endowed  either  of  the 
[*  262]  *  third   toll-dish,  or  of   a  third   of   the   profits,  or  of   the 


Assignment  in 
common  with 
cotenants. 

In  a  mill. 


ston  v.  Vandyke,  6  McLean,  422,  427; 
Curtis  v.  Hobart,  41  Me.  230,  232.  In 
Indiana,  the  statute  of  1852,  abolishing 
dower  and  giving  the  widow  one-third  of 
the  husband's  realty,  was  held  not  ap- 
plicable to  land  conveyed  by  the  husband 
previously :  Bowen  v.  Preston,  48  Ind. 
367,  372,  citing  the  previous  Indiana 
cases.  The  same  condition  exists  in 
Iowa:  Moore  v.  Kent,  37  Iowa,  20;  Cra- 
ven v.  Winter,  38  Iowa,  471,  481 ;  Peirce 
v.  O'Brien,  29  Fed.  Rep.  402,  citing  Iowa 
cases.  The  consequence  of  this  doctrine 
was  held,  in  Indiana,  to  operate  to  the 
widow's  deprivation  of  dower  in  lands 
sold  by  the  husband  prior  to  the  enlarge- 
ment of  dower,  because  to  give  her  dower 
as  fixed  by  the  act  of  1852  would  be  to 
change  the  encumbrance  subject  to  which 
the  purchaser  bought  into  a  fee,  thus  im- 
pairing a  vested  right:  Taylor  v.  Sample, 
51  Ind.  423.  Qucere  whether  in  such  case 
the  widow  was  not  entitled  to  dower  unaf- 
fected by  the  law  of  1852  ? 

1  Boyd  v.  Carlton,  69  Me.  200,  203  ; 
Carter  v.  Parker,  28  Me.  509  ;  Westcott 
v,  Campbell,  11  R.  I.  378,  380;  Price  v. 


Hobbs,  47  Md.  359,  370 ;  Scammon  v. 
Campbell,  75  111.  223,  227  ;  Wood  v.  Mor- 
gan, 56  Ala.  397,  399  ;  Peirce  v.  O'Brien, 
29  Fed.  Rep.  402;  Felch  v.  Finch,  52 
Iowa,  563;  Baden  v.  McKeny,  18  Dist. 
Col.  268,  272,  citing  cases  pro  and  con ; 
Young  v.  Thrasher,  115  Mo.  222,  234; 
Sanders  v.  McMillan,  98  Ala.  144  ;  Butler 
v.  Fitzgerald,  43  Neb.  192. 

2  "  Though  this  would  seem  to  be 
pushing  the  doctrine  to  a  questionable 
extreme "  per  Durfee,  C.  J.,  in  Westcott 
v.  Campbell,  supra ;  McClanahan  v.  Por- 
ter, 10  Mo.  746,  752;  Thompson  v.  Mor- 
row, 5  S.  &  R.  289,  291  ;  per  Wood,  J.,  in 
Dunseth  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  6  Oh.  76.  In 
Kentucky  the  value  when  the  husband 
alienated  the  land  is  considered,  without 
considering  any  amelioration  or  deterio- 
ration by  acts  of  the  purchaser:  Pepper 
v.  Thomas,  85  Ky.  539,  546. 

3  Phinney  v.  Johnson,  15  S.  C.  158. 

4  Ante,  §111.  Scribner,  vol.  2,  p.  639, 
§  1,  mentions  such  hereditaments  as  a  pis- 
cary, offices,  a  fair,  a  market,  a  dove-house, 
courts,  fines,  heriots,  &c,  as  requiring  an 
assignment  in  the  roi^s  a::d  profits. 

281 


*  262,  *  263  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY. 


§117 


entire  mill  for  every  third  month ;  *  in  a  ferry,  one- 
third  of  the  profits,  or  the  use  of  the  ferry  for  a  third 
part  of  the  time,  should  be  set  apart  to  the  widow ; 2  and  so,  when- 
ever there  can  be  no  assignment  by  metes  and  bounds,  there  may 
in  rents  and  be  either  a  division  of  the  rents  and  profits,  after 
Proceed°rofa  deducting  expenses  for  reasonable  repairs  and  taxes, 
sale.  but  not  insurance,3  or  a  sale  and  division  of  the  pro- 

ceeds ; 4  or  a  sum  may  be  adjudged  to  her  in  gross  for  her  dower 
interest.5  If  there  be  a  sale  of  the  whole  estate,  including  the 
dower  of  the  widow,  she  is  entitled  either  to  a  gross  sum,  equal  to 
an  amount  necessary  to  yield  an  annual  payment  to  her  of  the  inter- 
est on  one-third  of  the  net  proceeds  of  sale  for  the  remainder  of  her 
-  .   .  life,  which  may  be  determined  according  to  the  annuity 

Rule  to  ascer-  '  J         .  .  °  , 

tain  value  of  tables,  generally  indicated  either  by  statute  or  by  the 
hfe  estate.  supreme  courts  of  the  several  States ; 7  or  to  the  pay- 

ment of  a  sum  equal  to  the  interest  on  her  share  annually  until  her 
death.8  In  the  latter  case  the  payments  should  not  be  made  for  a 
whole  year  at  a  time,  but  in  monthly  or  quarterly  instalments.9 

A  sale  of  the  lands  of  a  deceased  person  by  the  adminis- 
Dower  not  con-   trator  *  for  the  payment  of  debts  of  the  deceased,   [*  263] 
vevedbvad-      imder  order  of  the  probate  court,  does  not  in- 

mimstrator  s  . r  ' 

sale  of  lands.      elude  the   dower   right  of  the  widow;   hence  she  will 
1  Per  Marshall,  J.,  in  Smith  v.  Smith,     work  on  Dower.     In  Alabama  it  is  held 


5  Dana,  179,  180  ;  but  see,  as  to  the  Illi- 
nois statute  on  this  subject,  Walker  v. 
Walker,  2  111.  App.  418,  420. 

2  Stevens  v.  Stevens,  3  Dana,  371,  373. 

3  Hillgartner  v.  Gebhart,  25  Oh.  St. 
557 ;  Walsh  v.  Reis,  50  111.  477,  480.  A 
proper  method  of  assigning  dower  in  coal 
mines  which  the  husband  owned  in  com- 
mon, is  to  give  her  one-third  of  the  pro- 
ceeds derived  from  the  mines  of  her 
husband's  share  :  Clift  v.  Clift,  87  Tenn. 
17.  In  New  York,  where  the  court  has, 
as  required  by  statute,  fixed  a  sum  equal 
to  one-third  of  the  rental  value  of  the  prop- 
erty, anil  specified  the  same  in  the  decree, 
the  court  has  no  power  to  alter  such  final 
judgment,  the  rents  having  depreciated: 
Mclntyre  v.  Clark,  43  linn,  352. 

*  Lenfers  v.  Henke,  73  111.  405,  410. 

■-  Rich  v.  Rich,  7  Bush,  53,  55.  Where 
a  sum  is  assessed  in  lieu  of  dower,  but 
not  in  fact  jiaid,  the  widow  still  has  her 
claim  against  the  land  itself,  but  no  specific 
lien  bhereon,  under  which  she  can  sell  it, 
in  the  hands  of  an  alienee  :  Williamson  v. 

•  ,  2  1  S.  ('.  100. 
'    A    Dumber   "f    such    are    given    by 
Scribner  in  an  appendix  to  vol.  2  of  Ids 
282 


that  the  "  American  Table  of  Mortality  " 
should  be  resorted  to,  as  the  orthodox 
standard  throughout  the  United  States 
and  Canada,  and  that  chancellors  and 
registers  ought  to  take  judicial  knowl- 
edge of  both  the  existence  and  coutents 
of  this  table:  Gordon  v.  Tweedy,  74  Ala. 
232,  237. 

7  Graves  v.  Cochran,  68  Mo.  74,  76 ; 
Unger  v.  Letter,  32  Oh.  St.  210,  214; 
Wood  v.  Morgan,  56  Ala.  397, 399 ;  Banks 
v.  Banks,  2  Th.  &  C.  483,  484.  And  the 
health  of  the  widow  should  be  taken  iuto 
account:  McLaughlin  v.  McLaughlin,  20 
N.  J.  Eq.  190,  195;  Swain  v.  Hardin,  64 
Ind.  85 ;  Gordon  v.  Tweedy,  74  Ala.  232, 
237.  In  South  Carolina,  one-sixth  of  the 
proceeds  is  paid  to  the  widow  in  lieu  of 
her  dower  without  reference  to  the  age  of 
the  widow:  Stewart  v.  Pearson,  4  S.  C.  4, 
46,  citing  Wright  v.  Jennings,  1  Bai.  277, 
280;  Woodward  v.  Woodward,  2  Rich. 
Eq.  23,  28;  and  Douglass  v.  McDill,  1 
Spears,  139,  140. 

8  Ware  v.  Owens,  42  Ala.  212,  217. 

9  Scammou  v.  Campbell,  75  111.  223, 
228. 


§  118     ANTE-NUPTIAL  CONTRACTS  AS  AFFECTING  DOWER.      *  263,  *  264 

not  be  precluded  by  such  sale,  although  she  herself  made  it  as 
administratrix,  from  claiming  her  dower  in  the  lands  sold  against 
the  vendee.1  But  a  sale  or  mortgage  by  her  as  dowress,  in  con- 
nection with  the  heirs,  conveys  her  dower  right,  which  she  cannot 
afterward  set  up  against  any  person; 2  and  she  may  become  a  party 
to  a  sale  by  the  administrator,  conveying  her  dower  interest  to  the 
purchaser  at  the  administrator's  sale,8  and  is  then  entitled  to  an 
allowance  out  of  the  proceeds  of  sale.4  The  same  result  follows 
where  the  probate  court  is  empowered  by  statute  to  order  the  sale 
of  real  estate  free  from  the  widow's  dower.5 

§  118.    Ante-Nuptial    Contracts    as    affecting  Dower.  —  Jointures, 
so  named  from  the  joint  tenancy  thereby  created  in   the   husband 
and  wife,6  were  introduced  by  the  English  Statute  of   Jointures 
Uses7  in  lieu   of   dower,  which,  as   has   already  been 
stated,8  was  recognized  by  the  common  law  as  attaching  to  strictly 

legal  seisin  only,  and  wholly  repudiated  in  chancery.     Origi- 
[*  264]  nally,  *  the  word  meant  a  joint  estate  limited  to  both  husband 

and  wife,  but  by  the  later  rules  may  be  an  estate  limited  to 
the  wife  only,  expectant  upon  a  life  estate  in  the  hus-    Statutes  of 
band.9     The  provisions  of  the  Statute  of  Uses  relating    Uses  in  the 
to  jointure  have  been  substantially  adopted  in  most  of 
the  United  States. 

Equitable  jointures  differ  from  legal  jointures  chiefly  in  this,  that 
the  former  are  good,  although  the  estate  settled  upon  the  wife  be 
less  than  one  of  freehold  to  continue  during  her  life,  if  she  be  of  age 

1  This  subject  is  treated  in  connection  convey  her  dower,  and  she  has  no  interest 
with  the  Sale  of  Real  Estate  by  order  of  in  the  proceeds,  but  may  pursue  her  dower 
the  probate  court,  and  the  liability  of  pur-  in  the  land  unaffected  by  such  sale :  Brad- 
chasers  to  the  dowress,  post,  §  483 ;   see  ford  v.  Bradford,  66  Ala.  252,  256. 
authorities  there  cited.  4  Where    the    probate    court   has   no 

2  Hoppin  v.  Hoppin,  96  111.  265,  270,  jurisdiction  in  the  subject  of  dower,  it  is 
272.  One  of  the  grounds  upon  which  this  doubtful  whether  it  can  order  the  pay- 
decision  was  based  is  that  the  warrantor  ment  to  the  widow  of  her  share  in  the 
is  not  permitted  to  attack  a  title,  the  proceeds  ;  but  if  there  has  been  a  conver- 
validity  of  which  he  has  covenanted  to  sion,  the  jurisdiction  is  undoubted :  Hart 
maintain:  Clark  v.  Baker,  14  Cal.  612,  v.  Dunbar,  4  Sm.  &  M.  273,  287.  Nor  can 
630 ;  Van  Rensselaer  v.  Kearney,  1 1  How.  the  administrator  recover  from  the  estate 
297,  325.  So  where  she  represents  her  the  sum  he  has  paid  the  widow  for  her 
husband  as  being  dead,  and  conveys  with  release  of  dower  in  lands  sold  by  him 
the  children,  she  will  be  equitably  estopped  under  probate  license  :  Needham  v.  Belote, 
from  asserting  her  dower  upon  the  hus-  39  Mich.  487. 

band's   actual  death:    Rosenthal  v.  May-  6  Schmitt  v.  Willis,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  515. 

hugh,  33   Oh.  St.  155,  159;    2  Scrib.   on  6  Tomlins,  Law  Diet. 

Dower,  251  et  seg.  7  27  Hen.  VIII.  c.  10.    One  of  the  mis- 

8  In   Alabama,  by  filing   her  written  chiefs  sought  to  be  remedied  by  this  stat- 

consent  in  the  office  of  the  probate  judge,  ute  is  recited  to  be  "that  by  uses  men  lost 

to  the  end  that  a  complete  title  may  be  their  tenancies  by  the  curtesy  and  women 

vested  in  the  purchaser  at  the  adminis-  their  dowers." 
trator's  sale:  Code,  1886,  §  2127.     If  she  8  Ante,  §  111. 

fail  to  file  such  consent,  the  sale  does  not         9  Abb.  Law  Diet.,  tit.  "Jointure." 

283 


264,  *  265  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY. 


§118 


Jointures  in       and  join  in  the  deed ; 1  and  in  most  States  any  pecuniary 
equity.  provision  made  for  the  benefit  of  the  intended  wife  in 

lieu  of  dower  will,  if  assented  to  by  her,  operate  as  a  bar.2  It 
appears  that  courts  incline  to  a  liberal  construction  of  contracts  in 
support  of  settlements  made  as  a  substitute  for  dower;8  whether  a 
legal  bar  to  dower  exist  or  not,  courts  of  equity  will  enforce  specific 
performance  of  ante-nuptial  agreements  in  lieu  of  dower,  according 
to  the  same  principles  which  govern  them  in  other  cases  of  specific 
performance  of  contracts.4  Hence  the  provisions  made  for  the  wife 
must  be  fair  and  reasonable,  or  she  may  elect  to  take  her  dower 
instead;5  the  covenants  must  be  fully  performed  on  the  part  of  the 
husband ;  a  failure  to  comply  with  them  through  his  fault  or  neglect 
destroys  the  validity  of  her  covenant  not  to  claim  dower.6  It  is 
held  in  some  cases  that  marriage  alone  is  not  a  sufficient  considera- 
tion, the  ante-nuptial  agreement  to  relinquish  dower  without  some 
provision  in  lieu  thereof  being  deemed  contrary  to  public 
policy;7  but  in  *  others  marriage  is  held  a  sufficient  con-  [*  265} 
sideration  to  support  a  contract  for  the  relinquishment  of 
dower,  if  fairly  entered  into  by  a  woman  sui  juris.6     But  the  breach 


1  2  Scrib.  on  Dower,  409,  §  35. 

2  A  statutory  provision  that  a  jointure 
in  favor  of  an  intended  wife  shall  bar  any 
claim  for  dower  does  not  deprive  her  of 
the  power  to  bar  her  dower  by  any  other 
form  of  ante-nuptial  contract :  Barth  v. 
Lines,  118  111.  374. 

8  "  Disregarding  forms,  the  aim  should 
be  to  protect  the  rights  of  dower,  and  if 
that  object  is  attained  by  the  agreement, 
the  law  is  satisfied  without  any  nice  dis- 
criminations between  legal  and  equitable 
jointures":  Logan  v.  Phillips,  18  Mo.  22, 
28;  Vincent  v.  Spooner,  2  Cush.  467,  474; 
Findley  v.  Findley,  11  Gratt.  434,  437; 
Andrews  v.  Andrews,  8  Conn.  79,  85. 

*  Could  v.  Womack,  2  Ala.  83,  91  ; 
Jenkins  v.  Holt,  109  Mass.  261,  262  ;  Bab- 
cock  v.  Babcock,  53  How.  Pr.  97,  100. 

6  Rivers  v.  Rivers,  3  Desaus.  190,  195  ; 
Farrow  v.  Farrow,  1  Del.  Ch.  457  ;  Shaw 
v.  Boyd,  5  S.  &  R.  309.  It  is  self-evident 
that  a  contract  induced  by  fraudulent  rep- 
resentations is  void:  Peaslee  v.  Peaslee, 
147  Mass.  171,  and  such  a  contract  can- 
not be  ratified  during  coverture:  lb.,  p. 
1H]  ;  and  it  lias  been  held  that  she  is  not 
bound  when  she  acta  in  ignorance  of  her 
real  legal  rights,  if  she  be  misled  by  those 
■tending  to  ber  in  a  confidential  relation, 
thongli  ao  actual  fraud  be  intended:  Spur- 
lock  V.  Hrown,  91  Tenn.  241,  and  cases 
284 


referred  to.  Persons  betrothed  stand  to 
each  other  in  confidential  relations ;  it  is 
the  duty  of  each  to  be  frank  in  the  dis- 
closure of  all  circumstances  bearing  on 
the  contemplated  agreement :  Kline  v. 
Kline,  57  Pa.  St.  120,  quoted  approvingly 
in  Pulling's  Estate,  93  Mich.  274 ;  and  it 
is  held  that  if  the  provisions  for  the  in- 
tended wife  be  disproportionately  small  to 
the  means  of  the  intended  husband,  there 
arises  a  prima  facie  presumption  of  de- 
signed concealment,  which  the  husband'* 
representatives  must  overcome  :  Taylor  v. 
Taylor,  144  111.  436;  and  see  further  to 
same  effect :  Graham  v.  Graham,  143  N.  Y. 
573. 

6  Sullings  v.  Sullings,  9  Allen,  234, 
237  ;  Butman  v.  Porter,  100  Mass.  337, 
339  ;  Camden  Mut.  Association  v.  Jones, 
23  N.  J.  Eq.  171, 173  ;  Garrard  v.  Garrard, 
7  Bush,  436,  441 ;  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  23 
Mo.  561,  568. 

7  Curry  v.  Cnrry,  10  Hun,  366,  370,  et 
seq. ;  Stilley  v.  Folger,  14  Ohio,  610,  647  ; 
Grogan  ;;.  Garrison,  27  Oh.  St.  50,  64,  et 
seq. ;  Mowser  v.  Mowser,  84  Mo.  437,  440. 

8  McNutt  v.  McNatt,  116  Ind.  545, 
548,  550;  Farwood  t\  Farwood,  86  Ky. 
114,  and  authorities;  Sparlock  v.  Brown, 
91  Tenn.  241,  255,  citing  cases  pro  and 
con. 


§  118     ANTE-NUPTIAL  CONTRACTS  AS  AFFECTING  DOWER.      *  265,  *  266 

of  a  covenant  collateral  to  the  controlling  purpose  of  the  contract, 
without  fraud  on  the  husband's  part,  will  not  be  construed  as  en- 
titling her  to  claim  dower.1 

Post-nuptial   settlements   are   not  absolutely   binding  upon    the 
widow,  as  a  bar  to  her  dower,  either  at  law  or  in  equity; 2  if  not  a 
legal  jointure  within  the  Statute  of  Uses,  she  will  at   Post-nuptial 
law  be  entitled  to  both  the  provision  and  her  dower;3   settlements, 
but  in  equity,  and  at  law  in  cases  where  the  settlement  would,  if 
made  before  marriage,  constitute  a  legal  jointure,  she  is    Election  b 
put  to  her  election  whether  she  will  take  dower  or  the    tween  dower 
jointure.4     And  where,  as  is  the  case  in  many  States,    and  Jomture- 
the  statute  authorizes  married  women  to  convey  their  property  as  if 
single,  the  wife's  release  of  her  right  to  dower  to  her  husband  is 
binding,  if  made  for  a  good  consideration^  and  without   fraud   or 
improper  dealing.5     But  if  she  release  her  dower  on  the  husband's 
oral  promise  to  convey  to  her  other  lands,  and  he  becomes  insolvent 
before  he  has  done  so,  equity  will  not  aid  her  to  obtain  a  decree 
for  dower  against  his  assignee.6    To  require  the  widow  to  elect,  the 
intention   to   exclude   dower  by  the   marriage   settlement  must  be 
shown,  either  by  express  words  or  manifest  implication;  otherwise 
she  will  be  entitled  to  both.7 

The  wife  may  effectually  relinquish  dower  by  an  agreement  to  sepa- 
rate ;  deeds  of  separation  are  upheld  by  courts  in  this  country,  as  well 
as  in  England,  if  made  through  the  medium  of  a  trustee,8   Dee(js  of 

or  even  without  a  trustee,  if  consummated.9  separation. 
[*  266]  But  "  courts  will  not  enforce  any  contract  which  is  *  the 
price  of  consent  by  one  party  to  the  procurement  of  a  divorce 
by  the  other;"10  hence  an  agreement  whereby  the  wife,  pending 
her  action  for  divorce,  agreed  with  her  husband,  for  a  considera- 
tion paid  partly  at  the  time,  the  remainder  to  be  paid  when  the 
divorce  was  granted,  to  make   no  claim   for  alimony,  is   void,    as 

1  Freeland  v.  Freeland,  128  Mass  509,  155,   affirmed    in    Gibson   v.   Gibson,   15 

512.  Mass.  106,  110;  Vance  v.  Vance,  21  Me. 

a  Townsend  v.  Townsend,  2  Sandf.  711  ;  364,  369. 

Crane  v.  Cavana,  36  Barb.  410;  Martin  v.  4  Parham  v.  Parham,  6  Humph.  287, 

Martin,  22  Ala.  86 ;  Walsh  v.  Kelly,  34  297 ;  Butts  v.  Trice,  69  Ga.  74,  76. 

Pa.  St.  84 ;  Carson  v.  Murray,  3  Pai.  483  ;  &  Rhoades  v.  Davis,  51  Mich.  306. 

Rowe  v.  Hamilton,  3  Me.  63.     Accepting  «  Winchester   v.   Holmes,    138    Mass. 

a  gift  of  personalty  from  the  husband  in  540. 

contemplation  of  death,  and  declared  in  7  Liles   v.   Fleming,  1   Dev.  Eq.  185, 

writing  to  be  for  her  individual  use  and  188;   Swaine  v.  Perine,  5  John.  Ch.  482, 

benefit,  is  no  waiver  of  dower :  Mitchell  v.  488  ;  Dudley  r.  Davenport,  85  Mo.  462. 

Word,  60  Ga.  525,  531  ;  nor  accepting  a  8  Garbut  v.  Bowling,  81  Mo.  214,  217, 

deed  of  real  estate  :  Dockray  v.  Milliken,  citing  authorities. 

76  Me.  517,  519;  whether  before  or  after  9  Hutton  v.  Hutton,  3  Pa.  St.  100,  104. 

the  husband's  death :  McLeery  v.  McLeery,  w  Per  Pardee,  J.,  in  Appeal  of  Seeley, 

65  Me.  172.  56  Conn.  202. 

*  Hastings  v.  Dickinson,  7  Mass.  153, 

285 


*  266,  *  267     ESTATES  OF  DOWER  AND  CURTESY. 


§119 


being  against  public  policy,   and  constitutes  no   bar  against   her 
right  to  dower.1 

§  119.  Election  between  Dower  and  Devise.  —  It  has  already 
been  observed,2  that  it  is  the  policy  of  the  law  to  place  the  widow's 
Riffht  of  dower  dower  beyond  the  reach  of  the  husband,  who  can,  at 
common  law  as  well  as  under  the  statutes  of  most  States, 
neither  sell,  convey,  nor  otherwise  dispose  of  his  real 
estate  so  as  to  deprive  his  widow  of  dower  therein  without  her  free 
consent.  A  devise  to  such  effect  is  a  fortiori  void,  unless  she 
chooses  to  abide  by  it.  If,  therefore,  the  husband 
devise  lands  to  his  wife,  she  will,  under  the  English 
doctrine  as  held  before  the  change  made  by  statute  in 
this  respect,8  take  them  as  a  voluntary  gift  in  addition 
to  what  the  law  secures  to  her  as  dower,  unless  it 
appear  plainly,  either  by  express  words  or  by  manifest  implica- 
tion, that  the  devise  was  intended  to  exclude  dower.4  The 
statute  referred  to,  enacted  long  after  the  establishment  of  the 
American  government,5  is  of  no  force  propria  vigore  in  any  of 
the  States  of  the  Union;  and  the  doctrine  holding  devises  to  be 
given  in  addition  to  dower,  if  not  otherwise  directed  by  the 
testator,  is  recognized  in  all  of  them  where  not  abrogated  or 
modified  by  their  own  statutes.  This  is  the  rule  in 
California,6    Connecticut,7    *  Delaware,8    Georgia,9  Iowa,10  [*  267] 


superior  to 
devise 


Hence  widow 
takes  devise 
in  addition  to 
dower,  unless 
indicated  to  be 
in  lieu  of  it. 


1  Although  the  divorced  wife,  upon 
payment  of  the  consideration  after  the 
decree,  executed  a  receipt  to  the  husband 
"  in  full  of  all  demands  to  date,  and  par- 
ticularly in  full  for  all  claims  of  alimony  "  : 
Appeal  of  Seeley,  supra.  See  also  to  same 
effect,  Orth  v.  Orth,  69  Mich.  158. 

2  Ante,  §  105. 

3  3  &4  Wm.  IV.  C.  105,  §  9. 

4  Birmingham  v.  Kirwan,  2  Sch.  &  Lef. 
444,  452;  Roper,  Husb.  &  Wife,  568;  2 
Scrib.  on  Dower,  440;  Lawrence  v.  Law- 
rence, 2  Vern.  365  ;  Lemon  v.  Lemon,  8 
Vin.  Abr.  366,  pi.  45  ;  Hitchin  v.  Hitchin, 
Pr.  Ch.  133;  Brown  v.  Parry,  2  Dick.  685. 

6  29  August,  1833. 

6  Instead  of  dower  or  curtesy,  spouses 
take  respectively  one  half  of  the  commu- 
nity property  (as  to  which  see  post,  §  122) 
upon  the  death  of  the  other;  and  it  is 
held  that  any  devise  by  a  husband  to  his 
•wife  goes  to  her  in  addition  to  the  moiety 
MCnred  to  her  by  law:  Beard  v.  Kimx,  5 
CaL  252,  256,  approved  in  Payne  v.  Payne, 
18  CaL  291,  SOI,  and  in  Estate  of  Silvey, 
.»'_'  Cal  210,  218.  Bee  also  Pratt  v.  Doug- 
Uu,  88  N.  J.   Eq.  516,  535,  in  which  the 


law  of  California  in  this  respect  is  clearly 
stated. 

"  Lord  v.  Lord,  23  Conn.  327,  331 ; 
Hickey  v.  Hickey,  26  Conn.  261.  See 
Anthony  v.  Anthony,  55  Conn.  256,  hold- 
ing that  a  testator  giving  his  widow  two- 
thirds  of  the  entire  income  of  the  personal 
property,  and  the  use  of  nearly  one  half 
of  all  the  real  estate,  meant  to  exclude 
dower. 

8  Kinsey  v.  Woodward,  3  Ilarr.  459, 
464,  followed  in  Warren  v.  Morris,  4  Del. 
Ch.  289,  299. 

9  Tooke  v.  Hardeman,  7  Ga.  20,  27; 
Speer  v.  Speer,  67  Ga.  748,  749. 

10  Iowa  has  abolished  dower  at  com- 
mon law  (see  ante,  §  106),  but  courts  still 
use  the  term  "dower"  to  designate  the 
widow's  right  in  the  property  of  her  de- 
ceased husband.  It  is  held  that  devise  to 
the  wife  of  a  life  estate  in  all  the  testator's 
real  property  is  consistent  with  her  dower 
right  to  one-third  of  it  in  fee  :  Dangherty 
v.  Daugherty,  69  Towa.  677  ;  Blair  v. 
Wilson,  57  Iowa,  177,  following  Metteer 
v,  Wiley,  34  Iowa,  214,  and  other  earlier 
cases.     Parker  v.  Hayden,  84  Iowa,  493  s 


§119 


ELECTION    BETWEEN   DOWER   AND   DEVISE.      *  267,  *  268 


New    York,1    South    Carolina,2    Vermont,3    Virginia,4    and    West 
Virginia.5 

This  rule,  however,  was  changed  in  England  by  the  statute 
already  mentioned,6  which  has  been  incorporated,  with  some  modi- 
fications, into  the  codes  of  many  States.  According  to  Devise  in  lieu 
the  English  statute,  the  devise  to  the  wife  of  any  land,  of  Uower- 
or  any  estate  or  interest  therein,  barred  her  of  dower,  unless  a  con- 
trary intention  appeared  from  the  will,  thus  reversing  the  presump- 
tion arising  from  an  unexplained  devise  for  the  benefit  of  the  widow. 
In  some  of  the  States  the  language  of  the  statute  is  more  sweeping 
than  that  of  the  English  act,  and  seems  to  bar  dower  in  every 
case  where  the  widow  takes  anything  under  the  will.  So,  for 
instance,  in  the  States  of  Florida7  and  North  Carolina.8  Gener- 
ally, however,  the  condition  allowing  her  to  enjoy  both  the  devise 
and  dower  is,  that  such  shall  clearly  appear  to  be  the  testator's 
intention,  either  expressed  or  necessarily  implied;  so  held 
[*  268]  in  the  States  of  Alabama,9  Arkansas,10  Illinois,11  *  Indiana,12 

6  3  &  4  Wm.  IV.  c.  105,  §  9. 

7  The  widow  loses  her  dower  right 
unless  she  dissent  from  the  will  within 
one  year:  Wilson  v.  Fridenberg,  21  Fla. 
386,  389. 

8  Code,  1883,  §  2103. 

9  Dean  v.  Hart,  62  Ala.  308,  310,  citing 
earlier  Alabama  cases. 

10  Apperson  v.  Bolton,  29  Ark.  418,  427. 

11  Blatchford  v.  Newberry,  99  111.  11, 
55,  in  which  Mr.  Justice  Sheldon  remarks 
that  the  legal  effect  of  a  devise  in  lieu 
of  dower  is  a  mere  offer  by  the  testator 
to  purchase  the  dower  interest  for  the 
benefit  of  the  estate ;  United  States  v. 
Duncan,  4  McLean,  99,  in  which  it  was 
held  that  the  testamentary  provision,  to 
bar  dower,  must  afford  a  reasonable  pre- 
sumption that  it  was  given  in  lieu  of 
dower;  Warren  v.  Warren,  148  111.  641, 
647,  in  which  the  court  intimates  that  the 
Duncan  case  is  no  longer  applicable  since 
the  change  in  the  phraseology  of  the 
statute,  and  holds  that  any  provision  is 
now  sufficient  to  bar  dower  (unless  the  will 
is  renounced  by  the  widow)  and  that  it 
makes  no  difference  that  the  devise  is  given 
to  another  in  trust  for  her. 

12  There  is  no  dower  in  Indiana;  but 
the  principle  applies  to  the  widow's  rights 
under  the  Statute  of  Descents,  and  it  is 
held  that  she  cannot  take  both  under  a 
will  and  under  the  statute  in  the  absence 
of  a  clearly  expressed  intention  to  that 
effect :  Ragsdale  v.  Parrish,  74  Ind.  191, 

287 


Howard  v.  Watson,  76  Iowa,  229  ;  but  a 
different  rule  prevails  where  the  life  es- 
tate is  given  in  personal  property,  in 
which  case  she  must  elect :  Foster's  Will, 
76  Iowa,  364.  A  gift  of  one-third  of  all 
testator's  estate  held  to  be  in  addition  to 
her  dower  or  distributive  share  under  the 
statute:  Estate  of  Blaney,  73  Iowa,  113; 
and  she  is  not  obliged  to  elect,  unless  it 
clearly  appear  from  the  will  that  the  gift 
was  intended  to  be  in  lieu  of  dower : 
Sutherland  v.  Sutherland,  102  Iowa,  535. 

1  Konvalinka  v.  Schlegel,  104  N.  Y. 
125 ;  Matter  of  Frazer,  92  N.  Y.  239,  250  ; 
Earl,  J.,  in  the  Matter  of  Zahrt,  94  N.  Y. 
605,  609  ;  Lewis  v.  Smith,  9  N.  Y.  502, 
511;  Adsit  v.  Adsit,  2  Johns.  Ch.  448, 
450. 

2  Hiers  v.  Gooding,  43  S.  C.  428; 
Lumeral  v.  Lumeral,  34  S.  C.  85 ;  Brax- 
ton v.  Freeman,  6  Rich.  Law,  35. 

3  Hatch's  Estate,  62  Vt.  300. 

4  Herbert  v.  Wren,  7  Cr.  370,  377; 
Dixon  v.  McCue,  14  Gratt.  540,  548,  an- 
nouncing the  rule  on  this  subject  to  be 
the  same  as  announced  in  England  by 
Chancellor  Kindersley,  in  Gibson  v.  Gib- 
son, 17  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  R.  349,  352. 

5  Tracey  v.  Shumate,  22  W.  Va.  474, 
499  ;  Atkinson  v.  Sutton,  23  W.  Va.  197, 
200.  In  both  of  these  cases  it  is  held  that 
evidence  showing  the  situation  of  the  tes- 
tator and  the  circumstances  surrounding 
him  at  the  time  of  writing  the  will  is 
competent  to  show  his  intention. 


268,  *  269  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND   CURTESY. 


§119 


Kansas,1  Kentucky,2  Maine,8  Maryland,4  Massachusetts,5  Michigan,6 
Minnesota,7  Mississippi,8  Missouri,9  Montana,10  Nebraska,11  New- 
Hampshire,12  Ohio,13  Oregon,14  Pennsylvania,16  Rhode  Island,16 
Tennessee,17  and  Wisconsin.18 

If  the  devise  or  provision  in  the  will   be  inconsist- 
ent with  the  enjoyment  of  the  right  of  dower,19  or  ex- 
pressly stated  to  be  in  lieu  of  dower,20  or  not  expressed 
to  be  in  addition  to  dower  in  those  States  which 
do  not  allow  dower  and  *  devise  cumulatively  [*  269] 


Where  the 
•widow  cannot 
take  both  de- 
vise and  dower, 
she  may  elect 
to  take  either. 


195.  Gift  of  the  residue  to  a  class,  "  after 
my  beloved  wife  has  taken  her  portion 
according  as  the  law  provides,"  clearly 
indicates  the  testator's  intention  that  a 
specific  devise  of  real  estate  to  his  wife, 
preceding  the  residuary  clause,  shall  be 
in  addition  to  her  share  under  the  statute : 
Burkhalter  v.  Burkhalter,  88  Ind.  368. 

1  Sill  v.  Sill,  31  Kans.  248,  252,  quoting 
the  statute,  Comp.  L.  1879,  ch.  117,  §§  41 
et  seq.  But  the  husband  may  execute  a 
valid  will  giving  the  whole  of  his  prop- 
erty to  his  wife  :  Martindale  v.  Smith,  31 
Kans.  270. 

2  Smith  v.  Bone,  7  Bush,  367;  Ex- 
change Bank  v.  Stone,  80  Ky.  109,  115; 
Huhlein  v.  Huhlein,  87  Ky.  247. 

3  Hastings  v.  Clifford,  32  Me.  132 ; 
Allen  v.  Pray,  12  Me.  138. 

*  Durham  v.  Rhodes,  23  Md.  233,  242  ; 
Gough  v.  Manning,  26  Md.  347,  366. 

6  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  750,  §  20  ;  Upham 
v.  Emerson,  119  Mass.  509,  510. 

6  How.  St.  1882,  §  5750;  Tracy  v. 
Murray,  44  Mich.  109.  The  testator's  in- 
tention may,  in  case  of  doubt,  be  ascer- 
tained by  proof  of  the  surrounding  cir- 
cumstances under  which  the  will  was 
executed  :  Dakin  v.  Dakin,  97  Mich.  284, 
291. 

7  Dower  being  abolished,  this  principle 
holds  good  under  the  law  of  descent : 
Washburn  v.  Van  Steenwyk,  32  Minn.  336, 
349;  In  re  Gotzian.  34  Minn.  159. 

8  Wilson  v.  Cox,  49  Miss.  538,  544  ; 
Booth  v.  Stebbins,  47  Miss.  161,  164. 
Hut  in  this  State  also  dower  is  abolished 
by  statute  :  ante.,  §  100. 

*  Dougherty  v.  Barnes,  64  Mo.  159, 
161,  citing  other  Missouri  cases;  Kaes  v. 
Gross,  92  Mo.  647,660;  Martienv.  Norris, 
91   Mo.   165,  i7i.     Bat  the  statute  refers 

onlv  to  lands  of  which   the  husband   died 
■eised  ;  as  to  lands  conveyed  during  cover- 

2HH 


ture  the  common-law  rule  governs :  Hall 
v.  Smith,  103  Mo.  289. 

10  She  is  barred  of  all  dower,  whether 
the  husband  had  conveyed  before  his  death, 
or  died  seised :  Spalding  v.  Hirshfield, 
15  Mont.  253. 

11  Cons.  St.  1893,  §§  1123-17. 

12  Publ.  St.  1891,  ch.  195,  §  17;  Copp 
v.  Hersey,  31  N.  H.  317,  330. 

13  Hibbs  v.  Insurance  Co.,  40  Oh.  St. 
543,  553  ;  Corry  v.  Lamb,  45  Oh.  St.  203. 

"  Code,  1887,  §  2971. 

15  Watterson's  Appeal,  95  Pa.  St.  312, 
316. 

1B  Gen.  Laws,  1896,  p.  666,  §  21;  Chapin 
v.  Hill,  1  R.  I.  446 ;  see  Durfee,  Petition- 
ers, 14  R.  I.  47,  53. 

"  Code,  1884,  §  3251;  Jarman  v.  Jar- 
man,  4  Lea,  671,  673. 

18  Application  of  Wilber,  52  Wis.  295  ; 
Wilber  v.  Wilber,  52  Wis.  298 ;  Van  Steen- 
wyck  v.  Washburn,  59  Wis.  483,  497. 

19  Where,  for  instance,  the  directions 
of  the  testator  in  the  disposition  of  the 
estate  cannot  be  carried  into  effect  if  the 
widow  also  take  her  dower:  Dodge  v. 
Dodge,  31  Barb.  413,  417;  Tobias  v. 
Ketchum,  32  N.  Y.  319,  327;  Matter  of 
Zahrt,  94  N.  Y.  605,  609  ;  Asche  v.  Asche, 
113  N.  Y.  232  ;  Speer  v.  Speer,  67  Ga.  748  ; 
Norris  v.  Clark,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  51,  55;  Col- 
gate v.  Colgate,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  372 ;  Griggs 
v.  Veghte,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  179;  Bailey  v. 
Boyce,  4  Strobh.  Eq.  84,  91 ;  Ailing  v. 
Chatfield,  42  Conn.  276 ;  Van  Guilder  v. 
Justice,  56  Iowa,  669 ;  In  re  Gotzian,  34 
Minn.  159. 

20  It  is  immaterial  in  such  case  whether 
the  presumption  be  in  favor  of  cumulative 
right  to  devise  and  dower,  or  that  the 
devise  is  in  lieu  of  dower;  for  in  every 
case  the  testator's  will  is  to  be  followed, 
if  not  in  derogation  of  the  widow's  statu- 
tory right. 


§  119  ELECTION    BETWEEN   DOWER   AND    DEVISE.  *  269 

without  express  direction  or  manifest  intention  of  the  testator,1  the 
widow,  though  she  cannot  enjoy  both  her  dower  right  and  the  pro- 
vision made  for  her  by  will,  may  elect  to  take  either  the  one  or 
the  other. 

The  right  of  election  is  guaranteed  to  the  widow  in  the  fullest 
manner,  and  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  her  to  secure  her  own  best 
interest  and  greatest  advantage.  To  this  end  she  is  Whatcon9ti. 
entitled,  not  only  to  have  sufficient  time  to  make  her  tutes  an 
choice,  but  also  to  full  information  of  the  condition  of  electlon- 
the  estate,  either  by  a  bill  in  equity  to  ascertain  the  extent  of  the 
respective  interests,2  or  by  a  full  disclosure  on  the  part  of  the  execu- 
tor or  administrator,  or  by  the  judge  of  the  probate  court,  as  may  be 
provided  by  statute.8  No  act  of  election  will  be  binding  on  the 
widow,  unless  done  under  a  full  knowledge  of  all  the  circumstances, 
and  of  her  rights,  and  with  the  intention  of  electing;4  and  if  she 
exercise  the  right  prematurely  she  will  not  be  estopped  from  main- 
taining an  action,  within  the  time  allowed  by  law  for  such  election, 
to  cancel  the  election  so  made.5  Thus  she  is  not  bound  by  an  elec- 
tion made  under  the  mistaken  supposition  that  the  estate  accepted 
by  her  is  free  from  all  claims  and  demands,  or  before  a  knowledge 
of  the  circumstances  necessary  to  a  judicious  and  discriminating 
choice  has  been  obtained,6  or  if  it  was  induced  by  fraud  or  imposi- 
tion.7 But  if  she  make  her  election  under  a  full  knowledge  of  the 
facts,  she  will  be  bound  thereby, 8  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  unfair 
advantage,  even  though  she  did  not  understand  her  legal   rights.9 

1  Barnard  v.  Fall  River  Bank,  135  v.  Garrett,  34  Ala.  558,  562  ;  Sill  v.  Sill, 
Mass.  326  ;  Cowdrey  v.  Hitchcock,  103  111.  31  Kans.  248 ;  James  v.  Dunstan,  38  Kans. 
262,  273.  289 ;  Yorkly  v.  Stinson,  97  N.  C.  236. 

2  United  States  v.  Duncan,  4  McLean,  5  Dudley  v.  Pigg,  149  Ind.  363,  370. 
99,  102 ;  Melizet's  Appeal,  17  Pa.  St.  449,  6  In  such  case  equity  will  relieve  her  : 
455;  Hall  v.  Hall,  2  McCord  Ch.  269,  Pinckney  w.  Pinckney,  2  Rich.  Eq.  218, 
280 ;  Smither  v.  Smither,  9  Bush,  230,  237  ;  Upshaw  v.  Upshaw,  2  Hen.  &  Munf. 
236  ;  Grider  v.  Eubanks,  12  Bush,  510,  381,  390,  393 ;  Osmun  v.  Porter,  39  N.  J. 
514;  Johnston  v.  Duncan,  67  Ga.  61,  71.  Eq.   141 ;  Goodrum  v.  Goodrum,  56  Ark. 

8  It  is  held  in  Tennessee,  that  if  the  532   (holding  that   a  conveyance   by  the 

widow  is  prevented  by  the  fraud  of  the  executor  before  retraction  of  the  widow's 

executor  or  other  person  from  dissenting  election  will   not   be  affected  by  her  re- 

to  the  will,  the  executor  will  be  deemed  a  traction,  but  she  will  be  made  whole  out 

trustee,  the  same  as  if  she  had  dissented  in  of  other  lands  not  conveyed), 
time :  Smart  v.  Waterhose,  10  Yerg.  94, 103.  7  McDaniel  v.  Douglas,  6  Humph.  220, 

4  Payton  v.  Bowen,  14  R.  I.  375;  Mil-  229,  approving   Smart   v.  Waterhose,  10 

likin   v.   Welliver,  37   Oh.  St.   460 ;   An-  Yerg.  94  ;  Morrison  v.  Morrison,  2  Dana, 

derson's   Appeal,   36   Pa.    St.   476,   496;  13,  18;  Elbert  v.  O'Neil,  102  Pa.  St.  302; 

Woodburn's    Estate,    138    Pa.    St.    606;  Burden  v.  Burden,  141  Ind.  471  ;  Dudley 

Garn  v.  Garn,  135  Ind.  687  ;  O'Driscoll  v.  v.  Pigg,  149  Ind.  363. 
Koger,   2   Desaus.  295,  299  ;    English  v.  8  She   must   take   subject    to   all    the 

English,  3  N.  J.  Eq.  504,  510;  Tooke  v.  charges  and  limitations  of  the  will:  Kline's 

Hardeman,  7  Ga.  20,30;  Hill  v.  Hill,  88  Appeal,   117  Pa.  St.  139,  148;   Snook  v 

Ga.  612;  Clark  v.  Hershy,  52  Ark.  473;  Snook,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  132. 
Stone  v.  Vandermark,  146  111.312;  Reaves  9  Light  v.  Light,  21  Pa.  St.  407  ;  Mc 

VOL.  I.  —  19  289 


269,  *  270  ESTATES    OF    DOWER    AND    CURTESY. 


§110 


Thus,  by  her  deliberate  election  to  take  under  the  will  she 
bars  *  herself  of  her  dower,  although  the  estate  prove  [*  270] 
insolvent.1  Nor  can  she  treat  her  election  as  a  nullity,  and 
yet  retain  what  she  has  received  in  virtue  thereof.2  The  statutes  of 
the  several  States  contain  minute  provisions  as  to  the  time  and 
manner  in  which  the  election  is  to  be  made;3  and  as  the  right  is  a 
statutory  one,  the  widow  is  held  to  a  strict  compliance  therewith.4 
If  she  permit  the  time  to  expire  without  making  her  election,  she 
will,  in  most  States,  be  held  to  a  waiver  of  her  dower.5 

The  right  to  elect  is  a  strictly  personal  one,  which  in  the  absence 
of  statutory  authority  can  be  exercised  by  no  one  for  her,  although 
Election  by  sne  ^ie  Def°re  the  time  given  to  make  the  election  have 
widow  a  per-  expired,6  or  be  insane;7  but  provision  is  made  by  statute, 
in  some  instances,  authorizing  the  widow  to  elect  by 
attorney  or  guardian.8  In  Maine  the  election  by  an  insane  widow 
was  held  valid,  on  the  ground  that  the  acts  of  an  insane  person  are 
not  void,  but  voidable.9  In  the  case  of  infant  widows  the  courts 
sometimes  make  elections  for  them,10  or  it  must  be  made  by  her 
guardian.11  In  England  courts  of  equity  would  grant  relief  to 
persons  under  disability  required  to  elect  between  two  inconsistent 


Daniel  v.  Douglas,  supra  ;  Bradfords  v. 
Kents,  43  Pa.  St.  474,  484;  Cannon  v. 
Appersen,  14  Lea,  553,  592. 

1  Grider  v.  Eubanks,  12  Bush,  510,  514. 
See  Evans  v.  Pierson,  9  Rich.  L.  9.  Nor 
can  she,  in  such  case,  take  dower  in  lauds, 
the  income  of  which  was  part  of  the  es- 
tate devised  in  lieu  of  dower,  but  which 
devise  was  void  because  in  contravention 
of  law  :  Lee  v.  Tower,  124  N.  Y.  370. 

2  Steele  v.  Steele,  64  Ala.  438,  461 ; 
Tomlin  v.  Jayne,  14  B.  Mon.  160,  162; 
see  Evans  v.  Pierson,  9  Rich.  L.  9. 

3  In  2  Scrib.  on  Dower,  505,  §§  16  et 
seq.,  will  he  found  a  collection  of  these 
statutes. 

4  It  was  held  in  Missouri,  in  the  cases 
of  Price  v.  Woodford,  43  Mo.  247,  253, 
and  Ewing  v.  Ewing,  44  Mo.  23,  that 
the  failure  of  the  probate  court  to  notify 
the  widow  of  her  right  of  election,  as 
required  by  statute,  does  not  operate  to 

■  ud  the  time  given  her  by  the  stat- 
ute. See  further,  on  this  point,  infra,  p. 
-'  271. 

r-  Akin  v.  Kellog,  119  N.  Y.  441; 
Stephens  v.  Gibbes,  14  Fla.  831,  352; 
Waterbury  v.  Netherland,  6  Heisk.  512; 
Dougherty  v.  Barnes,  04  Mo.  159;  Gant 
,■.  Hen!  ,64  Mo.  162;  Cowdrey  v.  Hitch- 
108  111.  262,  270;  Zaegel  v.  Kuster, 
•90 


51  Wis.  31,  39  ;  Kennedy  v.  Johnston,  65 
Pa.  St.  451,  454;  Quarles  v.  Garrett,  4 
Desaus.  145. 

6  Fosher  v.  Guilliams,  120  Ind.  172; 
Church  v.  McLaren,  85  Wis.  122;  Sher- 
man v.  Newton,  6  Gray,  307 ;  Boone  v. 
Boone,  3  Har.  &  McH.  95;  Hinton  v. 
Hinton,  6  Ired.  L.  274  ;  Welch  v.  Ander- 
son, 28  Mo.  293,  298;  Crozier's  Appeal, 
90  Pa.  St.  384  ;  Anderson's  Estate,  185 
Pa.  St.  174;  Eltzroth  v.  Binford,  71  Ind. 
455. 

7  Woerner  on  Guardianship,  §  149 ; 
Collins  v.  Carman,  5  Md.  503,  524;  Lewis 
v.  Lewis,  7  Ired.  L.  72  ;  Van  Steenwyck 
v.  Washburn,  59  Wis.  483,  501 ;  Heaven- 
ridge  v.  Nelson,  56  Ind.  90,  93  ;  Pinkerton 
v.  Sargent,  102  Mass.  568  ;  but  see  infra, 
p.  *  271,  note. 

8  In  Delaware:  Rev.  St.  1874,  p.  534, 
§  7  ;  Missouri :  Young  v.  Boardnian,  97 
Mo.  181  ;  North  Carolina:  Code,  1883,  § 
2108.  In  Ohio  the  probate  court  appoints 
some  person  to  ascertain  what  would  be 
most  valuable  for  the  widow,  and  the 
court  enters  of  record  an  election  to  that 
effect:  Bates'  Ann.  St.  1897,  §  5966. 

9  Brown  v.  Hodgdon,  31  Me.  65,  67. 

1°  Addison  V.  Howie,  2  151.  Ch.  606,623. 
11  Cheshire  v.  McCoy,  7  Jones  L.  376, 
377. 


§  119  ELECTION   BETWEEN   DOWER   AND   DEVISE.      *  270,  *  271 

rights  ; 1    and   this   doctrine   is  applied   in  some  American 
[*  271]  States  to  impose  upon  courts  of  equity  or  probate  courts  *  the 

duty  to  make  election  for  an  insane  widow;2  in  others,  the 
question  is  left  open  and  the  power  doubted.3 

Acts  in  pais  may  determine  an  election,  as  well  as  matter  of 
record :  thus  assignment  of  dower  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdic- 
tion,4 the  filing  of  a  petition  for  dower  within  the  time    ... 

'  °  *  Acts  in  pais 

allowed  to  make  the  election,6  renouncing  by  deed  the  amounting  to 
provision  made  in  the  will  and  claiming  dower,6  con-  eectl0n- 
tracting  to  relinquish  her  right,  for  a  valuable  consideration  paid 
her,7  taking  possession  of  property  under  a  will  and  exercising  une- 
quivocal acts  of  ownership  over  it  for  a  long  time,8  and  giving 
written  notice  to  the  executors  of  her  intention,9  have  all  been  held 
to  constitute  an  election  binding  upon  the  widow.  And  it  has  been 
held  in  North  Carolina  that  a  widow  is  estopped  to  take  under  the 
law  by  causing  the  will  to  be  probated  and  becoming  executrix 
thereof ; 10  but  in  California  the  contrary  rule  is  laid  down ;  u  and  in 
Massachusetts,  in  the  analogous  case  of  a  husband's  right  to  take 
under  the  law  against  the  will,  it  is  held  that  he  is  not  estopped  by 
probating  his  wife's  will,  if  he  take  nothing  under  it.12  So  in  a 
State  where  the  widow  is  not  entitled  to  take  both  her  dower  and 
the  homestead  under  the  homestead  law,  her  continued  occupation 
of  the  homestead  in  the  absence  of  an  election  to  take  dower  will 
be  deemed   an  election  to  take  under  the   homestead   right.18    But 

1  See  cases  cited  by  Cooper,  J.,  in  dower  to  the  husband  estop  her;  Stod- 
Wright  v.  West,  2  Lea,  78,  82,  and  also     dard  v.  Calcompt,  41  Iowa,  329,  333. 

by  Freeman,  J.,  dissenting,  p.  95.  7  Baldwin  v.  Hill,  97  Iowa,  586. 

2  Wright  v.  West,  supra,  Freeman  dis-  8  Reed  v.  Dickerman,  12  Pick.  146 ; 
senting  on  the  ground  that  such  election  Delay  v.  Vinal,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  57,  65; 
must  nevertheless  be  made  within  the  Thompson  v.  Hoop,  6  Oh.  St.  480,  485; 
statutory  period  allowed  therefor:  Ken-  Stark  v.  Hunton,  1  N.  J.  Eq.  216,  227; 
nedy  v.  Johnston,  65  Pa.  St.  451,  455;  Caston  v.  Caston,  2  Rich.  Eq.  I  ;  Craig  v. 
Van  Steenwyck  v.  Washburn,  59  Wis.  Walthall,  14  Gratt.  518,  525;  Clay  v. 
483,  504,  et  seq.  ;  State  v.  Ueland,  30  Minn.  Hart,  7  Dana,  1,  6;  Haynie  v.  Dickens, 
277 ;  Andrew's  Estate,  92  Mich.  449 ;  68  111.  267  ;  Cory  v.  Cory,  37  N.  J.  Eq. 
Penhallow  v.  Kimball,  61  N.  H.  596.  198,  201  ;  Rutherford  v.  Mayo,  76  Va.  117, 
"Without  authority  conferred  by  statute  123;  Exchange  Bank  v.  Stone,  80  Ky. 
upon  the  guardian  of  an  insane  widow,  it  109;  Clark  v.  Middlesworth,  82  Ind.  240, 
would  of  course  devolve  upon  the  courts  247;  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  145  Ind.  659; 
to  make  the  election  for  her  "  :  per  Black,  Cooper  v.  Cooper,  77  Va.  198,  205;  Hovey 
J.,  in  Young  v.  Boardman,  97  Mo.  181,  v.  Hovey,  61  N.  H.  599. 

188.  9  Greiner's  Appeal,  103  Pa.  St.  89. 

3  Crenshaw  v.  Carpenter,  69  Ala.  572.  10  Mendenhall  v.  Mendenhall,  8  Jones 

4  Cheshire  v.  McCoy,  7  Jones  L.  376.  L.  287,  affirmed  in  later  cases. 

5  Raynor  v.  Capehart,  2  Hawks,  375,  u  In  re  Gwin,  77  Cal.  313. 

377.  12  Tyler  v.  Wheeler,  160  Mass.  206. 

6  Hawley  v.  James,  5  Pai.  318,  435;  13  Thomas  v.  Thomas,  73  Iowa,  857; 
Young  v.  Young,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  562;  so  McDonald  v.  McDonald,  76  Iowa,  137. 
accepting  a  legacy  and  retaining  the  con-  See  in  connection  herewith,  Stone  v.  Van- 
6ideration  for  a  written  relinquishment  of  dermark,  146  111.  312. 

291 


*  271,  *  272  ESTATES   OP   DOWER   AND    CURTESY.  §  119 

where  not  only  the  time,  but  also  the  method  in  which  the  election 
is  to  be  made,  is  pointed  out  by  statute,  there  must  be  a  substantial, 
if  not  literal,  compliance  with  its  provisions.1  Thus,  if  the  renun- 
ciation is  not  made  within  the  time  prescribed,2  or  not  in  the  court8 
or  with  the  formalities  indicated,4  the  widow  is  neither  bound  nor 
entitled  as  if  she  had  made  a  valid  election.  There  must  be  some- 
thing more  than  a  mere  intention  or  determination  to  elect;  nor  is 
the  declaration  of  such  an  intention  itself  sufficient.5 

*  The  acceptance  by  the  widow  of  the  testamentary  pro-  [*  272] 
vision  made  for  her,  in  lieu  of  her  right  of  dower  in  the 
Dower  under      testator's  estate,  gives  her  an  interest  therein  superior 
rnce^ver'other   to   that   of  a  legatee :  having  relinquished  her  dower, 
legacies.  which  is  paramount  to  the  rights  of  creditors  as  well  as 

of  legatees  or  devisees,  she  thereby  became  a  purchaser  of  the 
interest  represented  by  the  devise  or  legacy  to  her.  She  takes,  not 
by  the  bounty  of  the  testator,  but  in  virtue  of  a  contract  with  him, 
the  reciprocal  considerations  being  the  relinquishment  by  the  widow 
of  her  legal  right  of  dower,  thereby  enabling  the  testator  to  dispose 
of  his  estate  without  reference  thereto,  and  the  price  offered  by  him 
for  this  right,  consisting  in  the  devise  or  legacy  to  her.6  But  while 
it  is  agreed,  on  all  sides,  that  the  claim  of  the  widow  having  relin- 
quished dower  is  superior  to  that  of  other  legatees  in  the  will,  so 
In  some  States  that  she  takes  to  their  exclusion,  if  there  is  a  deficiency, 
on  equality        j^  is  ^g^  [n  some  0f  the  States  that,  since  she  takes  as 

•with,  creditors,  .  .... 

it  by  contract,  she  is  on  an  equality  with  creditors,  and 

shares  with  them  if  the  assets  are  insufficient  to  pay  the  debts  and 

but  generally     ner  le&acv;7  bivt  the  view  seems  to  preponderate  that 

postponed  to       she  can  receive  nothing  by  way  of  legacy  until  all  the 

debts  have  been  paid.8     In  Missouri  it  is  held  that  the 

1  Supra,  p.  *  270,  note  4.  8  Isenhart  v.  Brown,  1  Edw.  Ch.  411, 

2  Ex  parte  Moore,  7  How.  (Miss.)  665  413,  citing  English  and  American  author- 
(the  written  renunciation  was  filed  within  ities  ;  Carper  v.  Crowl,  149  111.  465,  479  ; 
four  days  after  the  expiration  of  the  six  Jarm.  on  Wills,  * 467  ;  and  Bigelow's  note, 
months  allowed  by  the  statute).  p.  458,  collecting  American  cases.     As  to 

8  Daudt   v.  Musick,  9  Mo.  App.  169  ;  the  preference  of  legacies  in  lieu  of  dower 

Baldozier  v.  Haynes,  57  Iowa,  683 ;  Hous-  over  other  legacies,  see  post,  §   452,  and 

ton  v.  Lane,  62  Iowa,  291.     The  proper  cases. 

court  is  the  one  from  which  letters  must  7  Tracy  v.  Murray,  44  Mich.  109,  112  ; 

issue  :  Cribben  v.  Cribben,  136  111.  609.  Lord  v.  Lord,  23  Conn.  327,  330 ;  Thomas 

«  Estate  of    Rhodes,    11     Phila.    103;  v.  Wood,  1  Md.  Ch.  296,  300;  Gibson  v. 

Draper  v.  Morris,  137  Ind.  169;  Howard  McCormick.  10  Gill  &  .1.  65, 113  ;  Shackel- 

V.    Watson,  76    Iowa,  229    (holding   that  ford  v.  Miller,  91  N.  C.  181,  187  (giving 

notice  to  elect  must  be  given  the  widow,  the  widow  preference  to  creditors  under 

or  she  will  be  entitled  to  enjoy  what  has  thestatute).     See  also  Green  v.  Saulsbury, 

been  devised  to  her,     Sin-  has  *ix  months  6  Del.  Ch.  871. 
aft'T  notice  in  which  to  make  her  election).  8  Beekman  v.  Vanderveer.  3  Dem.  619, 

r>  English  v.  English,  3  N.  J.  Eq.  504  •,  622;  Paxson  v.  Potts,  3  N.  J.  Eq.313  324; 

Shaw  v  Shaw,  9  Dana,  341, 343 ;  Forester  Bray  v.  NeilL  21   N.  J.  Eq.  343,  350  (but 

v.  Watford,  67  Ga.  508.  a  legacy  given  in  lieu  of  dower  does  not 
VJ2 


§  119  ELECTION   BETWEEN   DOWER   AND    DEVISE.      *  272,  *  273 

widow  taking  under  a  will  specifically  disposing  of  all  the  real  and 
personal  property  of  the  testator  must  contribute  to  the  payment  of 
debts  ratably  with  other  legatees  and  devisees.1 

It  may  be  remarked  in  this  connection,  that  the  renunciation  of 
dower  enures  to  the  estate,  and  has  been  held  to  go  to  the  heir  or 
distributee  in  default  of  testamentary  disposition,2  so    T, 

A  Dower  re~ 

that  the  widow  herself  is  not  precluded  from  nounced  enures 
[*273]  taking   *or   sharing  therein  as  heiress  or   dis-   toe8tate- 

tributee,  although  she  could  not  take  as  dowress;8  but  it 
seems  that  the  declaration  by  the  testator  that  the  legacy  is  to  be  in 
lieu  of  dower,  and  she  accepts  it,  prevents  her  from  taking  anything 
else.4 

On  the  other  hand,  the  rejection  by  the  widow  of  the  provisions 
made  for  her  by  will  generally  results  in  the  diminution  or  con- 
travention of  devises  and  legacies  to  other  parties.  The 
rule  in  such  case  is,  that  the  devise  or  legacy  which  the  tion  on  devises 
widow  rejects  is  to  be  applied  in  compensation  of  those  to  others- 
whom  her  election  disappoints.5  If  she  has  elected  to  take  dower 
in  another  State,  it  will  be  presumed  that  such  has  been  set  off  to 
her  there,  and  she  cannot  resist  the  sale  of  real  estate  in  the  forum 
without  rebutting  such  presumption.6  If  the  renounced  share  is 
insufficient  to  compensate  the  disappointed  beneficiary,  the  other 
devisees  or  legatees,  at  least  such  as  are  in  the  same  class  with  him 
so  far  as  priority  of  payment  is  concerned,  must  contribute  pro  rata 
to  make  up  the  deficiency.7     Where  the  right  of  dower  includes  title 

abate  on  deficiency  of  assets,  if  the  testa-  B.  Mon.  370,  395 ;  Witherspoon  v.  Watts, 

tor  left  real  estate  of  which  the  widow»is  18  S.  C.  396,  423  ;  McReynolds  v.  Counts, 

dowable :  Howard  v.  Francis,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  9  Gratt.  242.     So  where  a  testator  gave 

444,  447) ;  Chambers  v.  Davis,  15  B.  Mon.  his  wife  a  life  estate  in  his  property,  with 

522,  527 ;  Arrington  v.  Dortch,  77  N.  C.  one-half  the  remainder  to  her   heirs  and 

367  ;    Steele  v.  Steele,  64  Ala.  438,  462 ;  the  other  half  to  a  church,  and  she  elects 

Hauna  v.  Palmer,  6  Col.  156,161;  Miller  to  take  her  dower,  consisting   (under  a 

v.  Buell,  92  Ind.  482 ;  Kayser  v.  Hodopp,  statute  to  that  effect)  of  a  fee  in  one-half 

116  Ind.  428;    Warren  v.  Morris,  4  Del.  the  property,  the  church   takes  a   fee  in 

Ch.  289,  306.  one-fourth  :  Lilly  v.  Menke,  143  Mo.  137. 

1  Brant's  Will,  40  Mo.  266,  277.  6  Lawrence's    Appeal,  49    Conn.  411, 

2  1  Jarm.  on  Wills,  *466.  424. 

3  Kempton,  Appellant,  23  Pick.  163,  1  Latta  v.  Brown,  96  Tenn.  343,  and 
164.  cases  cited  ;    see  also  Jones  v.  Knappen, 

4  Bullard  v.  Benson,  31  Hun,  104  ;  supra,  and  other  authorities  supra.  But  it 
Chamberlain  v.  Chamberlain,  43  N.  Y.  is  also  held  that  this  doctrine  should  not 
424,  443  ;  Kerr  v.  Dougherty,  79  N.  Y.  be  applied  to  the  extent  of  interfering 
327,  345  ;  Matter  of  Benson,  96  N.  Y.  499.  with  the  rules  of  priority  of  legacies  given 

6  Jones  v.  Knappen,  63  Vt.  391,  396  ;  in  the  will  or  by  the  law,  and  hence  that 

Dean  v.  Hart,  62   Ala.  308,  310;  Sandoe's  residuary  legatees  and  heirs  of  undisposed 

Appeal,   65   Pa.    St.  314,316;    Batione's  of  property  must  bear  the  loss  rather  than 

Estate,  136  Pa.  St.  307;    Evan's  Estate,  preferred  legacies:    Vance's    Estate,  141 

150  Pa.  St.  212  ;  Jennings  v.  Jennings,  21  Pa.  St.  201  ;  Trustees  Church  v.  Morris^ 

Oh.  St.  56,  80;   Timberlake  v.  Parish,  5  99  Ky.  317. 
Dana,  345,  352 ;  McCallister  v.  Brand.  1 1 

293 


273,  *274  ESTATES   OF   DOWER   AND    CURTESY. 


§120 


to  property  specifically  devised  to  another,  and  such  devise  is  void, 
as  contravening  the  homestead  law,  the  widow's  election  to  take 
dower  will  defeat  such  devise,  and  the  devisee  has  no  recourse 
upon  the  estate  for  its  value.1  A  devise  which  is  invalid  (for 
instance,  being  against  the  Statute  of  Perpetuities  by  reason  of  an 
intervening  estate  given  to  the  widow  which  prevents  alienation 
within  the  period  allowed)  cannot  become  valid  by  reason  of  the 
widow's  renunciation.2 

§  120.  Dower  as  affected  by  the  Statute  of  Limitations,  and  by 
Estoppel.  —  It  was  early  settled  in  England,  and  the  doctrine  was 
adopted  in  many  of  the  States,  that  the  widow's  remedy  for  the 
assignment  of  dower  was  not  within  the  operation  of  the  Statute  of 
Limitations.3  By  the  English  Statute  of  Limitations,4  however, 
Right  of  dow-  suits  for  dower  were  limited  to  twenty  years  after  the 
ress barred         death  of  the   husband;    and   similar   statutes   exist   in 

alter  lapse  of  ' 

many  years.  some  of  the  United  States.  Thus  in  Alabama  the 
remedy  of  the  widow  is  barred,  as  against  the  alienees  of  the  hus- 
band, after  three  years;5  and  although  the  Statute  of  Limitations 
does  not  ])roprto  vigore  limit  the  time  for  the  assignment  of  dower 
as  against  heirs,  yet  a  court  of  equity,  or  even  a  court  of  law,  upon 
principles  of  public  policy  and  general  convenience,  may  refuse  to 
intervene  for  the  relief  of  a  dowress  who  has  slept  upon  her  rights.6 
In  Georgia  dower  is  barred  by  a  failure  to  apply  for  it 
*  within  seven  years  from  the  death  of  the  husband.7  In  [*274] 
Indiana8  and  Mississippi,9  where  dower  is  now  abolished,10 
it  was  formerly  held  that  dower  was  included  in  the  general  Statute 
of  Lim  itations ;  and  it  is  now  so  held  in  Illinois, u  Iowa, 12  Kentucky, 1S 


1  Gainer  v.  Gates,  73  Iowa,  149. 

*  Dean  v.  Mulford,  102  Mich.  510. 

8  Per  Richardson,  C.  J.,  in  Barnard  v. 
Edwards,  4  N.  H.  107,  109  ;  Ridgway  v. 
McAlpiue,  31  Ala.  458,  462. 

*  3  &  4  Wm.  IV.  c.  27. 
6  Code,  1896,  §  1528. 

6  Barksdale  v.  Garrett,  64  Ala.  277, 
281.  "When  twenty  years  are  suffered 
to  elapse  from  the  consummation  of  the 
riiclit  of  dower,"  says  Brickell,  C.  J.,  in 
this  case,  "  in  the  absence  of  evidence 
which  shows  a  recognition  of  the  right  by 
the  parties  whose  estate  is  affected  by  it, 
without,  the  assertion  of  the  right  by  one 
of  the  appropriate  remedies  provided  by 
law.  a  conclusive  presumption  of  its  ex- 
tinguishment arises,  not  only  in  courts  of 
equity,  but  in  courts  of  law":  citing 
earlier  Alabama  cases. 

7  Code,  1895,  §  4689,  pi.  4;  Doyal  v. 
DoyaL81  Ga,  193;  but  the  time  does  not 

294 


run  during  a  suspension  of  the  general 
Statute  of  Limitations :  McLaren  v.  Clark, 
62  Ga.  106,  116. 

8  Harding  v.  Presbyterian  Church,  20 
Ind.  71,  73. 

9  Torrey  v.  Minor,  1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch. 
489,  494. 

10  Ante,  §  106. 

11  But  no  period  short  of  seven  years' 
adverse  possession  under  claim  and  color 
of  title,  and  the  payment  of  taxes,  will 
work  a  bar  to  the  claim  of  dower,  and 
the  same  strictness  of  proof  as  in  actions 
of  ejectment  will  be  required  to  sustain 
the  bar  :  Stowe  v.  Steele,  1 14  111.  382,  386 ; 
Brian  v.  Melton,  125  111.  647. 

12  Rice  v.  Nelson,  27  Iowa,  148,  156; 
but  only  when  there  is  adverse  posses- 
sion :  Berry  v.  Furhman,  30  Iowa,  462, 
464. 

1:1  Kinsolving  v.  Pierce,  18  B.  Mon. 
782,  785. 


§120 


AS  AFFECTED  BY  STATUTE  OF  LIMITATIONS. 


*  274,  *  275 


Maine,1  Michigan,2  New  Jersey,8  Ohio,4  Pennsylvania,6  and  South 
Carolina.6  In  Maryland,7  Montana,8  and  North  Carolina,9  the 
Statute  of  Limitations  is  held  not  to  include  dower;  while  in  Mas- 
sachusetts,10 New  Hampshire,11  New  York,12  and  West  Virginia,18 
it  is  expressly  included.  In  Missouri  it  was  formerly  held  that  the 
action  for  dower  was  not  barred  by  the  Statute  of  Limitations,14  but 
is  now  decided  to  be  within  the  statute  barring  recovery  of  real 
estate  after  ten  years.15  But  although  there  be  no  statute  of  limi- 
tation applicable  to  dower,  the  staleness  of  a  demand  will  in  many 
States  afford  an  equitable  defence  against  a  widow  who  has  per- 
mitted twenty  years  or  more  to  elapse  before  asserting  her  right.16 
Although,  as  a  general  rule,  the  right  of  dower  is .  not  barred,  at 

law,  by  collateral  satisfaction,17  yet  in  equity  the  acceptance 
[*  275]  of   *  anything   in   lieu   thereof    by   the   widow    Accepting 

estops   her   from    claiming   dower   in    addition   ProPerty in 

-£,  .  .  i     t  t  , i  -r   ,i  .„.    .        lieu  of  dower 

thereto.18     Thus  it  has  been  held  that,  if  the  wile  join    estops  the 
her  husband  in  a  deed  conveying  his  real  estate  in  fraud   wldow- 
of  creditors,  and  take  a  deed  from  the  vendee,  she  thereby  divests 
herself  of  her  inchoate  dower,  although  the  conveyances  are  subse- 
quently set  aside  at  the  suit  of  creditors ; 19  and  if  she  join  in  her 
husband's  deed,  she  is  estopped  from  asserting  dower  against  parties 


1  Durham  v.  Angier,  20  Me.  242,  245 ; 
in  this  State  the  action  is  not  harred  until 
twenty  years  and  one  month  after  demand : 
Chase  v.  Alley,  83  Me.  234. 

2  King  v.  Merritt,  67  Mich.  194,  215, 
(limitation  of  twenty  years). 

3  Conover  v.  Wright,  6  N.  J.  Eq.  613, 
615. 

4  Tuttle  v.  Wilson,  10  Oh.  24;  but 
where  the  widow  is  beyond  seas,  equity 
will  not  allow  the  staleness  of  her  claim 
to  bar  dower:  Larrowe  v.  Beam,  10  Oh. 
498,  502. 

5  Care  v.  Keller,  77  Pa.  St.  487,  493. 
Though  the  land  was  alienated  in  the 
husband's  lifetime,  the  widow  is  not 
barred  until  twenty-one  years  from  his 
death:  Winters  v.  De  Turk,  133  Pa.  St. 
359. 

6  Caston  v.  Caston,  2  Rich.  Eq.  1,  3. 

7  Mitchell  v.  Farrish,  69  Md.  235,  241. 
This  case  also  holds  that  a  period  of  four 
years  and  five  months  after  the  husband's 
death  before  suit  brought  does  not  con. 
stitute  laches. 

8  Burt  r.  Cook  Co.,  10  Mont.  571; 
Lynde  v.  Wakefield,  19  Mont.  23. 

9  Campbell  v.  Murphy,  2  Jones  Eq. 
357,  360. 

w  Publ.  St.  1882,  p.  742,  §   14.     But  if 


the  widow  has  been  continuously  occupy- 
ing with  the  heirs  the  dowable  lands,  or 
has  been  receiving  the  rents,  she  will  not 
be  barred  by  this  statute  from  having  her 
dower  assigned  whenever  the  heirs  seek 
to  hold  their  shares  in  severalty  :  Hastings 
v.  Mace,  157  Mass.  499;  the  statute  ap- 
plies, however,  where  the  land  passes  to  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  without  notice  of  her 
rights:  O'Gara  v.  Neylon,  161  Mass.  140. 

11  Robie  v.  Flanders,  33  N.  H.  524,  528. 

12  Spoor  v.  Wells,  3  Barb.  Ch.  199,  203. 
18  Smith  v.  Wehrle,  41  W.  Va.  270. 

14  Littleton  v.  Patterson,  32  Mo.  357, 
365 ;  Johns  v.  Fenton,  88  Mo.  64. 

15  Robinson  i;.  Ware,  94  Mo.  678;  Beard 
v.  Hale,  95  Mo.  16 ;  Farris  v.  Coleman,  103 
Mo.  352. 

i6  Barksdale  v.  Garrett,  64  Ala.  277, 
281 ;  Gilbert  v.  Reynolds,  51  111.  513, 
516;  Kiddall  v.  Trimble,  1  Md.  Ch.  143, 
150;  Carmichael  v.  Carmichael,  5  Humph. 
96,  99. 

17  2  Scrib.  on  Dower,  253,  and  authori- 
ties there  cited. 

18  See  on  the  doctrine  of  election,  ante, 
§  119. 

19  Meyer  v.  Mohr,  19  Abb.  Pr.  299,305: 
but  see  as  to  dower  in  lands  fraudulently 
conveyed,  ante,  §  113. 

295 


*  275,  *  276  ESTATES   OP   DOWER   AND    CURTESY.  §  121 

claiming  under  it.1  So  if  the  widow  sell,  as  administratrix,2  or  join 
in  the  conveyance  by  the  heirs,8  with  covenant  of  good  and  perfect 
title,  she  is  estopped  from  claiming  dower  in  the  estate  sold.2  In 
like  manner,  she  will  be  estopped  from  asserting  dower  in  property 
which  by  her  conduct,  or  by  means  of  fraudulent  practices,  she  has 
induced  others  to  buy  under  the  belief  that  she  waives  her  dower 
right;4  a  fortiori  if  she  enjoy  and  retain  the  fruits  and  benefits  of 
her  misguiding  acts.5  But  it  is  no  defence  to  an  action  for  dower 
that  the  defendant  was  a  purchaser  in  good  faith  and  had  no  notice 
of  the  widow's  right; 6  nor  is  the  statement  by  the  widow,  that  the 
purchaser  would  get  a  perfect  and  unquestionable  title  sufficient  to 
estop  her  from  claiming  dower,  if  it  could  not  have  misled  the  pur- 
chaser.7 So  the  receipt  of  payments,  under  an  agreement  that,  so 
long  as  the  widow  made  no  claim  to  dower,  a  certain  sum  should  be 
paid  to  her  annually,  does  not  create  an  estoppel.8 

§  121.  Estate  by  the  Curtesy.  —  At  common  law  (both  at  law  and 
in  equity)  an  estate  of  freehold  for  the  term  of  his  life  devolves 
upon  the  husband  on  the  death  of  his  wife,  known  as  the  estate  by 
the  curtesy  of  England,  in  the  lands  and  tenements  of  which  she 
was  seised  in  possession  during  coverture  in  fee  simple  or  tail, 
provided  lawful  issue  had  been  born  to  them  capable  of  inheriting 
the  estate.9    This   estate,  like  dower,    of  which  it  is  the 

*  counterpart,  was  introduced  into  the  several  States,  and  [*  276] 
is  in  existence  in  most  of  them,  either  by  special  enactment 

of  the  legislature,  or  by  the  judicial  recognition  of  its  introduction 
with  the  common  law.  It  has  been  held  to  exist  in  Alabama,10 
Arkansas,11  Connecticut,12  Delaware,18  Illinois,14  Iowa,16  Kentucky,16 
Maine,17  Maryland,18  Massachusetts,19  Michigan,20  Minnesota,21  Mis- 

1  Dnndas  v.  Hitchcock,  12  How.  (U.  S.)  9  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *  127  et  seq. 

256,  267  ;  Johnson  v.  Van  Velsor,  43  Mich.         10  Wells    v.   Thompson,    13    Ala.   793, 

208,   216;    Elmendorf    v.   Lockwood,    57  803. 

N.  Y.  322,  325.  n  McDaniel  v.  Grace,  15  Ark.  465,  483. 

2  Magce  v.  Mellon,  23  Miss.  585  12  Watson  v.  Watson,  13  Conn.  83,  86. 
8  Reeves  v.  Brooks,  80  Ala.  26,  29.  1S  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *  129. 

*  Allen   v.    Allen,    112   111.   323,   328;  14  Monroe  v.  Van  Meter,  100  111.  347, 

Knox  v.  Higginbotham,  75  Ga.  699,  701  ;  352.     Curtesy  is  now  abolished  in  Illinois. 

Danlap  v.  Thomas,  69  Iowa,  358;    Con-  As  to  the  husband's  interest,  see  infra. 

nolly  v.  Branstler,  3  Bush,  702  ;  Sweaney  16  Curtesy  is  abolished  in  Iowa,  but  the 

v.  Mallory,  62  Mo.  485, 487.    So  accepting  husband  takes  "  dower  "  in  the  wife's  es- 

a  lease  in  the  lands  will    bar  her  from  tate:  Ilurleman  v.  Hazlett,  55  Iowa,  256. 

claiming  dower  during  the  term:  Heiscn  16  Mackey  v.  Proctor,  12  B.  Mon.  433, 

V.  Heisen,  145  111.  658.  436;  Stewart  v.  Barclay,  2  Bush,  550,  554; 

8  Hodges  V.  Powell,  96  N.  C.  64,  68;  or  Yankee  v.  Sweeney,  85  Ky.  55. 

if  she  receives  a  valuable  consideration:  n  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *  129. 

Bmith  v.  Oglesby,  83  S.  C.  194.  J8  Rawlings  v.  Adams,  7  Md.  26,  54. 

•"'  Cruize  v.  Pillmire,  69  Iowa,  397.  w  Shores  v.  Carley,  8  Allen,  425. 

"I  Martian  V.  N'-rria,  91   Mo.  465,  475;  20  Brown  v.  Clark,  44  Mich.  309. 

Heller's  Appeal,  116  Pa.  St.  534.  21  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *  129. 

8  Heller's  Appeal,  1 16  Pa.  St.  534,  544. 

296 


§121 


ESTATE   BY   THE   CURTESY. 


276 


souri,1  Nebraska,2  New  Hampshire,8  New  Jersey,4  New  York,5 
North  Carolina,6  Ohio,7  Oregon,8  Pennsylvania,9  Ehode  Island,10 
South  Carolina,11  Tennessee,12  Vermont,18  Virginia,14  West  Virginia,15 
and  Wisconsin.16  In  California,  Louisiana,  Nevada,  and  Texas, 
estates  by  the  curtesy  and  dower  never  existed,17  and  in  Arizona, 
Colorado,  Connecticut,  Indiana,  Idaho,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Minnesota, 
Mississippi,  Nevada,  North  Dakota,  South  Dakota,  Washington,  and 
Wyoming,  they  have  been  abolished  by  statute.17  In  Illinois  curtesy 
is  abolished,  and  the  husband  takes  "dower"  in  his  wife's  realty.18 

The  requisites  to  entitle  a  husband  to  curtesy  are,  —  1.  Lawful 
marriage;  2.  Seisin  of  the  wife  during  coverture  of  an  estate  of 
inheritance,  either  legal  or  equitable;  3.  Birth  of  a  child  alive 
during  the  life  of  the  wife ; 19  and  4.  Death  of  the  wife. 

The  seisin  must,  in  general  terms,  be  one  of  inheritance,  but 
may  be  either  legal  or  equitable;20  whether  there  must  be  actual 


i  Tremmel  v.  Kleiboldt,  75  Mo.  255. 

2  Forbes  v.  Sweesy,  8  Neb.  520,  525. 

8  Martin  v.  Swanton,  65  N.  H.  10. 

*  Cushing  v.  Blake,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  689. 

6  Leach  v.  Leach,  21  Hun,  381. 

6  Childers  v.  Bumgarner,  8  Jones  L. 
297  ;  Nixon  v.  Williams,  95  N.  C.  103. 

1  Koltenbrock  v.  Cracraft,  36  Oh.  St. 
584. 

8  Gilmore  v.  Gilmore,  7  Oreg.  374. 

9  Commissioners  v.  Poor,  169  Pa.  St. 
116. 

1°  Briggs  v.  Titus,  13  R.  I.  136. 
»  Withers  v.  Jenkins,  14  S.  C.  597. 
W  Crumley  v.  Deake,  8  Baxt.  361. 

13  Haynes  v.  Bourn,  42  Vt.  686. 

14  Carpenter  v.  Garrett,  75  Va.  129. 
The  husband  has  now  only  a  modified 
tenancy  by  the  curtesy  :  Browne  v.  Bock- 
over,  84  Va.  424. 

16  Winkler  v.  Winkler,  18  W.  Va.  455. 

16  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *  129. 

»  Ante,  §  106. 

is  Bedford  v.  Bedford,  136  111.  354, 
which  may  be  changed  by  the  legislature 
while  inchoate:  McNeer  v.  McNeer,  142 
111.  388 ;  and  in  general  the  same  right  is 
conferred  as  a  widow  had  in  her  husband's 
realty  :  Heisen  v.  Heisen,  145  111.  658  ;  but 
where  the  husband  has  an  estate  at  com- 
mon law  by  curtesy  initiate  the  legislature 
cannot  deprive  him  of  such  vested  interest : 
Jackson  v.  Jackson,  144  111.  274. 

19  In  Pennsylvania  the  birth  of  a  child 
is  not,  by  provision  of  the  statute,  neces- 
sary :  1  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *  140,  §  46  ;  but 
the  maxim   of   the  common  law  iu   this 


respect  is  Mortuus  exitus  non  est  exitus, 
and  if  the  mother  die  before  exitus,  and 
that  be  by  the  Caesarian  operation,  though 
it  be  born  alive,  it  would  not  be  sufficient 
to  give  the  father  curtesy  :  lb.,  referring 
to  Co.  Litt.  29  6;  Marsellis  v.  Thalhi- 
mer,  2  Pai.  35,  42.  But  it  is  immaterial 
whether  the  child  is  born  before  or  after 
the  wife  acquires  her  estate  :  Jackson  v. 
Johnson,  5  Cow.  74,  102  ;  Comer  v.  Cham- 
berlain, 6  Allen,  166,  170. 

20  Robison  v.  Codman,  1  Sumn.  121, 
128  ;  Davis  v.  Mason,  1  Pet.  503,  508 ; 
Tremmel  v.  Kleiboldt,  6  Mo.  App.  549, 
affirmed,  75  Mo.  255  ;  Cornwell  v.  Orton, 
126  Mo.  355;  Robinson  v.  Lakenan,  28 
Mo.  App.  135,  140 ;  Winkler  v.  Winkler, 
18  W.  Va.  455,  456;  Cushing  v.  Blake, 
30  N.  J.  Eq.  689 ;  unless  the  devise  or 
conveyance  bar  the  right :  Monroe  v.  Van 
Meter,  100  111.  347  ;  Chapman  v.  Price,  83 
Va.  392  ;  and  a  conveyance  by  the  husband 
to  the  wife  for  her  separate  use  presump- 
tively excludes  his  curtesy :  Dugger  v. 
Dugger,  84  Va.  130,  144;  and  see  Haight 
I?.  Hall,  74  Wis.  152.  The  use  of  such 
words  as  "exclusively  of  her  said  hus- 
band," "  in  trust  for  the  sole  aud  separate 
use  of  my  said  daughter  Adelaide  without 
and  free  from  the  control  of  any  husband," 
&c,  in  the  conveyance  to  the  wife,  have 
been  held  not  sufficient  to  deprive  the 
husband  of  curtesy:  Rank  v.  Rank,  121 
Pa.  St.  191 ;  Dubs  v.  Dubs,  31  Pa.  St.  149, 
citing  numerous  cases ;  Soltan  v.  Soltan, 
93  Mo.  307.  But  see  on  this  point,  Mc- 
Cullongh  v.  Valentine,  24  Neb.  215. 
297 


*  277,  *  278  ESTATES    OF   DOWER    AND   CURTESY.  §122 

*  seisin,  as  at  common  law,  the  authorities  diverge  in  the  [*  277] 
several  States,  most  of  them  holding  to  the  common-law 
rule;1  but  in  some  instances  curtesy  is  allowed  in  reversions  to 
which  the  wife  was  entitled,  seisin  in  law  being  deemed  sufficient.2 
Possession  by  some  coparceners,  or  tenants  in  common,  amicable  to 
the  others,  is  sufficient  seisin  iu  fact  to  vest  an  estate  by  the  curtesy 
in  the  husbands  of  such  others.3 

Upon  the  birth  of  a  child  alive,  the  husband's  right  to  curtesy 
in  the  lands  of  his  wife  is  said  to  be  initiate.  In  this  condition  it  is 
both  salable  and  assignable.4  It  is  consummated  by  the  death  of 
the  wife,  the  freehold  thereby  devolving  upon  him  ipso  facto,  in  like 
manner  as  the  estate  of  the  ancestor  upon  the  heir; 5  no  preliminary 
form  is  necessary  to  consummate  his  title. 

§  122.  Community  Property.  —  Community  is  the  name  by  which, 
in  the  French  law,  a  species  of  partnership  is  designated,  contracted 
Community  between  a  man  and  a  woman  when  they  are  lawfully 
property.  married  to  each  other.6     It  maybe  either  conventional, 

when  formed  by  express  agreement  in  the  marriage  contract,  or 
legal,  arising  out  of  the  contract  itself.  It  is  necessary  to  consider, 
briefly  at  least,  the  nature  and  incidents  of  the  property 
affected  by  the  law  of  community,  because,  in  the  States  *  of  [*  278] 
Arizona,  California,  Idaho,  Louisiana,  Nevada,  Texas,  and 
Washington  its  devolution  upon  the  death  of  the  husband  or  wife 
affects  the  common-law  principles  governing  descent,  dower,  and 
curtesy. 

Under  the  Code  of  Louisiana,7  every  marriage  superinduces  of 
right  partnership  or  community  of  acquests  or  gains,  unless  the 
Under  Code  of  contrary  be  stipulated,  consisting  of  the  profits  of  all 
Louisiana.  the  effects  of  which  the  husband  has  the  administration 

1  Carpenter   v.    Garrett,   75    Va.    129,  298,  322;  Day  v.  Cochran,  24  Miss.  261, 

134;    Stewart   v.   Barclay,   2    Bush,   550,  277.     In  Kentucky,  however,  this  excep- 

553;  Reed  v.  Reed,  3  Head,  491  ;  Tayloe  tion  is  not  allowed :  it  was  first  questioned 

v.  Gould,    10   Barb.   388,  400;   Baker  v.  in  Vauarsdall  v.  Fauntleroy,  7   B.   Mon. 

Oakwood,  49  Hun,  414  ;  Orford  v.  Benton,  401,  402,  and  denied  in  Neely  v.  Butler,  10 

.'if,   N.  H.  395,  402;  Malone  v.  McLaurin,  B.  Mon.  48,  51. 

40   Miss.    161,   103;    Shores  v.   Carley,   8  3  Carr  v.  Givens,  9  Bush,  679 ;  Wass  v. 

Allen,  425;    Planters'  Bank  v.  Davis,  31  Bucknam,  38  Me.  356,  360 ;  Vanarsdall  v. 

Ala.   626,  <>29;   Mackcy  v.   Proctor,   12  B.  Fauntleroy,  7  B.  Mon.  401. 
Mon.   433,   436;    Nixon  v.   Williams,  95  4  Briggs  v.  Titus,  13  R.  I.  136,  citing 

N.  ('.  lo.'i.  and   approving    In   re    Voting   Laws,    12 

-  McKee  v.  Cottle,  6    Mo.  App.  416;  R.  I.  586;  Martin  v.  Pepall,  6  R.I.  92; 
Bnsh  v.   Bradley,  4   Day,  298,  305.     And  Gay  v.  Gay,  123  111.  221  (holding  a  volun- 
it  is  generally  held  that  a   feme  covert  is  tary  conveyance  to  be  iu  fraud  of  credit- 
considered    in  law  as  in   fact  possessed  of  ors) ;   Lang  V.  Hitchcock,  99  111.  550,552, 
the  wild  lands  she  may  own,  so  as  to  sup-  citing  Rose  v.  Sanderson,  38  111.  247,  and 
port   curtesy   in   her  hushand  ;  Jackson  v.  Shortall  v.  Hinckley,  31  111.219. 
Sellick,  8  John.  262,  270;  Davis  v.  Mason,  b  Watson  v   Watson,  13  Conn.  83,  85. 
I    Pel    506;   Barr  v.  Galloway,  1  McLean,  8  Bouvier,  Law  Diet.,  "  Community." 
476,480;   Guiorj  v.   Anderson,  8  Humph.  7  Civ.  Code,  1870,  art.  2399  et  seq. 
29  ■ 


§122  COMMUNITY   PROPERTY.  *  278,  *  279 

and  enjoyment,  of  the  produce  of  the  reciprocal  industry  of  both 
husband  and  wife,  and  of  the  estates  which  they  may  acquire  during 
coverture,  either  by  donations  to  them  jointly,  or  by  purchase,  sub- 
ject to  the  debts  contracted  during  the  marriage,  which  must  be 
acquitted  out  of  the  common  fund,  whilst  the  debts  of  husband  or 
wife  anterior  to  the  marriage  are  payable  out  of  their  own  individual 
effects.  The  husband  administers  the  community  property  and  may 
dispose  of  the  same  without  the  wife's  consent;  but  she  has  her 
action  against  the  husband's  heirs  if  she  prove  that  he  has  sold  or 
otherwise  disposed  of  it  in  fraud  to  her  injury.  Upon  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  marriage  all  the  effects  in  the  reciprocal  possession  of 
both  husband  and  wife  are  presumed  common  effects  or  gains,  unless 
it  be  satisfactorily  proved  which  of  them  were  brought  in  marriage, 
or  have  been  given  or  inherited  separately,  and  the  community 
property  is  divided  into  two  equal  portions  between  the  husband 
and  wife,  or  between  their  heirs;  the  gains  are  equally  divided, 
although  one  brought  in  marriage  more  than  the  other,  or  even 
where  one  brought  nothing  at  all,  including  the  fruits  hanging  by 
the  roots  on  the  hereditary  or  proper  lands,  and  the  young  of  cattle 
yet  in  gestation,  but  not  the  fruits  of  the  paraphernal  effects  reserved 
to  herself  by  the  wife.  The  wife  and  her  heirs  and  assigns  may 
exonerate  themselves  from  the  debts  contracted  during  the  marriage 
by  renouncing  the  gains,  unless  the  wife  took  an  active  concern  in 
the  effects  of  the  community.  But  she  must  make  an  inventory, 
and  renounce  within  a  proper  time ;  and  if  she,  being  above  the  age 
of  majority,  permit  judgment  to  pass  against  her  as  a  partner,  she 
loses  the  power  of  renouncing.  If  she  die  before  making  the 
inventory,  the  heirs  shall  be  allowed  another  term  of  equal  length, 
and  thirty  days  in  addition  thereto,  to  deliberate.  Creditors  of  the 
wife  may  attack  the  renunciation,  if  made  to  defraud  them,  and 

accept  the  community  of  gains  in  their  own  names. 
[*279]         *The  widow,  whether  she  accept  or  renounce,  has  the 

right,  during  the  delay  granted  her  to  deliberate,  to  receive 
her  reasonable  maintenance  and  that  of  her  servants  out  of  the  pro- 
visions in  store,  and  if  there  be  none,  to  borrow  on  account  of  the 
common  stock;  and  she  owes  no  rent  during  such  term  for  a  house 
inhabited  by  her,  belonging  to  the  community  or  to  the  heirs  of  the 
husband,  and  if  such  house  was  rented,  the  rent  is  payable  out  of 
the  common  fund. 

In  California,  upon  the  death  of  the  wife  the  entire  community 
property,  without  administration,  belongs  to  the  surviving  husband, 
except  such  portion  thereof  as  may  have  been  set  apart  Under  Code  of 
to  her  by  judicial  decree,  which  is  subject  to  her  testa-  California, 
mentary  disposition,  and  in  the  absence  thereof  goes  to  her  descend- 
ants or  heirs  exclusive  of  the  husband.  Upon  the  death  of  the  hus- 
band, one-half  of  the  community  property  goes  to  the  surviving  wife, 

299 


*  279,  *  280  ESTATES   OP    DOWER    AND    CURTESY.  §  122 

and  the  other  half  to  his  devisees  or  heirs,  subject  to  debts,  family 
allowance,  and  expenses  of  administration.1  In  case  of  the  hus- 
band's death  without  descendants  the  wife  is  entitled  to  three- 
fourths.3 

In  Texas  the  property  owned  before  marriage  by  either  husband  or 
wife,'  or  acquired  during  coverture  by  gift,  devise,  or  descent, 
together  with  all  the  increase  of  lands  (and  formerly  of 
slaves)  so  acquired,  are  his  or  her  separate  property; 
but  all  property  acquired  by  either  husband  or  wife  during  coverture, 
except  in  the  manner  aforesaid,  is  the  common  property  of  the  hus- 
band and  wife,  and  during  coverture  may  be  disposed  of  by  the 
husband,  and  is  liable  for  the  debts  of  the  husband  and  for  the  debts 
of  the  wife  contracted  during  the  marriage  for  necessaries.  Upon 
the  dissolution  of  the  marriage  by  death,  the  remainder  of  the  com- 
mon property  goes  to  the  survivor,  if  the  deceased  left  no  children,, 
but  if  there  be  a  child  or  children  of  the  deceased,  one-half  shall  go 
to  the  survivor,  and  the  other  half  to  such  child  or  children.  It  is 
not  necessary  for  the  surviving  husband  to  administer  upon  the  com- 
munity property,  but  he  must  file  a  full,  fair,  and  complete  inventory 
and  appraisement  of  all  the  community  property,  and  keep  a  fair 
and  full  account  of  all  exchanges,  sales,  and  other  disposition  of  the 
community  property,  and  upon  final  partition  account  to  the  legal 
heirs  of  his  wife  for  their  interest  in  the  community  and  the  increase 
and  profits  of  the  same.  In  default  of  such  inventory,  and 
in  default  of  bond,  *  when  required,  administration  may  be  [*  280] 
granted  as  in  other  cases.  The  same  right  is  accorded  to  a 
surviving  wife,  until  she  marry  again,  in  which  case  there  must  be 
administration.8 

In  Nevada  the  community  property  is  defined  like  that  in  Texas ; 4 
the  wife  is,  however,  required  to  file  a  full  and  complete  inventory 

„  of  her  separate  property  in  the  office  of  the  recorder  of 

the  county  in  which  she  resides,  and  if  there  be  real 
estate,  also  in  the  counties  in  which  the  same  lies,  in  default  of 
which  such  property  is  prima  facie  not  her  separate  property.  The 
husband  controls  the  community  property,  the  wife  her  separate 
property.  There  is  neither  dower  nor  curtesy;  but  on  the  death  of 
the  wife  the  entire  community  property  belongs,  without  adminis- 
tration, to  the  surviving  husband,  and  on  the  death  of  the  husband 
one-half  of  the  community  property  goes  to  the  surviving  wife,  and 

1  Civ.  Code,  §§  1401,  1402;  Hollister  "  In  re  Boody,  113  Cal.  682,  affirmed, 

v.  Cordero,  76  Cal.  04!).     The  entire  com-  as  to  the  law,  in  Estate  of  Boody,  119  Cal. 

muriitv,  <>u   tin:  <  i  <  -;i  ( li   of  the  husband,   is  402. 

administered   as   part    of    the   husband's  8  Pasch.  Ann.  Pig.  art.  4641   et  seq.  ,• 

estate,   and    the    Bnrviving    Wife's    interest      Rev.  St.  1888,  §§  2851  fit  seq. 
goes  to  her  bj  way  of  succession  and  dis-  4   Gen.  St.  1885,  §  508. 

tribution  through  the  probate  court:  /« 
re  Burdick,  112  Cal.  387. 
800 


§  122  COMMUNITY   PROPERTY.  *  280 

the  other  half  to  his  devisees  or  heirs,  subject  to  his  debts,  the 
family  allowance,  and  expenses  of  administration. 

In  Arizona  the  rents  and  profits  of  the  separate  estate  of  either 
husband  or  wife  are  made  by  statute  the  common  property,  of  which 
the  husband  has  the  entire  control  and  management, 
with  absolute  power  to  dispose  of  the  same  as  of  his  own 
separate  estate;  and  property  conveyed  to  the  wife  for  moneyed 
consideration  is  presumed  to  be  common  property,  which  presump- 
tion may,  however,  be  rebutted  by  proof  that  the  property  was 
purchased  with  her  separate  funds.1  The  homestead,  if  selected 
from  the  community  property,  vests  on  the  death  of  the  husband  or 
wife  in  the  survivor.2 

The  law  is  substantially  the  same  in  Idaho3  and  Washington;4 
in  this  latter  State  "the  community,"  composed  of  Idaho, 
husband  and  wife,  is  said  to  be  purely  a  statute  crea-  w  . .  t 
tion.  .  .  .  "It  was  plainly  the  intention  of  the  legisla- 
ture," says  Dunbar,  J.,  "to  depart  from  the  common  law  and 
breathe  into  legal  existence  a  distinct  and  original  creation,  partak- 
ing somewhat  of  the  nature  of  a  partnership  and  of  a  corporation, 
but  differing  in  some  essentials  from  both;  and  this  creature  is 
termed  '  a  community.'  "5  The  whole  community  property  is  to  be 
administered  on  the  death  of  either  spouse,  and  not  merely  of  the 
half  interest  of  the  decedent ; 6  and  if  the  administrator  die  before 
completing  the  administration,  the  estate  should  go  to  an  adminis- 
trator de  bonis  non  ;  but  where  the  survivor's  administrator  admin- 
isters, such  administration  is  merely  irregular  and  not  void,  nor  do 
the  ordinary  rules  relating  to  the  liability  of  executors  de  son  tort 
apply.7 

It  was  decided  in  a  Montana  case,  that  a  widow  who  Montana, 
has  taken  by  virtue  of  the  will  more  than  one-half  of  the  whole 
estate  cannot  claim  any  part  of  the  other  half  on  the  ground  that  the 
whole  estate  was  community  property;8  but  the  statutory  provision 
upon  which  the  decision  is  made  seems  to  have  been  omitted  from 
the  Constitution  and  Codes  of  1895. 9 

1  Charalean  v.  Woffenden,  1  Ariz.  243,  *  Code,  1896,  §  2154.     The  community 
262.  property  is  not  liable  for  a  personal  judg- 

2  Rev.  St.  1882,  §  1100.  ment  against   the    husband:    Brotton    v. 
8  "Community  property  is  property  ac-  Langert,  1   Wash.  73,  Stiles,  J.,  dissent- 
quired  by  husband  and  wife,  or  either,  dur-  ing,  p.  82. 

ing  marriage,  when  not  acquired  as  the  5  Brotton  v.  Langert,  supra,  p.  78. 

separate   property   of   either:"   Rev.    St.  6  Ryan  v.  Ferguson,  3  Wash.  356. 

1887,  §  2829;  including  mining  property  "  In  re  Hill's  Estate,  6  Wash.  285. 

held  under  a  grant  from  the  United  States ;  8  Chadwick    v.   Tatum,   9   Mont.   354, 

and  although  the  wife   may  never   have  369. 

been    a    resident   of    the  territory    [now  9  Civil  Code,  Title  VII.,"  Succession;" 

State]  of  Idaho  :  Jacobson  v.  Bunker  Hill  Title  1,  Ch.  III.,  "  Husband  and  Wife." 
Co.,  2  Idaho,  363. 

301 


281 


ESTATES   OF   DECEASED   PARTNERS. 


§123 


[*  281] 


*  CHAPTER  XII. 

ESTATES  OF  DECEASED  PARTNERS. 


§  123.  Dissolution  of  the  Partnership  by  the  Death  of  one  of 
its  Members.  —  The  death  of  any  member  of  a  firm  operates  its 
Death  of  one  dissolution  as  to  all,1  unless  by  the  articles  of  copartner- 
partner  dis-        ghjp   01.   0ther   agreement   between   the   partners  it    is 

solves  tlltJ  * 

partnership.       otherwise  stipulated. 2     These  agreements  are,  however, 

to  be  looked  upon  as  bargains  for  the  creation  of  a  new  partnership 

when  the  old  one  ceases  to  exist,  since  the  partner  who  has  died 

cannot  by  possibility  continue  a  member  of   the  firm,   and  though 

his  executors  or  children  become  members,  yet   it   cannot  be   the 

same  firm  as  that  of  which  he  was  a  member.8     In  the  absence  of  an 

agreement  of  all  the  partners,  the  executors  of  a  deceased  partner 

Administrator    have  no  right  to  become  partners  with  the  survivors  of 

has  no  nght        ^j     firm,  nor  in  any  manner  to  interfere  with  the  part- 
but  to  demand  '  J  r        . 

accounting.        nership  business,  save  to  represent  the  deceased  for  all 
purposes  of  accounting;4  but  a  testator  may  by  his  will  so  direct 


1  Ames  v.  Downing,  1  Bradf.  321,  325, 
with  numerous  authorities :  Knapp  v. 
McBride,  7  Ala.  19,  28;  Jenness  v.  Carle- 
ton,  40  Mich.  343  ;  2  Lindl.  on  Part.,  1044  ; 
1  Coll.  on  Part.,  §  1G4  ;  Story  on  Part.,  §  5  ; 
'ioard  v.  Clum,  31  Minn.  186. 

2  Shaw,  Appellant,  81  Me  207,  228; 
Scholefield  v.  Eichelberger,  7  Pet.  586,  594; 
r.aughlin  v.  Lorenz,  48  Pa.  St.  275,  282; 
Grat/.  v.  Bayaxd,  1 1  S.  &  li.  41  ;  Edwards 
e.  Thomas,  66  Mo.  408.  481  ;  Espy  v.  Co- 
mer, 76  Ala.  501,  503;  Leaf's  Appeal,  105 
Pa.  St.  505,  513.  See,  also,  llarbster's 
Appeal,  125  Pa.  St.  1,  10. 

:;  Ruger,  Ch.  •!.,  deciding  the  case  of 
Kennedy  i».  Porter,  16  N.  Y.  St,  613,  627  ; 
Matter  of  Laney,  50  Bun,  15, 18,  quoting 
from  Parsons  on  Part.    See  infra,  p.  * 282. 

4  "And,  nnless  restrained  by  special 
agreement,  they  have  the  power,  by  insti- 
tuting a  anil  in  chancery,  to  have  the  affairs 
of  the  partnership  wound  up  in  a  mariner 
which  ij  generally  ruinous  to  the  other 
pan  m  i  ■  Coll  on  Part.,  g  623,  p,  950. 

802 


The  administrator  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  deceased's  interest  in  the  firm  except 
to  see  that  no  waste  or  fraud  is  committed 
in   its   management.     Not  until   the  sur- 
vivor has  paid  off  the  firm  debts,  settled  up 
the  partnership,  and  turned  over  the  pro- 
portionate share  to  the  administrator  of 
the  deceased  partner,  does  the  liability  of 
the  latter  for  such  share  and  its  manage- 
ment commence:    Loomis  *-.  Armstrong, 
63  Mich.   355,  361  ;    Valentine  v.  Wysor, 
123    Ind.  47,  56.     See   remarks   of   Law- 
rence, J.,  in  Miller  v.  Jones,  39  111.  54,  60, 
on  the  relative  rights  and  duties  of  the  ad- 
ministrator of  a  deceased  partner  and  the 
surviving  partners  ;  also  McKcan  v.  Vick, 
108   111.  373,   377,  showing   that  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  administrator  of  the  deceased 
partner  to  compel  the  surviving  partner  to 
Bettle   lip  the  partnership   business  with- 
out   delay.     To    same  effect:    Gwynne  V. 
Estes,  14   Lea.   662.  676.     Only   the   per- 
sonal  representatives  of  the  deceased  part- 
ner—  not    the    heirs  —  can    maintain   an 


§123 


DISSOLUTION    OF   PARTNERSHIP    BY   DEATH.      *  281,  *  282 


the  continuance  of  the  partnership  after  his  death  that  Testator  may 

the  whole  estate  shall  be  liable  for  the  post-mortuary  J^J1'11" 

debts,  or  only  to  the  amount  of  his  actual  interest  in  the  partnership, 
partnership  debts  at  his  decease.1     It  has  been  held  in  England,2 

and   in   some  instances    in   the  United  States,8  that  a  court  of  equity 

court  of   equity  will  authorize   the    administrator  of  a  may  direct 

i  j  j.  j.-  j.-u  l  !.•  continuance. 

deceased  partner  to  continue  the  partnership  in 

[*  282]  *  behalf  of  an  infant  heir  ;  but  this  seems  a  dangerous  power, 
perilous  alike  to  the  administrator,  who  is  personally  liable 
for  debts  incurred  in  the  prosecution  of  the  business,  and  the  bene- 
ficiaries of  the  estate,  whose  interests  may  be  jeoparded  by  the 
vicissitudes  of  trade,  although  the  administrator  may  exercise  the 
utmost  vigilance  and  caution.  The  extent  of  the  lia-  Liability  for 
bility  of  a  deceased  partner's  estate  for  debts  contracted  after8  testator's 
after  his  death  on  behalf  of  the  partnership  will  in  all  death, 
cases  depend  upon  the  terms  of  the  agreement  in  virtue  of  which  it 
is  continued ; 4  and  while  it  is  clear  that,  on  general  principles,  no 
limitation  of  the  extent  of  his  assets  to  be  employed  in  the  partner- 
ship business  can  affect  the  rights  of  creditors  existing  at  the  time 
of  his  death,5  it  is  equally  clear  that  only  the  most  unambiguous 
language,  showing  the  positive  intention  of  the  testator  to  render 
his  general  assets  liable  for   debts  contracted  after  his  death,  can 


action  for  an  accounting  against  the  sur- 
viving partner  :  Robertson  v.  Burrell,  110 
Cal.  568.  In  Missouri  it  is  held  that  the 
statute  provides  "  the  administrator  of  the 
estate  of  the  deceased  partner  an  ample 
remedy  for  an  accounting  and  settlement 
of  the  partnership  estate ;  and  that  the  ad- 
ministrator of  the  individual  estate  is  re- 
miss in  his  duties  in  not  qualifying  in  due 
time  so  as  to  proceed  under  the  statute 
against  the  surviving  partner  " :  Goodson  v. 
Goodson,  140  Mo.  206,  216,  217.  The  per- 
sonal representative  of  the  deceased  part- 
ner may  in  good  faith  settle  the  affairs  of 
the  firm  with  the  survivor,  and  the  same  is 
conclusive  :  Sage  v.  Woodin,  66  N.  Y.  578 ; 
Sternberg  v.  Larkin,  58  Kans.  201  ;  es- 
pecially with  regard  to  the  method  of  dis- 
tribution :  see  §  127. 

1  Story  on  Part.  §  319  a;  Burwell  v. 
Cawood,  2  How.  560,  577  ;  Davis  v.  Chris- 
tian, 15  Gratt.  11  ;  Exchange  Bank  v. 
Tracy,  77  Mo.  594,  599. 

2  Thompson  v.  Brown,  4  John.  Ch. 
619,  citing  Montagu  on  Part.  287  ;  Sayer 
v.  Bennett,  and  Barker  v.  Parker,  1  T.  R. 
295. 

8  Intimation  by  Chancellor  Kent  in 
Thompson   v.   Brown,   supra;   Powell   v. 


North,  3  Ind.  392,  395,  citing  as  authority 
the  case  of  Thompson  v.  Brown,  and  hold- 
ing that  a  probate  court,  by  virtue  of  its 
equity  powers,  may  authorize  the  adminis- 
trator of  a  deceased  partner  to  carry  on  the 
partnership  business  in  behalf  of  an  infant 
heir. 

4  As  to  the  difference  in  the  rights  of 
creditors  of  a  partnership  directed  to  be 
continued  by  a  testator's  will,  and  of  one 
continued  in  virtue  of  a  partnership  con- 
tract, see  Blodgett  v.  American  National 
Bank,  49  Conn.  9,  23  ;  dictum  of  John- 
son, J.,  in  Scholefield  v.  Eichelberger, 
7  Pet.  586,  594;  Davis  v.  Christian,  15 
Gratt.  11,32,  et  seq.  Where  the  provision 
in  the  partnership  article  is  simply  that 
the  deceased  partner's  capital  shall  re- 
main in  the  business,  the  executor  is  not 
admitted  into  the  management  of  the  busi- 
ness: Wild  v.  Davenport,  48  N.  J.  L.  129, 
137  ;  hence  the  executor  of  the  deceased 
partner  cannot,  in  such  case,  be  sued  as  a 
member  of  a  new  firm  :  Stewart  v.  Robin- 
son, 115  N.  Y.   328,  343.  ' 

5  Coll.  on  Part.,  §  618;  Tomkins  v. 
Tomkins,  18  S.  C.  1 ;  In  re  Clap,  2  Low. 
Dec.  168. 

303 


282,  *  283  ESTATES   OF   DECEASED    PARTNERS. 


§123 


justify  the  extension  of  the  liability  of  his  estate  beyond  the  actual 
fund  employed  in  the  partnership  at  the  time  of  his  death.1 

The  continuation  of  the  partnership  after  the  testator's  death,  in 
pursuance  of  the  directions  in  the  will,  has  the  effect  of  creating  a 
Continuance  new  partnership,  of  which  the  survivors  and  executors 
creatL'new  °^  *ke  deceased  partner  are  the  members  ;  and  cred- 
partnership.  itors  of  this  new  firm  have  no  claim  upon  the 
*  general  assets  of  the  testator,  but  only  upon  such  assets  as  [*  283] 
are  directed  by  the  will  to  be  therein  employed.2  And  in 
this  new  firm  the  executor  pledges  his  own  responsibility  to  the  cred- 
itors, although  he  carries  on  the  business  not  for  his  own  benefit,  but 
only  for  the  benefit  of  children  or  legatees  of  the  testator.3  Hence  it 
Executor  may  must  be  optional  with  the  executor,  even  where  an  appar- 
thmTpartne"-  ent  duty  *s  imposed  by  the  will,  to  refuse  to  connect  him- 
ship-  self  with  the  business,  and  with  still  greater  reason  in  the 

case  of  an  administrator.4  If  he  carries  out  the  request  of  the  testator 
in  continuing  his  business  after  his  death,  it  is  to  be  conducted  in  the 
manner  in  which  the  testator  conducted  it ;  and  the  general  rule  that 
if  an  executor  sell  on  credit  he  must  take  security  for  the  effects  sold 
does  not  apply  to  sales  made  in  the  course  of  such  business.5 


1  Story,  J.,  in  Burwell  v.  Cawood,  2 
How.  560,  577  ;  Stewart  v.  Robinson,  115 
N.  Y.  328 ;  Jacquin  v.  Buisson,  1 1  How. 
Pr.  385,  389  ;  Brasfield  v.  French,  59  Miss. 
632,  636  ;  In  re  Clap,  2  Low.  168;  Smith 
v.  Aver,  101  U.  S.  320,  330.  In  Hart  v. 
Anger,  38  La.  An.  341,  a  clause  in  the 
partnership  articles  that  "  in  the  event  of 
the  death  of  either  of  the  parties  to  this 
act,  it  is  to  be  optional  with  the  survivor 
whether  said  copartnership  shall  continue 
or  not,"  was  held  not  to  be  enforceable. 
In  England  an  executrix,  who  was  directed 
to  carrv  on  her  testator's  partnership  and 
exceeded  her  authority  by  employing  as- 
sets therein  to  an  extent  not  warranted  by 
the  will,  was  allowed,  upon  her  and  the 
surviving  partner's  bankruptcy,  to  prove 
for  the  excess  so  employed  under  their 
commission  :  Ex  parte  Richardson,  Buck's 
Cas.  in  Bankr.  202,  209. 

2  Pitkin  v.  Pitkin,  7  Conn.  307,  311  ; 
Stanwood  v.  Owen,  14  Gray,  195;  Colum- 
bns  Watch  Co.  v.  Hodenpyl,  61  Hun,  557, 
560;  S.  c.  on  appeal,  135  N.  Y.  430;  Wil- 
cox v.  Derickson,  168  Pa  St.  331;  Vin- 
cenl  '•  Martin,  79  Ala.  540,  544. 

«  2  Coll  on  Part.,§§  621,  622,  citing 
Garland  ea  parte,  in  which  Lord  Eldon 
sayg  (referring  to  an  executor  carrying  on 

the  partnership  l.nsiness  under  direction  of 
304 


the  will)  that  "  the  case  of  the  executor  is 
very  hard.  He  becomes  liable,  as  person- 
ally responsible,  to  the  extent  of  all  his 
own  property ;  also  in  his  person,  and  as 
he  may  be  proceeded  against  as  a  bank- 
rupt, though  he  is  but  a  trustee.  But  he 
places  himself  in  that  situation  by  his  own 
choice,  judging  for  himself  whether  it  is 
fit  and  safe  to  enter  into  that  situation, 
and  contract  that  sort  of  responsibility." 
Wightman  v.  Townroe,  1  Maule  &  Sel.  412 
(in  this  case,  however,  the  executor  had 
no  authority  under  the  will  to  carry  on  the 
partnership)  ;  Alsop  v.  Mather,  8  Conn. 
584,  587  ;  Citizen's  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ligon, 
59  Miss.  305, 314  ;  Insley  v.  Shire,  54  Kans. 
793  ;  Wild  v.  Davenport,  48  N.  J.  L.  129. 
Obviously  the  executor  does  not  become 
personally  liable  for  debts  contracted  by 
the  firm  during  the  lifetime  of  the  deceased 
partner:  Mattison  v.  Farnham,44  Minn.  95. 

4  Edgar    v.  Cook,  4    Ala.    588,   590 
Jacquin  v.  Buisson,  11  How.  Pr.  385,388 
Louisiana   Bank  v.    Kenner,  1  La.   384 
Berry  v.  Folkes,  60  Miss.  576,  610,  et  seq. 
see  also  Buckingham  v.  Morrison,  136  HI. 
437,  454  ;  and  a  reasonable  time    within 
which  to  elect  is  given  :  Wild  v.  Davenport, 
48  N.  J.  L.  129,  136. 

6  Cline's  Appeal,  106  Pa.  St.  617. 


§124 


POWERS   AND   LIABILITIES   OF   PARTNERS.      *  283,  *  284 


§  124.    Powers  and  Liabilities  of  Surviving  Partners.  —  Upon  the 
dissolution  of  a  firm  by  the  death  of  one  of  its  members,  the  sur- 
vivors are,   at  common  law,  alone  entitled  to  sue  and    o,„.,r:„:„„ 
liable  to  be  sued  in  respect  of  debts  owing  to  or  by  the   partners  to  pay 
firm.1     They  have  the  legal  right  to  the  possession  and    debts°  eCt 
disposition  of  all  partnership   effects,  for  the  purpose    ,      ,  . . 
of  paying  the  debts  of  the   firm  and   distributing   the    all  property 
residue  to   those   entitled.2    They    become,  in    ^"^ 

r*2841  equity,  *  trustees  and  will  be  held  liable  as  such    T 

*  4.    4.1    •  x  4.V  In  trust  t0  Pa7 

tor  any  conversion  to  their  own  use  of  the  part-    debts  and 

nership  funds  or  property  in  their  hands;8  and  if  they  dlstnbute- 

continue  the  trade  or  business  of  the  partnership  with  continuation 

the  partnership  stock,  it  is  at  their  own  risk,  and  they  of  partnership 

will  be  liable,  at  the  option  of  the  representatives  of  the  their  own  risk. 

deceased  partner,  to  account  for  the  profits  made  there-  Representa- 

by,  or  to  be  charged  with  interest  upon  the  deceased  tlves ,"?ay  de" 

°  i'-ii  •  mand  interest, 

partner  s  share  of  the  surplus,  besides  bearing  all  the    or  share  of 
losses ; 4  but,  except  under  particular  circumstances,  the    Pronts- 
party  having  the  choice  cannot  elect  the  interest  for  one  period 
and  the  profits  for  another,  but  must  elect  to  take  one  or  the  other 
for  the  whole  period.5     And  if  the  profits  are  claimed,   bad  debts 

1  Daby  v.  Ericsson,  45  N.  Y.  786,  790 ; 
Murray  v.  Mumford,  6  Cow.  441  ;  Voorhies 
v.  Baxter,  I  Abb.  Pr.  43  ;  Osgood  v.  Spen- 
cer, 2  H.  &  G.  133  ;  Walker  v.  Galbreath, 
3  Head,  315  ;  Roys  v.  Vilas,  18  Wis.  169, 
173. 

2  Hanna  v.  Wray,  77  Pa.  St.  27  ;  Valen- 
tine v.  Wysor,  123  Ind.  47 ;  Hanson  v. 
Metcalf,  46  Minn.  25  ;  Andrews  v.  Brown, 

21  Ala.  437;  Tillotson  v.  Tillotson,  34 
Conn.  335,  358 ;  Territory  v.  Redding, 
1  Fla.  242  ;  Case  v.  Abeel,  1  Pai.  393,  398 ; 
Marlatt  v.  Scantland,  19  Ark.  443,  445  ; 
Gray  v.  Palmer,  9  Cal.  616;  Holland  v. 
Fuller,  13  Ind.  195,  199  ;  Barry  v.  Briggs, 

22  Mich.  201,  206;  Dwinel  v.  Stone,  30 
Me.  384,  386 ;  Evans  v.  Evans,  9  Paige, 
178 ;  Heath  v.  Waters,  40  Mich.  457  ;  Little 
v.  McPherson,  76  Ala.  552,  556  ;  Grim's 
Appeal,  105  Pa.  St.  375,  381 ;  Freeman  v. 
Freeman,  136  Mass.  260,  263  ;  Anderson  v. 
Ackerman,  88  Ind.  481,  485  ;  Dial  i\  Ag- 
new,  28  S.  C.  454  ;  Word  v.  Word,  90  Ala. 
81  ;  State  v.  Withrow,  141  Mo.  69. 

3  Renfrow  v.  Pearce,  68  111.  125; 
Costley  v.  Towles,  46  Ala.  660 ;  Farley  v. 
Moog,  79  Ala.  148  ;  Bell  v.  McCoy,  136  Mo. 
552  ;  Insurance  Co.  v.  Camp,  71  Tex.  503. 
"  The  survivors  do  not  take  such  assets  as 
trustees,  but,  as  survivors,  hold  the  legal 

vol.  i— 20 


title  subject  to  such  equitable  rights  as 
the  representatives  have  in  the  due  appli- 
cation of  the  proceeds  "  •  Ruger,  Ch.  J., 
in  Williams  v.  Whedon,  109  N.  Y.  333, 
338.  The  surviving  partners  are  regarded 
a3  trustees  of  the  firm's  assets  for  the 
benefit  of  the  firm's  creditors,  and  such 
trust  still  attaches  to  such  portion  of  the 
assets  as  are  paid  over  to  the  representa- 
tives of  the  deceased  partner  before  firm 
creditors  are  fully  paid :  Hayward  v. 
Burke,  151  111.  121,  130. 

4  Story  on  Part.,  §  343;  Fithian  v. 
Jones,  12  Phil.  201  ;  Oliver  v.  Forrester, 
96  111.  315,  321  (see  dissenting  opinion, 
325);  Brown's  Appeal,  89  Pa.  St.  139, 
147  ;  Freeman  v.  Freeman,  142  Mass.  98  ; 
Klotz  v.  Macready,  39  La.  An.  638. 
Where  the  surviving  partner,  in  good 
faith,  continued  the  management  of  a 
plantation  and  the  slaves  upon  it,  which 
were  then  lost  by  emancipation,  it  was 
held  in  a  general  settlement  that  he  was 
not  accountable  for  the  value  of  the  slaves, 
but  should  be  charged  the  fair  rental 
value  of  the  property  including  that  of  the 
slaves  while  slaves:  Clay  v.  Field,  138 
U.  S.  464. 

5  Goodburn  v.  Stevens,  1  Md.  Ch.  420, 
430;   Beck  v.   Thompson,   22    Nev.    109 

305 


*  284,  *  285  ESTATES   OF   DECEASED   PARTNERS.  §  124: 

must  also  be  deducted;  and  if  the  continuance  prove  beneficial 
Surviving  to  the  parties,  the  surviving  partner  should  receive  a 

aHvendfieTuj  reasonaDle  allowance  for  his  skill  and  industry  in  con- 
no  compensa-  ducting  the  business,1  although  usually  a  surviving 
partner  is  not  allowed  compensation  for  winding  up  the 
partnership  business,2  unless  the  services  rendered  are  extraordinary 
and  perplexing  in  their  nature,  so  as  to  justify  an  exception  to  the 
general  rule,3  or  stipulated  in  the  articles  of  copartnership.4  The 
whole  transaction  should  be  adopted  or  repudiated.5  If,  however, 
But  heirs  take  the  business  is  carried  on  by  the  survivors  with  the 
<miy  profits,  if    assent  of  the  executor  or  administrator  of  the  deceased 

thev  consent.  . 

partner,  the  survivors  are  liable  for  the  profits   only, 
and  if  a  loss  transpires,  they  are  not  liable  for  either  unless 
Representa-        there  was  *  negligence  or  carelessness   in  the  [*  285] 
tives  not  liable    management  of  the  business.6    Nor  do  the  exec- 

as  partners  tor  ° 

permitting  use  utors,  who  allow  the  share  of  the  capital  of  their  testator 
of  stock.  j.Q  remajn  jn  an([  fog  employed  in  the  business  of  the  part- 

nership after  his  death,  according  to  the  testator's  instruction  in  the 
will  or  the  partnership  agreement,  thereby  become  liable  as  partners, 
or  incur  any  responsibility.7  And  since  the  liability  to  account  for 
profits  after  dissolution  rests  upon  the  exposure  of  the  stock  of  the 
outgoing  partner  to  the  risks  of  the  new  business,  there  is  no  liabil- 
ity to  account  wThen  such  partner  has  withdrawn  as  much  or  more 
than  as  much  of  the  partnership  funds  as  he  is  entitled  to.8  If  the 
business  is  carried  on  with  the  consent  of  some  of  those  who  repre- 
sent the  interest  of  the  deceased  partner,  and  against  the  consent  of 

(allowing  the  surviving  partner  credit  for  p.  25.     This  statute  applies  only  to  com- 

the  cost  of  improvements  made   by  him,  missions  earned  after  its  passage :  Tutt's 

where  the  estate  elected  to  take  the  profits  Estate,  41  Mo.  App.  662. 
instead  of  interest).  8  Hite  v.   Eite,  1    B.    Mon.    177,  179; 

1  Griggs  v.  Clark,  23  Cal.  427,  430;  Maynard  v.  Richards,  166  111.  466  and 
see  also  O'Reilly   v.   Brady,  28   Ala.  530,  cases  cited. 

535  ;  Vanduzcr  v.  McMillan,  37  Ga.  299,  4  Sangston  v.  Hack,  52  Md.  173,  199. 

311;  Schenkl    v.   Dana,    118   Mass.   236;  6  Washburn  v.  Goodman,  17  Pick.  519, 

Freeman  v.  Freeman,  142  Mass.  98  ;  Zell's  526. 
Appeal,  126  Pa.  St.  339.  6  Millard  v.   Ramsdell,  Harr.   (Mich.) 

2  Beatty  v.  Wray,  19  Pa.  St.  516;  Ch.  373,  394.  Bradley,  J.,  in  Clay  v.  Field, 
Loomis  v.  Armstrong,  49  Mich.  521,  525  ;  138  U.  S.  464,  472.  But  in  such  case  the 
Coopei  v.  Reid,  2  Hill  Ch.  (S.  C.)549;  executor  or  administrator  ceases  to  have  a 
Terrell  v.  Rowland,  86  Ky.  67  ;  Maynard  lien  upon  the  property  as  against  subse- 
v.  Richards,  166  111.  466,  480;  Coopers,  quent  creditors  of  the  concern:  Hoyt  v. 
Merrihew,  Riley  Eq.  166;  Starry.  Case,  Sprague,  103  U.  S.  613,  628;  Bell  v.  Ilep- 
59    L.wa,   491,   503;    O'Neill    V.    Huff,  11  worth,  135  N.  Y.  442,  447. 

Phila.  244,  246 ;  Brown's   Appeal,  89   Pa.  7  Richter  v.  Poppenhusen,  39  How.  Pr. 

St.    139;     Piper    i:    Smith,   1     Head,    93;  82,91;   Laughlin  v.  Loreuz,  48  Pa.  St.  275, 

Gregory  v.  Menefee,  88  Mo. 413;  Scndder  282;  Avery  r.  Myers,  60  Miss.  367, 372. 
v.  Ames,  ho  Mo.  496,  509;   S.  C.    142  Mo.  8  Hyde    v.  Easter,  4  Md.  Ch.  80,  84; 

IH7.     In  Missouri  the  statute  now  makes  Taylor  v.  Hutchison,  25  Gratt.  536,  548. 
provision  for  compensation  :     Laws,  1885, 
306 


§124 


POWERS   AND    LIABILITIES   OP   PARTNERS.       *  285,  *  286 


others,  the  earnings  are  to  be  divided  according  to  the  capital  to 
which  each  was  entitled,  after  deducting  such  share  of  them  as  is 
attributable  to  the  skill  and  services  of  the  surviving  partner,1 
if  there  are  no  circumstances  rendering  such  a  rule  unjust  or 
inapplicable.2 

A  distinction  has  been  drawn,  with  respect  to  the  right  of  surviv- 
ing partners,  between  property  or  effects  in  possession,  of  which  the 
personal  representatives  of  deceased  partners  become  Distinction  be- 
tenants  in  common  with  the  survivors,   and  choses  in    fween  effects 

.  ..  .  i-iii  in  possession 

action,  debts,  and  other  rights  ot  action,  which  belong  and  choses  in 
to  the  surviving  partner.8  But  this  distinction  is  in-  actl0a- 
dicative  of  very  slight,  if  any,  practical  difference:  for  as  to  the 
choses  in  action,  the  survivors  become  trustees  thereof  so  soon  as 
they  recover  thereon  or  reduce  them  to  possession,  for  the  benefit  of 
the  partnership,  and  the  representatives  of  the  deceased  partner 
possess  in  equity  the  same  right  of  sharing  and  participating  in 
them  as  the  deceased  partner  himself  would  if  living;4  and  as  to 
their  right  to  the  effects  in  possession,  it  is  sufficient  to  enable  them 

to  wind  up  the  affairs  of  the  firm,  pay  its  debts,  and  dis- 
[*286]  tribute  the  residue.    If  necessary  for  such  *pur-    surviving 

pose,  they  may  recover  the  partnership  property    partners  may- 
even  from  the  administrator  of  the  deceased  partner;5 


1  Kobinson  v.  Simmons,  146  Mass. 
167. 

2  Each  case  depends  on  its  own  circum- 
stances; in  a  case  where  a  surviving 
partner,  believing  he  had  a  right  to  buy 
the  deceased's  interest  in  the  partnership, 
received  and  accounted  for  such  assets  to 
the  executors,  one  of  whom  he  was  him- 
self, at  a  price  they  thought  reasonable, 
but  slightly  under  their  real  value,  where- 
upon said  surviving  partner  formed  with 
others  a  new  firm  which  purchased  said 
assets,  mingled  them  with  new  assets,  and 
sold  them,  —  it  was  held  that  it  would  be 
impracticable,  even  if  just,  to  follow  the 
small  interest  of  the  estate  specifically,  and 
ascertain  how  much  it  had  earned  in  the 
subsequent  business  :  Denholm  v.  McKay, 
148  Mass.  434,  443.  "It  has  in  many 
cases  been  held,"  says  the  court  in  Young 
v.  Scoville,  99  Iowa,  177,  186,  "that  the 
representative  of  the  deceased  partner 
may  have  the  partnership  settled  and  an 
accounting  had  as  of  a  date  later  than  the 
death  of  the  intestate,  and  the  partnership 
treated  as  a  continuing  one." 

3  Sto.  on  Part.,  §  346  ;  Wilson  v.  Soper, 
13  B.  Mon.  411,  413. 


administrator, 

4  Sto.  on  Part.,  §  346  and  authorities ; 
Maynard  v.  Richards,  166  111.  466. 

5  Calvert  v.  Marlow,  18  Ala.  67,  71  ; 
Dwinel  v.  Stone,  30  Me.  384  ;  Hawkins  v. 
Capron,  17  II.  I.  679.  But  the  surviving 
partner  must  prove  the  debt,  like  any 
other  creditor  of  the  deceased,  and  has  no 
preference  over  other  creditors :  Bird  v. 
Bird,  77  Me.  499.  See  also  Wilby  v. 
Phinney,  15  Mass.  Ill,  118,  and  Johnson 
v.  Ames,  6  Pick.  330.  Where  the  estate 
of  the  deceased  partner  is  lawfully  pos- 
sessed of  a  fund  which  is  the  sole  asset  of 
the  partnership,  and  nothing  remains  to 
be  done  except  to  state  an  account  between 
the  partners,  it  need  not  pay  over  that 
fund  to  the  surviving  partner :  Kntz  v. 
Dreibulbis,  126  Pa.  St.  335,  340.  Where 
partnership  property  was  on  dissolution 
left  with  one  of  the  members,  who  died, 
and  the  executor  converted  it  and  placed 
the  proceeds  to  the  credit  of  the  estate, 
the  other  partners  may  recover  from  the 
estate  their  share  of  the  proceeds  only ; 
if  the  act  of  conversion  was  tortious  or 
negligent,  the  executor  is  personally  liable 
for  any  sum  which  the  property  was 
worth  in  excess  of  the  price  realized' 
Bradley  v.  Brigham,  144  Mass.  181. 

307 


*  o 


286 


ESTATES   OF   DECEASED   PARTNERS. 


§125 


Whether  sur- 
viving partner 
ma}-  prefer 
creditors  and 
make  general 
assignment  for 
benefit  of 
creditors. 


and  assign  and  they  may  assign  and  transfer  any  chose  in  action,1  or 
ertySforpay^  partnership  property  in  possession.2  Whether  in  pay- 
ment of  debts.  ing  the  partnership  debts  the  surviving  partner  may 
prefer  one  creditor  over  another,  is  held  differently  in 
different  States.  The  common-law  right  to  do  so  was 
asserted  to  exist  in  Missouri,3  until  the  statute  was 
enacted  requiring  payment  pro  rata  if  the  estate  is 
insolvent,4  and  still  exists  in  some  other  States,5  but 
is  emphatically  denied  in  Colorado6  and  Tennessee.7 
In  Kansas  it  is  held  that  the  statute  prohibits  a  general  assignment 
for  the  benefit  of  creditors  by  a  surviving  partner; 8  and  in  Missouri 
it  was  likewise  so  held,  after  a  full  discussion  of  the  authorities, 
three  judges  dissenting.9  If  the  surviving  partner  is  compelled  to 
pay  a  partnership  debt  in  full,  he  has  a  right  to  contribution  against 
the  estate  of  the  deceased  partner 10  so  also  for  losses  sustained  by 
the  firm,  which  claim  is  contingent  until  the  firm  business  is  settled, 
assets  converted,  and  claims  paid.11 

The  executor  or  administrator  of  a  surviving  partner,  who  died 
with  partnership  effects  in  his  possession  while  engaged  in  settling 
the  partnership  business,  is  entitled  to  the  possession 
of  such  effects,  and  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  com- 
pleting such  settlement;12  and  he  cannot  be  precluded 
from  receiving  compensation  out  of  the  partnership 
funds  for  his  services  in  the  performance  of  this  duty.13 
Remedies  of  Partnership  Creditors  in  Equity.  —  In  equity, 


Executor  or 
administrator 
of  surviving 
partner  en- 
titled to  part- 
nership effects 


§125. 


1  Egberts  v.  Wood,  3  Pai.  517  ;  Peyton 
v.  Stratton,  7  Gratt.  380,  384  ;  French  v. 
Lovejoy,  12  N.  H.  458,  461  ;  Lindner  v. 
Bank,  49  Neb.  735. 

2  Loeschigk  v.  Hatfield,  51  N.  Y.  660; 
Bartlett  v.  Parks,  1  Cush.  82 ;  Rose  v. 
Gunn,  79  Ala.  41 1,415.  But  tbe  surviving 
partner  cannot  exchange  one  kind  of  prop- 
erty for  another :  Perin  v.  McGibben,  6 
U.S.  App.  348,  371. 

3  Collier  v.  Cairns,  6  Mo.  App.  188, 190 ; 
Denny  v.  Turner,  2  Mo.  App.  52,  55. 

4  Laws,  1883,  p.  22. 

B  Ely  v.  Horiue,  5  Dana,  398  ;  Loes- 
chigk v.  Hatfield,  supra  ;  Egberts  v.  Wood, 
3  Paige,  517  ;  Emerson  v.  Senter,  118  U.  S. 
3;  First  National  Bank  v.  Parsons,  128 
Ind.  147  ;  it  was  held  in  New  York  that  an 
;nmenl  for  the  benefit  of  creditors, 
in  which  preferences  are  created,  cannot 
be  made  without  the  assent  of  the  repre- 
sentatives "f  the  deceased  partner :  Nelson 
v.  Tenney,  86  Hun,  327  ;  but  later  cases 
#ive  the  survivor  an  unqualified  right  to 
make  an  assignment  with  preferences  of 
308 


certain  creditors,  and  without  the  assent 
of  the  representatives  of  the  deceased  part- 
ner :  Williams  v.  Whedon,  109  N.  Y.  333 
and  cases  cited. 

6  Salsbury  v.  Ellison,  7  Col.  167,  169. 

7  Barcroft  v.  Snodgrass,  1  Coldw.  430, 
440;  Anderson  v.  Norton,  15  Lea,  14,  28. 

8  Shattuck  v.  Chandler,  40  Kans.  516, 
520. 

9  On  the  ground  that  to  hold  otherwise 
would  be  incompatible  with  the  theory 
that  the  partnership  should  be  adminis- 
tered in  the  probate  court:  State  v.  With- 
row,  141  Mo.  69,  81. 

10  Harter  v.  Songer,  138  1ml.  161. 

11  Logan  v.  Dixon,  73  Wis.  533. 

12  The  administrator  of  the  last  survivor 
stands  in  the  shoes  of  his  last  intestate, 
the  relation  between  him  and  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  partner  first  deceased  be- 
ing that  of  trustee  and  cestui  que  trust : 
Galbraith  v.  Tracy,  153  111.  54. 

13  Dayton  v.  Bartlett,  38  Oh.  St.  357, 
361. 


§  125    REMEDIES  OP  PARTNERSHIP  CREDITORS  IN  EQUITY.     *  286,  *  287 

and    under   the    statutes   of    most   of   the    States,    though    not   at 
common  law,  partnership   creditors  have  the  right,   if    Partnership 
the  surviving  partner  is  insolvent,  to  compel  payment   £redit£™  ™?7 
of  their  debts  out  of  the  deceased  partner's  estate  to  the    of  deceased 

full  amount  of  their  demands.1     Story,   in  his    Partner» 
[*  287]  work  on   *  Partnership,  says  that   formerly  recourse   could 

be  had  against  the  estate  of  the  deceased  partner  whether  the 
only  when  the  survivor  was  insolvent  or  bankrupt,  but  ner7s7n^>ivartt 
that  this  doctrine  has  been  overturned,  and  partnership  or  not. 
creditors  may  now  proceed  against  the  estate  of  the  deceased  partner 
and  enforce  full  payment  of  their  demands,  without  waiting  until 
the  partnership  affairs  are  wound  up.2  Such  is  the  law  in  many 
States  under  their  statutes,  treating  partnership  debts  as  both  joint 
and  several;  for  instance,  in  Alabama,8  Arkansas,4  Connecticut,5 
Florida,6  Indiana,7  Illinois,8  Iowa,9  Kansas,10  Michigan,11  Missis- 
sippi,12 Missouri,18  New  Jersey,14  New  Hampshire,15  Pennsylvania,16 
Tennessee,17  and  Texas.18  But  in  many  others  it  is  still  necessary 
to  aver  and  prove  the  insolvency  of  the  surviving  partner  before  the 
estate  of  the  deceased  can  be  held  liable,  among  which  may  be 
reckoned  Delaware,19  Georgia,20  Louisiana,21  Nebraska,22  New  York,28 
Ohio,24  Virginia,25  Wisconsin,26  and,  according  to  some  old  cases, 
North  Carolina  27  and  South  Carolina.28  This  right  is  self-evidently 
confined  to  debts  of  the  partnership  existing  at  the  time  of  the 
death;  for  it  has  already  been  shown,29  that  even  where  by  the 
terms   of  the  will  of  the  deceased,  or  by  force  of  the  articles  of 

i  2  Coll.  Part.,  §  611.  »  Wisham  v.  Lippincott,  9  N.  J.  Eq. 

2  Doggett   v.   Dill,    108   111.  560,   565,  353;  Green  v.  Butterworth,  45  N.  J.  Eq. 

quoting  Story  on  Part.,  §  362,  and  many  738 ;  see  also  Buckingham  v.  Ludlum,  37 

English  and  American  authorities  :  Nelson  N.  J.  Eq.  137. 

v.   Hill,   5    How.    127,    133,   approved   in         15  Bowker  v.  Smith,  48  N.  H.  Ill,  113. 
Lewis  v.  United  States,  92  U.  S.  618,  622.        1«  Moores'  Appeals,  34  Pa.  St.  411,  412 ; 

8  Waldron   v.  Simmons,  28  Ala.  629;  Williams' Appeal,  122  Pa.  St.  472. 
Rose  v.  Gunn,  79  Ala.  411.  "  Saunders  v.  Wilder,  2  Head,  577. 

4  McLain  v.  Carson,  4  Ark.  164,  166.  *8  Gaut  v.  Reed,  24  Tex.  46,  54. 

5  Camp  v.  Grant,  21  Conn.  41.  w  Currey  v.  Warrington,  5  Harr.  147. 

6  Eillyau  v.  Laverty,  3  Fla.  72, 101.  20  Bennett  v.  Woolfolk,  15  Ga.  213,  221 ; 

7  Hardy  v.  Overman,  36  Ind.  549.  Knox  v.  Bates,  79  Ga.  425. 

8  Silverman   v.   Chase,  90   HI.  37,  41,         21  Dyer  v.  Drew,  14  La.  An.  657  ;  Jones 
followed  and  approved  in  Doggett  v.  Dill,  v.  Caperton,  15  La.  An.  475. 

supra.  22  Leach  v.  Milburn,  14  Neb.  106 ;  Bowen 

9  Ryerson   v.   Hendrie,  22  Iowa,   480,     v.  Crow,  16  Neb.  556. 

Dillon,  J.,  dissenting,  484.  28  Voorhis  v.  Childs,  17  N.  Y.  354;  Ha- 
lo Stout  v.  Baker,  32  Kans.  113.  mersley  v.  Lambert,  2  John.  Ch.  508. 
"  Manning  v.  Williams,  2  Mich.  105  ;         24  Horsey  v.  Heath,  5  Oh.  353,  355. 

Van   Kleeck  v.  McCabe,   87   Mich.  599,        ^  Sale  v.  Dishman,  3  Leigh,  548,  551. 

605-  2s  Sherman  v.  Kreul,  42  Wis.  33,  38. 

12  Miller  v.  Northern  Bank,   34   Miss.        »  Burgwin    v.    Hostler,    1    Tayl.    75 
412,  416  ;  Irby  v.  Graham,  46  Miss.  425  ;  (2d  ed.). 

Freeman  v.  Stewart,  41  Miss.  138,  141.  28  Philson  v.  Bampfield,  1  Brev.  202. 

13  Griffin  v.  Samuel,  6  Mo.  50.  ®  Ante,  §  123. 

309 


*  287,  *  288  ESTATES    OF    DECEASED    PARTNERS.  §  125 

copartnership,  the  business  is  continued  by  the  survivors  together 
with  the  executor  or  other  personal  representative,  a  new 
partnership  is  in  reality  formed,  the  liabilities  of  *  which  [*  288] 
are  entirely  distinct  from  those  of  the  old  firm.  No  notice 
of  the  dissolution  of  the  firm  by  the  death  of  one  of  its  members  is 
necessary  to  discharge  the  estate  of  the  decedent  from  liability  for 
any  subsequent  transaction,  except,  perhaps,  where  the  surviving 
partners,  or  one  of  them,  are  executors  of  the  deceased  partner,  and 
the  business  is  continued  under  the  original  articles  of  copartner- 
ship.1 And  so  the  same  acts  of  the  creditor  which  operate  in  dis- 
charge of  the  surviving  or  of  a  retiring  partner  will  be  equally 
effective  to  discharge  a  deceased  partner's  estate.2 

As  the  personal  representatives  of  a  deceased  partner  may  call  on 
the  survivors  for  an  account  of  the  partnership  affairs,8  so  the 
Creditors  may  creditors  of  the  partnership  may  proceed  against  the 
against  the  survivors,  as  well  as  against  the  representatives  of  the 
survivor  or  deceased,  in  order  to  obtain  payment  of  their  debts  out 
deceased  part-  of  the  assets  of  the  deceased  partner;  but  the  separate 
ner-  creditors,  legatees,  and   next   of   kin  of   the   deceased 

partner  have  no  locus  standi  against  the  surviving  partner,  but  only 
against  the  executors  or  administrators  of  the  deceased,  unless 
there  be  collusion  between  these  persons,  or  circumstances  exist 
which  prevent  the  representatives  themselves  from  obtaining  a 
decree  for  an  accounting.4  If  the  administrator  fails  to  compel  a 
speedy  accounting  by  the  surviving  partner,  he  is  himself  guilty  of 
Laches.5  It  is  to  be  remembered,  in  connection  with  this  question, 
that,  as  a  general  rule,  partnership  creditors  have  a  primary  claim 
upon  partnership  assets,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  creditors  of  indi- 
vidual partners,  until  the  partnership  debts  are  paid,  and  vice 
versa  ; 8  and  that  they  may  enforce  their  rights  in  the  probate  courts, 

1  Story  on  Part.,  §  343,  and  note  citing  of  a  release :  Hanson  v.  Metcalf,  46  Minn. 
Vulliamy  v.  Noble,  3  Mer.  593,  614  ;  Coll.     25,  30. 

on  Part.,  §§  24,  613  ;   Maxlett  v.  Jackman,  3  Ante,  §  123. 
3  Allen,  287,  200  ;   Price  v.  Mathews,   14          4  Coll.  on  Part.,  §§  288,  348. 
La.  An.  11.     See   Dean   v.  Plunkett,    136  5  McKean   v.  Vick,  108  111.373;  Bar- 
Mass.   195,  where    the    surviving   partner  croft  v.  Snodgrass,  1  Coldw.  441 ;  Gwynne 
carried  on  the  business  as  agent  of  the  new  v.  Estes,  14  Lea,  662,  676 ;  see  ante,  §  123, 
firm  under  the  old  name,  and  the  firm  was  p.  *281,  note  4. 
held  liable  for  the  agent's  contracts.                     6  Keese  v.  Coleman,  72  Ga.  658;  Stone 

2  2  Coll.  "ii  Part.,  §  614,  and  authori-  v.  Carey,  42  W.  Va.  276  ;  Warren  v.  Far- 
ties.  Bnt  a  discharge  in  bankruptcy  of  the  mer,  100  Ind.  593,  595;  Farley  v.  Moog, 
surviving  partner  adjudged  bankrupt  on  79  Ala.  148;  Hayward  v.  Burke,  151  111. 
an  act  of  bankruptcy  committed  by  him  in  121  ;  Hanks  r.  Steele,  27  Neb.  K*8;  Claflin 
the  administration  of  the  assets  of  the  dis-  v.  Behr,  so  Ala.  503.  Statutes  looking  to 
solved  partnership,  <]<><■•<  not  discharge  the  the  classification  <>f  demands  against  the 
estate  of  the  deceased  partner  from  lia-  estateof  a  deceased  member  of  a  partner- 
bility:  7n  re  Stevens,  1  Sawy.  897 ;  so  the  ship  and  the  distribution  of  the  estate 
statute  may  aff eel  the  question  of  the  effect  have  do  effect  whatever  on  such  priority. 

810 


§  126       PARTNERSHIP   REAL   ESTATE   ON   DISSOLUTION.        *  288,  *  289 

where  these  have  jurisdiction  over  partnership  estates,  as  well  as  in 
equity;  the  procedure  being  pointed  out  by  the  statute  giving  such 
jurisdiction.1 

§  126.    Effect  of  Dissolution   on  Partnership   Real  Estate.  —  It  is 
now  well  recognized,  that  as  between  copartners  there  is  in  reality 
no  difference  whether  the  partnership  property  held  for    Real  estate 
the  purposes  of  trade  or  business  consists  of  personal  or   g™^  *s  per" 

real  estate,  or  of  both,  so  far  as  their  ultimate    equity. 
[*  289]  *  rights   and  interests   are  concerned.2    However   the   title 
may  stand  at  law,  real  estate  belonging  to  a  partnership  will 
in  equity  be  treated  like  its  personal  funds,  disposable  and  distribu- 
table  accordingly;  and   the  parties  in   whose   names  it  stands,  as 
owners  of  the  legal  title,  will  be  held  to  be  trustees  of   No  surv;vor. 
the    partnership,    accountable   accordingly.     Hence   in    shiP in  real 
equity,  in  case  of  the  death  of  one  partner,  there  is  no    solution  by 
survivorship  in  the  real  estate  of  the  partnership,  but   deatn« 
his  share  will  go,  after  payment  of  partnership  debts,  to  his  proper 
representatives;8  but   all   real   estate   purchased   with   partnership 
funds   for  the   use  of  the   firm,  and  employed  in  the  partnership 
business,  is  in  equity  regarded  as  assets  of  the  partnership,  and  will 
be  applied  to  the  liquidation  of  partnership  debts  in    Widow's 
preference  to  the   debts  of   individual  members  of  the    dowe5 in  Pa,rt- 

7»  a       mi  i  •  c  nership  real 

firm.4     The   dower   interest    of    the   widow   of    a   de-   estate. 


Hundley  v.  Farris,  103  Mo.  78,  86,  and 
cases  cited. 

1  State  v.  Shacklett,  73  Mo.  App.  265. 

2  Story  on  Part.,  §  92. 

8  Story  on  Part.,  §  92  ;  1  Coll.  on  Part., 
§  115,  note,  p.  219;  Shanks  v.  Klein,  104 
U.  S.  18. 

*  Ross  v.  Henderson,  77  N.  C.  170,  172; 
Buchan  v.  Sumner,  2  Barb.  Ch.  165,  200, 
in  which  Chancellor  Walworth  formulates 
the  rule  as  follows :  Real  estate  purchased 
with  partnership  funds,  or  for  the  use  of 
the  firm,  is,  in  equity,  chargeable  with  the 
debts  of  the  partnership,  and  with  any 
balance  which  may  be  due  from  one  copart- 
ner to  another  upon  the  winding  up  of  the 
affairs  of  the  firm ;  secondly,  as  between 
the  personal  representatives  and  the  heirs 
at  law  of  a  deceased  partner,  his  share  of 
the  surplus  of  the  real  estate  of  the  co- 
partnership, which  remains  after  payment 
of  its  debts  and  adjusting  all  the  equitable 
claims  of  the  different  members  of  the 
firm  as  between  themselves,  is  treated  as 
real  estate.  This  view  was  announced  in 
an  elaborate  opinion  upon  a  thorough  re- 
new of  the  American  authorities,  which 


he  found  somewhat  conflicting,  and  was 
approved  by  the  New  York  Court  of  Ap- 
peals in  Collumb  v.  Read,  24  N.  Y.  505, 
512',  Rice  v.  McMartin,  39  Conn.  573,  575 ; 
Darrow  v.  Calkins,  154  N.  Y.  503  ;  Carlisle 
v.  Mulhern,  19  Mo.  56  ,  Matthews  v.  Hun- 
ter, 67  Mo.  293,  295 ;  Martin  v.  Morris,  62 
Wis.  41 8, 427  ;  Espy  v.  Comer,  76  Ala.  501 ; 
Leaf's  Appeal,  1 05  Pa.  St.  505  ;  Messer  v. 
Messer,  59  N.  H.  375,377 ;  and  see  the  cases 
of  Coles  v.  Coles,  15  Johns.  159,  Dyer  v. 
Clark,  5  Met.  (Mass.)  562,  with  collection 
of  authorities  in  1  Am.  Lead.  Cas.  484 
et  seq. ;  also  Hanson  v.  Metcalf,  46  Minn. 
25  (holding  that  an  assignment  by  the  sur- 
vivor will  pass  the  equitable  interest  in  the 
realty  of  the  firm,  though  standing  in  the 
name  of  the  deceased  partner,  and  that  the 
purchaser  could  compel  the  conveyance  of 
the  legal  title);  Van  Aken  v.  Clark,  82 
Iowa,  256  (holding,  under  somewhat  sim- 
ilar circumstances,  that  the  heirs  need  not 
be  made  parties)  ;  Sternberg  v.  Lark'in,  58 
Kans.  201  (holding  that  on  settlement 
with  the  estate's  representative  to  that 
effect,  the  realty  goes  to  the  surviving 
partner  without  a  formal  conveyance). 
311 


*  289,  *  290  ESTATES   OF   DECEASED    PARTNERS.  §  126 

ceased  partner  depends  upon  the  contingency  whether  any  portion  of 
the  proceeds  of  sale  of  partnership  real  estate  remains  to  the  share 
of  her  deceased  husband  after  the  payment  of  all  the  partnership 
debts,  and  advances  made  by  the  other  partners ;  hence  she  has  no 
claim  to  dower  in  the  lands  sold  or  mortgaged  by  the  firm,  although 
she  did  not  join  in  the  sale,  but  may  have  a  dower  interest  in  the 
balance    of    the    purchase-money    so    remaining,    which    is    then 
treated  as  real  estate.1     So   each   partner  has  an  equitable 
Equity  of  part-   *  Merest  in  that  portion  of  the  legal  estate  held  [*  290] 
ner  superior  to   by  the  other,  until  all  the  debts  obligatory  on  the 
rights  of° heirs     firm,  including  advances  by  any  of  the  partners  to  the 
and  devisees,      firm,  are  paid,  and  the  rights  of  the  deceased  partner's 
widow,  legal  representatives,  heirs,  and  creditors  are  postponed  to 
such  payment.2     But  such   partnership   real   estate  as  may  not  be 
required  for  the  payment  of  partnership  debts  or  the  adjustment  of 
balances  between  the  partners  is,  in  the  settlement  of  the  estate  of 
a  deceased  partner,  generally,  —  at  least  in  cases  where  the  partners 
have  not  by  either  an  express  or  implied  agreement  indicated  an  in- 
tention to  convert  the  land  into  personal  estate,8 — treated  as  realty;  4 
although  in  some  cases,  both  in  England  and  America,  the  character 
of  personalty,  once  attaching  to  such  property  by  reason  of  having 
been  purchased   with   partnership   funds   or  used   for   partnership 
Firm  speculat-    purposes,  is  held  to  continue  until  final  distribution.6 

ing  in  real  Whether  an  agreement  to  buy  and  sell  lands  and  share 

estate. 

in  the  profits  of  the  sale  converts  the  land  absolutely 

into  personalty,  has  been  held  both  ways.6    The  current  of  authorities 

i  Howard  v.   Priest,   5    Met.    (Mass.)  Darrow  v.  Calkins,  154  N.  Y.  503.     See 

582;    Husson  v.  Neil,  41   Ind.   504,  510-,  ante,  §  111,  p.  * 235. 

Loubat  v.  Nourse,  5  Fla.  350,  358  ;  Greene  4  Wilcox   v.    Wilcox,    13   Allen,   252; 

t;.  Greene,  1   Ohio,  535,   542;   Sumner  v.  Harris   v.   Harris,    153    Mass.   439,    443; 

Hampson,  8  Ohio,  328,  364 ;  Duhring  v.  Dilworth   v.   Mayfield,   36    Miss.  40,  51 ; 

Duhring,  20  Mo.  174,   180,  et  seq. ;  Rich-  Buckley   v.   Buckley,    11    Barb.   43,    75; 

ardson    v.   Wyatt,   2  Desaus.    471,    482;  Buchan  v.  Sumner,  supra ;  Wooldridge  v. 

Gilbraith    v.   Gedge,    16    B.    Mon.    631;  Wilkins,  3  How.  (Miss.)  360,  371,  et  seq.; 

Wooldridge  v.   Wilkins,  3  How.   (Miss.)  Goodburn  v.  Stevens,  5  Gill,  1,  26;  Mark- 

360,  371,  et  seq. ;  Cobble  v.  Tomlinson,  50  ham  v.  Merrett,  7  How.  (Miss.)  437,  446  ; 

Ind.  550,  554;  Simpson  v.  Leech,  86  111.  Hale  v.  Plummer,  6  Ind.  121,  123;  Yeat- 

286;  Brewer  v.  Browne,  68  Ala.  210,  213.  man  v.  Woods,  6   Yerg.  20,  approved  in 

2  Dyer  v.  Clark,  5  Met.  (Mass.)  562,  Piper  v.  Smith,  1  Head,  93,  97,  and  Wil- 
575;  Holton  v.  Guinn,  65  Fed.  Rep.  450;  liamson  v.  Fontain,  7  Baxt.  212,  214; 
Shearer  v.  Paine,  12  Allen,  289;  Pierce  v.  Espy  v.  Coiner,  76  Ala.  501,  505  ;  Leaf's 
Trigg,  10  Leigh,  406,  421,  et  seq. ;  but  see  Appeal,  105  Pa.  St.  505  ;  Martin  v.  Morris, 
on  this  point,  Bush  v.  Clark,  127  Mass.  62  Wis.  418;  Brewer  v.  Browne,  68  Ala. 
Ill,  as  to  the  distinction  drawn  in  Massa-  210. 

rfuuettfl  between  personalty  and  real  es-  6  Ludlow  v.  Cooper,  4  Ohio  St.  1,  8, 

tate,  post,  p.  *  293.  et  seq. ;  Nicoll  v.  Ogden,  29  111.  323  ;  Cos- 

3  As,  for  instance,  in  Davis  v.  Smith,  ter  v.  Clarke,  3  Edw.  Ch.  428;  Hoxie  v. 
82  Ala.  198;  Perin  >'.  Megibben,  6  U.  S.  Carr,  1  Sumn.  173 

A  pp.   348,   369,   citing    Kentucky   casos ;  6  Negatively  in  Mississippi :  Markham 

312 


§127 


DISTRIBUTION   OP   PARTNERSHIP    EFFECTS. 


*  290,  *  291 


seems  to  regard  lands  bought  by  a  firm  engaged  in  the  business  of 
speculating  in  real  estate  as  personal  property  for  all  partnership 
purposes;  but  after  winding  up  the  partnership  and  fully  settling 
its  affairs,  the  realty  then  remaining  on  hand  resumes  its  legal 
characteristics.1 

§  127.    Distribution  of  Partnership  Effects.  —  Upon    the  payment 
of  all  the  partnership  debts  and  expenses  of  liquidation,  a  specific 
division   of    all   the   remaining    assets   may   be    made    Specific 
between  the  surviving  partners  and  the  personal  repre-    division, 
sentatives  of  the   deceased   partner,  if  they  so   agree.2    But  each 

party  may,  in  the  absence  of  such  an  agreement,  and  where 
f*  291]  the  *  partnership  contract  stipulates  no  division  in  a  different 

manner,  insist  on  a  sale  of  the  joint  stock; 8  and    gaie  0f  j0-nt 
where  a  court  of  equity  winds  up  the  concerns  of  a  part-    stock- 
nership  it  is  usually  done  by  a  sale  of  the  property,  whether  real  of 
personal,  and  a  conversion  of  it  into  money ; 4  but  there    sale  may  be 
may  be  cases  in  which  the  peculiar  circumstances  would    dispensed  with, 
make  a  sale  injurious,  and  where  the  true  interest  of  all  parties  may 
be  better  preserved  and  protected  without  it.6    It  seems    sale  at  public 
to  be  understood  that  a  sale  at  public  auction  is  most    auction, 
favored,  because  at  such  a  sale  all  interested  parties  may  be  present, 


v.  Merrett,  supra;  affirmatively  in  Ohio* 
Ludlow  v.  Cooper,  4  Oh.  St.  1,  9 ;  New 
York:  Coster  v.  Clarke,  supra. 

••Young  v.  Thrasher,  115  Mo.  222; 
Ravolsky  v.  Brown,  92  Ala.  522,  528 ;  and 
Bee  also  Mallery  v.  Russell,  71  Iowa,  63. 

2  Roys  v.  Vilas,  18  Wis.  169, 174  ;  Case 
v.  Abeel,  1  Pai.  393,  398;  Ludlow  v. 
Cooper,  4  Oh.  St.  1 ;  Sage  v.  Woodin,  66 
N.  Y.  578,  581.  The  executor  of  a  de- 
ceased partner,  if  not  a  member  of  the 
firm,  may  agree  with  the  survivor  that 
the  share  of  the  deceased  may  be  ascer- 
tained in  a  particular  way,  or  be  taken  at 
a  certain  value ;  and  a  final  accounting 
and  settlement  between  them  made  in 
good  faith  cannot  be  overhauled;  per 
Fuller,  J.,  in  Holladay  v.  Land  Co.,  6  U.  S. 
C.  C.  A.  560,  571 ;  s.  c.  18  U.  S.  A.  308 ; 
especially  when  receiving  the  sanction  of 
the  court :  Sternberg  v.  Larkin,  58  Ivans. 
201  (holding  that  such  compromises  should 
be  favored). 

8  Freeman  v.  Freeman,  136  Mass.  260. 
The  partnership  articles  may  give  the 
surviving  partner  an  option  to  take  the 
firm  assets  at  a  valuation  to  be  determined 
in  a  certain  manner  therein  specified ; 
Uohrbacher's  Estate,  168  Pa.  St.  158; 
Rankin   v.  Newman,   114   Cal.   635   and 


cases  cited ;  and  where  the  survivor  is 
given  a  length  of  time  within  which  to 
elect,  the  profits  up  to  the  time  he  makes 
his  election  belong  to  the  old  firm :  Hull 
v.  Cartledge,  18  N.  Y.  App.  D.  54. 

*  3  Kent  Com.  64 ;  Story  on  Part.,  § 
347  ;  1  Coll.  on  Part.,  §331  ;  Gow  on  Part., 
*234;  Evans  v.  Evans,  9  Pai.  178,  181; 
Sigourney  v.  Munn,  7  Conn.  11,  21  ;  Har- 
per t*.  Lamping,  33  Cal.  641,  649 ;  Dickin- 
son v.  Dickinson,  29  Conn.  601 ;  Lyman  v. 
Lyman,  2  Paine,  11,  39,  et  seq.  Surviving 
partners  "  cannot  take  the  property  of  the 
firm  to  themselves  at  an  estimated  value 
without  the  consent  of  the  representatives 
of  the  deceased  partner "  :  Ogden  v.  As- 
tor,  4  Sandf.  311,  313,  334;  Freeman  v. 
Freeman,  136  Mass.  260,  263  ;  Denholm 
v.  McKay,  148  Mass.  434. 

5  Pars,  on  Part.,  *  525.  Where  the 
object  of  the  partnership  is  to  carry  out  a 
contract  unfinished  at  the  death  of  one 
partner,  the  court  will  not  necessarily 
order  the  property  sold,  nor  the  share  of 
the  deceased  partner  in  it  ascertained  by 
valuation,  but  leave  the  surviving  partner 
to  complete  the  contract,  and  postpone 
the  account  until  it  is  completed:  May- 
nard  v.  Richards,  166  111.  466,  per  Magru 
der,  Ch.  J.,  479. 

313 


*  291,  *  292  ESTATES   OF   DECEASED   PARTNERS.  §  121 

But  no  conciu-  an(^  bid  to  prevent  a  sacrifice  of  the  stock ;  but  there  is 
sive  rule  as  to  no  conclusive  rule  upon  the  subject,  and  the  circum- 
met  o  o  sa  e.  S{.ances  0f  eacn  case  must  suggest  the  best  course  to  be 
adopted.1  The  representatives  of  the  deceased  partner  may  sell  the 
interest  of  the  latter  to  third  persons,  or  to  the  survivor,  if  the  sale 
is  fair  and  honest;2  but  not  where  the  surviving  partner  is  also 
executor  or  administrator  of  the  deceased  partner.8  The  surviving 
partner  cannot  shield  himself  from  responsibility  for  the  true  value 
of  partnership  property  bought  secretly  and  indirectly  by  himself, 
by  showing  that  the  sale  was  under  judicial  authority;  nor  where 
bidders  were  deterred  for  his  benefit  from  bidding,  although  in 
consequence  of  deceit  he  did  not  obtain  the  property.4  But  the 
court  may,  upon  a  proper  showing,  permit  the  surviving  partner  to 
retain  the  assets  upon  payment  of  their  full  value.5 

The  good  will  of  a  firm  dissolved  by  the  death  of  one  of  its  mem- 
bers has  often  a  marketable  value,  and  in  such  case  it  is  liable  to 
Good  will  an  De  so^  ^or  tne  benefit  of  all  the  partners,  like  any  other 
asset.  property  of  the  firm.     In  such  case  it  must  be 

♦taken  into  consideration  in  the  valuation  of  the  stock,6  and  [*292] 
the  proceeds  of  its  sale  become  assets  for  the  payment  of 
debts  or  distribution  between  the  deceased  and  surviving  partners. 
But  it  is  not  always  either  valuable  or  salable.  It  is  described  as 
the  sum  which  a  person  would  be  willing  to  give  for  the  chance  of 
being  able  to  keep  the  trade  established  at  a  particular  place,7  or 
rather  it  is  the  price  to  be  paid  for  the  advantage  of  carrying  on 
business  either  on  the  premises  or  with  the  stock  of  the  old  firm,  or 
connected  therewith  by  name,  or  in  some  manner  attracting  the 
customers  of  the  old  to  the  new  business.  Upon  the  sale  of  an 
established  business,  its  good  will  has  obviously  a  marketable  value ; 8 
but  this  depends  largely,  if  not  entirely,  on  the  absence  of  competi- 
tion on  the  part  of  those  by  whom  the  business  has  been  previously 
carried  on.  Hence,  since  a  surviving  partner  is  under  no  obligation 
either  to  retire  from  business  merely  because  the  partnership  is 
dissolved,  or  to  carry  on  the  old  business  so  as  to  preserve  its  good 
will  until  the  final  winding  up  of  the  partnership  affairs,9  its  market 

»  Taylor  v.  Hutchison,  25  Gratt.  536.  5  Sheppard  v.  Boggs,  9  Neb.  257,  262. 

2  Case  v.  Abcel,  1  Pai.  393,  398  j  Kim-  This  course  is  in  many  cases  the  best  or 
ball  v.  Lincoln,  99  Til.  578  (but  the  sur-  only  expedient  to  avert  serious  loss,  es- 
vivor  cannot  become  purchaser  at  his  own  pecially  of  the  value  of  good  will, 
pale.  p.  585);  see  Grim'u  Appeal,  105  Pa.  6  Case  i\  Abeel,  1  Pai.  393,  401  ;  Day- 
St.  375,  3*2;  Valentine  v.  Wysor,  123  ton  v.  Wilkos,  17  How.  Pr.  510,  511; 
Tnd.  47  ;  Holladay  V.  Land  Co.,  6  U.  S.  Rheppnrd  v.  Bo!xe:r,9  Neb.  257,261  ;  11am- 
C.  C.  A.  560;  s.  o.  18  U.  S.  A.  308.  melsl.en:  »;.  Mitchell,  29  Oh.  St   22,  54; 

3  Case  v.  Abeel,  tupra  :  Nelson  v.  Hay-  Piatt  v.  Piatt,  42  Conn.  330,  347. 
ner,  CO  111.  487,  493.     But  the  partnership  7  1  Coll.  on  Part.,  p.  238,  note  1. 
articles  may  provide  for  an  option  in  favor        8  Lindl.  on  Part.,  *8.r>9. 

of  the  survivor :  see  note  3,  p.*  291,  aupra.        9  Lewis  r.  Langdon,  7  Rim.  421,  425; 

4  Biota  "•  Macrcady,  39  La.  An.  638.        Howe  v.  Scaring,   10  Abb.  Pr.  264,  271, 

314 


§  127  DISTRIBUTION   OF   PARTNERSHIP    EFFECTS.       *  292,  *  293 

value  is  often  destroyed  or  inconsiderable.1  So  too  the  sale  of  an 
establishment  in  toto  will  carry  with  it  the  good  will  to  the  pur- 
chaser; 2  if  a  lease,  the  property  of  a  partnership,  be  sold,  the  good 
will  passes  with  it  to  the  person  purchasing.8  In  such  cases  the 
good  will  is  included  in  or  constitutes  a  part  of  the  value  of  the 
thing  sold,  and  it  follows  that  it  can  be  valued  or  sold  only  in  con- 
nection with  such  property;  the  stock  or  business  sold  is  enhanced 
in  value  by  the  estimated  value  of  such  good  will.4  Lindley  in  his 
work  on  Partnership  intimates  that  good  will  is  generally  valued  at 
so  many  years'  purchase  on  the  amount  of  profits,5  and  in  an  English 
case 6  it  was  remarked  that  it  was  equal  to  about  one  year's 
[*  293]  purchase.  *  Where  the  good  will  is  the  subject  of  a  special 
contract,  or  arises  out  of  it,  it  assumes  a  more  tangible 
shape,  and  may  be  valued  and  assigned  with  the  rest  of  the  effects; 
it  is  described  by  Collyer  as  "  an  advantage  arising  from  the  fact  of 
sole  ownership  to  the  exclusion  of  other  persons."7  Good  will  of 
this  kind,  being  a  valuable  addition  to  a  trade,  cannot  be  implied 
from  the  general  words  "stock,  effects,  &c,"  but  must  be  created 
by  some  appropriate  words ; 8  and  it  has  been  held  that  the  naked 
sale  of  the  good  will  of  a  business  does  not  transfer  a  right  to  the 
use  of  the  vendor's  name  of  trade.9  Nor  can  a  surviving  partner, 
without  the  consent  of  the  representatives  of  the  deceased  partner, 
use  the  firm  name  or  the  name  of  the  deceased  partner  in  continuing 
the  business.10  Where  by  the  partnership  articles  the  surviving 
partners,  at  a  specified  valuation  or  price,  the  mode  of  payment  of 
which  to  the  deceased  partner's  estate  is  pointed  out,  may  acquire 
the  deceased's  interest  and  the  right  to  continue  the  business  under 
the  firm  name,  the  good  will  of  the  business  passes  with  it.11 

It  appears  to  be  generally  held  that  partnership  assets  must  first 
be  applied  to  the  payment  of  partnership  debts  and  the  advances  of 
either  partner,  before  the  other  partner  or  any  one  through  him 
has  any  claim  on  them.12     This  principle  would,  of  course,  exclude 

et  seq.    And  he  need  not  account  to  the  3  Dougherty  v.  Van  Nostrand,  1  Hoff. 

representative  of  the  deceased  partner  for  Ch.  68,  70. 

the  goodwill,  though  he  do  business  in  the  4  1  Coll.  on  Part.,  §  117,  p.  241. 

same  place  :  Lobeck  v.  Lee,  37  Neb.  158.  5  Lindl.  on  Part.,  *  863. 

1  Scuddery.Ames,  142  Mo.  187;  Davies  6  Davies  v.  Hodgson,  supra, 
v.  Hodgson,  25  Beav.  177,  183,  et  seq.  »  1  Coll.  on  Part.,  p.  237. 

2  Marten  v.  Van  Schaick,  4  Pai.  479.  8  lb.,  pp.  238  et  seq.,  with  authorities. 
In  this  case  the  receiver  appointed  upon  9  Howe  v.  Searing,  supra,  Moncrief,  J., 
application  of  a  partner  was  directed  to  dissenting:  see  10  Abb.  Pr.  264,  276; 
continue  the  publication  of  a  political  Corastock  v.  White,  reported  as  a  note  to 
paper  until  a  sale  could  be  effected,  so  Howe  v.  Searing,  p.  264.  See  also  Matter 
that  the  good  will  might  be  saved  to  the  of  Randell,  2  Connolly,  29. 

purchaser,  and  the  full  value  of  the  estab-        10  Fenn  v.  Bolles,  7  Abb.  Pr.  202. 
lishment   secured  to  the    partners.     See         u  Rankin  v.  Newman,  114  Cal.  635. 
also  Williams  v.  Wilson,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  379,        "Valentine  v.   Wysor,   123   Ind.   47; 
380.  Keese  v.  Coleman,  72  Ga.  658 ;  Preston  v. 

315 


293,  *  294  ESTATES   OF   DECEASED   PARTNERS. 


§128 


the  right  of  the  widow  to  an  allowance  out  of  the  partnership  assets,1 
as  well  as  any  other  person  claiming  as  his  legal  representative.2 
But  in  Massachusetts  it  is  held  that  the  probate  court  may  make 
an  allowance  to  the  widow  of  a  deceased  partner  out  of  the  partner- 
ship assets  in  the  hands  of  a  surviving  partner  at  the  time  of  his 
death,  although  these  are  insufficient  to  pay  the  partnership 
debts.3 

*  It  need  hardly  be  suggested  that  the  property  of  a  firm,   [*  294] 
if  all  its  members  die  intestate,  without  heirs  or  known  next 
of  kin,  escheats  in  the  same  manner  to  the  State  as  the  property  of 
an  individual.4 

§  128.  Jurisdiction  of  Probate  Courts  over  Partner- 
ship Estates.  —  In  several  of  the  States  provision  is 
made  by  statute  for  the  winding  up  of  partnership 
estates  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  probate  court.  In 
Maine  the  executor  or  administrator  of  a  deceased  part- 


Statutory 

powers  of  pro- 
bate courts 
over  partner- 
ship estates. 
In  Maine. 


Colby,  117  111.  477,  483;  Farley  v.  Moog, 
79  Ala.  148  ;  Ross  v.  Carson,  32  Mo.  App. 
148 ;  Lyons  v.  Murray,  95  Mo.  23 ;  Hart 
v.  Hart,  31  W.  Va.  688,  696.  The  judg- 
ment lien  of  a  separate  creditor  on  part- 
nership lands,  though  held  in  the  individual 
name  of  the  debtor,  is  postponed  to  the 
equity  of  a  firm  creditor  whose  claim  ac- 
crued during  the  existence  of  the  partner- 
ship, though  subsequent  to  the  time  when 
such  lien  attached  :  Page  v.  Thomas,  43 
Oh.  St.  38.  But  bona  fide  purchasers  for 
value,  without  notice  that  same  was  part- 
nership property,  are .  protected  :  lb.,  p. 
44.  Alder  if  they  have  notice :  Norwalk 
Bank  v.  Sawyer,  38  Oh.  St.  339,  343.  The 
converse  of  the  proposition  announced  in 
the  text  is  equally  true,  viz. :  individual 
creditors  have  the  prior  right  to  individ- 
ual assets  {ante,  §  125,  last  paragraph)  and 
statutes  with  reference  to  classification  of 
demands  do  not  alter  the  rule:  Hundley 
v.  Farris,  103  Mo.  78. 

1  Julian  v.  Wrightsman,  73  Mo.  569, 
571. 

2  Thomp.,  Homest.  &  Ex.,  §  194  ;  Pond 
v.  Kimball,  101  Mass.  105. 

3  Hush  v.  Clark,  127  Mass.  111.  In 
reasoning  upon  the  proposition  before  the 
court,  it  is  assumed  that  the  surviving 
partner  holds  the  partnership  assets,  "and 
not  as  a  trustee "  (p.  112);  and  "as  it  is 
persona]  estate  of  the  deceased,  it  is  liable 
to  diminution  by  the  expenses  of  adminis- 
tration, mill  /,;/  allowance  to  the  widow." 
"And  when  such  allowance  is  made, what- 

816 


ever  part  of  the  estate  is  included  in  it 
ceases  to  be  assets  for  the  payment  of 
debts."  (p.  113.)  "This  rule  applies, 
whether  the  estate  came  to  the  intestate 
as  surviving  member  of  a  firm,  or  had 
been  his  separate  estate."  (p.  114.)  Grant- 
ing that  the  surviving  partner  holds  the 
partnership  assets  "  not  in  trust,"  the  re- 
sult reached  in  this  case  is  inevitable ; 
but  there  may  be  some  difficulty  in  recon- 
ciling this  view  with  earlier  Massachusetts 
cases  (see  Pond  v.  Kimball,  101  Mass. 
105),  and  with  authorities  in  general.  On 
principle,  it  seems  that  the  exemption  of 
a  certain  amount  of  property,  to  protect 
the  widow  and  infant  children  of  a  de- 
ceased partner  from  want  and  suffering, 
may  be  as  necessary  and  just  against  the 
creditors  of  a  partnership,  as  against  those 
of  an  individual ;  a  similar  view  has  been 
enforced  in  proceedings  against  a  bank- 
rupt firm  :  says  Treat,  J.,  in  Young  in  re, 
3  N.  B.  Peg.  440,  "  The  policy  of  exemp- 
tions, and  the  legal  rules  on  which  they 
rest,  modify  the  strict  technical  rules  by 
which  rights  of  creditors  are  otherwise 
enforceable."  He  accordingly  allowed  the 
exemption  to  which  an  individual  is  en- 
titled under  the  law  of  Missouri  to  be 
divided  between  the  two  partners.  Other 
similar  cases  are  mentioned  by  Thompson 
in  his  work  on  Homesteads  and  Exemp- 
tions, §§  214  et  seq. 

4  Commonwealth  v.  No.  Am.  Laud  Co., 
57  Pa.  St.  102. 


§  128  JURISDICTION    OP   PROBATE    COURTS.  *  294,  *  295 

ner  is  required  to  include  in  his  inventory  the  property  of  the  part- 
nership, which  must  be  appraised  as  in  other  cases,  and  to  retain  and 
administer  such  property  unless  the  survivor  give  bond  for  the  faith- 
ful and  diligent  closing  up  of  the  partnership  estate.1  Under  this 
statute  it  is  held  that  a  sale  by  the  surviving  partner  who  has  not 
given  such  bond  is  void,  and  notes  given  for  goods  so  sold  are  with- 
out consideration ; 2  and  when  the  administrator  has  given  the  bond, 
which  on  citation  the  survivor  refused  to  give,  he  is  entitled  to  the 
partnership  property  against  an  officer  who  has  attached  it  in  an 
action  by  a  creditor  of  the  firm  against  the  survivor.8  If  the  part- 
nership is  continued  after  the  death  of  a  member,  by  virtue  of  the 
articles  of  agreement  entered  into  before  such  member's  death,  it  is 
held  that  the  operation  of  the  statute  is  postponed,  at  least  until 
a  dissolution  does  take  place.4 

The  same  statute,  substantially,  was  enacted  in 
Oregon.5  A  doubt  was  expressed  in  this  State  whether, 
under  the  statute,  a  surviving  partner  could  transfer  real  estate, 
or  any  interest  in  real  estate,  held  for  partnership  purposes,  without 
an  order  of  the  probate  court,  and  without  giving  the  bond  required 
by  the  statute.6  But  in  a  later  case  it  was  held  that  the  probate 
court  took  no  jurisdiction  from  the  statute  to  partition  real 
[*  295]  estate  *  belonging  to  a  partnership  under  administration, 
and  that  it  is  the  province  of  a  court  of  equity  so  to  do.7 

A  similar  statute  exists  in  Kansas.8  It  was  held  in 
this  State  that  where  the  administrator  of  the  deceased 
partner's  estate  gives  the  additional  bond  required  of  him  on  taking 
charge  of  the  partnership  estate,  the  two  administrations  are  entirely 
separate  and  distinct;  that  the  sureties  on  the  administration  bond 
in  the  estate  of  the  deceased  partner  are  not  liable  for  any  acts  of 
the  administrator  concerning  the  partnership  estate ;  that  the  funds 
derived  from  the  one  estate  are  primarily  liable  for  the  individual 
debts  of  the  deceased,  and  those  of  the  other  for  the  debts  of  the 
firm.9     Also,  that  an  action  will  lie  by  a  creditor  of  the  firm  on  the 

1  Eev.  St.  1883,  ch.  69.  he   has   given   the   statutory  hond.     The 

a  Cook  v.  Lewis,  36  Me.  340,  345  ;  Hill  management  of  the  partnership  estate  by 

v.  Treat,  67  Me.  501.  the  surviving  partner  must  be  under  the 

8  Putnam  v.  Parker,  55  Me.  235.  control  of  the  probate  court :  Ballinger  v. 

4  Shaw,  Appellant,  81  Me.  207,  229.  Kedhead,   1    Kans.  App.  434.     The  only 

5  Code,  1887,  §§  1101  et  seq.  manner  of  settlement  of  the  partnership 

6  Knott  v.  Stephens,  3  Oreg.  269,  273.  estate  is  that  prescribed  by  the  statute : 
But  the  case  went  off  on  a  question  of  fact.  Towler  v.  Bull,  3  Kans.  App.  626.     The 

7  Burnside  v.  Savier,  6  Oreg.  154,  156.  sureties  on  the  bond  of  the  surviving  part- 

8  Dassler's  Rev.  1885,  ch.  37,  §  31.  ner  cannot  be  held  liable  upon  transactions 
The  surviving  partner  can  do  nothing  in  not  included  within  the  partnership,  nor 
the  way  of  carrying  on  the  partnership  upon  the  individual  liabilities  of  its  niem- 
affairs  except  such  things  as  may  be  bers  ;  Carter  v.  Christie,  57  Kans.  492, 498. 
necessary  to  preserve  the  property ;  nor  9  Glass  Company  v.  Ludlum,  8  Kan*, 
can  he  proceed  to  wind  up  its  affairs  until  40,  46,  et  seq. 

317 


*  295,  *  296  ESTATES   OP   DECEASED   PARTNERS.  §  128 

partnership  bond,  although  there  was  no  allowance  of  the  claim  in 
the  probate  court,  nor  a  settlement  of  the  partnership  affairs ;  and 
that  no  citation  is  necessary  to  give  validity  to  the  bond,  if  the 
surviving  partner  appears  without  citation  and  refuses  to  comply 
with  the  statute.1  But  if  he  does  not  so  appear,  or  in  some  other 
way  declines  to  take  charge  of  the  partnership  property  so  as  to 
waive  the  statutory  citation,  he  is  not  divested  of  his  right  to  con- 
trol and  dispose  of  the  property; 2  and  a  proceeding  against  him  by 
the  administrator  of  the  deceased  partner  should,  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, be  dismissed  on  motion  in  the  district  court.8  Before 
an  account  between  a  survivor  and  the  representatives  of  his  deceased 
partner  can  be  adjudicated,  the  account  between  such  survivor  and 
the  partnership  estate  must  first  be  determined ;  and  in  a  controversy 
between  the  representatives  of  the  deceased  partner  and  the  sur- 
vivor, who  has  given  the  statutory  bond  in  the  probate  court,  the 
district  court  has  jurisdiction  to  determine  such  account  between  the 
survivor  and  the  firm.4 

in  Washing-  In    Washington   it  is  held  that  the  statute  of  1862 

ton-  was  in  aid  of  the  common-law  method  of  closing  up 

partnership  estates,  and  does  not  interfere  with  the  common-law 
rights  of  the  surviving  partner,  except  to  give  the  representative  of 
the  deceased  the  right  to  either  have  another  person  than  the  sur- 
viving partner  close  up  the  affairs  of  the  firm,  or  have  the  latter 
give  security  to  that  end.6 

In   Illinois   the   surviving   partner   is   required   to   make  a  full 
inventory  of  the  partnership  estate,  and  have  the  same  appraised, 
and  return  the  inventory  and  appraisal,  together  with 
a  statement  of  the  liabilities  of  the  firm,  to  the  probate 
court;   to   settle   without   delay,    and   account   to   the   executor   or 
administrator  of  the  deceased  partner;  and  may  be  compelled  upon 
application  of  such  executor  or  administrator  to  render  account  in 
the  probate  or  circuit  court.     Upon  proper  application,  the  surviv- 
ing partner  may  be  compelled  to  give  security  for  faithful  settle- 
ment, etc.,  and  for  refusing  to  give  such  security,  a  receiver  may  be 
appointed,  with  like  powers  and  duties  as  receivers  in  courts 
of  chancery.     It   is   held  that  some  of  the  *  provisions  of  [*  296] 
this   act   afford   cumulative   remedies,  but  that  it  does  not 
change  the  nature  of  the  relation  existing  between  surviving  part- 
ners and  the  representatives  of  the  deceased   partners  in  equity.6 
A  similar  law  exists  in  Indiana,  the  enactment  of  which 
was  held  not  to  affect  the  rights  of  a  surviving  partner, 
who  had  charge  of  an  estate  under  the  law  in  force  prior  thereto.7 

1  Carr)>.Catlin,  13  Kans. 393, 403, efser/.  B  Dyer  v.  Morse,  10  Wash.  492.     The 

2  Blakei  V.  Sands,  '29  Kans.  551.  court  disapproves  the  Maine  cases. 

8  Teney  V.  Laing,  47  Kans.  297.  8  Nelson  v.  Ilayner,  66  111.  487,  492. 

*  Anderson  r.  Beebe,  22  Kans.  768,  771.  7  Adams  v.  Marsteller,  70  Ind.  381. 

318 


§  129  HISTORY   OP   THE   MISSOURI   STATUTE.  *  296,  *  297 

In  Ohio,  the  surviving  partner  must  apply  to  the  probate  court 
for  the  appointment  of  three  appraisers,  upon  notice  to  the  adminis- 
trator of  the  deceased  partner,  who  must  make  out  a  full 
inventory  of  the  partnership  estate  and  liabilities;  and 
such  survivor  may,  with  the  consent  of  such  administrator  and  the 
approval  of  the  probate  court,  take  the  estate  at  its  appraisal,  secur- 
ing the  payment  of  the  excess  remaining  after  deducting  the  liabili- 
ties, and  giving  bond  for  the  payment  of  the  partnership  debts.1 

So  in  California,  the  interest  of  the  deceased  partner  must  be 
included  in  the  inventory,  and  appraised  as  other  property;  the 
surviving  partner  must  settle  the  affairs  of  the  partner- 
ship, and  account  with  the  executor  or  administrator; 
and  upon  application  of  the  latter  the  court  may  order  the  surviv- 
ing partner  to  render  an  account,  and  compel  it,  in  case  of  neglect 
or  refusal,  by  attachment.2  If  the  surviving  partner  admit  the 
existence  of  the  partnership,  the  court  may  compel  him  to  testify  in 
relation  to  such  account; 3  but  the  probate  court  can  neither  adjudi- 
cate upon  the  question  of  partnership,  if  raised,4  nor  decree  a 
balance  on  the  account.6 

In  Alabama,  where  the  surviving  partner  becomes  also  co-adminis- 
trator with  another  of  the  deceased  partner,  the  probate 
court  has  no  jurisdiction  over  the  settlement  of  the  firm 

account  with  the  estate  of  the  deceased  partner; 6  nor  has  the 
[*  297]  probate  court  power  to  order  the  sale  of  a  deceased  *  part- 
ner's interest  in  partnership   lands,  before   the  firm   debts 
have  been  paid  and  the  accounts  between  the  partners  settled  and 
adjusted.7 

In  Arkansas  it  is  decided  that  the  probate  court  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  adjust  accounts  between  a  decedent  and  his  sur- 
viving partner.8  In  Arkansas. 

That  the  jurisdiction  conferred  on  the  probate  court   jurisdiction 
by  these  statutes  is  exclusive,  carrying  with  it  such  in-    exclusive, 
cidental  equitable  powers  as  may  be  necessary,  appears  later.9 

§  129.  History  of  the  Missouri  Statute  giving  Jurisdiction  to 
Probate  Courts  over  Partnership  Estates.  —  The  statute  of  Missouri 
on  this  subject  is  very  full,  and  gives  greater  powers  over  surviving 

1  Rammelsberg  v.  Mitchell,  29  Oh.  St.  2  Code  Civil  Proc,  §  1585. 

22,  49.     It  is  held  in  this  case,  that  the  3  Andrade  v.  Superior  Court,  75  Cal. 

law  applies  where  the  surviving  partner  459. 

is  also   one   of    the   executors  ;    that   an  i  Andrade  v.  Superior  Court,  supra. 

appraisement    is    valid,    although    made  8  Theller  v.  Such,  57  Cal.  447,  459. 

upon  the  basis  of  a  previous  appraisement  6  Vincent  v.  Martin,  79  Ala.  540. 

made  at  the  request  of  the  executors,  and  7  Roulston    v.    Washington,    79    Ala 

by  the  same  persons  ;  and  that  real  estate  529. 

belonging  to  the  partnership  may  be  trans-         8  Choate  v.  O'Neal,  57  Ark.  299. 
f erred  to  the  survivor  under  this  statute  :  9  Post,  §  130. 

p.  53. 

319 


*  297,  *  298  ESTATES   OF   DECEASED    PARTNERS.  §  129 

partners  to  the  probate  court  than  is  given  to  it  in  any  other  State. 
Its  history  furnishes  a  striking  instance  of  the  increasing  confi- 
dence in  the  efficiency  of  probate  courts,  and  of  the  tendency  of 
legislation  in  the  American  States  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  their 
powers  and  jurisdiction.  The  first  legislative  enactment  subjecting 
surviving  partners  to  the  jurisdiction  of  probate  courts  is  met  with 
in  the  Revised  Statutes  of  1845,  incorporating  therein  the  substance 
of  the  Maine  statute,  with  change  of  phraseology  only.1  In  1849  the 
probate  court  was  authorized  to  order  a  surviving  partner,  upon 
petition  of  two-thirds  in  interest  of  the  creditors,  and  proof  that 
injustice  would  not  be  done  to  other  parties,  to  adjust,  close,  and 
settle  the  business  of  the  firm  without  such  bond  or  security;  but  it 
was  specially  enacted  that  such  surviving  partner  shall  in  other 
respects  be  subject  to  the  control  and  superintendence  of  the  court.2 
In  the  Revised  Statutes  of  1855,  the  right  to  give  the  bond,  and  to 
administer  the  partnership  effects,  is  limited  to  surviving  partners 
residing  in  the  State,  and  such  administration  is  directed  to  be  had 
in  the  county  in  which  the  partnership  business  was  conducted.8 
Authority  is  also  given  to  the  surviving  partner  to  pay  partnership 
debts,  without  requiring  them  to  be  exhibited  for  allowance  in  the 
probate  court;  but  where  the  administrator  of  the  deceased  partner 
administers  the  partnership  estate,  and  also  where  the  surviving 
partner  refuses  to  pay  demands  against  the  partnership,  provision  is 
made  for  the  allowance  and  classification  of  such  demands.4 
Provision  is  made  *  for  the  appearance  of  surviving  partners,  [*  298] 
when  a  claim  is  presented  against  the  partnership  estate 
administered  by  the  administrator  of  the  deceased  partner,  and 
authority  given  them  to  defend  against  such  claim,  and  appeal 
from  the  decision  of  the  probate  court.5  It  is  also  provided,  that 
the  administration  of  the  partnership  effects  shall  in  all  things 
conform  to  administrations  in  ordinary  cases,  and  that  the  person 
administering,  and  his  sureties,  shall  perform  the  same  duties,  be 
governed  by  the  same  limitations  and  restrictions,  and  be  subject  to 

1  Rev.   St.   1845.     The   commissioners  provision    is   omitted,  and  the   power  to 

directing  and  superintending  their  publica-  permit  the  surviving  partner  to  adminis- 

tion    say:    "There  were  some  important  ter  without  bond  thus  withdrawn, 

modifications  and  several  new  provisions  8  P»ev.  St.  1855,  p.  121,  §  51. 

introduced  into  the  general  code.  .  .  .  The  4  lb.,  p.  124,  §§  62,  63.     A  surviving 

changes  in  the  administration  laws  rela-  partner   need   not   exhibit  even  his  own 

tive  to  partnership  effects  .  .  .  supply  a  claim    against    the    partnership:    Kahn's 

deficiency  in  that  law  which  has  long  been  Estate,  18  Mo.  App.  426. 

felt  "  :    1'ref.,  viii.     The  revisers  content  5  lb.,  §  64.     Previous  to  this  revision 

themselves   with   the   remark,   "  Sections  a  surviving  partner  could  not  appeal  from 

49  to  56,  both  inclusive"  (containing  the  the  judgment  of  a  probate  court  allowing 

provisions  referred  to  in  the  text),  "are  a  demand  against  the  deceased  partner's 

new,"    p.  01,  note.  administrator:    Asbury   v.   Mcintosh,    20 

3  Laws    of    Mo.    1849,    p.    10.     In   the  Mo.  278. 
next  following  revision  of  the  laws  this 
820 


§  129  HISTORY   OF   THE   MISSOURI   STATUTE.  *  298,  *  299 

the  same  penalties,  as  other  administrators  and  their  sureties.1  The 
General  Statutes  of  18G5  introduced  no  change;  but  in  the  Revised 
Statutes  of  1879  the  language  subjecting  surviving  partners  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  probate  court  is  made  peremptory  and  compre- 
hensive :  "  The  administration  upon  partnership  effects,  whether  by 
the  surviving  partner,  or  executor  or  administrator  of  the  deceased 
partner,  shall  in  all  respects  conform  to  administrations  in  ordinary 
cases,  except  as  herein  otherwise  provided,  and  the  person  adminis- 
tering upon  partnership  effects,  and  his  sureties  on  his  official  bond, 
shall  perform  the  same  functions  and  duties,  be  governed  by  the 
same  limitations,  restrictions,  and  provisions,  and  be  subject  to  the 
same  penalties,  liabilities,  and  actions,  as  other  administrators  and 
their  sureties."  2 

In  1883  the  legislature  introduced  a  further  provision  requiring 
the  surviving  partner  administering  to  pay  partnership  debts  pro 
rata,  according  to  their  respective  classes,  securing  to  all  the 
creditors  an  equal  participation  in  the  assets  of  insolvent  partner- 
ships.8 
[*  299]  *  The  history  of  this  statute,  together  with  the  interpre- 
tations it  received  from  the  judiciary  in  the  various  phases 
of  its  development,  strikingly  illustrates,  also,  the  difficulty  attend- 
ing the  introduction  of  principles  which  require,  on  the  part  of 
judges  and  lawyers,  a  departure  from  the  familiar,  well-trodden 
paths  of  the  common  law.  "The  provision  requiring  the  surviving 
partner  to  give  bond  is  a  new  one,"  says  Scott,  J.,4  "in  derogation 
of  the  rights  of  the  surviving  partner  as  they  existed  at  common 
law.  All  interference  with  his  rights  must  have  a  support  in  the 
statute  law,  and  we  are  restrained  from  going  further  in  diminish- 
ing his  control  over  his  goods  than  the  words  of  the  law  fairly 
warrant.  .  .  .  There  is  nothing  here"  (reciting  the  statute)  "like  a 
power  of  removal.  ...  It  would  be  against  all  principle  to  assume 
by  implication  a  power  of  taking  away  the  right  of  control  which  a 
man  has  over  his  own  property."     This  language  was  used  in  the 

1  Rev.  St.  1855,  §  65.  manner  as  in  ordinary  cases  of  administra- 

2  Rev.  St.  1879,  §  68.  tion,  were,  previous  to  this  amendment, 
8  Laws  of  Mo.  1883,  p.  22.     This  pro-     held  insufficient  to  deprive  him  of  such 

vision  brings  the  administration  of  partner-  power  :  Collier  v.  Cairns,  6  Mo.  App.  188. 

ship  estates  into  harmony  with  that  of  the  "Where  there  is  an  administering  surviv- 

estates  of  individuals  with  respect  to  the  ing  partner,  and  no  refusal  by  him  to  pay 

payment  of  debts  :  it  destroys  the  power  a   claim   against   the   partnership  estate, 

of  surviving  partners  to  prefer  creditors,  its    allowance    and   classification   by  the 

to  the  deprivation  of  creditors   not   pre-  probate  court  is  unauthorized,  and  gives 

ferred,  where   the  assets  are  insufficient  such   demandant  no  priority   over  other 

to  pay  the  debts  in  full.     Such  was  held  creditors  who  present  their  claim  to  the 

to  be  in  the  power  of  a  surviving  partner  survivor :  Easton  v.  Courtwright,  84  Mo. 

at   common   law,   and   the   provisions    of  27. 

the  statute  requiring  classification  of  de-         *  Green  v.  Virden,  22  Mo.  506,  511. 
mands,  and   their   payment  in  the  same 

VOL.  i.  — 21  321 


*  299,  *  300  ESTATES    OF    DECEASED    PARTNERS.  §  129 

decision  of  a  case  arising  under  the  law  of  1845,  the  Supreme  Court 
denying  the  power  of  the  probate  court  under  said  law  to  remove  a 
surviving  partner,  and  deprive  him  of  the  administration  of  the 
partnership  estate,  on  the  ground  of  non-residence.  In  the  revision 
of  the  statutes  which  took  effect  in  1856,  the  same  year  in  which 
this  decision  was  rendered,  the  residence  within  the  State  of  the 
surviving  partner  was  made  a  condition  to  his  right  to  give  the 
bond,  and  the  section  added  which  placed  the  surviving  partner 
under  the  same  control  of  the  probate  court  which  it  possessed  over 
administrators.1 

Notwithstanding  these  provisions,  and  the  further  provision 
requiring  claims  of  partnership  creditors  which  the  surviving  part- 
ner "  shall  refuse  to  pay  "  to  be  exhibited  to  the  probate  court  "  for 
allowance  and  classification,"  giving  the  court  "the  same  jurisdic- 
tion of  demands  thus  presented  as  it  has  of  demands  against  estates 
in  ordinary  cases,"  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  "under  this  act  the 
powers  of  a  surviving  partner  in  closing  up  the  affairs  of  the  part- 
nership are  not  changed  or  restricted,  otherwise  than  as  he  is 
required  to  give  bond  and  security  that  he  will  use  due  diligence 
and  fidelity;  .  .  .  for  any  misconduct  or  neglect  there  is  a 
remedy  on  his  bond."  2  The  same  view  was  announced  *  by  [*300] 
the  Court  of  Appeals ; 3  but  the  latter  court  also  held,  that 
the  remedy  by  scire  facias,  given  by  the  statute  against  the  sureties 
of  an  administrator,  may  be  resorted  to  by  the  administrator  of  a 
deceased  partner  against  the  sureties  of  a  surviving  partner  who 
fails  to  obey  an  order  of  the  probate  court  directing  him  to  pay  over 
the  amount  found  due  by  him  on  final  settlement.4  And  recently 
the  Supreme  Court,  with  three  judges  dissenting,  held  that  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  probate  court  over  the  partnership,  operated  to 
cut  off  the  right  of  the  surviving  partner  to  make  a  general  assign- 
ment for  the  benefit  of  creditors.5  It  is  also  held,  that  where  a 
surviving  partner  having  given  bond  to  administer  refuses  to  pay 
the  demand  of  a  partnership  creditor,  the  creditor  has  no  action  on 
the  surviving  partner's  bond,  unless  he  present  his  claim  to  the 
probate  court  for  allowance  and  classification.6 

We  have  seen  that  upon  these  decisions  the  legislature,  in  1879, 

1  Supra,  pp.  *297,  *  298.  creditor  to  obtain  the  allowance  against 

-  Crow  v.  Weidner,  36  Mo.  412,  416.  the  administrator  of  the  deceased  partner, 

Tn  the  case  of  State  v.  Woods,  36  Mo.  73,  if  presented  within  the  two  years  after  the 

80,  it  was  held  thai  a  partnership  creditor,  removal  of  the  surviving  partner. 

who  tailed  to  cause  his  claim  to  be  classi-         8  Denny  v.  Turner,  mtpra;   Collier  v. 

fied  in  the  probate  court,  has  do  cause  of  Cairns,  6  Mo.  App.  188,  191. 

action  on  the  partnership  bond;  hut  in         4  McCartney  v.  Garneau,  4  Mo.  App. 

Dennj    v    Tomer,  2  Mo.  App.  52,  the  566,567. 

promise  of  the  surviving  partner  to  pay         B  State  v.  Withrow,  141  Mo.  69,  84. 

a  demand  was  held  sufficient  to  defeat  the         6  State  v.  Shacklett,  73  Mo.  App.  265. 
itory  limitation,  ho  as  to  enable  the 
322 


I  129  HISTORY   OF  THE   MISSOURI    STATUTE.  *  800 

directed  the  winding  up  of  a  partnership  estate  by  the  surviving 
partner  to  conform,  in  all  respects,  to  the  law  of  administration,  so 
far  as  applicable,  and  in  1883,  to  meet  the  cases  of  Denny  v. 
Turner,  Collier  v.  Cairns,  and  Crow  v.  Weidner,  expressly  required 
the  payment  of  partnership  debts  pro  rata  according  to  their  class.1 
But  even  the  peremptory  terms  of  the  statute  of  1879  are  inade- 
quate to  extinguish  the  difference  between  the  winding  up  of  a 
partnership  by  the  surviving  partner,  and  the  administration  of  an 
estate  by  the  executor  or  administrator  of  a  decedent.  The  Supreme 
Court  has  recently  decided  that  the  probate  court  has  no  power  to 
authorize  the  surviving  partner  to  sell  partnership  real  estate  for 
the  payment  of  partnership  debts.2 

In  the  Revision  of  1889,  the  division  of  claims  against  partner- 
ship estates  into  two  classes,  according  as  they  are  presented  for 
allowance  within  the  first  or  second  year,  is  repealed,  and  creditors 
are  now  required  to  present  their  claims  for  allowance  within  the 
first  year  of  the  administration,  or  be  forever  barred  against  the 
partnership  effects  under  administration.3  From  this  it  would  seem 
that  the  legislature  intended  to  enable  final  settlement  of  partner- 
ship estates  to  be  made  at  the  end  of  the  first  year,  because  all 
claims  are  then  barred.  But  since  creditors  may  proceed,  at  their 
option,  against  the  private  estate  of  the  deceased  partner,  or  against 
the  survivor,  for  the  enforcement  of  their  claims  against  a  partner- 
ship, as  well  as  against  the  partnership  estate;  and  since  all  such 
claims,  when  allowed  against  and  paid  by  the  administrator  of  the 
deceased  partner,  are  by  the  statute  made  charges  against  the  part- 
nership effects,  to  be  allowed  and  included  in  the  final  settlement  of 
the  partnership  estate,4  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  legislature  con- 
templated such  final  settlement  before  the  expiration  of  the  two 
years  within  which  partnership  creditors  are  allowed  to  enforce 
their  demands  against  the  estate  of  the  deceased  partner.  There  is 
no  doubt,  however,  that  such  a  settlement  would  be  collaterally 
unassailable  (if  otherwise  valid)  and  could  not  be  impeached  as 
having  been  prematurely  made.  It  has  not  been  judicially  deter- 
mined, whether  final  settlement  of  partnership  administration  can 
be  compelled  before  the  end  of  the  second  year.5 

1  Supra,  p.  *298.  tor,  the  excess,"  &c.  :    "Rev.  St.  1889,  §  59. 

2  Easton  v.  Courtwright,  84  Mo.  27,  39.  It  is  to  he  observed,  however,  that,  the 
holding  that  such  a  partner  may  sell  the  same  condition  as  to  time  (two  years)  was 
realty  to  pay  firm  debts,  without  a  license  contained  in  the  bond  ("Rev.  St.  1855.  p. 
from  the  probate  court.  122,  §  55)  at  a  time  when  creditors  were 

3  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  65.  allowed  three  years  to  prove  debts  against 

4  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  65.  the  private  estate  (Rev.  St.  1855,  p.   151, 

5  The  bond  is  required  to  be  con-  §  1),  but  only  two  years  to  prove  debts 
ditioned,  inter  alia,  to  "pay  over,  within  against  the  partnership  estate  (St.  1855, 
two  years,  unless  a  longer  time  he  allowed  p.  125,  §  63). 

by  the  court,  to  the  executor  or  administra- 

323 


*  300,  *301     ESTATES  OF  DECEASED  PARTNERS.  §  130 

§  130.  Effect  of  Giving  or  Refusing  to  Give  Bond.  —  The  juris- 
diction conferred  upon  probate  courts  over  the  estates  of  partner- 
E  elusive  ships  dissolved  by  death  is  exclusive,  and  carries  with 

jurisdiction  of  it  such  equitable  powers  as  may  be  necessary  to  wind 
probate  courts.  up  the  partnership  affairs.  Until  final  settlement  of 
such  estate  in  the  probate  court,  the  circuit  court  or  court  possessing 
original  chancery  powers  has  no  jurisdiction  over  it.1  The  final 
settlement  has  the  force  and  effect  of  a  judgment,  from  which 
appeal  may  be  taken.2 

In  Maine,  as  already  shown,8  the  surviving  partner  has  no  power 
over  the  partnership  effects,  after  the  death  of  a  copartner,  until  he 
has  given  the  statutory  bond;4  but  in   Missouri   he  is  not 
Effect  of  re-        *  divested  of  his  common-law  powers  to  wind  [*  301] 
fusai  to  give       up  the  partnership  until   the  administrator   of 

the  deceased  partner  has  given  the  bond  authorizing 
him  to  take  charge  of  the  partnership  effects  on  the  survivor's 
refusal  to  do  so.5  In  Kansas  the  law  is  similar  to  that  prevailing 
in  Missouri.6  This  doctrine  involves  the  power  of  the  surviving 
partner  to  fully  settle  up  the  partnership  affairs  and  transfer  the  firm 
property  in  payment  of  its  debts  without  giving  the  bond  required 
by  the  statute,  unless  the  administrator  of  the  deceased  partner  give 
the  bond,  which  he  cannot  do  until  the  expiration  of  at  least  thirty 
days  from  the  partner's  death.  It  also  results  from  these  cases 
that  until  the  administrator  of  the  deceased  partner  does  so  qualify, 
the   right   of  the   surviving    partner   cannot   be    questioned,    most 

1  Ensworth  v.  Curd,  68  Mo.  282 ;  Cald-  674,  678  J  Eastern  v.  Courtwright,  84  Mo. 
well  v.  Hawkins,  73  Mo.  450.  It  is  held  in  27,  38  ;  Goodson  v.  Goodson,  140  Mo.  206  ; 
Missouri  that  the  statute  affords  an  ample  Hargadine  v.  Gibbons,  45  Mo.  A  pp.  460 
remedy  to  the  administrator  of  the  de-  (criticising  Mutual  Savings  Institution  v. 
ceased  partner  in  the  probate  court  for  an  Enslin,  supra,  as  in  conflict  with  prior  and 
accounting  and  settlement  of  the  partner-  subsequent  Missouri  cases  and  transferred 
ship  estate,  and  while  the  court  does  not  to  the  Supreme  Court,  as  being,  in  the 
wish  to  be  understood  as  holding  this  opinion  of  one  of  the  judges  of  the  Court 
statutory  mode  exclusive  in  all  cases,  yet  of  Appeals,  in  conflict  with  that  decision), 
cogent  reasons  should  be  shown  why  it  When  the  surviving  partner  has  refused 
should  not  be  so  held  before  the  adminis-  to  give  bond,  and  the  administrator  of  the 
trator  of  the  individual  estate  should  be  deceased  partner  has  given  the  bond  as 
permitted  to  proceed  in  equity  to  compel  provided  by  law,  the  effect  is  to  substitute 
an  accounting  and  settlement  of  the  part-  the  latter  to  all  the  rights  and  duties 
nership:  Goodson  v.  Goodson,  140  Mo.  which  would  have  been  enjoyed  by  a 
ooo    216.  surviving    partner   at   common  law,   and 

2  McCartney  v.  Garneau,  4  Mo.  App.  becomes  the  legal  representative  of  the  co- 
566.  partnership    for   purposes   of  suit  on   its 

8  Ante,  §  128.  choses  in  action  :  Latimer  v.  Newman,  69 

4  Cool  '■■  Lewis,  86  Me.  340.  Mo.  App.  76,  81. 

6  Weise   v.   Moore,  22  Mo.   App.  530,  6  Teney  v.  Laing,  47  Kans.  297,  303. 

534;    Bredow  V.  Mutual   Savings  Tnstitu-  So  also  under  the  1862  statute  of  Wash- 

tion,  28  Mo.    181,    184,  recognized  in  Mu-  ington  :    Dyer  v.    Morse,   10   Wash.  492, 

tual     Ravings     Institution    ;•.    Enslin,    37  disapproving  the  Maine  decisions. 
Mo.  453,  457;   Holman  v.   Nance,  84   M<>. 
984 


§130  EFFECT   OF  GIVING   OR  REFUSING   TO   GIVE   BOND.  *  301 

clearly  not  by  a  partnership  debtor 1  —  and  that  no  one  can  be 
authorized  to  take  charge  of  the  partnership  estate,  save  the  surviv- 
ing partner  or  the  administrator  of  the  deceased  partner.2  Hence, 
if  the  estate  of  the  deceased  partner  is  in  charge  of  the  public 
administrator,  it  may  become  the  duty  of  the  probate  court  to  order 
the  public  administrator  to  take  charge  of  and  wind  up  the  partner- 
ship estate  in  his  official  capacity,  if  the  surviving  partner  refuse  to 
give  the  bond.8 

Although  the  statute  provide  for  citation  against  the  surviving 
partner,  such  citation  is  not  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  bond  to 
be  given  by  the  administrator  of  the  deceased  partner;    Notice  to  the 
notice  to  him  that  he  will  apply  to  the  probate  court    administrator16 
for  an  order  directing  him  to  take  charge  of  the  partner-    of  deceased 
ship  estate  unless  the  survivor  give  bond,  is  sufficient.4   par  ner* 

The  inventory  which  the  administrator  of  a  deceased  partner  is 
required  to  make  before  it  is  determined  whether  he  or  the  surviv- 
ing partner   shall   administer   the   partnership   estate,    Liabilities  of 
includes  the  partnership  effects  for  the  purpose  only  of   respective1  6r 
ascertaining   the   interest  of   the   deceased   partner;  it    bonds, 
does  not  authorize  such  administrator  to  take  charge  of  or  exercise 
any  control  over  the  same.     Hence  the  sureties  on  his  bond  are  not 
liable  for  conversion  of  the  partnership  effects  so  inventoried,  made 
after  giving  the  additional  bond  required  to  authorize  him  to  take 
charge  of  the  partnership  effects.5 

It  is  held  in  Missouri,  that  neither  a  surviving  partner  nor  his 
administratrix  is  chargeable  with  the  duty  of  accounting  in  the 
State  courts  for  partnership  assets  which  are  outside  the  State  until 
such  time  as  the  proceeds  thereof  actually  come  into  their  hands 
within  the  State.6 

1  Hargadine  v.  Gibbons,  114  Mo.  561,  6  Orrick  v.  Vahey,  49  Mo.  428,  430; 
566.  Carr  v.  Catlin,  13  Kans.  393;  Glass  Com- 

2  Weise  v.  Moore,  22  Mo.  App.  530.  pany  v.  Ludlum,  8  Kans.  40. 

8  Headlee  v.  Cloud,  51  Mo.  301.  6  Scudder  v.  Ames,  142  Mo.  187. 

*  James  v.  Dixon,  21  Mo.  538  ;  Carr  v. 
Catlin,  13  Kans.  393. 


325 


*  302  ESCHEATS.  §§  131, 132 


*  CHAPTER  XIII.  [*  302]  \ 

ESCHEATS. 

§  131.  Devolution  of  Property  in  Default  of  Heirs.  —  Property 
of  deceased  persons  necessarily  vests  in  the  State  if  no  one  is  coni- 
The  State  sue-  petent  to  take  it  as  heir  or  testamentary  donee.1  "It 
ertv Vthere13"  seems  to  De  the  universal  rule  of  civilized  society,  that 
are  no  heirs.  when  the  deceased  owner  has  left  no  heirs  it  should  vest 
in  the  public  and  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  government."2  Such 
property  is  said  to  escheat,  —  a  term  applied  in  the  common  law  to 
the  reversion  of  an  estate  to  the  lord  from  whom  it  was  held,  either 
propter  defectum,  sanguinis,  i.  e.  on  account  of  the  failure  of  heirs 
of  the  grantee,  or  propter  delictum  tenentis,  i.  e.  on  account  of  the 
felony  or  attainder  of  the  tenant.3  Of  course,  there  can  be  no 
escheat  in  this  country  on  the  latter  ground  (nor  in  England,  since  j 
corruption  of  the  blood  and  forfeitures  and  escheats  are  done  away ' 
with  by  statute  4) ;  hence,  in  the  United  States,  escheat  signifies  a 
reversion  of  property  to  the  State  in  consequence  of  a  want  of  any 
individual  competent  to  inherit.5 

§  132.  Escheat  at  Common  Law.  —  It  will  be  remembered  that 
at  common  law  the  term  "escheat"  is  properly  applicable  to  real 
Only  real  estate  only,  since  it  is  an  incident  to  the  feudal  tenure,6 

estate  escheats    although  Blackstone,   in  one  part  of  his  Commentaries, 

at  common  °  '  r 

law.  treats  the  doctrine  of  escheats  as  applying  to  property 

1  "  It  is  right  and  proper,  that  when  5  Within  the  States  of  the  American 
the  owner  of  property  dies  without  giving  Union,  escheats  for  defect  of  heirs  are  to 
it  away,  and  without  leaving  any  ohject  the  State  in  which  the  property  is  situate, 
having  natural  claims  to  his  hounty,  such  and  not  to  the  United  States  :  Cooley's 
as  heirs  or  next  of  kin,  his  property  Blackst.,  vol.  1,  bk.  2,  p.  302,  note  9.  "In 
should  go  to  the  community  of  which  he  this  country,"  says  Gray,  J.,  in  Hamilton 
is  a  member":  per  Tucker,  P.,  in  Hub-  v.  Brown,  161  U.  S.  256,  263,  "  where  the 
hard  v.  Goodwin,  3  Leigh,  492,  518;  title  to  land  fails  for  want  of  heirs  and 
Matthews  v.  Ward,  10  Gill  &  J.  443,  450.  devisees,  it  escheats  to  the  State  as  part 

2  Bouvier,  Law  Diet.  "  Escheat,"  citing  of  its  common  ownership,  either  by  oper- 
Domat,  Droit  Pub.,  liv.  1,  t.  6,  s.  3,  n.  1  ;  ation  of  law,  or  upon  the  inquest  of  office, 
4  Kent,  424;  2  Bla.  Comm.  244  ;  1  Washb.  according  to  the  law  of  the  particular 
R.  Prop.  24,  27  ;   1   Browne,  Civ.  L.  250.  State." 

"  Abbott,  Law  Diet.  "  Escheat."  c  2  Bla.  Comm.  72,  89,  244. 

4  33  &  34  Vict.  c.  23. 
326 


§  132  ESCHEAT   AT   COMMON   LAW.  *  302,  *  303 

in   general.1      The   title   by  escheat   accruing   to   the   lord 
[*  303]  *  upon  the  termination  of  his  vassal's  tenancy    Title  by  es- 
(by   death  without  heirs  or  corruption  of  the    che?t  m^ be 

^  pBriGctcu.  bv 

tenant's  blood)   was  not  complete  until  the  lord  per-    some  notorious 
formed  an  act  of  his  own  by  entering  on  the  lands  and    act* 
tenements  so  escheated,  or  suing  out  a  writ  of  escheat,  on  failure  of 
which,  or  by  doing  any  act  amounting  to  an  implied  waiver  of  his 
right,  as  by  accepting  homage  or  rent  of  a  stranger  who  usurps  the 
possession,  his  title  by  escheat  was  barred.2     It  is  accordingly  said, 
that  at  common  law  a  process  like  a  recovery  of  the  lands  by  suit 
must  be  gone  through  with  before  the  land  can  properly  be  considered 
as  belonging  to  the  State.3    But  the  necessity  of  an  "  in-    When  inquest 
quest  of  office,"  or  "office  found,"  as  the  proceeding  to    of  office  is 
ascertain  the  sovereign's  title  is  called,  seems  to  apply    '       sarj' 
to  cases  only  in  which  the  escheat  is  claimed  on  the  ground  that  the 
heir  is  an  alien.     Story,  J.,  states  the  common  law  to  be,4  that  an 
alien  can  take  lands  by  purchase,  though  not  hy  descent; 

i  ill  niii  ti  llGTl   nOiQS 

he  cannot  take  by  the  act  or  law,  but  he  may  by  the  act    lands  coming 
of  the  party.     There  is  no  distinction  whether  the  pur-    chaselufj'ect^ 
chase  be  by  grant  or  devise.     The  estate  vests  in  the    to  be  divested 
alien,  not  for  his  own  benefit,  but  for  the  benefit  of  the   on  office  foun(L 
State;  the  alien  has  the  capacity  to  take,  but  not   to  hold  lands; 
they   may  be   seized  into  the   hands   of  the  sovereign.     Until  the 
lands  are  so  seized,  the  alien  has  complete  dominion  over  them,  and 
may  convey  them  to  a  purchaser.     The  title  acquired  by  an  alien  by 
purchase  is  not  divested  until  office  found,  because,  as  the  freehold 
is  in  the  alien,  and  he  is  tenant  to  the  lord  of  whom  the  lands  are 
holden,  it  cannot  be  divested  out  of  him  but  by  some  notorious  act, 
by  which  it  may  appear  that  the  freehold  is  in  another.    On  death  of 
And  the  reason  of  the  difference  why,  when  an  alien    Sap™wS- 
dies,  the   sovereign   is   seised   without  office  found   is    out  inquest, 
because  otherwise  the  freehold  would  be  in  abeyance,  as  an  alien 
cannot  have  any  inheritable  blood.     Even  after   office   found,   the 
king   is   not   adjudged   in   possession,   unless  the    possession  were 
then   vacant;   for   if    the    possession   were    then   in   another,    the 

1  "  In  case  no  testament  be  permitted  cheated,  until  the  fact  is  judicially  ascer- 
by  the  law,  or  none  be  made,  and  no  tained  by  a  proceeding  in  the  nature  of  an 
heir  be  found  so  qualified  as  the  law  inquest  of  office " :  People  v.  Folsom,  5 
requires,  still,  to  prevent  the  robust  title  Cal.  373,  378.  "  The  King's  title  was  not 
of  occupancy  from  again  taking  place,  the  complete  without  an  actual  entry  upon  the 
doctrine  of  escheats  is  adopted  in  almost  land,  or  judicial  proceeding  to  ascertain 
every  country"  :  2  Bla.  Comm.  11.  the  want  of  heirs  and  devisees  "  :  Gray,  J., 

2  2  Bla.  Comm.  245.  in  Hamilton  v.  Brown,  161  U.  S.  256,  263, 
8  3  Washb.  on  R.  Prop.  *  444.     "  By     stating      the     common-law      method    of 

the  civil  law  as  well  as  the  common  law,     escheat. 

the  King  cannot  take  upon  himself  the  *  Fairfax  v.  Hunter,  7  Cr.  603,  619. 

possession  of  an  estate,  said   to  have  es- 


*  303,  *  304  escheats.  §  133 

king  must  enter  or  seise  *  by  his  officer,  before  the  posses-  [*  304] 
sion  in  deed  shall  be  adjudged  to  him. 

It  seems  to  follow  that  "  whenever  the  owner  dies  intestate,  with- 
out leaving  any  inheritable  blood,  or  if  the  relations  whom  he 
leaves  are  aliens,  there  is  a  failure  of  competent  heirs,  and  the 
lands  vest  immediately  in  the  State  by  operation  of  law.  No 
inquest  of  office  is  requisite  in  such  cases."1  But  there  will  be  no 
escheat  so  long  as  there  are  any  heirs  capable  of  inheriting;  if  some 
of  the  next  of  kin  be  incapable  by  reason  of  alienage  to  take,  the 
inheritance  descends  to  those  who  are  competent,  as  if  such  alien 
had  never  existed.2 

The  distinction  between  escheat  (to  the  chief  lord  of  the  fee)  and 
forfeiture  (to  the  crown)  must  not  be  overlooked.  The  one  was  a 
Distinction  be-  consequence  of  the  feudal  connection,  the  other  was 
tween  escheat  anterior  to  it,  and  inflicted  upon  a  principle  of  public 
policy.8  It  follows  from  the  nature  of  escheats  at  com- 
lanWheid  in  mon  law,  that  trust  property  does  not  escheat  upon  the 
t"131-  death  of  the   cestui  que  trust,  because,  the   legal  title 

being  in  the  trustee,  there  is  no  lack  of  an  owner,  although  the 
•  owner  of  the  beneficiary  title  die  without  heirs.4  Per- 
as  to  personal  sonal  property,  which  in  default  of  next  of  kin  goes  to 
property.  ^Q  king,  as  parens  patriae,  is  allodial  by  law ;  and  for 

this  reason,  when  held  in  trust,  the  king  is  as  well  entitled  to  it  as 
to  any  other  personal  estate.5 

§  133.  Escheats  under  the  Statutes  of  the  Several  States.  —  It 
results  from  what  has  already  been  stated,  that  escheat  in  the  feudal 
N  ,  sense  has  never  existed  in  America,  at  least  not  since 

escheat  in  the  Kevolution,6  but  has  here  become  a  falling  of  the 

America.  estate  into  the   general   property  of   the    State,  either 

because  the  tenant  is  an  alien,  or  because  he  has  died  intestate 
without  lawful  heirs  to  take  his  estate  by  succession.7  This  prin- 
Personal  and  ciple  includes  personal  property  as  well  as  real,  and  is 
anakeP8™LTercf  so  treated  in  the  statutes  governing  the  subject  in  the 
to  escheat.  several  States,  some  of  them  distinguishing  between 
the  two  species  of  property  in  the  method  pointed  out  for  its 
recovery  by  the  State,  and  as   to  the  time  allowed   claimants    to 

1  4  Kent,  *  424 ;  Farrar  v.  Dean,  24  Mo.  5  Burgess  v.  Wheate,  1  Win.  Bl.  123, 
16;  People  v.  Conklin,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  67,     164. 

74  ;  Pom.  Mnn.  L.   567.     See  post,  §   133,  8  Mr.  Washburn  calls  attention  to  the 

on   the   necessity   of    inquest   under   the  existence  of  escheat,  in  the  feudal  sense, 

statutes.  in  Maryland,  and  perhaps  a  few  other  of 

2  Wunderle  v.  Wunderle,  144  111.  40,  the  Colonies,  before  the  Kevolution:  3 
67;  Bchnltze  v.  Schultze,  144  IU.  2'JO,  Was  lib.  R.  Prop.  *443.  A  full  account 
298.  of  the  grant  of  lands  to  Lord  Baltimore 

8  4  Kent,  *  427.  may  be  found  in  the  cases  of  Fairfax  v. 

*   Burgess  v.   Wheate,  1   Wm.  Bl.  123  ;     Hunter,  7  Cr.  603,  and  Ringgold  v.  Ma- 

1  Kden,  177  ;  2  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *  185.  lott,  1  Har.  &  J.  299. 


7  3  Washb.  *  443  ;  4  Kent,  *  424. 


328 


§  133        ESCHEATS  UNDER  STATUTES  OF  THE  SEVERAL  STATES.        *  305 

[*  305]  *  prove  their  right  to  property  declared  escheated;  but   in 
all  of  thern  (except  where  the  statute  is  silent  on  this  point, 
as  in  Colorado  *),  the  right  of  the  State  to  property  left    in  Maryland 
without  a  competent  heir  or  testamentary  donee  is  placed   propem- 
upon  the  same  ground,  whether  it  is  real  or  personal,    escheats  un- 
In  Maryland,  personal  property  escheats  if  there  be  no    beVithin^fth 
heirs  within  the  fifth  degree  of  consanguinity.2  degree. 

The  American  doctrine  also  includes  property  held  in  trust, 
whether  by  express  enactment  of  the  statute,  as,  for  instance,  in 
Kentucky,8  Pennsylvania,4  Virginia,5  and  West  Vir-  Property  held 
ginia,6  or  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  right  of  intrust, 
the  State  as  ultimus  hceres  ; 7  a  fortiori  if  the  trust  be  a  contrivance 
to  defeat  the  law,  as  where  an  alien  purchases  real  estate  in  the 
name  of  a  trustee  to  evade  the  law  prohibiting  aliens  from  holding 
real  estate.8 

It  has  also  been  held,  that  an  estate  in  remainder,  if  vested  in 
fee,  may  escheat  before  the  termination  of  the  life  Escheat  of 
estate;  as  where  a  testator  devised  the  remainder  to  remainders, 
one  who  is  incompetent  to  take  it,  and  dies  without  heirs.  In  such 
case,  the  interest  devised  goes  to  the  State  by  escheat;9  but  in 
Pennsylvania  it  is  held  that  the  remainder  cannot  be  escheated 
until  the  termination  of  the  life  estate.10  This  subject  is  again 
mentioned  in  connection  with  the  subject  of  the  title  of  the  State.11 

We  have  seen  that  at  common  law  no  inquest  of  office  is  neces- 
sary to  vest  the  title  by  escheat  in  the  king,12  unless  the  escheat 
is   claimed  because   the  heir  is  an  alien.18    The  same    Inquest  not 
doctrine  holds  good  in  the  United  States,  except  where    fetTreamred" 
such  proceeding  is  directed  by  express  statute.14     With   by  statute. 

1  The   Constitution    directs   that    the        10  Commonwealth  v.  Naile,  supra. 
school  fund  shall  consist,  i.  a.,  of  prop-         n  Post,  §  134. 

erty  escheated  to  the  State  :  Const.  (Gen.  12  Ante,  §  132. 

St.  1883),  art.  ix.  §  5.  is  Maynard  v.  Maynard,  36  Hun,  227, 

2  Pub.  Gen.  L.  1888,  p.  1358,  §  135.  231. 

3  St-  1894,  §  1617.  u  Crane  v.  Keeder,  21  Mich.  24,  78,  et 

4  But  the  Pennsylvania  statute  (of  seq.  (citing  Mooers  v.  White,  6  John.  Ch. 
1869)  was  held  impossible  of  execution  360;  Slater  v.  Nason,  15  Pick.  345,349; 
as  to  trust  estates :  West's  Appeal,  64  Montgomery  v.  Dorion,  7  N.  H.  475 ;  Ru- 
Pa.  St.  186,  194.  See,  however,  Com-  beck  v.  Gardner,  7  Watts,  455  ;  O'Hanlin 
monwealth  v.  Naile,  88  Pa.  St.  429,  434,  v.  Den,  20  N.  J.  L.  31  ;  s.  c.  21  N.  J.  L. 
in  which  the  escheat  of  property  held  by  582)  ;  Sands  v.  Lynham,  27  Gratt.  291, 
a  trustee  was  held  good.  296  ;  Reid  v.  State,  74  Ind.  252.     Where 

Lode,  1887,  §  2396.  the  statute    requires    proceedings   in  the 

6  Code,  1891,  p.  631,  §  24.  nature  of  an  inquest  of  office,  the  record 

1  Matthews  v.  Ward,  10  G.  &  J.  443,  thereof  is  the  only  evidence  by  which  a 

451, et  seq. ;  Commonwealth  v.  Naile,  supra,  title  by  escheat  can  be  established:  Wal- 

8  Hubbard  v.  Goodwin,  3  Leigh,  492,  lahan  v.  Ingersoll,  117  111.  123.  When  a 
51  *•  man  dies,  the  legislature  is  under  no  con- 

9  People  v.  Conklin,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  stitutional  obligation  to  leave  the  title  to 
"'»  '*•  his  property,  real  or  personal,  in  abeyance 

329 


*  306,  *  307  escheats.  §133 

*  respect  to  real   estate   this   is   in  many  States  required.   [*306] 
The  statutes  of  Arkansas,1  Illinois,2  Maine,8  Mississippi,4 

Missouri,5  South  Carolina,6  Virginia,7  West  Virginia, 
sary  for  per-  and  probably  some  other  States,  distinguish  between 
souai  property.  reaj  anc|  personal  property  in  this  respect;  so,  by  the 
present  Code  in  California;8  but  in  Delaware,9  Georgia,10  Oregon,11 
and  Pennsylvania,12  there  must  be  proceedings  in  the  nature  of 
Escheat  of  per-  an  inquest  for  personal  as  well  as  for  real  property.  In 
determinedly  resPect  °f  personal  property  the  law  in  most  States 
probate  court,  makes  it  the  duty  of  the  probate  court  in  which  admin- 
istration is  pending  to  adjudge  the  question  of  escheat,  either  as 
constituting  an  element  of  the  order  of  distribution,  since  the  State 
is  but  the  ultimus  Jueres  in  such  cases,  or  by  express  direction  of 
the  statute,  as  in  Alabama,13  Arkansas,14  Georgia,15  Illinois,16 
Action  to  re-  Indiana,17  Iowa,18  Missouri,19  and  Vermont.20  The 
cover  escheated  action  or  proceeding  by  the  State  to  recover  escheated 
proper  j.  property  from  a  person  in  possession  is  distinct  from 

and  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  inquest  of  office;  in  such 
action  the  State  is  in  the  same  position  as  any  individual  suing  for 
his  right,  and  in  ejectment  must  recover  upon  the  strength  of  its 
own  title,  the  bare  possession  of  the  defendant  being  sufficient  to 
defeat  the  State  unless  full  proof  be  made  of  all  the  elements 
constituting  *  the  escheat.21     So  the  State  may,  like  an  indi-  [*307] 

for  an  indefinite  period;  but  it  may  pro-  6  Rev.  St.  1893,  §2438;  Muiru.  Thom- 

vide  for  promptly  ascertaining,  by  appro-  son,  28  S.  C.  499. 

priate  judicial  proceedings,  who  has  sue-  7  Code,  1887,  §  2375. 

ceeded  to  his  estate.     If  such  proceedings  8  Code  Civ.   Pr.   §    1269;     People    v. 

are  had,  after  actual  notice  to  all  known  Roach,  76  Cal.  294. 

claimants,  and  constructive  notice  to  all  9  Laws,  1874,  p.  495. 

possible  unknown  claimants,  the  final  de-  10  Code,  1895,  §  3577. 

termination  of  the    right  of    succession,  n  Code,  1887,  §  3136. 

either  among  private  persons,  as  in  the  12  Pepper  &L.  Dig.  1896,  p.  1858,  §§  6, 9. 

ordinary  administration  of  estates,  or  he-  13  Code,  1896,  §§  1752,  1755. 

tween    all   persons   and   the    State,  as  by  ll  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §§  2844  et  seq. 

inquest  of  office  or  similar  process  to  de-  15  Code,  1895,  §  3577. 

termine  whether  the  estate  has  escheated,  M  St.  &  C.  Ann.  St.  1896,  §§  2  et  seq. 

is  due  process  of  law;  and  a  statute  pro-  n  Fuhrcr  v.  State,  55  Ind.  150,  152. 

riding  f"r  Bach  proceeding  and  determi-  18  Code,  1897,  §  3388. 

nation  does  not  impair  the  obligation  of  19  Rev.  St.  1889,  §4800. 

any  contract  contained  in  the  grant  under  20  St.  1894.  §  2549. 

which  Hi';  former  owner  held,  whether  21  3  Washb.  R.  Prop.  *  445;  Common- 
Unit  grant  was  from  the  State  or  from  a  wealth  v.  Hite,  6  Leigh,  588 ;  Catham  v. 

private  person  :  Cray,  J.,  in  Hamilton  v.  State,  2  Head,  553  ;  Hammond  v.  Inloes, 

Brown,  161  U.  8.  256,  275.  4  Md.  138;    Ramsey's  Appeal,  2  Watts, 

1    Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  2851.  228,    231;    Commonwealth    v.    Selden,   5 

-  St.  &  C.  Ann.  St.  (2d  ed.,  1896),  ch.  Munf.  160;    State  v.  Meyer,  63  Ind.  33, 

49,  §  3.  38.     But    it    is    held    in    Louisiana     that 

'■'■   Rev.  St.  1888,  ch.  98,  §  11.  where   the   State   claims    the    succession, 

4  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §§  1702  et  aeq.  in  a  proceeding  against  the  universal  leg- 

'<  Rev,  St.  18K9,  §§  4808  at  seq.  ateo,  who  is  in  possession  of  the  estate, 

880 


§133    ESCHEATS  UNDER  STATUTES  OF  THE  SEVERAL  STATES.    *  307,*  308 


Escheator. 


vidual,  be  estopped  by  its  own  grant  and  warranty  from  claiming 
escheat.1 

In  most  of  the  States  it  is  made  the  duty  of  some  officer,  specially 
vested  with  authority  for  such  purpose,  to  investigate  and  ascertain 
whether  property,  real  or  personal,  have  escheated,  and 
to  take  all  needful  steps  in  securing  such  to  the  State. 
In  Delaware,2  Kentucky,3  Virginia,4  and  West  Virginia,  this  officer 
is  appointed  by  the  governor,  and  is  called  Escheator;  in  Pennsyl- 
vania5 the  auditor-general,  and  in  South  Carolina6  the  Escheators 
county  auditor,  is  made  by  statute  ex  officio  escheator;  €X0JlC10- 
and  in  Alabama,7  Georgia,8  and  Iowa,9  the  administrator  of  an 
estate  to  which  there  are  no  competent  heirs  is  charged  with  the 
duties  of  an  escheator.  In  most  States  the  duty  to  recover  escheated 
property  for  the  State  is  imposed  upon  the  attorney-general,10 
prosecuting  attorney,11  State's  attorney,12  district  attorney,18  or 
directly  upon  the  representative  officers  of  the  school  boards  to  be 
benefited  by  the  proceeding;14  because,  with  rare  exceptions,  the 
proceeds  of  escheated  property  are  dedicated  in  the  several  States 
to  the  general  school  fund,  or  otherwise  appropriated  Beneficiaries 
for  the  purposes  of  public  instruction.15  It  is  held,  that 
the  beneficiaries  of  these  donations  acquire  a  vested 
right  to  the  property  escheated,  as  soon  as  the  facts 
which  give  rise  to  the  escheat  exist;  hence  a  law 
[*  308]  changing  the  destination  *  of  escheats  can  operate  prospec- 
tively only ; 16  and  an  order  to  sell  the  land  of  one  who  died 
without  leaving  heirs,  for  the  payment  of  his  debts,  is  void,  unless 
the  parties  entitled  to  escheated  lands  are  present,  or  have  notice  of 


under  law  of 
escheat  enti- 
tled to  notice 
before  sale  of 
pro  pert}'  for 
debts. 


on  the  ground  of  his  alleged  incapacity, 
in  which  proceeding  third  parties  inter- 
vened claiming  as  heirs  at  law,  the  bur- 
den is  not  on  the  State  to  prove  that  the 
deceased  had  left  no  heirs,  but  on  the  in- 
terveners to  prove  their  heirship  :  Succes- 
sion of  Townsend,  40  La.  An.  66. 

1  Commonwealth  v.  Andre,  3  Pick. 
224. 

2  Laws,  1874,  p.  495,  §  2. 

8  Gen.  St.  1887,  p.  540.  By  the  St. 
1894,  the  escheator  is  appointed  by  the 
Auditor:  §  1610. 

*  Code,  1887,  §  237. 

6  Pep.  &  L.  Dig.  1896,  p.  1858,  §  6. 

6  Rev.  St.  1893,  §  2435. 

7  Code,  1896,  §  1753. 

8  Code,  1895,  §  3577.  But  the  admin- 
istrator  will  be  restrained  in  equity  from 
recovering  possession  of  a  tract  of  land 
left  by  one  who  died  intestate,  without 
heirs,  distributees,  or  creditors,  from  one 


who  purchased  the  same  and  has  been 
mauy  years  in  possession:  Smith  v.  Gen- 
try, 16  Ga.  31. 

9  Code,  1897,  §  3389. 

10  In  California,  Maine,  Massachusetts, 
Minnesota,  New  Jersey,  New  York. 

11  In  Arkansas,  Indiana,  Missouri, 
Ohio. 

13  In  Illinois. 

13  In  Mississippi,  Tennessee,  Texas. 

14  In  Kansas,  North  Carolina  (see  Oli- 
veira  v.  University,  Phill.  Eq.  69). 

36  In  many  States  this  is  provided  hy 
the  constitution,  and  gives  rise  to  doubts 
concerning  the  power  of  the  legislature  or 
of  courts  to  dispose  of  escheats. 

16  Rock  Hill  College  v.  Jones,  47  Md.  1, 
18,  et  seq.;  University  of  North  Carolina 
v.  Foy,  1  Murphy,  58,  81,  et  seq.,  Hall,  J., 
dissenting,  on  the  ground  that  the  Univer- 
sity is  but  the  agent  of  the  State,  p.  89. 

33i 


*  308,  *  309  escheats.  §  134 

the  application  for  such  order.1  So,  where  the  constitution  pro- 
vides who  shall  be  the  recipient  of  escheated  property,  the  same 
Law  in  force  at  cannot  be  diverted,  either  by  administration  or  by  act 
the  time  of  the  0f  the  legislature.2  The  law  in  force  at  the  time  of  the 
death  governs  death  of  one  who  leaves  only  alien  heirs  determines  the 
escheat.  question   of  escheat;  and   a   treaty  securing  to  aliens 

competent  to  inherit  real  estate  the  right  to  such  inheritance,  con- 
fers no  right  upon  an  alien  who  was,  at  the  time  of  the  intestate's 
death,  incompetent,  though  subsequently  aliens  were  by  statute 
enabled  to  hold  real  estate  by  inheritance.8 

§  134.  Nature  of  the  Title  by  which  the  State  holds  Escheats. 
—  Chancellor  Kent,  in  his  Commentaries,  mentions  with  disappro- 
At  common  bation  "  a  very  inequitable  rule  of  the  common  law,  that 
Reheat  dear68  ^  tne  king  t°°k  lands  by  escheat,  he  was  not  subject  to 
of  trusts.  the  trusts  to  which  the  escheated  lands  were  previously 

liable;"4  and  says,  that  "the  opinion  in  England  is  understood  to 
be  that,  upon  the  escheat  of  the  legal  estate,  the  lord  will  hold  the 
escheat  free  from  the  claims  of  the  cestui  que  trust ;  "  6  and  he  points 
out  certain  English  statutes 6  as  calculated  to  check  the  operation  of 
In  America  the  so  unreasonable  a  principle.  In  America  the  principle 
hit^resf  ofSthe6  *s  universally  recognized,  that,  where  property  escheats, 
decedent.  the  State  takes  precisely  the  title  which  the  party  dying 

had,  and  no  other.7  It  is  taken  in  the  condition  and  to  the  extent 
in  which  he  held  it.  This  is  the  necessary  result  of  the  principle 
that  escheat  in  America  means  only  the  substitution  of 
the  State  to  the  rights  of  an  owner  who  is  *  incom-  [*  309] 
petent  to  hold  the  title,  or  as  heir  to  an  estate  in  case 
there  be  no  other  heir  competent  to  take  it.8  In  some  of  the 
States  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  trust  estates  shall  not  escheat 
for  the  want  of  a  trustee,9  or  that  the  State  holds  escheated  lands 
subject  to  existing  trusts.10  It  likewise  follows,  that  an  estate  in 
remainder  may  be  escheated  during  the  existence  of  a  valid  life 

1  Hinkle  v.  Shadden,  2  Swan,  46 ;  or  grant,  to  execute  the  trust.  The  stat- 
Parchman  v.  Charlton,  1  Coldw.  381,  388.  ute   of  4  &  5  Wm.  IV.  c.  23,  provided 

2  State  v.  Iteeder,  5  Neb.  203,  205  ;  that,  when  a  trustee  of  lands  died  with- 
Harvey  v.  Harvey,  25  S.  C.  283.  out  an  heir,  the  court  of  chancery  may 

8  Hauenstein  v.  Lynhain,  28  Gratt.  62,  appoint   a  trustee    to   act   for  the  party 

67.    Thia  case  was  reversed  by  the  United  beneficially  interested. 
States  Supreme  Court,  in  100  U.  S.  483,  7  3  Washb.  R.  P.  *446;  4  Kent.  *427. 

on  the  ground  that  a  former  treaty  en-  8  Casey   v.   Inloes,    1    Gill,   430,    507  ; 

aided    the    aliens    to    take.      As   to  the  Straub  v.  Dimm,  27  Pa.  St.  36, 39 ;  Parch- 

capacity   of   aliens   to   inherit,    see   ante,  man  v.  Charlton,  1  Coldw.  381.     But  the 

§  19.  State  is  not  an  heir  in  the  sense  of  being 

i  4  Kent,  *  425,  citing  3  Ilarg.  Co.  Litt.  entitled  to  notice  of  the  probating  of  a 

13,  n.  7;  Pimb'fl  Case,  Moore,  196.  will,  like  an  heir  at  law  :  State  v.  Ames,- 

6  4  Kent,  *  426.  23  La.  An.  69. 

0  40  Geo.  III.  c.  88  ;  see  also  59  Ceo.  9  As  in  Virginia  and  West  Virginia. 

III.  c.  94,  enabling  the  king,  by  warrant         10  New  York  may  be  instanced. 
832 


§  134  TITLE   BY  WHICH    STATE    HOLDS   ESCHEATS.      *  309,  *  310 

estate,1  and  that  the  escheat  of  the  intervening  estate  does  not  affect 
the  remainder;2  and  that  an  "escheat  grant,"  i.e.  a  grant  by  the 
State  of  property  which  it  had  acquired  by  escheat  to  a  pur- 
chaser, passes  the  estate  just  as  the  original  grantee  held  it, 
with  all  privileges  and  appurtenances,  and  subject  to  all  liens 
and  encumbrances,  existing  at  the  time  of  the  escheat.8 

Most  of  the  States  make  liberal  provisions  to  enable  heirs  to 
recover  property  even  after  judgment  of  escheat,  if  they  were  not 
parties  to  the  inquisition,  and  had  no  notice  of  the  How  heirs  may 
proceeding.  Where  money  and  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  Inheritance11" 
of  personal  or  real  property  have  been  paid  into  the  after  escheat. 
State  treasury,  the  relief  consists  in  a  provision  authorizing  the 
payment  of  the  net  amount  of  the  escheat  to  the  claimants  who 
within  a  certain  time  make  sufficient  proof  of  their  title.  The 
time  is  limited  to  two  years  for  personal  property  in  Mississippi;4 
to  five  years  for  personalty  in  Delaware,5  and  for  realty  in  Illinois,6 
Mississippi,7  Missouri,8  and  South  Carolina;9  to  six  years  in 
Georgia; 10  to  seven  years  in  Arkansas  u  and  Delaware; 12  to  ten  years 
in  Iowa,18  North  Carolina,14  Oregon,15  Virginia,16  and  for  personalty 

in  Illinois  n  and  Missouri ; 18  to  seventeen  years  in  Vermont ; 19 
[*  310]  to  twenty  years  in  *  California; 20  to  twenty-one  years  in 

Kansas ; 21  and  to  thirty  years  in  Connecticut.22  No  time  seems 
to  be  fixed  within  which  application  must  be  made  in  Maryland,28 


1  People  v.  Conklin,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  67.  «  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  2864. 

But  see  ante,  p.  *305.  12  For   real    estate:    L.    1874,   p.   498, 

2  Borland  v.  Dean,  4  Mas.  174,  180.  §  18. 

8  Casey  v.  Inloes,  1  Gill,  430,  507.     As  18  Code,  1897,  §  3391. 

land  is  not  escheatable  so  long  as  there  u  Code,  1883,  §  1504. 

are  competent  heirs  of  the  original  gran-  18  Code,  1887,  §  3141. 

tee,  the  grant  by  the  State  of  lands  before  16  Code,  §  2403.     See  also  Code,  1873, 

there  is  a  failure  of  heirs  is  simply  void :  p.  877,  §  33. 

Hall  v.  Gittings,  2  Har.  &  J.  112,  125.  «  St.  &  Curt.  St.  1896,  p.  1811,  f  7. 

4  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  1712.  18  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  4821. 

6  Laws,  1874,  p.  498,  §  18.  »  St.  1894,  §  2552. 

«  St.  &  Cur.  St.  1896,  ch.  49,  §  7.  20  Code  Civ.    Proc.    §    1272.     But  this 

7  Rev.  Code,  1880,  §  892.  In  the  An-  only  authorizes  such  non-resident  alien 
notated  Code  of  1892  prepared  byThomp-  to  show  that  which  he  might  have  shown 
son,  Dillard,  and  Campbell,  and  adopted  had  he  been  made  a  party  to  the  escheat 
by  the  legislature,  this  provision  is  proceedings,  to  wit,  that  he  did  appear 
changed ;  the  statute  now  is,  that  if  es-  and  claim  the  property  within  five  years 
cheated  land  be  recovered  from  the  pur-  from  the  time  of  the  succession  :  State  v. 
chaser  at  the  suit  of  an  heir,  within  two  Smith,  70  Cal.  153,  157. 

years  after  the  escheat  was  declared,  the  21  Gen.  St.  1897,  p.  550,  §  198. 

State  will  refund  to  the  purchaser  the  pur-  22  Gen.  St.  1888,  §  648. 

chase-money  with  six  per  centum  interest  23  As  to  personalty:  Pub.  Gen.  L.  1888, 

per  annum:  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  1711.  art.  93,  §   136.     But   no   collateral   heirs 

8  Rev.  St  1889,  §  4823.  more   distant  than  children  of  brothers 


9  Rev.  St.  1893,  §  2444.  and  sisters  can  apply. 

10  Code,  1895,  §  3580. 


333 


*  310,  *  311  ESCHEATS.  §135 

Michigan,1  New  Hampshire,2  Rhode  Island,8  and  Texas.4  It  is 
held  in  Pennsylvania,  that  the  heirs  or  kindred  of  any  partner  of 
a  partnership  whose  property  has  escheated  may  claim  the  prop- 
erty taken  by  the  State.5  In  South  Carolina  it  is  held  that,  where 
an  heir  claims  compensation  for  property  declared  escheated,  the 
fact  that  the  legislature  has  granted  away  the  right  to  the  land  in 
question ,  and  that  no  money  has  been  paid  into  the  treasury,  does 
not  defeat  the  claim.6  In  Texas,  if  the  proceedings  to  escheat  have 
been  regular,  the  judgment  is  conclusive  evidence  of  the  State's 
title  in  the  land,  not  only  against  claimants  having  had  actual 
notice,  but  also  against  all  other  persons  interested  in  the  estate 
and  having  had  constructive  notice.7 

The  State  may,  by  legislative  grant,  give  title  to  lands  escheated 
for  the  want  of  heirs  before  office  found;8  but  if  the  grant  be  of 
land  to  which  the  State  has  no  title,  the  statute  constituting  the 
grant  is  void.9 

§  135.  Administration  of  Escheated  Estates.  ■ —  It  is  provided  in 
the  statutes  of  some  of  the  States,  that  where  a  person  dies  leaving 
.......      no  competent  heirs,  there  shall  nevertheless  be  admin- 

Administration  ^  ,  ' 

of  personalty  istration  of  his  estate  in  the  usual  manner.  In  Ala- 
asusuaL  bama,10   Arkansas,11    Connecticut,12    Illinois,13    Iowa,14 

Kentucky,15  Missouri,16  New  Hampshire,17  North  Carolina,18  this  is 
affirmatively  required  by  the  language  of  the  enactments.  It  is 
obvious  that  in  these  States  the  object  of  the  law  is  fully 
accomplished  by  placing  the  State  in  the  category  *  of  an  [*  311] 
heir,  represented  in  all  matters  requiring  representation,  in 
court  or  otherwise,  by  the  official  escheator  or  person  designated  to 
guard  the  interest  of  the  State  in  such  proceeding;  and  the  rights  of 
creditors  or  other  claimants  against  such  estate  are  adjudicated 
precisely  as  if  there  were  no  question  of  escheat.     In  other  States 

1  Howell's  St.  §  5988.  cannot  subject  such  lands  to  the  satisfac- 

2  Pub.  St.  1891,  ch.  196,  §  8.  Appli-  tiou  of  their  claims  without  an  order  from 
cation  must,  however,  be  made  to  the  the  ordinary  to  the  administrator,  as  in 
legislature.  other   cases :    Congregational   Church   v. 

3  Attorney-General  v.  Providence,  8  Morris,  8  Ala.  182,  193.  If  no  one  makes 
R.  I.  8,  10.  application  for  letters,  it  is  proper,  if  not 

4  Savles'  Tex.  St.  1897,  §  1834.  imperative,  for  the  probate  judge,  ou  the 
6  Commonwealth  v.  No.  Am.  Land  Co.,     facts  being  brought  to  his  notice,  to  grant 

57  Pa.  St.  102.  administration   ex  mero  motu:    Nicrosi   v. 

0  Ex  pnrte  Williams,  13  Rich.  77,  84.  Ginly,  85  Ala.  305. 

'   Hamilton  v.  Brown,  161    U.  S.  256,  «   Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  2843. 

268.  12  Oen.  St.  1888,  §  647. 

■  Colgan  V.  McKeon,  24  N.  J.  L.  566 ;  1S  St.  &  C  St.  1896,  p.  1809,  IT  2. 

McCaughal  V.  Ryan,  27  Barb.  376,378,  J4  Code,  1897,  §3388. 

Rnbeck    ».   Cardiior,    7   Watts.  455,   458;  1&  St.  1894,  §  1607. 

Nettlei  ».  Cummimrs,  9  Rich.  Bq.  440.  u  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  4800. 

»  Colgan  v.  McKeon,  supra.  "  Pub.  St.  1891,  ch.  196,  §  7. 

10  Code,  1896,   §   1753.     Creditors  of  a  18  Code,  1883,  §  1504. 
decedent  whose  lands  have  been  escheated 
334 


§  135  ADMINISTRATION    OF    ESCHEATED    ESTATES.  *  311 

the  necessity  of  administration  in  the  usual  form  results  from  the 
absence  of  legislation  directing  the  management  of  escheated  estates. 
But  in  some  States  administration  in  the  ordinary  sense  Administration 
is  excluded  by  the  authority  vested  in  the  escheator,  or  b>'  escheator. 
person  acting  for  the  State,  with  respect  to  property  escheated. 
Such  seems  to  be  the  ease  in  Delaware,1  Georgia,2  Indiana,3  Missis- 
sippi,4 Ohio,5  Pennsylvania,6  Rhode  Island,7  South  Carolina,8 
Tennessee,9  Virginia,10  and  West  Virginia. 

1  Upon  inquest  and  fiuding  that  de-  4  Code,  1892,  §  1708. 

cedent   left   property   and    no   heirs,   the  5  Bates'  Ann.  St.  1897,  §  4163. 

escheator   seizes   the    goods    and    causes  6  West's  Appeal,  64  Pa.  St.  186,  193. 

them  to  be  sold,  unless  the  person  in  pos-  7  Haigh  v.  Haigh,  9  R.  I.  26,  29. 

session  gives  bond  that  he  will  traverse  at  8  Rev.  St.  1882,  §  2310. 

the  next  term  of  the  court :  Laws,  1874,  9  Code,  1884,  §  2962. 

p.  467,  §§  8  et  seq.  l°  Code,  1887,  §§  2371  etseq.;  Watson  v. 

a  Code,  1895,  §§  3577,  7692.  Lyle,  4  Leigh,  236,  246. 

8  Burns'  Ann.  St.  1894,  §§  1157,  2633, 
7692. 


SS3 


*TITLE    SECOND.  [*3i2] 

OF  THE  INSTRUMENTALITIES   EFFECTING  THE 
DEVOLUTION. 


§  136.  Tribunals  and  Officers  employed  by  the  Law  to  accom- 
plish the  Devolution.  —  Having  in  the  preceding  pages  pointed  out 
the  principles  which  determine  the  succession  of  property  upon  the 
death  of  its  owner,  and  considered  the  various  channels  through 
which  it  descends  to  the  new  owners,  it  seems  natural  now,  in  the 
further  development  of  our  subject,  to  examine  the  instrumentalities 
employed  by  the  law  to  accomplish  and  control  the  devolution.  It 
seems  more  convenient,  in  doing  this,  though  not,  perhaps,  in 
strictly  logical  sequence,  to  consider,  in  the  first  place,  the  nature, 
scope,  and  power  of  the  various  courts  and  tribunals  armed  with 
jurisdiction  in  this  respect;  and,  next,  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
authority  of  those  officers  whom  the  law  intrusts  with  the  active 
administration  of  the  estates  of  deceased  persons,  —  appointed,  or 
at  least  confirmed,  by  these  courts  and  tribunals,  and  amenable  to 
them  for  their  official  conduct,  but  deriving  their  authority  directly 
from  the  law,  which  determines  the  scope  of  their  powers,  duties, 
and  liabilities,  and  whose  office  it  is  to  personate  the  deceased  in  all 
matters  touching  the  legal  disposition  of  his  property. 


XK 


[#313]  *PART   FIRST. 

OF  THE  TRIBUNALS  CONTROLLING  THE  ADMINISTRA- 
TION OF  THE  ESTATES   OF  DECEASED  PERSONS. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

PROBATE   POWERS   AS   EXISTING   AT   COMMON   LAW  AND   UNDER 
ENGLISH   STATUTES. 

§  137.  Origin  of  the  Ecclesiastical  Jurisdiction  over  the  Probate 
of  Wills.  —  Surrogate  Bradford,  in  the  Introductory  Note  to  his 
series  of  Surrogate  Reports,  gives  a  concise  and  lucid  account  of 
the  origin  of  the  ecclesiastical  jurisdiction  over  the  probate  of  wills 
and  the  administration  of  the  estates  of  deceased  persons,  evincing 
great  learning,  and  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  historical 
development  of  the  jurisdiction,  and  of  the  rules  and  principles  of 
the  civil  law  as  affecting  this  department  of  jurisprudence.1  It  is 
indispensable  to  a  proper  understanding  of  the  nature  of  probate 
courts  in  the  United  States  to  travel  over  the  same  ground,  to  some 
extent  at  least,  in  order  to  gain  an  insight  into  the  principles  and 
doctrines  of  the  common,  civil,  and  canon  law  constituting  the 
unwritten  presuppositions,  tacitly  understood  and  premised,  of 
American  statutes  regulating  the  administration  of  the  estates  of 
deceased  persons.  Much  that  seems  contradictory,  capricious,  or 
incomprehensible  in  the  several  enactments  and  decisions,  will  be 
seen  to  harmonize,  and  the  principles  of  the  civil  and  canon  law, 
vitalizing  the  dry  formulae  of  the  common  law,  will  serve  to  fill  out 

and  round  off  the  statutory  provisions.2 
[*  314]         *  This   branch   of   English   jurisprudence,  or   rather  of 

practice  under  the  common   law,  was  for  a  long  time,  and 

i  1  Bradf.  v.  et  seq.  the  land,  that  is,  to  that  branch  of  the 
2  Courts  of  probate  "  exercise  many  common  law  known  and  acted  upon  for 
powers  solely  by  virtue  of  our  statutes ;  ages,  the  probate  or  ecclesiastical  law  " : 
but  they  have  a  very  extensive  jurisdic-  Bell,  C.  J.,  in  Morgan  v.  Dodge,  44  N.  H. 
tion  not  conferred  by  statute,  but  by  a  255,258.  And  see  post,  §  149,  on  the  pro- 
general  reference  to  the  existing  law  of  cedure  in  probate  courts. 

vol.  i. — 22  337 


*  314,  *  315        PROBATE   POWERS    UNDER    ENGLISH    STATUTES.       §  137 

until  quite  recently,  known  as  well  by  the  name  of  ecclesiastical  as 
by  that  of  testamentary  or  probate  law,  because  the  clergy  had 
assumed  testamentary  jurisdiction  and  exercised  it  in  their  spiritual 
courts.  Just  when  this  authority  was  first  asserted  does  not  very 
clearly  appear;  but  on  the  Continent  certainly  before  the  reign  of 
Justinian,1  because  he  undertook  to  curb  the  practice  by  an  edict.2 
"But,"  says  Selden,  "here  we  see  that  the  clergy,  even  in  those 
days,  had  set  their  foot  upon  the  business;  and  I  suppose  that  since 
that  time  they  never  pulled  it  wholly  out  again."3  In  England, 
although  the  claim  and  practice  of  spiritual  courts  in  this  particular 
is  said  to  have  been  originally  a  mere  usurpation,4  it  became  a  privi- 
lege enjoyed  by  them,  not  as  a  matter  of  ecclesiastical  right,  but, 
as  Blackstone  puts  it,  by  the  special  favor  and  indulgence  of  the 
municipal  law,6  producing  what  he  terms  "  a  peculiar  constitution" 
of  the  island. 

This  jurisdiction,  exercised  in  the  county  court,  where  the  bishop 
and  the  earl  sat  conjointly  for  the  transaction  of  business  until  the 
separation  of  the  ecclesiastical  from  the  secular  jurisdiction  by 
William  the  Conqueror,6  was  plausibly  claimed  by  bishop,  as 
being  in  harmony  with  the  customs  of  the  Normans,  and  the 
civil  and  canon  law,  which  gave  to  bishops  the  charge  of  the 
execution  of  testaments  containing  bequests  in  pios  usus."1  It  is 
certain,  says  Bradford,  that  the  constitution  of  the  ecclesiastical 
tribunals  was  authorized  by  William;  and  that  their  jurisdiction 
included  the  probate  of  wills  soon  after,  if  not  from  the  instant 
of  separation  from  the  county  courts,  is  almost  capable  of  direct 
proof.8 

*  But  as  the  jurisdiction  before  the  Norman  Conquest  was  [*  315] 
a  purely  lay  jurisdiction,  exercised  not  only  in  the  county 
courts,  courts  of  hundred  or  tithing,  but  also,  by  special  custom  or 
franchise,  in  local  courts  in  which  the  earl,  the  lord  of  the  manor, 
the  municipal  magistrate,  or  other  civil  officer  presided,  those  courts 
that  were  such  by  special  custom  or  franchise  retained  their  powers 
in  this  respect;  there  were  many  lay  courts  in  England  exercising 

1  A.  I).  527-565.  wode,   "the   ablest  canonist  of    the    fif- 

2  "  And  also  by  a  mnlct  of  50  pound  teentli  century,"  and  from  a  canon  of  the 
weight  of  gold,  saying  Absurdum  est  nam-  Archbishop  Stratford  to  show  that  tes- 
que  si  promiscuis  actibus  rerum  turbentur  tamentary  causes  and  the  administration 
officio,  et  alii  creditum  alius  subtrahat ;  ac  of  intestates'  goods  was  ab  olnn  granted 
prcecipue  Clericis,  rjuibus  opprobrium  est,  si  to  the  ordinary  consensu  regio  et  magnatum 
peritas  se  velint  Disrejilationum  esse  Foren-  regni  Anghm. 

mum  ostendere " :  Spelman.Prob.  of  Wills,  6  2  Burn's  Eccl.  Law,  33;    Spelman, 

(Posthumous  Works),  129  ;  3  Blackst.  9G.     131. 

3  Sr.fliiian,  129.  7  1  Bradf.  xxii. 

*  See  note  appended  to  Hensloe's  Case,  8  i  Bradf.  xxii.;  3  Blackst.  96;  Spel- 
jn  9  Co.  37,41;  Spelman,  supra ;  4  Burn's  man,  131;  4  Burn's  Eccl.  Law,  291; 
Eccl.  Law,  291  ;  .'l  Blackst.  95.  Hensloe's  Case,  citing  numerous  ancient 

f'  3  Blackst.  95,  quoting  from   Linde-     authorities,  9  Co.  37. 


§  138  ORIGIN    OP   ADMINISTRATION   IN   ENGLAND.      *  315,  *  316 

testamentary  jurisdiction,  of  indefinite  antiquity  or  of  Saxon  origin, 
when  the  act  establishing  courts  of  probate  *  was  passed.2 

§  138.  Origin  of  Administration  in  England.  —  Anciently,  says 
Blackstone,3  the  king,  as  parens  patriae,  seized  upon  the  goods  of 
persons  dying  intestate  and  administered  them  through  his  ministers 
of  justice,  probably  in  the  county  court;  and  the  prerogative  was 
granted  as  a  franchise  to  many  lords  of  manors,  and  others,  who 
continued  to  hold,  by  prescription,  the  right  to  grant  administration 
to  their  intestate  tenants  and  suitors  in  their  own  courts  baron.4 
While  the  franchise  so  granted  remained  in  the  prerogative  and 
prescriptive  courts  for  many  centuries,  and  until  the  passage  of  the 
Probate  Act,  together  with  the  jurisdiction  to  grant  probate  of  wills 
of  personalty,6  the  jurisdiction  formerly  exercised  by  the  king  or 
his  representatives  was  vested  in  favor  of  the  Church  in  prelates, 
"  because  it  was  intended  by  the  law  that  spiritual  men  are  of  better 
conscience  than  laymen,  and  that  they  have  more  knowledge  what 
things  would  conduce  to  the  benefit  of  the  soul  of  the  testator  than 
laymen  have."6  The  Church,  accordingly,  obtained  the  supervision 
of  the  distribution,  or  administration,  of  the  personal  property  of 
intestates;  the  ordinary  might  seize  them  and  keep  them  without 
wasting,  and  also  might  give,  alien,  or  sell  them  at  his  will,  and 
dispose  of  the  money  in  pios  usus.  "So  that,"  says  Blackstone, 
"properly  the  whole  interest  and  power  which  were  granted  to  the 
ordinary  were  only  those  of  being  the  king's  almoner  within  his 
diocese,  in  trust  to  distribute  the  intestate's  goods  in  charity  to  the 
poor,  or  in  such  superstitious  uses  as  the  mistaken  zeal  of  the  times 

had  denominated  pious." 7 
[*  316]         *  The  trust  thus  vested  in  the  ordinary  was  most  solemn 

and  conscientious  in  its  nature.  The  reverend  prelates  were 
not  accountable  to  any  but  to  God  and  themselves  for  their  conduct. 
"If  he  [the  ordinary]  did  otherwise  [than  dispose  of  the  money  in 
pios  ustis],  he  broke  the  confidence  which  the  law  reposed  in  him."8 
"The  common  law  did  not  make  him,  being  a  spiritual  governor, 
subject  to  temporal  suits  for  such  things.  And  this  was  a  great 
defect  in  the  common  law." 9  The  trust  was,  in  the  course  of  time, 
grossly  abused.  The  Popish  clergy,  says  Blackstone,  took  to  them- 
selves (under  the  name  of  the  Church  and  poor)  the  whole  residue 
of  the  estate  of  the  deceased,  after  the  partes  rationabiles,  or  two- 

1  20  &  21  Vict.  c.  77.  article  of  Magna  Charta  in  the  charter  of 

a  1    Bradf.   xix. ;    Foster's   "  Doctors'  Henry  III.,  as  to  the  payment  of  the  debts 

Commons " :  see  post,  §  204.  of  the  deceased  ;    an   omission,  he    says, 

8  2  Comm.  494.  which  is  thought  to  have  been  procured 

*  Ibid.  by  ecclesiastical  influence  :  1  Bradf.  xxv. 

5  Ante,  §  137.  note  (*). 

6  Perk.  Prof.  Book,  §  486.  8  2  Blackst.  494. 

7  2  Bl.  494,  495.  Surrogate  Bradford  9  Graysbrook  v.  Fox,  1  Plowd.  R.  275, 
calls  attention  to  the  omission  of  the  32d  277. 

339 


*316,  *  317       PROBATE   POWERS   UNDER   ENGLISH    STATUTES.        §  139 

thirds,  of  the  wife  and  children  were  deducted,  without  paying  even 
his  debts,  or  other  charges  thereon.  This  led  to  the  enactment  of 
the  Statute  of  Westminster  II.,1  directing  the  ordinary  to  pay  the 
intestate's  debts  so  far  as  his  goods  will  extend.2  But  even  after 
this  check  to  the  exorbitant  power  of  the  clergy,  whereby  the  ordi- 
nary was  made  liable  to  creditors,  yet  the  residuum  after  payment 
of  debts  remained  still  in  their  hands,  to  be  applied  to  whatever 
purpose  his  conscience  should  approve.  It  was  the  flagrant  abuse 
of  this  power  that  again  called  for  legislative  interposition ;  by  the 
statute  of  31  Edw.  III.  c.  11,  the  estates  of  deceased  persons  were 
directed  to  be  administered  by  the  next  of  kin  of  the  deceased,  if 
he  left  no  will,  and  not  by  the  ordinary  or  any  of  his  immediate 
dependants.  This  statute  originated  the  system  of  confiding  the 
settlement  of  the  estates  of  intestates  by  their  next  of  blood, 
appointed  by  the  ordinary,8  putting  them,  with  respect  to  suits  and 
accounting,  upon  the  same  footing  with  executors,  and  making  them 
officers  of  the  ordinary.4 

§  139.  Powers  of  Ecclesiastical  Courts  in  England.  —  The  com- 
mon law  of  England,  as  affected  by  the  statutes  above  named,6  and 
such  of  those  noticed  below  as  were  enacted  before  the  settlement  of 
the  American  Colonies,  is  at  the  basis  of  the  American 
♦statutes  concerning  administration,  and  the  law  in  the  [*317] 
American  States  in  so  far  as  it  has  not  been  supplanted  by 
their  own  statutes.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  follow  still  further 
the  history  of  the  English  law  on  this  subject. 

By  the  statute  of  21  Henry  VIII.  c.  5,  the  discretion  of  the  ordi- 
Statute  au-  nary  in  the  appointment  of  administrators  to  intestate 
thorizing  ap-  estates  was  enlarged,  so  as  to  authorize  the  appointment 
wTdow^next  0I>  either  the  widow,  or  the  next  of  kin,  or  both,  at  the 
of  kin,  or  both,  ordinary's  pleasure;  and  in  the  case  of  two  or  more 
persons  of  the  same  degree  of  kindred  he  might 
appoint  whichever  he  pleased.6 

The  Statute  of  Distributions7  destroyed  the  common-law  right  to 
the  pars  rationabilis,  and  made  the  estate  distributable  among  the 
„  _        widow  and  next  of  kin,  leaving  still,  however,   in  the 

quiring  dis-  hands  of  the  administrator,  for  his  own  use,  the  third 
tribution.  formerly  retained  by  the  Church,  until  finally,  by  the 

statute  of  1  Jac.  II.  c.  17,  this  third  was  made  distributable,  as 
well  as  the  remainder  of  the  intestate's  estate.8 

1  13  Edw.  I.  c.  19.  *  Hensloe's  Case,  9  Co.  39;  2  Blackst. 

2  "  A  use  more  truly  pious  than  any     496. 

requiem  or  mass  for  his  soul":  2  Blackst.  6  13  Edw.  I.  c.  19;  31  Edw.  III.  c.  11. 

495.  •  2  Bla.  Comm.  *496. 

■  The   process  ran   in  the   name  and  7  22  &  23  Car.  II.  c.  10;  29  Car.  II- 

under  the  seal  of   the   bishop :    1   Bradf.  c.  30. 

xxvi.  note  t.  8  1  Bradf.  xxvi. 
340 


§  139     POWERS  OF  ECCLESIASTICAL  COURTS  IN  ENGLAND.     *  317,  *  318 

The  powers   of  the  spiritual  courts  were  thus  restricted  to  the 
judicial   cognizance  of  the  class  of  cases  arising  out   Ecclesiastical 
of  the  probate  of  wills,  the  grant  of  administration,  and    Junsdlctlon 

over  cst&tcs 

the  payment  of  legacies,  and  thus  remained  until,  by    of  deceased 
the  statute  creating  the  court  of  probate,1  their  powers    Persons- 
in  this  respect  were  wholly  abrogated.     The  authority    h^Courtof*" 
to  appoint  administrators,  and  to  take  proof  of  wills,    Probate, 
resided  in  the  bishop  of  the  diocese  wherein  the  testator  or  intestate 
dwelt  at  the  time  of  his  death,  unless  he  left  effects   to  such   an 
amount  as  to  be  considered  notable  goods    (bona  notabilia,  fixed  by 
the  ninety-third  of  the  canons  at  the  value  of  £5  or  over)  within 
some  other  diocese  or  peculiar;  in  such   case  the  will  was  to  be 
proved  before  the  metropolitan  of  the  province  by  way  of  preroga- 
tive, whence  the  courts,  where  the  validity  of  such  wills  was  tried, 
and  the  offices  where  they  were  registered,  were  called  the  preroga- 
tive offices  of  Canterbury  and  York.2 

This  spiritual  jurisdiction  of  testamentary  causes  is  described  by 
Blackstone  as  "a  peculiar  constitution  of  this   ^ 
[*318]  island;  for  in  *  almost  all  other,  even   Popish   spiritual 

countries,  all  matters  testamentary  are  under  Junsdlctlon- 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  temporal  magistrate."3  It  was  exercised  by 
the  consistory  courts  of  diocesan  bishops,  and  in  the  prerogative 
court  of  the  metropolitan,  generally,  and  in  the  arches  court  and 
court  of  delegates  by  way  of  appeal.  It  is  divisible  into  three 
branches,  the  probate  of  wills,  the  granting  of  administrations,  and 
the  suing  for  legacies,  in  respect  to  the  latter  of  which  the  juris- 
diction is  concurrent  with  courts  of  equity.4 

As  the  rules  of  the  canon  and  civil  law  had  been  adopted  by  the 
ecclesiastical  courts,  they  gradually  became  the  basis  of  the  ecclesi- 
astical law,  prevailing,  not  propria  vigore,  but  only  so  far  as  the 
custom  and  prescription  have  admitted  them  in  the  spiritual  courts.6 
"The  proceedings  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts,"  says  Blackstone,6 
"are  therefore  regulated  according  to  the  practice  of  the  canon  and 
civil  law;  or  rather,  according  to  a  mixture  of  both,  corrected  and 
new-modelled  by  their  own  peculiar  usages  and  the  interposition  of 
courts  of  common  law.  .  .  .  When  all  pleadings  and  proofs  are 
concluded,  they  are  referred  to  the  consideration,  not  of  a  jury,  - 
but  of  a  single  judge,  who  takes  information  by  hearing  advocates 
on  both  sides,  who  thereupon  forms  his  interlocutory  decree,  or 
definitive  sentence,  at  his  own  discretion,  which,  if  not  appealed 
from  in  fifteen  days,  is  final  by  the  statute  of  25  Henry  VIII. 
c.  19. 

1  20  &  21  Vict.  c.  77.  6  1   Bradf.   xxvi.   citing    Hale's  Hist   . 

8  Wms.  Ex.  [289].  Com.  L.  28. 

8  3  Bla.  Comm.  *95.  6  3  Bla.  Comm.  *  100. 

4  3  Bla.  Comm.  *  97,  98. 

341 


*  318,  *  319        PROBATE    POWEES    UNDER    ENGLISH    STATUTES.        §  110 

"But  the  point  in  which  these  jurisdictions  are  most  defective 
Ordinary  could  is  that  of  enforcing  their  sentences  when  pronounced, 
enforce  his  for  which  they  have  no  other  process  but  that  of  excom- 
excommunica-  munication ;  which  is  described  to  be  twofold :  the  less 
tion  only.  an(j  jfae  greater  excommunications."  1 

§  140.  Probate  Jurisdiction  in  other  English  Courts.  —  The  extent 
of  jurisdiction  exercised  by  the  ecclesiastical  courts  of  England 
Powers  in  included  but  a  small  proportion  of  the  judicial  authority 

ecclesiastical  involved  in  the  adjudication  of  questions  arising  in  the 
small  propor-  settlement  of  dead  men's  estates.  To  some  extent,  the 
tion  of  judicial    power  to  pass  upon  the  accounts  of  executors  and 

control  over 

executors  and      administrators,  if  no  trial  of  issues,  *  either  of  [*  319] 
administrators.    facj.  or  jaWj  wag  necessary,  and  to  grant  them  a 
discharge  after  a  true  accounting,  seems  to  have  been  exercised  by 
the   ecclesiastical    tribunals.2     But   the  trial  of  disputed  accounts, 
Residue  of  involving    the    testimony   of    witnesses,    questions    of 

such  powers  devastavit,  liability  to  creditors,  legatees,  and  distribu- 
law  and  equity,  tees,  the  marshalling  of  assets,  recourse  to  real  estate 
for  the  payment  of  debts  and  legacies,  etc.,  — in  short,  the  control 
over  executors  and  administrators  in  every  respect  not  included  in 
the  probate  of  wills,  appointment  of  administrators,  and  payment 
of  legacies,  —  was  exclusively  in  the  common-law  and  chancery  courts, 
as  well  as  the  appointment  and  removal  of  guardians  and  curators  to 
minors  and  persons  of  unsound  mind,  and  the  control  over  them  in 
respect  of  the  management  of  their  estates.  It  should  therefore 
Difference  be-  be  remembered  that  there  is  a  very  great  difference 
tween  powers      between   the   totality  of  the   powers  exercised  by  the 

of  English  tes-  ,         J  r    .  '  .     .      J     . 

tamentary  English  courts  in    connection  with  the  administration 

American*  )ro-  °^  es^a^es  °*  deceased  persons,  sometimes  called  testa- 
bate  courts.  mentary  or  probate  jurisdiction,  and  the  testamentary 
or  probate  jurisdiction  of  ecclesiastical  courts,  —  a  distinction 
which  is  of  the  utmost  importance  in  ascertaining  the  conclusiveness 
of  the  judgments  and  decrees  of  the  several  classes  of  courts  in  col- 
lateral proceedings,  and  also  in  comparing  the  relative  powers  of 
ecclesiastical  courts  with  those  of  American  probate  courts.  Eor 
although  the  tribunals  established  in  the  Colonies  were  at  first 
modelled  after  those  of  the  mother  country,  whose  functions  they 
were  to  perform,  so  that  they  were  to  some  extent  governed  by  the 
rules  of  the  civil  and  canon  law,  and  in  some  instances  took  even 
the  name  of  their  prototypes,  yet  in  the  course  of  time  they  were 
invested  with  greater  powers  and  jurisdiction,8  and  to  fit  them  for 

1    By    BCt   of   58   Geo.    III.  c.   127,  the  2  Swinb.  on  Wills.pt.  6,  §  21  ;  4  Burn's 

sentence    <»f    excommunication  was    (lis-  Eccl.  L.  609  (9th  ed.) ;  Wms.  Ex.  [20G0] ; 

placed  by  the  writ  de  contumace  capiendo,  Toll.  Ex.  &  Adm. 495.    See  ]><>st,  §§  498  et 

issued  out  < . f  chancery  upon  the  siijnijica-  seq.,  on  the  subject  of  accounting. 

i?i7  of  the  ecclesiastical  court.  8  "The  powers  of  the  probate  courte 
342 


110    PROBATE  JURISDICTION  IN  OTHER  ENGLISH  COURTS.    *  319,  *  320 


the  efficient  exercise  of  the  new  functions  invested  in  them, 
[*  320]  they  were  made  *  courts  of  record,  with  a  public  seal  and 

a  clerk ;  have  organized  process  and  executive  officers,  stated 
terms,  and  continued  functions.1  The  several  legislatures,  being  at 
perfect  liberty  to  adapt  the  constitution  and  powers  of  the  courts  to 
the  requirements  and  convenience  of  the  people,  invested  these 
tribunals,  not  only  with  the  powers  possessed  by  the  spiritual  courts 
in  England,  but,  in  most  instances,  with  all  the  powers  possessed 
by  the  English  ecclesiastical,  common  law,  and  chancery  courts,  in 
so  far  as  they  were  necessary  to  control  the  administration  of  dece- 
dents' estates;  and  within  the  sphere  of  the  jurisdiction  conferred 
upon  them  they  are  a  branch  of  the  judiciary  of  the  State,  as  much 
so  as  any  other  court  of  general  or  plenary  power.2 


have  been  gradually  increased  by  a  series 
of  state  and  provincial  statutes  reaching 
back  to  the  time  of  their  separation  from 
the  common-law  courts.  Jurisdiction  has 
been  given  them  of  matters  formerly 
within  the  exclusive  cognizance  of  the 
courts  of  common  law,  and  not  analogous 
to  any  proceedings  of  the  probate  court 
as  a  court  of  ecclesiastical  jurisdiction- 
Those  various   statutes,  based   upon  the 


suggestions  of  practical  experience,  and 
passed  with  the  view  of  promoting  the 
prompt  and  economical  disposition  of  the 
matters  to  which  they  relate,  have  resulted 
in  the  large  jurisdiction  now  exercised 
by  probate  courts " :  Smith's  Prob.  Law 
(Mass.),  ch.  1. 

i  Obert  v.  Hammel,  18  N.  J.  L.  73,  79. 

2  Miller  v.  Iron  County,  29  Mo.  122. 


343 


*  321,  *  322   NATURE  OP  PROBATE  COURTS  IN  AMERICA.      §  141 


*  CHAPTER  XV.  [*321] 

NATURE   OP  PROBATE   COURTS   IN   AMERICA. 

§  141.  Origin  of  Probate  Courts  in  America.  —  The  essential 
characteristics  of  courts  whose  office  it  is  to  control  the  administra- 
tion of  estates  not  owned  by  persons  competent  to  act  sui  juris, 
have  been  indicated  in  an  earlier  chapter.1  It  will  appear  from  the 
consideration  of  the  nature,  power,  and  scope  of  the  courts  intrusted 
with  this  species  of  jurisdiction  in  the  several  American  States,  to 
what  extent  the  principle,  there  mentioned  as  resulting  from  the 
nature  of  property  and  the  office  of  the  State,  has  been  practically 
realized  and  found  recognition  in  the  statute-books.  It  is  easy  to 
understand  why  this  principle  was  so  inadequately  recognized,  and 
never  expressed  as  an  organic  element  of  the  law,  in  England.  The 
only  courts  exercising  a  peculiar  jurisdiction  over  the  subject,  the 
present  court  of  probates,  taking  the  place  of  the  former  ecclesias- 
tical and  manorial  courts,  extend  their  control  over  a  part  only  of 
the  subject;  another  portion  falls  exclusively  within  the  province  of 
chancery  courts,  who  treat  executors  and  administrators  as  trustees; 
while  yet  another  element  of  the  functions  of  these  officers  is  dealt 
with  in  the  courts  of  common  law.  However  incongruous  such  a 
system  might  have  been  recognized  to  be,  and  however  strongly  a 
Circumstances  change  might  have  been  desired,  the  conservative  spirit 
retarding  re-  0f  the  English  people  and  the  peculiarity  of  the  Eng- 
mentary  courts  lish  constitution  are  unfavorable  to  reform  in  this 
in  England.  direction.  Prescriptive  rights  and  prerogatives  are 
tenaciously  adhered  to.  The  habits,  customs,  and  practices  of  the 
people,  the  bar,  and  the  bench  represent  a  vis  inertice  to  overcome 
which  the  impetus  must  be  powerful  indeed.  The  statute  creating 
the  new  court  of  probates,  thereby  abrogating  the  secular  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  spiritual  courts,  strongly  illustrates  the  intense  conserva- 
tism of  even  the  legislative  branch  of  the  English  government,  in 
the  pension  which  it  was  found  necessary  to  grant  to  the 
*  bishops  and  archbishops,  and  even  to  the  proctors  practis-  [*  322] 
ing  in  these  courts,  to  compensate  them  for  the  loss  of  their 
lucrative  privileges. 

But  in  America  circumstances  have  been  peculiarly  favorable  to 
the   rational   development  of   this    principle.     Ecclesiastical   courts 

1  Ante,  §  11. 
344 


§  142  THE  SOURCE  OF  PROBATE  POWERS.     *  322,  *  323 

with  secular  powers  did  not  exist.  Prerogatives  and  pre-  circumstances 
scriptive  rights  were  swept  away  by  the  republican  favoring  devei- 
spirit  of  the  people.  The  legislatures  were  unhampered  principle  un- 
by  the  traditions  and  customs  of  the  mother  country,  bate^courtski 
armed  with  full  authority  to  carry  out  the  views  and  America, 
convictions  of  the  people,  who  thus  exerted  a  controlling  influence  in 
shaping  the  law  and  regulating  the  practice  of  managing  and  settling 
estates  of  deceased  persons  and  minors ;  for  no  branch  of  the  law  con- 
cerns the  general  public  so  universally,  and  affects  their  interests  so 
directly,  as  this.  The  consequence  has  been  a  rapid  development  of 
the  law  of  administration,  particularly  in  those  States  which  early 
cut  loose  from  the  common-law  doctrines  in  this  respect.  The 
American  courts  of  probate,  with  their  extensive  powers,  their  simple 
and  efficient  procedure,  their  happy  adaptation  to  the  wants  of  the 
people  in  the  safe,  speedy,  and  inexpensive  settlement  of  the  estates 
of  deceased  persons  attest  the  marvellously  clear  insight  of  the  people 
of  the  Colonies  and  young  States  into  the  principles  involved,  and  the 
genuine  instinct  which  guided  them  in  their  realization.  Necessarily 
diverse  in  their  details,  as  the  systems  of  the  several  States  cannot 
but  be,  since  each  State  enacts  its  own  code,  there  is  a  common 
intendment  of  them  all  in  the  direction  of  recognizing  the  law  of 
administration  as  a  distinct,  independent  branch  of  jurisdiction, 
based  upon  and  determined  by  its  own  inherent  principles.  The 
rich  and  manifold  experiences  of  a  century  of  unexampled  national 
growth  and  development  have  tended  to  mould  these  systems  in  the 
national  spirit  common  to  all  the  States ;  as  each  is  the  reflex  of 
the  nation,  so  their  institutions  are  rapidly  assimilating  into  a 
national  system,  in  which  the  incongruities  incidental  to  the  experi- 
mental enactments  of  the  several  and  independent  legislatures  are 
gradually  disappearing  before  the  light  of  common  experience  and 
intelligent  discussion. 

§  142.    American  Statutes  the  only  Source  of  Probate  Powers  in 
the  States.  —  We  have  seen  that  by  the  common  law  the  entire  scope 

of  jurisdiction  over  the  estates  of  deceased  persons  vested 
[*323]  *in  the   ecclesiastical,   common-law,    and  chancery  courts.1 

Hence,  there  being  no  ecclesiastical  courts  in  America,  all 
such  jurisdiction,  in  so  far  as  it  became  a  part  of  the  juridical  system 
of  the  States,  necessarily  vested  in  the  common-law  and  chancery 
courts,  to  the  extent  in  which  it  was  not  lodged  elsewhere  by  statute. 
It  follows  from  this,  that  although  in  many  of  the  Probate  courts 
States  the  constitution  establishes  or  provides  for  the  ers^romthe^ 
establishment  of  courts  of  probate,  yet  they  take  all  statutes. 
their   powers  from   the  statutes   regulating   them.2    From  this  cir- 

1  Ante,  §  140.  Russell  ».  Lewis,  3  Oreg.  380  ;   Pennisson 

2  Tucker  v.  Harris,  13  Ga.  1,  8;   Mc-    v.  Pennisson,  22  La.  An.  131  ;  Pelham  v. 
Pherson  v.  Cunliff,  11   S.  &  R.  422,  429 ;     Murray,  64  Tex.  477,481.    But  in  Cali- 

345 


*  323,  *  324      NATURE    OP    PROBATE    COURTS   IN    AMERICA. 


§142 


Hence  they 
have  only 
such  powers  as 
are  conferred 
either  ex- 
pressly or  by 
necessary 
implication; 


cumstance  arises  an  important  rule  to  be  observed  in 
ascertaining  the  extent  of  power  lodged  in  any  one  of 
this  class  of  courts  :  they  can  exercise  such  powers  only 
as  are  directly  conferred  upon  them  by  legislative 
enactment,1  or  necessary  to  carry  out  some  power  so  con- 
ferred.2 Unless  a  warrant  for  the  exercise  of  jurisdic- 
tion in  a  particular  case  can  be  found  in  the  statute,  given  either  ex- 
but  jurisdiction  Pressly  or  by  implication,  the  whole  proceeding  is  void ; 8 
conferred  over  but  where  jurisdiction  is  conferred  over  any  subject- 
matter  carries  matter,  and  it  becomes  necessary  in  the  adjudication 
with  it  all  pow-  thereof  to  decide  collateral  matters  over  which  no  juris- 
to  adjudicate  diction  has  been  conferred,  the  court  must,  of  necessity, 
thereon.  decide  such  collateral  issues.4 

The  courts  so  created  took  various  names.  In  many  of  the  States 
they  are  known  as  Probate  Courts,  or  Courts  of  Probate,  which  is  also 
Courts  of  pro-  the  name  given  to  the  English  court  created  in  1857,  to 
tion^nown'bT  which  the  jurisdiction  previously  exercised  by 
various  names",  ecclesiastical,  manorial,  and  other  courts  *  of  tes-  [*  324] 
tamentary  jurisdiction  was  transferred.  This  term  is  indica- 
tive of  one  of  the  chief  and  characteristic  elements  of  their  powers, 
and  is  used  in  this  treatise  to  designate  all  courts  of  this  class,  being 
at  once  the  most  convenient,  familiar,  and  accurate.5    In  other  States 


fornia,  since  1879,  the  Superior  Court  is 
given  jurisdiction  of  all  matters  iu  probate 
by  the  constitution,  as  a  part  of  its  general 
jurisdiction,  and  while  sitting  in  probate 
the  court  is  not  a  statutory  tribunal,  and 
does  not  derive  its  powers  from  the  legisla- 
ture, but  is  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction, 
and  entitled  to  the  same  presumptions : 
Eurris  v.  Kennedy,  108  Cal.  331  (reciting 
the  probate  history  in  the  State)  ;  Hey- 
denfeldt  v.  Super.  Ct.,  117  Cal.  348.  And 
in  Borne  States  probate  courts  are  given 
jurisdiction  over  matters  not  referable  to 
statutes:  post,  §  149,  p.  *341. 

1  Bramell  v.  Cole,  136  Mo.  201,209; 
Shafer  v.  Shafer,  85  Md.  554,  558;  Erwin 
v.  Lowry,  1  La.  An.  276;  Brittin  v.  Phil- 
lips, I  Demarest,  57,  59;  Snyder's  Appeal, 
86  Pa.  St.  100.  Hence  there  can  be  no 
trial  by  jurv  in  the  absence  "f  a  statutory 
provision  to  that  effect :  Bradley  v.  Woer- 
ner,  io  Mo.  App.  371. 

-    In  New  York  the  attempt  was  made, 

by  the  Revised  Statutes  of  1 880,  to  limit 
tin-  surrogates  to  the  exercise  of  expressly 
conferred  powers.  I'm  it  was  found  that 
the  exercise  "f  incidental  powers  was 
<■  .  ntial  to  the  due  administration  of  jus- 
tice: Dayton  on  Surr. 4;  Pew  v.  Hastings, 
846 


1  Barb.  Ch.  452.  The  restrictive  clause  in 
the  Revised  Statutes  was  accordingly  re- 
pealed, and  the  exercise  of  necessary  inci- 
dental powers  restored  to  the  surrogates : 
Laws,  1837,  p.  536,  §  71  ;  Sipperly  v.  Bau- 
cus,  24  N.  Y.  46 ;  In  re  Verplanck,  91  N.  Y. 
439,  450. 

8  Smith  v.  Howard,  86  Me.  203;  Biggs 
v.  Cragg,  89  N.  Y.  479,  489  ;  nor  does  the 
consent  of  parties  confer  jurisdiction: 
Theller  v.  Such,  57  Cal.  447,  459  ;  Sibley 
v.  Waffle,  16  N.  Y.  180,  185;  Sitzman  v. 
Pacquette,  13  Wis.  291,  305;  Leman  v- 
Sherman,  18  111.  App.  368;  s.  c.  117  111. 
657. 

4  Otherwise  the  end  would  be  conceded 
without  the  means :  Baillio  v.  Wilson,  5 
Mart.  n.  s.  214,  217  ;  Lawson  v.  Ripley,  17 
La.  238,  249;  Estate  of  Altemus,  32  La. 
An.  364, 369  ;  Hinckley's  Estate,  Myr.  189 ; 
Crooks'  Estate,  Myr.  247  ;  Fowler  v.  Lock- 
wood,  3  Redf.  465  ;  Ilyland  v.  Baxter,  98 
N.  Y.  010,  010. 

6  It  is  used  in  the  statutes  of  Alabama, 
Connecticut,  Illinois,  Kansas,  Maine,  Mas- 
sachusetts, Michigan,  Minnesota,  Missouri, 
Nebraska,  New  Hampshire,  and  most  of 
the  new  States. 


§143 


THEIR   DIGNITY    AS   COURTS. 


324 


they  are  called  Orphan's  Courts,1  Ordinaries  or  Courts  of  Ordinary,2 
Surrogates,8  Prerogative  Courts,4  Registers  ; 5  while  in  many  of  them 
the  jurisdiction  is  conferred  upon  courts  of  plenary  powers,6  or 
upon  the  county  courts,7  all  of  which,  however,  are  known  as  courts 
of  probate  jurisdiction  when  acting  upon  testamentary  matters,  and 
are  then  governed  by  the  principles  and  rules  of  such,  and  not  by 
their  method  of  procedure  when  acting  as  common-law,  chancery,  or 
county  courts.8  In  some  States  probate  judges  are  required  to  give 
bond  for  the  faithful  discharge  of  their  duties,  constituting  a  lien  on 
the  property  of  the  principal ;  and  it  is  held  that  for  a  liability  uuder 
such  bond  he  cannot  claim  the  homestead  exemption;9  but  it  has 
no  retroactive  validity.10  A  judge  of  probate  cannot  in  his  official 
capacity  maintain  a  bill  for  the  correction  or  prevention  of  public 
abuses.11 

§  143.  Their  Dignity  as  Courts.  —  In  consequence  of  the  statutory 
origin  of  courts  of  probate,  they  have  been  said  to  be  courts  of 
limited,12  inferior,18  special  and  limited,14  limited  though  not  special,18 
or  limited  though  not  inferior  jurisdiction.16  The  result  of  this 
peculiarity,  i.  e.  their  lack  of  all  power  save  as  conferred  Judgments 
by  statute,  has  been,  in  some  of  the  States,  to  deprive 
their  judgments  and  decrees  of  all  validity  unless  the 
facts  upon  which  their  jurisdiction  depends  appear 
affirmatively    from     the    face    of    their    proceedings.17 


invalid  unless 
facts  confer- 
ring jurisdic- 
tion appear 
of  record. 


1  In  Delaware,  Maryland,  New  Jersey, 
and  Pennsylvania. 

2  In  Georgia. 

8  In  New  York  and  New  Jersey. 
4  New  Jersey. 

6  In  Delaware,  Maryland,  New  Jersey, 
and  Pennsylvania. 

6  Such  as  district  courts, as  in  Nevada; 
circuit  courts,  as  in  Indiana,  and  Iowa ; 
chancery  courts,  as  in  Mississippi  and 
Tennessee.  In  North  Carolina  probate 
jurisdiction  is  in  the  Clerk  of  the  Superior 
Court,  as  an  independent  and  original 
tribunal :  Edwards  v.  Cobb,  95  N.  C.  4. 
In  California  the  Superior  Court  is  given 
general  jurisdiction  of  all  probate  matters, 
just  as  in  cases  at  law  or  in  equity  :  Bur- 
ns v.  Kennedy,  108  Cal.  331. 

7  In  Colorado,  Florida,  Kentucky,  Il- 
linois, and  South  Dakota. 

8  Wells  v.  Smith,  44  Miss.  296,  304. 
See  Smith  v.  Westerfield,  88  Cal.  374. 

9  Randolph  v.  Brown,  115  Ala.  677, 
€81. 

10  Randolph  v.  Billing,  115  Ala.  683. 

11  Hays  n.  Ahlrichs,  115  Ala.  239,  247. 

12  Erwin  v.  Lowry,  1  La.  An.  276,  278  ; 


Snyder's  Appeal,  36  Pa.  St.  166  ;  Gallman 
v.  Gallman,  5  Strobh.  L.  207 ;  Brodess  v. 
Thompson,  2  Harr.  &  G.  120;  People's 
Bank  v.  Wilcox,  15  R.  I.  258. 

13  Townsend  v.  Gordon,  19  Cal.  188. 

14  Potwine's  Appeal,  31  Conn.  381 ; 
Wood  v.  Stone,  39  N.  H.  572 ;  People  v. 
Corlies,  1  Sandf.  228,  247  ;  Hendriok  v. 
Cleaveland,  2  Vt.  329,  337;  Shafer  v. 
Shafer,  85  Md.  554. 

15  Obert  v.  Hammel,  18  N.  J.  L.  73,  79 ; 
Plume  v.  Howard  Savings  Institution,  46 
N.  J.  L.  211,  229. 

16  Cody  v.  Raynaud,  1  Col.  272,  277; 
Turner  v.  Malone,  24  S.  C.  398,  401. 

17  Kemp  v.  Kennedy,  Pet.  C.  C.  30,  36, 
Washington,  J.,  announcing  that  "  courts 
of  limited  jurisdiction  must  not  only  act 
within  the  scope  of  their  authority,  but  it 
must  appear  upon  the  face  of  their  pro- 
ceedings that  they  did  so,  and  if  this  does 
not  appear,  all  that  they  do  is  coram  non 
judice,  and  void " ;  Turner  v.  Bank  of 
North  America,  4  Dall.  8.  11.  Both  of 
these  cases  arose  in  federal  courts,  describ- 
ing them  as  limited,  but  not  inferior  courts. 
The  following  cases  originated  in  probate 

347 


*  325,  *  326      NATURE  OF   PROBATE   COURTS   IN    AMERICA.  §  144 

This  doctrine      *  But  this  view  does  not  seem  sound  on  princi-  [*  325] 
appifcabkiif      pie;  it  ignores  the  character  of  these  tribunals 
America.  as  courts,  and  the  necessity  that  their  judgments  and 

decrees  should  be  binding,  as  authoritative  announcements  of  the 
law,  upon  all  the  world.  It  is  held  that  federal  courts,  although 
of  limited  jurisdiction,  are  not  inferior  courts  in  the  technical  sense  ^ 
and  that  their  judgments,  although  reversible  by  writ  of  error  or 
appeal,  are  binding,  although  the  jurisdiction  be  not  alleged  in  the 
pleadings.1  The  doctrine  that  judgments  of  probate  courts  are 
void  unless  the  facts  upon  which  their  jurisdiction  depends  appear  of 
record  arose  probably  from  the  necessity  of  the  application  of  such 
a  rule  to  the  ecclesiastical  courts  of  England,  whose  jurisdiction  was 
exceedingly  limited,  which  were  not  courts  of  record,  possessed  no 
means  of  enforcing  their  judgments  or  decrees,2  and  whose  exercise 
of  jurisdiction  was  jealously  scanned  by  the  temporal  courts  to  guard 
against  encroachment  and  usurpation.  No  one  of  these  reasons  exists 
in  the  United  States.3  Courts  of  probate  in  America  are  entitled  to 
the  sanction  which  every  court  of  record  holds  ; 4  they  are  not  to  be 
classed  with  those  tribunals  which  have  no  authority  beyond  special 
powers  for  the  performance  of  specific  duties,  little  or  in  no  wise 
relating  to  the  general  administration  of  justice,  whose  modes  of  pro- 
ceeding are  prescribed  by  the  statute,5  but  are  of  that  class  of  courts 
whose  judgments,  like  those  of  the  federal  courts,  are  held  good  with- 
out a  recital  of  the  facts  upon  which  they  rest.6  The  subject  of  the 
validity  of  judgments  and  decrees  of  probate  courts  is  more  fully 
considered  hereafter.7 

*  §  144.    Their  Powers  as  Judicial  Tribunals.  —  They  are   [*  326] 
in  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  States  courts  of  record,8  having  a 

courts  :  Lipe  v.  Mitchell,  2  Yerg.  400,  404 ;  seers,  and  the  like :   Obert  v.  Hammel,  18 

Overseers  v.  Gullifer,  49  Me.  360  ;   Dakin  N.  J.  L.  73,  79. 

v.   Hudson    6  Cow.  221,    224;   Potwine's  6  Grignon  v.  Astor,  2  How.  319,  342; 

Appeal,    31    Conn.   381,' 383;    Shafer    v.  Thompson    v.   Tolmie,  2  Pet.    157,    165; 

Shafcr  85  Md.  554  558.  Shroyer  v.  Richmond,  16  Oh.  St.  455,  464  ; 

i  Skillern  v.  May,  6  Cr.  267  ;    McCor-  People  v.  Gray,  72  111.  343,  347  ;  Johnson 

mick  v.  Sollivant,  10  Wheat.  192, 199.  »-  Beazley,  65  Mo.  250,  254;  Martin  v. 

2  gee  ante  §  139.  Robinson,   67  Tex.    368,  374;  Acklen  v. 

8  Tucker  ''.Harris,  per  Lumpkin,  J.,  13  Goodman,  77  Ala.  521 ;  Plume  v.  Howard 

Ga.  1,  8  ;    Fisher  v.  Bassett,  9   Leigh,  119,  Savings  Institution,  46  N.  J.  L.  211,  228  ; 

131  ;   Adams  v.  Adams,  22  Vt.  50,  57.  Clark  v.  Costello,  59  N.  J.  L.  234,  237. 

1   McPherson  v.  Cunliff,  11  S.&R.422,  By  statute   in   Rhode   Island:  Angell  v. 

429;    Halm   v.   Kelly,  34  Cal  391.     See  Angell,  14  R.  I.  541;   but  see   People's 

cases    cited    pott,    §    115,    and   Tucker  v.  Rank  v.  Wilcox,  15  R.  I.  258,  260. 

Harris,  supra,  in   which  Judge  Lumpkin  '   Post,  §  145. 

appealed  to  the  legislature  Eor  an  act  so        8  Shroyer  v.  Richmond,  16  Oh.  St.  455, 

declaring,  which  responded  to  the  call  by  464  ;  Chase  v.  Whiting,  30  Wis.  544,  547  ; 

an  oi  1856  (Arts,  lKf.f)  56, p.*  147):  Davie  Milan  v.  Pcmberton,  12  Mo.  602;  Tebbets 

v.  McDaniel,  J7  Ga.  195,  200.  v.  Tilton,  24  N.  H.  120,  124;  Dayton  v. 

r-  Sn^li    as    commissioners,    surveyors,  Mintzer,  22  Minn.  393  ;  Turner  v.  Malone, 

appraisers,    committees,    directors,    over-  24  S.  C.  398,  401. 
348 


§  144  THEIR   POWERS   AS   JUDICIAL   TRIBUNALS.      *  326,  *  327 

public  seal  and  a  clerk,  or  authority  in  the  judge  to  act    „        . 
as  clerk,   organized  process,  and   executive  officers,  as    of  probate 
well  as  stated  terms  and  continuing  functions.     Within    courts 
the  field  of  their  jurisdiction  they  are  as  much  a  branch  of  the  judi- 
ciary of  the  State  as  any  court  of  general  or  plenary  powers.1     As 
judicial  tribunals  they  have  the  inherent  power  of  such  to  punish 
for  contempt  to  the  same  extent  as  common-law  courts,2   t0  p,,,^  for 
to  compel  obedience  to  their  orders  and  decrees,8  and   contempt  and 
their  judgments  upon  matters  within  their  jurisdiction    encePto  their'* 
are  enforced,  usually,  by  the  same  means  which  are  at    orders, 
the  disposal  of   common-law  and    chancery   courts.4     Their  orders, 
judgments,  and  decrees,  are  therefore  as  conclusive  upon  the  parties 
to  the  record,  until  reversed  or  annulled  on  appeal,  writ  of  error,  or 
direct  proceeding  in  chancery  for  fraud,  as  decrees  in  chancery  or 
judgments  at  law ; 5  but  if  want  of  jurisdiction  appears  from  the  face 
of  the  proceedings,  they  are,  like  the  judgments  of  any   Their  judg- 
court  under  like  circumstances,  merely  void.6     Thus  it   ments  are  void 
has  been  said  by  very  high  authority  on  questions  of   jurisdiction 
probate  law,  that  jurisdiction  of  the   subject-matter  is    aPPear; 
to  be  tested  by  the  authorized  extent  of  the  powers  of  the  court  in 
regard  to  the  alleged  cause  of  action ;  and  if  the  court  had    but  couaterauy 
power  to  try  that,  did  try  it,. and  pronounced  judgment    conclusive 

thereon,  the  question  cannot  again  be   tried   in    °   erwise* 
[*  327]  another  court.7    It  is,  *  however,  asserted,  on  the  other  hand, 

that,  where  courts  of  probate  are  courts  of  limited  jurisdic- 
tion, a  distinction  is  to  be  drawn  between  their  judgment  on  a  fact 
which  may  be  decided  without  deciding  the  case  on  its  merits,  — 
such  judgment  being  collaterally  assailable  although  the  jurisdic- 
tional fact  is  averred  of  record  and  was  actually  found  upon  evidence 
heard  by  the  court,  —  and  judgment  on  a  fact  involved  in  the  gist  of 
the  suit,  so  that  it  cannot  be  decided  without  involving  the  merits, 
which  judgment  is  collaterally  conclusive.8 

1  Obert  v.  Hammel,  18  N.  J.  L.  73;  Coon,  5  Sm.  &  M.  751,  767;  Bryant  v. 
Miller  v.  Iron  County,  29  Mo.  123.  Allen,  6  N.  H.  116;  Granbery  v.  Mhoon, 

2  Bac.  Ab.,  tit.  Courts  and  their  Juris-  1  Dev.  L.  456 ;  Brown  v.  Gibson,  1  N. 
diction,  E  ;  Chess's  Appeal,  4  Pa.  St.  52,  54.  &   McC.   326,   328;   Cummings   v.    Cum- 

3  In  re  Brinson,  73  N.  C.  278,  280;  mings,  123  Mass.  270,  273;  Dayton  v. 
Seaman  v.  Duryea,  11  N.  Y.  324 ;  Tome's  Mintzer,  22  Minn.  393,  394;  Mercer  v. 
Appeal,  50  Pa.  St.  285,   295  ;   People   v.  Hogan,  4  Maekey,  520,  527. 

Marshall,  7  Abb.  N.  Cas.  380 ;    Sherry's  6  Mohr  v.  Tulip,  40  Wis.  66,  76  ;   Ep- 

Estate,  7   Abb.  N.  Cas.  390 ;    Stratton  v.  ping  v.  Robinson,  21  Fla.  36,  49. 
McCandliss,  32  Kans.  512,516;  Ex  parte  *  Bradford,   S.,  in    Black  v.  Black,  4 

Hayes,  88  Ind.  1,5.  Bradf.  174,  204,  citing  Bissell  v.  Briggs, 

4  McLaughlin  v.  McLaughlin,  4  Oh.  9  Mass.  462 ;  Williams  v.  Robinson,  63 
St.  508, 512  ;  Caruth  v.  Anderson,  24  Miss.  Tex.  576,  581,  citing  earlier  Texas  cases. 
60 ;  Yoeman  v.  Younger,  83  Mo.  424,  429.  »  People's  Bank  v.  Wilcox,  15  R.  I.  258, 

s  Watson  v.  Hutto,  27  Ala.  513;  Dick-  containing  an  extensive  collection  of  Amer- 
inson  v.  Hayes,  31  Conn.  417,  422;  Tomp-  ican  cases  on  this  point.  The  subject  is 
kina  v.  Tompkins,   1  Sto.  547 ;   Jones   v.    more  fully  treated  in  the  sections  infra. 

349 


*  327,  *  328   NATURE  OF  PROBATE  COURTS  IN  AMERICA.      §  145 

Although  these  courts  are  courts  of  record,  it  does  not  follow  that 
they  recognize  an  "attorney  of  record."  Parties  in  interest  may 
Th  i  rt     aPPear  in  person,   by  agent,   or  attorney  at  law ;  they 

of  record,  gen-  may  appear  by  one  attorney  at  one  hearing,  and  by 
recoCTizeno  another  on  the  next.  Notice  or  process  served  upon 
attorney  of  an  attorney  is  of  no  more  avail  than  if  served  upon  a 
stranger,  unless  the  party  respond  to  the  notice  or 
summons.1 

§  145.  Conclusiveness  of  their  Judgments  in  Collateral  Proceed- 
ings.—  The  development  and  growth  of  the  jurisdiction  of  courts  of 
Uncertainty  probate  in  the  United  States  has  given  occasion  to  con- 
whether  judg-  siderable  divergence  in  the  authorities  on  the  question 
assailable  whether  their  judgments  are  conclusive,  or  impeachable 

collaterally.  collaterally.  The  uncertainty  produced  by  the  vacilla- 
tion of  courts  in  this  respect  is  not  only  perplexing  to  the  admin- 
istrators, practitioners,  and  judges,  but  injurious  and  sometimes 
ruinous  to  the  interests  of  all  persons  concerned  in  the  administra- 
tion of  estates  ;  and  particularly  to  the  purchasers  of  real  estate  sold 
under  the  order  of  probate  courts,  who  sometimes  lose  the  fruits 
of  their  purchase  because  the  officers  of  the  court  are  not  sufficiently 
skilled  or  careful  to  let  the  record  show  all  jurisdictional  facts ;  and 
to  the  heirs  or  creditors,  because  the  risk  incurred  by  purchasers 
depresses  the  price  of  the  property  at  the  sale. 

On  principle  there  seems  to  be  no  difficulty  attending  the  question, 
except,  perhaps,  to  ascertain  whether  the  tribunal  intrusted  with 
„  .    .  ,     .        iurisdiction  in  probate  matters  is  a  court,  with  judicial 

Principle  of  J  r  '  ; ? 

collateral  functions  in  the  common-law  sense,  or  whether  its  func- 

conciusiveness.    ^ions  are  ministerial  only,  or  having  no  authority 

*  beyond  special  powers  for  the  performance  of  specific  duties  [*  328] 
not  relating  to  the  general  administration  of  justice.2     If  the 

latter  be  the  case,  it  is  obvious  that,  to  give  validity  to  its  acts,  it 
must  affirmatively  appear  that  everything  necessary  to  such  end  has 
been  observed.  But  if  it  be  found  that  the  tribunal  is  one  competent 
to  decide  whether  the  facts  in  any  given  matter  confer  jurisdiction, 
it  follows  with  inexorable  necessity  that,  if  it  decides  that  it  has 
jurisdiction,  then  its  judgments  within  the  scope  of  the  subject- 
matters  over  which  its  authority  extends,  in  proceedings  following 
the  lawful  allegation  of  circumstances  requiring  the  exercise  of  its 
power,  are  conclusive  against  all  the  world,  unless  reversed  on  appeal, 
or  avoided  for  error  or  fraud  in  a  direct  proceeding.  It  matters  not 
how  erroneous  the  judgment:  being  a  judgment,  it  is  the  law  of  that 
case,  pronounced  by  a  tribunal  created  for  that  purpose.  To  allow 
such  judgment  to  be  questioned  or  ignored  collaterally,  would  be  to 
ignore  practically,  and  logically  to  destroy,  the  court.     And  it  is  not 

i   Efofli  v.  Halsey,  2  Pem.  577  ;  Douglas         2  Ante,  §  143. 
v.  i'ol-um,  'Jl   Niv.411,  447. 
350 


§  145       COLLATERAL   CONCLUSIVENESS  OF   JUDGMENTS.      *  328,  *  329 

necessary  that  the  facts  and  circumstances  upon  which  the  juris- 
diction depends  shall  appear  upon  the  face  of  their  proceedings, 
because,  being  competent  to  decide,  and  having  decided,  that  such 
facts  exist  by  assuming  the  jurisdiction,  this  matter  is  adjudicated, 
and  cannot  be  collaterally  questioned.1 

The  English  ecclesiastical  and  manorial  courts  were  not  courts  in 
the  common-law  sense,  —  "they  did  not  proceed  according  to  the 
common-law,"  —  hence  the  English  rule  requiring  them  to  show 
jurisdictional  facts  on  the  face  of  their  proceedings. 

Many  of  the  American  courts  of  probate  were,  in  early  colonial 
times,  modelled  after  the  ecclesiastical  courts;  hence  the  necessity 
of  the  same  rule  as  applicable  to  their  acts,  and  the  early  American 
cases  so  holding. 

In  the  progress  of  time,  however,  most  of  these  courts  were  re- 
modelled and  vested  with  greatly  increased  judicial  powers,  made 
courts  of  record,  etc.2  The  reform  was  initiated  and  carried  out 
by  the  legislative  branch  of  government,  —  the  only  one  having 
power  to  accomplish  it,  —  thus  compelling  the  judiciary  to 
[*  329]  *  follow ;  and  it  is  but  natural,  perhaps,  that  they  followed 
reluctantly.  Lawyers  and  judges  were  equally  imbued  with 
the  doctrines  of  the  common  law  which  ignored  the  ecclesiastical 
courts  as  judicial  tribunals ;  and  they  found  it  difficult  to  assign  to 
the  American  probate  courts  a  different  status.  And  since  the  en- 
largement of  their  powers  emanated  from  as  many  different  sources 
as  there  are  States,  and  proceeded  in  as  many  different  channels,  it 
is  not  strange  that  for  a  long  time  there  was  very  great  divergence 
in  their  decisions.  It  is  gratifying  to  observe,  however,  that,  while 
unanimity  has  by  no  means  been  attained,  yet  the  magnitude  of  the 
divergence  is  gradually  diminishing,  in  the  proportion  in  which  the 
principle  upon  which  these  courts  rest  is  understood  and  practically 
realized. 

Thus  it  is  denied  by  the  federal  courts  that  courts  of  probate  are 
in  any  technical  sense  inferior  courts,8  and  their  judgments  within 
the  sphere  of  their  jurisdiction  are   as    conclusive   as   Courts  h0itijne 
those  of  the  circuit  or  any  other  general  court,  and  en-   judgments  of 
titled  to  the   same   intendments  and   presumptions    in    unasslnabietS 
their  favor.     The  same   doctrine  is  held  in  Alabama,4   collaterally. 

1  Wyatt  v.   Steele,  26  Ala.  639,  650;  3  Grignon  v.  Astor,  2  How.  319,  341  5 

Bostwick  v.  Skinner,  80  111.  147,  152  ;  Cox  McNitt    v.  Turner,    16    Wall.   352,   366; 

v.  Thomas,  9  Gratt.  323  (announcing  the  Cornett  v.  Williams,  20  Wall.  226,  249. 

rule  in  the  case  of  circuit  courts),  325  et  See  ante,  §  143. 

seq. ;   State  v.  Scott,  1  Bai.  294  (showing  *  Wyman    v.  Campbell,   6   Port.   219, 

that  the  same  rule  must  apply  to  judg-  244  ;  Whorton  v.  Moragne,  62  Ala.  201, 

ments  of  inferior  courts),  295  et  seq. ;  Mor-  207;    Farley   v.    Dunklin,    76   Ala.    530; 

ford  v.  Diffenbacker,  54  Mich.  593,  605,  Barclift    v.    Treece,   77    Ala.    523,   531; 

citing  earlier  Michigan  cases.  Knahe  v.  Rice,  106  Ala.  516. 

a  See  ante,  §§  141-144. 

351 


*  329,  *  330      NATURE   OF   PROBATE    COURTS   IN   AMERICA. 


§145 


Arkansas,1   California,2    Connecticut,3   Florida,4    Georgia,5   Illinois,6 
Indiana,7  Iowa,8  Kansas,9  Kentucky,10  Louisiana,11  Maine,12 
*  Michigan,13     Mississippi,14     Missouri,15    Nebraska,16    New  [*  330] 
Jersey,17  New  Hampshire,18  New  York,19  North  Carolina,20 
Ohio,21   Pennsylvania,22   South  Carolina,28  South   Dakota,24  Texas,26 
Vermont,26  Virginia,27  and  Wisconsin.28    The  reverse  has  been  held 


1  Montgomery  v.  Johnson,  31  Ark.  74, 
83  ;  Sturdy  v.  Jacoway,  19  Ark.  499,  514  ; 
Boiden  v.  State,  11  Ark.  519,  525;  Kogers 
v.  Wilson,  13  Ark.  507,  509. 

2  Burris  v.  Kennedy,  108  Cal.  331  ; 
Hahn  v.  Kelly,  34  Cal.  391,  402. 

3  Dickinson  v.  Hayes,  31  Conn.  417, 
422  ;  Judson  v.  Lake,  3  Day,  318. 

4  Eppingv.  Robinson,  21  Fla.  36. 

5  McDade  v.  Burch,  7  Ga.  559,  562; 
Doe  v.  Roe,  30  Ga.  961 ;  Patterson  v. 
Lemon,  50  Ga.  231,  236 ;  Veach  v.  Rice, 
131  U.  S.  293. 

«  Iverson  v.  Loberg,  26  111.  179,  182  ; 
Moore  v.  Neil,  39  111.  256,  262  ;  Logan  v. 
Williams,  76  111.  175;  Andrews  v.  Bern- 
hardt 87  111.  305 ;  Goodbody  v.  Good- 
body,  95  111.  456,  460 ;  McCormack  i>. 
Kimmel,  4  111.  App.  121,  124. 

7  Dequindre  v.  Williams,  31  Ind.  444, 
454. 

8  Read  v.  Howe,  39  Iowa,  553,  559,  e t 
seq.,  citing  numerous  Iowa  cases ;  Myers 
v.  Davis,  47  Iowa,  325.  (See  the  case  of 
Cooper  v.  Sunderland,  3  Iowa,  114,  134,  in 
which  the  doctrine  announced  in  the  fed- 
eral cases  is  criticised.) 

9  Bryan  v.  Bauder,  23  Kans.  95,  97. 

1°  Fletcher  v.  Wier,  7  Dana,  345,  347 
(this  case  holds  the  assumption  of  juris- 
diction by  probate  courts  to  be  prima  facie 
evidence  of  the  jurisdictional  facts) ;  Mas- 
ters v.  Bieuker,  87  Ky.  1. 

11  Sizemore  v.  Wedge,  20  La.  An.  124; 
Barbee  v.  Perkins,  23  La.  An.  331 ;  Duck- 
worth v.  Vaughan,  27  La.  An.  599 ;  Green 
v.  Baptist  Church,  27  La.  An.  563;  Wis- 
dom v.  Parker,  31  La.  An.  52;  Simmons 
v.  Saul,  138  U.  S.  439. 

12  Bent  v.  Weeks,  44  Me.  45, 47  ;  Record 
v.  Howard,  58  Me.  225,  228. 

13  Coon  v.  Fry,  6  Mich.  506,  508; 
Woods  v.  Monroe,  17  Mich.  238;  Osman 
V.  Traphagen,  23  Mich.  80;  Alexander  r. 
Rice,  52  Mich.  451,  454. 

14  Ames  v.  Williams,  72  Miss.  760,  771  ; 
Joues  v.  Coon,  5  Sin.  &  M.  751,  707. 

852 


15  Johnson  v.  Beazley,  65  Mo.  250 ;  Cam- 
den v.  Plain,  91  Mo.  117,  129;  Rottmann 
v.  Schmucker,  94  Mo.  139  ;  Williams  v. 
Mitchell,  112  Mo.  300,  308;  Macey  v. 
Stark,  116  Mo.  481,494. 

16  Alexander  v.  Alexander,  26  Neb.  68, 
75  ;  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Bradley,  51  Neb. 
596,  605. 

17  Plume  v.  Howard  Saving  Institution, 
46  N.  J.  L.  211  ;  Obert  v.  Hammel,  18  N. 
J.  L.  73,  80 ;  Clark  v.  Costello,  59  N.  J.  L. 
234. 

18  Merrill  v.  Harris,  26  N.  H.  142,  147  ; 
Kimball  v.  Fisk,  39  N.  H.  110;  Gordon  v. 
Gordon,  55  N.  H.  399,  401,  et  seq. 

19  By  statute,  in  this  State,  judgments 
of  probate  courts  (surrogates)  are  held 
good  unless  shown  to  be  without  jurisdic- 
tion, the  onus  probandi  resting  upon  those 
who  assail  the  validity :  Wood  v.  Mc- 
Chesney,  40  Barb.  417,  421  ;  Forbes  v. 
Halsey,  26  N.  Y.  53,  65;  Richmond  v. 
Foote,  3  Lans.  244,  253  ;  O'Connor  v.  Hug- 
gins,  113  N. Y.  511,  516. 

20  Overton  v.  Cranford,  7  Jones  L 
415. 

21  Shroyer  v.  Richmond,  16  Oh.  St.  455, 
465  ;  Sheldon  v.  Newton,  3  Oh.  St.  494, 
500. 

22  McPherson  v.  Cuuliff,  11  S.  &  R.422, 
432;  West  v.  Cochran,  104  Pa.  St.  482, 
488,  citing  earlier  Pennsylvania  cases. 

23  Turner  v.  Malone,  24  S.  C  398. 

24  Code,  Dakota,  1887,  §  5651.  See 
Matson  v.  Swenson,  5  S.  Dak.  191. 

25  Lynch  v.  Baxter,  4  Tex.  431  ;  Hurley 
v.  Barnard,  48  Tex.  83,  87;  Guilford  v. 
Love,  49  Tex.  715,  739  ;  Pelliam  v.  Mur- 
ray, 64  Tex.  477 ;  Martin  v .  Robinson,  67 
Tex.  368. 

2«  Try  on  v.  Tryon,  16  Vt.  313,  317; 
Doolittle  v.  Holton,  28  Vt.  819,  823. 

27  Fisher  v.  Bassett,  9  Leigh,  119,  131. 

28  Gary,  Pr.  L.,  §  24,  citing  Barker  «;. 
Barker,  14  Wis.  131,  147.  See  Portz  v. 
Schantz,  70  Wis.  497,  505. 


§146 


CORRECTION    OF   JUDGMENTS. 


*  330, *  331 


in  many  of  these  States,  until  the  law  was  changed  by   c        ,  . 
legislation,  or  until  the  courts,  on  principle,   reversed    such  judg- 
their  former  doctrine  ;  but  instances  are  not  wanting  in    "usive^n'^Su" 
which  the  doctrine  is  ruled  both  ways  in  the  same  State,    lateral  proceed- 
under   the  same  statute,  and  under  circumstances  pre-    ings' 
senting  no  essential  difference.     It  has  been  held  that  substantial 
compliance  with  the  statutory  requirements  must  be  affirmatively 
shown  by  the  record  to  secure  the  validity  of  judgments  of  probate 
courts    against    collateral    assailability,    in    California,1    Colorado,2 
Massachusetts,8    Mississippi,4    Tennessee,5   and    Wisconsin,6    beside 
numerous  cases  involving  the  validity  of  probate  powers,  where  the 
owner  of  property  had  been  erroneously  adjudged  to  be  dead,7  or 
where  the  deceased  was  in  fact  domiciled  in  a  county  other  than  that 

within  which  letters  were  granted.8 
[*  3313        *  §  146.    How  far  Probate  Courts  may  correct  their  Judg- 
ments. —  The  orders,  decrees,  and  judgments  of    „   . 

.  n  Probate  courts 

probate  courts,  in  so  far  as  they  are  courts  of  record,  can  speak  by  their 

be  known  by  their  record  alone,9  which  necessarily  im-  record  onlF. 

ports  absolute  verity,  and  can  neither  be  questioned  nor  which  imports 

falsified  ; 10  from  which  it  follows  that  the  court  is  bound  absoluteverity> 
by  its  own  record,  and  can  neither  change  nor  disregard  its  orders, 

judgments,  ov  decrees  after  the  lapse  of  the  term  at  which  and  cannot  be 

they  were  rendered.11    It  is  consistent  with  this  principle  {he^ctose  afer 

that  it  is  the  duty  of  a  court,  if  the  judgment,  decree,  or  the  term, 

order  is  clearly  void  for  the  want  of  jurisdiction,  or  other  But  the  record 

defect  apparent  from  the  record,  to  vacate  the  same  upon  mentsltc^may 

proper  application ; 12  hence  letters   of    administration  be  vacated. 


1  Haynes  v.  Meeks,  20  Cal.  288,  314, 
et  seq. ;  Estate  of  Boland,55  Cal.  310,  315. 
The  statutory  amendments  and  constitu- 
tional changes  altering  the  law  in  this 
respect  are  referred  to  in  Burris  v.  Ken- 
nedy, 108  Cal.  331. 

2  Vance  v.  Maroney,  4  Col.  47. 

8  Holyoke  v.  Haskins,  5  Pick.  20 ;  s.  c. 
9  Pick.  259;  Thayer  v.  Winchester,  133 
Mass.  447. 

*  Learned  v.  Matthews,  40  Miss.  210. 
But  equity  will  grant  relief  to  avoid  in- 
justice :  Gaines  v.  Kennedy,  53  Miss.  103, 
109;  Hill  v.  Billingsly,  53  Miss.  Ill, 
116. 

5  Hopper  v.  Fisher,  2  Head,  253,  257  ; 
Whitmore  v.  Johnson,  10  Humph.  610; 
Linnville  v.  Darby,  1  Baxt.  306,  311. 

6  Gibbs  v.  Shaw,  17  Wis.  197;  Howe 
v.  McGivern,  25  Wis.  525;  Blodgett  v. 
Hitt,  29  Wis.  169  ;  Chase  v.  Ross,  36  Wis. 
267,  275. 

vol.  i. —23 


7  As  to  which  see  post,  §§  208  et  seq. 

8  On  which  point  see  post,  §  204. 

9  Milan  v.  Pemberton,  12  Mo.  598; 
Rutherford  v.  Crawford,  53  Ga.  138,  143. 

">  Hahn  v.  Kelly,  34  Cal.  391,  405; 
Shroyer  v.  Richmond,  16  Oh.  St.  455,  466  ; 
Selin  v.  Snyder,  7  S.  &  R.  166,  172 ;  Ken- 
nedy v.  Wachsmuth,  12  S.  &  R.  171,  175 ; 
18  Vin.  Abr.,  t.  Record,  p.  173,  §  4. 

11  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  26  Oh.  St.  357 ; 
Alexander  v.  Nelson,  42  Ala.  462 ;  Bryant 
v.  Horn,  42  Ala.  496  ;  Wolf  v.  Banks,  41 
Ark.  104,  107  ;  State  v.  Probate  Court,  33 
Minn.  94 ;  Browder  v.  Faulkner,  82  Ala. 
257;  Hitchcock  v.  Judge,  99  Mich.  128; 
Leavins  v.  Ewins,  67  Vt.  256. 

12  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  40  Ala.  247,  251 
(citing  Stickney  v.  Davis,  17  Pick.  169; 
Mobley  v.  Mobley,  9  Ga.  247)  ;  Hunting- 
ton v.  Finch,  3  Oh.  St.  445,  448  (holding 
the  power  to  vacate  for  irregularity  or  im~ 
proper  conduct  in  procuring  the  entry) ; 

353 


*  331,  *  332      NATURE   OP   PROBATE   COURTS   IN   AMERICA. 


§140 


obtained  by  fraud  may  be  revoked  and  granted  to  others,1  and  pro- 
bate of  a  will  obtained  by  fraud  set  aside.2  So  it  was  held  in  Ver- 
mont that  probate  courts  have  power  to  reopen  a  former  decree,  so  as 
to  charge  the  administrator  with  advancements  and  assets  omitted 
from  the  decree.3  But  in  the  absence  of  statutory  grant  of  power  to 
open  orders  and  decrees,  or  to  grant  rehearing  to  litigants,  they  have 
no  power  to  revise  their  decisions  on  the  ground  of  error, 
either  of  law  or  fact ; 4  except,  as  will  be  more  fully  *  noticed  [*  332] 
below,  during  the  continuance  of  the  term  at  which  they  were 
rendered.5 

In  some  of  the  States,  however,  probate  courts  are 
authorized  by  statute  to  review,  set  aside,  annul,  or 
alter  their  judgments  on  proper  allegations,  by  parties 
interested,   if    fraud    or   mistake    be   shown;6  and   in 


In  some  States 
probate  courts 
review  their 
judgments  for 
fraud  or 
mistake. 


MeCabe  v.  Lewis,  76  Mo.  296,  301 ;  In  re 
Gragg,  32  Minn.  142. 

1  Marston  v.  Wilcox,  2  111.  60 ;  Perley 
v.  Sands,  3  Edw.  Ch.  325,  328,  holding 
that  a  misstatement  of  facts  is  a  "false 
representation,"  under  the  statute,  author- 
izing the  surrogate  to  revoke  the  letters 
obtained  thereby;  Mullanphy  ».  County 
Court,  6  Mo.  563.  See  on  these  points 
post,  §  268. 

2  Hotchkiss  v.  Ladd,  62  Vt.  209  ;  Ham- 
herlin  v.  Terry,  1  Sm.  &.  M.  Ch.  589. 
See  the  subject  of  the  revocation  of  pro- 
bate treated  post,  §§  227,  268. 

8  On  the  ground  that  power  to  revise 
previous  proceedings  are  incidental  to  all 
courts  of  general  jurisdiction,  including 
probate  courts,  to  which  this  power  is 
peculiarly  necessary  :  Adams  v.  Adams, 
21  Vt.  162, 166  ;  Hotchkiss  v.  Ladd,  supra, 
reaffirming  and  extending  this  power. 
The  reasoning  employed  does  not  seem  to 
establish  either  the  necessity  or  the  wisdom 
of  allowing  probate  courts  to  open  judg- 
ments rendered  at  a  former  term,  except 
fur  clearly  apparent  lack  of  jurisdiction. 
The  case  of  French  v.  Winsor,  24  Vt.  402, 
407,  sometimes  cited  in  support  of  the 
same  proposition,  establishes  only  the 
right  to  correct  annual  settlements  at  or 
before  final  settlement.  Hut  in  California 
the  order  of  the  Superior  Court  settling 
the  annual  account  of  testamentary  bras* 

erroneously  purported  to  fix  the  date, 
of   an    annuity    contrary    to    the    previous 

express  decision  of  the  same  court,  was 

allowed  to   be   amended  :    Estate  of   Pratt, 

11 'j  Cal  L58. 
354 


4  Daly,  J.,  acting  as  surrogate,  in  the 
thoroughly  considered  case  of  Brick's 
Estate,  15  Abb.  Pr.  12,  36,  thus  states 
his  resume'  of  the  numerous  authorities 
by  him  consulted :  "  They  may  undo 
what  has  been  done  through  fraud,  or 
upon  the  supposition  that  they  had  juris- 
diction, or  on  the  assumption  that  a  party 
was  dead  who  is  living,  or  that  there  was. 
no  will ;  or  they  may  open  decrees  taken 
by  default,  or  correct  mistakes,  the  re- 
sult of  oversight  or  accident.  .  .  .  But 
when  all  the  parties  in  interest  have  been 
represented  at  the  hearing,  and  the  court 
has  given  its  final  sentence  or  decree,  I 
know  of  no  authority,  showing  that  these 
courts  have  ever  exercised  the  general 
power  of  opening  and  reversing  it  again, 
upon  the  ground  that  they  had  erred  as 
to  the  law,  or  had  decided  erroneously 
upon  the  facts." 

5  Infra,  p.  *333. 

6  See  post,  §  507,  on  Final  Settlements. 
In  Mississippi,  where  it  had  been  held  that 
a  bill  of  review  would  not  lie  in  the  pro- 
bate court  (Fanners'  &  Merchants'  Bank 
v.  Tapj.au,  5  Sm.  &  M.  112),  and  that  its 
judgments  and  orders  were  final  and  could 
not  be  set  aside  or  annulled  in  that  court 
at  a  subsequent  term  (Hendricks  v.  Hud- 
dleston,  5  Sm.  &  M.  422),  power  to  that 
effect  was  vested  in  probate  courts  by 
act  of  1846:  Hooker  v.  Hooker,  10  Sm. 
&  M.  599  ;  Austin  v.  Lamar,  23  Miss.  189. 
In  New  Jersey  the  statutory  provision 
making  settlements  conclusive  and  final 
"  except  when  fraud  or  mistake  can  be 
shown  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court," 


§146 


CORRECTION    OF   JUDGMENTS 


332,  *  333 


others  this  power  is  held  to  inhere  in  probate  as  well    in  some,  power 

to  in- 
probate 


as  all  other  courts.1     In  New  York,  where  this  power    hereof' 


is  granted  by  statute,  it  is  held  that  the  party  com-  courts, 
plaining  of  an  adverse  decision  should  be  denied  a  rehearing,  and  left 
to  his  remedy  by  appeal,  unless  he  can  bring  himself  squarely  within 
the  rules  laid  down  by  the  court  of  appeals  for  a  rehearing  or  re- 
argument  in  that  court ; 2  "  the  power  is  undoubtedly  given 
[*  333]  *  to  the  surrogate  to  open  a  decree,  even  after  the  time  for 
appeal  has  passed,  and  correct  a  palpable  mistake  if  the  mov- 
ing party  shows  fraud,  deception,  or  excusable  negligence  in  connec- 
tion with  the  alleged  error."  8  The  grant  of  power  to  the  probate 
court  to  review  and  set  aside  its  orders  for  fraud  or  mistake  does  not 
deprive  a  superior  court  of  its  equity  power  in  the  matter.4 

But  the  rule  applicable  to  all  common-law  courts,  that  during  the 
continuance  of  the  term  the  record  remains   in   the  breast  of  the 
judge,5  and  the  record  as  well  as  the  judgment  itself   Durinfrtne 
may  be  altered,  revised,  or  revoked,  as  well  as  amended   term  the  record 

n      i      ■      i  1  ..  n    n  .    .       as  well  as  the 

in  respect  of   clerical  errors  and  matters  or  form,6  is  judgment  itself 

equally  applicable  to  probate  courts.7     "  All  the  days  of  may  be  altered, 

the  term  are  considered  as  one,  and  everything  is  in  the  if  notice  be 

power  of  the  court  during  its  continuance."8     But  this  party  affected 

power  must  not  be  exercised  unless  the  parties  to  be  thereby. 

is  held  not  to  clothe  the  court  with  a  dis- 
cretion merely,  but  as  equivalent  to  a 
positive  enactment  depriving  the  judg- 
ment of  its  conclusive  character  if  fraud 
or  mistake  can  be  shown  •.  Crombie  v. 
Engle,  19  N.  J.  L.  82.  Similarly  in  New 
York:  Campbell  v.  Thatcher,  54  Barb. 
382 ;  Janssen  v.  Wemple,  3  Redf.  229  ; 
Matter  of  Hawley,  36  Hun,  258,  260 ;  but 
see  s.  c.  104  N.  Y.  250,  259.  The  statute 
making  provision  for  the  correction  of 
accounts  of  executors  and  administrators, 
the  modes  of  correction,  and  the  remedies 
therein  prescribed,  must  be  followed : 
Johnson  v.  Johnson,  26  Oh.  St.  357,  364. 
See  also,  to  similar  effect,  McDermott  v. 
Hayes,  60  N.  H.  9.  In  Alabama  provision 
is  made  by  statute  for  the  correction  of  an 
incorrect  description  of  lands  sold  under 
probate  decree,  at  the  instance  of  the  pur- 
chaser: Lee  v.  Williams,  85  Ala.  189. 

1  Adams  v.  Adams,  supra ;  Milne's  Ap- 
peal, 99  Pa.  St.  483,  489 ;  Montgomery  v. 
Williamson,  37  Md.  421,  428;  Bowers  v. 
Hammond,  139  Mass.  360,  365  ;  Vreeden- 
burgh  v.  Calf,  9  Pai.  128,  129;  Bronson 
v.  Burnett,  1  Chand.  136,  140 ;  Fortson 
v.  Alford,  62  Tex.  576,  579.  And  see 
Schlink  v.  Maxtou,  153  111.  447. 


2  Melcher  v.  Stevens,  1  Dem.  123,  130, 
quoting  from  Mount  v.  Mitchell,  32  N.  Y. 
702,  as  follows  :  "  Motions  for  reargument 
should  be  founded  on  papers  showing 
clearly  that  some  question  decisive  of 
the  case,  and  duly  submitted  by  counsel, 
has  been  overlooked  by  the  court ;  or 
that  the  decision  is  in  conflict  with  an  ex* 
press  statute,  or  with  a  controlling  de- 
cision, to  which  the  attention  of  the  court 
was  not  drawn,  through  the  neglect  or 
inadvertence  of  couusel."  The  necessity 
for  such  a  rule  is  emphasized  by  the  sur- 
rogate, who  calls  attention  to  the  lan- 
guage of  Daly,  J.,  in  Curley  v.  Tomlinson, 
5  Daly,  283,  and  cites  numerous  other 
New  York  cases. 

3  Matter  of  Dey  Ermaud,  24  Hun,  I,  4. 

4  Baker  v.  O'Riordan,  65  Cal.  368; 
Douglass  v.  Low,  36  Hun,  497,  500 : 
Griffith  v.  Godey,  113  U.  S.  89,  93. 

5  Co.  Litt.  260  a. 

6  Freem.  on  Judgm.  §69,  and  author- 
ities there  collected. 

7  Rottmauu  v.  Schmucker,  94  Mo.  139, 
144. 

8  Moore  v.  Moore,  1  Dev.  L.  352; 
Caldwell  v.  Lockridge,  9  Mo.  362. 

355 


*  833,  *  334   NATURE  OF  PROBATE  COURTS  IN  AMERICA      §  147 

affected  are  present  in  court,  or  have  notice,  so  that  they  may  be 
heard  if  they  desire ; *  and  the  presence  of  the  parties,  or  notice  to 
the  in,  must  appear  from  the  record  itself ;  no  presumption  of  notice 
arises  where  the  record  is  silent.2  Any  change  or  amendment  must 
also  be  upon  such  terms  as  will  protect  the  interests  of  third  parties.8 
§  147.  Entering  Judgment  Nunc  pro  Tunc.  —  The  power  to  record 
a  judgment  or  order  at  any  time  after  it  was  rendered,  and  to 
Entering  or  correct  a  judgment  or  order  erroneously  entered,  resides 
correcting  ^n  ^e  probate  courts  equally  with  common-law  courts. 

judgment  nunc  ,  r  ,  .  J         . 

pro  tunc.  This  power  originated  in  the  maxim,  that  "  an  act  of  the 

court  shall  prejudice  no  one,"4  or,  as  worded  by  Freeman,  "a  delay 
of  the  court  shall  prejudice  no  one," 5  and  was  originally  employed  to 
relieve  parties  from  hardships  arising  out  of  the  delay  of  courts,  by 
entering  a  judgment  nunc  pro  tunc  as  of  the  day  on  which  it 
ought  to  have  been  rendered ;  but  is  *  now  resorted  to  for  [*  334] 
the  purpose  of  entering  of  record  judgments  rendered,  but 
through  inadvertence  not  entered,  and  of  correcting  judgments  erro- 
neously entered,  nunc  pro  tunc,  as  they  ought  originally  to  have  been 
entered  of  record.6 

There  is  some  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  circumstances  which 
shall  be  sufficient  to  authorize  a  nunc  pro  tunc  entry.  The 
Upon  what  evi-  purpose  to  be  accomplished  is  salient  enough:  it  is  to 
^unTJnir\ir°  secure  a  ^rue  record  of  the  precise  ruliug  of  the  judge  as 
may  be  made,  originally  pronounced,  in  cases  where  the  record  is  silent, 
or  inaccurate,  or  false.  But  the  question  here  arising,  How  is  the 
truth  of  the  entry  to  be  established  ?  is  not  so  easily  answered.  To 
allow  it  to  be  determined  by  parol  evidence  is  to  assail  the  inviolable 

1  Caldwell  v.  Lockridge,  supra.  otherwise    they    would    be  exposed    by 

2  Peake  v.  Redd,  14  Mo.  79  ;  Freem.  on  reason  of  inadvertence,  misconception,  or 
Judgm.  §  72,  and  authorities  cited.  bad  faith  of  clerical  officers.     But  it  must 

3  Ligon  v.  Rogers,  12  Ga.  281 ;  Perdue  be  confined  to  judgments  actually  an- 
v.  Brad.shaw,  18  Ga.  287;  McCormick  v.  nounced,  or  proceedings  actually  had,  in- 
W heeler,  36  111.  114,  119.  advertently  omitted  from  or  erroneously 

4  Broom's  Legal  Maxims,  Actus  Cu-  entered  of  record;  it  cannot  be  permitted 
rice  neminem  gravubi't,  p.  122;  Mitchell  v.  to  supply  a  judgment  or  order  which 
Overman,  103  U.  S.  62,  65.  might  or  ought  to  have  been,  but  in  real- 

6  Freem.  on  Judgm.  §  56.  ity  was  not,  rendered  or  made :  Gray  v 
6  Borer  v.  Chapman,  119  U.  S.  587,  Brignardello,  1  Wall.  627,  636;  Fetters 
596  ;  Mitchell  v.  Overman,  supra,  and  v.  Baird,  72  Mo.  389  ;  Turner  v.  Benoist, 
cases  cited  in  note  thereto.  The  practice  50  Mo.  145  ;  Howell  v.  Morelau,  78  111. 
is  now  firmly  established  as  reaching  all  162,  165.  Nor  can  an  appellate  or  revis- 
cases  in  which  the  record  is  at  variance  ing  court  order  the  amendment,  but  only 
with  the  judgment,  decree,  or  order  pro-  the  court  before  which  the  original  pro- 
nounced by  the  judge;  and  no  principle  ceedings  were  had  :  Brooks  v.  Duckworth, 
is  more  clearly  deducible  from  the  inhe-  59  Mo.  48;  Walton  v.  Pearson,  85  N.  C. 
rent  quality  and  nature  of  courts  and  tho  34,48;  Binns  v.  State,  35  Ark.  118,  119. 
requirements  of  justice;  for  upon  it  de-  In  Brooks  v.  Brooks,  52  Ivans.  562,  the 
pends  the  power  of  courts  to  vindicate  entry  was  held  proporly  made  by  the  suc- 
their  rulings  and  decisions  from  misstate-  cceding  judge  of  the  same  court, 
ment,  perversion,  or  corruption,  to  which 
856 


§  147  JUDGMENTS  NUNC  PRO  TUNC.       *  334,  *  335 

character  and  conclusiveness  of  the  record  (without  which  there  can 
be  neither  stability  of  legal  rights,  nor  confidence  in  the  unbending 
justice  and  integrity  of  courts),  by  subordinating  it  to  the  memory  of 
witnesses  who  may  be  produced  by  interested  parties.1  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  recollection  of  the  judge  were  alone  to  be  relied  on 
for  the  rectification  of  the  record,  the  rights  of  parties  would  be 
placed  absolutely  at  his  mercy :  confidence  in  the  verity  of  the  record 
must  be  impaired,  even  where  the  integrity  of  the  judge  is  undoubted, 
for  his  very  anxiety  to  do  right  and  accomplish  justice  exposes  him 
to  the  danger  of  unconsciously  yielding  to  the  powerful  temptation  to 
so  frame  the  nunc  pro  tunc  entry  as  to  conform  the  judgment  to  his 
conviction  of  what  it  ought  to  be,  —  a  conviction  wrought,  it  may  be, 

by  subsequently  developed  facts,  or  by  maturer  consideration. 
[*  335]       *  The  logical  and  safe  rule  seems  to  be  that  laid  down  in  the 

English  statutes  on  this  subject.2  To  relieve  from  the  rigor 
of  the  common  law,  which  interdicted  any  alteration  of  English 
the  proceedings  after  they  had  become  a  record,  except  statute, 
during  the  term  to  which  it  related,8  it  was  first  enacted  "that  by  the 
misprision  of  a  clerk  ...  no  process  shall  be  annulled  or  discontinued 
by  mistaking  in  writing  one  syllable  or  letter  too  much  or  too  little ; 
but  as  soon  as  the  mistake  is  perceived  ...  it  shall  be  amended  in 
due  form,  without  giving  advantage  to  the  party  that  challengeth  the 
same,  because  of  such  misprision."  4  This  statute  was  held  to  apply 
only  to  proceedings  before  judgment ;  it  was  subsequently  enacted 
that  the  justices  have  power  to  amend  the  record  and  process  as  well 
after  as  before  judgment.5  This  statute,  although  permitting  amend- 
ment of  the  record  after  judgment,  still  confined  it  to  "  a  syllable  or 
letter."  The  authority  to  amend  was  enlarged  by  a  later  statute,6 
giving  the  king's  judges  power  "  to  examine  such  records,  process, 
words,  pleas,  warrants  of  attorney,  writs,  panels  or  return,  by  them 
and  their  clerks,  and  to  reform  and  amend  (in  affirmance  of  the  judg- 
ments of  such  records  and  processes)  all  that  which  to  them  in  their 
discretion  seemeth  to  be  misprision  of  the  clerks  therein,  .  .  .  except 
appeals,  indictments  of  treason,  and  of  felonies  and  the  outlawries  of 
the  same,  so  that  by  such  misprision  of  the  clerk  no  judgment  shall 
be  reversed  or  annulled.  And  if  any  record,  process,  writ,  warrant  of 
attorney,  return,  or  panel  be  certified  defective,  otherwise  than  accord- 
ing to  the  writing,  which  thereof  remaineth  in  the  treasury,  courts, 
or  places  from  whence  they  are  certified,  the  parties,  in  affirmance  of 
the  judgments  of  such  record  and  process,  shall  have  advantage  to 
allege  that  the  same  writing  is  variant  from  the  said  certificate,  and 
that  found  and  certified,  that  the  same  variance  shall  be  by  the  said 
judges  reformed  and  amended  according  to  the  first  writing." 

1  Perkins  v.  Perkins,  27  Ala.  479,  480.  4  14  Edw.  III.  c.  6. 

2  Cited  by  Ray,  J.,  in  Makepeace  v.         6  9  Edw.  V.  St.  1,  c.  4. 
Lukens,  27  Ind.  435,437,  et  seq.  6  8  Henry  VI.  c.  12. 

8  Co.  Litt.  260. 

357 


335,  *  336   NATURE  OF  PROBATE  COURTS  IN  AMERICA. 


147 


The  rule  deducible  from  these  statutes  is,  that  no  amendment 
There  must  be  of  the  record  can  be  made  unless  there  be  a  mistake  of 
thTrecord  to  tne  c^er^j  an(^  something  in  the  record  by  which  the 
amend  by.         mistake  can  be  rectified.1 

*  This  rule  is  adhered  to  in  the  federal  courts,2  and  in  the  [*  33G] 
courts  of  Alabama,8  California,4  Georgia,5  Illinois,6  Indiana,7 
Kentucky,8  Maine,9  Mississippi,10  Missouri,11  Tennessee,12  and  Texas.18 
Where  nunc  In  other  States,  entries  nunc  pro  tunc  are  allowed  upon 
parol  evidence,  or  upon  the  memory  of  the  judge;  for 
instance,  in  Connecticut,14  Iowa,18  Maryland,16  Massachu- 
setts,17 New  Hampshire,18  New  York,19  North  Carolina, 2& 
Ohio,21  and  Wisconsin.22 


pm  tunc  entries 
may  be  made 
upon  parol  evi- 
dence or  mem- 
ory of  the 
judge. 


1  Ray,  J.,  in  Makepeace  v.  Lukens,  supra, 
cites  1  Tidd,  713;  Wynne  v.  Thomas, 
AVilles  R.  563 ;  Ray  v.  Lister,  Andrews, 
351 ;  Bac.  Abr.,  tit.  Amendment,  F ;  Palm. 
98;  Harecourt  v.  Bishop,  Cro.  Eliz.  497; 
and  Chetle  v.  Lees,  Carthew,  167. 

2  Story,  J.,  in  Albers  v.  Whitney,  I 
Sto.  310,  312,  holding  that  a  mistake  in 
the  Christian  name  of  a  party,  if  not  ap- 
parent upon  some  part  of  the  record,  but 
established  by  aliunde  evidence,  will  not 
authorize  an  amendment  of  the  record ; 
Russell  v.  United  States,  15  Ct.  CI.  168, 
171,  Drake,  C.  J.,  holding  that  clerical 
errors,  but  not  errors  in  the  judgment  itself, 
can  be  corrected  under  the  federal  statute, 
citing  Bank  of  the  United  States  v.  Moss, 
6  How.  (U.  S.)  31. 

8  Metcalf  v.  Metcalf,  19  Ala.  319 ; 
Dickens  v.  Bush,  23  Ala.  849;  Summer- 
eett  v.  Summersett,  40  Ala.  596 ;  Hudson 
v.  Hudson,  20  Ala.  364. 

1  Morrison  v.  Dapman,  3  Cal.  255,  257  ; 
Swain  r.  Naglee,  19  Cal.  127;  De  Castro 
v.  Richardson,  25  Cal.  49,  53  ;  Smith  v. 
His  Creditors,  59  Cal.  267. 

5  Dixon  p.  Mason,  68  Ga.  478,  480. 

6  Wallahan  v.  People,  40  111.  103. 

7  Jenkins  v.  Long,  23  lud.  460;  Make- 
peace 17.  Lukens,  27  Ind.  435. 

«  Davis  v.  Ballard,  7  T.  B.  Mon.  603, 

604  ;  Scroggin  v.  Scroggin,  1  J.  J.  Marsh. 

362,  364  ;  Bennett  v.  Ticrnay,  78  Ivy.  580. 

1  Colbj    >     Moody,   19  Me.    Ill,  113; 

White  v.  Blake,  74  Me.  489,  493. 

W  Rnaaell  v.  McDougall,  3  Sm.  &  M. 
234,  248  ;  Moody  v.  Grant,  41  Miss.  565. 

ii  Priest  w.  McMaster,  52  Mo.  60,  62; 
Allen  v.  Sales,  56  Mo.  28,  85;  Blize  v. 
Caatlio,  8  M'>.  App.  290,  294,  with  numer- 
ou    ■  a  ■    ■  ited. 


i2  State  w.  Fields,  Peck,  140,  141. 

13  Price  17.  Likens,  23  Tex.  635,  637. 
In  Burnett  v.  State,  14  Tex.  455,  it  is  held 
that  the  nunc  pro  tunc  entry  may  be  made 
if  it  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
court  that  an  order  was  made  at  a  former 
term  and  omitted  to  be  entered  by  the 
court  or  clerk. 

«  Weed  v.  Weed,  25  Conn.  337,  Waite, 
J.,  holding  that  "  whether  there  was  a 
mistake  in  the  record  was  a  question  of 
fact  for  the  court  below,  to  be  established 
as  any  other  fact  in  a  court  of  justice,  by 
proper  evidence  "  :  p.  344. 

15  Jones  v.  Field,  80  Iowa,  281,  286. 

16  Waters  v.  Engle,  53  Md.  179,  182,  on 
the  ground  that  in  such  case  the  court 
exercises  a  quasi  equitable  power,  accord- 
ing to  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the 
case  ;  Kemp  v.  Cook,  18  Md.  130,  138. 

17  Fay  v.  Wenzell,  8  Cush.  315,  317. 
But  see  Sayles  v.  Briggs,  4  Met.  (Mass.) 
421,  424,  holding  that  the  want  of  a  judi- 
cial record  cannot  be  supplied  by  parol 
evidence,  and  Kendall  v.  Powers,  4  Met. 
(Mass.)  553,  555,  to  same  effect. 

18  Frink  v.  Frink,  43  N.  II.  508,  515. 

19  Bank  of  Newburgh  v.  Seymour,  14 
Johns.  219;  Marsh  v.  Berry,  7  Cow.  344, 
348. 

20  Wade  v.  Odencal,  3  Dev.  L.  423,  424  ; 
Reid  v.  Kelly,  1  Dev.  L.  313,  315;  Phil- 
lipse  17.  Higdon,  Busb.  L.  380;  Mayo  v. 
Whitson,  2  Jones  L.  231,  235. 

21  Hollister  v.  District  Court,  8  Oh.  St. 
201,  203.  But  in  Ludlow  v.  Johnson,  3 
Ohio,  553,  it  was  held  that  an  order  nunc 
pro  tunc  cannot  bo  founded  upon  mere 
parol  proof  of  what  was  ordered  to  be 
done  at  a  previous  term  :  p.  575  et  seq. 

22  Wyman  v.  Buckstaff,  24  Wis.  477. 


§148 


PROCEEDING   IN    REM    AND   IN   PERSONAM.      *  336,  *  337 


The  correction  of  the  record  must  be  drawn  with  the  view  of  pro- 
tecting the  rights  of  third  parties  acquired  by  virtue  of  the 
[*  337]  *  original  entry  and  before  the  correction  there-   Must  be  made 

of,1  and  after  notice  to  the  parties  to  be  affected   uPon  notice 
by  it.2     But  where  the  amendment  is  merely  as  to  form,    protect  third 
or  to  complete  a  ministerial  act,  notice  to  the  other  side    Parties- 
does  not  seem  to  be  necessary.3     It  is  held  that  where  a  judgment  is 
stricken  out  during  the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered,  such  action  is 
not  the  subject  of  appeal ; 4  but  where  it  is  done  after  the  lapse  of  the 
term,  an  appeal  lies.5 

§  148.    Proceeding  in  Rem  and  in  Personam.  —  The   expression   is 
often  used,  in  asserting  for  the  judgments  of  probate  courts  a  validity 
not  claimed  for  them   in  respect  of  judgments  in  per-    What  are 
sonam,  that  from  the  nature  of  the  jurisdiction  exercised   ceedings  in 
by  them  they  proceed  in  rem.     The  judgment,  being  in 
rem,  it  is  said  is  conclusive  upon  all  the  world,  and  hence  all  persons 
whatever  have  a  right  to  be  heard  in  the  proceeding.6     Even  parties 
not  in  esse  at  the  time  of  the  judgment  have  been  held  to  be  con- 
cluded.7    A  distinguished  jurist  says,  "That  only  is  a  proceeding  in 
rem  in  which  the  process  is  to  be  served  on  the  thing  itself,  and  the 
mere  possession  of  the  thing  itself,  by  the  service  of  the  process  and 
making  proclamation,  authorizes  the  court  to  decide  upon  it  without 
notice  to  any  individual  whatever."  8     To  constitute  a  probate  pro- 


1  McCormick  v.  Wheeler,  36  111.  114; 
Hunt  v.  Grant,  19  Wend.  90;  and  see 
Freem.  on  Judgra.,  §  66,  for  further  au- 
thorities. It  is  no  objection,  however, 
that  a  suit  between  the  parties  to  the  orig- 
inal record  be  thereby  defeated :  Colby  v. 
Moody,  19  Me.  111. 

2  Poole  v.  McLeod,  1  Sm.  &  M.  391 ; 
Cobb  v.  Wood,  1  Hawk.  95 ;  Wheeler  v. 
Goffe,  24  Tex.  660;  Lovejoy  v.  Irelan,  19 
Md.  56.  In  Alabama  it  is  held  that  no 
notice  is  necessary  to  the  opposite  party  : 
Allen  v.  Bradford,  3  Ala.  281,  282,  citing 
earlier  cases.  So  where  the  application 
is  made  when  all  parties  are  present  in 
court,  in  another  proceeding,  no  formal 
notice  is  necessary:  Leavey's  Estate,  82 
Iowa,  440. 

3  Hagler  v.  Mercer,  6  Fla.  721 ;  Allen 
i'.  Bradford,  supra ;  Nabers  v.  Meredith, 
67  Ala.  333. 

*  Rutherford  v.  Pope,  15  Md.  579,  581. 

8  Graff  v.  Transportation  Company,  18 
Md.  364,  370;  Craig  v.  Wroth,  47  Md. 
281. 

6  Lowber  v.  Beauchamp,  2  Harr.  139; 
William  Hill  Co.  v.  Lawler,  116  Cal.  559; 


State  v.  Central  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Nev. 
47,  80;  Grignon  v.  Astor,  2  How.  (U.  S.) 
319;  Day  v.  Micou,  18  Wall.  156,  162 
(per  Strong,  J.) ;  Broderick's  Will,  21 
Wall.  503,  509,  519;  Dickey  v.  Vann,  81 
Ala.  425 ;  Ryan  v.  Ferguson,  3  Wash. 
356;  Lyons  v.  Hamner,  84  Ala.  197,  202; 
and  see  remarks  of  Lotz,  J.,  dissenting,  in 
Barnett  v.  Vanmeter,  7  Ind.  App.  45,  56 ; 
Burris  v.  Kennedy,  108  Cal.  331.  Pro- 
ceedings to  set  out  the  widow's  homestead, 
in  the  probate  court,  are  in  rem ;  and  per- 
sonal notice  not  jurisdictional :  ante,  § 
103  ;  so  the  grant  of  letters  is  a  proceed- 
ing in  rem  :  post,  §  263  ;  the  probate  of  a 
will :  post,  §  227,  p.  *  500 ;  and  distribution 
on  final  settlement :  post,  §  561,  p.  *  1230. 

7  Ladd  v.  Weiskopf,  62  Minn.  29  (on 
an  order  of  distribution  in  the  probate 
court). 

8  Drake  on  Attachments,  §  5.  The 
author  adopts  the  language  of  Chief  Jus- 
tice Marshall  in  Mankin  v.  Chandler,  2 
Brock.  125,  127,  and  also  cites  Megee  v. 
Beirne,  39  Pa.  St.  50,  and  Bray  v.  Mo 
Clury,  55  Mo.  128. 

359 


*  337,  *  338   NATURE  OF  PROBATE  COURTS  IN  AMERICA. 


§148 


ceeding  a  proceeding  in  rem,  says  Mr.  Waples  in  his  recent  work  on 
Proceedings  in  Rem,  it  "must  possess  all  the  characteristics  and 
embrace  all  the  requisites  of  that  form  of  action."  *  It  fol- 
Custodyofthe  lows,  that  possession  of  the  *  thing  (custody  of  [*  338] 
res  necessary,  ^q  res^  {s  one  0f  the  essential  conditions  of  ju- 
risdiction over  the  thing.  Every  other  requisite  may  be  conceded ; 
and  if  executors  and  administrators  be  looked  upon  as  officers  of  the 
court,  so  that  possession  by  them  may  be  considered  possession  by 
the  court,2  the  disposition  of  personal  property  by  order  or  judgment 
of  the  probate  court  is  clearly  a  proceeding  in  rem.  The  law  vests 
title  to  all  personal  property  of  a  decedent  in  his  executor  or  admin- 
istrator, and  requires  the  latter  to  notify  "all  the  world,"  by  publi- 
cation, of  his  assumption  of  the  office,  —  a  proceeding  constituting 
the  notice,  monition,  or  proclamation  required  to  obtain  jurisdiction 
in  rem.  The  same  principle  is  applicable  to  real  estate,  where,  as 
is  the  case  in  a  number  of  States,  it  passes  to  the  personal  repre- 
sentative.3 


1  "  There  must  be  a  res,  custody  of 
the  res,  right  to  proceed  against  it,  a  com- 
petent forum,  allegations  equivalent  to  an 
information,  notice  to  all  interested,  a 
hearing,  a  finding  of  facts,  an  order,  judg- 
ment, or  decree,  a  sale,  and  a  confirmation 
or  homologation,  before  the  'new  title 
paramount '  can  be  evolved  from  probate 
proceedings " :  Waples,  Proc.  in  Rem, 
§  563. 

2  Says  Brewer,  J.,  in  delivering  the 
opinion  of  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  in  Byers  v.  McAuley,  149  U.  S.  608, 
615:  "An  administrator  appointed  by  a 
State  court  is  an  officer  of  that  court ;  his 
possession  of  the  decedent's  property  is  a 
possession  taken  in  obedience  to  the  orders 
of  that  court ;  it  is  the  possession  of  the 
court,  and  cannot  be  disturbed  by  any 
other  court." 

3  See  post,  §  337,  enumerating  these 
States.  "  The  probate  court,"  says  Canty, 
J.,  in  deciding  on  the  validity  of  a  decree 
of  distribution  involving  title  to  real  es- 
tate in  Minnesota,  in  which  State  realty 
goes  to  the  executor  or  administrator  on 
the  death  of  its  owner,  "not  only  exer- 
cises the  jurisdiction  formerly  exercised 
by  the  courts  of  common  law  and  equity 
iivcr  the  n-:il  estate  of  deceased  persons, 

lint  it  also  exercises  a  jurisdiction  over 
hihIi  real  estate  never  exercised  by  those 
courts.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of 
Common  law  and  equity  over  such  real 
estate  was  exercised  by  proceedings  in 
360 


personam.  This  was  wholly  inadequate  to 
a  complete  and  proper  administration  of 
such  real  estate.  The  legislature  deemed 
it  proper  that  the  whole  world  should  be 
bound  by  the  administration  proceedings, 
and  to  accomplish  this  provided  a  pro- 
ceeding in  rem.  This  proceeding  is  not 
according  to  the  course  of  the  common- 
law,  and  is  not  a  mere  substitute  for  any 
proceeding  known  to  the  common  law  in 
the  administration  of  such  real  estate,  but 
its  scope  and  purpose  are  wholly  different. 
The  change  from  the  proceeding  in  perso- 
nam to  one  in  rem  is  not  a  mere  evasion  of 
the  constitutional  rights  of  parties  who 
would  be  entitled  to  personal  notice  under 
the  old  form  of  procedure.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  legislature  have  a  right  to  say 
that  when  the  owner  dies  the  court  shall 
seize  his  property,  and  by  constructive 
notice  compel  all  claimants  to  appear  or 
be  barred.  It  is  a  case  where  it  is  proper 
for  the  court  to  seize  the  rem,  and  by  con- 
structive notice  make  the  whole  world 
parties.  Where  all  the  world  are  in  fact 
proper  or  necessary  parties,  the  doctrine 
of  due  process  of  law  does  not  prevent  the 
legislature  from  adopting  a  more  appro- 
priate, adequate,  and  complete  remedy 
than  that  known  to  the  common  law": 
McNamara  v.  Casserly,  61  Minn.  335,  343. 
But  this  case  holds  that  where  the  pro- 
ceedings in  the  probate  court  have  once 
"ceased  to  be  in  fieri,  or  pending  for  any 
purpose,"  the  right  to  personal  notice  to. 


§  149   METHOD  OF  PROCEDURE  IN  PROBATE  COURTS    *  338,  *  339 

But  the  title  to  real  property  vests,  in  most  States,  not  in  the 
executor  or  administrator,  but  in  the  devisee  or  heir.  Hence,  in  all 
of  these  States,  the  essential  requisite  of  jurisdiction  in  rem,  posses- 
sion, the  custody  of  the  res,  is  wanting  in  respect  of  real  estate.  Mr. 
Waples,  in  the  work  referred  to,  strongly  emphasizes,  that,  if  the 
estate  be  in  the  adverse  possession  of  another,  the  administrator  must 
first  gain  possession  before  the  probate  court  can  take  jurisdiction 
over  it.1  It  is  provided  in  most  States  that  notice  must  be  given  to 
the  heirs,  or  others  interested  in  real  estate,  either  by  personal  ser- 
vice or  publication,  before  real  estate  can  be  subjected  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  debts  of  the  decedent.3  When  such  notice  has  been  given,  the 
importance  of  the  distinction  between  proceeding  in  rem  and  in  per- 
sonam disappears :  if  the  notice  was  by  actual  service  on  the  parties, 
they  are  parties  to  the  record,  and  as  such  bound  by  the  judgment  of 
the  court;  if  by  publication,  then  the  analogy  to  the  proceeding  in 
rem  is  complete ;  the  title  of  the  administrator  is  thereby  extended 
over  the  real  estate,  and  displaces  that  of  the  heir  or  devisee  for  the 
purposes  pointed  out  by  the  law.  The  judgment  affects  neither  the 
person  nor  any  other  property  of  the  heirs  or  devisees  save  that 
described  in  the  notice  published,8  which  may  then  be  said  to  be  in 
the  custody  of  the  law.4  But  if  no  notice  was.  given  to  parties  in 
interest,  and  the  administrator  was  not  in  possession  of  the  land, 
under  the  law  of  the  State,  then  the  proceeding  is  necessarily  void, 

being  neither  in  rem  nor  in  personam} 
[*339]  *It  is  hardly  necessary  to  repeat  that  the  jurisdiction 
exercised  by  probate  courts  in  adjudicating  upon  the  rights 
of  litigating  parties,  is,  so  far  as  such  parties  are  present  in  court  or 
represented  by  counsel,  strictly  followed  by  all  the  consequences 
attendant  upon  adjudications  in  personam,  to  the  extent  of  the  sub- 
ject-matter over  which  the  court  has  power. 

§  149.    Method  of  Procedure  in  Probate  Courts.  —  Although  pro- 
bate courts  are  mostly,  if  not  universally,  courts  of  record,6  having  a 
seal,  a  clerk  or  authority  to  act  as  their  own  clerk,  and    Proceedings 
executive  officers,  yet  their  procedure  is,  generally,  sum-    m  P™bate 
mary,  requiring  no  pleading  in  the  technical  sense,  nor   summary, 
adherence  to  artificial  rules  in  the  statement  of  the  cause  of  action  or 

resident  heirs  before  their  right,  once  ad-  8  McPherson  v.  Cunliff,  11  S.  &  R.  422, 

judicated,  could  be  affected,  was  constitu-  430. 

tional,  and  no  new  proceeding  in  rem  could  *  Doe  v.  Hardy,  52  Ala.  291,  295. 

be  resorted  to,  to  overthrow  a  decree  valid  5  And   the   record   should  show  such 

on  its  face  (holding  notice  by  publication  notice:  Waples,  Proc.  in  rem,  §  569,  cit- 

insufficient  as  to  resident  heirs).  ing   numerous   authorities   to   show  that 

1  Waples  Proc.  in  rem,  §  565.  But  without  notice  to  the  heirs  a  sale  of  their 
see,  as  to  the  American  law  on  this  sub-  real  estate  by  order  of  the  probate  court 
ject,  post,  §  471,  p.  *  1044  et  seq.  is  void. 

2  See  post,  §  466,  on  the  subject  of  the         6  Ante,  §  144. 
sale  of  real  estate. 

361 


339,  *  340   NATURE  OF  PROBATE  COURTS  IN  AMERICA.     §  149 


Statement  of 
a  subsisting 
Tight  is  suffi- 
cient to  let  in 
all  necessary 
proof  to  sus- 
tain it; 
appearance 
of  defendant 
sufficient 
traverse. 


defence.  An  intelligible  statement  of  an  existing  sub- 
stantial right,  which  the  court  has  jurisdiction  to  enforce, 
is  a  sufficient  allegation  of  all  matters  necessary  to  sus- 
tain a  judgment;  and  the  simple  appearance  of  the 
defendant  usually  entitles  him  to  rebut  the  proof  offered 
by  the  other  side,  or  prove  any  matter  in  defence;  save, 
perhaps,  a  cause  of  action  constituting  a  set-off  or  counter 
claim,  of  which  the  other  side  must  have  sufficient  notice 
to  enable  it  to  prepare  any  defence  it  may  have  to  the  same.  "  The 
practice  in  county  courts  is  purposely  so  framed  that  parties  can 
attend  to  their  own  business  in  ordinary  matters,  and  the  decision 
should  be  so  rendered  as  to  subserve  the  ends  of  justice  according  to 
the  evidence,  without  regard  to  technical  precision  in  pleading."1 
In  Rhode  Island  a  statute  requiring  applications  to  the  pro- 
bate court  to  be  made  in  writing  waS  held  directory  *  merely  ;  [*  340] 
Parties  mav  ^u^  ^  was  further  held  that  the  facts  constitu- 
appear  in  per-  ting  the  cause  of  action  must  in  some  manner  appear  of 
counsel  or  record.2  It  has  already  been  stated,  that  a  party  may 
agent.  appear  by  attorney  (or  agent),  or  in  person.8 

It  lies  in  the  nature  of  these  courts,  that  in  the  exercise  of  their 
jurisdiction  they  are  not  confined  to  legal  principles  or  the  rules  of 
common-law  courts,  but  exercise  equitable  powers  as  well. 
Whenever,  within  the  scope  of  the  statutory  jurisdiction 
confided  to  them,  the  relief  to  be  administered,  the  right 
to  be  enforced,  or  the  defence  to  an  action  properly 
pending  before  them,  involves  the  application  of  equi- 
table principles,  or  a  proceeding  in  accordance  with  the 
practice  in  chancery,  their  powers  are  commensurate 
with  the  necessity  demanding  their  exercise,  whether  legal  or  equi- 
table in  their  nature.4 


Not  confined 
to  legal  or 
equitable,  but 
exercise  all 
powers  ne- 
cessary to 
accomplish 
the  statutory 
functions. 


1  Per  Wagner,  J.,  in  Sublett  v.  Nel- 
son, 38  Mo.  487,  488.  "The  law  has 
pointed  out  and  adopted  a  summary  mode 
of  proceeding  for  the  convenience  ol*  the 
people,"  continues  the  judge,  "and  to 
apply  the  doctrine  of  variance  with  the 
.strictness  hen-  contended  for  would  make 
it  a  snare  to  entrap  the  unwary."  To  the 
same  effect,  Flinn  v.  Shackleford,  42  Ala. 
202,  207  :  "  The  '  Irphan's  Court  is  a  court 
of  equity,  and  looks  only  to  the  justice  of 
the  demand,  and  not  to  the  form  in  which 

it  is  presented."      If  "the  decree   reaches 
the    real   justice    of    the   case,"    it   will   be 

affirmed  :  Stockton's  Appeal,  04  l'a.  St. 
.oh,  68  ;  Watkina  v.  Donelly,  88  Mo.  322  ; 
McManus  v.  McDowell, per  Thompson,  J., 
11  Mo.  A  pp.  436,444  ;  Noble  v.  McGinnis, 
55  I nd.  528,  532  ;  Ramsey  V.  FoUtS,  C7 
3G2 


Ind.  78,  80;  Brook  v.  Chappell,  34  "Wis. 
405,  419;  Comstock  v.  Smith,  26  Mich. 
30G,  322;  Anderson  v.  Gregg,  44  Miss. 
170,  176,  citing  numerous  Mississippi 
cases  ;  Steph.  Dig.  of  Ev.  4  ;  Windell  v. 
Hudson,  102  Ind.  521  ;  Culvert  v.  Yundt, 
112  Ind.  401  ;  Titus  v.  Poole,  145  N.  Y. 
414;  Hayner  v.  Trott,  46  Kans.  70.  The 
Statute  of  Limitations  may  be  relied  on 
without  being  specially  pleaded  as  a  de- 
fence: Bromwell  v.  Bromwell,  139  111. 
424,  428.  So  oral  exceptions  to  final  set- 
tlements may  be  heard:  Clark  v.  Bettel- 
heim,  144  Mo.  258,  274. 

a  Bobbins  v.  Tafft,  12  It.  I.  67. 

8  Ante,  §  144. 

*  Shepard  v.  Speer,  140  111.  238,  245  ; 
Guier  v.  Kelly,  2  I5inn.  294,  299;  Dnn- 
das's  Appeal,  78  Pa.   St.  474,  477,  479; 


§  149       METHOD    OF   PROCEDURE   IN    PROBATE   COURTS.        *  340,  *341 


But  they  possess  these  powers  only  in  so  far  as  they  have  been  con- 
ferred by  statute,  or  are  indispensable  to  the  exercise  of  such  as  have 
been  conferred.1     They  have  no  original  chancery  pow-    Have  no  ori  . 
ers,  such  as  to  enforce  a  vendor's  lien,2  no   ancillary    nai  chancery 
jurisdiction  in  aid  of  common-law  courts,  no  power  to    Powers- 
follow  a  trust  fund  through  various  transformations,3  nor  over  any 
purely  equitable  right.4     Even  where  the  chancery  court  itself 
[*  341]  has  probate  jurisdiction,  it  will  proceed  in  probate  *  matters 
not  according  to  the  strict  and  technical  practice  resorted  to 
in  chancery,  but  according  to  the   summary  method  which  is   pre- 
scribed for  probate  courts.5     The  resemblance  of  probate  courts  to 
courts  of  chancery  consists  in  their  practice  of  proceeding  by  petition 
and  answer,  containing  the  substance,  but  not  the  nice  distinctions,  of 
a  bill  in  equity.6 

Although  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  is  secured  in  most  States  to 
claimants  seeking  to   establish  their  claims  in  probate  courts,7  yet 


Williamson's  Appeal,  94  Pa.  St.  231,  236 ; 
In  re  Moore,  96  Cal.  522,  529 ;  In  re  Clos, 
110  Cal.  494,  501  ;  Johnston  i>.  Shofner,  23 
Oreg.  Ill,  118;  Powell  v.  North,  3  Ind. 
392  ;  Dehart  v.  Dehart,  15  Ind.  167  ;  Hurd 
v.  Slaten,  43  HI.  348 ;  Millard  v.  Harris, 
119  111.  185,  198;  Hales  v.  Holland,  92  111. 
494,  498 ;  Donovan's  Appeal,  41  Conn. 
551;  Potter's  Appeal,  56  Conn.  1,  16; 
Blanton  v.  King,  2  How.  (Miss.)  856; 
Titterington  v.  Hooker,  58  Mo.  593  ;  In  re 
Niles,  113  N.  Y.  547,  556 ;  Green  v.  Sauls- 
bury,  6  Del.  Ch.  371 ;  Maginn  v.  Green,  67 
Mo.  App.  616  ;  Hyland  v.  Baxter,  98  N.  Y. 
610,  616  ;  Pitch  v.  Bellamy,  holding  that 
where  a  surrogate  or  probate  power  is  at 
the  same  time  a  chancery  power,  the  juris- 
diction is  concurrent  in  the  two  courts : 
14  Fla.  537,  542  ;  Shoemaker  v.  Brown, 
to  same  effect:  10  Kans.  383,  390.  In 
Pennsylvania  the  Orphan's  Court  has 
power  to  order  property  of  an  estate  un- 
lawfully in  the  hands  of  another  to  he 
surrendered  for  administration,  where  the 
title  is  undisputed :  Odd  Fellows  Savings 
Bank's  Appeal,  123  Pa.  St.  356.  So  far 
as  the  jurisdiction  to  try  claims  depends 
on  the  equitable  nature  of  the  claim,  this 
subject  is  discussed  under  §  392,  treating 
of  what  demands  and  defences  are  triable 
in  probate  courts. 

1  Post,  §  392  ;  Pearce  v.  Calhoun,  59 
Mo.  271  ;  Bernheimer  v.  Calhoun,  44 
Miss.  426,  429;  Sanders  v.  Soutter,  126 
N.  Y.  193,  200. 

2  Ross   v.  Julian,   70  Mo.   209,   212  ; 


West  v.  Thornburgh,  6  Blackf.  542,  544, 
or  set  aside  a  deed :  Estate  of  Dunn,  Myr. 
122   123. 

8  Butler  v.  Lawson,  72  Mo.  227,  245  ; 
Wombles  v.  Young,  62  Mo.  App.  115. 

*  Davis  v.  Smith,  75  Mo.  219,  227; 
Willard's  Appeal,  65  Pa.  St.  265,  267; 
Wiley's  Appeal,  84  Pa.  St.  270;  Stilwell 
v.  Carpenter,  59  N.  Y.  414,  425 ;  Presby- 
terian Church  v.  McElhinney,  61  Mo.  540, 
543;  Gilliland  v.  Sellers,  2  Oh.  St.  223, 
228;  Caldwell  v.  Caldwell,  45  Oh.  St.  512, 
521 ;  McCaulley  v.  McCaulley,  7  Houst. 
102;  Vail's  Appeal,  37  Conn.  185,  195; 
Mann  v.  Mann,  53  Vt.  48,  55 ;  Leonard  v. 
Leonard,  67  Vt.  318  ;  Hewitt's  Appeal,  53 
Conn.  24  ;  Sherman  v.  Lanier,  39  N.  J.  Eq. 
249,  258.     See  post,  §  392. 

5  Wells  v.  Smith,  44  Miss.  296,  304; 
Sharp  v.  Sharp,  76  Ala.  312,  317. 

6  "  By  which,  however,  justice  is  ob- 
tained more  conveniently  and  as  cer- 
tainly as  in  courts  of  equity,  purely  so 
called  "  :  Brinker  v.  Brinker,  supra  ;  Sim- 
mons v.  Henderson,  Freem.  Ch.  493,  497  ; 
Satterwhite  v.  Littlefield,  13  Sm.  &  M. 
302,  307. 

7  It  is  held  that  there  can  be  no  trial 
by  jury  in  the  absence  of  a  statutory  pro- 
vision to  that  effect  Bradley  v.  Woerner, 
46  Mo.  App.  371  ;  Martin  v.  Martin,  74  111. 
App.  215,219.  See  also  Duffieldy.Walden, 
102  Iowa,  676,  679  (holding  that  a  jury 
trial  in  probate  proceeding  is  not  a  mat- 
ter of  right). 

363 


*  341,  *  342   NATURE  OP  PROBATE  COURTS  IN  AMERICA.      §  149 

the  power,  inherent  in  courts  proceeding  according  to 
instruct"  jury  tne  principles  of  the  common  law,  to  instruct  the  jury 
or  set  aside  a      and  to  direct  or  set  aside  a  verdict  and  grant  a  new 

trial,  does  not  exist  in  probate  courts  unless  affirmatively 

granted  by  statute.1 

But  the  origin  of  our  probate  system,  referable  to  the  English 

spiritual  courts,  is  still  recognizable  in  the  decisions  of  some  States 

Procedure  as  to  their  mode  of  procedure,  although  the  rules  of  the 

traceable  to        civil  and  common  law  which  governed  the  ecclesiastical 

civil  and  canon  i  ■■•« 

law.  courts  are  necessarily  greatly  modified  in  the  adaptation 

to  the  widely  different  circumstances  and  spirit  of  the  American  peo- 
ple. So  it  has  been  held  in  Maine,  that  the  probate  court  "  does  not 
derive  its  mode  of  proceeding  from  the  common  law,  but  the  statute 
has  conferred  upon  it  the  powers  of  ecclesiastical  courts,  and  pre- 
scribed the  modes  of  proceeding  borrowed  from  these  courts  and  the 
courts  of  chancery."  2  In  New  Jersey  they  are  said  to  partake  of  the 
powers  of  a  chancery  and  prerogative  court  instituted  by  law ; 8  in 
Mississippi4  and  Georgia,6  the  civil  and  canon  law,  as  it  governed 
the  proceedings  of  the  ecclesiastical  courts  of  England  in  testamen- 
tary causes,  is  the  law  of  the  courts  of  ordinary  on  similar  questions ; 
and  in  South  Carolina  their  statutory  organization  is  said  to  consti- 
tute them  civil,  in  contradistinction  to  ecclesiastical  courts.6  In 
Powers  not        New  Hampshire  courts  of  probate  "  have  a  very  exten- 

exclusiveiy  s^ve  -jurisdiction  not  conferred  by  statute,  but  by  a  gen- 
referable  to  J  n     1       1        -i      i  .  l 

statutes.  eral  reference  to  the  law  of  the  land,  that  is,  to  that 

branch  of  the  common  law  known  and  acted  upon  for  ages, 

*  the  probate  or  ecclesiastical  law." 7     And  in  California  the  [*  342] 
superior  court  is  by  the  constitution  invested  with  jurisdic- 
tion over  probate  matters  as  a  part  of  its  general  jurisdiction,  the 
same  as  its  common-law  and  equity  powers,  and  is  not  therefore  a 
statutory  tribunal,  although  controlled  in  the  mode  of  its  action  by 

.        the  code.8 
dence  same  as         But  the  rules  of  evidence  and  of  property  are  equally 
in  other  courts,    binding  upon  probate  and  common-law  courts.9 

1  "Asa  general  thing,"  says  Bliss,  J.,  4  Cowden  v.  Dobyns,  5  Sm.  &  M.  82, 90. 

in  Bartling  i>.  Jamison,  44  Mo.  141,  144,  6  Finch  v.  Finch,  14  Ga.  362. 

"the  probate  and  county  courts  are  com-  6  Lide  v.  Lide,  2  Brev.  403. 

posed  (jf  men  unlearned  in  the  law  and  7  Per  Bell,  C.  J.,  in  Morgan  v.  Dodge, 

incompetent  to  pass  upon  the  various  con-  44  N.  H.  255,  258;  see  remarks  of  Perley, 

siderations   laid   down    in    the   books  as  C.  J.,  in  Hayes  v.  Hayes,  48  N.  H.  219, 

grounds    fur    a   new   trial."      He   (motes  226. 

from  :in  old  N'f-w  fork  <"isc  the  opinion  8  Burris  v.  Kennedy,  108  Cal.  331,  337  ; 

of  Justice  Kent,  emphatically  holding  that  Heydenfeldt  v.  Super.  Ct.,  117  Cal.  348. 

inferior  courts  "are  QOt  intrusted  by  the  9  Eveleth  v.  Crouch,  15  Mass.  307.    As 

law  with  the  power  <>f  setting  aside  ver-  to  the  right  of  parties  to  testify  in  their 

diets  of  juries  upon   the   merits."  own   behalf,  see  post,  §  398,  pp.  *829  et 

a  Wit  hf-e  v.  Howe,  49  Me.  571,  580.  aeq.  ;  and  as  to  evidence  in  proving  claims 

8  Wood  v.  Tallman,  1  N.  J.  L.  158,  155.  in  probate  courts,  ace  post,  §  396. 
364 


§  149 


METHOD  OF  PROCEDURE  IN  PROBATE  COURTS. 


342 


It  is  self-evident  that  the  jurisdiction  conferred  upon  a  court,  as 
such,  can    be   exercised   only   by   the   court   when   sitting   in   term 
time,  and  not  by  the  judge  in  vacation.     Hence  a  judg-   Court  only 
ment  rendered  by  the  judge  after  the  adjournment  of   when  in  term; 

.       .  ,  .       judge  in  vaca- 

the  term  is    coram  non  judice,    and   void.1     And  so   is  tion  has  not 
a  judgment   rendered   against   a  party  without  notice  ^  couTu  °f 
to   him.2     Mere   verbal    orders,    or   ex   parte  proceed- 
ings not  of  record,  are  not  valid,  and  therefore  afford  wuhgout  "notice, 

no    protection    to    an    administrator    in   a   subsequent   verbal  orders, 

j.        o  etc.,  void. 

proceeding.8  ' 

Probate  courts,  however,  have  the  incidental  power  to  adjourn ; 4 
and   when,  for  unavoidable  reasons,   the    court   cannot   be   held  at 
the  county  seat,   its  proceedings  are  not   void  if  held    Have  power 
elsewhere ; 6  and  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  house  in    t0  adjourn, 
which  the  court  is  held  is  the  court-house.6 

The  method  and  procedure  in  proving  claims  against  the  estates  of 
deceased  persons  in  probate  courts  is  a  subject  elsewhere  treated.7 


1  But  semble  such  a  judgment  may  be 
declared  void,  and  the  cause  proceeded 
with  from  the  last  previous  continuance  : 
Moore  v.  Maguire,  26  Ala.  461,  464 ;  the 
judge  has  no  power  to  hold  a  court  at 
any  other  time  or  place  than  those  fixed 
by  law,  and  any  decree  passed  in  such 
case  will  be  void:  White  v.  Riggs,  27 
Me.  114,  117;  a  court  of  probate  cannot 
in  vacation  compel  an  administrator  to 
appear  before  it  and  give  additional  secur- 
ity upon  the  bond :  Wiugate  v.  Wallis,  5 
Sm.  &  M.  249,  253  ;  nor  allow  a  claim  : 
Dingle  v.  Pollock,  49  Mo.  App.  479 ;  nor 
remove  an  administrator  at  a  special  term 
to  which  the  cause  was  not  adjourned  : 
Boynton  v.  Nelson,  46  Ala.  501,  509.  But 
it  was  held  that  during  term  time  the 
court  may  adjouru  for  the  day,  and  then 
reconvene  court ;  and  the  appointment  of 


an  administrator  then  made  will  not  be 
vitiated  on  that  account :  Bowen  v.  Stew- 
art, 128  Ind.  507. 

2  Wood  v.  Myrick,  16  Minn.  494,  502 ; 
Wells  v.  Smith,  44  Miss.  296,  302  ;  Gard- 
ner v.  Gardner,  42  Ala.  161. 

8  Scott  v.  Fox,  14  Md.  388,  394,  citing- 
Carlysle  v.  Carlysle,  10  Md.  440  ;  Shine  v. 
Redwine,  30  Ga.  780,  794.  Writing  the 
word  "  vacated  "  across  the  order  of  ad- 
journment has  been  held  a  sufficient 
method  of  setting  aside  the  order  •.  Cole 
Co.  v.  Dallmeyer,  101  Mo.  57,  66. 

4  Kimball  v.  Fisk,  39  N.  H.  110,  122. 

8  Sevier  v.  Teal,  16  Tex.  371,  373. 
But  it  must  be  iu  the  county :  Capper  v. 
Sibley,  65  Iowa,  754. 

6  Shull  v.  Kennon,  12  Ind.  34,  36  j 
Kimball  v.  Fisk,  supra. 

7  Post,  §§  386-412. 


365 


*  343,  *  344  SUBJECT-MATTER   OF  JURISDICTION.  §  150 


*  CHAPTER   XVI.  [*  343] 

OF    THE     SUBJECT-MATTER     WITHIN    THE    JURISDICTION     OF    PROBATE 

COURTS. 

§  150.  Scope  of  the  Jurisdiction.  —  Logically,  the  jurisdiction  of 
probate  courts  should  extend  to  all  matters  necessarily  involved  in 
Princi  le  of  *ne  disposition  of  the  estates  of  deceased  persons,  from 
jurisdiction  of  the  time  of  the  owner's  death  until  the  property  has 
pro  ate  courts.  ^een  piaced  in  the  possession  of  those  to  whom  it  de- 
volves. We  have  seen  that  the  English  testamentary  courts  never 
possessed  more  than  a  comparatively  small  proportion  of  this  power ; x 
and  it  is  equally  true  that  in  no  one  of  the  American  States  is  the 
whole  of  it  vested  in  probate  courts.  Some  of  the  elements  of  power 
necessary  to  the  practical  realization  of  the  rights  of  creditors,  heirs, 
legatees,  distributees,  devisees,  and  of  the  husband,  widow,  and  minor 
children,  are  found  wanting  in  the  statutory  grant  of  powers  to  these 
courts  in  each  State,  which  therefore  necessarily  lodge  in  other 
courts.2  But  the  powers  so  withheld  are  not  the  same  in  all  the 
States ;  those  denied  in  some  are  granted  in  others ;  so  that,  while 
no  one  probate  court  possesses  them  all,  yet  the  full  scope  of  jurisdic- 
tion strictly  subsumable  under  the  principle  which  conditions  this 
class  of  courts  will  be  found  in  the  aggregate  of  powers  conferred 
upon  them  in  the  several  States.8 

It   would  involve   unprofitable  labor  to  enumerate  in  this   place 

the   powers    directly    conferred    by   statute,  which  may  be   readily 

found   in    the    enactments    of    the    several    States    conferring   the 

powers.     But   it    should    be    mentioned   that   as   to   the    incidental 

To  what  extent    powers  there  is  considerable  divergence  in  the  different 

incidental  pow-    states,    resulting   from   the    different    views   taken   by 

ersaregranted       ,  °,  ,.....,  J 

the  courts  upon  the  extent  to  which  implied  powers  are 

involved  in  the  powers  granted.      The   State  of   New  York  (under 
the  Rev.    St.,  1830,  before   the   amendment   of   1837*),   in 
*  which  rill  powers  of  the  surrogates  were  limited  to  such  as  [*344] 
were    expressly    conferred    by   statute,    and   that   of    Penn- 
sylvania, in   which  very  extensive  powers  are  held  to  reside  in  the 
Orphan's  Court  by  necessary  implication,  may  be  looked  upon  as 

1  Ante,  §  130.  »  3  South.  L.  Rev.  (n.  r.)  264. 

2  Bull   v.   LindHcy,  44  Cal.   121,  125;  *  See  ante,  §  142,  p.  *  323,  note. 
ante,  §  142. 

866 


§  151        LIMITED  TO  DEVOLUTION  OF  PROPERTY.    *  344,  *  345 

marking  the  two  extremes  in  this  respect,  the  other  States  taking 
intermediate  grounds.  It  is  said,  in  Pennsylvania,  that  the  Orphan's 
Court  alone  has  authority  to  ascertain  the  amount  of  a  decedent's 
property,  and  order  its  distribution  among  those  entitled  to  it;1 
that  among  those  entitled  to  distribution  are  included  creditors,  next 
of  kin,  legatees,  and  other  ])ersons  interested  in  the  estate ; 2  that 
"  within  its  appointed  orbit  "  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Orphan's  Court 
"is  exclusive,  and  therefore  necessarily  as  coextensive  as  the  demands 
of  justice,"  8  having  ample  power  to  inquire  into  all  questions  stand- 
ing directly  in  the  way  of  a  distribution  to  the  parties  in  interest ; 4 
and  upon  the  principles  of  equity  may  dispose  of  every  question  that 
arises  in  the  determination  of  matters  within  its  jurisdiction.5 

§  151.    Jurisdiction  as  limited    to  the  Devolution  of    Property  on 
the  Owner's  Death.  —  Since  the  functions  of  probate  courts  are  lim- 
ited, in  respect  of  executors  and  administrators,  to  the 
control  of  the  devolution  of  property  upon  the  death  of    Hmited^prop- 
its  owner,  it  is  not  their  province  to  adjudicate  upon    erty  questions 

ii    i         i  .•  mi  •    i  i  ,m         pi        i  i  arising  out  of 

collateral  questions.     1  he  right  or  title  of  the  decedent   its  devolution 
to  property  claimed   by  the  executor  or  administrator    on  its  owner's 
against  third  persons,  or  by  third  persons  against  him, 
as  well  as  claims  of  third  persons  against  creditors,  heirs,  legatees, 
devisees,  or  distributees,  must,  if  an  adjudication  become  necessary, 
be  tried  in  courts  of  general  jurisdiction,  unless  such 

.    -,.    ,.         ,  ,  £  j  uj.  Lfi    Unless  further 

jurisdiction  be  expressly  conferred  on  probate  courts.6    powers  are 
It    follows    from    this    principle,   that    probate    granted  by 
[*  345]  *  courts  have  no  power  to  investigate  the  validity 

of  an  assignment  of  the  interest  of  an  heir  or  legatee ;  the 
decree  of  distribution  or  payment  should  be  to  the   legal  successor 
of  the  property,  leaving  questions  of  disputed  rights  be-   N  .    .  ,.   . 
tween  these  and  claimants  against  them  to  be  adjudi-   to  try  disputed 
cated  in  the  ordinary  courts.7     And  this  is  so  of  the    asslgnments- 

1  Per  Black,  C.  J.,  in  "Whiteside  v.  s  Miskimins' Appeal,  114  Pa.  St.  530, 
Whiteside,  20  Pa.  St.  473,  474.  533. 

2  Per  Lewis,  J.,  in  Kittera's  Estate,  17  6  Stuart's  Estate,  67  Mo.  App.  61,  64; 
Pa.  St.  416,  422  et  seq. ;  Black  v.  Black,  34  Hoehn  v.  Struttman,  71  Mo.  App.  399, 
Pa.  St.  354, 356 ;  Ashford  v.  Ewing,  25  Pa.  405  ;  Theller  v.  Such,  57  Cal.  447,  459  ;  In 
St.  213,  215;  Linsenbigler  v.  Gourley,  56  re  Haas,  97  Cal.  232;  Shumway  ;;.  Cooper, 
Pa.  St.  166,  172  ;  Watts'  Estate,  158  Pa.  St.  16  Barb.  556,  559  ;  Larue  v.  Van  Horn,  25 
1  (two  of  the  judges  dissenting  on  the  ex-  La.  An.  445;  Homer's  Appeal,  35  Conn, 
traordinary  powers  assumed  to  exist  in  the  113, 114  ;  Dunn's  Estate,  Myr.  122  ;  Gor- 
Orphan's  Court  in  this  case).  don  v.  Goule',  30  La.  An.  138 ;  Proctor  v. 

8  Shollenberger's   Appeal,   21    Pa.   St.  Atkyns,  1  Mass.  321  ;    Robinson's  Estate, 

337,  341  ;   Ashford  v.  Ewing,  supra,  citing  12  Phila.  170;  Edwards  v.  Mounts,  61  Tex. 

Downer  v.  Downer,  9  Watts,  60,  and  other  398;    Wise   v.   O'Malley,   60   Tex.    588; 

Pennsylvania  cases.  Mousseau   v.   Mousseau,    40    Minn.   236, 

*  Dundas' Appeal,  73  Pa.  St.  474,  479 ;  239;   Walker's  Will,  136  N.  Y.  20,  28; 

Williamson's  Appeal,  94  Pa.  St.  231,  236  ;  Daugherty  v.  Daugherty,  82  Md.  229. 
Lex's  Appeal,  97  Pa.  St.  289,  292.  7  Johnson  v.  Jones,  47  Mo.  App.  237, 

367 


*  345,  *  346  SUBJECT-MATTER    OP    JURISDICTION. 


§151 


But  may 

decree  distribu- 
tion or  pay- 
ment to  an 
assignee  with 
the  assignor's 
consent. 


assignments  of  creditors,1  of  legatees,2  of  distributees,8  of  parties 
entitled  to  partition,4  of  the  assignment  by  a  widow  of  her 
interest  in  the  estate,6  and  of  a  legacy  charged  upon  another 
legacy.6  But  it  must  not  be  inferred  from  this  that  the  probate 
court  has  no  authority  to  decree  payment  to  an  as- 
signee whose  right  is  not  disputed,7  or  where  the  dis- 
tributee is  estopped  by  a  release  ; 8  for  the  decree  in 
favor  of  an  assignee,  assented  to  by  the  assignor,  is  of 
the  same  effect  as  a  decree  in  favor  of  the  assignor.9 
And  such  power  may  be  conferred  upon  the  probate 
court  by  statute.10  So,  too,  an  executor  or  administrator,  who  wrong- 
fully collects  rents  from  real  estate  of  which  the  title  and  right  of 
No  power  over  possession  is  in  the  heirs  or  devisees,  is  not  accountable 
property  for  such  rents  to  the  probate  court,  because  he  does  not 

takeif  by  the  hold  the  rents  so  collected  as  a  representative  of  the 
administrator,  estate,  but  as  one  who  has  trespassed  upon  the  rights  of 
others,  who  may  call  him  to  account  in  a  court  of  ordinary 
jurisdiction.11  And  the  same  is  *  true  of  personal  property  [*  346] 
seized  or  claimed  by  the  executor  or  administrator  as  a  part 
Nor  over  ques-  of  the  estate,  and  claimed  by  others.12  Where  the  stat- 
^^mount'to  u^e  con^ers  exclusive  jurisdiction  upon  courts  of  probate 
that  of  the  to  obtain  and  regulate  the  partition  of  successions,18  the 

decedent. 


241 ;  Wood  v.  Stone,  39  N.  H.  572  ;  Hill  v. 
Hardy,  34  Miss.  289,  291 ;  Decker  v.  Mor- 
ton, 1  Redf.  477, 484 ;  Portevant  v.  Neylans, 
38  Miss.  104  ;  Knowlton  v.  Johnson,  46  Me. 
489;  Holcomb  v.  Sherwood,  29  Conn.  418; 
Harrington  v.  La  Rocque,  13  Or.  344 ;  Farn- 
ham  v.  Thompson,  34  Minn.  330,  336; 
Hewitt's  Appeal,  53  Conn.  24;  Matter  of 
Randall,  152  N.  Y.508  (holding that  incase 
of  dispute  the  court  could  order  payment  to 
neither  party  until  adjudicated  in  a  court 
of  equity) ;  Cheever  v.  Ching,  82  Cal.  68. 

1  Post,  §  412,  p.  *867. 

2  Post,  §  461,  p.  *1015. 
8  Post,  §  563,  p.  *1235. 
*  Post,  §  567,  p.  *1245. 

6  Woodruff  v.  Woodruff,  3  Dem.  505, 
508;  as  in  case  of  dower:  Hewitt's  Appeal, 
53  Conn.  24,  37.  And  so  of  the  release  or 
ii iiif-nt  of  the  widow's  statutory  pro- 
vision or  year's  support :  Cauley  v.  Truitt, 
63  Mo.  App.  356. 

6  Ditsche'e  Estate,  18  Phila.  288;  Brit- 
tin  v.  Phillips,  1  Dem.  57,  60.  See  post, 
§  155,  p.  *.'ir>2.  In  Pennsylvania, however, 
the  Orphan's Courl  has  exclnsive  jurisdic- 
tion in  oases  of  legacies  charged  on  real 
estate:  Brotzman's  Appeal,  119  I'a.  St. 
868 


645,  655.  And  see  further  on  this  and 
other  questions  relating  to  the  charging  of 
legacies  on  real  estate  and  the  manner  and 
forum  of  enforcing  them,  post,  §  491, 
p.  *1099. 

7  If  an  assignee  of  a  legatee  submit  his 
claim  to  the  decision  of  the  probate  court, 
such  decision,  if  not  appealed  from,  i3 
binding :  Otterson  v.  Gallagher,  88  Pa.  St. 
355,  358. 

8  Tillson  v.  Small,  80  Me.  90. 

9  Ordinary  v.  Matthews,  7  Rich.  L.  26, 
30;  Vanhorn  v.  Walker,  27  Mo.  App.  78. 
As  to  the  rights  of  assignees,  see  post, 
§  563,  and  authorities. 

10  See  Re  Phillips,  71  Cal.  285,  where  it 
is  assumed  that  the  power  is  vested  in  the 
court  having  probate  jurisdiction  ;  and  In 
re  Burton,  93  Cal.  459. 

11  Calyer  v.  Calyer,  4  Redf.  305.  See 
post,  §  513. 

12  Marston  v.  Paulding,  10  Pai.  40; 
Merrick's  Estate,  8  Watts  &  S.  402; 
Wadsworth  v.  Chick,  55  Tex.  241  ;  Calyer 
v.  Calyer,  supra. 

18  The  subject  of  partition  of  real  estate 
in  probate  courts  is  discussed  hereafter, 
§  567,  p.  *1243. 


§  151  LIMITED    TO    DEVOLUTION    OP   PROPERTY.  *  346 

grant  of  power  is  held  to  apply  only  to  cases  "  where  the  thing  to  be 
partitioned  is  one  entire  succession  and  the  parties  hold  by  the  same 
title  as  heirs ;  "  l  if,  therefore,  the  property  to  be  divided  be  owned  in 
part  by  heirs,  and  in  part  by  a  distinct  and  independent  title,  the  pro- 
bate court  is  without  jurisdiction.2  So  the  probate  court  N  . 
has  no  jurisdiction  of  questions  between  trustee  and  bene-  testamentary 
ficiary,  or  to  compel  an  accounting  between  a  testamen-  ^tuiluetrus?. 
tary  trustee  and  the  cestui  que  trust ;  8  but  power  in  the 
executor  to  sell  land,  and  to  dispose  of  the  property  of  the  estate  as 
to  the  executor  shall  seem  best,  "  and  without  responsibility,"  does 
not  create  a  trust  in  the  sense  of  depriving  the  probate  court  of  its 
jurisdiction  to  compel  the  executor  to  account  for  waste  of  such 
estate.4  The  jurisdiction  of  the  probate  court  ceases,  when  an  ex- 
ecutor, who  is  also  trustee,  has  made  his  final  settlement ;  a  court  of 
equity  alone  can  enforce  the  testamentary  trusts  ; 5  but  until  distribu- 
tion he  holds  as  executor,  and  not  as  trustee,  and  equity  has  no  juris- 
diction.6 So  if  a  testamentary  trustee  is  required  by  the  statute  to 
account  periodically  to  the  probate  court,  it  has  jurisdiction  to  deter- 
mine whether  the  trustee  has  accounted  in  full  to  the  beneficiaries 
for  the  whole  of  the  income  of  the  trust  fund.7  The  statute  of  Ver- 
mont is  held  to  give  to  the  probate  court  "  general  equity  powers  " 
in  regard  to  trusts  and  trust  funds  that  arise  in  the  settlement  of 
estates  ; 8  but  the  court  further  holds  that  the  probate  court  has 
not  general  equity  jurisdiction,  and  being  of  limited  jurisdiction  in 
this  respect  must  proceed  in  accordance  with  the  statute  conferring 
jurisdiction.9  In  like  manner,  where  the  statute  confers  power  on 
the  probate  court  to  order  payment  of  claims  against  the  estate  which 

1  Henry  v.  Keays,   12   La.  214,   219;     clare  a  trust  and  enforce  it  by  decree: 
Buddecke  v.  Buddecke,  31  La.  An.  572,     Matter  of  Monroe,  142  N.  Y.  484. 

574  ;   State  v.  Parker,  9  N.  J.  L.  242,  243  ;  *  Auguisola  v.  Arnaz,  51  Cal.  435,  438. 

McBride's  Appeal,  72  Pa.  St.  480,  484.  So  where  a  trust  is  imposed  upon  the  ex- 

2  Buddecke  v.  Buddecke,  supra  ;  Rich-  ecutrix  as  such,  the  Orphan's  Court  has 
ardson  v.  Loupe,  80  Cal.  490;  Buckley  v.  sole  jurisdiction  of  such  trust:  Erie  Sav- 
Superior  Court,  102  Cal.  6.  But  aliter  if  ings  Co.  v.  Vincent,  105  Pa.  St.  315,  322. 
the  statute  determines  the  question  of  And  see  Harland  v.  Person,  93  Ala.  273. 
jurisdiction:  Brown's  Appeal,  84  Pa.  St.  6  Blumenthal  v.  Moitz,  76  Md.  564; 
457,  458.  McLane  v.  Cropper,  5  Disc.  Col.  App.  276  ; 

8  Poole  v.  Brown,  12  S.  C.  556,  558 ;  as  to  jurisdiction  of  the   surrogate   over 

Haverstick   v.  Trudel,  51   Cal.  431,  433;  testamentary  trusts  in  New  York,  see  Mat- 

Billingsly  ;,-.  Harris,  17  Ala.  214 ;  McBride  ter  of  Hawley,  104  N.  Y.  250,  262  et  seq. ; 

v.  Mclutyre,  91  Mich.  406  ;  Smith  v.  Smith,  Rudd  v.  Rudd,  4  Dem.  335. 

15  Wash.  239  ;    Strong  v.  Strong,  8  Conn.  6  Dougherty  v.  Bartlett,  100  Cal.  496 ; 

408   (the  statute   requiring  the   appoint-  Creamer  v.  Holbrook,  99  Ala.  52  ;  Foss  v. 

ment  of  distributors  in  this  State) ;  Jasper  Sowles,  62  Vt.  221. 

v.  Jasper,  17  Oreg.  590  (Strahan,  J.,  dis-  T  New  England  Trust  Co.  v.  Eaton,  140 

senting  from  this  view  on  the  ground  that  Mass.  532. 

under  the  statute  the  jurisdiction  of  the  8  Foss  v.  Sowles,  62  Vt.  221,  224,  citing 

county  court  was  coextensive  with  the  trust  §§  2284-2300  R.  L. 

imposed) ;  the  probate  court  cannot  de-  9  Foss  v.  Sowles,  supra. 

VOT..    i.  —  24  369 


*  346,  *  347  SUBJECT-MATTER   OF   JURISDICTION.  §  152 

are  not  disputed  by  the  administrator,  there  is  no  power  to  order  the 
payment  of  disputed  claims 1  or  legacies,2  nor  of  claims  acquired 
by  subrogation.8  So  as  to  homesteads  of  widows,  if  their  right  is 
disputed.4  And  jurisdiction  "  in  all  matters  relating  to  the 
allotment  of  dower"  *  does  not  confer  jurisdiction  over  a  [*  347] 
stranger  claiming  adversely  to  the  husband  under  an  execu- 
tion sale  ; 5  nor  does  the  power  conferred  upon  probate  courts  to  sub- 
poena and  examine  parties  alleged  to  conceal  or  withhold  property 
of  the  estate  authorize  such  courts  to  try  the  title  to  the  property  in 
dispute.6  In  South  Carolina,  where  the  constitution  confers  jurisdic- 
tion upon  probate  courts,  and  the  power  to  partition  real  estate  is 
not  expressly  conferred,  it  was  held  that  an  act  of  the  legislature 
conferring  the  power  is  unconstitutional,  and  the  want  of  jurisdic- 
tion to  decree  partition  in  a  probate  court  may  be  insisted  on  in  the 
appellate  court,  or  declared  by  the  court  itself,  although  neither  side 
raised  the  point  in  either  court.7  So  the  power  to  try  civil  and  crim- 
inal cases  conferred  upon  the  probate  court  by  a  territorial  legisla- 
ture has  been  held  inconsistent  with  the  act  of  Congress  under  which 
the  Territory  is  organized,  and  which  conferred  upon  the  supreme 
and  district  courts  general  jurisdiction  at  common  law  and  in  chan- 
cery ; 8  and  where  the  jurisdiction  of  district  courts  "  extends  over 
all  civil  causes  where  the  amount  in  dispute  exceeds  fifty  dollars," 
the  probate  court  was  held  to  be  without  jurisdiction  to  try  charges 
of  maladministration  aud  spoliation  against  the  administrator.9 

§  152.  Liabilities  arising  from  the  Administration.  —  Upon  the 
same  principle,  probate  courts  have  no  jurisdiction  to  decree  pay- 
XT  .    ...  ..       ment  to  persons  employed  by  the  executor  or  adminis- 

No  jurisdiction  r  r     j  j  _ 

of  demands        trator  to  render  services  for  him,  or  for  the  estate,  in  its 

hftearisi,l,goeut    administration.10     Although  it  maybe  the  duty  of  the 

of  the  adminis-    court,   in  passing  upon   the    administration  account,   to 

determine  the  reasonableness  of  payments  for  such  ser- 

1  Magee  v.  Vedder,  6  Barb.  352,  354.  v.  Gilmore,  13  Mo.  App.  155,  158;  Gard- 

2  Matter  of  Hedding  Church,  35  Huu,  ner  v.  Gillihan,  20  Oreg.  598.  See  addi- 
313.  tional   authorities    cited,  post,  §  325,    p. 

3  Lcviness  v.  Cassebeer,  3  Hedf.  491,  *681. 

498;  Burton's  Estate,  64  Cal.  428.  7  Davenport  v.  Caldwell,  10  S.  C.  317, 

4  La/ell  v.  Lazcll,  8  Allen,  575,  577  ;  347 ;  as  to  the  jurisdiction  of  probate 
Woodward  v.  Lincoln,  9  Allen,  239.  And  courts  in  partition,  see  post,  §  5G7,  p. 
S'f  cases  cited  ante,  §  104,  p.  *21C.  *  1243. 

B  Jiggittsw.  Bennett,  31  Miss.  610, 612,  8  Ferris  v.  Iligley,  20  Wall.  375,  379. 

citing  former  Mississippi  cases,  Fisher,  J.,  See  cases  cited  in  Webster  v.  Seattle  Co., 

dissenting  on  the  ground  that  the  term  7  Wash.  G42,  as  holding  that  territorial 

"  allotment  "of  dower  necessarily  includes  legislatures  cannot  confer  general  law  and 

all  cases  iii  which  an  allotment  of  dower  is  equity  powers  on  probate  courts. 

claimed:  j*.  614.  '■'  Fournique  v.  Perkins,  7  How.  (U.  S.) 

«  Dinsmore  v.  Brawler,  if>4   111.  211,  160. 

221  ;  Sammerfield  v.  Howie,  2  Redf.  149  ;  10  See  post,  §  35G,  and  numerous  cases 

Gibson  V,  Cook,  62  Md.  256,  261  ;  Smith  cited. 
370 


§153        JURISDICTION   OF   CLAIMS   AGAINST   DECEASED.      *  347,  *  348 


vices,  and  allow  or  reject  the  credits  taken  therefor,  it  has  not  the 
power,  unless  expressly  granted  by  statute,  to  adjudicate  upon  the 
claims  of  such  persons  against  the  administrator ;  their  remedy,  if 
he  refuse  to  pay,  is  in  another  court.1     Thus,  while  the  court  may 

make  an   allowance  to  an  administrator  who  performs  ser- 
[*  348]   vices  *  for  the  estate,  as  an  attorney  at  law,  not  within  the 

scope  of  his  duties  as  administrator,2  in  States  where  the 
statute  provides  for  extra  compensation  aside  from  the  regular  com- 
missions,3 or  allow  him  credit  for  counsel  fees  properly  paid,4  it  has 
no  jurisdiction  to  order  the  payment  of  counsel  fees  by  Nor  of  debts 
the  administrator.5  Debts  created  after  the  death  of  the 
intestate  or  testator  cannot  be  proved  in  the  probate 
court;6  nor  can  the  probate  court  adjust  the  rights  or 
equities  arising  out  of  the  sale  of  real  estate,  or  out  of 
the  vacation  of  the  sale,  between  the  purchaser  and  ad- 
ministrator ; 7  nor  between  co-administrators  as  to  the 
commissions  allowed  them  in  gross,  unless  the  power  is 
conferred  by  statute ; 8  nor  determine  the  validity  of  a  purchase  by  an  ad- 
ministrator in  his  own  name  for  the  benefit  of  creditors.9  Neither  has 
it  power  to  try  a  claim  against  an  executor  for  damages  arising  out  of 
his  acts  as  such ; 10  nor  to  declare  a  lien  in  favor  of  the  administrator 
on  account  of  money  expended  by  him  for  the  benefit  of  the  estate.11 
§  153.  Adjudication  of  Claims  against  the  Deceased.  —  The  power 
to  adjudicate  upon  claims  against  deceased  persons  is  in  most  States 
conferred  upon  the  courts  having  control  over  the  admin-  No  power  to 
istration  of  their  estates,  either  exclusively,  or  concur- 
rently with  other  courts  ; 12  but  unless  such  power  is 
expressly  granted,  the  probate  courts  cannot  exercise  it. 
Thus    it   is   held    in   Maryland   that    authority   in   the 


created  after 

decedent's 

death. 

Nor  to  adjust 
the  rights  of 
purchasers  of 
real  estate  sold 
during  the 
adminis- 
tration. 


adjudicate  on 
claims  against 
the  deceased 
unless  con- 
ferred by 
statute. 


1  Pike  v.  Thomas,  62  Ark.  223,  228. 
See  authorities  cited,  §  356. 

2  Bates  v.  Vary,  40  Ala.  421,  441  ;  or 
order  counsel  fees  to  be  paid  where  the 
statute  authorizes  the  court  to  direct  the 
payment  of  expenses  of  administration  : 
Stokes  v.  Dale,  1  Dem.  260. 

3  On  which  point,  see  post,  §  529.  Or- 
dinarily the  administrator  will  not  be  per- 
mitted credit  for  legal  services  performed 
by  himself  in  person,  though  for  the  benefit 
of  the  estate :  post,  §  515,  p.  *  1 146. 

4  Pearson  v.  Darrington,  32  Ala.  227, 
273.  See  post,  §  515  et  seq.,  as  to  what 
counsel  fees  will  be  allowed. 

6  Wright  v.  Wilkerson,  41  Ala.  267  ; 
273  ;  Townshend  v.  Brooke,  9  Gill,  90 ; 
Hoes  v.  Halsey,  2  Dem.  577,  579;  Barker 
v.  Kunkel,  10  111.  App.  407,  411  ;  In  re 
Levinson,   108    Cal.   450,  458;    and  see 


Henry  v.  Superior  Court,  93  Cal.  569,  and 
cases  under  §  356,  pro  and  con. 

6  Presbyterian  Church  v.  McElhinney, 
61  Mo.  540, 542 ;  Estateof  Robinson,  12  Phil. 
170 ;  Daingerfield  v.  Smith,  83  Va.  81,  92 ; 
Winston  v.  Young,  52  Minn.  1 ,  5.  See  post, 
§  356,  where  the  subject  is  fully  discussed. 

7  Eichelberger  v.  Hawthorne,  33  Md. 
588,  596  ;  Young  v.  Shumate,  3  Sneed, 
369,  371  ;  Bond  v.  Clay,  2  Head,  379 ; 
Wolfe  v.  Lynch,  2  Dem.  610,  616.  But 
see  post,  §  1 54,  wiiere  cases  are  cited  show- 
ing the  exercise  of  such  authority. 

8  See  cases,  post,  §  530,  p.  *  1170,  and 
§  524,  p.  *1162. 

9  Peters  v.  Carr,  2  Dem.  22,  29. 

10  Winton's  Appeal,  111  Pa.  St. 387, 394. 

11  Huston  v.  Becker,  15  Wash.  586. 

12  See  post,  §  391 ;  and  as  to  the  effect 
of  such  allowance,  see  §  392. 

.""1 


*  348,  *  349  SUBJECT-MATTER  OP   JURISDICTION.  §  154 

Orphan's  Court  to  pass  such  claims,  and  authorize  and  approve  their 
payment,  does  not  include  the  power  to  ascertain  their  validity  and 
amount; 1  hence  the  Orphan's  Court  has  no  power,  against  the  pro- 
testation of  the  administrator,  to  decree  the  payment  of  any  claim 
until  a  court  of  law  shall  have  definitively  pronounced  on  its  validity.2 
And  in  New  York  the  delegation  of  authority  to  surrogates 
to  decree  distribution  to  claimants  "  according  *  to  their  [*  349] 
respective  rights,"  and  "  to  settle  and  determine  all  questions 
concerning  any  debt,  claim,  legacy,  bequest,  or  distributive  share," 
is  held  to  give  them  no  power  to  ascertain  what  such  rights  were, 
and  that  they  are  utterly  without  jurisdiction  either  to  allow  or 
reject  any  claim  whose  validity,  not  having  been  established  in  some 
competent  tribunal,  is  disputed  by  the  executor  or  administrator.8 
Nor  has  the  surrogate  jurisdiction  to  determine  whether  there  has 
been  an  accord  and  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  disputed  by  the  admin- 
istrator, or  whether  the  estate  is  entitled  in  equity  to  a  release  or 
discharge.*  But  the  New  York  statute,  which  provides  for  the  prov- 
ing and  allowing  of  an  executor's  claim  against  the  estate  before  the 
surrogate,  is  held  to  include  claims  that  are  disputed  as  well  as  those 
not  disputed,  and  the  circumstance  that  other  persons  are  jointly 
interested  with  him  does  not  affect  the  surrogate's  authority  to  adju- 
dicate the  same,  because  otherwise  the  executor  would  have  no  means 
to  have  his  claim  allowed.5 

§  154.    Incidental  Powers  conferred  by  Necessary  Implication.  — 
The  necessity  of  recognizing  power  in  the  probate  courts  to  carry 

„  out  the  functions  expressly  pointed  out  for  them,  and  to 

rowers  1m-  ■,■,■,  r  •  i       i 

plied  in  powers    accomplish  the   express   purposes   for   which   they   are 

granted.  created,  has  already  been  mentioned.6    Thus  the  power 

to  compel  the  executor  or  administrator  to  return  a  correct  inven- 

„,  tory  of  the  estate,  includes  the  power  to  determine  what 

lo  jisccrttiin  ^ 

what  consti-  property  constitutes  assets  or  belongs  to  the  estate,  and 
tutes  assets.  nence  to  try  the  title  to  property ; 7  authority  to  direct 
and  control  executors  and  administrators  includes  the  power  to  ap- 
prove or  disapprove  investments  made  by  them  as  trustees  under 
provisions  of  a  will ; 8  the  power  to  decree  distribution  or  payment  of 

i  Bowie  v.  Ghiselin,  30  Md.  553,  55G.  Lambert  v.  Craft,  98  N.  Y.  342 ;  Matter 

2  Miller  v.  Dorsey,  9  Md.  317,  323.  of  Callahan,  152  N.  Y.  320. 

■■  (Jreene  v.  Day,  1  Dem.  45,  50.     The         4  McNulty  v.  Ilurd,  72  N.  Y.  518,  521. 

surrogate,    on    pp.   48    and    49,    collects  6  Shakespeare  v.   Markham,  72  N.  Y. 

numerous    New    York    decisions,   among  400,407;  Houghton  v.  Flint,  74  N.  Y.  476, 

them   Tucker  v.  'Pucker,  4   Keyes,    136,  480.    See  post,  §  391. 

the    leading    case    on    this    point;     and  6  Ante,   §    142,   and   authorities   there 

quaintly  remarks  that  the  statute  author-  cited. 

izesthe  surrogate  "  to  settle  and  determine  7  McWillie  V.  Van  Vacter,  35  Miss.  428, 

Buch  questions,  and  such  questions  only,  445,  citing  Mississippi  cases. 

as  were  not  a  matter  of  dispute;  between  8  Jones  v.   Hooper,  2  Dem.  14.      But 

the   parties,   or,   in    simpler    phrase,   such  see  Merritt  v.  Merritt,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  1,  14 

questions  as  there  was  no  question  about ; " 
372 


§  154    INCIDENTAL  POWERS  CONFERRED  BY  IMPLICATION.     *  349,  *  350 


to  the  executor 
as  creditor, 
heir,  or 
legatee. 

To  try  validity 
of  trusts  cre- 
ated by  will. 


legacies  involves  the  power  to  try  the  validity  of  an    yaiiditvof 
alleged  gift  mortis  causa  ; x  as  well  as  to  determine  who    gifts  mortis 

is  entitled  to  the  funds,  and  all  questions  neces-   causa- 
[*  350]  sary  to  a  proper  distribution  of  the  estate.2    Jurisdiction  *to 

construe  a  will,  and  to  ascertain  and  pass  upon  the  claims  of 
parties  asserting  rights  under  or  by  virtue  of  it,  includes  the  power  of 
the  probate  court  to  adjudicate  upon  the  rights  of  an  ex-    indebtedness 
ecutor,  as  creditor,  legatee,  or  heir,  adverse  to  those  whom 
he  represents  ; 3  under  power  "  to  distribute  the  residue 
of  the  estate  among  the  persons  who  by  law  are  entitled 
thereto,"  to  determine  whether  a  valid  trust  has  been 
created  by  the  will,4  and  what  is  the  trust,  who  are  the 
trustees  and  beneficiaries,  and  to  distribute  accordingly.5 
In  the  exercise  of  the  power  to  sell  succession  property  the  probate 
court  has  jurisdiction,  as  an  incident  thereto,  to  enforce    To  enforce 
the   remedies   provided   by   law   against  a  bidder   who    rem.edies 
refuses   to   comply    with   his   bid.6      In   Pennsylvania,    der  in  a  sale 
where  the  Orphan's  Court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  parti-   c)*,})/t°t)etr-ty 
tion  of  decedents'  estates,  it  is  held  that  ejectment  will   assets. 
not  lie  by  heirs  against  a  widow  in  possession,  but  the  Partition  lands, 
proceeding  must  be  by  partition  in  the  Orphan's  Court ; 7 
nor  dower  against  the  heirs,8  unless  the  land  is  in  the      ssign    ower* 
adverse  possession  of  one  denying  her  right,  or  not  amenable  to  the 
process  of  the  Orphan's  Court ; 9  and  may  enforce  the  payment  of 
owelty  in  partition.10     Specific  performance  of  a  dece-    Specific  per- 
dent's   contracts   for   the   sale   of   land   has  been   held    contracts  for 
to   be  within   the    jurisdiction    "  pertaining   to   probate    sale  of  lands, 
courts,"  n  as  well  as  to  try  questions  of  fraud  incidental  to  any  sub- 
ject of  which  the  probate  court  has  jurisdiction.12 

1  Fowler  v.  Lockwood,  3   Redf.  465,  8  Thomas  v.  Simpson,   3   Pa.   St.   60, 

67. 

9  Evans  v.  Evans,  29  Pa.  St.  277,  280. 
See  the  case  of  Mussleman's  Appeal,  65 
Pa.  St.  480,  485,  in  which  Agnew,  J., 
reviews  the  history  of  the  gradual  en- 
largement of  jurisdiction  of  the  Orphan's 
Court  in  Pennsylvania. 

10  Neel's  Appeal,  88  Pa.  St.  94. 

11  Adams  v.  Lewis,  5  Sawy.  229.  Con- 
current with  chancery  courts  when  con- 
ferred by  statute:  Lynes  v.  Hayden,  119 
Mass.  482.  Usually  specific  performance 
is  held  to  be  of  purely  equitable  nature, 
concerning  which  probate  courts  have  no 
jurisdiction,  unless  expressly  conferred  : 
Houston  v.  Killough,  80  Tex.  296 ;  ante, 
§  149,  p.  *340. 

12  Wade  v.  Labdell,  4  Cush.  510. 

373 


470. 


125. 


689. 


Proctor   v.   Dicklow,  57  Kans.   119, 
Denegre    v.   Denegre,   33    La.   An. 


4  Estate  of  Hinckley,  Myr.  189,  194; 
Estate  of  Crooks,  Myr.  247,  249. 

8  Crew  v.  Pratt,  119  Cal.  139,  151 ;  Es- 
tate of  Crooks,  supra.  See  also  Hudgins 
v.  Leggett,  84  Tex.  207;  ante,  §  151,  p. 
*346. 

6  Succession  of  Bobb,  27  La.  An.  344, 
345;  Bell's  Appeal,  71  Pa.  St.  471.  But 
this  is  held  differently  in  most  States ; 
ante,  §  151. 

7  Seider  v.  Seider,  5  Whart.  208,  217. 
The  jurisdiction  of  probate  courts  to  par- 
tition realty  is  discussed,  post,  §  567,  p. 
*  1243. 


*  350,  *  351  SUBJECT-MATTER    OP    JURISDICTION.  S   155 

Where  the  power  to  award  costs  and  enforce  their  payment  is 
given,  it  is  exclusive ;  a  common-law  court  to  which  issues  are  sent 
T    '  .  ,.  by  the  Orphan's  Court  cannot  enter  judgment  for 

upon  the  ques-  costs,1  nor  can  an  appellate  court.2  Costs  *  fol-  [*  351] 
tion  of  costs.       jQW.   £ke   -judgment  or  decree   rendered,   unless 

otherwise  expressed  in  the  judgment;  and  when  the  term  has  lapsed 
at  which  the  judgment  was  rendered,  the  probate  court  has  no  fur- 
T     1   td  ther  power  over  it.3    It  is  held  in  Minnesota,  that  where 

for  insane  a  widow,  who  is  entitled  to  her  election  between  the  pro- 

visions of  a  will  and  her  dower,  is  incompetent,  because 
of  unsoundness  of  mind,  to  make  the  election,  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
probate  court  to  elect  for  her,  unless  there  be  a  statutory  power  com- 
mitted to  the  guardian  or  committee ; 4  in  other  States  such  power 
rests  in  chancery  courts,5  or,  being  personal  to  the  widow,  is  lost.6 

§  155.  Power  to  construe  Wills.  —  The  jurisdiction  of  probate 
courts  over  the  estates  of  deceased  persons  necessarily  includes  the 
power  in  the  first  instance  to  construe  wills,  whenever  such  coustruc- 
Construction  tion  is  involved  in  the  settlement  and  distribution  of  the 
of  wills  in-         estate  of  a  testator.     It  is  obvious  that  distribution  can- 

cluded  in  fix-  ,  .  ■,-,,-,  •  i  i  ., 

ing  the  rights  not  be  made  nor  legacies  ordered  to  be  paid,  unless  the 
of  legatees.  rights  of  legatees  are  first  adjudicated;  and  such  adjudi- 
cation involves  the  ascertainment  of  the  testator's  intention,  in  order 
to  fix  the  rights  of  legatees  in  accordance  therewith,7  and  whether  a 
bequest  is  valid  or  void,8  or  adeemed.9  It  is  the  decree  of  distribution 
that  determines  the  rights  of  legatees  and  distributees  ;  hence  such 
order  or  decree  is  conclusive  as  to  the  rights  of  heirs,  legatees  and 
devisees,  subject  only  to  be  set  aside  or  modified  on  appeal.10  This 
power  is  given,  however,  only  to  the  extent  of  determining  to  whom 
the  executor  must  pay  or  deliver  the  funds  of  the  estate  in  the 
To  determine  nrs^  instance,  and  does  not  extend  to  the  determination 
to  whom  of  questions  between  legatees  themselves,  such  as  whether 

jacj  goe         ^e  iegaCy  js  absolute  or  for  life  only,  or  subject  to  trusts 

1  Levy  v.  Levy,  28  Md.  25,  29.  322  ;  Blasini  r.  Blasini,  30  La.  An.  1388, 

-  Johns  v.  Hodges,  GO  Md.  215,  228;  1389;  Appeal  of  Schaeffner,  41  Wis.  260, 

Brown   v.  Johns,  62  Md.  333.  264,  approving  Brook  v.  Chappell,  34  "Wis. 

1  Lucas  v.  Morse,  139  Mass.  59.  405,419;  Harrison  v.  Harrison,  9  Ala.  470, 

1  State  v.  Ueland,  30  Minn.  277,  282.  477  ;  Covert  v.  Sebern,  73  Iowa,  564;  Crew 

6  Kennedy  v.  Johnston,  65  Pa.  St.  451,  v.  Pratt,  119  Cal.  139,  151. 

455.  8  Johnson  v.  Langmire,  39  Ala.   143; 
«  Collins  v.  Carman,  5  Md.  503,  529  ;  Webster  v.  Seattle  Co.,  7  Wash.  642,  de- 
Lew  is  v.   Lewis,  7   Ired.  72.     See  on  this  terinining  shares  of  omitted  heirs  under  a 
subject  ante,  §  119.  statute. 

7  Brown   v.   Stark,  47   Mo.  App.    370,  9  May  v.  May,  28  Ala.  141. 

379;  State  r.  Ueland,  30  Minn.  277,282;  10  Goad  v.  Montgomery,   119  Cal.  552, 

Clover  v.   I.'eid,  ho  Mieh.  228;  Byrne  v.  557.     The  conclusiveness  of  the  order  of 

Hume,  84  Mich   185;  Goldtree  v.  Allison,  distribution  is  treated  of,  post,  §§   561, 

L19Cal    844;  In  -e  Verplanck,  91   X.  Y.  562. 
489,450;  Da  Bois  v.  Brown,  l  Dem  317, 
87  i 


§  155  POWEE   TO   CONSTRUE   WILLS.  *  351,  *  352 

or  conditions.1  In  New  York 2  a  statute  confers  upon  the  surrogate 
of  the  county  of  New  York,  in  a  proceeding  to  prove  a  last  will,  the 
same  power  as  is  vested  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State  to  pass 
upon  and  determine  the  true  construction,  validity,  and  legal  effect 
thereof,  in  case  the  validity  of  any  of  the  dispositions  contained  in 
such  will  is  contested,  or  the  construction,  or  its  legal  Law  in  New- 
effect,  called  in  question  by  any  of  the  heirs  or  next  of  York- 
kin  of  the  deceased,  or  any  legatee  or  devisee.  The  surrogate  of 
New  York  construed  this  act  as  requiring  him  to  exercise  the  author- 
ity of  determining  the  legal  effect  and  true  construction  of  any  of  its 
provisions,  as  absolutely  as  the  Supreme  Court  might  do  when 
[*352]  it  obtained  jurisdiction;8  but  this  view  was  *  overruled  by 
the  Court  of  Appeals,  holding  that  the  effect  of  the  statute 
was  restricted  to  the  proceedings  in  proving  the  will ;  and  that  the 
surrogate  possessed  no  more  power  to  try  the  validity  of  a  disputed 
legacy,  than  to  adjudicate  upon  the  disputed  claim  of  a  creditor. 
"When  in  good  faith  an  executor  resists  the  charging  of  a  legacy 
upon  the  residuary  estate  in  his  hands  and  shows  that  there  is  a  real 
question  of  fact  or  of  law  in  his  refusal  to  allow  it,  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  surrogate  ceases,  or  has  never  attached.  It  is  for  the  appro- 
priate court  of  law  or  equity  to  adjudicate  upon  the  matter.  When 
determined  there,  the  surrogate  may  go  on  with  the  accounting,  or 
whatever  other  proceeding  was  before  him  when  the  question 
arose."  4  This  decision  is  modified  by  later  cases,  in  which  it  is  held 
that  the  surrogate  has  power  to  pass  upon  the  construction  of  a  will 
where  the  right  to  a  legacy  depends  upon  a  question  of  construction 
which  must  be  determined  before  a  decree  of  distribution  can  be  made, 
and  that  this  power  can  be  exercised  on  final  accounting  only,  when 
all  the  parties  who  may  be  affected  by  the  adjudication  are  brought 
in.6  By  a  later  statute  the  power  to  construe  the  will,  as  to  person- 
alty, is,  under  certain  conditions,  made  to  apply  to  all  surrogates;6 
but  this  does  not  give  jurisdiction  where  the  disposition  of  personalty 
and  realty  is  inseparately  connected,7  nor  where  title  is  claimed  para- 
mount to  the  estate.8 

In  Maryland  the  orphans'  courts  have  power  to  take  probate  of 
wills,  but  not  to  adjudicate  questions  of  title  dependent  upon  their 
operation   and   effect,  or   to   decide   upon   the  right  of   disposition. 

1  Bramell  v.  Cole,  136  Mo.  201.  be  equal  to  and  concurrent  with  that  of 

2  Laws,  1870,  ch.  359,  §  11.  the  Supreme  Court)  ;  Tappan  v.  Church, 

3  Danserf.  Jeremiah,  3  Redf.  130,  137.  3  Dem.   187,  disapproving  Fraenznick  v. 

4  JBevan  v.  Cooper,  72  N.  Y.  317,  327  et  Miller,  supra. 

seq. ;  Fraenznick  v.  Miller,  1  Dem.  136.  6  Code,  Civ.  Pr.  §  2624. 

6  Puggs  v.  Cragg,  89  N.  Y.  479,  492,  7  Matter  of  Schrader,  63  Hun,  36.     A 

and   cases    supra;    In   re   Verplanck,   91  fortiori  to  devises  of  real  estate :  Merriam'i 

N.  Y.  439,  450;    Garlock  v.  Vandevort,  Will,  136  N.  Y.  58. 
128  N.  Y.  374  (holding  the   surrogate's  8  Walker's  Will,  136  N.  Y.  20. 

jurisdiction  under  such  circumstances  to 

375 


*  352,  *  353  SUBJECT-MATTER   OP   JURISDICTION.  §  155 

In  Maryland      "  When  probate  is  granted,  authority  to  determine  what 
Maine,  passes  under  the  will  is  devolved  upon  the  courts  of 

law  and  equity,  tribunals  which  are  clothed  with  ample 
jurisdiction  to  decide  that  question."  l  So,  until  recently,  in  Maine,2 
and,  it  seems,  in  Rhode  Island.8  The  difference  in  the  functions  of 
courts  of  probate  and  courts  of  construction  is  mentioned  elsewhere.4 
It  may  be  proper  to  note  in  this  connection  the  power  of  courts  of 
equity  in  respect  of  the  construction  of  wills,  upon  the  application 
Construing  °^  an  executor,  administrator,  or  other  trustee,  or  even 
wills  in  of  a  cestui  que  trust,  to  determine  questions  of  doubt  in 

equ1-'  carrying   trusts   into  effect.6    The  power  arises  out  of 

the  jurisdiction  of  courts  of  equity  to  decree  the  payment  of  legacies 
(because  the  ecclesiastical  courts  could  neither  take  the 
accounts  necessary  sometimes  *  to  ascertain  the  amount  of  [*  353] 
legacies,  nor  enforce  their  decrees),  and  to  entertain  bills  of 
interpleader  (in  cases  of  conflicting  trusts,  to  save  trustees  from 
hazardous  responsibility  and  future  litigation,  or  of  conflicting  legal 
claims  against  one  who  has  no  interest  in  the  thing  claimed,  but  is 
a  mere  stakeholder).6  It  is  deduced  from  the  equity  jurisdiction 
given  by  statute  in  cases  of  trust  arising  in  the  settlement  of  estates, 
where  the  trustees  are  actors  and  seek  the  aid  and  direction  of  a 
court  of  equity  in  cases  of  doubt  and  difficulty,  and  where  conflicting 
claims  are  asserted  by  different  parties  to  the  same  property  or 
rights  under  the  instrument  creating  the  trust ; 7  and  is  expressly 
conferred  by  statute  in  some  of  the  States.8  Where  equity  jurisdic- 
tion is  conferred  upon  the  probate  court,  it  may  be 
bate  couru  applied  to  for  instructions  as  to  the  construction  of  a 
will ; 9  but  the  power  does  not  reside  in  such  courts  un- 
less expressly,  or  by  necessary  implication,  conferred.10     Thus  an 

1  Schull  v.  Murray,  32  Md.  9,  15,  16,         6  Tayloe    v.  Bond,  per    Pearson,    J., 
citing  the  case  of  Michael  v.   Baker,  12     Busb.  Eq.  5,  15. 

Md.  158,  169;  Ramsey  v.  Wilby,  63  Md.  7  Treadwell  v.  Cordis,  5  Gray,  341, 348  ; 

584,  citing  earlier  cases.  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Harrison,  68  Ga.  463, 

2  The  probate  court  "  has  no  power  to  469,  relying  on  Miles  v.  l'eabody,  64  Ga. 
construe  a  will,  —  to  determine  its  effect  729. 

upon  the  distribution  of  the  estate, —  or  8  Such  statutes  are  construed  in  Wil- 

to  adjudicate  between  the  heirs  and  resid-  liams  v.  Williams,  73  Cal.  99 ;  Horton  v. 

uary  legatees";  Hanscom  v.  Marston,  82  Cantwell,  108  N.  Y.  255,  263;  First  Bap- 

Me.  288,  296.     But  by   a   recent  statute  tist   Church   v.    Robberson,  71    Mo.   326, 

probate  courts  are   empowered   to   order  vindicating  the   jurisdiction   of  chancery 

distribution  according  to  the  will:  Laws  courts  by  the  majority,  p.  334,  JJ.  Hough 

1891,  ch.  49.  (p.  339)  and  Henry  (p.  352)  holding  the 

8  Williams  v.  Ilerrick,  18  R.  I.  120.  jurisdiction  to  reside  in  the  probate  court. 

4  Post,  §  222,  p.  *485  ;  §  228,  p.  *502.  9  Swasey    v.    Jaques,    144   Mass.   135. 

6  See  on  this  point  1    Rcdf.  on  Wills,  The  pleadings  and  practice  ought  to  con- 

438,493;  School  Ex.  §§265,473;  Story,  form  substantially,  in   such  case,  to  the 

Eq.  §1005;  Rosenberg  '•.   Frank,  58  Cal.  equity   procedure:    Green  v.   Hogan,   153 

3H7,   39'J;   Williams  v.   Williams,  7.'t  Cal.  Mass.  462. 

99.  K>  Chadwick  v.  Chadwick,  6  Mont.  566 
876 


§  155  POWER   TO    CONSTRUE   WILLS.  *  353,  *  354 

executor,  administrator  c.  t.  a.,  or  any  party  claiming  against  him, 
may  apply  to  a  court  of  equity  to  have  his  rights  in  the  estate  ascer- 
tained and  settled  in  respect  of  testamentary  trusts  which  may  be 
valid  or  invalid  ;  for  the  executor  holds  the  property  in  trust  for  the 
persons  to  whom  it  is  legally  bequeathed,  and  for  those  who  are  en- 
titled to  it  under  the  Statute  of  Distributions  if  not  effectually  dis- 
posed of  by  the  will.  So  in  respect  of  property  devised,  and  where 
there  is  a  mixed  trust  of  real  and  personal  estate,  questions  may 
arise  as  to  the  validity  and  effect  of  contingent  limitations,  or  other 
doubtful  points,  which  it  becomes  necessary  to  decide  in  order  to 
make  a  final  settlement,  and  to  give  proper  instructions  and  direc- 
tions touching  the  execution  of  the  trusts.1  It  is  evident  that  appli- 
cation, whether  by  an  executor,  administrator,  or  devisee,  heir  at  law, 
or  any  other  person,  for  the  construction  of  a  will,  or  other  aid  to 
the  proper  execution  of  a  trust,  can  only  be  made  when  necessary  for 

the  present  action  of  the  court,  upon  which  it  may  enter  a 
[*  354]  decree  or  *  direction  in  the  nature  of  a  decree  ;  for  a  court 

will  never  give  an  abstract  opinion  or  advice.2  Nor  does  the 
principle  upon  which  courts  administer  this  species  of  relief  extend 
to  questions  growing  out  of  the  past  management  of  the  estate  or 
trust,  involving  an  inquiry  into  the  validity  of  such  management.8 
Hence  a  court  of  equity  will  not  judicially  construe  a  devise  on  the 
application  of  an  heir  at  law,  where  no  trust  is  involved,  for  that  is 
a  purely  legal  question  to  be  decided  by  a  court  of  law,  nor  pass 
upon  any  question  properly  triable  in  another  court,4  and  a  court  of 

576;  Washbon  v.  Cope,  144  N.  Y.  287;  doon,  133  Mass.  Ill;  Wilbur  v.  Maxam, 

First  Baptist  Church  v.  Robberson,  supra.  133  Mass.  541  ;  Bullard  v.  Chandler,  149 

"  If,  at  the  time,  a  question  as  to  the  con-  Mass.  532 ;  Morse  v.  Lyman,  64  Vt.  167  ; 

struction  of  a  will  needs  to  be  decided,  the  Bowen   v.  Bowen,  38   Oh.  St.  426,   428 ; 

probate  court  can  be  resorted  to,  and  the  Rexroad  v.  Wells,  13  W.  Va.  812;  Gaf- 

jurisdiction  is  adequate  for  the  purpose,  ney  v.  Kenison,  10  Atl.  R.  (N.  H.)  706, 

that  court  must  be  resorted  to,  and  chan-  citing  Greely  v.  Nashua,  62  N.  H.  166  ; 

eery  cannot  be:"  Ward  v.  Church,  66  Vt.  Bullard   v.   Attorney-General,  153  Mass. 

490,  quoting  from  an  earlier  case.  249,  in  which  it  is  said  :  "  The  court  has 

1  Bowers  v.  Smith,  10  Paige,  193,  199,  often  declined  to  give  instructions  as  to 
per  Chancellor  Walworth  ;  Read  v.  Wil-  what  disposition  shall  be  made  of  a  fund 
liams,  125  N.  Y.  560,  holding  that  the  on  the  occurrence  of  a  future  event,  even 
next  of  kin  may  maintain  the  action.  One  when  it  was  certain  that  the  event  must 
who  claims  as  a  purchaser  simply,  through  occur."  But  sometimes  courts  will  de- 
an heir  or  devisee,  cannot  maintain  the  cide  questions  which  have  not  arisen,  but 
bill:  Mellen  v.  Mellen,  139  N.  Y.  210,  are  " pretty  certain "  to  arise  in  the  exe- 
217;  and  in  some  States  it  is  held  that  cution  of  a  trust:  per  Durfee,  C.  J.,  in 
heirs  and  legatees  have  no  right  to  ask  Goddard  v.  Brown,  12  R.  I.  31,  41. 

the  advice  of  courts,  at  least  as  to  matters         3  Sohier  v.  Burr,  127  Mass.  221,  224  ; 

in  controversy  between  themselves :  Bel-  Miles  v.  Strong,  60  Conn.  393. 

field  v.  Booth,  63  Conn.  299,  307.  4  Simmons  v.  Hendricks,  8  Ired.  Eq. 

2  Little  v.  Thome,  93  N.  C  69,  71  ;  84;  Bowers  v.  Smith,  10  Paige,  193,  200; 
Tayloe  v.  Bond,  Busb.  Eq.  5;  Wead  v.  Mellen  v.  Mellen,  139  N.  Y.  210;  Tyson 
Cantwell,  36  Hun,  528;  Casperson  v.  v.  Tyson,  100  N.  C.  360;  Woodlief  v 
Dunn,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  87 ;  Mnldoon  v.  Mul-  Merritt,  96  N.  C.  226 ;  Collins  v.  Collins, 

377 


*  354,  *  355  SUBJECT-MATTER   OF   JURISDICTION.  §  155 

chancery  has  not  jurisdiction  after  the  probate  court  has  passed  on 
the  questions  at  the  time  of  settlement  and  distribution.1  Nor  will 
a  court  of  equity,  without  urgent  reasons,  interfere  with  the  discre- 
tion vested  in  a  trustee  ; 2  nor  does  the  court  take  the  place  of 
counsel,  to  act  as  general  legal  adviser  to  an  administrator  or  other 
fiduciary  respecting  his  official  duties ; 8  and  it  is  said  that  courts 
are  not  bound  to  entertain  applications  for  the  construction  of 
doubtful  wills,  and  that  they  will,  in  their  discretion,  refuse  to  do 
so  except  where  great  interests  are  involved,  and  a  decision  in  the 
ordinary  course  of  litigation  would  be  attended  with  great  inconven- 
ience, delay,  and  expense.4  But  having  acquired  jurisdiction  for  the 
purpose  of  construing  the  will,  they  have  authority  to  do  complete 
justice  between  the  parties  by  enforcing  their  adjudications,5  unless 
exclusive  jurisdiction  is  vested  in  the  court  of  probate,  in  which 
case  the  adjudication  becomes  binding  as  the  law  of  the  will,  to  be 
carried  out  by  the  probate  court.6 

It  is  self-evident  that  the  decree  or  adjudication  rendered  is  bind- 
ing on  those  only  who  have  been  made  parties  to  the  proceeding ; 7 
hence,  if  the  judgment  of  the  court  is  invoked  on  a  particular 
sentence  of  the  will,  which  is  so  connected  with  other  *  sen-  [*  355] 
tences  that  these  are  necessarily  affected  by  the  adjudication, 
all  parties  interested  in  the  construction  of  such  other  sentences 
should  be  made  parties.8  And  since  a  party  must  be  present  in 
the  precise  capacity  in  which  he  is  sought  to  be  charged,  it  is  not 
sufficient  that  one  who  may  be  interested  as  an  heir  at  law  has 
been  made  a  party  as  legatee  or  devisee.9  Where  the  application 
is  made  by  an  executor  in  good  faith,  under  circumstances  creating 
a  doubt  as  to  the  intention  of  the  testator  or  the  rights  of  legatees 
or  heirs,  the  costs  are  payable  out  of  the  estate  ; 10  not  so,  however, 

19   Oh.   St.   468  ;    Bailey   v.   Briggs,   56         8  Magers  v.  Edwards,  13  W.  Va.  822, 

N.  Y.  407,  413  ;  Pratt  v.  Bond,  5  Allen.  59  ;  831. 

Sprague  v.  West,  127  Mass.  471  ;  Bullard  9  Lomerson    v.    Vroom,    11    Atl.    R. 

v.  Attorney-General,  153  Mass.  249;  Min-  (N.  J.)    13. 

kler  v.  Simonds,  172  111.  323.  10  Rogers   v.   Ross,  4  John.   Ch.   608 

1  Ward  v.  Church,  66  Vt.  490.  Morrell  v.  Dickey,  1  John.  Ch.  153,  156 

a  Greer  v.  McBeth,  13  Rich.  L.  &  Eq.  Sawyer   v.   Baldwin,  20   Pick.  378,  388 

254.  Rowland  v.  Green,   108  Mass.  277,  285 

8  Clay  v.  Gurley,  62  Ala.  14,  19.  Drew   v.   Wakefield,   54    Me.   291,    300 

*  Crosby  v.  Mason,  32  Conn.  482,  484.  Jacobus  v.  Jacobus,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  49,  54 

A   fortiori,  if  complete  relief  can  be  ob-  but  see   Urey  v.  Urey,  5  S.  W.  R.  859 

tained    in    the    probate  court:    Wager  v.  864,  in  which  all  parties  except  non-resi 

Wager,  89  X.  V.  161,  168  J  Siddall  V.  liar-  dents  were  required  to  pay  tbeir  own  at- 

ri-'.u,  15  1'ac.  R.  130.  torueys.     So  in  Kimball  »>.  Bible  Soc,  65 

'■■  Nash   v.  Simpson,  78   Me.  142,  151  ;  N.  II.  139,  159,  it  is  held  that  the  costs  of 

Wager  v.  Wager,  89  N.  Y.  161.  litigation  and  attorneys'  fees  incurred  be- 

8  Allen  v.  Barnes,  12  Bac.  R.  (Utah)  tween  defendant  claimants  cannot  be  paid 

912,  915.  out  of  the  estate  in  favor  of  those  who  are 

7  Bowers  v.  Smith,  10  Pai.  193,  201.  unsuccessful  in  their  contentions. 
378 


§156 


EXCLUSIVE  AND  CONCURRENT  JURISDICTION.      *  355,  *  356 


where  the  proceeding  was  unnecessary  or  frivolous,  in  which  case  the 
party  causing  it  must  bear  the  costs.1 

§  156.    Exclusive    and    Concurrent  Jurisdiction. — Jurisdiction    of 
Federal  Courts.  —  The   jurisdiction  exercised  by  probate  courts  in 
the  matter  of  admitting  wills  to  probate,  appointing  administrators, 
and   taking   administration    bonds,   is    exclusive    of   all  Exclusive  ju- 
other    courts   or    tribunals   in    all   the    States.      Other  risdiction  to 
matters  committed  to  their  jurisdiction  are,  generally,   and  grant 
within  their  exclusive  original  jurisdiction,  any  party  administration 
interested  having,  in  most  States,  a  right  to  appeal  and  have  a  trial 
de  novo  in  the  appellate  court.     From  the  nature  of  the  jurisdiction 
so  conferred,  it  is  evidently  essential  that  the  adjudications  upon  the 
subject-matter,  not  appealed  from  or  reversed  in  direct  proceeding, 
shall  be  final,  not  only  in  the  courts  in  which  they  are  pronounced, 
but  in  all  other  courts  where  the  same  question  arises.2    Hence  a  supe- 
rior court  has  no  power,  in  the  exercise  of  its  chancery  jurisdiction, 
to  set  aside  a  will  which  has  been  admitted  to  probate,  or 
to  remove  an  executor,3  or  to  control  an  administrator 
in  the  discharge  of  the  ordinary   duties  of   his  office, 
while    the    administration   is    pending   in   the   probate 
court,4  or  to  subject  the  lands  of  heirs  to  the  payment 
of  debts  of  the  ancestor,  if  the  creditors  have 
[*  356]  *  failed  to  present  their  claims  for  allowance  in 
the    probate    court ; 8  nor  to  allow  and  enforce 
payment   of   a  claim   against    an    estate ; 6    nor   has    a 
common-law  court  power  to  try  an  action  purely  pro- 
bate in  its  character,  having  for  its  object  the  recogni- 
tion of  heirs,  legatees,  or  distributees,  and  establishing 
their  rights  judicially.7 

In  some  States,  courts  of  equity  have  retained  concurrent  juris- 
diction with  probate  courts  in  some  respects,  chiefly  in  the  matter 
of  compelling  executors  or  administrators  to  account.8     The  general 


Superior  court 
no  power 
to  revoke 
probate  and 
to  control 
administrator. 


Or  order  the 
sale  of  lands 
for  payment 
of  debts. 


Payment  of 
legacies  and 
distribution. 


1  Mundell  v.  Green,  108  Mass.  277,  283. 

2  See  ante,  §  145;  Martin  v.  Roach,  1 
Harring.  477,  486. 

8  Tudor  v.  James,  53  Ga.  302 ;  Leddel 
v.  Starr,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  159,  163.  The  sub- 
ject of  chancery  jurisdiction  to  remove  an 
executor  or  administrator  is  more  fully 
discussed  post,  §  267  ;  and  of  chancery 
jurisdiction  to  set  aside  probate  of  a  will, 
post,  §  227. 

4  Overton  v.  McFarland,  15  Mo.  312; 
Pearce  v.  Calhoun,  59  Mo.  271,  273. 

5  Titterington  v.  Hooker,  58  Mo.  593. 
As  to  jurisdiction  of  chancery  to  order  a 
sale  to  pay  debts  before  final  settlement, 
see  post,  §  463,  p.  *  1022. 


6  See  cases  cited  post,  §  392,  p.  *  816. 
As  to  chancery  jurisdiction  of  claims 
accruing  after  final  settlement,  see  post,  § 
579,  p.  *  1271. 

7  Linsenbigler  v.  Gourley,  56  Pa.  St. 
166,  171 ;  Hart  v.  Hoss,  22  La.  An.  517  ; 
Lusk  v.  Benton,  30  La.  An.  686,  688.  See 
also  Proctor  v.  Dicklaw,  57  Kans.  119, 
126. 

8  Clark  v.  Perry,  5  Cal.  58 ;  Brown's 
Appeal,  12  Pa.  St.  333  ;  Seibert's  Appeal, 
19  Pa.  St.  49;  McLean  v.  Wade,  53  Pa. 
St.  146;  People  v.  Barton,  16  Colo.  75; 
Bivins  v.  Marvin,  96  Ga.  268,  270;  Ritch 
v.  Bellamy,  14  Fla.  537  ;  Dean  v.  Wil- 
coxon,  25  Fla.  980;  Ligon  v.  Ligon,  105 

379 


*  356,  *  357 


SUBJECT-MATTER   OF   JURISDICTION. 


§156 


Concurrent 
jurisdiction 


tendency,  however,  is  to  vest  exclusive  original  juris- 
diction over  executors,  administrators,  guardians,  cura- 
tors, etc.,  in  probate  courts,  arming  them  with  ample  powers,  both  in 
the  exteut  of  their  jurisdiction  and  their  mode  of  procedure,  for  the 
accomplishment  of  those  purposes  which  could  not  be  attained  in 
the  English  testamentary  courts  and  rendered  necessary  the  inter- 
ference of  equity  courts.1  Hence,  in  this  country,  courts  of  equity 
do  not  generally  interfere  in  the  administration  of  estates,  except 
in  aid  of  the  probate  courts,  where  the  powers  of  these  are  inadequate 
to  the  purposes  of  perfect  justice,  and  then  for  the  same 
eraiiy  does  not  reasons  which  induce  them  to  interfere  with  the  juris- 
mterpose.  diction  of  common-law  courts.2     Where,  for  instance,  an 

administrator  dies  before  settling  his  administration  account,  and  the 
same  person  is  appointed  his  administrator,  and  also  administrator 
de  bonis  non  of  his  intestate,8  the  proper  tribunal  before  which  to 
make  the  settlement  is  a  court  of  chancery.4  So  where  it  is 
necessary  to  restrain  the  *  sale  of  real  estate  in  protection  [*  357] 
of  the  interest  of  the  heirs,6  involving  the  accounting  by  the 
administrator ; 6  or  to  protect  the  estate  against  fraud  or  waste  by 
the  administrator  where  the  probate  court  is  powerless,7  or  in  case 
of  collusion  between  the  executor  and  a  creditor,8  or,  generally, 
where  there  is  an  evident  mistake  or  fraud  in  the  settlement,9  or 


Ala.  460  ;  Carter  v.  Christy,  57  Kans.  492  ; 
Shoemaker  v.  Brown,  10  Kans.  383  ;  Lynes 
v.  Hayden,  1 1 9  Mass.  482.  See  post,  §§  500 
and  503,  as  to  the  concurrent  jurisdiction 
between  chancery  courts  and  courts  of 
probate,  in  compelling  executors  and  ad- 
ministrators to  account. 

1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  543  a,  Redfield's 
(10th)  ed. 

*  Winslow  v.  Leland,  128  111.  304,  342; 
Adams  v.  Adams,  22  Vt.  50,  58 ;  Moulton's 
Estate,  9  Utah,  159  ;  Meyer  v.  Garthwaite, 
92  Wis.  571  ;  Bryan  v.  Hickson,  40  Ga. 
405,  408;  Irvin  v.  Bond,  41  Ga.  630,  650  ; 
Jeter  v.  Barnard,  42  Ga.  43,  44.  In  Ala- 
bama, when  the  administration  is  removed 
to  the  chancery  court,  that  court  must 
proceed  to  a  complete  settlement  of  all 
matters  involved  :  Tygh  ''.  Dolan,  95  Ala. 
269  ;  and  any  distributee,  at  any  time 
before  the  jurisdiction  of  the  probate  court 
baa  been  exercised,  may  have  the  estate 
removed  to  a  court  of  equity  from  the 
probate    COUrl    in    the    then    condition    to 

be  completed:  Baker  v.  Mitchell,  109  Ala- 

490. 

8  In  Alabama,  in  swh  case,  the  settle- 
ment by  the  administrator  with  himself 

380 


as  administrator  de  bonis  non  is  void : 
Hays  v.  Cockrell,  41  Ala.  75,  80,  for  which 
reason,  the  probate  court  being  powerless 
to  act,  it  is  said  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  of  chancery  is  exclusive  :  p.  81.  So 
also,  where  joint  executors  are  removed 
and  one  of  them  is  appointed  administrator 
de  bonis  non,  etc. :  Martin  v.  Atkinson,  108 
Ala.  314. 

4  Carswell  v.  Spencer,  44  Ala.  204,  206 ; 
Buchanan  v.  Thomason,  70  Ala.  401.  So, 
in  some  States,  if  the  surviving  is  also 
administrator  of  the  deceased  partner: 
Reward  v.  Slagle,  52  111.  336,  340;  or  ad- 
ministrator and  guardian  of  the  distribu- 
tee :  see  on  this  point,  post,  §  506,  p.  *  1 1 28. 

5  McCook  v.  Pond,  72  Ga.  150;  First 
Baptist  Church  v.  Lyons,  51  N.  J.  Eq. 
363. 

6  Finger  v.  Finger,  64  N.  C.  183,  186. 

7  Freeman  v.  Ileagan,  26  Ark.  373, 
378;  Ragsdale  v.  Holmes,  1  S.  C.  91,  95. 

8  Fleming  v.  McKesson,  3  Jones  Eq. 
316,318. 

'■'  Brackenridge  v.  Holland,  2  Blackf. 
377,  380,  referring  to  Allen  v.  Clark,  2 
Blaekf.  343;  Gafford  v.  Dickinson,  37 
Kans.  287. 


5  156      PROBATE  JURISDICTION  OF  FEDERAL  COURTS.       *  357 

the  probate  court,  by  reason  of  its  limited  powers,  cannot  administer 
proper  relief.1  So  a  non-resident  executor,  relieved  by  the  will  from 
giving  bond,  will  be  compelled,  at  the  instance  of  a  legatee  whose 
legacy  is  not  yet  due  and  payable,  to  give  security  for  its  payment 
into  court,  where  there  is  just  cause  to  apprehend  loss;3  and  an 
executor  formerly  domiciled  in  another  State  may  be  called  to 
account  in  equity  by  an  unpaid  legatee  ; 8  and  where  unadministered 
assets  are  found,  too  little  in  value  to  justify  the  opening  of  an  ad- 
ministration, and  but  one  creditor,  chancery  will  subject  them  to  the 
payment  of  that  debt.4  But  where  the  jurisdiction  of  the  probate 
court  has  once  properly  attached,  no  other  court  will  interfere  or  go 
behind  its  judgments  or  decrees,  without  special  and  sufficient 
reasons.6 

The  Jurisdiction  of  Federal  Courts  is  conferred  upon  them  by  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  the  laws  of  Congress  in  pur- 
suance thereof  ;  and  where  the  requisites  of  jurisdiction  . 
exist,  this  jurisdiction  cannot  be  ousted  or  annulled  by    diction 
statutes   of  the    States,  though  assuming   to   confer  it   admSration 
exclusively  on   their   own  courts.6    It  is  held  that  the 
equity  jurisdiction  in  administration  suits,  conferred  on  the  federal 
courts,  is  the  same  that  the  High  Court  of  Chancery  in  England  pos- 
sesses ;  that  it  is  subject  to  neither  limitation  nor  restraint  by  State 
legislation,  and  is  uniform  throughout  the  different  States  of  the 
Union.7     A  citizen  of  another  State  may,  therefore,  establish  a  debt 

1  Clark  v.  Head,  75  Ala.  373;  In  re  8  Hess  v.  Reynolds,  113  U.  S.  73,  77, 
Hyde,  47  Kans.  277,  281 ;  and  see  cases  and  cases  cited.  A  proceeding  to  sell 
cited  post,  §  503,  p.  *  1124,  on  the  same  lands  to  pay  decedent's  debts  was  held  to 
subject.  Hence  equity  has  jurisdiction  of  be  within  the  act  for  the  removal  of  suits 
an  action  by  an  iufant  to  set  aside  a  fraud-  to  federal  courts,  in  Elliott  v.  Shuler,  50 
ulent  sale  of  land  made  by  an  executor :  Fed.  R.  454. 

Hawley  v.  Tesch,  72  Wis.  299.  7  Borer   v.   Chapman,  119   U.  S.  587, 

2  Walker  v.  Johnson,  82  Ala.  347.  600 ;    Payne  v.  Hook,    7  Wall.  425,   430. 

3  Colbert  v.  Daniel,  32  Ala.  314,  330.         See  also   Lawrence  t;.   Nelson,  143  U.  S. 

4  Mallory  v.  Craige,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  73,  74.     215,  Hayes  v.  Pratte,  147  U.  S.  557,  570, 
6  Seymour  v.   Seymour,    4   John.  Ch.     and  Arrowsmith  v.  Gleason,  129  U.  S.  86, 

409 ;  Savage  v.  Benham,  17  Ala.  119,  126  ;  98.     Judge  Thayer,  in  Walker  i».  Brown, 

Moren  v.  McCown,  23  Ark.  93,  94 ;  Page  27  U.  S.  A.  291,  observes  that  "the  juris- 

v.  Ralph,  55  Ark.  52 ;    Womack  v.   Wo-  diction  of  these  courts  [federal]  over  the 

mack,   2   La.  An.  339,  341  ;    Branton   v.  administration  of  estates  is  less  extensive 

Branton,  23  Ark.  569, 579 ;  Deck  v.  Gerke,  than  that   which  was  formerly  exercised 

12   Cal.  433,  436;    Search  v.  Search,  27  by  the  English  chancery   courts.     Their 

N.   J.    Eq.  137,  140;  Kothman  v.   Mark-  jurisdiction  at  best  is  but  a  limited  one," 

son,  34  Kans.  542,  550;   Dolan  v.  Dolan,  etc. :  p.  303  of  the  opinion.     But  in  addi- 

91  Ala.  152;  Harland  v.  Person,  93  Ala.  tion  to  the  jurisdiction  exclusively  con- 

273 ;  Shepard  v.  Speer,  140  111.  238  ;  Ames  ferred  on  them  the  State  probate  courts 

v.  Ames,  148  111.  321  ;  Green  v.  Tittman,  may  have  some  of  the  general  equity  pow- 

124  Mo.   372,  378;    Boltz  v.  Schutz,  61  ers :  "Whenever,  in  the  exercise  of  this 

Minn.  444,  446;    Proctor  v.   Dicklaw,  57  concurrent  jurisdiction,  the  probate  court 

Kans.  119.     See  also,  in  connection  here-  has  adjudicated  upon  a  matter  within  the 

with,  post,  §  503,  p.  *1124.  scope  of  its  authority,  such  effect  will  be 

381 


357 


SUBJECT-MATTER   OF   JURISDICTION. 


156 


against  the  estate  in  a  federal  court ; *  or,  if  he  is  not  chargeable 
with  laches,  maintain  a  bill  after  final  settlement,  to  charge  heirs, 
devisees,  and  legatees  to  the  extent  of  assets  received  by  them,  with 
ancestral  debts,  though  the  claim  was  not  presented  against  the 
estate  within  the  time  limited  by  the  special  statute  of  non-claims 
provided  by  the  State  law;  but  failure  so  to  establish  the  claim  is 
evidence  of  laches  and  should  be  satisfactorily  explained;2  or  a 
foreign  distributee  may  establish  in  the  federal  court  his  right  to 
a  share  in  the  estate,  and  enforce  such  adjudication  against  the 
administrator  personally  and  his  sureties,  or  against  any  other  par- 
ties subject  to  liability,  so  long  as  the  possession  of  the  property  by 
the  State  court  (holding  through  the  administrator)  is  not  interfered 
with ; 8  or,  it  seems,  foreclose  a  mortgage  given  by  the  deceased  in 
his  lifetime.4 

But,  as  was  recently  announced  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  in  an  exhaustive  opinion  delivered  by  Justice  Brewer, 
Federal  court  ^e  federal  courts  have  no  original  jurisdiction  with 
respect  to  the  administration  of  estates  of  deceased  per- 
sons ;  they  cannot  draw  to  themselves,  by  reason  of  any 
of  the  powers  enumerated,  the  res,  or  administration 
itself ;  nor  make  any  decree  looking  to  the  mere  admin- 
istration of  the  estate ;  nor  can  they  in  any  way  disturb 
the  possession  of  the  decedent's  property  held  by  an 
administrator  appointed  by  a  State  court,  and  thus,  through  him, 
dispossess  that  court  of  its  custody.5  The  rights  of  parties  as  given 
or  restricted  by  the  probate  jurisdiction  of  the  State 
courts  are  fully  recognized  by  the  federal  tribunals  ;  * 
hence  the  claims  established  by  a  resident  of  another 
State  in  the  United  States  court  cannot  be  enforced  by 
direct  process  against  the  decedent's  property,  but  must 
take  its  place  and  share  in  the  estate  as  administered  in 
the  probate  court.7     Nor  can  action  be  taken  in  the  United  States 

given  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States 
to  that  judgment  as  hy  the  laws  of  the 
State  it  is  entitled  to ;  subject  to  any  such 
adjudication  the  complainant  is  entitled  to 
have  the  matter  involved  adjudicated  by 
the  court  whose  jurisdiction  is  invoked"  : 
Comstock  v.  Herron,  5  C.  C.  A.  266,  275; 
8.  c.  6  U.  S.  App.  626. 

1  Hess  v.  Reynolds,  113  U.  S.  73; 
Xonley  v.  Lavender,  21  Wall.  276.  But 
execution  cannot  be  issued  thereon  (see 
statement,  infra ). 

2  Continental  Bank  v.  Heilman,  81  Fed. 

R.  (C.  C.)  36  ;  Public  Works  ».  Columbia 
College,  17  Wall.  521  ;  Borer  V.  Chapman, 
iupra. 

3  Borer  v.  Chapman,  119  U.  S.  587,  and 

882 


cannot  assume 
control  of  the 
administration 
itself,  but  only 
decide  the 
status  of  non- 
residents to  the 
estate. 


Claims  allowed 
by  U.  S.  courts 
are  enforced 
by  proceed- 
ings in  pro- 
bate courts  like 
other  claims. 


Payne  v.  Hook,  7  Wall.  425,  as  explained 
in  Byers  v  McAuley,  149  U.  S.  608; 
Brendel  v.  Charch,  82  Fed.  (C.  C.)  262 
(action  for  a  legacy). 

*  Edwards  v.  Hill,  19  U.  S.  A.  493. 

»  Byers  v.  McAuley,  149  U.  S.  608, 
reviewing  prior  decisions,  Justice  Shiras 
and  Chief  Justice  Fuller  dissenting. 

6  Thayer,  J.,  in  Walker  v.  Brown,  27 
U.  S.  App.  291,  303;  Sowls  v.  First 
National  Bank,  54  Fed.  R.  564  ;  and  if  the 
United  States  appear  as  claimant  in  a 
State  probate  court,  the  proceedings  are 
governed  by  the  local  law  :  United  States 
v.  Hailey,  2  Idaho,  26,  30. 

7  Myers  v.  McAuley,  149  U.  S.  608, 
620  ;     Yonley    v.    Lavender,     21     Wall. 


§156 


PROBATE   JURISDICTION    OF   FEDERAL   COURTS. 


357 


courts  to  compel  the  closing  of  an  administration,1  or  to  Cannot  compei 
restrain,  at  the  instance  of  the  executor  and  legatee  close  of  admin- 
residing  in  the  testator's  foreign  domicil,  an  administra-  1S  ra  lon' 
tor  ordered  to  distribute  an  estate,  from  so  disposing  of  the  assets  in 
disregard  of  the  provisions  of  the  will.2  So  also  the  Federal  courts 
federal  courts  have  no  "jurisdiction  to  grant  original  pro-    no  jurisdiction 

,  ......         .......         to  grant  origi- 

nate or  letters,  such  jurisdiction  being  exclusively  in  the    nal  probate  of 

State  probate  courts  ; 8  but  while  tbe  probate  of  a  will   Wllls* 

ex  parte  is  in  rem,  and,  not  being  between  parties,  cannot  be  removed 

to  the  federal  courts,  yet,  where  such  will  is  contested 

P      .     .     .  .    .  ,   .  ..     But  otherwise 

in  pursuance  ot  statutory  provisions,  and  becomes  a  suit   on  contest  and 
inter  partes,   residing   in   different   States,  the   federal    interpretation 

,..,..  .  of  will. 

courts  take  jurisdiction  as  they  would  in  any  other  con- 
troversy between  the  parties.4  After  a  will  has  been  established  in 
the  State  court  the  federal  courts  have  jurisdiction  to  interpret  its 
provisions  in  an  action  between  citizens  of  different  States.5  But  it 
is  held  that  where  the  exercise  of  federal  jurisdiction  depends  upon 
diverse  citizenship  it  must  be  confined  to  the  administration  of  the 
rights  of  such  diversely  domiciled  citizens,  and  them  alone.6 


276.  (In  the  last-mentioned  case  Justice 
Davis  adds  an  intimation  that  in  case  of  pos- 
sible State  legislation  purposely  discrimi- 
nating against  non-resident  creditors,  the 
United  States  courts  "would  find  away,  in 
a  proper  case,  to  arrest  discrimination  . .  . 
even  if  the  estate  were  seized  by  operation 
of  law  and  intrusted  to  a  particular  juris- 
diction.") See,  also,  In  re  Kittson,  45 
Minn.  197  ;  and  post,  §  166,  p.  *374. 

1  Smith  v.  Worthington,  10  U.  S.  App. 
616,  627. 

2  Gaines  v.  Wilder,  13  U.  S.  App.  180. 
8  Hargroves  v.  Redd,  43  Ga.  142,  150; 

Comstock  v.  Herron,  5  C.  C.  A.  266,  275 ; 
8.  c.  6  U.  S.  App.  626  ;  Reed  t;.  Reed,  31 
Fed.  (C.  C.  Ohio)  49. 


*  Gaines  v.  Fuentes,  92  U.  S.  10  (three 
judges,  however,  dissenting) ;  Ellis  v. 
Davis,  108  U.  S.  485,  497;  Richardson  v. 
Green,  61  Fed.  R.  (C.  C.  A.)  423  ;  Franz 
v.  Wahl,  81  Fed.  Rep.  9  ;  and  if  the 
ground  in  the  affidavit  is  local  prejudice, 
etc.,  the  application  for  removal  is  not  too 
late,  though  made  after  an  appeal,  pro- 
vided the  hearing  was  to  be  de  novo  before 
a  jury  in  the  appellate  court :  Brodhead 
v.  Shoemaker,  44  Fed.  R.  (C.  C.  Ga.)  518 
(distinguishing  between  ex  parte  and 
solemn  probate). 

6  Wood  v.  Paine,  66  Fed.  R.  807. 

6  Security  Co.  v.  Pratt,  65  Conn.  161. 


583 


♦358 


DOMICILIAEY   AND   ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION. 


§157 


*  CHAPTER  XVII.  [*358] 

DOMICILIARY    AND    ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION. 


Principle  of 
the  limitation 
of  authority 
to  property 
within  the 
State  granting 
administration, 


§  157.  Authority  of  Representatives  limited  to  the  State  granting 
it.  —  The  property  of  deceased  persons  is  vested  by  law  in  represen- 
tatives who,  for  the  purposes  of  its  devolution,  continue 
the  person  of  the  defunct.1  The  authority  of  these  rep- 
resentatives emanates  from  the  law  of  the  State  or  coun- 
try under  which  they  hold  letters  testamentary  or  of 
administration ;  and  since  it  is  universally  recognized 
that  the  laws  of  every  State  affect  and  bind  directly  all 
property  within  its  territorial  limits  and  all  persons  residing  therein, 
whether  natural-born  citizens,  subjects,  or  aliens  ;  and  that  a  State 
may,  therefore,  regulate  the  manner  and  circumstances  under  which 
property  within  it,  whether  real  or  personal,  shall  be  held,  trans- 
mitted, and  enforced,2  —  it  is  evident  that  no  one  can,  in  a  represen- 
tative capacity,  whether  a  testato  or  ab  intestato,  meddle  or  interfere 
with  a  succession  before  probate  of  the  will  or  grant  of  administration, 
Letters  testa-  or  some  other  formal  induction  into  the  property  in  the 
mentary  or  of  forum  of  the  country  or  State  where  it  is  found.3  This 
have  no  extra-  is  the  necessity  of  the  rule,  recognized  in  England  4  as 
territorial  effect.  wen  as  in  the  federal5  and   State  courts  of  America,6 


1  Ante,  §  10;  post,  §  170. 

2  Sto.  Confl.  L.  §  18;  Minor  v.  Card- 
well,  37  Mo.  350,  353  ;  Vaughan  v.  North- 
up,  15  Tet.  1,  5;  Walton  v.  Hall,  66  Vt. 
455. 

3  Westl.  Pr.  Int.  L.  §  291  ;  Fenwick  v. 
Sears,  1  Cr.  259,  282 ;  Graeme  v.  Harris, 
1  DalL  456;  Patterson  v  Pagan,  18  S.  C. 
584,  citing  Dial  v.  Gary,  14  S.  C.  573, 
579. 

*  WmB.  Ex.  [362]. 

8  Dixon  v.  Ramsay,  3  Cr.  319,  323; 
Kerr  v.  Moon,  9  Wheat.  565,  571;  Noo- 
nan  v.  Bradley,  9  Wall.  394,  399,  et  seq.\ 
hells  v.  Holder,  2  McCrary,  622. 

■  The  cases  BO  holding  are  very  nu- 
merous ;  among  then  are,  in  Alabama: 
Bronghtonv.  Bradley,  34  Ala.  694,  708; 

Arkansas;    Clark   v.    Holt,    16    Ark.    257, 
384 


263  ;  Greer  v.  Ferguson,  56  Ark.  324 ;  Cal- 
ifornia :  Brown  v.  Gaslight  Co.,  58  Cal. 
426 ;  Connecticut :  Hobart  v.  Turnpike 
Co.,  15  Conn.  145,  147 ;  Georgia :  Turner 
v.  Linam,  55  Ga.  253,  255 ;  Illinois  : 
Hickox  v.  Frank  (showing  that  the  au- 
thority of  a  foreign  administrator  depends 
upon  the  law  of  the  forum),  102  111.  660 ; 
Iowa:  McClure  v.  Bates,  12  Iowa,  77; 
Indiana :  Naylor  v.  Moody,  2  Blackf.  247  ; 
Kentucky:  Dorsey  v.  Dorsey,  5  J-  J. 
Marsh.  280;  Kansas.  Moore  v.  Jordan, 
36  Cans.  271  ;  Louisiana:  Succession  of 
Roffignac,  21  La.  An.  364;  Maine:  Smith 
v.  Guild,  34  Me.  443;  Maryland:  Barton 
v.  Higgins,  41  Md.  539,  546 ;  Massachu- 
setts :  Trecothick  V.  Austin,  4  Mass.  16, 
32,  and  cases  cited  by  Story,  J.;  Michi- 
gan: Sheldon  v.  Rice,  30  Mich.  296,302; 


§  158  SAME   SUCCESSION    IN    DIFFERENT   COUNTRIES.      **  358-360 

that  letters  testamentary  and  of  administration  have  no  legal 
[*  359]  force  or  effect   beyond  the  territorial  *  limits  within  which 

the  authority  of  the  State  or  country  granting  them  is  recog- 
nized as  law.1 

§  158.    Administration  of  Same   Succession  in  Different  Countries. 
—  It  follows  from  this  doctrine  that  where  a  person  dying  leaves 

property   in   several    different    jurisdictions,    the    legal 

r     r       j  j  i-.i-  Same  person 

representatives    of   such  person    must   derive  their  au-    may  adminis- 

thority  from  each  of  as  many  sovereignties  as  may  have  gtraJ"s?lfferent 
jurisdiction  over  the  property  so  left,  because  the  terri- 
torial element  of  the  law,  or  rather  of  the  sovereignty  from  which 
the  law  emanates,  permits  no  other  sovereignty  to  exercise  authority 
over  it,  and  each  therefore  must  itself  create  the  legal  ownership 
necessary  in  its  devolution.2  This  authority  or  legal  ownership  may 
be,  and  except  in  the  States  in  which  non-residence  disqualifies  a  per- 
son from  the  office  of  executor  or  administrator8  generally  is,  con- 
ferred upon  the  same  person  in  several  or  all  of  the  States  in 
which  the  deceased  person  left  property  ;  for  a  testator  may  appoint 
the  same  or  different  executors  in  different  countries,4  and  it  is 
held  that  ex  comitate,  and  in  order  to  preserve  as  far  as  pos- 
sible the  singleness  of  administration,  the  person  who  obtains 
administration  as  next  of  kin  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the  intes- 
tate's domicil,  or  his  attorney,  is  entitled  to  a  similar  grant  in 
any  other  jurisdiction  where  the  deceased  has  personal 
estate ; 5  but  the  administration  in  each  State  is  wholly  juration  in 
independent,    whether   in    the    hands  of   the   same    or    ?ach  State  is 

of  different  executors  or  administrators,8  in  no 
[*  360]  wise  impaired,  *  abridged,  or  affected  by  a  previous,  and  a 

Mississippi :   Riley   v.  Moseley,  44  Miss,  on  Wills,  24,  note  7,  and  authorities  cited  ; 

37,  43  ;  Missouri :  Estate  of  Ames  &  Co.,  2  Kent,  431  et  seq.  ;  Naylor  v.  Moffat,  29 

52  Mo.  290,  293  ;  Emmons  v.  Gordon,  140  Mo.  126 ;  Wright  v.  Gilbert,  51  Md.  146, 

Mo.  490;   Montana:  Braithwaite  v.  Har-  152. 

vey,   14    Mont.    208 ;    New    Hampshire :  2  Westlake,  Pr.  Int.  L.  §  291  ;  Story, 
Taylor   v.  Barron,   35   N.  H.   484;   New  Confl.  L.  §§  513  et  seq. 
York:  Doolittle  v.  Lewis,   7  Johns.  Ch.  3  As  to  which  see  post,  §§  230,  241. 
45;  North  Carolina:  Sanders  v.  Jones,  8  *  Hunter   v.   Bryson,  5  G.  &  J.  483; 
Ired.  Eq.  246;  Grant  v.  Reese,  94  N.  C.  Schultz  v.  Pulver,  11  Wend.  361  ;  Fletcher 
720,  729;    Ohio:   Nowler  v.  Coit,  1    Oh.  v.  Wier,  7  Dana,  345,  349;  Sherman  v. 
519  ;   Pennsylvania  :   Sayre  v.  Helme,  61  Page,  85  N.  Y.  123,  128. 
Pa.  St.  299  (as  to  the  limitations  of  the  5  Westl.  Pr.  Int.  L.  §  292,  and  author- 
rule  in  this  State  see  Laughlin  v.  Solomon,  ities  there  cited  ;  and  see  post,  §  246,  as  to 
180  Pa.  St.  177);  South  Carolina:   Car-  appointment  of  administrators ;  Woodruff 
michael  v.  Ray,  1  Rich.  116  ;  Tennessee  :  v.  Schultz,  49  Iowa,  430,  431. 
Carr  v.  Lowe,   7   Heisk.   84 ;   Vermont :  6  So  that  the  executor  in  one  State  is 
Vaughn  v.  Barret,  5  Vt.  333,  336 ;  Vir-  not  bound  to  inventory,  or  in  any  wise 
ginia  :  Dickinson  v.  McCraw,  4  Rand.  158  ;  account  for,  the  assets  of  another  executor 
West  Virginia :    Oney  v.  Ferguson,   41  in  another  State :  Sherman  v.  Page,  85 
W.  Va.  568.  N.  Y.  123. 
1  Story,  Confl.  L.  §§  512,  513  ;  3  Redf. 

vol.  i.  —  25  385 


360 


DOMICILIARY   AND    ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION. 


§158 


No  privity  be-  fortiori  by   a   subsequent,  grant   of   administration    in 

tween  admin-  another  State.1     There  is  no  privity  between  adminis- 

difierent  states  trators  in  different  States,2  although  there  may  be  be- 

of  same  estate,  tween  executors  of  the  same  testator  in  different  States,8 

but  there  mav  ......  ' 

be  between  "      who,  at  common  law,  are  said  to  be  in  privity  as  to  the 
executors.  creditors. 

The  administration  granted  in  the  State  of  the  domicil  of  ■  the 
Principal  ad-  decedent,  is  the  principal,  primary,  original,  or  chief 
administration,  because  the  law  of  the  domicil  governs 
the  distribution  of  the  personal  property,  whether  to 
heirs,  distributees,  or  legatees  ; 4  while  that  granted  in 
any  other  country  is  ancillary  or  auxiliary.5  Both  are 
sonal  property.  ioca^  however,  to  the  jurisdiction  in  which  they  are 
granted,  being  limited  to  the  chattels  having  a  particular  situs,6 
independent  of  each  other,  save  that  the  origin  and  devolution  of  the 


ministration 
is  in  State  of 
domicil ;  law 
of  domicil 
governs  distri- 
bution of  per- 


1  Henderson  v.  Clarke,  4  Litt.  277; 
Pondy.  Makepeace,  2  Met.  (Mass.)  114; 
Burbank  v.  Payne,  17  La.  An.  15  ;  Aspden 
v.  Nixon,  4  How.  467,  497  ;  McLean  v. 
Meek,  18  How.  16;  Banta  v.  Moore,  15 
N.  J.  Eq.  97  ;  Apperson  v.  Bolton,  29  Ark. 
418,  435;  Picquet,  Appellant,  5  Pick.  65; 
Equitable  Life  Assurance  Soc.  v.  Vogel, 
76  Ala.  441,  446  ;  Grant  v.  Reese,  94  N.  C. 
720,  729 ;  Graveley  v.  Graveley,  25  S.  C. 
1,  19. 

2  Taylor  v.  Barron,  35  N.  H.  484; 
Dent  v.  Ashley,  Hemps.  54;  King  v. 
Clarke,  2  Hill  (S.  C.)  Ch.  611  ;  Freeman's 
Appeal,  68  Pa.  St.  151  ;  Wells  v.  Wells, 
35  Miss.  638;  Keaton  v.  Campbell,  2 
Humph.  224  ;  Stacy  v.  Thrasher,  6  How. 
44,  59 ;  Hill  v.  Tucker,  13  How.  458, 
466;  Creswcll  v.  Slack,  68  Iowa,  110, 
113. 

3  The  privity  between  executors  in 
different  States,  appointed  by  the  same 
testator,  is  based  upon  the  common-law 
doctrine,  that  the  executor  derives  his 
authority  from  the  will,  while  that  of  the 
administrator  rests  solely  upon  the  ap- 
pointment  by  the  probate  court:  Hill  v. 
Tucker,  supra  ;  Goodall  v.  Tucker,  13 
How.  469;  Bopper  v.  Eopper,  125  N.  Y. 
400  (holding  that  a  judgment  in  one  State 
against  the  same  executor  in  another, 
would  at  least  prima  facie  establish  the 
claim  and  answer  the  plea  of  limitation), 
406.  Thi-  reason  fails,  however,  in  those 
States  in  which  the  authority  of  the  exe- 
.•nt'ir  is  likewise  deduced  from  his  appoint- 
ment bj  the  court;  and  is  not  applicable 

386 


to  an  administrator  de  bonis  non  cum  testa- 
mento  annexo:  Grant  v.  Reese,  94  N.  C. 
720,  730.  But  see  Garland  v.  Garland,  84 
Va.  181,  189,  in  which  the  court  says: 
"  An  administrator  with  the  will  annexed 
is,  in  legal  contemplation,  executor  of 
that  will,  and  a  decree  against  a  domicil- 
iar  executor  binds  every  executor  of  the 
same  will  in  every  jurisdiction."  A  fortiori 
is  a  decision  in  one  State  binding  against 
the  same  executrix  when  she  takes  out 
letters  in  another  State :  Carpenter  v. 
Strange,  141  U.  S.  87,  105. 

4  See  post,  §  565,  and  cases  cited. 
"  This,"  says  Story,  J.,  in  Harvey  v.  Rich- 
ards, 1  Mason,  381,  402,  "although  once 
a  question  vexed  with  much  ingenuity  and 
learning  in  courts  of  law,  is  now  so  com- 
pletely settled  by  a  series  of  well-consid- 
ered decisions  that  it  cannot  be  brought 
into  judicial  doubt."  See  Russell  v.  Mad- 
den, 95  111.  485,  491.  A  noteworthy  ex- 
ception to  this  general  principle  is  made 
in  Mississippi,  where  the  statute  directs 
personal  property  to  be  distributed  ac- 
cording to  the  laws  of  that  State :  post, 
§168. 

5  Spraddling  v.  Pipkin,  15  Mo.  118; 
Gable's  Estate,  79  Iowa,  178,  182;  Good- 
all  v.  Marshall,  11  N.  H.  88;  Ordronaux 
v.  Helie,  3  Sandf.  Ch.  512;  Clark  v.  Clem- 
ent, 33  N.  II.  563. 

6  Green  i\  Rugely,  23  Tex.  539 ;  Mc- 
Cord  o.  Thompson,  92  Ind.  565;  Dial  v. 
Gary,  14  S.  C.  573 ;  Reynolds  v.  McMullen 
55  Mich.  568. 


§159 


PROPERTY    REMOVED    TO    ANOTHER   STATE.      *  360,  *  361 


property  in   each  may  be  the  same.1     It  follows  from    judgment 

this  want  of  privity  that  a  judgment  obtained   against  admin- 

■^  ~„--,    *.  •  £         •    \  £  l     istrator  in  one 

[*  361]  *  against  one  furnishes  no  cause  of  action  against    state  not  valid 

another,  so  as  to  affect  assets  under  the  control    in  another. 
of  the  other; 2  and  it  is  immaterial  that  the  judgment  was  obtained 
against  the  administrator  of  the  foreign  jurisdiction  in  person,  upon 
due  notice  to  him,8  or  even  upon  his  voluntary  appearance.4    Nor 
will  a  judgment   in  favor  of  a  foreign   administrator   against   the 
debtor  of  his  intestate  support  an  action  against  the  debtor  by  an 
administrator  in  another  State.6     But  a  question  determined  by  the 
courts  of  a  sister  State,  so  as  to  become  res  judicata   judgment  of 
between  the  parties,  cannot  be  reopened  by  the  same    sister  State- 
parties   in    another   State.6     And   where    jurisdiction   of   an   action 
against  a  corporation  debtor  of  an  estate  is  concurrent  in  two  States, 
and  suit  is  brought  in  one,  the  courts  of  the  other  State  will,  on  the 
principle  of   comity,  decline  to   entertain   jurisdiction   of   a  second 
action  on  the  same  debt.7 

§  159.    Jurisdiction  of  Property  removed  to  Another  Country  after 


1  Story,  Conn.  L.  §  522.  See  Man- 
ning v.  Leighton,  65  Vt.  84,  on  p.  102. 

2  Brodie  v.  Brickley,  2  Rawle,  431  ; 
Low  v.  Bartlett,  8  Allen,  259 ;  Aspden  v. 
Nixon,  4  How.  467 ;  Stacey  v.  Thrasher, 
6  How.  44  ;  McLean  v.  Meek,  18  How.  16  ; 
Johnson  v.  Powers,  139  U.  S.  156  ;  Ela  v. 
Edwards,  13  Allen,  48 ;  Merrill  v.  N.  E. 
Ins.  Co.,  103  Mass.  245  ;  Taylor  v.  Barron, 
35  N.  H.  484;  Dent  v.  Ashley,  Hemps. 
54;  King  v.  Clarke,  2  Hill  (S.  C.)  Ch. 
611;  Slauter  v.  Chenowith,  7  Ind.  211; 
Rosenthal  v.  Renick,  44  111.  202,  207; 
McGarvey  v.  Darnall,  134  111.  367  ;  Turner 
v.  Risor,  54  Ark.  33  ;  Braithwaite  v.  Har- 
vey, 14  Mont.  208 ;  Price  v.  Mace,  47  Wis. 
23";  Creswell  v.  Slack,  68  Iowa,  110,  113. 
And  in  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  63  Hun,  1,  it 
is  held  that  a  judgment  for  or  against  an 
administrator  in  one  State  is  of  no  effect 
for  or  against  him  in  another  State,  though 
the  same  person  administers  the  estate  in 
both  States.  So  also  in  Judy  v.  Kelley, 
11  111.  211 ;  and  see  Bakewell,  J.,  to  same 
effect  in  Rentschler  v.  Jamison,  6  Mo. 
App.  135,  137. 

3  Rentschler  v.  Jamison,  6  Mo.  App. 
135,  136. 

4  Judy  v.  Kelley,  11  111.  211,  214; 
Greer  v.  Ferguson,  56  Ark.  324,  331.  See 
remarks  of  Mr.  Justice  Brewer  in  Rey- 
nolds v.  Stockton,  140  U.  S.  254,  on  p.  272. 

5  Talmage  v.  Chapel,  16  Mass.  71. 


6  Carpenter  v.  Strange,  141  U.  S.  87. 
Hence,  where  the  domiciliary  court,  hav- 
ing competent  jurisdiction  to  construe  a 
will,  adjudicates  thereon,  such  adjudica- 
tion is  binding  upon  the  courts  of  other 
States .  Washburn  v.  Van  Steenwyk,  32 
Minn.  336,  357  ;  Ford  v.  Ford,  80  Mich. 
42,  50.  But  this  doctrine  does  not  go  to 
the  extent  of  depriving  the  courts  of  the 
State  in  which  lands  lie  from  construing 
the  will  as  to  such  realty.  Where  a  tes- 
tator by  a  single  will  devises  lands  lying 
in  two  or  more  States,  the  courts  of  such 
States  will  construe  it  as  to  the  lands 
situated  in  them  respectively  :  McCartney 
v.  Osburn,  118  111.  403,  411  ;  s.  c.  121  111. 
408  ;  Staigg  v.  Atkinson,  144  Mass.  564. 
A  judgment  on  final  accounting  in  one 
State  is  entitled  to  full  faith  and  credit  in 
the  courts  of  another  State,  under  the 
constitution  and  acts  of  Congress :  Fitz- 
simmons  v.  Johnson,  90  Tenn.  416,  432; 
and  so  the  disallowance  of  a  claim  in  one 
State,  being  a  judgment  in  favor  of  the 
estate,  was  held  to  be  entitled  as  such  to 
"  full  faith  and  credit "  in  another,  and  to 
be  a  bar:  Sanborn  v.  Perry,  86  Wis.  361. 
So  also  a  decree  of  distribution  obtained 
in  one  State  cannot  be  attacked  on  the 
ground  of  fraud  and  mistake  in  another 
State  :  Mooney  v.  Hinds,  160  Mass.  469. 

7  Sulz  v.  M.  Association,  145  N.  Y 
563. 

387 


*  361,  *  362      DOMICILIARY   AND    ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION.  §  159 

Owner's  Death.  —  But  it  may  be  that  the  situs  of  property  is  changed 
Property  re-  after  the  death  of  the  owner,  and  before  any  administra- 
moved  from  tor  reduces  it  into  possession.  In  such  case,  since  every 
another,  after  administration  operates  on  such  property  of  the  deceased 
owner's  death,    as  js  at  the  time  of  the  grant,  or  shall  be  at  any  time  dur- 

goes  to  the  .  .  .  .........  J 

tirst  adminis-  mg  its  existence,  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
setzes  k 'within  grauting  tne  same,1  the  question  determining  the  juris- 
ts juris-  diction  is  whether  there  is  or  is  not  any  vacancy  in  the 
legal  title  to  the  property  where  and  when  found.  For 
if  goods  are  once  in  the  legal  possession  of  an  administrator 
duly  appointed,  they  cannot  afterward  be  affected  *  by  an  ad-  [*  362] 
ministration  granted  in  another  jurisdiction  to  which  they 
may  be  removed,  because  there  is  then  no  vacancy  in  the  legal  owner- 
ship ;  they  are,  technically,  no  longer  the  goods  of  the  deceased,  but 
of  the  administrator  of  the  jurisdiction  from  which  they  were  re- 
moved.2 But  if  the  goods  have  never  been  in  possession  of  the 
administrator,  although  they  be  removed  from  the  jurisdiction  where 
he  might,  but  did  not,  take  possession  of  them,  an  administrator  of 
Without  re-  ^ne  jurisdiction  to  which  they  are  taken  may  do  so,  with- 
gard  to  the  out  regard  to  priority  in  the  grant  of  the  respective 
grant  of  ad-  *  administration.  Thus,  where  stage-coaches  and  stage- 
ministration,  horses  belonged  to  a  line  running  from  one  State  to 
another,  it  was  said  that,  if  there  had  been  different  administrators 
in  the  two  States,  "  the  property  must  have  been  considered  as  be- 
longing to  that  administrator  who  first  reduced  it  into  possession 
within  the  limits  of  his  own  State." 8  So,  also,  ships  and  cargoes, 
and  the  proceeds  thereof,  may  be  situated  in  a  foreign  country  at  the 
time  of  the  owner's  death;  but  since  they  proceed  according  to  their 
usage,  on  their  voyages  and  return  to  the  home  port  they  are  properly 
taken  possession  of  and  administered  by  the  administrator  of  the 
forum  domicilii.*  In  Massachusetts  it  was  held,  that  a  sale  by  a 
foreign  domiciliary  administrator  without  taking  out  ancillary  letters 

1  Thus  the  statute  of  Maine  provides  3  Orcutt    v.   Orms,   3   Pai.   459,   465 ; 

that  letters  of  administration  are  granted  Wells  v.  Miller,  45  111.  382.    But  in  North 

to  persons  dying  out   of   the   State,  not  Carolina  an  administrator  was  held  liable 

only  when  they  leave  property  to  be  ad-  for  negroes  sent  out  of  the  State  to  an 

ministered  in  the  county,  but  when  such  administrator    in     Tennessee    before    he 

property  "  is  afterward  found  therein  " :  qualified  as  administrator,  on  the  ground 

Saunders  v.  Weston,  74  Me.  85,  89,  91.  that  his  appointment  related  back  to  the 

And  the  debt  due  to  a  resident  of  another  time  of  his  intestate's  death,  and  he  might 

State  from  one  removing  into  the  State  have  reduced  them    into   possession,  and 

of    the   forum  after  the   creditor's   death  maintained  an  action  for  them  iu  the  State 

authorizes  the  appointment  of  an  adminis-  where  appointed,  or  elsewhere:  Plummer 

tratOZ  on  the  estate  of  the  creditor:   Pin-  V.  Brandon,  5  Ired.  Eq.  190,  194,  et  seq. 
ney  V.  McGregory,  1<>2  iMass.  180,  189.  4  Story,  Confl.  L.  §  520;  Whart.  Confl 

1  Wcstl.   l'r.  int.  L.   §  295.     See  also  L.  §  633 ;  Wells  v.  Miller,  supra. 
/"  re  Hughes,  95   N.  Y.  .r>">,  f.2,  and  Mc- 
<  or  1  v,  Thompson,  92  Ind.  565. 

388 


§  160         LEGAL   STATUS   OF   FOREIGN    ADMINISTRATORS.      *  362,  *  363 


in  Massachusetts  of  a  yacht  which,  when  the  intestate  died,  was  in 
the  State  of  doniicil,  but  of  which  he  took  possession  in  Massachu- 
setts, was  valid,  though  the  yacht  was  removed  to  the  latter  State 
before  his  appointment.1 

§  160.  Legal  Status  of  Foreign  Administrators.  —  No  executor  or 
administrator  can,  in  his  official  capacity,  originate  or  maintain  an 
action  in  the  courts  of  any  country,  save  that  which  has 
granted  him  letters  testamentary  or  of  administration,2 
without  authority  from  the  country  in  which  he  brings 
the  action ;  nor  collect  rents,8  or  in  any  manner  inter- 
meddle  with    the   property   of   the    deceased    in    such 

country.4    The  strict  correlative  of  this  proposition  is,  that 
£*  363]  no  *  executor  or  administrator  can  be  subjected    Nor  be  sued 

to  an  action,  in  his  official  capacity,  in  the  State    as  such- 
or  country  in  which  he  is  not  recognized  as  such ; 6  nor  is  he  account- 
able except  in   the   forum   from  which  he   obtained  his  authority, 
for  assets  collected  in  a  foreign  state 6  by  virtue  of  his  office.     By 


Foreign  ad- 
ministrator can 
maintain  no 
action  as  such, 
unless  author- 
ized bv  statute. 


1  Martin  v.  Gage,  147  Mass.  204. 

2  Ante,  §  157,  and  authorities;  Perkins 
v.  Williams,  2  Root,  462 ;  Nicole  v.  Mum- 
ford,  Kirby,  270;  Gilman  v.  Gilman,  54 
Me.  453;  McAnulty  v.  McClay,  16  Neb. 
418;  Lewis  v.  Adams,  7  Pac.  Rep.  779; 
s.  c.  8  Pac.  R.  619  ;  Barclift  v.  Treece,  77 
Ala.  528  ;  Kropff  v.  Poth,  19  Fed.  Rep. 
200;  Moore  v.  Jordan,  36  Kan.  271  ;  Gib- 
son v.  Ponder,  40  Ark.  195,  199  ;  Gregory 
v.  McCormick,  120  Mo.  657. 

8  Smith  v.  Smith,  13  Ala.  329 ;  Morrill 
v.  Morrill,  1  Allen,  132;  Rutherford  v. 
Clark,  4  Bush,  27 ;  Patterson  v.  Pagan, 
18  S.  C.  584 ;  Eells  v.  Holder,  2  McCrary, 
622. 

*  Cabanne  v.  Skinker,  56  Mo.  357,  367, 
and  authorities  cited  by  Judge  Sherwood, 
approved  in  Emmons  v.  Gordon,  140  Mo. 
490. 

5  Vaughan  v.  Northup,  15  Pet.  1,  5; 
Caldwell  v.  Harding,  5  Blatchf.  501  ; 
Greer  v.  Ferguson,  56  Ark.  324  ;  Curie  v. 
Moor,  1  Dana,  445 ;  Garden  v.  Hunt, 
Cheves,  42,  Part  II. ;  Beeler  v.  Dunn,  3 
Head,  87 ;  Allsup  v.  Allsup,  10  Yerg. 
283;  Winter  v.  Winter,  Walker  (Miss.), 
211;  Sparks  v.  White,  7  Humph.  86; 
Davis  v.  Phillips,  32  Tex.  564  ;  Hedenberg 
v.  Hedenberg,  46  Conn.  30,  33 ;  Durie  v. 
Blauvelt,  49  N.  J.  L.  114;  Fugate  v. 
Moore,  86  Va.  1045.  In  Pennsylvania  the 
earlier  decisions  held  that  foreign  execu- 
tors should  be  recognized  to  a  greater  or 


less  extent,  and  that  they  could  be  sued  by 
resident  creditors :  Swearingen  v.  Pendle- 
ton, 4  S.  &  R.  389 ;  Evans  v.  Tatem,  9  S. 
&  R.  552 ;  these  decisions  were  disap- 
proved in  later  cases  and  criticised  as 
laying  down  a  doctrine  which  was  an 
"anomaly  produced  by  an  unexampled 
spirit  of  comity,"  &c.  :  Brodie  v.  Brickley, 
2  Rawle,  431,  437;  Magraw  v.  Irwin,  87 
Pa.  St.  139,  142 ;  while  in  still  more  re- 
cent cases  the  earlier  decisions  are  again 
affirmed,  and  the  intermediate  ones  disap- 
proved :  Laughlin  v.  Solomon,  180  Pa.  St. 
177,  reviewing  the  decisions,  and  pointing 
out  the  trend  of  the  early  decisions,  the  de- 
parture therefrom  and  the  return  thereto, 
and  concluding  that  "  notwithstanding  the 
adverse  criticisms  to  which  Swearingen  v. 
Pendleton  and  the  other  cases  have  been 
subjected,  we  regard  them  as  of  unshaken 
authority,  and  it  must  be  taken  as  the 
rule  in  Pennsylvania  that  a  foreign  execu- 
tor within  the  jurisdiction  of  our  courts 
is  liable  to  suit  by  a  resident  creditor  of 
his  decedent,  and  such  will  be  sustained 
unless  it  trenches  unduly  on  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  another  court  already  attached,  or 
would  expose  parties  subject  to  such  juris- 
diction to  inequitable  burdens." 

6  Succession  of  St.  John,  6  La.  An. 
192  ;  Brownlee  v.  Lockwood,  20  N.  J.  Eq. 
239;  Norton  v.  Palmer,  7  Cush.  523; 
Selectmen  v.  Boylston,  2  Mass.  384; 
Campbell  v.  Sheldon,  13  Pick.  8,  23;  Mc 
389 


*363, 


164      DOMICILIARY    AND    ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION. 


§160 


ferred  by  com- 
ity of  the 
States. 

Duty  of  ad- 
ministrators to 
collect  assets 
in  foreign 
States. 


Such  authority  t-ne  comity  of  States  the  authority  of  domiciliary  ad- 
may  be  con-  niinistrators  is  recognized  in  different  jurisdictions  to  a 
greater  or  less  extent ; 1  and  it  is  a  matter  concerning 
which  the  authorities  differ,  whether  an  administrator  is 
guilty  of  laches  or  negligence  in  failing  to  collect  assets 
beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  his  forum,  or  obtaining  letters 
in  a  foreign  jurisdiction  in  which  there  may  be  property 
belonging  to  the  estate.2  If  he  collect  such  property  in  a 
foreign  jurisdiction  without  authority,  either  under  his  domiciliary 
letters,  or  by  new  letters  there  obtained,  he  is  liable  to  be  sued  in  the 
courts  of  the  foreign  State,  as  one  unlawfully  intermeddling  with  the 
effects,  by  any  creditor  or  other  person  interested ;  he  would  in  such 
case  be  clearly  liable  as  an  executor  de  son  tort,  wherever  this  species 
of  liability  is  still  recognized,8  "  for  it  would  not  lie  in  his  mouth  to 
deny  that  he  had  rightfully  received  such  assets,  and  he  could  not 
rightfully  receive  them  except  as  executor  ;  "  4  or  as  executor 
de  jure,  if  the  *  intermeddling  was  not  a  tortious  one.5    Where  [*  364] 


Namara  v.  MeNamara,  62  Ga.  200,  204; 
Musselmann's  Appeal,  101  Pa.  St.  165 ; 
Cocks  v.  Varney,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  514.  For 
the  liability  of  an  administrator  or  execu- 
tor to  account  for  assets  received  in  a 
foreign  jurisdiction,  see  post,  §  537. 

i  See  post,  §§  161,  167. 

2  It  is  held  that  an  administrator  is 
under  no  legal  obligation  to  procure  ad- 
ministration out  of  his  own  State,  in  San- 
ders v.  Jones,  8  Ired.  Eq.  246,  citing  earlier 
authorities ;  Cabanne'  v.  Skinker,  56  Mo. 
367  ;  that  it  is  devastavit  if  he  refuse  to 
procure  such  letters  if  the  interest  of  the 
estate  requires :  Helme  v.  Sanders,  3 
Hawks,  563;  but  it  is  clearly  his  duty  to 
collect  assets  in  a  foreign  jurisdiction  if 
he  can  do  so  under  the  authority  of  his 
letters  in  the  State  of  the  domicil :  Schultz 
v.  Pulver,  3  Pai.  182  ;  s.  c.  11  Wend.  361 ; 
Klein  v.  French,  57  Miss.  662;  In  re  Ortiz, 
86  Cal.  306  ;  see  also  §  162  and  notes. 
Where  he  has  possession  of  the  note  of  a 
person  living  in  auother  State,  it  is  his 
duty  to  make  reasonable  effort  to  collect 
it  without  suit:  Grant  v.  Reese,  94  N.  C. 
720,731.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, after  reviewing  the  decisions  in  that 
Btate,  say:  "  But  in  no  case  has  it  been 
held  that  the  mere  fact  of  an  administra- 
tor expending  money  in  any  reasonable 
effort,  to  save  the  property  of  his  intestate 
■itnatein  another  State,  is  sufficient  to  con- 
vict him  of  a  devattavit.  .  .  .  To  hold  that 
the  representatives  of  the  personal  estate 
390 


within  the  domicil  owe  no  duty  whatever 
to  creditors  or  next  of  kin  with  reference 
to  personalty  outside  the  jurisdiction,  is  to 
invite  neglect  and  consequent  waste  and 
dissipation  of  assets.  That  he  has  no 
standing  as  a  suitor  in  a  foreign  jurisdic- 
tion does  not  alone  fix  the  measure  of  his 
duty,  nor  has  it  ever  been  so  regarded  in 
practice.  In  thus  holding,  we  do  not  inti- 
mate that  he  must  go  into  a  foreign  juris- 
diction and  institute  suits  which  could  not 
be  sustained,  or  offensively  intermeddle 
with  assets,  so  as  to  defy  or  disregard  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  the  situs. 
There  are  often  many  things  he  may  do 
which  suggest  themselves  to  the  prudent 
business  man,  tending  toward  the  preser- 
vation of  the  estate,  and  are  neither  ob- 
noxious to  the  law  nor  antagonistic  to  the 
interests  of  the  foreign  creditors  "  :  Shinn's 
Estate,  166  Pa.  St.  121, 129.  See  also  the 
remarks  of  the  court  in  McCully  v.  Cooper, 
114  Cal.  258,  on  p.  263,  in  the  same 
strain. 

8  Campbell  v.  Tousey,  7  Cow.  64  ;  Jones 
v.  Jones,  39  S.  C.  247,  255.  The  remedy 
by  action  against  any  one  as  executor  de 
son  tort  was  subsequently  abolished  in  New 
York  by  statute  :  Brown  v.  Brown,  1  Barb. 
Ch.  189,  195. 

*  Story,  Conn.  L.  §  514  ;  Allsup  v.  AU- 
Hup,  10  Yerg.  283,  285. 

6  Tunstall  v.  Pollard,  11  Leigh,  1,  27, 
retracting  an  intimation  to  the  contrary 
in  Pugh  v.  Jones,  6  Leigh,  299  ;   Marcy  u 


§161 


VOLUNTARY  PAYMENT  TO  FOREIGN  ADMINISTRATOR. 


C64 


payment  by  a 
debtor  to  a 
foreign  ad- 
ministrator 
is  a  valid  dis- 
charge if  paid 
where  he  had 
jurisdiction 
to  sue. 


a  testatrix  appoints  different  executors  for  effects  in  different  States, 
and  all  of  them  qualify,  the  executors  in  one  State  are  not  bound 
to  inventory  or  account  for  the  effects  in  another  State,  being  there 
administered.1 

§  161.  Validity  of  Voluntary  Payment  to  Foreign  Administrator. 
—  Upon  the  question  of  the  validity  of  the  voluntary  payment  of  a  debt 
to  a  foreign  executor  or  administrator,  the  authorities  Voluntary 
are  not  unanimous.  The  tendency  is,  however,  in  the 
direction  of  recognizing  the  validity  of  such  payments, 
when  not  conflicting  with  the  home  administration. 
Chancellor  Kent  held  such  a  payment  to  be  a  good  dis- 
charge of  the  debt.2  And  in  Massachusetts  it  was 
asserted,  that  voluntary  payment  of  a  debt  by  the  citi- 
zen of  another  State,  in  the  State  where  the  administrator  received 
his  appointment,  is  a  good  bar  to  an  action  for  the  same  debt  by  an 
administrator  of  the  State  of  the  debtor's  domicil ; 8  a  proposition 
resulting  of  necessity  from  the  liability  of  the  debtor  to  pay  wherever 
he  may  be  reached  by  the  creditor.4  Nelson,  J.,  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  says :  "  There  is  doubtless  some  plausi- 
bility in  it  [the  objection  to  the  validity  of  the  voluntary  payment  to 
a  foreign  administrator],  growing  out  of  the  interest  of  the  home 
creditors.  But  it  has  not  been  regarded  of  sufficient  weight  to  carry 
with  it  the  judicial  mind  of  the  country.  With  the  exception  of  the 
case  in  the  State  of  Tennessee,  none  have  been  referred  to,  nor  have 
our  own  researches  found  any,  maintaining  the  invalidity  of  the  pay- 
ment. The  question  has  been  directly  and  indirectly  before  several 
of  the  courts  of  the  States,  and  the  opinions  have  all  been  in  one 
direction,  —  in   favor    of   the   validity."5     So   it   is   held   that  the 


Marcy,  32  Conn.  308.  "When  a  debtor  in 
Pennsylvania  of  a  decedent  dying  domi- 
ciled in  New  Jersey  has  voluntarily  paid 
to  the  foreign  executor,  he  cannot  subse- 
quently, when  such  executor  shall  have 
obtained  ancillary  letters  in  Pennsylvania, 
claim  as  a  creditor  to  have  the  ancillary 
accountant  surcharged  with  the  debt  so 
paid  him,  where  he  has  already  accounted 
for  the  same  in  the  domicil :  Gray's  Ap- 
peal, 116  Pa.  St.  256. 

1  Sherman  v.  Page,  85  N.  Y.  123,  128. 

2  In  Doolittle  v.  Lewis,  7  John.  Ch. 
45,  49,  which  turned  upon  the  validity  of 
the  sale  of  premises  in  New  York  secur- 
ing the  payment  of  a  bond  payable  by 
a  citizen  of  New  York  to  a  deceased 
resident  of  Vermont,  "  his  heirs,  execu- 
tors, and  administrators,"  by  the  admin- 
istrators, of  the  intestate  appointed  in 
Vermont. 


8  Stevens  v.  Gaylord,  11  Mass.  256, 
264. 

*  Story,  Confl.  L.,  §  515,  and  note  3; 
Equitable  Association  v.  Vogel,  76  Ala. 
441,448. 

5  Wilkins  v.  Ellett,  9  Wall.  740,  742, 
referred  to  with  approval  in  Wyman  v. 
Halstead,  109  U.  S.  654.  The  cases  re- 
ferred to  by  Justice  Nelson  are  Williams 
v.  Storrs,  6  John.  Ch.  353;  Doolittle  v. 
Lewis,  supra;  Vroom  v.  Van  Home,  10 
Pai.  549,  557  ;  Schulz  v.  Pulver,  11  Wend. 
361;  Trecothick  v.  Austin,  4  Mason,  16,33  ; 
Stevens  v.  Gaylord,  11  Mass.  256;  Nisbet 
v.  Stewart,  2  Dev.  &  B.  24;  Parsons. 
v.  Lyman,  20  N.  Y.  103,  108.  Some  of 
these  decisions  contain  mere  dicta  or  in- 
timations on  the  point  under  considera- 
tion, and  are  referred  to  below. 


391 


*  365,  *  366 


DOMICILIARY   AND   ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION. 


§161 


voluntary  *  payment  of  a  debt  to  a  foreign  ad-  [*  365] 
ministrator,  or  the  release  of  a  debt  by  such, 
would  not  be  held  invalid  if  there  is  no  administrator  in 
the  debtor's  domicil  interfering ; 1  and  that  in  the  absence 
of  a  domestic  administrator  payment  of  debts  could  only 
be  made  to  a  foreign  executor.2  The  case  of  Trecothick  v.  Austin, 
sometimes  relied  on  iu  support  of  the  view  that  a  foreign  executor 
may  sue  without  probate  of  the  will  in  the  State  of  the  forum,  estab- 
lishes the  view  of  Judge  Story,  as  an  obiter  dictum,  that 
a  foreign  executor  may  maintain  a  suit  in  his  own  right, 
but  not  in  his  representative  capacity.3  In  North  Caro- 
lina one  who  paid  over  the  money  left  by  a  deceased 
resident  of  Georgia,  who  died  while  on  a  visit  in  North 
Carolina,  to  an  administrator  in  Georgia,  was  held  not  liable  as  execu- 
tor de  son  tort  to  a  Georgia  creditor,  but  the  question  of  liability  to  a 
creditor  in  North  Carolina  was  expressly  reserved.4  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  held  directly  and  unqualifiedly  that  payment 
to  a  foreign  executor  or  administrator  is  void,  and  no 
defence  to  the  demand  of  an  administrator  duly  appointed 
in  the  State  of  the  debtor's  domicil.6  On  principle,  it 
would  seem  to  result  from  the  limitation  of  the  validity 
of  letters  testamentary  and  of  administration  to  tbe  State  or  country 
granting  them,  that  foreign  executors  and  administrators  can  bind  the 
estate  of  a  decedent  to  the  extent  only  to  which  the  law  under  author- 
ity of  which  they  act  is  recognized  by  the  comity  of  the  State  in 
which  the  property  may  be  found ;  and  such  comity  may  be  expressed 
by  act  of  its  legislature,  or  the  decisions  of  its  courts.6 
*  Hence  a  voluntary  payment  to  a  foreign  executor  or  ad-  [*  366] 
ministrator,  unless  authorized  by  such  comity,  is  void,  and 


Or  if  there  be 
no  administra 
tion  in  the 
State  of  the 
debtor's 
domicil. 


Foreign  ad- 
ministrator 
may  sue,  if  he 
does  so  in  his 
individual 
right. 


Payment  to 
foreign  admin- 
istrator not 
good  against 
a  domestic  ad- 
ministrator. 


1  Williams  v.  Storrs,  supra ;  Vroom  v. 
Van  Home,  supra;  Schulz  v.  Pulver,  11 
Wend.  361  ;  Citizens'  Bank  v.  Sharp,  53 
Md.  521  ;  Wilkins  v.  Ellett,  108  U.  S. 
256,  259 ;  Luce  v.  Railroad,  63  N.  H.  588, 
591  :  Schl liter  v.  Bowery  Bank,  117  N.  Y. 
125  ;  Hull  v.  Fuller,  78  Iowa,  20  ;  and  see 
remarks  of  Deau,  J.,  in  Shinn's  Estate,  166 
Pa.  St.  121,  129  ;  McCully  v.  Cooper,  114 
Cal.  258,  261.  But  if  a  debtor  whose 
property  is  about  to  be  attached  in  the 
State  of  the  domicil  of  the  deceased  by 
cutor,  procures,  for  the  purpose  of 
defeating  payment  there,  a  collusive  ap- 
pointment "f  an  administrator  in  a  foreign 
State  which  is  the  domicil  of  the  debtor, 
hut  not  of  tin'  deceased,  to  which  foreign 
administrator  lie  then  makes  a  voluntary 
payment,  this  will  be  no  defence  to  the 
action  by  attachment  brought  by  the  ex- 
's 9  2 


ecutor :  Amsden  v.  Danielson,  18  R.  I.  787. 
Sees.  c.  19  R.  I.  533. 

2  Parsons  v.  Lyman,  20  N.  Y.  103,  113. 

8  4  Mas.  16,  32.     See  §  162 

4  Nisbet  v.  Stewart,  2  Dev.  &  Bat.  24. 

5  Bartlett  v.  Hyde,  3  Mo.  490 ;  Stone  v. 
Scripture,  4  Lans.  186,  reviewing  the  New 
York  cases,  supra,  up  to  that  time,  and 
holding  that  the  power  of  an  administra- 
tor appointed  in  the  domicil  of  the  debtor 
is  exclusive  of  that  of  any  foreign  execu- 
tor or  administrator;  Young  v.  O'Neal,  3 
Sneed,  55,  holding  that  the  payment  might 
be  good  if  made  in  the  State  under  which 
the  foreign  administrator  holds  his  ap- 
pointment.    See  also  post,  §  200. 

'■  Story,  Confl.  L.,  §§  514,  515  a  ;  Westl. 
Pr.  Int.  L.,  §  296,  citing  Whyte  v.  Rose, 
3  Q.  B.  (Ad.  &  E.  n.  s.)  493  ;  Reynolds  k 
McMullen,  55  Mich.  568,  575. 


§162 


EXTRA-TERRITORIAL   VALIDITY   OP   TITLE.      *  366,  *  367 


no  defence  against  the  claim  of  an  administrator  of  the  State  where 
the  debtor  or  property  is  found;  but  will  be  good  where  it  does  not 
conflict  with  such  administration.1 

§  162.    Extra-territorial    Validity   of  Title    once  vested.  —  Where 
the  legal  title  to  the  intestate's  or  testator's  chattels  has  been  fully- 
vested  in  the  executor  or  administrator,  it  is  obvious    Title  once  ac- 
that  he  may  remove  them,  or  follow  them  into  a  foreign    quired  follows 
jurisdiction  without  forfeiting  or  losing  this  ownership,    everyw 
for  "  the  title  to  personal  property  duly  acquired  by  the  lex  loci  rei 
sitCB  will  be  deemed  valid  and  be  respected  as  a  lawful  and  perfect 
title  in  every  other  country."  2    Hence  he  and  his  assignee  or  vendee 
may  sue  for  and  recover  them  in  a  foreign  jurisdiction  without  a 
grant  of    new  administration  there.3      Upon  this  prin-    Test  is  whether 
ciple,  a  foreign  executor  or  administrator  may  maintain    the  suit  can  be 
an  action  on  a  judgment  recovered  against  the  debtor  in    individual 
another  State,  for  such  suit  need  not  be  brought  in  the    capacity, 
representative  capacity  of  the  plaintiff,4  as  well  as  on  a  contract  made 
by  the  defendant  with  the  foreign  executor  or  administrator 
[*  367]  personally ; 6  and  it  is  not  a  *  fatal  objection  in  such  cases 


1  Denny  v.  Faulkner,  22  Kans.  89,  96, 
citing  several  cases  above  referred  to. 
See  cases  under  §§  160,  161  ;  and  Klein  v. 
French,  57  Miss.  662,  668  ;  M cNamara  v. 
McNamara,  62  Ga.  200  ;  Luce  v.  Railroad, 
63  N.  H.  588:  Putnam  v.  Pitney,  45  Minn. 
242,  246,  refusing  to  issue  letters  on  the 
ground  that  the  foreign  executor  could 
collect  all  the  assets  in  Minnesota  without 
administration,  there  being  no  necessity 
to  bring  suit  therefor,  and  no  domestic 
creditors. 

2  Story,  Confl.  L.,  §  516;  ante,  §  159; 
Collins  v.  Bankhead,  1  Strobh.  25.  The 
same  principle  holds  good  respecting  a 
liability,  which  follows  the  person  of  the 
debtor ;  hence  a  legacy  charged  upon  real 
estate  devised  may  be  enforced  against 
the  devisee  (although  he  be  also  executor), 
if  he  accepted  the  devise,  in  any  foreign 
State  to  which  he  may  remove  :  Brown  v. 
Knapp,  79  N.  Y.  136, 143.  So,  also,  it  was 
held  that  a  foreign  administrator  in 
whose  State  the  cause  of  action  accrued 
may  maintain  suit  for  the  death  of  his  in- 
testate in  another  State,  on  the  ground 
that  he  sues  not  in  his  character  of  admin- 
istrator, but  rather  as  trustee  of  an  ex- 
press trust  in  favor  of  the  widow  and  next 
of  kin,  to  whom  the  amount  recovered 
would  go,  it  not  being  assets  of  the  estate  : 
Wilson  v.  Tootle,  55  Fed.  R.  211. 


3  Kilpatrick  v.  Bush,  23  Miss.  199; 
Purple  v.  Whithead,  49  Vt.  187;  Craw- 
ford v.  Graves,  15  La.  An.  243  ;  Wingate 
v.  Wheat,  6  La.  An.  238 ;  Beckham  v. 
Wittkowski,  64  N.  C.  464;  Common- 
wealth  v.  Griffith,  2  Pick.  11.  In  the  lat- 
ter case  it  was  held  that  a  slave  escaped 
from  another  State,  not  being  property  in 
Massachusetts,  could  not  be  administered 
upon  there ;  but  that  if  the  owner's  title 
had  vested  in  the  administrator  in  the 
State  of  the  owner's  domicil,  the  latter  or 
his  agent  might,  under  the  law  of  Con- 
gress, seize  and  remove  the  slave  without 
administration  in  Massachusetts. 

4  Indeed,  a  new  administrator  appoint- 
ed in  the  State  of  the  new  forum,  not 
being  privy  to  the  judgment,  could  not 
maintain  such  action  :  Talmage  v.  Chapel, 
16  Mass.  71.  See  Cherry  v.  Spight,  28 
Tex.  503 ;  Biddle  v.  Wilkins,  1  Pet.  686 ; 
Barton  v.  Higgins,  41  Md.  539  ;  Tittmann 
v.  Thornton,  107  Mo.  500;  Hall  v.  Harri- 
son, 21  Mo.  227 ;  Rucks  v.  Taylor,  49 
Miss.  552,  560 ;  Lewis  v.  Adams,  70  Cal. 
403. 

8  Lawrence  v.  Lawrence,  3  Barb.  Ch. 
71  ;  Barrett  v.  Barrett,  8  Me.  346  ;  Trot- 
ter v.  White,  10  Sm.  &  M.  607  ;  Mowry  v. 
Adams,  14  Mass.  327,  329;  Williams  v. 
Moore,  9  Pick.  432,  434. 

393 


DOMICILIARY   AND   ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION. 


1G2 


that  the  plaintiff  described  himself  as  executor  or  administrator, 
this  being  a  proper  descriptio  personce.  Where  the  foreign  executor 
•can  sue  upon  such  a  contract  he  may  be  sued  upon  it ;  the  remedy 
must  run  to  either  party  or  neither.1  So  an  executor  may  maintain 
an  action  for  lands  devised  to  him  in  another  State,  without  qualify- 
ing in  such  State  as  executor,  because  in  such  case  he  may  sue  as 
devisee,2  and  the  executor  or  administrator  holding  a  note  indorsed 
in  blank  or  payable  to  bearer  may  sue  thereon,  as  indorsee  or  owner  ; 3 
and  a  fortiori  as  payee,  where  the  note  is  giveu  or  payable  to  him  in 
person;  for  in  such  case  the  full  legal  title  is  in  the  personal  repre- 
sentative, and  the  addition  of  his  official  capacity  mere  description  of 
the  person.4  So  an  administrator,  to  whom  a  patent  was  reissued  on 
an  invention  of  his  intestate,  may  maintain  an  action  for  the  infringe- 
ment thereof  in  a  State  in  which  he  has  obtained  no  letters,  because 
the  legal  title  to  such  patent  is  in  the  administrator  as  trustee.6  For 
the  same  reason,  the  assignee  of  a  chose  in  action  assigned  by  a 
foreign  executor  or  administrator  may  maintain  an  action  on  the 
chose  transferred,  although  the  assignor  could  not  bring  such  suit 
himself,6  on  the  ground  that  the  disability  of  the  foreign  executor  or 


i  Johnson  v.  Wall  is,  1 12  N.  Y.  230,  232, 
holding  an  action  to  he  maintainable 
against  foreign  executors  to  compel  speci- 
fic performance  of  a  contract  made  by 
them  to  assign  a  judgment  belonging  to 
the  estate. 

2  Lewis  v.  McFarland,  9  Cr.  151.  But 
this  principle  would  not  hold  good  in  the 
case  of  a  legatee  or  heir  of  personal  prop- 
erty, wbo  must  derive  his  title  through  the 
executor  or  administrator,  and  he  derives 
his  authority  as  such  from  the  lex  loci  rei 
sitce  :  Partnership  Estate  of  Ames  &  Co., 
52  Mo.  290. 

3  Barrett  v.  Barrett,  supra ;  Bobinson 
v.  Crandall,  9  Wend.  425  ;  Klein  v.  French, 
57  Miss.  GG2,  671 ;  Knapp  v.  Lee,  42  Mich 
41.  It  lias  been  held  that  where  a  nego- 
tiable note  matures  after  the  testator's 
deatli  it  becomes  vested  in  the  local  ex- 
ecutor, who  may  sue  upon  it  in  another 
State  without  taking  out  letters  there,  and 
establish  a  vendor's  lien  in  the  State  where 
the  land  is  situated,  for  the  purchase  of 
which  the  note  was  given:  Giddings  v. 
Green,  48  Fed.  R.  489. 

i  Rector  v.  Langham,  1  Mo.  568;  La- 
compu-  v.  Beargent,  7  Mo.  351  ;  Smith  '•. 
Monks,  55  Mo.  106,  Bo  where  an  admin- 
istratrix insured  th"  intestate's  property, 
situate  in  the  State  "f  the  domiciL  in  a 
company  doing  business  in  another  State, 


in  which  administration  is  also  had,  the 
money  due  on  the  loss  of  the  property  was 
held  payable  to  the  administratrix  at  the 
place  of  domicil :  Abbott  v.  Miller,  10  Mo. 
141  But  when  he  sues  in  his  representa- 
tive capacity,  alleging  title  in  his  testator 
or  intestate,  he  cannot  recover  by  virtue  of 
his  individual  interest  in  the  matter  in 
controversy  :  Burdyne  v.  Mackey,  7  Mo. 
374. 

6  Goodyear  v.  Hullihen,  3  Fisher's  Pat. 
Cas.  251,  citing  Woodworth  v.  Hall,  1 
Woodb.  &  Min.  248,  254,  and  Smith  v. 
Mercer,  3  Pa.  L.  J.  529,  531. 

c  Campbell  v.  Brown,  64  Iowa,  425, 
citing  authorities  pro  and  con;  Harper  v. 
Butler,  2  Fet.  239  ;  Peterson  v.  Chemical 
Bank,  32  N.  Y.  21  ;  Smith  v.  Tiffany,  16 
Hun,  552 ;  Leake  v.  Gilchrist,  2  Dev.  L. 
73 ;  Mackay  v.  Church,  15  li.  I.  121  ;  Equi- 
table Life  Assur.  v.  Vogel,  76  Ala.  441,  447  ; 
Abercrombie  v  Stillmann,  77  Tex.  589  ; 
Salinsky  v.  National  Bank,  82  Tex.  244 
(holding  that  the  assignment  of  a  note 
draws  with  it  the  mortgage  appurtenant  to 
it),  246.  So  it  was  held  in  Missouri,  that 
an  executrix,  who  was  also  residuary  lega- 
tee, having  fully  administered  in  Ken- 
tucky, may  bring  an  action  in  her  own 
right  against  a  debtor  of  the  testator  resi- 
dent of  Missouri  :  Morton  v.  Hatch,  54 
Mo.  408.     And  the  assignee  of  stock  by  a 


§  163      STATUTORY  AUTHORITY  OF  FOREIGN  EXECUTORS.      *  3G7,  *  3G3 


administrator  to  sue  does  not  attach  to  the  subject  of  the 
[*  368]  action,  but  to  the  person  of  the  plaintiff.     But  this  *  is  true 

only  in  cases  where  the  title  to  the  chose  has  fully  attached, 
and  may  be  asserted  without  trenching  upon  the  authority  of  the 
forum  rei  sitae ;  where,  for  instance,  the  property  of  an  executor  or 
administrator  is  wrongfully  removed  into  another  State,1  or  where 
such  property  is  removed  after  due  administration  thereon.  In  such 
case  the  title  of  the  owner  is  not  affected  by  any  question  of  admin- 
istration, and  is  as  full  as  that  of  any  owner  sui  juris.  In  general, 
however,  simple  contract  debts  are  bona  notabilia  in  the  State  where 
the  debtor  resides,  and  neither  an  administrator  appointed  in  a 
foreign  State,  nor  the  assignee  of  such,  can  control  or  release  them.2 
So  the  balance  remitted  by  a  foreign  executor  to  his  agent  in  an- 
other State,  with  directions  to  pay  it  to  a  residuary  legatee,  cannot 
be  claimed  by  an  administrator  appointed  in  such  State.8 

§  163.  Statutory  Authority  of  Foreign  Executors  and  Adminis 
trators.  —  Statutory  provisions  of  many  of  the  States  enable  foreign 
executors  and  administrators,  under  such  conditions  and     .   ..    .. 

'  ,  Authority 

restrictions  as  may  be  imposed,  to  assign,  transfer,  col-   conferred  by 
lect,  and  sue  for  the  property  of  their  testators  and  in-    statutes- 
testates  found  within  the  jurisdiction  of  such  States.4     It  follows 


foreign  executor  may  compel  the  transfer 
thereof  in  the  courts  of  the  State  where 
the  corporation  does  business :  Middle- 
brook  v.  Merchants'  Bank,  3  Abb.  App. 
Dec.  295,  affirming  same  case  in  41  Barb. 
481  ;  18  Abb.  Pr.  109  ;  27  How.  Pr.  474  ; 
Brown  v.  San  Francisco  Co.,  58  Cal.  426, 
428 ;  Luce  v.  Railroad,  63  N.  H.  588  ;  Gra- 
ham v.  Oviatt,  58  Cal.  428.  And  it  has 
been  held  that  he  may  foreclose  a  mort- 
gage securing  a  note  transferred  by  a 
foreign  executor  :  Gove  v.  Gove,  64  N.  H. 
503  ;  but  the  contrary  has  also  been  held : 
Mclntire  v.  Conrad,  93  Mich.  526,  holding 
that  the  assignment  by  a  foreign  executor 
of  a  Michigan  mortgage  and  note  is  inef- 
fectual, where  a  power  of  sale  in  a  mort- 
gage is  given  to  a  non-resident  and  his 
legal  representatives,  the  latter  may  exe- 
cute the  power,  as  it  vests  in  him  by  the 
contract,  and  is  not  dependent  upon  the 
laws  of  either  State  relating  to  administra- 
tion :  Stevens  v.  Shannahan,  160  111.  330. 
And  since  the  executor  having  letters  of 
probate  granted  in  the  testator's  domicil  is 
the  holder  of  stock  within  the  meaning  of 
the  corporation  act,  he  may  vote  on  such 
stock  standing  in  the  decedent's  name  in 
another  State:  In  re  Election,  51  N.  J. 
L.  78. 


1  Moore  v.  Fields,  42  Pa.  St.  467, 472. 

2  Post,  §§  205,  309 ;  Dial  v.  Gary,  14 
S.  C.  573 ;  Morton  v.  Hatch,  supra,  in 
which  the  distinction  between  the  condi- 
tion of  the  title  before  and  after  comple- 
tion of  the  administration  is  emphasized  : 
Stearns  v.  Barnham,  5  Me.  261 ;  McCarty 
v.  Hall,  13  Mo.  480;  Partnership  Estate  of 
Henry  Ames  &  Co.,  52  Mo.  290 ;  Moore  v. 
Jordan,  36  Kans.  271,  274.  See  also 
Barnes  v.  Brashear,  2  B.  Mon.  380,  where 
it  is  held  that  the  assignment  of  a  note  by 
the  executor  of  a  deceased  testator  prop- 
erly appointed  authorizes  the  assignee  to 
bring  suit  upon  it  in  any  other  State,  and 
that  the  administrator  of  the  estate  in  the 
place  of  the  domicil,  who  obtained  posses- 
sion of  a  bond  which  was  in  possession  of 
the  intestate  at  the  time  of  his  death  in 
another  State,  was  authorized  to  collect 
such  bond :  pp.  383  et  seq. ;  Thompson  v. 
Wilson,  2  N.  H.  291. 

3  Because  it  was  money  had  and  re- 
ceived by  the  agent  to  the  use  of  the 
residuary  legatee,  who  was  entitled  to  re- 
cover the  same :  Wheelock  v.  Pierce,  6 
Cush.  288. 

4  Eells  v.  Holder,  2  McCrary,  622  ;  Bell 
v.  Nichols,  38  Ala.  678  ;  Cloud  v.  Golightly, 
5  Ala.  654 ;   Glassell  v.  Wilson,  4   Wash 


*  368,  *  369      DOMICILIARY  AND   ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION.  §  163 


from  this  authority  of  foreign  executors  and  administrators,  that 
the  Statute  of  Limitations  runs  against  them  just  as  though 
they  had  been  appointed  in  such  States.1  And  where  the  *  stat-  [*  369] 
ute  authorizes  them  to  sue  and  be  sued,  in  like  manner  as  a 
non-resident  may  be  sued,3  an  attachment  against  such  will  divests 
them  of  all  interest  in  the  property  attached.8  In  Pennsylvania  a 
distinction  formerly  existed  between  executors  appointed  in  a  sister 
State  and  those  of  foreign  countries,  and  it  was  held  that  this 
law  was  intended  to  prevent  the  withdrawal  from  the  jurisdiction  of 
Pennsylvania  of  the  estates  of  non-residents,  to  the  prejudice  of  those 
interested  in  the  distribution,  and  to  apply  to  administrators  as  well 
as  executors ; 4  but  now  any  foreign  executor  may  transfer  stock 
of  a  company  in  Pennsylvania.6  In  some  of  the  States  the  foreign 
executor  or  administrator  is  permitted  to  act,  but  must  first  qualify 
according  to  the  laws  of  such  State,6  or  file  his  letters  testamentary 
or  of  administration  in  the  county  where  he  brings  suit.7     In  Wis- 


59  ;  Newton  v.  Cocke,  10  Ark.  169  ;  South 
Western  Railroad  v.  Paulk,  24  Ga.  356 ; 
Turner  v.  Linam,  55  Ga.  253 ;  Kansas 
Pacific  Railroad  v.  Cutter,  16  Kans.  568 ; 
Sheldon  v.  Rice,  30  Mich.  296 ;  Price  v. 
Morris,  5  McLean,  4  ;  Deringer  v.  Derin- 
ger,  5  Houst.  416  ;  such  provisions  do  not 
exclude  the  grant  of  letters  by  the  local 
courts,  but  are  cumulative :  Epping  v. 
Robinson,  21  Fla.  36,  51. 

1  Manly  v.  Turnipseed,  37  Ala.  522; 
Bell  v.  Nichols,  supra. 

2  As  in  Kansas,  Gen.  St.  ch.  37,  §  203. 
8  Cady  v.  Bard,  21  Kans.  667,  668.    In 

general,  however,  attachment  will  not  lie 
against  an  executor  or  administrator, 
though  he  be  a  non-resident:  Levy  v. 
Succession,  38  La.  An.  9 ;  In  re  Hurd,  9 
Wend.  465  ;  see  also  Weyman  v.  Murdock, 
Harp.  L.  125. 

*  Alfonso's  Appeal,  70  Pa.  St.  347. 

6  Williams  v.  Pennsylvania  Railroad, 
9  l'liila.  298,  referring  to  the  statute  of 
1871,  Pamph.  L.  44,  and  holding  that  it  is 
not  incumbent  upon  the  company  to  as- 
certain whether  the  will  authorizes  such 
transfer,  but  the  power  in  the  executor 
will  be  presumed.  The  earlier  statutes 
00  this  subject  were  regarded  with  dis- 
trust and  apprehension  by  the  courts. 
"The  authority  of  an  administrator," 
nays  Gibson,  C.  J.,  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Pennsylvania,  "under  letters  granted 
in  a  sister  State,  to  meddle  with  the  assets 
an  anomaly  produced  by  an  unex- 
ampled spirit  of  comity  in  the  courts  of 
396 


this  State,  which  will  probably  be  at- 
tended, in  this  respect,  with  perplexity 
and  confusion " :  Brodie  v.  Brickley,  2 
Rawle,  431,  437.  See  the  remarks  on  this 
and  other  Pennsylvania  cases  in  Shinn's 
Estate,  166  Pa.  St.  121,  in  which  the  court 
inclines  to  extend  rather  than  restrict  the 
spirit  of  comity  in  that  State  ;  and  in  the 
later  case  of  Laughlin  v.  Solomon,  180  Pa. 
St.  177,  the  court  again  reviews  the  cases, 
and  approves  the  early  cases  which  gave 
larger  recognition  to  foreign  executors, 
and  disapproves  Brodie  v.  Brickley  and 
other  intermediate  cases. 

6  Perkins  v.  Williams,  2  Root,  462; 
Nicole  v.  Munford,  Kirby,  270 ;  Hobart 
v.  Turnpike  Company,  15  Conn.  145; 
Allsup  v.  Allsup,  10  Yerg.  283 ;  Curie  v. 
Moor,  1  Dana,  445 ;  Winter  v.  Winter, 
Walker  (Miss.),  211 ;  Sims  v.  Hedges,  6S 
Miss.  210;  Vermilya  v.  Beatty,  6  Barb. 
429.  These  conditions  are  in  effect  a  re- 
quirement to  obtain  new  letters. 

7  Mansfield  v.  Turpin,  32  Ga.  260; 
Naylor  v.  Moody,  2  Blackf.  247 ;  Higgins 
v.  Reed,  48  Kans.  272  (allowing  a  foreign 
executrix  to  sell  realty)  ;  Babcock  v.  Col- 
lins, 60  Minn.  73,  per  Canty,  J.,  p.  77,  re- 
ferring to  the  statutes.  And  in  Illinois 
it  is  held  that,  where  the  transcript  of  the 
letters  so  filed  shows  that  they  were 
granted  in  a  foreign  State  by  the  clerk, 
this  will  be  deemed  a  ministerial  act,  and 
collateral  inquiry  may  be  made  whether 
the  conditions  necessary  to  give  jurisdic- 
tion existed:  Illinois  Central  Railroad  v 


§  163      STATUTORY  AUTHORITY  OF  FOREIGN  EXECUTORS.     *  369,  *  370 

consin  he  may  file  a  copy  of  his  appointment  in  any  county  and  can 
then  exercise  the  same  powers  as  a  domestic  executor  or  adminis- 
trator.1 In  Arkansas,  administrators  and  executors  appointed  in  any 
of  the  States  of  the  Union  may  sue  in  their  representative  capacity, 
to  the  same  and  like  effect  as  if  appointed  in  Arkansas  ; 2  while  a 
judgment  obtained  against  a  foreign  administrator  in  this  State,  upon 
his  voluntary  appearance,  is  held  to  be  void,3  yet  if  he  subsequently 
file  a  bill  of  review  to  reverse  the  decree  on  the  ground  that  he 
could  not  be  sued  in  Arkansas,  he  thereby  becomes  himself  the  actor, 
and  under  the  statute  confers  jurisdiction  on  the  court  to  bind  him 
by  the  original  decree,  if  his  bill  is  dismissed  for  want  of  equity.4 
Where  a  foreign  executor  or  administrator  is  entitled  to  bring  suit 
on  condition  of  obtaining  new  letters,  as  in  Nebraska,  he  stands  in 
the  same  relation  to  the  estate  which  an  executor  sustains  at  com- 
mon law  before  probate  of  the  will ;  he  may  commence  an  action 
before  obtaining  letters,  and  take  judgment,  if  he  show  by  subsequent 
averment  that  he  was  duly  qualified.5  But  where  a  foreign  executor 
attempts  to  enforce  a  judgment  in  favor  of  his  intestate  without 
complying  with  the  statute  of  the  forum,  his  subsequent  qualifica- 
tion in  accordance  therewith  will  not  relate  back  so  as  to  validate 
an  unauthorized  execution,6  and  a  presentation  of  a  claim  by  a  for- 
eign executrix  against  the  debtor's  estate,  before  complying  with 
the  statute  clothing  foreign  executors  with  authority,  is  void,  and 
does  not  put  in  operation  the  statute  of  non-claim.7  The  authority 
of  a  foreign  executrix  to  defend  a  suit  in  Kentucky  is  not  extin- 
guished by  her  marriage;  the  statute  of  Kentucky  has  no  bearing 
upon  the  authority  of  a  non-resident  representative,  which  is  gov- 
erned by  the  foreign  law.8  In  this  State  a  non-resident  executor  or 
administrator  of  a  non-resident  decedent  may  sue  to  recover  a  debt, 
on  giving  bond  in  the  county  where  the  action  is  brought;  but  if  he 
desires  to  proceed  for  any  other  purpose  (as  to  sell  realty  under  a 
will)  he   must    take  out  new  letters ;  9  nor  is  a   foreign   executor 

authorized  under  the  statute  to  sue  for  a  tort.10  A  foreign 
[*  370]  executor  selling  *  land  in  Indiana  is  governed  by  the  same 

rules,  terms,  and  conditions  as  a  domestic  executor,  except 
that  he  is  not  liable  to  give  bond,  if  he  have  given  a  sufficient  bond 

Cragin,  71    111.  177.     And   in   Iowa  the  3  Greer  v.  Ferguson,  46  Ark.  324. 

foreign  executor  must  also  give  bond  be-  *  Lawrence  v.  Nelson,  143  U.  S.  215. 

fore   he  can    sue:    Karrick   v.  Pratt,    4  5  Swatzel  v.  Arnold,  1  Woodw.  383; 

Greene   (Iowa),   144.  and  see  Gray  v.  Ferguson,  86  Mich.  383. 

1  Murry  v  Norwood,  77  Wis.  405,  408.  6  Jackson  v.  Scanland,  65  Miss.  481. 

2  In  this  State   lands  are   by  statute  7  Henry  v.  Roe,  83  Tex.  446. 
made  assets  in  the  hands  of  an  adminis-  8  Moss  v.  Rowland,  3  Bush.  505. 
trator;    it   is   held,   that    nevertheless    a  9  Marrett  v.  Bahb,  91  Ky.  88. 
foreign  administrator  cannot  sue  for  pos-  10  L.  &  N.  Railroad  v.  Brantley,  96  Ky 
session  of  the  realty ;  nor  is  he  liable,  as  297. 

such,  for  rents  and  profits:  Fairchild  v. 
Hagel,  45  Ark.  61. 

397 


*  370,  *  871      DOMICILIARY  AND    ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION.  §  164 

in  the  State  in  which  he  received  his  appointment.1  In  Florida 
foreign  executors  and  administrators  are  authorized  by  the  statute 
to  bring  suits,  but  not  to  defend  them.2  Letters  granted  in  New 
York  have  been  held  to  enable  a  suit  to  be  brought  in  the  District 
of  Columbia,3  and  in  Minnesota  a  foreign  administrator  may  be  ad- 
mitted to  defend  a  suit  pending  against  the  decedent  at  his  death.4 
In  Georgia  a  foreign  administrator  de  bonis  non  cannot  be  substituted 
for  the  deceased  predecessor  as  plaintiff  in  a  pending  action,  but  he 
may  maintain  a  new  suit.5  Where  a  testator  in  Ireland  named  a 
person  in  America  as  trustee,  with  power  and  discretion  to  collect 
and  transmit  his  estate  in  America  to  his  executors  in  Ireland,  the 
person  so  named  was  held  to  be  a  limited  executor,  and  bound  to 
execute  the  trust  in  the  mode  prescribed  in  the  will.' 

§  164.  Liabilities  of  Foreign  Administrators.  —  The  principle  that 
executors  and  administrators  are  not  liable  to  actions  as  such  in 
States  where  they  have  obtained  no  letters  is  not  permitted  to  pro- 
Equitv  will  tect  them  against  the  consecpiences  of  their  own  wrong 
grant  relief  or  default.  Thus,  where  an  executor  or  administrator 
ministrator  removes  the  property  of  the  estate  in  his  charge,  with- 
bringingun-      ouj.   having   completed    the   administration,  to   another 

administered  °  r  7 

property  into  State,  and  fails  to  obtain  new  letters  of  administration 
ou^obtaYning  there,  a  court  of  equity  will  grant  relief  to  any  person 
letters.  whose  interest  is  thereby  jeoparded,  on  the  ground  that, 

where  a  trust  fund  is  in  danger  of  being  wasted  or  misapplied,  the 
court  of  chancery,  on  the  application  of  those  interested,  will  inter- 
fere to  protect  the  fund  from  loss.7  The  exercise  of  this  authority 
is  in  no  way  inconsistent  with  the  general  principle  announced  as 
governing  the  powers  and  liabilities  of  executors  and  administrators, 
who,  as  such,  derive  their  powers  from,  and  are  amenable  only  to, 
the  forum  of  the  State  under  whose  laws  they  hold  their  office. 
They  are  in  such  proceeding  treated,  not  in  their  official  capacity, 
which  is  co-extensive  only  with  the  State  in  which  they  received 
their  appointment,  but  as  persons  who,  by  withdrawing  them- 
selves from  the  *  jurisdiction  of  the  court  having  power  over  [*  371] 
them,  are  unlawfully  in  possession  of  the  property  which  is 
to  be  protected,  or  adjudged  to  its  lawful  owner.  "This  is  not 
a  suit  against  the  administrator  for  a  debt  due  from  the  estate, 
but  it  is  an  assertion  of  title  to  the  property  itself,  which,  being 

*  "Rapp  v.  Matthias,  35  Ind.  3.32.     And  368;    if  certified   according  to  2   St.   at 

the  court's  failure  to  require  the  foreign  Large,  755. 

executor  to  file  an  authenticated  copy  of  4  Brown  v.  Brown,  35  Minn.  191. 

the  will  and  of  his  appointment,  is  not  a  6  Patterson  v.  Blanchard,  98  Ga.  518 

jurisdictional  defect   in  a  sale  of  real  es-  6  Hunter  v.  Brvson,  5  G.  &  J.  483. 

tote:    Bailey  v.  Winker,  L46  Ind.  129.  7  Calhoun    v.   King,   5  Ala.  523,  525; 

a  Cordon    v.  Clark,   10    Fla.    179,   19G;  Bceler  v.  Dunn,  3   Head,  87,  90;  Dillard 

Sloan  v.  Sloan,  21   Fla.  589.  v.  Harris,  2  Term.  Ch.  196,  206. 

8  Blydenburgn  v,  Lowry,  4  Cr.  C.  C. 

398 


§164 


LIABILITIES   OP   FOREIGN    ADMINISTRATORS. 


371 


found  in  this  State,  will  give  the  court  jurisdiction."  1  So  an  exec- 
utor may  be  compelled  by  a  court  of  equity,  in  a  State  to  which  he 
may  have  removed,  to  disclose  with  what  funds  he  has  purchased 
property,  the  character  of  the  funds,  and  whether  he  holds  the  prop- 
erty as  trustee,  and  for  what  uses  and  trusts.2  In  Connecticut  it  is 
held  that  an  executor  bringing  unadministered  assets  of  his  testator's 
estate  into  a  foreign  State  is  there  liable  to  creditors  as  executor  de 
jure.8  And  executors  who  have  been  made  parties  to  a  suit  in  a 
foreign  State  at  their  own  request  will  not  be  heard  to  deny,  in  a 
subsequent  suit  on  such  judgment  in  the  State  of  the  domicil,  the 
jurisdiction  of  such  foreign  court.4  And  where  an  executor  obtains 
letters  of  administration  in  another  State  also,  he  is  liable  there  for 
assets  obtained  in  the  foreign  State  before  issue  of  letters  to  him.8 
In  California  it  was  held  that  an  ancillary  administrator  there 
appointed  could  recover  by  replevin  from  the  foreign  domiciliary 
administrator  temporarily  in  the  State,  negotiable  paper  evidencing 
debts  due  the  deceased  from  a  local  bank,  which  the  foreign  admin- 
istrator was  unable  to  collect.6 

In  Georgia,  an  administrator,  appointed  in  another  State,  having 
converted  the  assets  of  the  estate  and  removed  to  Georgia,  was  not 
only  held  personally  liable  to  the  heirs,  but  also  the  sureties  on  his 
administration  bond,  who  had  likewise  removed  to  Georgia.7 


1  Ormond,  J.,  in  Calhoun  v.  King, 
supra.  To  the  same  effect,  Williamson  v. 
Branch  Bank,  7  Ala.  906  ;  Julian  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 8  Ala.  680 ;  Montalvan  v.  Clover, 
32  Barb.  190;  Patton  v.  Overton,  8 
Humph.  192;  Tunstall  v.  Pollard,  11 
Leigh,  1  ;  Colbert  v.  Daniel,  32  Ala.  314; 
McNamara  v.  Dwyer,  7  Pai.  239  ;  Allsup 
v.  Allsup,  10  Yerg.  283  ;  Bryan  v.  McGee, 
2  Wash.  C.  C.  337;  Powell  v.  Stratton, 
11  Grat.  792;  Manion  v.  Titsworth,  18  B. 
Mon.  582,  597,  approved  in  Baker  v. 
Smith,  3  Met.  (Ky.)  264,  holding  that  the 
accountability  of  the  administrator  must 
be  determined  by  the  law  of  the  State 
where  he  qualified  ;  Spraddling  v.  Pipkin, 
15  Mo.  118,  holding  that  in  such  case  the 
remedy  is  not  detinue  by  an  administrator 
de  bonis  non  appointed  here,  but  by  bill  in 
equity;  Whittaker  v.  Whittaker,  10  Lea, 
93,  97. 

2  Clopton  v.  Booker,  27  Ark.  482.  In 
this  case  it  is  held  that  the  executor,  as 
such,  cannot  be  called  to  account  before  a 
foreign  court. 

3  Marcy  v.  Marcy,  32  Conn.  308. 

*  Upon  the  ground  of  estoppel,  and 
also  on  the  principle  that  where  one  sues 
as  executor,  or,  being  sued,  answers  as 


such,  he  is  liable  as  executor  de  son  tort: 
National  Bank  v.  Lewis,  12  Utah,  84,  99  ; 
Davis  v.  Connelly,  4  B.  Mon.  136,  139, 
et  seq. 

8  Parsons  v.  Lyman,  4  Bradf.  268  ;  s.  c. 
20  N.  Y.  103,  108.  But  where  a  debtor 
makes  voluntary  payment  to  a  foreign 
executor,  who  accounts  therefor  in  such 
foreign  State,  and  subsequently  takes  out 
letters  in  the  debtor's  State,  the  latter 
cannot  then,  as  a  creditor,  claim  to  have 
him  surcharged  in  his  State  with  the  debt 
so  paid  :  Gray's  Appeal,  116  Pa.  St.  256. 

6  McCully  v.  Cooper,  114  Cal.  25S. 

7  Johnson  v.  Jackson,  56  Ga.  326,  328. 
Warner,  C.  J.,  in  delivering  the  opinion, 
puts  this  doctrine  on  the  ground  that  the 
sovereignty  and  jurisdiction  of  the  State 
extend  to  all  persons  while  within  its  lim- 
its, whether  as  citizens,  denizens,  or  tem- 
porary sojourners,  including  executors  and 
administrators  as  well  as  other  persons, 
no  exception  being  made  in  favor  of  sure- 
ties on  their  bonds  ;  the  nature  and  extent 
of  their  liability  being  determined  by  the 
laws  of  the  country  or  State  from  which 
they  derive  their  authority,  in  the  same 
manner  as  if  they  were  sued  in  the  courts 
of  that  State  or  country.    "And  that,"  h« 

399 


*  372,  *  373      DOMICILIARY   AND   ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION.  §  165 

*  It  may  be  stated,  however,  as  a  general  proposition,  that  [*  372J 
the  liability  of  an  administrator  for  property  fraudulently,  or 
without  having  been  fully  administered,  brought  from  the  State  in 
which  he  received  his  appointment  to  another  State,  is  to  the  credi- 
tors and  distributees  alone,  and  does  not  authorize  the  grant  of  letters 
in  the  latter  State.1 

§  165.  Probate  Jurisdiction  affected  by  Change  of  Government.  — 
A  question  of  some  interest  in  connection  with  the  status  of  foreign 
^  ....      ,        executors  and  administrators  arose  out  of  the  exercise 

Validity  of  .-•■»•.■         * 

letters  issued  or  probate  jurisdiction  by  the  courts  under  the  govern- 
r/beMoif6  m  ments  existing  in  some  of  the  States  during  the  late 
rebellion,  and  the  subsequent  rehabilitation  of  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States.  The  probate  of  wills  and  the  appoint- 
ment of  executors  and  administrators  by  probate  courts  holding 
authority  under  and  commissions  from  the  government  of  the  State 
of  Alabama  while  a  member  of  the  Confederacy  were  after  the  war, 
in  the  State  of  Alabama,  held  to  be  the  acts  of  a  foreign  jurisdiction. 
"  It  is  true,"  says  Peck,  C.  J.,  of  the  Supreme  Court,  delivering  the 
opinion  in  Bibb  v.  Avery,  "there  seems  to  be  an  apparent  incon- 
gruity in  this  view  of  the  case,  arising  from  the  fact  that  the  rebel 
State  government  had  the  same  name,  and  was  in  possession  of  the 
same  geographical  territory,  as  the  legitimate  government  of  the 
State  of  Alabama  before  and  since  the  rebellion,  and  the  people  were 
the  same  people  ;  but  this  apparent  incongruity  disappears  when  we 
look  to  principles  and  not  to  names.  For  we  know  that  the  rebel 
State  of  Alabama,  not  rightfully,  but  in  fact,  was  in  all  its  essentials, 
its  sovereignty,  dominion,  and  government,  as  utterly  foreign  to  the 
United  States  as  the  government  of  Canada  or  of  San  Domingo; 
consequently,  the  judgments  of  its  courts  and  judicial  acts  can  be 
treated  as  having  no  greater  legal  effect  than  the  judgments 
and  judicial  acts  of  a  recognized  foreign  government."  a  *In  |~*  373] 
Arkansas  it  was  held  that  letters  of  administration  issued  by 
the  clerk  of  the  probate  court,  holding  a  commission  from  the  Gov- 
ernor of  Arkansas  under  the  Confederate  Constitution  of  1861,  were 
void,  and  conferred  no  authority  in  1867,  because  the  clerk  was  not, 
at  the  time  of  granting  the  letters,  in  March  1864,  an  officer  of  the 

says,  "  is  the  comity  of  States  as  rccog-  said  court  had  taken  the  oath  of  amnesty 

nized   by   the  .  .  .  Code."    It    is    to    be  and  of  office  required  by  the  Governor's 

noticed,  however,  that  the  facts  recited  in  proclamation  of  July  20,    1865,  were  re- 

the  opinion    bring  ihe  case  fully  within  cmired  to  obtain  new  letters,  and  give  new 

the  general  rule  as  stated  in  the  text.  bonds   and   security,   before    they    could 

1  AlcCabe  v.  Lewis,  7G  Mo.  296,  304.  maintain  an  action  in  the  courts  of  that 

2  45  Ala.  691,  698,  et  spq.  It  was  ac-  State  ;  but  that,  under  the  peculiar  cir- 
COTcMngly  beld  id  this  case,  that  executors  cumstances  of  the  case,  the  new  letters  so 
holding  tetters  testamentary  issued  "by  issued  must  be  regarded,  not  as  ancillary, 
a  probate  court  of  the  rebel  State  govern-  but  as  original. 

ment  of  Alabama"  before  the  judge  of 

400 


§  166     PROCEDURE  GOVERNED  BY  LAW  OP  FORUM.   *  373,  *  374 

government  of  the  State  of  Arkansas.1  But  an  action  commenced  by 
an  executor  appointed  during  the  war  may  be  continued  by  such 
executor  in  his  own  name  under  authority  of  new  letters  granted 
after  the  war  by  the  proper  probate  court  of  the  existing  govern- 
ment.2 So  in  Texas  it  was  held  that  the  military  courts  established 
by  the  federal  authority  during  the  reconstruction  period  were  the 
proper  legal  authority  until  the  dominant  power  holding  military 
possession  determined  that  the  military  rule,  called  for  by  the  seces- 
sion of  the  State,  should  be  at  an  end ;  and  since  this  was  not  done 
before  April  16,  1870,  the  constitution  of  1869,  adopted  by  the  people 
of  Texas  and  withdrawing  probate  jurisdiction  from  the  county 
courts,  could  not  have  the  effect  of  working  a  cessation  of  probate 
jurisdiction  in  those  courts  until  April  16th,  1870 ;  and  it  was  accord- 
ingly held  that  a  probate  sale,  made  and  approved  in  1870,  prior  to 
April  16th  in  a  county  court,  was  valid  to  pass  the  title.8 

A  similar  question  was  presented  in  consequence  of  the  cession  of 
a  part  of  their  territories  by  the  States  of  Virginia  and  Maryland  to 
the  government  of  the  United  States  to  form  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia, which  led  to  the  decision  that  letters  of  administration  granted 
in  Maryland  before  the  cession  of  the  territory  have  no  validity  in 
the  district  ceded  after  the  separation,  and  that  the  administrator 
must  obtain  new  letters  there.4  But  an  administrator  who  had  been 
appointed  in  Virginia  before  the  separation  could  not,  in  a  suit 
against  him  in  the  District  of  Columbia  after  the  separation,  sustain 
the  plea  of  "  never  administrator."  5  And  in  Kentucky  it  was  held 
that  the  probate  of  a  will  in  Virginia  before  the  separation  of  Ken- 
tucky from  its  territory  was  not  a  foreign  probate,  but  that  the  will 
so  proved  was  admissible  in  evidence  as  a  will  proved  in  Kentucky 
after  the  separation.6 

§  166.  Procedure  governed  by  the  Law  of  the  Forum.  —  Although 
the  law  of  the  domicil  of  the  decedent  governs  the  devolution  of 
personal   property  to  heirs  and  legatees,  yet  it  follows 
from  the  exclusive  authority  of  each  nation  over  the    ministration, 
property  and  persons  within  its  jurisdiction,  that  the    J1^*7?* 
mode  of  administration,  including  the  method  of  prov-   method  of 
ing  debts,  their  right  to  priority  of  payment,  and  the    are  governed' 
marshalling  of  assets  for  this  purpose,  is  gov-    by  the  law  of 
[*  374]  erned  *  altogether  by  the  law  of  the  country  in   the  forun1, 

which  the  executor  or  administrator  acts,  entirely  independent 
of  that  in  the  domicil  of  the  decedent,  or  in  any  other  State.7     This 

*  Page  v.  Cook,  26  Ark.  122.  1  Story,  Confl.  L.  §§  524,  525;  Smith 

2  Gilmer  v.  Purgason,  50  Ala.  370.  v.  Union  Bank  of  Georgetown,  5  Pet.  518, 

8  Daniel  v.  Hutchison,  86  Tex.  51.  526  :  "  Every  sovereign  has  his  own  code 

4  Fenwick  v.  Sears,  1  Cranch,  259.  of  administration,  varying  to  infinity  as 

6  Courtney  v.  Hunter,  I  Cr.  C.  C.  265.  to  the  order  of  paying  debts,  and  almost 

6  Morgan  v.  Gaines,  3  A.  K.  Marsh,  without  an  exception  asserting  the  right 

613  ;  Gray  v.  Patton,  2  B.  Monr.  12.  to  be  himself  first  paid  out  of  the  assets. 

VOL.  i.  —  26  401 


374,  *  375      DOMICILIARY   AND   ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION.  §  167 


principle  is  recognized  in  the  federal  as  well  as  in  the  State  courts. 
Thus,  a  creditor  obtaining  a  judgment  in  a  district  court  of  the 
United  States  was  held  not  entitled  to  an  execution  thereon  against 
the  administrator  of  an  intestate's  estate  declared  insolvent  by  the 
probate  court,  although  the  judgment  had  been  obtained  before  the 
estate  was  declared  insolvent,  on  the  ground  that  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  probate  court  had  attached  to  the  assets.1  When  the  United 
States  comes  into  the  probate  court  its  claim  will  be  governed  by  the 
local  law.2  That  an  executor  or  administrator  is  not  liable  in  the 
State  where  he  received  his  appointment  for  assets  received  in  an- 
other State,  whether  he  obtained  additional  letters  there  or  not,  has 
already  been  shown.8  The  cases  holding  a  contrary  doctrine,4  in  so  far 
as  they  are  not  based  upon  the  principle  that  the  assets  were  wrong- 
fully removed  from  the  State  or  country  having  jurisdiction  for  the 
purpose  or  with  the  effect  of  defeating  such  jurisdiction,  seem  to  be 
inconsistent  with  the  general  doctrine  on  this  subject,  and  are  said  by 
Judge  Story  to  be  very  difficult  to  be  supported.6 

*  §  167.    Payment  of  Debts   and    Distribution  to   Non-resi-   [*  375] 
dents.  —  From  these  principles  it  results  that  the 
administration  of  the  assets  of  a  deceased  person  is  con- 
ducted according  to  the  laws  of  the  State  in  which  they 


Debts  proved 
by  domestic 
creditors  and 
expenses  of 


And  the  obligation  in  the  administrator 
to  conform  to  such  laws  is  very  gener- 
ally enforced,  not  only  by  a  bond,  but  by 
an  oath,  both  of  which  must  rest  for  their 
efficiency  on  the  laws  of  the  State  which 
requires  them."  Kennedy  v.  Kennedy,  8 
Ala.  391  ;  McGehee  v.  Polk,  24  Ga.  406  ; 
Hooker  v.  Olmstead,  6  Pick.  481  ;  St. 
Jurjo  v.  Dunscomb,  2  Bradf.  105;  Isham 
v.  Gibbons,  1  Bradf.  69  ;  Willing  v.  Perot, 
5  Rawle,  264;  Goodall  v.  Marshall,  11 
N.  II.  88;  Dixon  v.  Ramsay,  3  Cr.  319; 
Trecothick  v.  Austin,  4  Mas.  16. 

1  "  They  are  in  gremio  legis,"  says 
Grier,  J.  "  But  we  wish  it  to  be  under- 
Btood  that  we  do  not  express  any  opinion 
as  to  the  right  of  State  legislation  to  com- 
pel foreign  creditors  in  all  cases  to  seek 
tlnir  remedy  against  the  estates  of  dece- 
dents in  the  State  courts  alone,  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of 
the  United  States":  Williams  v.  Rene- 
din,  8  How.  107,  112.  In  later  cases,  it 
was  held  that  a  foreign  creditor  may  es- 
tablish his  debt  in  the  courts  of  the  United 
States  against  the  representatives  of  a 

decedent,  notwithstanding  the  local  laws 
relative  to  the  administration  and  settle- 
rn'-nt  of  insolvent  estates,  and  that  the 
court  will  interpose  to  arrest  the  distribu- 
402 


tion  of  any  surplus  among  the  heirs,  re- 
serving, however,  the  question  whether  or 
what  steps  may  be  taken  to  secure  equal- 
ity of  such  creditors  in  the  distribution  of 
the  assets  independently  of  the  adminis- 
tration in  the  probate  courts :  Green  v. 
Creighton,  23  How.  (U.  S.)  90, 107,  et  seq.  ; 
Union  Bank  of  Tennessee  v.  Jolly,  18 
How.  503.  For  a  fuller  discussion  of  the 
extent  to  which  federal  courts  can  take 
jurisdiction  in  administration  matters,  see 
ante,  §  156. 

2  United  States  v.  Hailey,  2  Idaho,  26, 
30. 

8  Ante,  §  160,  and  authorities. 

4  Sweariugen  v.  Pendleton,  4  S.  &  R. 
389,  392,  and  Evans  v.  Tatem,  9  S.  &  R. 
252,  259,  both  overruled  in  Magraw  v. 
Irwin,  87  Pa.  St.  139,  142  ;  Bryan  v.  Mc- 
Gee,  2  Wash.  C.  C.  337;  Campbell  v. 
Touscy,  7  Cow.  64. 

6  Story,  Coufl.  L.  §  514  a,  citing  with 
approval  Fay  v.  Haven,  3  Met.  (Mass.) 
109  ;  Selectmen  v.  Boylston,  2  Mass.  384; 
Goodwin  v.  .Jones,  3  Mass.  514;  Davis  v. 
Estey,  8  Pick.  475;  Dawes  v.  Head,  3 
Pick.  128;  Doolittle  v.  Lewis,  7  John.  Ch. 
45;  McKae  v.  McKae,  11  La.  571  ;  and 
quoting  largely  from  the  opinions  in  2  and 
3  Mass.  and  7  John.,  supra. 


§167 


PAYMENT    OF    DEBTS    AND    DISTRIBUTION. 


*  Q 


75 


ds 


may  be  found,  and  applied  first  to  the  payment  of  the  administrate 

expenses  of  administration,1  and  such  debts  as  may  be  out ofthefuir 

proved  acrainst  the  estate  by  creditors  residing  there  ; 2  m  th<2  h*n.ds  of 

1  °  /  .  °.  .    '  the  admimstra- 

and  if  there  be  legatees  or  heirs  there  also,  their  claims  tor  in  the  State 

will  be  determined  according  to  the  law  of  the  decedent's  of  the  forum- 

domicil,  and  distributed  to  them.     The  residue  may  then  Residue  is  then 

be  remitted  from  the  ancillary  to  the  domiciliary  execu-  domiciliary 

tor  or    administrator.8     But   it    is   not  obligatory   upon  administrator, 

courts  to  transfer  the  assets  to  the  domicil  for  distribution  ;  in  their 

judicial  discretion,  to  be  guided  by  the  circumstances  of 

each   particular   case,  they   may  be  thus  remitted,4  or 

ordered  to  be  distributed  by  the  ancillary  administrator 

to  the  parties  in  interest  seeking  their  remedy  there.5 

1  In  Georgia  it  is  held  that  the  year's     them  in  full ;  Jones  v.  Jones,  39  S.  C.  247, 


or  distributed 
by  the  court 
without  such 
transmission. 


support  of  the  widow  of  an  intestate  is  by 
statute  declared  to  be  a  part  of  the  neces- 
sary expenses  of  administration,  but  that 
t'ae  amount  thereof  is  to  be  ascertained  by 
t'.ie  law  of  the  domicil  of  the  intestate  at 
the  time  of  his  death,  and  not  by  the  law 
of  the  forum  before  which  the  adminis- 
tration is  pending:  Mitchell  v.  Word,  64 
Cia.  208,  218.  A  dissenting  opinion  by 
Jackson,  J.,  held  that  the  expenses  of  ad- 
ministration are  regulated  by  the  law  of 
the  forum  ;  p.  219. 

2  Cowden  v.  Jacobson,  1G5  Mass.  240. 
Says  the  court,  in  Smith  v.  Howard,  86 
Me.  203,  207 :  "  So  long  as  there  are 
creditors  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
ancillary  administration,  they  have  a  legal 


256 ;  Richards  v.  Dutch,  8  Mass.  50G  ; 
Fay  v.  Haven,  3  Met.  (Mass.)  109;  Stev- 
ens v.  Gaylord,  1 1  Mass.  256 ;  Childress 
v.  Bennett,  10  Ala.  751 ;  Perkins  v.  Stone, 
18  Conn.  270;  Adams  v.  Adams,  11  B. 
Mon.  77;  Stokely's  Estate,  19  Pa.  St. 
476,  482  ;  Gibson  v.  Dowell,  42  Ark.  164  ; 
Moore  v.  Jordan,  36  Kans.  271,  275; 
Gable's  Estate,  79  Iowa,  178,  in  which 
case  the  residue  consisted  of  the  proceeds 
of  realty  ;  Hayes  v.  Pratt,  147  U.  S.  557, 
570. 

*  Gaines'  Succession,  46  La.  An.  252; 
Gravillon  v.  Richard,  13  La.  293. 

5  Cassily  v.  Meyer,  4  Md.  1,  7,  et  seq. ; 
Williams  v.  Williams,  5  Md.  467 ;  Mou- 
raiu  v.  Poydras,  6  La.  An.  151 ;  Gilchrist 


right  to  insist  upon  having  all  the  assets     v.  Cannon,  1  Coldw.  581  ;  Porter  v.  Hey- 


found  there  appropriated  to  pay  their 
debts.  The  court  .  .  .  has  no  jurisdiction 
to  determine  that  there  are  no  unpaid 
creditors  here  until  the  expiration  of  the 
time  fixed  by  law  for  presenting  their 
claims."  This  statement  is  substantially 
a  quotation  from  the  case  cited  by  the 
court:  Newell  v.  Pearlee,  151  Mass.  601, 
which  holds  void  as  to  unpaid   creditors 


dock,  6  Vt.  374;  Eretwell  v.  McLemore, 
52  Ala.  124 ;  In  re  Hughes,  95  N.  Y.  55; 
Damert  v.  ( /shorn,  140  N.  Y.  30 ;  Young 
v.  Wittenmyre,  22  111.  App.  496 ;  Nelson 
and  Curtis,  J  J.,  in  Mackey  v.  Coxe,  18 
How.  (IT.  S.)  100,  105;  Welch  v.  Adams, 
152  Mass.  74;  Carmichael  v.  Ray,  5  Ired. 
Eq.  365,  holding  that  the  administrator  of 
the  domicil  can  maintain  no  action  asraiust 


an  order  to  transmit  funds  to  the  domicil    an  ancillary  administrator  for  a  surplus  in 


before  the  expiration  of  the  time  to  prove 
debts. 

3  Harvey  v.  Richards,  1  Mas.  381,  413; 
Spraddling  v.  Pipkin,  15  Mo.  118;  Parker, 
C.  J.,  in  Dawes  v.  Head,  3  Pick.  128, 144; 


his  hands  after  paying  debts  ;  Churchill  v. 
Boy  den,  17  Vt.  319;  Adlum's  Estate,  6 
Phila.  347 ;  Parker's  Appeal,  61  Pa.  St. 
478;  Wright  v.  Phillips,  56  Ala.  69,  82; 
Despard  v.  Churchill,  53  N.  Y.  192,  200  J 


Dawes  v.  Boylston,  9  Mass.  337 ;  Morde-  Trimble  v.  Dzieduzyiki,  57  How.  Pr.  208, 

cai  v.  Boylan,  6  Jones  Eq.  365,  holding  213.     In  Brown  v.   Brown,  1    Barb.   Ch. 

that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  ancillary  ex-  189,  218,   the   Chancellor   suggests  that, 

ecutor   to   distribute   the  legacies  to   the  "  as  a  question  of  expediency,  certainly, 

resident  legatees  pro  rata,  if  there  is  not  those   who   have   claims   upon  an   estate 

a  sufficiency  of  assets  in  his  hands  to  pay  ought  to   be  compelled  to  resort  to  the 


*  876,  *  377      DOMICILIARY   AND   ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION  §  167 

*  Where  the  estate  administered  on  in  more  than  one  State  [*  376] 
or  country  is  fully  solvent,  the  rule  referred  to  is  of  easy  ap- 
plication, and  there  seems  to  be  no  occasion  to  doubt  the  correctness 
of  the  principle.  "  For,"  says  Parker,  C.  J.,  of  the  Supreme  Judicial 
Court  of  Massachusetts,  "it  would  be  but  an  idle  show  of  courtesy  to 
order  the  proceeds  of  an  estate  to  be  sent  to  a  foreign  country,  the  pro- 
vince of  Bengal,  for  instance,  and  oblige  our  citizens  to  go  or  send  there 
for  their  debts,  when  no  possible  prejudice  could  arise  to  the  estate, 
or  those  interested  in  it,  by  causing  them  to  be  paid  here ; x  and  pos- 
sibly the  same  remark  may  be  applicable  to  legacies  payable  to  legatees 
living  here,  unless  the  circumstances  of  the  estate  should  require  the 
Difficulty  of  funds  to  be  sent  abroad."  2  But  with  reference  to  effects 
this  rule  at-  collected  by  an  ancillary  administrator  of  an  insolvent 
vent  estates.  estate  the  question  is  more  difficult.  "  We  cannot  think, 
however,"  says  the  same  learned  judge,  "that  in  any  civilized  coun- 
try advantage  ought  to  be  taken  of  the  accidental  circumstance  of 
property  being  found  within  its  territory,  which  may  be  reduced  to 
possession  by  the  aid  of  its  courts  and  laws,  to  sequester  the  whole 
for  the  use  of  its  own  subjects  or  citizens,  where  it  shall  be  known 
that  all  the  estate  and  effects  of  the  deceased  are  insufficient  to  pay 
his  just  debts.  .  .  .  Creditors  of  all  countries  have  the  same  right 
as  our  citizens  to  prove  their  claims  and  share  in  the  distribu- 
tion."8 But  to  send  the  effects  of  an  insolvent  estate  to  the 
domiciliary  administrator,  to  be  the  reapportioned  among  all 
the  *  creditors  according  to  the  laws  of  the  State  of  the  [*  377] 
domicil  would  work  equal  injustice  and  greater  inconveni- 

courts  of  the  country  where  the  decedent  where  there  are  parties  in  the  ancillary 
was  domiciled,  and  where  the  personal  jurisdiction  entitled  to  share  in  the  prop- 
representatives  of  his  estate  were  ap-  erty,  and  no  domiciliary  creditors. 
pointed;  especially  where  the  claimants  1  Creditors  having  the  same  domicil 
are  not  creditors,  but  stand  in  the  cliarac-  with  the  deceased  will  not  be  allowed  to 
ters  of  legatees  or  distributees  of  the  tie-  prove  their  claims  against  the  fund  of  the 
cedent."  Graveley  v.  Graveley,  25  S.  C.  ancillary  administration,  but  must  resort 
1,  21,  holding  that,  as  a  general  rule,  to  that  of  the  domicil :  Barry's  Appeal,  88 
legatees  go  to  the  administration  of  the  Pa.  St.  131,  133;  Churchill  v.  Boyden,  17 
domicil,  but  that  "courts  of  the  ancillary  Vt.  319;  especially  when  the  equities  are 
jurisdiction  have  the  right  to  order  the  against  such  claim,  and  the  creditor  has 
payment  of  a  legacy  or  the  distribution  neglected  to  prove  up  his  claim  in  the 
of  funds  to  residuary  legatees,  or  under  domicil  until  it  is  too  late:  Durston  v. 
the  statute  of  the  domicil,  whenever  it  Pollack,  91  Iowa,  6G8.  And  when  per- 
appeara  as  matter  of  fact  that  there  are  mitted  by  statute  to  do  so,  and  the  estate 
funds  of  the  estate  in  the  hands  of  the  is  insolvent  in  both  States,  they  will  not 
ancillary  jurisdiction;  unless  for  some  be  allowed  to  prove  up  their  claims  against 
purpose  the  equities  of  the  parties  require  the  ancillary  administration,  when  they 
that  the  fund*  be  Benl  to  the  domicil  for  have  already  received  a  larger  percentage 
distribution."  Welles'  Estate,  161  Pa.  than  the  creditors  of  the  latter :  Hays  v. 
St.  218,  holding  that  there  is  a  well-recog-  Cecil,  1G  Lea,  160. 
i.i/e  i  exception  to  the  general  rule  requir-  a  Dawes  v.  Head,  3  Pick.  128,  144,  et 
Ing  the  surplu  age  of  personalty  to  be  scq. ;  In  re  Hughes,  95  N.  Y.  55. 
remitted  to  the  domicil  for  distribution,  8  Dawes  v.  Head,  3  Pick.  145  et  seq. 
Mil 


§  167  PAYMENT   OF    DEBTS   AND    DISTRIBUTION.  *  377,  *  378 

ence  to  the  creditors  in  the  State  of  the  ancillary  administration, 
"  whose  debts  might  not  be  large  enough  to  bear  the  expense  of  prov- 
ing and  collecting  them  abroad ;  and  in  countries  where  there  is  no 
provision  for  equal  distribution,  the  pursuit  of  them  might  be  wholly 
fruitless.  As  in  Great  Britain,  our  citizens,  whose  debts  would  gen- 
erally be  upon  simple  contracts,  would  be  postponed  to  creditors  by 
judgment,  bond,  etc.,  and  even  to  other  debts  upon  simple  contract 
which  might  be  preferred  by  the  executor  or  administrator.  It  would 
seem  too  great  a  stretch  of  courtesy  to  require  the  effects  to  be  sent 
home,  and  our  citizens  to  pursue  them  under  such  disadvantages." 1 
To  avoid  the  injustice  and  inconvenience  attendant  upon  either 
course,  Chief  Justice  Parker  suggested  the  rule,  now  adopted  by 
courts  in  some  States  and  in  some  enacted  by  statute,2  to  retain  the 
funds  in  the  State  of  the  ancillary  administration  for  a  Funds  retained 
pro  rata  distribution  according  to  the  laws  thereof  among  tors  ^Trata 
its  citizens,  having  regard  to  all  the  assets  in  the  hands  in  all  the 
of  the  principal  as  well  as  of  the  auxiliary  administrator,  therTmay  b^ 
and  also  to  all  of  the  debts  which  by  the  laws  of  either  assets, 
country  are  payable  out  of  the  decedent's  estate,  without  regard  to 
any  preference  which  may  be  given  to  one  species  of  debt  over 
another,  considering  the  funds  in  each  State  as  applicable,  first,  to 
the  payment  of  the  just  proportion  due  to  its  citizens,  and,  if  there 
be  any  residue,  that  should  be  remitted  to  the  principal  administra- 
tor, to  be  dealt  with  according  to  the  laws  of  his  country.8  The 
learned  judge,  in  his  exhaustive  review  of  the  subject  under  con- 
sideration, points  out  some  difficulties  attending  the  practical  applica- 
tion of  this  rule,  and  suggests  how  they  may  be  met ;  but  even  the 
comprehensive  powers  of  a  court  of  chancery,  to  which  he  refers  the 
solution  of  all  difficulties  which  probate  courts  are  impotent  to  sur- 
mount, would  seem  inadequate  to  meet  all  complications  that 
[*  378]  might  arise,  unless  the  *  spirit  of  comity  which  he  ascribes 
to  the  courts  should  also  lead  our  legislatures  to  come  to 
their  aid  by  proper  statutory  enactments.* 

1  lb.  146.  Where  a  foreign  creditor  4  An  illustration  of  some  of  the  diffi- 
asks  for  a  dividend  of  a  decedent's  estate,  culties  attending  ^the  application  of  this 
he  must  take  it  subject  to  the  priorities  es-  rule,  which  is  enacted  by  statute  in  Mis- 
tablished  by  the  law  of  the  forum :  Miller's  souri,  came  within  the  personal  experience 
Estate,  3  Rawle,  312, 320;  Holmes  v.  Rem-  of  the  writer.  Debts  to  a  considerable 
sen,  20  John.  229,  265.  amount  were  proved  against  the  ancillary 

2  So  in  Missouri :  Rev.  St.  1889,  §§  261-  administrator  in  Missouri  of  an  intestate 
274;  Massachusetts:  Gen.  St.  1860, p.  508;  domiciled  in  Tennessee,  in  excess  of  the 
Vermont:  Prentiss  v.  Van  Ness,  31  Vt.  assets  under  administration  in  Missouri. 
95,  100.  The  estate  in  the  domiciliary  jurisdiction 

3  Dawes  v.  Head,  3  Pick.  128,  146,  et  was  also  represented  as  insolvent.  To  de- 
seq. ;  Davis  v.  Estey,  8  Pick.  475  ;  Harvey  termine  the  rate  of  payment  to  which 
v.  Richards,  1  Mas.  381,  421  ;  Churchill  v.  Missouri  creditors  were  entitled,  it  was 
Boyden,  17  Vt.  319;  Lawrence  v.  Elmen-  necessary  to  ascertain  the  amount  of  as- 
dorf,  5  Barb.  73 ;  Hays  v.  Cecil,  16  Lea,  160.  seta  in  the  hands  of  the  domiciliary  adminr 

405 


*378,  *379      DOMICILIARY   AND    ANCILLARY   JURISDICTION.  §  168 


Non-resident  creditors  of  an  insolvent  estate  may,  in  some  States; 
prove  their  claims  against  the  ancillary  administration-  and  subject 
the  real  estate  of  the  intestate  to  their  payment,  without  showing 
that  the  personal  property  of  the  estate  in  the  State  of  the  domicil 
has  been  exhausted.1  A  fortiori  may  resident  creditors  do  this  in 
case  of  a  solvent  estate.2 

§  168.  Real  Estate  governed  by  the  Lex  Rei  SitaG.  —  It  is  a  rule 
conditioned  by  imperative  necessity,  that  immovable  property  should 
Probate  and  De  governed,  especially  in  respect  of  its  transmission,  by 
the  law  of  the  country  in  which  it  is  situated.8  For  this 
reason  the  execution  and  probate  of  a  will  must  con- 
form strictly  to  the  law  of  the  State  in  which  land  is 
therein  devised,4  and  this  law  is  also  to  govern  "as  to 
the  capacity  of  the  testator "  and  "  the  extent  of  his 
power  to  dispose  of  the  property."  s  So  the  descent  and 
heirship  of  real  estate  are  exclusively  governed  by  the 
law  of  the  country  within  which  it  is  actually  situate, 
can  take,  except  those  who  are  recognized 
*  as  legitimate  heirs  by  the  laws  of  that  country ;  and  they  [*  379] 
take  in  the  proportions  and  in  the  order  which  these  laws 
prescribe.6  All  the  authorities,  both  in  England  and  America,  so  far 
as  they  go,  recognize  the  principle  in  its  fullest  import,  that  real 
estate,  or  immovable  property,  is  exclusively  subject  to  the  laws  of 
the  country  within  whose  territory  it  is  situate.7  The  reason  of  the 
rule  includes  leasehold  and  chattel  interests  in  land,8  servitudes  and 


execution  of 
will  must  con- 
form to  the  law 
of  the  State  in 
which  devised 
property  is 
situated. 

Descent  also 
governed  by 
lex  rei  sitce. 


No 


person 


istrator,  as  well  as  the  amount  of  debts 
proved  there,  which  the  ancillary  admin- 
istrator was  unable  to  report  for  a  number 
of  years,  during  all  of  which  time  the 
Missouri  creditors  were  deprived  of  the 
money  rightfully  belonging  to  them. 
Again,  under  the  law  of  Missouri,  the  de- 
mands  against  estates  of  deceased  persons 
are  divided  into  six  classes,  the  first  five 
of  which  must  be  proved  during  the  first 
year,  and  each  of  which  is  entitled  to  pay- 
ment in  full  before  any  of  the  funds  are 
applied  to  the  payment  of  the  next  class. 
It  so  happened  that  the  largest  debt  was 
proved  during  i lie  second  year  of  admin- 
istration, and  was  therefore  placed  in  the 
,-i  ■  ii  <  lass;  and  although  by  reason  of  its 
magnitude  it  secured  in  the  adjustment 
between  the  creil it i .rs  of  the  two  States  a 
sufficient  amount  for  the  payment  in  full 
of  the  Missouri  creditors  of  the  first  four 

and   nearly  in  full  of   the   fifth 

class,  yet  the  sixth-class  creditor  received 
nothing. 

i  Rosenthal  v.  Renick,  n  111.  ^02,  207 
406 


2  See  authorities  post,  §  470,  p.  *  1042. 

3  See  Whart.  Conn.  L.,  §  560;  Story, 
Confl.  L.,  §  483  ;  Westl.  Pr.  Int.  L.,  §  146  ; 
McCormick  v.  Sullivant,  10  Wheat.  192, 
202 ;  United  States  v.  Fox,  1 04  U.  S.  31 5, 320. 

4  As  to  the  probate  and  validity  of 
foreign  wills,  see  post,  §  226 ;  Kerr  v. 
Moon,  9  Wheat.  565,  572. 

5  Story,  Confl.  L.,  §  474  ;  Applegate  v. 
Smith,  31  Mo.  166,  169;  ^Yashbum  v.  Van 
Steenwyk,  32  Minn.  336,  347. 

0  Story,  Confl.  L.,  §  483 ;  Lingen  v. 
Lingen,  45  Ala.  412. 

7  See  collection  of  authorities  by  Mr. 
Justice  Miller,  in  Brine  v.  Insurance  Co., 
96  U.  S.  627,  635,  et  seq. 

8  Story,  Confl.  L.,  §  447,  note  (a),  cit- 
ing Freke  v.  Carbery,  L.  R.  16  Eq.  461  ;  In 

G Is  of  Gcntili,  Ir.  R.  9  Eq.  541.     But 

iu  New  York  a  leasehold  has  been  held 
to  be  personal  property,  and  as  such,  as  to 
its  transmission  by  last  will,  controlled  by 
the  law  which  governed  the  person  of  the 
owner:  Despard  v  Churchill,  53  N.  Y.  192, 
198,  et  i*/. 


5   183  ALIMONY   OF   WIDOW    AND    MINOR    CHILDREN.       *  379,  *  380 

easements,   and  other  charges   on  lands,  as   mortgages    Including 
and  rents,  and  trust  estates ;  all  of  these  are  deemed  to    leaseholds,  and 
be,  in  the  sense  of  the  law,  immovables  and  governed   °8tg  generally, 
by  the   lex  rei  sites}     And  as  to  what  constitutes   im-    servitudes,  and 
movable  or  real  property  resort  must  also  be  had  to  the 
lex  loci  rei  sitce.2 

In  Mississippi  the  statute  provides  that  not  only  real  estate,  but 
"all  personal  property  situated  in  this  State  shall  descend  and  be 
distributed  according  to  the  laws  of  this  State."  8    Under    In  Mississippi 
this  statute  it  is  held  that  money  in  a  bank  in  the  State    all  estate 

„  ,, .,  ,.  ,  ,,  passes  under 

of  Mississippi,  and  a  note  secured  by  real  estate  there,  the  law  of 
are  not  included,  if  the  deposit  certificate  and  book  and  that  State- 
the  note  are  found  at  the  foreign  domicil  of  the  intestate  who  has  no 
creditors,  heirs,  or  property  in  this  State,  and  the  domiciliary  court 
orders  distribution  ;  *  but  choses  in  action  held  by  an  agent  in  this 
State  for  an  owner  domiciled  in  another  State,  taken  in  the  course  of 
business  of  lending  money  in  this  State,  must  be  distributed  under  its 
laws.5 

§  169.  Provisional  Alimony  of  Widow  and  Minor  Children.  —  It 
appears  from  what  has  been  stated  in  an  earlier  chapter,6  that  a  non- 
resident widow  is  in  some  States  allowed  a  certain  portion  of  the 
estate  of  her  deceased  husband  to  protect  her  and  her  minor  chil- 
dren from  want  and  privation,7  while  this  is  denied  to 
[*  380]  *  non-residents  in  others.8  It  seems,  on  principle,  that  the 
statutes  made  for  the  protection  of  the  family  against  the 
suffering  and  destitution  threatening  them  on  the  decease  of  their 
natural  protector  should  be  construed  so  as  to  accomplish  their  pur- 
pose. Hence  the  widow  should  be  entitled  to  avail  herself  of  such 
a  law  if  in  force  in  the  place  of  her  residence,  although  her  husband 
was  domiciled  in  another  State.  But  while  the  law  of  the  decedent's 
domicil  must  govern  as  to  the  distribution,  descent,  or  testamentary 
disposition  of  personal  property  to  the  widow  or  minor  children,  it 
seems  clear  that  the  law  of  the  forum  must  determine  the  relief 
against  destitution  and  distress  of  resident  families.9 

1  Story,  Confl.  L.,§  447  ;  Knox  v.  Jones,     debtor    and    decedent    being    both    non- 
47  N.  Y.  389,  395.  residents:  Mayo  v.  Assur.  Soc,  71  Miss. 

2  Chapman  v.  Robertson,  6  Pai.  627,     590. 

630.  6  Ante,  §  89. 

3  Miss.  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  1542.  7  New  York,  Georgia,  and  Louisiana 
*  Speed  v.  Kelly,  59  Miss.  47,  50.               are  there  mentioned. 

5  Jahier  v.  Rascoe,  62  Miss.  699,  703.  8  See  the  States  referred  to  ante,  §  89. 

It  is  otherwise  where  the  evidence  of  debt  9  Piatt's  Appeal,  80  Pa.  St.  501 ;  dis- 

(as  an  insurance  policy,  for  instance)  is  senting  opinion  of  Jackson,  J.,  in  Mitchell 

simply  left  on  deposit,  and  not  incident  to  v.  Word,  64  Ga.  208,  219;   Whart.  ConfL 

a  business  conducted  in  Mississippi,  the  L.,  §§  189,  791. 


407 


*PART  SECOND.  [*381] 

OF  THE  OFFICE  OF  EXECUTORS  AND  ADMINISTRATORS. 


CHAPTER   XVIII. 

NATURE   OF   THE   TITLE   VESTING   IN   EXECUTORS   AND 
ADMINISTRATORS. 

§  170.  Conduit  of  the  Inheritance. —  Under  the  ancient  Roman  law 
the  suns  hceres  succeeded  to  the  inheritance  immediately  upon  the 
Heirs  liable  for  death  of  the  ancestor,  without  any  act  of  his  own ; l  and 
undTrlhe debtS  ne>  as  we^  as  tne  ^iceres  necessarius,2  was  legally  bound 
Roman  law.  by  all  the  debts  of  the  deceased,  neither  of  them  having 
the  right  to  renounce  the  inheritance.3  A  different  doctrine  prevails 
Liable  for  such  iQ  England,  and  generally  in  the  United  States.  The 
debts  to  the  ex-  damnosa  hcBreditas  of  debts,  resting  under  the  Roman 
England  and  hw  upon  heirs,  whether  a  testato  or  ab  intestato,  is  by 
America.  our  system    limited   to   the    assets.     The  real    estate 

descends  to  the  heirs  and  devisees,  subject  to  the  power  of  the 
executor  or  administrator  to  convert   the   same   into  *per-  [*382] 
sonalty  for  the  payment  of  the  decedent's  debts;  the  real  or 
personal  property  set  apart  for  the  widow  and  minor  children  goes 
to  them  absolutely,  and  the  personal  property  goes  to  the  executor 
or  administrator  to  be    distributed,    after    payment  of  debts,    to 

1  Sandar's  Inst.  Just.  365 ;  citing  Dig.  the  heirship  if  his  debts  were  suspected  to 
xxxviii.  16,  14.  exceed  the  value  of  the  estate  ;  but  a  slave 

2  A  slave  instituted  heir  of  his  master  could  not  refuse  to  take  upon  himself  the 
by  testament,  and  called  hce.res  necessarius  office,  so  that,  if  instituted  heir,  the  goods 
because,  whether  he  wished  it  or  not,  he  would  be  sold,  not  in  the  name  of  the  de- 
became  instantly  free  by  the  death  of  the  ceased  debtor,  but  in  that  of  the  emanci- 
testator,  and  thereby  the  necessary  heir:  pated  slave  :  lb.  103. 

Sand.  Just.  309.  The  practice  of  enfran-  8  By  later  changes  in  the  law  this  hard- 
Chising  slaves  owed  its  origin  to  the  great  ship  was  removed.  It  is  provided  in  Jus- 
stigma  which  the  sale  of  a  deceased  per-  tinian's  Institutes  that  heirs  may  enter 
ion's  effects  for  the  payment  of  his  debts  upon  their  inheritance  and  not  be  liable 
cast  upon  his  memory.  Since  under  a  for  debts  beyond  the  value  of  the  estate. 
Romas  testament  the  instituted  heir  as-  by  claiming  what  commentators  call  the 
Humeri  all  the  liabilities  of  the  testator,  it  benrfirium  inventarii:  Sand.  Just.  315,  316, 
was  not  likely  that  any  one  would  accept  citing  Gai.  ii.  163,  c.  vi.  30,  22. 
408 


§  171     EXECUTORS  AND  ADMINISTRATORS  DISTINGUISHED.    *  382,  *  383 

legatees  or  next  of  kin.1  It  will  now  be  proper  to  inquire  into  the 
nature  and  extent  of  the  authority  conferred  upon  the  officers 
employed  by  the  law  to  give  effect  to  the  will  of  a  decedent  in 
respect  of  his  property,2  and  whose  function  it  is  to  personate  the 
deceased  in  all  matters  touching  the  posthumous  disposition  of  his 
affairs.3 

§  171.  Distinction  between  Executors  and  Administrators.  —  The 
functions,  powers,  liabilities,  rights,  and  duties  of  executors  are  in 
most  respects  identical  with  those  of  administrators.  The  legisla- 
ture of  Iowa  explained  by  statute  that  "  the  term  '  executor  '  includes 
an  administrator,  where  the  subject-matter  applies  to  an  adminis- 
trator;"4 and  that  the  word  "executor,"  as  used  in  the  title  con- 
cerning estates  of  decedents,  is  intended  to  be  applied  to  the  persons 
who  administer  upon  the  estate  of  one  deceased,  whether  appointed 
by  the  will  or  otherwise.5  An  executor  has  power,  generally,  to 
administer  all  the  property  of  the  deceased,  although  a  part  of  it 
may  not  have  been  bequeathed.6  But  however  great  the  similarity 
between  the  two  offices  may  be,  there  are  some  essential  distinctions 
which  cannot  be  ignored  or  abolished  even  by  legislation,  without  a 
change  in  the  law  of  administration  so  radical  as  to  be  improbable, 
at  least  for  many  years  to  come.7 

The  decisive  difference  between  them  arises  out  of  the  method  of 

their  appointment :  executors  represent  their  testators  by  virtue  of 

the  act  of  the  testator  himself,  while  the  authority  of   Distinction  be- 

the  administrator  is  derived  exclusively  from  the    to^andadm'in- 

[*  383]  appointment  by  some  competent  court.    "An*  ex-    istrators. 

ecutor  can  derive  his  office  from  a  testamentary  appointment 
only;"8  the  administrator,  on  the  other  hand,  derives  his  authority 

1  Mr.  Wharton,  in  his  able  treatise  on         6  Post,  §  229  and  cases  cited. 

the  Conflict  of  Laws,  states  the  doctrine         7  The  author  of  the  Iowa  Digest  com. 

thus  :  "  The  law  says,  '  We  recognize  you  plains  that  this  "  peculiarity  "  was  copied 

as  in  your  own  persons  the  successors  of  into  the  Revision  of  1860  and  the  Code  of 

your  deceased  ancestor.     But,  in  order  to  1873,  and  says  that  "this  statutory  inno- 

prevent  conflict  and  promote   speed,  we  vation  in  the  language  of  the  law  is  with- 

appoint  a  public  officer  who  is  to  see  that  out  any  perceived  benefit,  and  attended 

the  claims  of  third  parties  are  properly  with  some  inconveniences."     1  Withrow  & 

settled,  at  the  period  when  this  new  devo-  Styles,  Dig.  1874,  p.  510. 
lution  of  the   estate   commences.      This         8  Wms.  Ex.  [239],  citing  Wentw.  Ex. 

officer,  on  the  principle  of  universal  sue-  p.  3  :  "  Hence  it  followeth  necessarily  that 

cession,  represents  your  ancestor  until  his  a  will  is  the  only  bed  where  an  executor 

debts  are  paid  and  the  plan  of  distribution  can  be  begotten  or  conceived  ;  for  where 

settled.    But  at  once,  on  the  principle  of  no  will  is  there  can  be  no  executor ;   and 

singular  succession,  the  real  estate  and  -ex-  this  is  so  conspicuous  and  evident  to  every 

empted  personalty  go  to  you.' "    Confl.  L.,  low  capacity  that  it  needs  no  proof  or  illus- 

§  552.  tration."     Hartnett  v.  Wandell,  60  N.  Y. 

2  Ante,  §  10.  346,  350.  But  the  testator  may  exercise 
8  Ante,  §  136.  his  power  of  appointment  after  his  death 
4  Code,  1886,  §  45,  par.  21.  by  an  agent  appointed  in  the  will.  See 
8  Laws,  1860,  §  2333.  cases  cited  post,  §  229,  p.  *503. 

409 


*  383,  *  384  NATURE   OF   TITLE.  §  172 

wholly  from  the  probate  court ;  he  has  none  until  letters  of  admin- 
istration are  granted.1  From  this  distinction  important  questions 
frequently  arise  with  regard  to  the  time  when  the  authority  or 
liability  of  the  one  or  other  originated,  which  will  be  more  fully 
considered  hereafter.2 

An  important  distinction  exists  also  in  respect  of  the  power  to 
hold,  manage,  and  alienate  the  property  of  the  deceased :  the  author- 
ity of  the  administrator  is  commensurate  with  the  provisions  of  the 
law  on  the  subject,  as  existing  and  recognized  in  the  forum  of  his 
appointment;  but  the  will  of  the  testator  is  in  itself  a  law  to  the 
executor,  which  may  enlarge  or  circumscribe  the  authority  or  discre- 
tion which  an  administrator  would  have,  and  which,  to  the  extent 
in  which  it  is  not  repugnant  to  the  law  of  the  State,  he  must 
strictly  observe.3 

§  172.  When  the  Title  vests  in  the  Executor,  and  •when  in  the 
Administrator.  —  An  executor  is  a  person  appointed  by  a  testator 
At  common  ^°  carlT  ou^  ^ne  directions  and  requests  in  his  will,  and 
law  title  of  to  dispose  of  the  property  according  to  his  testamentary 
"Testator's  S  provisions  after  his  decease.4  As  his  interest  in  the 
death,  estate  of  the  deceased  is  derived  from  the  will,  it  vests, 

according  to  the  common  law,  from  the  moment  of  the  testator's 
death.5  The  will  becomes  operative,  including  the  appointment  of 
the  executor,  not  by  the  probate  thereof,  nor  by  the  act  of  the  execu- 
tor in  qualifying,  which  are  said  to  be  mere  ceremonies  of  authenti- 
cation, but  by  the  death  of  the  testator.6  On  the  other 
hand,  an  administrator  is  one  to  whom  the  goods  and  *  effects  [*  384] 
of  a  person  dying  intestate,  or  without  appointing  an  exec- 
and  in  the  ad-  utor  who  survives  and  accepts  the  office,  are  committed 
ministrator  ^y  the  probate  court.7  Deriving  his  authority  wholly 
of  letters.  from  his  appointment  by  the  court,  his   title   to   the 

property  of  the  deceased  vests   in  him  only  from  the  time  of  the 

grant.8 

In  respect  of  executors,  however,  the  common  law  has  been  mate- 
rially modified  in  many  of  the  States,  and  the  doctrine  that  their 

1  Wms.  Ex.  [6301.  If  t,ie  court  aP"  Groton  v-  Uuggles,  17  Me.  137;  Scott  v. 
pointing  had  no  jurisdiction,  the  acts  of  West,  63  Wis.  529,  558,  and  authorities 
the  administrator  are  void,  and  may  be     cited. 

collaterally  impeached:    Unknown   Heirs  4  Whart.  Law  Lex.,  "  Executor." 

V.  Baker,  23  111.  484  ;   Terry's  Appeal,  67  6  Wms.  Ex.  [629],  [293]. 

Conn.  181.  6  Wankford  v.  Wankford,  1  Salk.  299; 

2  Pott,  §§  185,  186,  187.  Graysbrook    v.   Fox,    1     Plowd.    R.    275, 

3  Thus,  if  a  trust  he  created  in  a  will  277  f/ ;  Johnes  v.  Jackson,  67  Conn.  81, 
ami  no  trustee  named,  it  is  incumbent  88  ;  Thiefes  v.  Mason,  55  N.  J.  Eq.  456. 
upon  the  executor  (or  upon  any  person  7  Whart.  Law  Lex.,  "  Administrator." 
Who  mav  become  by  law  intrusted  with  the  8  Wms.  Ex.  [630];  Woolley  v.  Clark, 
execution  of  the  will)  to  carry  out  the  5  B.  &  Aid.  744,  745;  Rand  v.  Hubbard, 
trust:  Sannderson  tr.  Stearns,  6  Mass.  87,  4  Met.  (Mass.), 252,  256. 

89  ;  I  )orr  v.  Wainwright,  13  Tick.  828,331  ; 
410 


§172 


WHEN    THE    TITLE    VESTS. 


384,  *  385 


powers  are  conferred  directly  by  the  will  is  mostly  Common-law 
repudiated.  "The  fact  that  one  is  named  in  the  will  ^^exefutors 
as  executor  does  not,  as  at  common  law,  make  him  in  most  States. 
executor  in  fact,  but  only  gives  him  the  right  to  become  executor 
upon  complying  with  the  conditions  required  by  law."  *  "At  death, 
a  man's  property  really  passes  into  the  hands  of  the  law  for  admin- 
istratiou,  as  much  when  he  dies  testate  as  when  he  dies  intestate; 
except  that,  in  the  former  case,  he  fixes  the  law  of  its  distribution 
after  payment  of  his  debts,  and  usually  appoints  the  persons  who 
are  to  execute  his  will.  But  even  this  appointment  is  only  pro- 
visional, and  requires  to  be  approved  by  the  law  before  it  is  com- 
plete; and  therefore  the  title  to  the  office  of  executor  is  derived 
rather  from  the  law  than  the  will."2  Most  States  announce  this 
doctrine,  among  which  may  be  mentioned  Alabama,8  Arkansas,4 
Georgia,6  Kentucky,6  Louisiana,7  Maine,8  Massachusetts,9 
[*  385]  Missouri,10  New  Hampshire,11  New  York,12  *  Pennsylvania,13 


1  Bliss,  J.,  in  Stagg  v.  Green,  47  Mo. 
500,  501. 

2  Shoenberger  v.  Lancaster,  28  Pa.  St. 
459,  466. 

3  Gardner  v.  Gantt,  19  Ala.  666  ;  Wood 
v.  Cosby,  76  Ala.  557. 

4  Diamond  v.  Shell,  15  Ark.  26. 
6  Echols  v.  Barrett,  6  Ga.  443. 

6  Carter  v.  Carter,  10  B.  Mon.  327, 
330. 

7  Succession  of  Vogel,  20  La.  An. 
81. 

8  McKeen  v.  Frost,  46  Me.  239  ;  but  see 
Hathorn  v.  Eaton,  70  Me.  219. 

9  Dublin  v.  Chadbourn,  16  Mass.  433, 
441  ;  Rand  v.  Hubbard,  4  Met.  (Mass.) 
252,  257. 

10  Stagg  v.  Green,  supra.  Judge  Bond, 
in  speaking  for  the  St.  Louis  Court  of 
Appeals,  after  discussing  the  Missouri 
statute  and  cases,  thus  announces  the 
law  in  Bambrick  v.  Webster  Groves  As- 
sociation (53  Mo.  App.  225,  236):  "The 
law  is  therefore :  First,  That  an  ex- 
ecutrix, before  taking  out  letters,  may  do 
all  and  any  acts  which  the  necessities  of 
the  trust  estate  and  its  preservation  re- 
quire, and  that  any  liabilities  so  incurred 
by  the  executrix  become,  after  her  quali- 
fication as  such,  enforceable  against  the 
estate  of  the  testator.  Second,  That  after 
taking  out  letters  an  executrix  may,  until 
the  succeeding  term  of  the  probate  court, 
do  any  and  all  acts  necessary  to  prevent 
material  loss  to  the  estate  and  to  accom- 


plish the  objects  pointed  out  in  the  stat- 
ute, such  as  completing  unfinished  work," 
etc. 

11  Tappan  v.  Tappan,  30  N.  H.  50,  69. 
But  in  a  subsequent  case,  Shirley  v. 
Healds,  34  N.  H.  407,  410,  the  common- 
law  rule  is  relied  on,  and  authorities  cited 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  Hampshire 
in  support  of  its  validity.  Neither  of  the 
cases  is  binding  upon  the  question  under 
consideration  further  than  that  in  the 
former  it  is  held  that  an  executor  has  no 
authority  to  maintain  an  action  before 
probate  of  the  will,  and  in  the  latter  that 
it  is  his  duty  to  propound  the  will  for 
probate,  unless  he  refuse  the  trust,  and  he 
may  appeal  from  the  decree  of  the  pro- 
bate court  disallowing,  rejecting,  or  refus- 
ing probate  thereof,  basing  the  reason  for 
such  right  to  appeal  upon  his  title  to 
the  personal  estate  of  the  deceased  under 
the  will,  according  to  the  common-law 
rule. 

12  Bellinger  v.  Ford,  21  Barb.  311, 
315.  Probate  and  letters  testamentary 
remove  the  statutory  prohibition  against 
disposing  of  the  property,  or  interfering 
with  it  except  for  its  preservation,  but  in 
other  respects  the  rights  and  powers  of  the 
executor  are  the  same  before  as  after, 
though  in  some  respects  held  in  abeyance 
by  the  statute:  People  v.  Barker,  150 
N.  Y.  52,  58. 

13  Shoenberger  v.  Lancaster  Savings  la 
stitution,  supra. 

411 


*385,  *386  NATURE   OF   TITLE.  §  173 

Rhode    Island,1   South    Carolina,    Tennessee,2    Texas,3   Vermont,4 
and  Virginia.5 

§  173.  Relation  of  the  Appointment  to  the  Time  of  the  Testa- 
tor's or  Intestate's  Death.  —  For  particular  purposes  the  letters  of 
Letters  of  ad-  administration  relate  back  to  the  time  of  the  death  of 
ministration        the  intestate, 6  and  vest  the  property  in  the  administrator 

relate  back  to        „  .  »      , ,      ,  .         ,  . 

the  intestate's     from  that  time,'  attaching  to  property  coming  from  a 
death,  foreign  jurisdiction  as  soon  as  it  comes  into  that  of  the 

domicil.8  On  this  principle,  an  administrator  may  maintain  tres- 
pass for  iujuries  to  the  goods  of  the  intestate  committed  after  his 
death  and  before  the  appointment;9  or  trover  for  property  so 
wrongfully  detained;10  or  an  action  on  a  contract  made  with  the 
defendant  before  appointment;11  or  for  money  belonging  to  the 
estate  collected  by  defendant  before  grant  of  letters ; 12  or  assumpsit 
for  money  paid  to  defendant's  order.13  And  on  the  same  principle, 
the  heirs  have  no  power,  before  the  appointment  of  an  administrator, 
to  bind  the  personal  estate  by  any  agreement.14  "This  doctrine  of 
relation  is  a  fiction  of  law  to  prevent  injustice,  and  the  occurrence 
of  injuries  where  otherwise  there  would  be  no  remedy;  and  would 
not  be  applied  in  cases  where  the  rights  of  innocent  parties  inter- 
vened;"15 nor  "to  recognize,  validate,  and  bind  the  estate  by  the 
unauthorized  acts  which  have  been  done  to  the  prejudice  of  the 
estate,  by  any  one,  while  the  title  was  in  abeyance; "  16  nor  to  give 
effect  to  the  Statute  of  Limitation,  which  does  not  run  during  the 
period  intervening  between  the  death  of  the  intestate  and  the  grant 
of  letters.17  The  principle  is  applicable,  a  fortiori,  to  execu- 
tors *  in  all  of  the  States  in  which  they  are  required  to  [*  386] 
give  bond  before  induction  into  office,  or  where,  for  any  rea- 

i  Gaskill  v.  Gaskill,  7  R.  I.  478.  10  Manwell  v.  Briggs,  17  Vt.  176, 181 ; 

2  Martin  v.  Peck,  2  Yerg.  298.  Hatch  v.  Proctor,  102  Mass.  351,  353. 

»  Roberts  v.  Stuart,  80  Tex,  379,  387.  n  Brown  v.  Lewis,  9    R.  I.  497,    500, 

*  Trask  v.  Donoghue,  1  Aik.  370.  citing   English  cases  :  Hatch   v.  Proctor, 

6  Monroe  v.  James,  4  Munf.  194.  supra  ;   Leber  v.  Kauffelt,  5   W.  &  S.  440, 

445  (an  action  on  a  bond  of  indemnity  to 
the  intestate,  where  the  administrator 
paid   the  claim   constituting   the   breach 


6  Alvord  v.  Marsh,  12  Allen,  603,  604 
McVanghters  v.  Elder,  2  Brev.  307,  313 
Miller  v.  Reigne,  2  Hill  (S.  C),  592,  594 


Bullock  v.  Rogers,  16  Vt.  294,  296;  Jones  before  appointment)  ;  and  see  Rainwater 

v.  Jones,  118  N.  C  440;  Missouri  P.  R.  V.  Harris,  51  Ark.  401. 

Co.  r.  Mradlcv,  51  Neb.  596.  12  Dempsey  v.  McNally,  73  Md.  433. 

7  Lawrence  v.   Wright,  23  Pick.   128,  1S  Clark  v.  Pishon,  31  Me.  503. 

129;    Gilkey  v.  Hamilton,  22  Mich.  283,  J1  Stalil  v.  Brown,  72  Iowa,  720. 

286.     Bui  the  title  to  real  estate  does  not  1S  Per  Napton,  J.,  in  Wilson  v.  Wilson, 

i  the  administrator  until  there  be  a  54  Mo.  213,  216. 

decree  to  that  effect:  Lane  v.  Thompson,  w  Per  Cooley,  J.,  in  Gilkey  v.  Hamilton, 

43  N.  II.  820,  825.  supra;  Wiswell  v.  Wiswell,  35  Minn.  371  ; 

«    UYIls  v.  Miller,  48  DL382,  387, citing  Cook  V.  Cook,  24  S.  C.  204. 

Collins  v.  Bankhead,  l  Btrobh.  25.  17  Benjamin  v.  DeGroot,  1  Denio,  151; 

''   lira.  I. .it  r.  II, ,itl,  20  N.  11.  257,  259.  Polk   v.  Allen,    19   Mo.  467  ;   post,  §§  401, 


402,  under  payment  of  debts. 


412 


§  174  TITLE  IN  AUTER  DROIT.  *  386 

son,  the  common-law  rule,  according  to  which  they  de-    and  letter8 
rive  their  authority  from  the  testator,  and  not  from  the    testamentary 
court,  is  modified  by  statute.1     A  conveyance  under  a   testator'™  ° 
power  of  sale  in  a  will,  before  probate  of  such  will,  by   death. 
one  nominated  as  executor,  will  be  validated  by  a  subsequent  probate 
of  the  will.8    What  executors  and  administrators  may  do  before  pro- 
bate or  grant  of  letters  will  be  discussed  hereafter.8     Mr.  Redfield 
apprehends  that  by  reason  of  the  doctrine  of  relation,  by  which  the 
estate  vests  in  the  administrator  from  the  death  of  the  intestate, 
the  distinction  between  executors  and  administrators  as  to  the  time 
of  the  vesting  of  the  title  has  become  of  no  practical  importance.4 

§  174.    Title  of  Executors  and    Administrators  in  auter    Droit.  — 
The  interest  which  an  executor  or  administrator  has  in  the  estate 
of  the  deceased  is  in  auter  droit  merely:  he  is  the  min-    Title  of  exec- 
ister  or  dispenser  of  the  goods  of  the  dead.5    Since  the   utor.s  and  ad: 

iinnistrfl.tors  is 

property  is  not  his  own,  it  follows  that  he  may  maintain    in  the  right 
an  action  therefor  in  auter  droit,  although  he  himself  be    of  others- 
disabled  from  suing  proprio  jure  ;*  and  anyone  claiming  the  same 
under  a  title   from  him  in  his  private   or  personal  capacity  must 
show  that  he  has  ceased  to  hold  it  in  a  representative   Assets  are  not 

capacity.7    If  the  executor  or  administrator  become  bank-    liable  for  the 

.,.  ..  .  pi-.  debts  of  exec- 

rupt,  having  property  in  possession  ot  his  testator  or   utors  or  admin- 
intestate  distinguishable  from  his  own,  it  is  not  liable    lstrators» 
to  the  bankrupt's  creditors,  though  it  should  be  money;  nor  can  the 
property  so  distinguishable  be  seized  in   execution   of  a  judgment 
against  the  executor  or  administrator  in  his  own  right.8   nor  subject  to 
Although  the  goods  held  by  an  executor  pass,  as  they   *he  execiltor's 
do  at  common  law,  in  some  of  the  States,  to  his  execu-   disposition," 
tor,  yet  he  cannot  in  his  will  dispose  of  any  of  the  goods  so  held  to 

1  Schoul.  Ex.  &  Adm.  §  194,  and  au-         2  Brooks  v.  McComb,  38  Fed.  R.  317, 

thorities :    lb.    §   238.     See   Bambrick  v.  and  authorities.     See  also  White  v.  Kel- 

Webster  Groves  Association,  53  Mo.  App.  ler,  68  Fed.  R.  (C.  C.  A.)  796:  Babcock  v. 

225,  233,  et  seq.     Where  there  is  a  devise  Collins,  60  Minn.  73,  and  cases  cited. 
to  several  in  common,  to  be  divided  by  3  Post,  §§  185-187. 

agreement,  a  division  before  the  probate         4  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  127. 
of  the  will  vests  title  to  each  in  severalty,  6  Wentw.  Ex.  192;    Weeks  ?;.  Gibbs, 

though  the  subsequent  probate  is  indis-  9  Mass.  74,  75 ;   Lewis  v,  Lyons,  13  111. 

pensable  as  evidence  of  title  under  the  117,  121;  Carter  v.  National  Bank,  71  Me. 

will:    Goodman  v.  Winter,  64  Ala.  410,  448. 
429;  where  those  nominated  as  executors  6  Wms.Ex.  [636]. 

are  the  only  ones  who  are  in  a  position  to         7  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  130,  pi.  2  ;  Weeks 

take  possession  or  control  of  the  personalty,  v.  Gibbs,  supra;   Lessing  v.  Vertrees,  32 

though  the  will  is  not  probated  until  after  Mo.  431,  434,  overruling  former  Missouri 

the  date  when  the  assessment  is  made,  yet  cases,  in  which  it  had  been  held  that  the 

their  possession  is  such  by  the  doctrine  of  executor   or  administrator   is,  for   every 

relation  as  to  authorize    an  assessment  purpose,  the  owner  of  the  money  of  the 

against  them  in  their  representative  ca-  decedent  which  had  come  to  his  hands, 
pacity  :  People  v.  Barker,  150  N.  Y.  52,  8  Branch  Bank  v.  Wade,  13  Ala.  427; 

59.  Marvel  v.  Babbitt,  143  Mass.  226. 

413 


*  386,  *  387  NATURE   OF   TITLE.  §  175 

a  legatee,  for  he  holds  them  in  auter  droit  only,  and  cannot  bequeath 
nor  to  the  anything   but   what    he   has   to   his    own   use.1      And 

^executnx's      similarly,  where  the  common-law  rule  still  exists,  by 
husband.  which  marriage  operates  as  an  unqualified  gift 

to  the  husband  of  all  *  the  wife's  goods  and  personal  chat-  [*387] 
tels,  yet  it  will  make  no  gift  to  him  of  the  goods  and  chat- 
tels which  belong  to  the  wife  in  auter  droit  as  executrix  or 
administratrix;2  and  funds  held  by  an  administrator  do  not  pass  to 
his  guardian  on  his  becoming  non  compos,  and  such  guardian  has  no 
right  to  intermeddle  therewith.8  The  possession  of  personal  prop- 
erty acquired  as  an  administrator  cannot  be  united  to  and  perfect  an 
equitable  title  which  he  holds  in  his  own  right,  so  as  to  defeat  an 
action  by  the  party  having  the  legal  estate.4  But  where  a  chose  in 
action  has  been  assigned,  and  the  assignee  become  administrator  of 
the  assignor's  estate  after  his  death,  he  may  recover  as  adminis- 
trator to  his  own  use,  and  without  accounting  to  the  estate.6  Since 
^  ,,  an  administrator  stands  in  the  relation  of  trustee  to  all 

following  con- 
verted funds,      those  interested  in  the  estate,  property  misapplied  by 

him  and  converted  into  other   property,  or   sold  and  the  proceeds 

thus  misapplied  can,  in  his  hands,  be  followed,  wherever  it  can  be 

traced  through  its  transmutations,  and  will  be  subject,  in  its  new 

form,  to  the  rights  of  those  interested  in  the  estate;  and  proof  of 

substantial  identity  is  sufficient.6 

§  175.    Power  of  Alienation.  —  But  an  executor  or  administrator 

has  at  common  law  power  to  dispose  of  and  alien  the  assets  of  the 

r  ,  decedent ; 7  he  has  absolute  power  over  them  for  this  pur- 

right  to  dispose    pose,  and  they  cannot  be  followed  by  the  creditors  of  the 

of  the  assets.      deceased.8     And  he  may  convert  them  to  his  own  use, 

1  "Wms.  Ex.   [643],  citing  Bransby  v.  5  Dawes  v.  Boylston,  9  Mass.  337,  343. 
Grantham,  Plowd.  525,  and  Godolph.,  pt.  6  Pierce  v.  Holzer,  65  Mich.  263,  272 ; 
2,  c.  17,  s.  3.  Holden  v.  Piper,  5  Colo.  App.  71. 

2  Co.  Lit.  351  a ;  Thompson  ;•.  Pinchell,  7  The  subject  of  how  the  assets  of  an 
11  Mod.  177,  by  Powell,  J.  Thus,  if  hus-  estate  may  be  transferred  is  discussed 
band   and   wife   recover   judgment  for  a  also,  post,  §  331. 

debt  due  to  the  wife  as  executrix,  and  the  8  Harper  ?>.  Butler,  2  Pet.  239;  "  The 
wife  dies,  the  husband  shall  not  have  a  title  which  is  vested  in  the  executor  car- 
srire.  facias  upon  the  judgment,  but  the  ries  with  it  the  jus  disponendi  which 
succeeding  executor  or  administrator:  generally  inheres  iu  the  ownership  of 
Beamond  v.  Long,  Cro.  Car.  208,  227;  property":  Petersen  v.  Chemical  Bank, 
s  c  W.  Junes,  24S.  But  the  husband  is  32  N.  Y.  21,  45,  per  Denio,  C.  J.:  "A 
entitled  to  administer  in  his  wife's  right  bare  act  of  sale  of  the  assets  by  the  ex- 
fur  his  own  safety,  lest  she  misapply  the  ecutor  is  a  sufficient  indemnity  to  the 
funds,  in  which  case  be  would  be  liable;  purchaser,  if  there  be  no  collusion": 
ami  incident  to  this  right  he  has  the  Sutherland  v.  Brush,  7  John.  Ch.  17,  21, 
power  <>f  disposition  over  the  personal  per  Kent,  Ch. ;  Hunter  v.  Lawrence,  11 
estate  rested  in  bis  wife  as  executrix  or  Gratt.  Ill,  188;  Field  v.  Schieffelin,  7 
administratrix:  Wms.  Ex.  [644].  John.  Ch.  150,  154;  Hertell  v.  Bogert, 
■  Ryan  V.  North  Bank,  168  Mass.  215.  9  Pai.  52,  57;  Clark  v.  Blackington,  110 
«  Gamble  v.  Gamble,  1 1  Ala.  966.  Mass.  369,  374,  ct  seq. ;  Gray  v.  Armistead, 
414 


§  176  METHODS   OP   CONVERSION.  •  387,  *  388 

thus    making   himself   chargeable  for   the   amount,  and   subjecting 
them   thus   converted   to  the  same  incidents  and  liabilities,  in  all 
respects,  as  if  they  had  never  belonged  to  the  estate  of    Right  to  ap- 
the  deceased.1     Thus,  under  the  common-law  doctrine    jJ3Jjd!£ff 
of  retainer,    if  the  testator   or  intestate  died  indebted   of  retainer. 

to   the    executor    or   administrator,    or    where    the    latter, 
[*  388]  *  not  having  ready  money  of  the  decedent,  or  for  any  other 

good  reason,  shall  pay  a  debt  of  the  decedent  with  his  own 
money,  he  may  elect  to  take  any  specific  chattel  as  compensation, 
and,  if  it  be  not  more  than  adequate,  it  shall  by  such  election 
become  his  own.  And  it  has  been  held  that,  if  the  debt  due  him  by 
the  testator  amount  to  the  full  value  of  all  the  effects  in  the  execu- 
tor's hands,  there  is  a  complete  transmutation  of  the  property  in 
favor  of  the  executor  by  the  mere  act  and  operation  of  law.2  But 
we  shall  see  later  on,  that  the  doctrine  of  retainer  is  abolished,  and 
the  rights  and  duties  of  executors  and  administrators  with  respect 
.  to  the  sale  of  the  assets  very  considerably  modified  in  most  of  the 
American  States.8 

§  176.  Other  Methods  of  Conversion.  —  There  are  other  methods 
and  ways  also  in  which  the  property  which  goes  to  the  executor 
or  administrator  in  aider  droit  may  become  his  in  his  Right  in  auter 
own  right.  Eeady  money  left  by  the  decedent  becomes  J^T*64 
his  as  soon  as  it  comes  into  his  hands,  and  he  is  respon-  proprio. 
sible  to  the  estate  for  its  value;  for  when  it  is  intermixed  with  his 
own  money,  it  cannot  be  distinguished  therefrom  so  as  to  enable 
courts  to  treat  it  as  the  specific  property  of  the  estate.4  So  the 
executor  or  administrator  may,  as  well  as  any  other  person,  buy 
goods  of  the  decedent  sold  under  &  fieri  facias,  and  when  he  does  so, 
the  property  which  was  vested  in  him  as  personal  representative 
becomes  his  injure  proprio.5  Where,  in  the  settlement  of  an  estate, 
the  distributees  refused  to  accept  a  note  and  mortgage  which  the 
administrator  had  taken  for  money  of  the  estate  loaned,  and  he 
paid   their   distributive   shares   in   cash   and  other  securities,    the 

6  Ired.  Eq.  74,  77  ;  Bradshaw  v.  Simpson,  2  Wms.  Ex.  [646]  et  seq.,  with  English 

6  Ired.  Eq.  243,  246;  Crooker  v.  Jewell,  authorities.     So  in  the  case  of  a  lease  of 

31  Me.  306,  313;  Carter  v.  National  Bank,  the   testator  devolved   on    the   executor, 

71   Me.  448 ;  Ladd  r.  Wiggin,  35  N.  H.  such   profits   only  as   exceed   the   yearly 

421,  430;  Overfield  v.  Bullitt,  1  Mo.  749;  value  shall  be  assets;  it  therefore  follows 

Beattie   v.   Abercrombie,  18   Ala.  9,  18;  that,  if  the  executor  pay  the  rent  out  of 

Hadley  v.  Kendrick,  10  Lea,  525;  Mar-  his  own   purse,  the  profits  to  the   same 

shall  County  v.  Hanna,  57  Iowa,  372,  375 ;  amount  shall  be  his  :  Wentw.  Ex.  c.  7,  p. 

Rogers  v.  Zook,  86  Ind.  237,  242.  200,   14th   ed. ;   Toller,   239      See,  as  to 

1  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  130,  pi.  1  ;  Schoul.  doctrine  of  retainer,  post,  §§  377  et  seq. 

Ex.  &  Adm.  §  239  ;  Mead  v.  Byington,  10  3  Post,  §§  377,  378 ;  see  also,  as  to  the 

Vt.  116,  122 ;  Beecher  v.  Buckingham,  18  sale  of  the  personal  property,  §§  329  et  seq. 

Conn.   110,   120;    Neale  v.   Hagthrop,   3  4  Wms.  Ex.  [646];  3  Redf.  on  Wills, 

Bland  Ch.  551,  563 ;  Lappin  v.  Mumford,  130,  pi.  2  a. 

14  Kans.  9,  15.  6  Wms.  Ex.  [648], 

415 


*  388,  *  389  NATURE    OF   TITLE.  §177 

administrator  thereby  becomes  the  absolute  owner  of  such  note  and 
mortgage.1  If  the  executor  or  administrator  among  the  goods  of  the 
deceased  find  and  take  some  that  were  not  his,  and  the  owner 
recover  damages  for  them  in  trespass  or  trover,  and  in  all  similar 
cases,  the  goods  become  the  property  of  the  trespasser,  for 
he  has  paid  for  them.2  He  may  make  an  *  under-lease  of  a  [*389] 
term  of  years  of  the  deceased,  rendering  rent  to  himself,  his 
executors,  etc. ;  and  although  he  has  the  term  wholly  in  right  of 
the  testator  or  intestate,  yet,  having  power  to  dispose  of  the  whole, 
by  making  a  lease  of  a  part,  he  appropriates  that  to  himself  and 
divides  it  from  the  rest,  and  thus  has  the  rent  in  his  own  right;  and 
if  he  dies,  the  rent  will  be  payable  to  his  personal  representatives 
and  not  to  the  administrator  de  bonis  non  of  the  original  decedent.8 
So  an  executor  who  is  also  a  legatee  may  by  assenting  to  his  own 
legacy  vest  the  thing  bequeathed  in  himself  as  legatee,  and  such 
assent  may  be  express  or  implied; 4  and  an  administrator  who  is  also 
a  distributee  may  acquire  a  legal  title  in  his  own  right  to  goods  of 
the  deceased,  by  appropriating  them  to  himself  as  his  own  share.6 
So  where  an  executrix  used  the  goods  of  her  testator  as  her  own, 
and  afterwards  married,  and  then  treated  them  as  the  property  of 
her  husband,  it  was  held  that  she  could  not  be  allowed  to  object  to 
their  being  taken  in  execution  for  her  husband's  debt.6  And  after 
a  lapse  of  six  or  seven  years  equity  will  not  restrain  by  injunction  a 
creditor  of  an  executor  from  taking  in  execution  property  of  the 
testator  which  is  assets  in  equity.7  But  Lord  Tenterden  held  that 
the  use  of  the  goods  of  an  intestate  by  the  administrator  for  three 
months  was  not  sufficient  to  raise  the  presumption  that  they  were 
the  administrator's  property.8  The  possession  and  retention  of  a 
bequest  by  a  legatee  for  some  considerable  time,  without  objection 
by  the  executor,  will  be  conclusive  that  there  had  been  an  assent.9 

§  177.  Property  in  Auter  Droit  distinguished  from  Property  in 
Difficulty  of  Jure  Proprio.  — Both  English  and  American  text-writers 
wh'ngroheTtv  ca^  attention  to  the  difficulty  of  ascertaining  when 
is  heldt»a«ter  ownership  in  the  character  of  executor  or  administrator 
'injuiTproprio  ceases,  and  ownership  independent  of  that  character 
atcommoniaw.    commences.10     Thus  it  was  formerly  held,  as  Williams 

1  Blakcly  v.  Carter,  70  Wis.  540.  6  Quick  v.  Staines,  1  Bos.  &  Pull.  293. 

a  Wins.  Ex.  [648].  7  Bay  v.  Bay,  Coop.  Ch.  Cas.  264. 

3  Boyd  D.  Sloan,  2  Bailey,  311,  312;  8  Gaskell  v.  Marshall,  1  Mood.  &  Bob. 
3  Bedf.  on  Wills,  131,  pi.  2  a.  132,  in   which   the  judge,  upon  Quick  ;•. 

4  (  heater  v.  Greer,  5  Humph.  26 ;  but  Staines,  supra,  being  cited,  observed  that 
such  assent  will  not  be  presumed  in  the  the  marriage  in  that  case  made  all  the 
absence  of  acta  and  declarations  conducing  difference. 

to  show  an  assent:  Mnrphree  v.  Single-  9  Hall  v.  Hall,  27  Miss.  458,  460;  see 

ton,  87    Ala.  412,   416.     Post,  §   453,   on  post,  §  453,  on  executor's  assent. 

executor',  assent,  10  Wins.  Ex.  [643]  ;  3  Kedf.  on  Wills, 

6  Parke,  B.,  in  Elliott  v.  Kemp,  7  M.  129. 
&  W.  .'tor,,  318. 
416 


§  177         IN  AUTER  DROIT  AND  PROPRIO  JURE.     *  389,  *  390 

points  out,1  that  in  respect  to  land  no  merger  can  take  place 
[*  390]  of  *  the  estate  held  by  a  man  as  executor  in  that  which  he 

holds  in  his  own  right;2  but  a  distinguished  author8  urges 
this  distinction,  viz.  that  when  either  of  the  two  estates  is  an 
accession  to  the  other  by  act  of  law,  there  will  not  be  any  merger, 
but  that  where  the  accession  is  hj  act  of  the  part//,  the  lesser  estate 
will  merge.  Although  opposed  to  the  views  of  earlier  lawyers,4 
this  distinction  seems  to  be  supported  by  the  current  of  authorities.5 
It  is  also  to  be  observed  that  a  person  originally  entitled  to  a  term 
or  to  an  estate  of  freehold  as  executor  or  administrator  may  in 
process  of  time  become  the  owner  in  his  own  right.  Thus,  an 
executor  who  is  also  residuary  legatee,  having  performed  the  pur- 
poses of  the  will,  holds  the  estate  as  legatee;  so  where  he  pays 
money  of  his  own  to  the  value  of  the  term  in  discharge  of  the 
testator's  debts,  and  with  an  intention  of  appropriating  the  term  to 
his  own  use  in  lieu  of  the  money,  he  holds  in  his  own  right;  and 
so  does  an  administrator  who  is  entitled  to  the  whole  beneficial 
ownership  of  the  intestate's  property,  or  procures  a  discharge  from 
those  who  are  to  share  that  property  with  him,  and  all  the  debts  of 
the  intestate  are  paid.  Under  these  and  the  like  circumstances  the 
executor  or  administrator  will  have  the  estate  in  his  own  right,  and 
when  he  has  the  estate  in  his  own  right  it  will  be  subject  to  merger.8 
In  America,  however,  the  difficulties  attending  the  Thig  difficu]t„ 
ascertainment  of  the  character  in  which  property  is  slighter  in 
held  by  executors  and  administrators,  whether  qua  exec-  enca' 
utor  (or  administrator)  or  in  some  other  capacity  (such  as  guardian, 
trustee,  legatee,  etc.)  are  greatly  diminished  by  statutory  provisions 
requiring  the  distribution  of  assets  to  be  made  under  order  of  the 
probate  court,  or  at  least  to  be  reported  in  the  annual  or  final  settle- 
ments made  in  court.7  And  since  the  ownership  is  in  the  first  place 
always  that  of  executor  or  administrator,  it  is  incumbent  upon  any 
one  who  would  attach  a  right  to  the  assets  derived  from  or  through 
the  executor  or  administrator  personally,  to  show  that  the  original 
title  has  been  changed,  and  that  he  holds  the  property  in  some  other 
capacity,  which  may  be  done  by  proving  a  sale,  conversion,  or 
merger  in  any  of  the  methods  by  which  a  personal  representative 
may  divest  the  title  of  his  testator  or  intestate.  Hence,  since  an 
order  of  distribution,  or  to  pay  debts  or  legacies,  operates  to  change 
the  representative's  official  to  a  fixed  personal  liability,8  it  follows 

1  Wms.  Ex.  [640]  et  seq.  clearer,"   says  the  latter,   "  than  that   a 

2  2  Bla.  Comm.  177;  Jones  v.  Davies,    term   which  is  taken  alieno  jure   is  not 
5  H.  &  N.  766.  merged  in  a  reversion  acquired  suo  jure." 

8  Preston  on  Conveyancing,  vol.  iii.  p.  5  Wms.  Ex.  [641]. 

273  et  seq.  (3d  ed.,  1829).  6  Wms.  Ex.  [642] ;  3  Preston  on  Conv. 

4  Lord  Holt,  in  Gage  v.  Acton,  1  Salk.  310,  311. 

325,  326,  and  Lord  Kenyon,  in  Webb  v.  *  See  infra,  p.  *391. 

Russell,  3  T.  R.  393,  401.     "Nothing  is  8  As  will  appear  in  discussing  the  sub- 

vol.  i.  _27  417 


•390,  *391 


NATURE    OF    TITLE. 


177 


that  he  may  thereafter,  and  before  payment,  be  sum- 
moned as  garnishee  by  an  attaching  or  execution  creditor 
of  the  beneficiary  to  whom  the  executor  or  administrator 
is  ordered  to  pay.1  Conversely,  it  is  generally  held  that 
while  holding  in  his  representative  character,  he  is 
not  subject  to  garnishment  process,2  unless  he  is  made 
so  by  express  statutory  provision,  as  is  the  case  in  a 
large  and  increasing  number  of  the  States.3 
*  An  executor  or  administrator  having  assets,  being  also  [*  391] 

the   guardian  of  a  legatee  or  distributee,  may  transfer  the 

distributive  share  to  himself  as  guardian;  but  to  do  so, 
and  thus  fix  his  liability  in  the  new  capacity,  some  dis- 
tinct act  or  declaration  is  necessary.4  Nor  can  there 
be  a  transfer  of  a  mere  naked  liability,  as,  for  instance, 
the  debt  owing  to  the  estate  by  an  insolvent  fiduciary.5 

So,   if  a  trustee   must   give  bond,    an   executor   who  is   also   made 


Administrator 
may  be  gar- 
nished after 
order  to  pay, 

but  not  while 
holding  in  offi- 
cial capacity, 
unless  allowed 
by  statute. 


Transfer  of 
property  held 
in  one  capacity 
to  himself 
in  another 
capacity. 


ject  of  distribution  under  the  American 
statutes :  post,  §  569,  and  of  the  order  to 
pay  debts:  post,  §  411. 

1  Richards  v.  Griggs,  16  Mo.  416; 
Harrington  l\  La  Rocque,  13  Oreg.  344  ; 
Fitchett  o.  Dolbee,  3  Harring.  267 ;  Bar- 
tell  v.  Banmann,  12  HI.  App.  450;  Hoyt 
v.  Christie,  51  Vt.  48. 

2  Curling  v.  Hyde,  10  Mo.  374  ;  Gill  v, 
Middleton,  60  Ark.  213 ;  Norton  v.  Clark, 
18  Nev.  247;  Tost  v.  Love,  19  Fla.  634; 
McCreary  v.  Topper,  10  Pa.  St.  41 9.  And 
it  is  held  to  avail  the  creditor  nothing  if 
garnishment  proceedings  are  instituted 
before  an  order  of  distribution,  that  the 
proceedings  remain  in  court  until  there- 
after :  Case  v.  Miracle,  54  Wis.  295.  The 
amount  due  the  beneficiary  must  be  fixed 
before  there  can  be  judgment  against  a 
garnishee  :  Roth  v.  Hotard,  32  La.  An. 
280.  The  administrator  of  a  garnishee 
who  dies  before  answering  cannot  be 
brought  in  by  revivor:  White  v.  Ledyard, 
48  Mich.  2C4;  Tate  v.  Morehead,  65  N. 
C.  681  ;  Brecht  v.  Golly,  7  Mo.  App.  300, 
3D7  •  unless  the  statute  permits  him  to  be 
garnished:  Holman  v.  Fisher,  49  Miss. 
472. 

'■'■  So    in   Iowa:  Rover   i>.   Hawkins,  86 
I.»wa,  40  (in  which  the  court  says  "that 
in  most  of  the  States  the  tendency  has 
been  to   broaden  the  scope  of  this  rem- 
")  ■  Shepherd  >•■  Bridenstein,  80  Iowa, 
(holding  thai  the  Btatnte  did  not  au- 
thorize the  administrator  to  be  garnished 
418 


officially  on  a  suit  against  him  personally) ; 
Alabama  :  (where  the  personal  creditor  of 
an  executor  may  garnish  the  latter  in  his 
official  capacity  for  a  debt  due  him  indi- 
vidually) :  Dudley  v.  Falkner,  49  Ala.  148; 
New  Hampshire :  Palmer  v.  Noyes,  45 
N.  H.  174;  but  the  administrator  cannot 
garnish  himself  :  Hoag  v.  Hoag,  55  N.  H. 
172;  Maryland:  Hardesty  v.  Campbell, 
29  Maryland,  533  ;  Massachusetts :  Me- 
chanics' Bank  v.  Waite,  150  Mass.  234; 
Pennsylvania  (on  foreign  attachment) : 
Simickson  v.  Painter,  32  Pa.  St.  384 ; 
Mississippi :  Holman  v.  Fisher,  49  Miss. 
472;  Georgia:  Sapp  v.  McArdle,  41  Ga. 
628;  but  see  Davis  v.  Davis,  96  Ga.  136; 
Maine  :  Cummings  v.  Garvin,  65  Me.  301  ; 
Indiana:  Simonds  v.  Harris,  92  Lid.  505; 
Connecticut :  Johnes  v.  Jackson,  67  Conn. 
81  (permitting  garnishment  before  pro- 
bate) ;  Barnnm  v.  Boughton,  55  Conn. 
117  (but  refusing  to  allow  the  widow's 
allowance  to  be  attached  in  the  adminis- 
trator's hands)  ;  Virginia  (the  heir  being 
non-resident) :  Vance  v.  McLaughlin,  8 
Gratt.  289  ;  and  probably  other  States. 

4  Sanborn's  Estate,  109  Mich.  191  ; 
Smith  v.  Gregory,  26  Gratt.  248,  257 ; 
Miller  v.  Congdon,  14  Gray,  114.  See  also 
authorities  cited  jiost,  §  569,  p.  *1252. 
See  also  Woerner  on  Guardianship,  §  102, 
p.  344. 

5  This  subject  is  more  fully  discussed 
in  connection  with  the  liability  of  sureties, 
post,  §  255,  p.  *  551. 


§177 


IN    AUTER    DROIT    AND    PROPRIO    JURE. 


391 


trustee  will  remain  liable  as  executor  until  he  has  given  bond  as 
trustee; 1  or  if  no  bond  be  required,  until  by  some  authoritative  and 
notorious  act  he  elects,  or  is  directed,  to  act  in  the  capacity  of 
trustee ; 2  and  if  a  legacy  is  given  to  one  qua  executor,  he  remains 
liable  as  executor,  although  he  take  credit  therefor  as  legatee.8  So 
a  special  administrator  is  liable  for  money  belonging  to  the  estate 
received  by  him  as  agent  of  a  previous  administrator.4  And  an 
administrator  who  is  also  guardian,  or  trustee,  who  has  completed 
the  administration  and  therefore  has  no  further  use  for  assets,  is 
presumed  to  hold  the  property  as  guardian,5  or  trustee,6  as  the  case 
may  be.  And,  in  general,  where  a  man  holds  money  in  several 
capacities,  the  law  will  attach  to  him  liability  in  that  capacity  in 
which  of  right  it  ought  to  be  held;7  as  where  a  man  in  his  own 
person  unites,  by  operation  of  law,  the  character  of  debtor  and 
creditor.8  See  on  this  point  the  subject  of  debts  by  the  executor  or 
administrator  to  the  deceased.9  It  may  also  be  observed  that  where 
one  is  acting  in  a  dual  capacity  the  law  will  resolve  doubts  by 
attributing  his  acts  with  respect  to  the  subject-matter  to  the  proper 
capacity.10 

An  administrator  cannot  contract  with  himself.  Hence,  being 
indebted  to  the  estate  for  misappropriation  of  assets,  Administrator 
where  he  makes  a  note  payable  to  himself  as  ad  minis-  cannot  contract 
trator,  and  executes  a  mortgage  to  himself  to  secure  the  W1 
same,  such  mortgage,  as  a  mortgage,  is  inoperative.11  The  cancella- 
tion and  release  by  an  administrator  of   his  own  mortgage  to  the 


1  Prior  v.  Talbot,  10  Cush.  1  ;  Dorr  v. 
Wainwright,  13  Pick.  328,  331  ;  Probate 
Court  v.  Hazard,  13  R.  I.  1,  2;  Hall  v. 
Cushing,  9  Pick.  395,  409. 

2  Shaw,  Ch.  J.,  in  Newcomb  v.  Wil- 
liams, 9  Mete.  524,  534.  In  some  States 
the  order  of  the  probate  court  is  neces- 
sary: see  Higgins'  Estate,  15  Mont.  474, 
488-500,  with  numerous  quotations  of  de- 
cisions from  other  States  in  the  opinion. 
So  in  Scheffer's  Estate,  58  Minn.  29,  the 
court  say  :  "  In  the  case  of  one  who  is 
executor  and  also  a  legatee  in  trust,  or 
otherwise,  to  ascertain  whether  his  pos- 
session as  executor  has  ceased,  and  his 
possession  as  legatee  begun,  we  must  look 
to  the  action  of  the  probate  court  upon 
the  matter,"  and  holding  that  to  change 
the  capacity  in  which  he  holds,  the  order 
of  the  court  must  show  that  its  attention 
was  directed  to  it. 

*  Probate  Court  v.  Angell,  14  R.  I. 
495,  499. 

*  Gottsberger  v.  Taylor,  19  N.  Y.  150. 


6  United  States  v.  May,  4  Mackey,  4, 
7;  Tittman  v.  Green,  108  Mo.  22,  and 
cases  cited,  p.  39  ;  see  also  post,  §  569,  p. 
*  1252,  as  to  the  effect  of  an  order  of  distri- 
bution to  change  a  holding  by  one  in  one 
capacity  to  himself  in  another. 

6  Abell  v.  Brady,  79  Md.  94,  96,  and 
cases  cited. 

7  Kirby  v.  State,  51  Md.  383,  392,  cit- 
ing many  Maryland  cases  ;  State  v.  Ches- 
ton,  51  Md.  352,  376 ;  Citizens'  Bank  v. 
Sharp,  53  Md.  521,  527. 

8  Schnell  v.  Schroder,  Bail.  Eq.  334 
Enicks  v.  Powell,  2  Strobh.  Eq.  196,  206 
Griffin  v.   Bonham,  9  Rich.  Eq.   71,  77 
Jacobs  v.  Woodside,  6  S.  C.  490 ;  Todd  v. 
Davenport,  22  S.  C.  147 ;  Smith  v.  Greg- 
ory, 26  Gratt.  248,  260. 

9  Post,  §311. 

10  Even  when  purporting  to  be  done  in 
the  other  capacity  :  Duckworth  v.  Co.,  98 
Ga.  193. 

11  Gorham  v.  Meacham,  63  Vt.  231. 

419 


391 


NATURE   OP   TITLE.  §  W7 


estate  not  upon  payment  to  the  estate,  but  for  the  purpose  of  exe- 
cuting a  new  mortgage  with  the  knowledge  of  the  new  mortgagee,  is 
invalfd"  ThS  an  administrator  in  his  individual  capacity  cannot 
sue  himself  in  his  representative  character  is  stated  elsewhere. 

l  Eastham  v.  Landon,  17  Wash.  48.  a  P°st>  §  377' 


420 


§  178  ADMINISTRATORS  CUM  TESTAMENTO  ANNEXO.      *  392,  *  393 


[*392]  *  CHAPTER  XIX. 

OP   SPECIAL   AND    QUALIFIED    ADMINISTRATORS. 

§  178.  Administrators  cum  Testamento  annezo.  —  It  has  been 
shown  that  the  chief  distinction  between  an  executor  and  an  admin- 
istrator lies  in  the  source  of  their  appointment,  and  in    _,.  L.    ..     . 

i.     -i  t  Distinction  be- 

the  fact  that  the  one  disposes  of  the  estate  according  to   tween  executor 
the  directions  of  the  testator,  while  the  other  is  gov-   J"~  *d^™IS" 

'  _     o  trator  cum 

erned  in  this  respect  by  the  general  law.1  The  distinc-  testamento 
tion  is  still  fainter  in  cases  where  a  will  exists  and,  annex0- 
from  any  cause,  there  is  no  executor.  In  such  case  the  probate 
court  designates  a  person  to  carry  out,  or  execute,  the  will,  which  is 
then  annexed  to  and  becomes  part  of  his  letters;  from  which  cir- 
cumstance he  is  known  as  administrator  (not  executor,  because  not 
nominated  by  the  testator)  cum  testamento  annexo,  or  administrator 
with  the  will  annexed.  Since  it  is  his  duty  to  dispose  of  the  prop- 
erty of  the  testator  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  will,  it 
is  obvious  that  his  powers  can  differ  but  slightly  from  those  of  an 
executor.  Indeed,  the  difference  sometimes  insisted  upon  —  that 
an  administrator  cum  testamento  annexo  cannot  execute  such  powers 
conferred  by  the  testator  upon  the  executor  as  may  be  beyond  the 
ordinary  functions  of  an  executor  —  is  not  in  reality  a  difference 
between  the  administrator  and  executor  at  all,  because  powers 
beyond  the  ordinary  functions  of  executors  are  to  that  extent  a 
testamentary  trust,  and  vest  in  him  as  such  trustee,  not  because  he 
is  executor,  but  in  addition  to  and  independent  of  his  office  as 
such.8 

Since  all  the  duties  of  an  executor,  pertaining  to  his  office  as 

such,  devolve  to  the  administrator  with  the  will  annexed,8 

[*393]  the    *  latter    possesses,     generally,    the     same    Powers,  duties, 

powers,  is  bound  by  the  same  duties,  and  sub-    a?d Jiabi!><-ies 
\  ,.,.,..     ^  of  administra- 

ted to  the  same  liabilities  as  the  former,4  whether  ap-   tor  c.  t.  a.  gen- 

1  Ante,  §  171.  Talbert,  36  Miss.  367,  373  ;  Olwine's  Ap- 

2  Shaw  v.  McCameron,  11  S.  &  R.  252,  peal,  4  W.  &  S.  492;  Lucas  v.  Price,  4 
255.  Ala.  679,  683. 

3  Blake  v.  Dexter,  12  Cush.  559,  569  ;  *  Kidwell  v.  Brummagim,  32  Cal.  436, 
Buttrick  v.  King,  7  Met.  (Mass.)  20  ;  Wil-  439,  citing  Jackson  v.  Ferris,  15  John.  346, 
son's  Estate,  2  Pa.  St.  325,  329;  Hester  347  ;  Bowers  v.  Emerson,  14  Barb.  652; 
v.  Hester,  2  Ired.  Eq.  330,  339  ;  Jackson  Farwell  v.  Jacobs,  4  Mass.  634,  636.  It 
v.  Jeffries,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  88  ;  King  v.  was  held  that  the  office  of  administrator 

421 


*393,  *394    special  and  qualified  administrators.  §  179 

eraliv  the  same    P°iuted    originally,    or    upon   the   death,    removal,    or 
as  of  an  resignation  of  the  executor; 1  but  the  powers  and  duties 

not  necessarily  connected  with  the  functions  of  an  ex- 
ecutor devolve  upon  the  administrator  with  the  will  annexed  only 
when  it  appears  clearly  from  the  will  that  the  testator  so  intended;  2 
as  where,  for  instance,  he  directed  an  act  to  be  done  at  all  events, 
without  leaving  any  discretion  to  the  executor.8 

The  power  of  the  administrator  with  the  will  annexed  is  not, 
p  fad-  generally,  limited  to  the  administration  of  the  estate 
ministrator  disposed  of  by  the  will,  although  it  has  in  some  cases 
to  dlwntsd?  been  held  so>4  but  extends  to  the  whole  of  the  decedent's 
testator's  estate,5  unless  the  testator  has  otherwise  directed.6 

The  power  to  sell  lands  granted  to  executors  who 
refuse  to  qualify,  or  are  removed  or  die,  is  in  most  States  regulated 
by  statute,  and  will  be  further  considered  in  connection  with  the 
subject  of  the  management  of  real  estate.7 

§  179.  Administrators  de  Bonis  non.  —  Upon  the  death,  removal, 
or  resignation  of  a  sole  executor  or  administrator,  or  of  all  of 
Administrator  several  joint  executors  or  administrators,  before  the  estate 
de  bonis  non  &d-  has  been  fully  administered,  it  becomes  necessary  to 
assets  remain-  appoint  a  successor,  to  the  end  that  the  administration 
ingunadmin-      mav  ^g  completed.8     Such  an  officer  is  known 

istered.  .     . 

*  as  administrator  de  bonis  non  (administratis) ,  [*  394] 
—  administrator  of  the  unadministered  effects;  or,  if  he 
succeed  an  executor  or  an  administrator  cum  testamento  annexo,  he 
is  known  as  administrator  de  bonis  non  ctim  testamento  annexo,  — 
Distinction  in  administrator  with  the  will  annexed  of  the  unadminis- 
this  respect  at  tered  goods.  At  common  law  there  is  a  distinction  in 
bet"veen"exec-  this  respect  between  executors  and  administrators,  grow- 
utors  and  ad-  ing  0ut  of  the  doctrine  that  an  executor's  executor  suc- 
ceeds to  the  estate  of  the  deceased  executor's  testator, 

with   the  will   annexed   ceases  upon  the  annexo  should  also  take  a  graut  of  admin- 
setting  aside  of  the  will  in  the  same  way  istration  et  ceterorum. 

as  if   he  were  executor  under  the  will :  6  Ex  parte  Brown,  2  Bradf.  22 ;  Lan- 

Kitton  v.  Anderson,  18  R.  I.  136.  ders  v.  Stone,  45  Ind.  404. 

1  Ex  parte  Brown,  2  Bradf.  22.  6  3   Redf.  on  Wills,  96,  pi.  2,  citing 

2  Ingle  v.  Jones,  9  Wall.  486,  498;  Hays  t*.  Jackson,  6  Mass.  149,  in  which 
Knight  v.  Loomis,  30  Me.  204  ;  Conklin  Parsons,  C.  J.,  says  that  the  correct  prac- 
v.  Egerton,  21  Wend.  430;  Tainter  v.  tice  in  America  is  that  executors  admin- 
C]:trk,  13  Met.  220,  226  ;  Wills  v.  Cowper,  ister  undivided  estate  ex  officio,  without 
2  Oh.  312,  316;  Moody  t\  Vandyke,  4  a  letter  of  administration.  The  same 
Bin.  31  ;  Dunning  v.  Ocean  Bank,  61  N.  doctrine  is  held  in  Landers  v.  Stone,  45 
Y.  497,  501.  Ind.  404,  407  ;  Venahle  v.  Mitchell,  29  Ga. 

1  King  ".  Talbert,  36  Miss.  367,  373.  566.     See  on  this  point  post,  §  229. 

«    Harp.-r    -•.   Smith,   9    6a.   461;    Ash-  7  Post,  §§  339  et  seq. 
burn  v.  Ashbnrn,  16  Ga.  213,  216;  Dean  8  Scott  v.  Fox,  14  Md.  388,394.     See 
v.  Biggcrs,  27  Ga.  73,  75.    These  Georgia  post,  §  351,  on  the  succession  of  admin- 
cases  hold  that,  where  it  becomes  neces-  istrators. 
eary,    the    administrator    rntn    testamento 
422 


§  179  ADMINISTRATORS    DE   BONIS   NON.  *  394,  *  395 

but  not  the  deceased  executor's  administrator,  nor  does  a  deceased 
administrator's  executor  or  administrator  succeed  to  the  estate  of 
the  original  intestate.1  This  distinction  disappears,  of  course, 
with  the  rule  from  which  it  springs,  and  now  exists  in  very  few  of 
the  American  States ; 2  where  it  is  not  recognized,  the  necessity  for 
the  appointment  of  an  administrator  de  bonis  non  is  the  same, 
whether  it  was  an  executor  or  administrator  who  left  the  estate 
unadministered.8  It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  a  successor  to 
an  executor  provided  for  in  the  will  by  the  testator,  completes  the 
administration  as  executor,  not  as  administrator.4 

An  estate  is  not  fully  administered  so  long  as  anything  remains 
to  be  done  to  vest  the  title  of  the  decedent's  estate  in  the  beneficiary, 
whether  creditor,  next  of  kin,  legatee,  or  devisee,  which  unadminis- 
no  one  but  an  executor  or  administrator  can  lawfully  tered  estate. 
do;  such  as  paying  a  legacy,  or  distributing  the  effects  or  assets,5 
although  the  assets  had  been  reduced  to  money,6  paying  debts,7 
collecting  debts,8  or  the  like.  But  it  has  been  held  that  an  admin- 
istrator de  bonis  non  cannot  be  appointed  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
making  a  conveyance  which  the  original  administrator  ought  to  have 
made,  and  that  such  appointment  is  not  necessary  in  some  other 
instances  where  it  would  serve  no  useful  purpose.9 

The  administration  de  bonis  non  may  be  granted  after  any  length 
of  time,10  but  lapse  of  time  and  other  circum-    Time  within 
[*  395]  stances  may  *  raise  a  presumption  that  all  debts    which  an  ad- 
against  an  estate  are  barred  or  paid,  and  that  the    S!TV.am°av 
remaining  assets  belong  to  the  heirs,  in  which  case  the    be  appointed. 

1  See,  as  to  the  authority  of  a  deceased  but  afterwards  became  good  :  Mallory's 
executor's  executor  to  the  estate  of  the  Appeal,  62  Conn.  218.  But  in  Iowa  it  is 
original  testator,  post,  §  350.  held  that  if  the  debts  of  the  estate  are  all 

2  Post,  §  350.  paid  and  the  administrator  discharged  the 
8  Taylor   v.   Brooks,  4  Dev.  &  B.  L.     court  has  no  jurisdiction  to  re-appoint  the 

139,    143 ;    Carroll    v.    Connet,    2    J.   J.  administrator  to  collect  a  debt  which  on 

Marsh.  195,  205.  final  settlement  it  was  presumed  would  be 

4  Kinney  v.  Keplinger,  172  111.  449.  paid;  in  such  case  the  heirs  should  sue  as 

5  Alexander  v.  Stewart,  8  G.  &  J.  property  due  to  them  :  Jordan  v.  Hunnel, 
226,  244 ;  Hendricks  v.  Snodgrass,  Walk.  96  Iowa,  334.  A  claim  instituted  by  a 
(Miss.)  86;  Scott  v.  Crews,  72  Mo.  261,  removed  executor  should  be  prosecuted 
264 ;  University  v.  Hughes,  90  N.  C.  537 ;  by  his  successor :  Hayward  v.  Place,  4 
Kinney  v.  Keplinger,  172  111.  449.  Dem.  487. 

G  Donaldson  v.  Raborg,  26  Md.  312, 326 ;  9  See  post,  §  352,  p.  *  749,  cases  referred 

De  Valengin  v.  Duffy,  14  Pet.  282,  291.  to  in  note;  Graysou    v.   Weddle,  63   Mo. 

7  Howell  v.  Jump,  140  Mo.  441.  Al-  523,  539;  Long  v.  Joplin  M.  Co.,  68  Mo. 
though   the   estate    was   all    distributed :  422,  427. 

Brattle  i\  Converse,  1   Root,  174;  Brattle  10  Bancroft  v.  Andrews,  6  Cush.  493, 

v.  Gustin,  1   Root,  425  ;  Bancroft  v.  An-  495 ;  citing   Kempton   v.    Swift,  2   Mete 

drews,  6  Cush.  493,  494;  State  v.  Farmer,  (Mass.)  70,  in  which  the  second  adminis- 

54  Mo.  439,  445.  tration   was    granted    more    than   thirty 

8  Although  such  debts  were  on  final  years  after  the  first ;  Holmes,  Petitioner, 
settlement  accounted  for  as  uncollectible,  33  Me.  577. 

423 


395 


SPECIAL   AND   QUALIFIED    ADMINISTRATORS. 


§180 


Vacancy  in  the 
administration 
before  adminis- 
trator d.  b.  n. 
can  be  ap- 
pointed. 


administration  cannot  be  reopened  by  the  appointment  of  an  ad- 
ministrator de  bonis  non.1  If  nothing  remains  to  be  done  to  com- 
plete administration,  the  grant  of  letters  de  bonis  non  is  merely 
nugatory.2 

Since  there  can  be  but  one  valid  administration  in  the  same  State 
of  the  same  succession  at  the  same  time,  the  appointment  of  an 
administrator  de  bonis  non  before  the  death,  removal, 
or  resignation  of  the  executor  or  original  administrator 
is  obviously  a  nullity;8  and  this  applies  with  the  same 
force  to  the  case  of  several  joint  executors  or  adminis- 
trators, so  long  as  one  of  them  remains  in  office,  because 
the  grant  of  administration  is  an  entirety,  and  the  authority  survives 
to  the  last  one.4  But  the  mere  informality  of  omitting  the  words 
de  bonis  non  in  the  appointment  of  an  administrator  to  succeed  a 
general  administrator  who  had  died,5  or  of  omitting  to  enter  the 
order  removing  the  administrator,  when  the  facts  necessary  to  sus- 
tain such  order  are  recited  in  connection  with  the  grant  of  adminis- 
tration de  bonis  non,  does  not  render  such  appointment  void.6  And 
it  was  held  in  Minnesota  that  although  the  statute  does  not  con- 
template the  appointment  of  an  administrator  where  there  is  already 
one  whose  office  has  not  been  extinguished,  yet  the  appointment  in 
such  case,  though  erroneous,  is  not  void.7  See  on  this  subject  the 
chapter  on  the  privity  between  executors  and  administrators  of  the 
same  estate.8 

-_.u         ...  S  180.    Public    Administrators.  —  The    public    admin- 

When  public  s  .    .  .  r 

administrator      istrator,  or  administrator  general,  is  an  olhcer  author- 
charee  of  ^ze(^  ^y  ^ne  statutes  of  several  of  the  States  to  admin- 

estates,  ister  the  estates  of    persons   dying  intestate  without 

i  Murphy  v.  Menard,  14  Tex.  62,  67. 

2  Wilcoxon  v.  Reese,  63  Md.  542, 
545. 

8  Munroei).  People,  102  111.  406,  409; 
Rambo  v.  Wyatt,  32  Ala.  363,  365  ;  Mat- 
thews v.  Douthitt,  27  Ala.  273  ;  Watkins 
v.  Adams,  32  Miss.  333,  335 ;  Petigru  v. 
Ferguson,  6  Rich.  Eq.  378 ;  Grande  v. 
Chaves,  15  Tex.  550;  Hamilton's  Estate, 
34  Cal.  464  ;  Bowman's  Estate,  121  N.  C. 
37.",  ;  Creath  v.  Brent,  3  Dana,  129.  And 
in  [ndiana  can  only  be  granted  in  case  of 
vacancy  before  final  settlement :  Croxton 
v.  Banner,  108  Ind.  223. 

1  Lewie  v.  Brooks,  6  Yerg.  167;  State 
V.  Green,  68  Mo.  528,  530,  citing  State  v. 
Rucker,  59  Mo.  24.  See  post,  §  346.  And 
for  farther  discnasion  and  citation  of  au- 

thoritiei  on  this  and  similar  points,  §  245. 

•  Moselin  i).  Martin,  37  Ala.  216,  219; 

Bfeees  >    Bennett,  24  Vt.  303;  Bailey  v. 

424 


Scott,  13  Wis.  618;  per  Fuller,  C.  J.,  in 
Veach  v.  Rice,  131  U.  S.  293,  315. 

6  Ragland  v.  King,  37  Ala.  80;  Russell 
v.  Erwin,  41  Ala.  292.  The  appointment 
of  an  administrator  de  bonis  non  is  of  it- 
self prima  facie  evidence  of  a  vacancy ; 
and  this  presumption  must  prevail  in  a 
collateral  proceeding  until  clearly  dis- 
proved: Macey  v.  Stark,  116  Mo.  481,  501. 
On  this  and  similar  points  see  post,  §  245 
p.  *  534,  note. 

7  Culver  v.  Hardenbergh,  37  Minn. 
225,  232,  236.  On  the  ground  that  where 
a  probate  court  appoints  a  first  adminis- 
trator, it  thereby  acquires  jurisdiction  to 
direct  and  control  the  administration,  and 
that  such  jurisdiction  continues  until  its 
close,  and  sustains  all  that  the  court  may 
do  in  the  course  and  for  the  purpose  of 
the  administration. 

K  Post,  §§  351  et  seq. 


§  180  PUBLIC   ADMINISTRATORS.  *  395,  *  396 

relatives  entitled  to  administer,1  or  where  those  entitled  refuse  to  do 
so.  In  some  of  the  States  this  officer  is  elected  by  the  people,  and 
holds  office  for  a  number  of  years ; 2  in  others  he  is  appointed 
[*396]  *by  the  governor,8  or  by  the  court  having  probate  jurisdic- 
tion,4 and  in  North  Carolina  by  the  clerk  of  the  Supreme 
Court.  It  is  held  in  the  last-named  State  that  the  office  of  public 
administrator  is  a  property  right  of  which  the  incumbent  cannot  be 
deprived  on  the  ground  of  his  failure  to  renew  his  bond  without 
due  notice  to  him  to  show  cause  why  his  authority  should  not  be 
revoked.5  In  Alabama  such  officer  is  appointed  for  the  county  of 
Mobile  only;6  but  the  probate  court  may  compel  the  sheriff  or 
coroner  to  administer,  and  on  application  of  a  creditor  the  probate 
judge  refusing  to  make  such  an  order  may  himself  be  compelled  by 
maridamus  to  do  so.7  So,  in  Arkansas 8  and  Virginia,9  sheriffs  are 
ex  officio  public  administrators,  and  the  authority  of  probate  courts 
to  order  the  sheriff  to  take  charge  of  an  estate  without  reciting  the 
reason  therefor  is  unquestioned.10  In  Georgia  the  ordinary  may  com- 
pel the  clerk  of  the  Superior  Court  to  perform  the  duties  of  adminis- 
trator, if  no  one  else  can  be  found  to  apply  for  letters.11  When 
administration  is  committed  to  any  such  officer,  he  is  liable  on  his 
official  bond  for  its  faithful  performance ; la  in  Arkansas  it  is  held 
that  the  sureties  on  the  sheriff's  bond  are  liable,  although  a  special 
administration  bond  was  given  in  each  estate  taken  charge  of  as 
public  administrator; 13  but  it  is  ruled  differently  in  other  States.14 
In  Georgia  the  ordinary  may  order  an  estate  to  be  administered  by 
the  clerk  without  bond,  if  no  one  can  be  found  who  will  give  bond.15 
The  authority  of  these  officers  as  administrators  does  not  usually 

1  Abb.  L.  Diet.  "  Administer."  sheriff   or   coroner  virtute   officii  expires 

2  In    California,    Missouri,    Montana,  with  his  term:  Landford  v.  Dunklin,  71 
Nevada,  and  New  York.  Ala.  594,  609. 

3  Colorado,  Illinois,  Maine,  and  Massa-  8  Dig.  St.  1894,  §§  238-245. 
chusetts.  9  Hutcheson  v.  Priddy,   12  Gratt.  85, 

4  Kentucky,  Mississippi,  Tennessee,  and  87. 

"Wisconsin.  w  State  v.   Watts,   23   Ark.  304,  312. 

6  Trotter  v.  Mitchell,   115  N.  C.  190.  But  the  sheriff  has  no  authority  to  allow 

And  where,  upon  notice  served  for  failure  or  reject  claims  against  the  estate  of   a 

to  renew  his  bond,  the  bond  is  tendered,  decedent  until  he  has  assumed  the  charge 

no  other  default  having  been   shown,  it  of  the  assets,  or  been  ordered  to  assume 

was  held  error  for  the  clerk  to  refuse  to  the  administration  by  the  probate  court : 

accept  the  bond  so  tendered:  Trotter  v.  Williamson  v.  Furbush,  31  Ark.  539,  541. 

Mitchell,  115  N.  C.  193.  «  Johnson  v.  Tatum,  20  Ga.  775. 

6  It  is  there  held  that  an  order  by  the  12  Scarce   v.   Page,    12    B.   Mon.   311 ; 
probate  court  committing  an  estate  to  the  Cocke  v.  Finley,  29  Miss.  127. 

charge  of  the  general  administrator  is  not  13  The  court  so  concluded  "  with  much 

void  for  the  omission  to  recite   the   due  hesitation  "  :  State  v.  Watts,  23  Ark.  304, 

appointment  of  the  general  administrator :  309. 

Kussell  v.  Erwin,  41  Ala.  292.  «  McNeil  v.  Smith,  55  Ga.  313. 

7  Brennan  v.  Harris,  20  Ala.  185.    The  15  Code,  1895,  §  3391. 
grant  of  letters  of  administration  to  the 

425 


*  396,  *  397     special  and  qualified  administrators.  §  180 

cease  with  their  official  term,  but  continues  until  the  estate  is  fully 
administered;1  but  in  South  Carolina  the  authority  of  a  commis- 
sioner in  equity  suing  out  letters  of  administration  on  a  derelict 
estate  is  held  to  cease  with  his  office  as  commissioner,  and  Lis 
successor  must  sue  out  letters  de  bonis  non  ;  2  and  in  Missouri,  while 
he  may  continue  to  administer  estates  in  his  hands  after  his  term  of 
office  has  expired,  yet  his  functions  cease  when  he  has  resigned  as 
such,  and  a  successor  has  been  appointed.3 

In  most  States  the  authority  of  the  public  administrator,  or 

*  administrator  general,  depends  upon  appointment  by,4  or  [*397] 
letters  obtained  from,  the  probate  court,5  upon  the  applica- 
tion of  some  party  interested,6  or  without  such  application;  and  a 
public  administrator,  by  making  application,  acquires  no  vested 
right  as  against  his  successor  in  office 7  and  in  some  States  it  is  made 
his  duty  to  take  into  custody  and  protect  against  loss  and  waste 
any  estate  not  otherwise  administered,  until  there  may  be  a  regular 
appointment  of  some  person  having  preference  under  the  law.8  In 
Missouri9  and  New  York,10  however,  the  public  administrator  takes 
charge  of  estates  under  circumstances  pointed  out  by  the  statute, 
without  order  of  the  probate  court  or  surrogate;  but  he  may  be 
ordered  to  take  charge  of  other  estates  in  their  discretion. 

In  Missouri  the  public  administrator  is  required  to  file  notice  in 
the  probate  court  whenever  he  takes  charge  of  an  estate;  but  the 
validity  of  his  administration  does  not  depend  upon  giving  such 
notice,11  nor  can  his  authority  be  questioned  collaterally.12  The 
probate  court  may  direct  him  to  take  charge  of  an  estate  for  any 

1  Beale  v.  Hall,  22  Ga.  431  ;   Russell  v.  tion  to  the  sheriff  to  take  charge  of  the 

Erwin,  41  Ala.  292  ;  Rogers  v.  Hoberlein,  estate  of  "  Robert  W."  does  not  authorize 

11  Cal.  120;    Warren  v.   Carter,  92  Mo.  him  to  take  charge  of  the  estate  of  "Henry 

288 ;   Thornton  v.  Loague,  95  Teun.  93  ;  W." :    Woodyard   v.  Threlkeld,    1   A.  K. 

Tunstall  v.  Withers,  86  Va.  892.     When  Marsh.  10. 

his  authority  depends  upon  a  grant  of  let-  6  Unknown  Heirs  v.  Baker,  23  111.484  ; 

ters  from  the  court,  as  in  most  States,  it  is  Succession  of  Miller,  27  La.  An.  574. 

not  enough  that  his  petition  for  letters  be  "'  State  v.  Woody,  20  Mont.  413,  417. 

filed  before  the  expiration  of   his   term,  8  Beckett  v.  Selover,  7  Cal.  215. 

but  it  is  necessary  that  letters   also   be  9  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  299. 

granted  before  that  time  :  In  re  Pingree,  1U  3  Banks  &  Bro.,  pp.  2309,  2319. 

100  Cal.  78;   his  status   at  the   time  of  n  Adams  v.  Larrimore,  51  Mo.  130, 131. 

granting   letters   determines   his    compe-  u  Dunn   v.   Bank,    109    Mo.    90,    101  ; 

tency  ;   In  re  McLaughlin,  103  Cal.  429.  Green  v.  Tittman,  124  Mo.  372  ;   Wetzell 

-1   Levi  v.  Hnggins,  14  Rich.  166.  v.  Waters,  18  Mo.  396.     But  proof  of  the 

3  State   i.  Kennedy,  73  Mo.  App.  384.  filingof  the  notice  by  a  person  not  shown  to 

In  BUCfl  case  the  court  should  order  him  to  be  public  administrator  is  not  sufficient  to 

nettle  and  turn  over  the  estate  to  his  sue-  show  that  such  person  is  legally  in  charge 

cessor  :   lb.  of  the  administration;  and  the  certificate 

1  Morse  v.  Griffith,  25  La.  An.  213;  of  the  probate  judge  that  he  is  public  ad- 
Wilson  v.  Dibble,  16  Fla.  782,  784,  citing  ministrator  is  not  competent  proof;  it 
Davis  v.  Shuler,  14  Fla,  438.  must  be  shown  by  a  copy  of  the  record  of 

'•  Thomas  v.  Adams,  10  111.319;   Ks-  appointment  as  public  administrator :  Lit- 

tate  of   Hamilton,  34  Cal.  464.     A  direc-  tleton  v.  Christy,  11  Mo.  390,  393. 
426 


§  180  PUBLIC    ADMINISTRATORS.  *  397,  *  39S 

good  cause,  "to  prevent  its  being  injured,  wasted,  purloined,  or 
lost;"1  the  partnership  estate  of  a  deceased  partner  forms  no 
exception.2  But  it  is  held  that  he  has  no  authority  to  bring  suit 
against  a  foreign  insurance  company,  doing  business  in  Missouri, 
upon  a  policy  of  insurance  not  made,  nor  to  be  executed,  in  Missouri, 
upon  the  life  of  a  citizen  of  another  State,  who  neither  resided, 
died,  nor  left  property  in  Missouri;3  nor  to  maintain  an  action  for 
assets   of    an   estate  which   he   has   unlawfully  taken   charge   of.4 

His  action  in  taking  charge  of  an  estate  without  the 
[*  398]  *  order  of  the  probate  court  is  not  final,  but  may  be  annulled 

by  the  probate  court,  if  in  its  opinion  the  facts  did  not  war- 
rant the  administration  by  the  public  administrator.5  Under  the 
statute  of  1845  he  might  resign  as  public  administrator  and  be 
appointed  as  an  individual  administrator  de  bonis  non.*  A  Michigan 
case  intimates  that  the  validity  of  the  acts  of  a  public  administra- 
tor having  an  estate  in  charge  without  appointment  by  the  probate 
court,  is  collaterally  assailable.7 

In  New  York  there  is  a  distinction  between  the  powers  of  the 
public  administrators  in  the  city  of  New  York,  and  of  those  of  the 
interior  counties.  In  New  York  City  the  public  administrator  is 
made  the  head  of  a  bureau  in  the  law  department,  and  is  to  be 
appointed  by  the  corporation  counsel.8  He  takes  charge  "in  right 
of  his  office  "  of  the  estates  of  persons  dying  intestate  within  the 
State  or  elsewhere  leaving  property  in  the  city  or  county  of  New 

1  This  statute  authorizes  the  public  ad-  after  calling  attention  to  the  latter  two 
ministrator  to  take  charge  of  any  estate  cases,  the  court  observe :  "  Even  if  the 
under  order  of  the  probate  court  upon  facts  did  not  exist  to  justify  him  in  taking 
which  no  administration  has  previously  charge  of  the  estate,  he  would  be  the  ad- 
been  granted  :  Callahan  v.  Griswold,  9  Mo.  ministrator  until  superseded  by  a  duly  ap- 
784.  And  he  cannot  refuse  to  take  charge  pointed  private  administrator."  Leeper  v. 
of  and  administer  any  estate  which  by  law  Taylor,  111  Mo.  312,  322.  In  view  of 
should  be  administered  so  long  as  he  holds  these  considerations,  it  may  well  be  doubt- 
office  :  State  v.  Kennedy,  73  Mo.  App.  384,  ed  whether  Lewis  v.  McCabe,  supra,  will 
388.  be  adhered  to  in  subsequent  cases. 

2  Headlee  v.  Cloud,  51  Mo.  301.  5  McCabe  v.  Lewis,  76  Mo.  296,  301, 
8  Insurance  Company  v.  Lewis,  97  U.  S.     reversing  Court  of  Appeals.     Two  of  the 

682.  judges  dissent  from  this  principle,  holding 
4  Lewis  v.  McCabe,  76  Mo.  307.     The  with  the  Court  of  Appeals,  that  the  pro- 
principle  announced  in  this  case  was  re-  bate  court  had  no  power  to  control  the 
pudiated  by  two  of   the  judges,  who   in  public  administrator's  discretion  in  taking 
their  dissenting  opinion  call  attention  to  charge  of  estates. 
the  case  of  Wetzell  v.  Waters,  18  Mo.  6  Macey  v.  Stark,  116  Mo.  481,  497. 
396  (cited  ubi  supra),  with  the  doctrine  of          T  Per  Cooley,  C.  J.,  in  Reynolds  v.  Mc- 
which  it  conflicts.     It  seems  to   militate  Mullen,  55  Mich.  568,  573.     The  authority 
against  the  case  of  Headlee  v.  Cloud  also,  relied  on  (Illinois  Railroad  Co.  v.  Cragin, 
in  which  it  is  announced  that  the  public  71  111.  177)  holds  letters  granted  by  a  clerk, 
administrator  cannot  be  divested  of  an  ad-  and  not  approved  by  the  court,  to  be  im- 
ministration  in  a  collateral  proceeding,  but  peachable  collaterally. 
only  on  application  to  the  probate  court:          8  Laws,  1873,  ch.  335,  §  38. 
51  Mo.  302.     And  again,  in  a  recent  case, 

427 


*  398,  *  399    special  and  qualified  administrators.  §  180 

York,  or  when  such  property  shall  arrive  there  after  the  death  of 
such  person,  or  leaving  effects  at  the  quarantine  of  said  city.1 
Outside  of  the  city  of  New  York,  the  several  county  treasurers  are 
bound,  virtute  officii,  to  accept  appointment  as  administrators  made 
by  the  surrogates,  to  give  bond,  etc.2  The  effects  of  foreigners 
dying  intestate  are  taken  charge  of  by  the  commissioners  of  emigra- 
tion of  the  city  of  New  York  until  such  time  as  their  authority 
may  be  superseded  by  letters  regularly  granted;  these  commis- 
sioners may  also  appropriate  to  the  use  of  any  minor  child  its  dis- 
tributive share  of  the  estate  in  their  charge.8 

The  circumstances  under  which  a  public  administrator  is  authorized 
to  take  charge  of  an  estate  depend,  of  course,  wholly  upon  the 
respective  statutes.  It  has  already  been  mentioned,  that  in  some 
of  the  States  it  is  his  duty  to  take  charge  of  estates,  in  certain 
contingencies,  without  order  or  letters  from  the  probate  court; 4  and 
also,    that   where    he   has    such    authority,    but    does    not 

*  exercise  it,  he  may  be  compelled  to  do  so  by  order  of  the  [*  399] 
probate  court.6  So  also,  although  the  public  administrator 
assume  the  charge  of  an  estate  without  order  or  authority  from  the 
probate  court,  exercising  in  this  respect  a  co-ordinate  jurisdiction, 
yet  the  validity  of  his  act  in  so  doing  may  be  questioned  in  the 
probate  court,  and  his  authority  annulled  if  found  unwarranted  by 
the  circumstances.6  And  similarly  the  authority  of  the  public 
administrator  may  be  revoked,  even  where  he  was  appointed  by 
decree  of  the  probate  court,"  if  such  decree  was  improvidently 
granted.7 

The  exercise  of  the  discretion  of  probate  courts,  under  the  statutes 

on  this   subject,    in   granting   letters   of   administration   to   public 

administrators,  or  ordering  them  to  take  charge  of  the 

vv  iH'Ti  proD&tc  t  t  ,  ^^ 

court  mav  di-      estates  of  deceased  persons,  is  not  always  without  dirh- 

Idmii'itt^ato'r0      Culty-       Ifc  haS   been   held   that   the    TiSht   °f    the    public 

to  take  charge  administrator  to  letters  is  confined  to  cases  of  intestacy ; 
in  estates  of  testates  the  court  may  exercise  its  discre- 
tion.8 Where,  the  next  of  kin  being  disqualified,  the  grant  of  letters 
to  the  public  administrator,  or  to  another  person,  is  discretional, 
neither  the  expressed  desire  of  the  intestate,  nor  the  unanimous 
recommendation  of  the  next  of  kin  have  any  legal  effect  to  narrow 
such  discretion;9  but  if  there  is  a  contest  between  a  creditor  and 

1  3  P.anks  &  P>ro.,  p.  2.309.  lb.  p.  *406.     See  also  cases  cited  supra, 

2  lb.,  p.  23 1!)    el  seq.  p.  *397  and  p.  *398. 

3  Ex  parte  Commissioners  of  Emigra-  7  Varnell  v.  Loaguo,  9  Lea,  158,  161  ; 
tion,  1  Bradf.  259.  Proctor  v.  Wanmaker,  1   Barb.  Ch.  302, 

4  Supra,  p.  *397.  308,  citing  English  cases. 

6  Snrr<i,  ],.  *897.  8  Nunan's  Estate,  Myr.  238. 

0  Donaldson  ".  Lewis,  7  Mo.  App.  403,  9  Estate  of  Morgan,  53  Cal.  243  ;  Estate 

405;    and  the   judgment   of  the    probate  of  Kelly,  57  Cal.  81. 
court  in  inch  case  may  he  appealed  from: 

4L'H 


§  180  PUBLIC    ADMINISTRATORS.  *  399,  *  400 

the  public  administrator,  other  creditors  will  be  heard,  and  the 
public  administrator  may  be  appointed  at  their  request.1  He  can- 
not, however,  be  appointed  provisionally  until  the  contest  for  the 
administration  is  determined,  if  he  is  himself  one  of  the  applicants; 2 
and  where,  pending  the  application  of  a  public  administrator,  his 
term  of  office  expires,  he  is  not  entitled  to  the  appointment.3  It 
was  held,  at  one  time,  that  the  claim  of  the  public  administrator 
was  superior  to  that  of  blood  relatives  who  are  not  entitled  to 
distribution;4  but  this  decision  was  overruled  in  later  cases,6  and 
it  is  now  held  that  the  claim  of  one  next  of  kin,  although  not 
entitled  to  distribution,  is  superior  to  that  of  the  public  adminis- 
trator.6   And   where,   in  case   of    disqualification   of    the   next   of 

kin,  the  public  administrator  is  entitled,  the  application 
[*  400]  *  of  one   nearer  of   kin   than   any   person  residing   in  the 

United  States  will  not  prevail  against  the  public  adminis- 
trator's right.7  So  the  public  administrator  has  preference  over  the 
guardian  to  one  next  of  kin;8  and,  at  the  surrogate's  discretion,9 
over  a  trust  company  authorized  by  statute  to  administer;10  and  in 
California  is  preferred  to  one  who  is  creditor  of  the  intestate  and 
the  nominee  of  a  non-resident  heir;  n  but  the  probate  court  may  in 
its  discretion  appoint  the  guardian  of  an  incompetent  person,  or 
minor,  in  preference  to  the  public  administrator.12  In  Illinois  the 
creditor  of  a  non-resident  intestate  is  preferred  to  the  public  admin- 
istrator.18 In  Montana  it  was  held  that  where  occasion  arises  under 
the  statute  of  that  State  to  appoint  a  special  administrator,  the 
public  administrator  cannot  be  appointed  if  there  are  next  of  kin 
competent  and  willing  to  act.14  In  Louisiana  the  public  adminis- 
trator as  such  is  not  entitled  to  administer  as  dative  testamentary 
executor  where  the  testamentary  executor  has  died,  and  there  are 
heirs  present  in  the  State ; 15  nor  to  a  grant  of  letters  where  there  are 

1  Doak's  Estate,  46  Cal.  573.  1°  Because  an  individual  is   preferable 

2  Succession  of  Miller,  27  La.  An.  574.     to  a  corporation  :  Goddard  v.  Public  Ad- 
8  State  v.  Woody,  20  Mont.  413,  419.  ministrator,  I  Dem.  480,  483. 

4  Public  Administrator  v.  Peters,  1  u  Estate  of  Hyde,  64  Cal.  228 ;  In  re 
Bradf.  100.  Muersing,  103  Cal.  585.     One  who  is  the 

5  Lathrop  v.  Smith,  35  Barb.  64;  24  only  next  of  kin,  but  disqualified  because 
N.  Y.  417,  420.  a  non-resident  alien,  cannot  by  power  of 

6  Butler  v.  Perrott,  1  Dem.  9.  attorney  authorize  another  to  act  as  ad- 

7  Public  Administrator  v.  Watts,  1  Pai.  ministrator.  In  such  case  the  public  ad- 
347,  382 ;  Matter  of  Blank,  2  Redf.  443,  ministrator  is  entitled  to  administer : 
445;  Murphy's  Estate,  Myr.  185.  Sutton  v.  Public  Admr.,  4  Dem.  33.    See 

8  Speckles  v.  Public  Administrator,  1  also  In  re  Garber,  74  Cal.  338. 
Dem.  475  (under  a  special  act  of  New  12  In  re  McLaughlin,  103  Cal.  459. 
York);  and  over  an  illegitimate  claimant  1S  Rosenthal  v.  Prussing,  108  111.  128. 
whose  right  to  distribution  is  not  clearly  u  In  re  Ming,  15  Mont.  79,  De  Witt,  J., 
proved :   Ferrie  v.  Public  Administrator,  dissenting. 

S  Bradf.  249.  15  jf  a  public  administrator,  who  is  also 

9  Goddard's  Estate,  94  N.  Y.  544,  552.     an  heir,  is  appointed  under  such  circum- 

429 


*  400,  *  401      SPECIAL    AND    QUALIFIED    ADMINISTRATORS.  §  181 

heirs  in  the  State;1  and  the  temporary  absence  from  the  State 
of  the  widow  or  heirs  does  not  authorize  the  appointment  of  the 
public  administrator.2  His  right  to  be  appointed  exists  only  where 
there  is  a  vacancy  in  the  administration;  he  has  no  authority  in  law 
to  provoke  the  removal  of  an  executor  or  administrator.3 

§  181.  Administrators  Pendente  Lite.  —  The  authority  of  testa- 
mentary courts  to  grant  administration  pendente  lite  —  during  a 
Pwr  fad-  controversy  "concerning  the  right  to  the  administration 
ministrators  — seems  to  have  always  been  admitted;  and  since  the 
pendente  lite.  cage  of  Walker  v.  Woolaston,4  the  power  of  the  court 
to  grant  administration  pendente  lite  in  cases  touching  an  executor- 
ship also  has  been  settled.5  The  safety  of  the  estate  requires  that 
some  person  be  charged  with  the  duty  and  armed  with  the  necessary 
authority  to  protect  and  preserve  it  until  the  termination 
*of  the  contest  touching  the  administration  or  executorship  [*401] 
shall  place  it  in  the  charge  of  the  •  permanent  administrator 
or  executor;6  hence  they  are  also  known  as  administrators  ad  col- 
ligendum, and  the  general  duties  of  such  an  administrator  have  been 
described  as  being  simply  to  represent  the  estate  during  the  pen- 
dency of  the  litigation  and  to  see  that  no  detriment  comes  to  the 
goods  or  effects  of  the  estate,7  and  administrators  pendente  lite 
compared  to  receivers  in  chancery.8  Their  authority  ceases,  of 
course,  upon  the  termination  of  the  contest,9  and  they  must  then 
surrender  the  estate  into  the  hands  of  the  rightful  representative.10 
But  until  such  termination  of  their  office  they  may  maintain  suits 
for  debts  due  the  deceased,  and  bring  ejectment  for  leasehold  estates 
against  the  heirs,  next  of  kin,  or  any  other  person  who  may  be  in 

stances,  it  will  be  assumed  that  he  was  8  Schoul.  Ex.  &  Adm.  §  134. 

appointed  as  one  of  the  heirs :  Succession  9  If  it  is  desired  to  have  the  adminis- 

of  Bougere,  30  La.  An.  422.  trator  pendente  lite  act  as  general  adminis- 

1  Succession  of  Henry,  31  La.  An.  555.  trator  after  the  contest  is  decided,  he  must 

2  Succession  of  Longuefosse,  34  La.  receive  a  new  appointment  as  general  ad- 
An.  583.  To  same  effect,  Succession  of  ministrator:  Cole  v.  Wooden,  18  N.J.  L. 
Smith,  3  So.  R.  (La.)  539.  15,    19,  citing   Piggot's  Case,  5  Rep.  29. 

'■'■  Succession  of  Burnside,  34  La.  An.  See  also  Munnikhuysen  v.  Magraw,  57  Md. 

728;  Succession   of  Withers,  45  La.  An.  172,  195,  and  Lilly  r.Menke,  12G  Mo.  190, 

556.  221  ;  Baldwin  v.  Mitchell,  86  Md.  379. 

1  2  P.  Wins.  576,  decided  in  K.  B.,  on  10  Ellmaker's  Estate,  4  Watts,  34,  36, 

error  from  C.  P.,  Trin.  T.,  1731.  citing  Commonwealth  v.  Mateer,  16  S.  & 

6  Wins.  Lx.  [495].  R.  416,  and  Adair  v.  Shaw,  1   Sch.  &  Lef. 

«  Walker  v.  Dougherty,  14  Ga.  653, 656;  243,  254;    State  v.  Craddock,  7  Ilarr.  & 

Sarle  v.  Court  of  Probate,  7  R.  I.  270,  274 ;  John.  40  ;  Ro  Bards  v.  Lamb,  89  Mo.  303, 

Gresham  t>.  Pyron,  17  Ga.  263, 265;  Crozier  311,  holding  that  notice  of  settlement  by 

u.Goodwin,  I  Lea,  368;   Lawrence  v.  Par-  the  administrator  pendente  lite  with  the 

sons,  27  How.   Pr.  26 ;   Succession  of  De  regular  executor  need  not  be  given.    If 

Plechier,  I  La  An.  20;  Flora  v.  Mennice,  there  be  an  appeal,  the  suit  is  not  at  an 

12    Ala.   886;    Satterwhite    v.   Carson,   3  end  until  the  appeal  is  determined:  Brown 

bed.  L.  549,  553;    Robinson's  Estate,  12  v.  Ryder,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  356;  post,  ch.  lix., 

Phil  14.  on  appeals. 

'  :j  Redf.  on  Wills,  108,  pL  2,  3. 
430 


§181  ADMINISTRATORS   PENDENTE   LITE.  *  401,  *  402 

possession1  or  pay  the  widow's  award.2  And  where  a  fire  insur- 
ance policy  is  payable  to  the  legal  representative  and  proof  of  loss 
must  be  made  and  suit  brought  within  a  certain  time,  a  temporary 
administrator  should  be  appointed  to  collect  thereunder  if  for  any 
reason  the  appointment  of  the  regular  represeutative  cannot  be 
made  within  the  time.3  Whatever  they  may  lawfully  do  is  binding 
upon  the  estate,  and  the  authority  of  the  subsequently  appointed 
rightful  administrator  or  executor  is  confined  to  so  much  of  the 
estate  as  may  remain  unadministered.4  In  the  absence  of  statutory 
authority,  they  have  no  power  other  than  may  be  necessary  to  col- 
lect the  effects,  not  even  to  invest  or  distribute  them ; 6  nor  to  pay 

legacies,6  or  debts,7  but  if  they  were  paid  bona  fide,  they 
[*  402]   will  be  allowed. 8    But  the  powers  of  administrators  *  pendente 

lite  are  enlarged  by  the  English  probate  act,9  to  include  all 
the  rights  and  powers  of  a  general  administrator  except  the  right  of 
distributing  the  residue,10  and  the  tendency  in  America  is  in  the 
same  direction.11 

Administrators  pendente  lite  are  officers  of  the  court,  and  not  the 
mere  nominees  or  agents  of  the  parties  on  whose  recommendation 
they  are  selected; 12  hence  they  must  give  bond,  although  adminis- 
tration be  granted  jointly  to  the  nominees  of  the  two  litigating 
parties.13  It  is  said  by  Judge  Redfield  that  the  nominee  of  neither 
party  should,  as  a  general  rule,  be  appointed,14  but  that  such  may 
be  done  out  of  regard  to  special  fitness; 16  and,  a  fortiori,  where  both 
parties  agree.16   In  England,  the  probate  court  will  refuse  to  appoint 

1  Matter  of  Colvin,  3  Md.  Ch.  278,  295;  S.  C.  561,  576,  citing  Stevenson  v.  Wilcox, 
Ewing  v.  Moses,  50  Ga.  264.  In  Libby  v.  16  S.  C.  432.  See  also  Henry  v.  Superior 
Cobb,  76  Me.  471,  such  an  administrator  Court,  93  Cal.  569.  Nor  can  he  mortgage 
was  allowed,  under  the  circumstances,  to  the  real  estate:  Duryea  v.  Mackey,  151 
redeem  his  intestate's  land  from  a  mort-  N.  Y.  204.  An  order  of  court  directing 
gage.  the  special  administrator  to  pay  a  debt  is 

2  In  re  Welch,  106  Cal.  427.  void :  State  v.  Court,  18  Mont.  481. 

8  Matthews  v.  Am.  C.  Co.,  154  N.  Y.  8  Kaminer  v.  Hope,  supra,  citing  Adair 

449.  v.  Shaw,  1  Sch.  &  Lef.  243,  254. 

4  Patton's  Appeal,  31  Pa.  St.  465.  9  20  &  21  Vict.  c.  77,  §  70. 

5  3  Redf.  108,  pi.  3,  citing  Gallivan  v.  M>  Tichborne  v.  Tichborne,  L.  R.  2  P.  & 
Evans,  1  Ball  &  Beatty,  191  ;  Langford  v.  D.  41. 

Langford,  82  Ga.  202  ;   In  re  Welch,  106  "  Benson  v.  Wolf,  43  N.  J.  L.  78  ;  In  re 

Cal.  427,  433 ;  Lilly  v.  Menke,   supra  (the  Duncan,  3  Redf.  153  ;  Cadman  v.  Richards, 

two  last-cited  cases  denying  the  right  of  13  Neb.  383. 

the  administrator  pendente  lite  to   make  12  Wms.  Ex.  [498] ;    Stanley  v.  Bernes, 

partial  distribution)  ;    Kaminer  v.  Hope,  1  Hagg.  221. 

9  S.  C.  253,  258.     In  a  second  appeal   of  13  Stanley  v.  Bernes,  supra  ;  Matter  of 

the  same  case,  18  S.  C.  561,  574,  it  is  held  Colvin,  3  Md.  Ch.  278,  297. 

that  the  administrator  pendente  lite  may  14  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  109,  pi.  6.     An  in- 

bring  actions  to  recover  debts  due  his  in-  different     person     should     be    selected: 

testate  estate.  Mootrie  v.  Hunt,  4  Bradf.  173. 

6  Wms.  Ex.  [499]  ;  Welch  v.  Adams,  15  Young  v.  Brown,  1  Hagg.  53. 

152  Mass.  74,  85.  16  Schoul.  Ex.  &  Adm.,  §  134,  note  (3) ; 

7  Mclver,  J.,  in  Kaminer  v.  Hope,  18     Wms.  Ex.  [497],  note  (i). 

431 


*  402,  *  403      SPECIAL   AND   QUALIFIED    ADMINISTRATORS.  §  182 

an  administrator  pendente  lite  when  the  contest  does  not  affect  the 
rights  of  the  executors ; 1  in  Missouri,  on  the  contrary,  the  statute  is 
construed  as  making  it  obligatory  upon  the  probate  court  to  appoint 
some  person  administrator  pendente  lite  other  than  the  person 
charged  with  the  execution  of  the  will,  whether  this  be  an  executor 
or  an  administrator  cum  testamento  annexo,  whenever  a  contest  of 
the  will  exists.2  In  Tennessee,  an  administrator  pendente  lite 
appointed  by  a  chancery  court  is  held  to  possess  all  the  powers  of  a 
general  administrator,  and  no  other  administration  can  be  granted 
to  succeed  him,  unless  upon  his  resignation  or  removal.8 

Letters  of  general  administration  granted  pending  the  contest 
of  a  will  are  null  and  void,  and  cannot  be  supported  as  a  grant  of 
administration  pendente  lite;4  nor  can  there  be  a  valid  grant  of 
administration  pendente  lite  after  a  general  administrator  has  fully 
settled  the  estate.5 

*  As  to  the  privity  between  administrators  pendente  lite    [*  403J 
and  general  administrators,  there  will  be  occasion  to  treat 
hereafter.6 

§  182.  Administrators  durante  Minore  .State.  —  The  different 
classes  of  administration  which  have  been  the  subject  of  discussion 
Distinction  ^n  ^ne  preceding  sections  of  this  chapter  are  as  essential, 
between  ad-  and  therefore  as  common,  in  this  country  as  in  England. 
essentiaUo8  r^e  functions  accorded  to  each  correspond  to  some 
the  adminis-  peculiar  condition  of  the  estate,  or  of  the  parties  inter- 
suchas  are  ested  therein,  and  are  clearly  distinguishable  on  essen- 
necessary  un-     j-^j  p-r0unds  •  but  in  their  aggregate  they  are  indispensable 

der  conditions  °  '  .     .  .  P    .  ■,  *    ■,  t 

peculiar  to  the  to  the  full  administration  of  the  property  of  deceased 
common  law.  personS)  which  may  require  their  exercise  in  the  one 
or  other  form.  In  addition  to  these  classes  of  administration,  there 
are  others  known  to  the  common  law,  and  of  importance  in  England, 
which  are  not  so  important  in  America,  because  the  theory  of 
administration  differs  in  the  two  countries  in  some  important  par- 
ticulars, chief  among  which  is  the  time  during  which  the  authority 
of  personal  representatives  continues.  In  England  the  administra- 
tion extends,  in  general,  to  the  whole  personal  estate  of  the  deceased, 
and  terminates  only  with  the  life  of  the  grantee ;  while  the  authority 

>  Mortimer  v.  Paull,  L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  2  Lamb    v.   Helm,    56   Mo.   420,   430, 

85.     So  in  New  York,  other  things  being  citing  and  approving  Rogers  v.  Dively,  51 

equal,   it    is    said    that   considerations    of  Mo.  193.     See  also  State  v.  Moehlenkamp, 

economy    would     demand     that    the    one  133  Mo.  134. 

Damed  as    executor    in    a   disputed    will  8  Todd  v.  Wright,  12  Heisk.  442,  447. 

should  be  appointed:    Haas  v.  Childs,  4         *  Slade  v.  Washburn,  3  Ired.  L.  557, 

I),  in.  137,     In  granting  letters  <>f  admin-  562;  Cummings'  Appeal,  11  Mont.  196. 
istration  the  surrogate  is  not  limited  in         6  Fisk  v.  Norvel,  9  Tex.  18, 17. 
ma]  ing  his  selection  to  persons  entitled  to        fl  Seepost,  §  354. 

ordinary  administration  under  the  statute: 

Plath'i  Estate,  56  Hun,  223. 

■132 


§  182  ADMINISTRATORS    DURANTE   MINORE   ESTATE.      *  403,  *  404 

of  limited  administrators  is  confined  to  a  particular  extent  of  time, 
or  to  a  specified  subject-matter.1  At  the  common  law,  too,  executors, 
and  at  one  period  of  time  administrators,  possessed  an  interest  in 
the  residuum  of  the  estates  in  their  charge  which  has  rarely  or 
never  been  recognized  in  the  United  States.2  It  is  the  policy  in 
this  country,  declared  and  emphasized  by  the  statutes  of  the  several 
States,  echoed  by  the  courts,  and  warmly  approved  by  the  people,  to 
reduce  the  time  allowed  executors  and  administrators  to  close  up 
their  administrations  to  the  briefest  period  compatible  with  justice 
to  creditors.  In  consequence  of  this  policy,  the  more  speedy  settle- 
ment of  estates  has  greatly  reduced  the  ratio  of  cases  giving  rise  to 
questions  involving  the  necessity  of  special  administrators;  and  the 
right  to  administer  is  itself  of  far  less  importance  under  American 
statutes  than  it  was  at  common  law.     Hence  the  Ameri-    American 

can  policy  is  to  discourage  grants  of  limited  in  courage°special 
[*  404]  favor  of  full  administration,   whether  original    administrators. 

or  de  *  bonis  non,  in  testate  or  intestate  estates.8  Neverthe- 
less, it  sometimes  happens  that  special  administrators  are  necessary 
to  the  accomplishment  of  justice,  and  limited  administrations  are 
provided  for  by  the  statutes  of  many  States,  or  recognized  as  exist- 
ing at  common  law. 

Thus  it  may  happen  that  a  person  nominated  sole  executor,  or  he 
to  whom  the  right  of  administration  has  devolved  under  the  statute, 
may  be  within  age  at  the  time  of  the  testator's  or  intestate's  death. 
In  such  case  a  peculiar  administration  was  grantable  at  common 
law,  known  as  durante  minore  cetate,  —  during  the  minority  of  the 
executor  or  administrator  entitled  to  the  administration;4  and  the 
like  provisions  exist  in  the  American  States,6  distinguishing,  in 
some  instances,  between  the  rights  of  executors  and  those  of 
administrators.6  The  grant  in  such  cases  is  usually  to  the  guardian 
of  the  minor;7  but  the  selection  is  entirely  within  the  sound  dis- 
cretion of  the  court.8 

1  Wins.  Ex.  [479].  131  ;  In  re  Sartoris,  1  Curt.  910;  Wins. 

2  See  post,  §  352.  Ex.  [481],  and  authorities.     By  statute  in 

3  Schoul.  Ex.  &  Adm.  §  135 ;  3  Redf.  New  York  :  Blanck  v.  Morrison,  4  Dem. 
on  Wills,  113,  pi.  5.  297;  Louisiana:    Boudreaux'  Succession, 

4  Wms.  Ex.  [479]  ;  Wallis  v.  Wallis,  42  La.  An.  296 ;  California  :  In  re  Woods, 
1  Winst.  78;  Bell,  J.,  in  Taylor  v.  Bar-  97Cal.428;  Nevada:  7nreNickals,21  Nev. 
ron,  35  N.  H.  484,  493  ;  Collins  v.  Spear,  462  (holding,  however,  that  the  right  does 
Walk.  (Miss.)  310.  not  extend  to  a  guardian  appointed  in  an- 

6  3  Redf.  on  Wells,  104,  pi.  1.  other  State) ;  Montana:  Stewart's  Estate, 

6  E.  (j.  in  Missouri,  where  administra-  18  Mont.  595  (holding  the  statute  inap- 
tion  durante  minore  cetate  will  be  granted  plicable  to  a  surviving  minor  husband  or 
in  case  of  a  mino  executor,  but  the  law  wife  who  may  nominate  an  administrator 
is  silent  as  to  minor  administrators  :  Rev.  under  another  statute). 

St.  1889,  §  13.  8  pitcher  v.  Armat,  5  How.  (Miss.)  288, 

7  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  104,  pi.  2,  citing  289:  Wms.  [480],  citing  Briers  v.  God- 
Brotherton  v.  Hellier,  2  Cas.  Temp.  Lee,    dard,  Hob.  250 ;  Thomas  v.  Butler,  Ventr. 

VOL.  I.  —  28  433 


404,  *  405      SPECIAL   AND    QUALIFIED    ADMINISTRATORS. 


fclb3 


to  take  charge 
until  the  return 
of  an  absent 
executor  or 
administrator. 


Administrators  during  minority  are  said  to  possess  all  the  author- 
ity, for  the  time  being,  of  general  administrators,1  whatever  may 
have  been  the  prevailing  opinion  in  earlier  times;2  their  acts  are 
binding  upon  the  estate,  and  when  their  office  has  expired  by  reason 
of  the  majority  of  the  executor  or  administrator  in  his  own  right, 
they  are  liable  to  creditors  for  devastavit,8  but  only  to  the  executor 
or  administrator  for  the  assets;  and  if  he  has  duly  administered 
and  turned  over  the  surplus,  he  may  show  this  under  the  plea  of 
plene  administravit*  in  defence  of  a  suit  by  creditors. 

§  183.  Administrators  durante  Absentia.  —  For  a  reason  similar 
to  that  which  requires  the  grant  of  administration  durante 
Administrator  minor e  *  cetate,  administrators  are  sometimes  [*405] 
appointed  to  take  charge  of  estates  during  the 
temporary  absence  from  the  State  of  the  executor  or 
next  of  kin  entitled  to  the  administration.5  At  common 
law  this  class  of  administrators  can  be  appointed  only 
before  probate  of  the  will,  or  before  the  grant  of  original  letters  of 
administration;6  although  in  England  the  spiritual  courts  were 
enabled  by  statute  to  grant  special  administration  where  the  execu- 
tor to  whom  probate  had  been  granted  had  absented  himself  from 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  English  courts.7  Such  authority  is  not  vested 
in  American  probate  courts.8  The  usual  course  in  this 
country  is  to  treat  prolonged  absence  from  the  State  by 
an  executor  or  administrator  who  has  made  no  provision 
to  be  represented,  as  a  cause  for  his  removal  and  the 
appointment  of  an  administrator  de  bonis  non  ;  and  even 
in  the  case  of  absence  before  probate  or  grant  of  general 
administration,  it  is  more  usual,  in  the  absence  of  statutory  pro- 
visions directing  a  different  course,  to  disregard  the  absent  executor 
or  next  of  kin  and  appoint  a  general  administrator  at  once.9 

In  those  of  the  States  in  which  non-residents  are  competent  to 


In  America 
administrator 
d.  b.  n.  is  ap- 
pointed if 
original  ex- 
ecutor or  ad- 
ministrator 
absent  himself. 


217,  219;  West  v.  Willby,  3  Phillim.  374, 
379. 

i  3  Redf.  106,  pi.  4  ;  Schoul.  Ex.  §  132. 

2  Wms.  Ex.  [488]  et  seq.,  citing  nu- 
merous authorities. 

:t  Wms.  Ex.  [492],  citing  Hull,  N.  P. 
]  15  ;  Palmer  v.  Litherland,  Latch,  160; 
Packman's  Case,  6  Co.  19;  Chandler  V. 
Thompson,  Hob.  265  6,  266;  Lawson  v. 
Crofts,  1   Sid.  57. 

4  Anon.,  1  Frein.  150;  Brooking  p. 
Jennings,  l  .Mod.  174. 

'■■   Ritchie  P.   McAuslin,   1    Ilayw.  220; 

Willing  p.  Perot,  5  Rawle,  264." 

«   Wms.   Ex.  [502],  citing  3  Rac.  Ahr. 
.r>r,,  tit.   ExecntOTS,  Gj  Clare  v.  Hedges  ('! 
W  y.  M  I, .it.d  in  1  Lutw.342;  Lord  Holt, 
484 


in  Slater  v.  May,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1071,  saying 
that  this  administration  stood  upon  the 
same  reason  as  an  administration  durante 
minore  cetate,  viz.  that  there  should  be  a 
person  to  manage  the  estate  of  the  tes- 
tator till  the  person  appointed  by  him  is 
able. 

7  By  statute  38  Geo.  III.  c.  87  (usually 
called  Simeon's  Act). 

8  Griffith  J'.  Frazier,  8  Cr.  9,  21,  citing 
the  manuscript  opinion  of  the  court  of 
appeals  of  South  Carolina  in  Ford  v. 
Travis,  deciding  the  grant  of  adminis- 
tration after  probate  of  a  will  to  lie  void, 
although  the  executor  is  absent. 

9  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  111,  pi.  2  ;  Schoul. 
Ex.  §  133.     See  ante,  §  182. 


§  184  TEMPORARY    AND    LIMITED    ADMINISTRATORS.      *  405,  *  406 

act  as  executors  and  administrators,  the  grant  may,  of  course,  be  to 
such  non-resident,  or  to  his  attorney  or  nominee;  but  such  grants 
do  not  constitute  administrators  durante  absentia,  whose  office  is 
temporary,  ceasing  upon  the  return  of  the  executor  or  administrator 
originally  entitled.1 

§  184.  Other  Temporary  and  Limited  Administrators.  —  Several 
other  instances  of  temporary  or  special  administrations  may  be 
mentioned,  a  list  of  which  is  furnished  in  Williams's  treatise  on 
Executors  and  Administrators ; 2  Schouler  mentions  them  under  the 
head  of  "  Special  Administrations  for  Limited  and  Special 
[*406]  *  Purposes,"8  and  Eedfield  says  of  them,  that  as  a  general 
thing  "these  limited  administrations  seldom  or  never  obtain 
in  the  American  practice,  the  probate  courts  preferring,  for  the 
convenience  and  security  of  all  concerned,  to  have  the  administra- 
tion of  the  settlement  of  estates  as  simple  as  practicable."4 

It  seems  necessary,  however,  to  refer  briefly  to  the  nature  of 
these  peculiar  administrations  as  recognized  at  common  law  and 
in  some  of  the  States,  to  avoid  expense  and  complication,  and 
accomplish  the  protection  of  estates  under  peculiar  and  unusual 
circumstances. 

Temporary   administration    becomes    necessary   if    the    executor 
appointed  is  directed  to  take  charge  of  the  estate  at  a 
time   mentioned   by   the    testator,    and   the   latter   die    administrator 
before  the  time  so  mentioned; 8  in  such  case  the  office  of   aPPointed  !f 

.     .  '  executor  die 

the  administrator  appointed  until  the  efflux  of  such  before  a 
time  will  correspond  exactly  to  that  of  an  adminis-  certamtime- 
trator  durante  minore  estate.  So  where  it  is  known  that  there  is 
a  will,  which  cannot  at  the  time  be  produced  for  probate,  limited 
administration  may  be  necessary  until  its  production;6  or  where 
the  executor  fails  to  appear,  until  such  time  as  he  comes  and  proves 
the  will,7  or  till  a  lost  will  be  found;8  or  during  incapacity  of 
executor  or  next  of  kin  entitled  to  administration.9 

There  may  be,  also,  a  grant  of  administration  limited  to  certain 
specific  effects  of  the  deceased,  while  the  general  administration  may 
be  committed  to  a  different  person ; 10  a  testator  may  appoint  different 

1  Schoul.  Ex.  §  133,  citing  Rainsford  Anon.,  1  Cas.  Temp.  Lee,  625 ;  Goods  of 
v.  Taynton,  7  Ves.  460,  466.  Phillips,  2  Add.  336,  note  (b)  ;  Goods  of 

2  Wms.  [513].  Milnes,  3  Add.  55 ;   Ex  parte  Evelyn,  2 
8  Schoul.  Ex.  §  135.  My.  &  K.  3,  4 ;  Goods  of  Joseph,  1  Curt. 

4  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  113,  pi.  5.  907  ;  Goods  of  Southmead,  3  Curt.  28.    In 

5  Wms.  Ex.  [249,  250].  California,  where  one  entitled  to  adminis- 

6  Goods  of  Metcalfe,  1  Add.  343.  ter  is  a  non  compos,  his  guardian  may  be 

7  Wms.  Ex.  [515],  citing  1  Gibs.  Cod.  appointed  under  the  statute:  In  reMc- 
574;  see  also  Howell  v.  Metcalfe,  2  Add.  Laughlin,  103  Cal.  429. 

348,  350.  io  McNairy  v.  Bell,  6  Yerg.  302,  304  ; 

8  Goods  of  Campbell,  2  Hagg.  555.  Jordan  v.  Polk,  1  Sneed,  430,  434 ;  Goods 

9  Hills  v.  Mills,  1  Salk.  36  ;  Toller,  99  ;     of  Biou,  3  Curt.  739. 

435 


*  406,  *  407      SPECIAL   AND   QUALIFIED   ADMINISTRATORS.  §  184 

executors  as  to  different  parts  of  his  estate  in  the  same  country ; * 
and  where  an  executor  has  not  qualified  to  execute  a  will  disposing 
of  part  of  the  estate  only,  special  administration  may  be  granted  as 
to  so  much  of  the  estate  as  does  not  pass  by  the  will.2  But  such 
grants  are  said  to  be  entirely  exceptional,  and  should  not  be  made 
unless  a  very  strong  reason  be  given.8 

*  Special  administrators,  known  as  administrators  ad  litem,  [*  407] 
are  sometimes  appointed  for  the  sole  purpose  of  defending  or 
prosecuting  particular  suits  instituted  by  or  against  a  person  who 
may  die  while  such  suit  is  pending;4  or  where  a  pressing  necessity 
is  shown  for  carrying  on  proceedings  in  chancery,  and  there  is  no 
general  personal  representative;6  or  where  the  interest  of  the 
general  administrator  or  executor  conflicts  with  that  of  the  estate.6 
It  has  been  held  that  probate  courts  have  inherent  power  to  grant 
limited  administration,  within  their  discretion,  whenever  it  is 
necessary  for  the  purposes  of  justice;7  but  such  administrators 
possess  no  powers  except  such  as  are  specially  granted  by  the  pro- 
bate judge  at  the  time  of  his  appointment,  and  should  not  be  kept 
in  office  longer  than  may  be  necessary  for  the  appointment  of  a 
general  administrator.8  Special  administrators  are  limited  in  their 
powers  to  the  collection  and  preservation  of  the  property  of  the 
testator  or  intestate  until  demanded  by  an  executor  or  administrator 
duly  authorized  to  administer  the  same;  they  are  not  required  to 
file  any  inventory,  and  have  no  power  to  pay  debts,  or  allow  claims 
against  the  estate;  nor  have  they  authority  to  enter  into  an  agreed 
case  in  relation  to  money  collected  by  them.9 

In  Michigan  the  probate  judge  is  granted  almost  absolute  discre- 

1  Dorsey,  J.,  in  Hunter  v.  Bryson,  5  340,  399 ;  Newman  v.  Schwerin,  22  U.  S. 
Gill  &  J.  483,  488.  App.  393. 

2  Dean  v.  Biggers,  27  Ga,  73,  75.  But  6  Rev.  St.  Mo.  1889,  §  204.  The  allow- 
generally,  in  America,  executors  adminis-  ance  of  a  claim  in  disregard  of  this  section 
ter  as  well  on  intestate  as  testate  person-  is  a  nullity:  State  v  Bidlingmaier,  26  Mo. 
alty:  post,  §  229.  483;  see  post,  §  395,  p.  *821.     So  where 

3  Wins.  Ex.  [520] ;  Goods  of  Watts,  1  litigation  ensues  between  estates  having 
Sw.  &  Tr.  538 ;  Goods  of  Somerset,  L.  R.  the  same  administrator  :  Denning  v.  Todd, 
1  P.  &  D.  350.  91  Tenn.  422. 

*  Wade  v.  Bridges,  24  Ark.  569,  572  ;  7  Martin  v.  Dry  Dock  Co.,  92  N.  Y.  70 ; 
Lothrop's  Case,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  246.  See  per  Gray,  J.,  in  McArthur  v.  Scott,  113 
Wolffe  v.  Eberlein,  74  Ala.  99,  107 ;  Mc-  U.  S.  340,  399. 

Kamv  v.  McNabb,  97  Tenn.  236,  239.  8  Dull   v.    Drake,    68    Tex.   205,   207. 

r"  Wins.  Ex.  [522],  citing  Goods  of  the  When  appointed  to  act  until  the  succeed- 

Elector  of  Hesse,  1    Hagg.  93  ;  Harris  v.  ing  term,  and  suit  is  commenced  within 

Milburn,  2  Ilagg.  62  ;    Maclean  v.  Daw-  that  time,  and  judgment  rendered  at  the 

eon,    1    Sw.    &    Tr.    425;     Ilawarden    t>.  next  term,  it  will  be  presumed,  in  Texas, 

Danlop,  2  Sw.  &  Tr.  614  ;  Woolley  v.  Gor-  that  the  appointment  was  renewed,  so  as 

don,  3  I'liillim.  314;  Goods  of  Dodgson,  to   validate   the   judgment:    Williams   v. 

1  Sw.  &  Tr.  259  ;  Ex  parte  Lyon,  60  Ala.  Bank,  91  Tex.  651. 

650,  65.');    MrArthur  v.  Scott,  113   U.  S.  9  Tomlinson   v.  Wright,    12  Ind.  App. 

292;  State  v.  Wright,  16  Ind.  App.  662. 
436 


§  184  TEMPORARY   AND   LIMITED   ADMINISTRATORS.  *  407 

tion  to  appoint  a  special  administrator.1  In  Texas  the  testator 
may  direct  that  no  other  action  shall  be  had,  in  the  court  having 
testamentary  jurisdiction,  in  relation  to  the  settlement  of  his  estate, 
than  the  probating  and  recording  of  the  will,  return  of  an  inventory, 
appraisement,  and  list  of  claims  of  his  estate ;  the  executor  of  such 
a  will  is  known  as  an  "independent  executor,"2  and  the  manage- 
ment of  the  estate  thereunder  is  recognized  as  administration.8  An 
independent  executor  can.  sell  any  property  of  the  estate  without 
an  order  of  court,  when  necessary  to  pay  debts.4 

1  And  no  appeal  lies   from  such  ap-  2  Holmes  v.  Johns,   56  Tex.  41,  51  ; 

pointment :  Greece  v.  Helm,  91  Mich.  450  Dwyer  v.  Kalteyer,  68  Tex.  554,  563. 

(holding  that  a  special  administrator  could,  3  Todd  v.  Willis,  66  Tex.  704. 

under  the  circumstances,  compromise  a  4  Howard  v.  Johnson,  69  Tex.  655, 659. 
claim  in  favor  of  the  sstate). 


437 


*  TITLE  THIRD.  [*408] 

OF  THE  DEVOLUTION  TO  THE  LEGAL  REPRE- 
SENTATIVES. 


PART   FIRST. 
OF  THE  ESTATE  WITHOUT  OFFICIAL  REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTER   XX. 

WHAT    MAY   BE   DONE   BEFORE   PROBATE   OR   GRANT   OF   LETTERS. 

§  185.    To  ■whom    the  Real  and  to  -whom  the    Personal  Property 

„    .  ,       descends.  —  Upon  the  death  of  an  owner  of   property 

scends  to  heir     his    real    estate     descends,    at     common    law,    to    his 

or  devisee.         heirs   or  devisees,    subject,   under   a  series   of  English 

statutes,   to    be    converted    into   assets    for   the   payment    of    the 

owner's  debts,   if  the  personalty  be    insufficient   for  that  purpose. 

This  liability,  however,  does  not  deflect  the  course  of  descent:  the 

personal  representative  possesses  only  the  naked  power  to  sell  or 

lease  the  real  estate,  if  it  become  necessary,  to  pay  debts,  and  until 

this  power  is  executed,  by  order  of  the  court  having  jurisdiction,  the 

title  and  its  defence,  the  possession,  rents,  and  profits,  belong  to  the 

heirs  and  devisees.1     The  title  of  the  heir  or  devisee  vests  instantly 

upon  the  death  of  the  ancestor  or  testator ;  and  when  the  executor 

or  administrator  sells,  the  sale  does  not  relate  back  to  the  death  of 

the  deceased,  but  takes  effect  from  the  time  when  made.8 

The  law  is  substantially  the  same  in  *  most  of  the  American  [*  409] 

r  States,  although  some  of  them  have  abolished  the 

Exception  in  \  ° 

some  of  the        artificial  common-law  rule  distinguishing,  in  this  respect, 

between  real  and  personal  estate,  and  subject  both  classes 

of  property  alike  to  the  title  of  personal  representatives  for  the  pur- 

i  See  post,  §§  337  et  teq.,  and  §§  463  et         2  Roynton  v.  Peterborough  R.  R.  Co., 
$cq.  4  Cush.*467,  469. 

438 


§185    DESCENT  OF  REAL  AND  PERSONAL  PROPERTY.   *  409,  *  410 


pose  of  administration.  These  exceptions  will  be  more  conveniently 
noted  in  connection  with  the  subject  of  the  liability  of  real  estate  for 
the  debts  of  its  deceased  owner.1 

The  personal  estate  of  a  decedent,  however,  passes,  as  at  common 
law,  so  in  all  the  States,  with  the  exception,  in  some  personal  prop- 
particulars,  of  Louisiana,  to  the  executor  or  administra-    ertv,  descends 

•      mi  •        -i      j.   •  •  ■  n  i      -i.^    i    j_i     i.    -j.     to  tne  personal 

tor.2    This    doctrine  is  so  universally  admitted  that  it    representa- 
would  be  useless  to  cite  any  of  the  numerous  authorities    tives- 
so  holding.8 

We  have  already  seen,  however,  that  as  to  the  time  when   the 
personal  estate  vests  in  the  representatives  there  is,  at  common  law, 
a   broad  distinction  between  executors  and  administra- 
tors.'4     It  results  from  the  English  doctrine  ascribing  vests  in  execu- 
the  executor's  authority  to  the  will  itself,  of  which  the   tor  at  testa- 

tor  s  death  * 

probate    is   but   the  authenticated   evidence,5   that   the 

property  of  the  deceased  vests  in  the  executor  from  the  moment  of 

the  testator's  death ; 6  while  the  administrator,    whose 

sole  source  of  authority  is  the  appointment  by  the  pro-  toVVonTtime" 

bate  court,  can  have  no  power  to  act  before  the  grant  of  of  his  appoint- 

letters,7  although  it  is  said  that,  when  appointed,  his 

title  relates  back  to  the  death  of  the  intestate  or  testator,8  as  the 

probate,  when  produced,  is  also  said  to  have  relation  to  the 

testator's  death.9     Upon  these  principles,  it  is  said  that  probate  both 

"the  executor,  before  he  proves  the  will  in  the  probate  relate  back  to 

court,  may  do  almost  all  the  acts  which  are  incidental  of  the  de- 

to  his  office,  except  only  some  of  those  which  ceased- 

[*  410]  *  relate  to  suits."  10     He  may  even  commence  an  jn  England 

action  before  the  probate,  and  it   was   enough  executor  may 

that  he  had   obtained   letters   testamentary   and   made  bate  of  the 

profert  of  them  at  the  time  of  the  declaration.11  wllL 


1  Post,  ch.  1  ;  see  §§  337  et  seq.,  where  a 
list  of  the  States  is  given,  and  §  276. 

2  "  By  the  laws  of  this  realm,"  says 
Swinburne  (pt.  6,  §  3,  pi.  5),  "as  the  heir 
hath  not  to  deal  with  the  goods  and  chat- 
tels of  the  deceased,  no  more  hath  the 
executor  to  do  with  the  lands,  tenements, 
and  hereditaments." 

3  The  fundamental  difference  between 
the  title  of  personal  representatives  and 
of  guardians,  respecting  the  personalty,  is 
pointed  out  in  Woerner  on  Guardianship, 
§  53  ;  q.  v. 

4  Ante,  §§  171,  172. 

6  Ex  parte  Fuller,  2  Sto.  327,  332 ; 
"  Letters  testamentary  are  merely  the  evi- 
dence establishing  that  the  executor  has 
been  duly  qualified  to  act " :  Succession  of 
Vogel,  20  La.  An.  81,  82 


6  Ante,  §  172. 

7  Rand  v.  Hubbard,  4  Met.  (Mass.)  252, 
256. 

8  Ante,   §    173  ;    Drury   v.  Natick,   10 
Allen,  169,  174. 

9  See  ante,  §  172. 

10  Wms.  Ex.  [302],  An  executor  can 
maintain  a  suit  only  by  virtue  of  his  let- 
ters testamentary :  Dixon  v.  Ramsay,  3 
Cr.  319,  323. 

11  Richards  v.  Pierce,  44  Mich.  444, 
and  cases  cited ;  Thomas  v.  Cameron, 
16  Wend.  579,  580,  citing  Com.  Dig. 
Administration,  B,  9 ;  Bac.  Abr.  Ex'rs 
and  Adm'rs,  E,  p.  1,  14;  Humbert  v. 
Wurster,  22  Hun,  405,  406 ;  Seabrook  v. 
Freeman,  3  McC.  371.  In  Maine  he  may 
bring  an  action  of  trespass  before  probate: 
Hathorn  v.  Eaton,  70  Me.  219. 

439 


*  410,  *  411  ESTATE    BEFORE    GRANT    OF    LETTERS. 


§186 


§  186.  Authority  of  Executors  before  Grant  of  Letters  Testamen- 
tary. —  In  most  of  the  American  States  executors  are  required  to 
qualify  by  giving  bond  and  taking  the  oath  of  office  ;  until 
executor'must  they  have  complied  with  these  conditions  they  have  no 
quality  before  legal  power  to  act,1  except  decently  to  bury  the  deceased 
and  to  do  what  may  be  necessary  to  preserve  the  estate.8 
Where  the  statute  authorizes  the  executor  to  act  without  bond,  the 
grant  of  letters  testamentary  by  the  probate  court  is  the  source  of 
his  authority,  which  does  not  depend  for  its  validity  upon  the 
manual  issuance  of  the  letters.3  Hence  the  sale  or  transfer  of  prop- 
erty by  an  executor  who  has  not  qualified  is  void,4  and 
his  assent  to  a  specific  legacy  does  not  pass  the  legal 
title  to  the  thing  bequeathed.5  But  a  person  nominated 
as  executor  has  sufficient  interest  in  the  estate  to 
demand  that  one  acting  as  executor  under  a  former  will 
of  the  same  testator  shall  give  bond  pending  the  pro- 
ceeding to  establish  the  later  will,6  and  to  appeal  from 
the  refusal  to  grant  probate  ; 7  and  it  has  also  been  held 
that  a  foreign  executor  may,  without  probate  or  grant 
of  letters  in  the  forum  of  the  debtor,  make  demand  for  the  payment 
of  a  promissory  note  to  his  testator,  so  as  to  charge  the  indorser.8 
It  has  also  been  held  that  an  executor  before  probate,  if  legally  com- 
petent to  qualify,  may  be  treated  as  representing  his  estate  so  far  as 
relates  to  acts  in  which  he  is  merely  passive,  such  as  receiving  notice 
to  an  indorser  of  the  dishonor  of  a  note.9 

*  In  Oregon  the  sale  of  property  by  executors  who  had  not  [*  411] 
qualified  was  held  good,  on  the  ground  that  the  legal  estate 
was  vested  in  them  merely  for  the  purpose  of  sale  and  conveyance  ; 10 


and  cannot 
give  title  to 
property  of 
the  testator 
before  grant 
of  letters,  nor 
assent  to  a 
legacy;  but 
may  demand 
bond,  and 
appeal  from  re- 
fusal to  grant 
probate. 


1  Gardner  v.  Gantt,  19  Ala.  666,  670, 
citing  earlier  Alabama  cases ;  Wood  v. 
Cosby,  76  Ala.  557  ;  Diamond  v.  Shell, 
15  Ark.  26  ;  Echols  v.  Barrett,  6  Ga.  443, 
446  ;  Mitchell  v.  Rice,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  623, 
627  ;  McKeen  v.  Frost,  46  Me.  239,  248 ; 
Stagg  v.  Green,  47  Mo.  500 ;  Fay  v. 
Reager,  2  Sneed,  200,  203;  Kittredge  v. 
Folsom,  8  N.  H.  98,  111;  Wood  v.  Sparks, 
1  Dev.  &  B.  389,  396 ;  Trask  v.  Donoghue, 
1  Aik.  370,  373. 

2  McDearmonv.  Maxfield,38  Ark.  631, 
636  ;  Killebrew  v.  Murphy,  3  Ileisk.  546, 
553 ;  Luscomb  v.  Ballard,  5  Gray,  403, 
406.  As  to  the  acts  rendering  one  liable 
as  executor  tie  son  tort,  see  post,  §§  189— 
191. 

3  Ludlow  v.  Flournoy,  34  Ark.  451, 
401. 

<  Monroe  v.  James,  4  Munf.  194,200; 
Humbert  v.  Wurster,  22  Hun,  405;  Car- 
440 


ter  v.  Carter,  10  B.  Mon.  327,  330;  Gay 
v.  Miuot,  3  Cush.  352. 

5  Martin  v.  Peck,  2  Yerg.  298. 

6  Cunningham  v.  Souza,  1  Redf.  462. 

7  Shirley  v.  Healds,  34  N.  H.  407,  410. 

8  Rand  v.  Hubbard,  4  Met.  (Mass.) 
252,  258. 

9  Schoenberger  v.  Lancaster,  28  Pa. 
St.  459;  Drexler  v.  McGlynn,  99  Cal. 
143.  But  notice  of  non-payment  is  insuf- 
ficient when  given  to  one  nominated  as 
executor  after  his  refusal  to  act  and  the 
appointment  of  a  special  administrator  : 
Goodnow  v.  Warren,  122  Mass.  79;  and 
notice  to  one  afterward  appointed  admin- 
istrator is  insufficient :  Mathewson  v.  Straf- 
ford Bank,  45  N.  II.  106,  108.  See  as  to 
protest  and  notico  of  dishonor  of  notes, 
post,  §  327  a. 

10  Hogan  v.  Wyman,  2  Oreg.  302,  304. 


§  187  AUTHORITY   OF   ADMINISTRATORS.  *  411,  *  412 

and  in  South  Carolina  the  common-law  doctrine  seems  to  be  still 
recognized,  according  to  which  the  executor  may,  before  probate, 
possess  himself  of  the  property  of  the  testator,  pay  debts  and  lega- 
cies, give  releases,  maintain  trespass,  trover,  or  detinue  for  goods  of 
the  estate  in  his  possession,  and  sell,  give  away,  or  otherwise  dispose 
of  the  property  of  the  testator.1  Similarly  in  Maine,2  and  New 
Jersey.8 

§  187.  Authority  of  Administrators  before  Grant  of  Letters.  — 
It  is,  of  course,  inaccurate  to  predicate  any  authority  of  an  adminis- 
trator who  is  shown  by  the  statement  not  to  be  an  administrator ; 
the  phrase  is  employed  to  designate  those  persons  who,  having  a 
legal  preference  or  exclusive  right  to  the  appointment  as  adminis- 
trator, act  for  the  protection  and  in  the  interest  of  the  estate  in 
anticipation  of  such  appointment.  The  principle  upon  which  the 
acts  of  an  executor  are  validated  upon  subsequent  probate  of  the 
will  or  grant  of  letters  testamentary  is  extended  to  administrators, 
and  has  been  enlarged  upon  in  an  earlier  chapter  treating  of  the 
nature  of  the  title  of  executors  and  administrators.4  The  decisive 
test  to  ascertain  whether  the  acts  done  before  appoint- 
ment are  legalized  or  ratified  by  the  subsequent  grant  of  appointment 
administration  is  whether  such  acts  would  have  been  winch  would  be 

.    .  valid  after  ap- 

valid    had   he   been    the   rightful    administrator;5    the  pointmentare 
consequences  both  to  the  person  acting  and  to  the  estate  ^sequent7 

must  be  the  same  as  if  he  had  been  legally  in   grant  of 
[*  412]  charge  of  the  estate.6    The  doctrine  is  stated  *  to  letters* 

be,  that  the  title  to  the  personal  property  of  a  decedent  is 
in  abeyance  until  his  executor  qualifies,  or  an  administrator  is  ap- 
pointed, when  it  vests  in  him  by  relation  from  the  time  of  the 
death.7     It  has  already  been  pointed  out,  that  this  doctrine  is  a  fic- 

1  Magwood  v.  Legge,  Harp.  116,  119.  5  Outlaw  v.  Farmer,  71  N.  C.  31,  35; 
It  is  held  in  this  case  that  any  act  which  Bellinger  v.  Ford,  21  Barb.  311,  314,  and 
would  constitute  him  executor  de  son  tort,  authorities  cited  there ;  Gilkey  v.  Hamil- 
as  taking  possession  of  the  goods  and  con-  ton,  22  Mich.  283,  286 ;  Haselden  v.  White- 
verting  them  to  his  own  use,  or  disposing  sides,  2  Strobh.  353  ;  McClure  i>.  People, 
of  them  to  another,  etc.,  is  evidence  of  the  19  111.  App.  105. 

executor's  acceptance  of  the  trust :  p.  1 1 9  ;  6  Tucker   v.    Whaley,    11    R.   I.    543, 

but  in  a  later  case  it  is  said  that,  when  holding  a  person  who  bought  hay  to  feed 

executors  are  appointed  to  sell  and  con-  the   stock   of  a  decedent,  and  who   was 

vey  lands,  a  neglect  to  qualify  is  prima  afterward  appointed  administrator,  liable 

fac  ie  evidence  of  a  refusal  to  act,  and  will  as  administrator  personally.      An   action 

validate  a  sale  made  by  the  acting  exec-  commenced  by  an  administrator  before  his 

utors :  Uldrick  v.  Simpson,  1   S.  C.  283,  appointment  must  necessarily  fail :   Gat- 

286.     It  is  so  held  in  Tennessee:  Drane  field  v.  Hanson,  57  How.  Pr.  331. 
r.  Bayliss,  1  Humph.  174;   Robertson  v.  7  Per    Smith,   J.,   in    McDearmon   v. 

Gaines,  2  Humph.  367,  381.  Maxfield,  38  Ark.  631,  636,  citing  i.  a. 

2  Hathorn  v.  Eaton,  70  Me.  219,  220.  Rattoon  v.  Overacker,  8  John.  126;  Priest 
8  Thiefes  v.  Mason,  55  N.  J.  Eq.  456.  v.  Watkins,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  225. 

4  Ante,  ch.  xviii.  §§  172,  173,  and  au- 
thorities there  cited. 

441 


*4l2  ESTATE   BEFORE   GRANT   OF   LETTERS.  §  187 

tion  of  the  law  to  prevent  injustice  and  injuries  to  estates,  and  will 
never  be  resorted  to  where  it'  might  unjustly  affect  the  rights  of 
innocent  parties  intervening,  or  to  recognize  or  validate  unauthor- 
ized acts  in  prejudice  of  the  estate.1  The  status  of  an  executor 
or  administrator  acting  before  grant  of  probate  or  letters  is  very 
similar  to  that  of  an  executor  de  son  tort,  and  it  will  become  neces- 
sary again  to  allude  to  the  principle  upon  which  their  acts,  though 
unauthorized  at  the  time  of  commission,  become  valid  and  binding 
upon  the  estate  by  the  grant  of  letters  to  them.2 

1  Ante,  §  173,  and  authorities.  2  See  post,  ch.  xxi.  §§  188  et  seq. 


4U 


§  188  DEFINITION.  *  413 


[*413]  *  CHAPTER    XXI. 

OP   EXECUTORS    DE   SON   TORT. 

§  188.  Definition.  —  The  coinmon-law  doctrine  ascribing  to  an  ex- 
ecutor authority  to  act  without  first  qualifying,  or  going  through  any 
ceremony  of  authentication  or  induction  into  office  whatever,  which 
might  serve  as  notice  to  the  public  of  his  official  character,  has  given 
rise  in  the  English  law  to  what  Mr.  Schouler  terms  "  an  official  name 
to  an  unofficial  character ;  styling  as  executor  de  son  tort  —  executor 
in  his  own  wrong  —  whoever  should  officiously  intermeddle  with  the 
personal  property  or  affairs  of  a  deceased  person,  having  received 
no  appointment  thereto."1  The  theory  of  holding  an 
intermeddler  liable  in  the  character  which  he  has  him-  docTrme'o/ex- 
self  voluntarily  assumed,  is  not  unjust  to  him,  and  may  ecutorJe^« 
be  necessary  to  the  protection  of  the  interests  of  credi- 
tors, heirs  and  legatees  of  the  deceased  person,  not  only  because 
strangers  may  naturally  conclude  that  the  person  so  acting  has  a  will 
which  he  has  not  yet  proved,2  but  for  the  substantial  reason  that,  by 
holding  him  liable  in  the  assumed  character,  the  remedy  of  parties 
injured  is,  at  least  at  common  law,  much  simplified,  and  circuity  of 
action  avoided.  The  harshness  of  the  doctrine,  which  is  complained 
of  by  American  writers,  is  not  apparent  from  the  common-law  stand- 
point ;  and  in  some  of  the  States  unauthorized  intermeddling  with 
the  estate  of  a  deceased  person  is  more  severely  punished  than 
at  common  law.3  However  inapt  the  term  and  incon-  still  recognized 
gruous  the  doctrine  maybe  in  America,4  it  is  certainly  in  most  states. 

1  Schoul.  Ex.  §  184.  4  See  post,  §  198,  where  the  States  are 

'2  "  And    in    all    actions   by   creditors  mentioned  in  which  the  doctrine  is  not  in 

against  such  an  officious  intruder,  he  shall  force.     Mr.  Schouler  (stipra)  says  :  "  This 

be  named  an  executor,  generally ;  for  the  designation  is  inapt,  since  it  applies  the 

most  obvious  conclusion  which  strangers  term  '  executor '  as  well  to  intestate  as  to 

can  form  from  his  conduct  is,  that  he  hath  testate   estates,   and   signifies,   moreover, 

a  will  of  the  deceased,  wherein  he  is  named  that  the  person  who  intended  his  services 

executor,  but  hath  not  yet  taken  probate  had   no   legal   authority   in    any   sense." 

thereof":  2  Bla.  Comm.  507,  citing  5  Rep.  Mr.  Redfield  (3   Redf.   on  Wilis,    p.  21, 

31 ;  12  Mod.  471.  note  6)  says :  "  The  American  courts  have 

3  The  liability  of  an   executor  is,  at  sometimes  held  such  persons  liable  to  an 

common  law,  coextensive  with  the  value  action  at  the  suit  of  creditors  of  the  estate. 

of  the  property  converted  ;  in  New  Hamp-  But  there  has  always  been  manifested  a 

shire  it  is   double   such  value ;    in   some  marked   disposition   here   to   narrow  the 

other  States  a  penalty  is  superadded  to  range  of  such  responsibility,  and  virtually 

the  liability.  to  expunge  the  term  from  the  law.      It  is, 

443 


*  414  *  415 


EXECUTORS    DE   SON   TORT. 


§188 


intermeddling 
with  property 
of  deceased 
persons  creates 
liability. 


an  essential  *  element  of  the  law  of  administration  in  most  of  [*  414] 
the  American  States,  being  recognized  as  in  full  force  in  Ala- 
bama,1 Connecticut,2  Delaware,8  District  of  Columbia,4  Georgia,5  Illi- 
nois,6 Indiana,7  Iowa,8  Kentucky,9  Louisiana,10  Maine,11  Maryland,12 
Massachusetts,13  Michigan,14  Mississippi,15  New  Hampshire,16  New 
Jersey,17  New  York,18  Pennsylvania,19  North  Carolina,20  South  Caro- 
Unauthorized  Una,21  Tennessee,22  Utah,28  Vermont,24  and  Virginia.25  It 
is  therefore  important  to  define  the  acts  of  intermeddling 
which  make  one '  liable  in  such  States,  as  executor  —  or, 
as  is  sometimes  (particularly  in  Iowa)  said,  administra- 
tor —  de  son  tort. 
The  general  definition,  as  given  by  Swinburne,  Godolphin,  and 
Wentworth,  is  in  these  words :  "  He  who  takes  upon  himself  the 
office  of  executor  by  intrusion,  not  being  so  constituted  by  the  de- 
ceased, nor,  for  want  of  such  constitution,  substituted  by  the  court  to 
administer."  26  Mr.  Williams  says  :  "  If  one  who  is  neither  executor 
nor  administrator  intermeddles  with  the  goods  of  the  deceased,  or 
does  any  other  act  characteristic  of  the  office  of  executor,  he  thereby 
makes  himself  what  is  called  in  the  law  an  executor  of  his 
own  wrong,  or,  more  usually,  an  executor  de  son  *  tort."  27  In  [*  415] 
New  Hampshire,  where  the  statute  makes  an  intermeddler 
liable  in  double  the  value  of  the  property  intermeddled  with,  the  rule 
is  laid  down  that  "  all  acts  which  assume  any  particular  control  over 
the  property,  without  legal  right  shown,  will  make  a  person  executor 
in  his  own  wrong,  as  against  creditors.     Any  act  which  evinces  a 


in  itself,  a  subject  resting  upon  no  just 
basis  of  correlative  rights  and  responsi- 
bilities, but  operates  chiefly  in  the  nature 
of  a  penalty  for  intermeddling  with  the 
estates  of  deceased  persons.  We  have 
devoted  no  space  to  the  topic,  in  this 
work,  because  it  is  so  nearly  obsolete  in 
the  American  courts  that  it  would  seem 
unjust  to  the  profession  to  tax  them  with 
the  expense  of  what  is  only  speculatively 
useful,  when  so  much  which  is  practically 
so  has  to  be  omitted." 

1  Simonton  v.  McLane,  25  Ala.  353. 

3  Bennett  v.  Ives,  30  Conn.  329. 

8  Wilson  v.  Hudson,  4  Ilarr.  168. 

4  Peters  v.  Breckeuridge,  2  Cr.  C.  C. 
518. 

6  Barron  v.  Barney,  38  Ga.  264  ;  Mor- 
row ?•.  (.'loud,  77  Ga.  1 14. 

«  McClnre  v.  People,  19  111.  App.  105, 
107  ;  Camp  v.  Elliott,  88  111.  App.  337. 

7  Brown  V.  Sullivan,  2'J  Ind.  359. 

8  Elder  v.  Littler,  L5  Iowa,  65.     See 
also  French  v.  French,  91  Iowa,  140. 

•  Brown  v.  Dnrbin,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  170. 

444 


10  Succession  of  Mouton,  3  La.  An.  561. 
"  White  v.  Mann,  26  Me.  361. 

12  Neale  v.  Hagthorp,  3  Bland.  Ch.  551, 
565 ;  Baumgartner  v.  Haas,  68  Md.  32. 

13  Mitchel  v.  Lunt,  4  Mass.  654. 

14  Damouth  v.  Klock,  29  Mich.  289. 

15  Hunt  v.  Drane,  32  Miss.  243  ;  Ellis  v. 
McGee,  63  Miss.  168. 

16  Emery  v.  Berry,  28  N.  H.  473. 

17  Parker  v.  Thompson,  30  N.  J.  L.  311. 
is  Scoville  v.  Post,  3  Edw.  203.     But  in 

this  State  the  office  of  executor  de  son  tort 
is  now  abolished  by  statute :  2  Rev.  St. 
449,  §  17  ;  Banks  &  Bro.,  7th  ed.,  p.  2395, 
§17. 

19  Crunkleton  v.  Wilson,  1  Browne,  361. 

2:1  Bailey  v.  Miller,  5  Ired.  L.  444. 

21  Hubble  v.  Fogartie,  3  Rich.  413. 

22  Mitchell  v.  Kirk,  3  Sneed,  319. 

28  National  Bank  v.  Lewis,  12  Utah,  84. 
24  Walton  v.  Hall,  66  Vt.  455,  463. 
2*  Hansford  v.  Elliott,  9  Leigh,  79. 
2«  School.  Ex.  §  184,  note  (1). 
27  Wins.  Ex.  [257]. 


§189 


ACTS   CREATING   THE   LIABILITY. 


415,  *  416 


legal   control,   by   possession,   direction,    or   otherwise, 
plained,  make  him  liable."  1 

§189.  Acts  which  create  the  Liability.  —  Very  sli 
stances  of  intermeddling  with  the  goods  of  a  deceased 
make  one  liable  as  executor  de  son  tort.  Mr.  Williams 
alludes  to  some  ancient  cases  in  which  the  milking  of  a 
cow  by  the  widow,  taking  a  dog,  a  bedstead,2  a  Bible,8 
were  held  sufficient,  as  Indicia  of  being  the  representa- 
tive of  the  deceased.4  Killing  the  cattle,5  using,  selling, 
or  giving  away  the  goods,6  or  taking  them  in  satisfac- 
tion of  a  debt  or  legacy,7  will  render  one  liable  as 
executor  de  son  tort.  The  wife  of  the  deceased  taking 
more  apparel  than  she  is  entitled  to,8  or  continuing  in 
possession  of  his  goods  and  using  them  as  her  own,9  and 
a  daughter  carrying  on  the  business  with  them,10 
[*  416]  is  liable  *  as  executrix  de  son  tort ;  u  and  so,  it 
seems,  is  a  husband  who  retains  possession  of  his 
deceased  wife's  property,  which  she  held  jointly  with 
the  next  of  kin  of  her  former  husband.12  But  there 
can  be  no  executorship  de  son  tort  with  respect  to  lands, 


will,   unex- 

ght    circum- 

person  will 

Milking  a  cow; 

taking  a  dog, 
a  bedstead,  a 
Bible; 

killing  cattle, 
using,  selling, 
or  giving  away 
the  goods; 

taking  goods  in 
satisfaction  of  a 
debt  or  legacy ; 

taking  apparel; 

widow  retain- 
ing goods  of 
husband; 

husband  retain- 
ing goods  of 
wife. 

Not  in  respect 
of  lands, 


1  Emery  v.  Berry,  28  N.  H.  473,  483, 
citing,  as  sustaining  the  position  an- 
nounced, 2  Bac.  Abr.  387 ;  5  Coke,  33  6  ; 
Edwards  v.  Harben,  2  T.  R.  587,  597  ; 
Padget  v.  Priest,  2  T.  R.  97 ;  Campbell  v. 
Tousey,  7  Cow.  64;  White  v.  Mann,  26 
Me.  361 ;  Wilson  v.  Hudson,  4  Harr.  168; 
Hubble  v.  Fogartie,  3  Rich.  413  ;  1  Saund. 
265,  note. 

2  Robbin's  Case,  Noy,  69. 
8  Toller,  38. 

4  Schouler  deems  it  absurd  that  the 
milking  of  a  cow  by  the  widow  of  the 
deceased  should  expose  her  to  the  lia- 
bility of  executrix  de  son  tort,  not  on 
account  of  the  trivial  nature  of  the  trans- 
action, but  because  milking  was  in  the 
interest  of  the  estate,  —  as  conducing  to 
the  health  of  the  cow,  and  saving  a  per- 
ishable commodity  for  account  of  a  rep- 
resentative subsequently  appointed.  It 
is  probable,  however,  that  the  milking 
was  not  in  the  interest,  but  to  the  depri- 
vation, of  the  estate,  because  acts  of  kind- 
ness and  charity  never  subjected  any  one, 
even  in  the  times  of  Godolphin,  Dyer,  and 
Wentworth,  who  report  the  above  cases, 
to  the  hazard  of  executorship  de  son  tort. 
And  the  trivial  acts  complained  of  were 
probably  looked  upon  as  an  indication  of 
the   wrong,  —  the   straw  moved    by  the 


wind,  —  not  as  the  wrong  itself,  unless 
the  articles  mentioned  were  of  more  than 
ordinary  value. 

5  Godolphin,  pt.  2,  c.  8,  s.  4. 

6  Gilchrist,  J.,  in  Leach  v.  Pillsbury, 
15  N.  H.  137,  139,  citing  Read's  Case,  5 
Coke,  34,  and  Mountford  v.  Gibson,  4  East, 
441.    See  Baumgartner  v.  Haas,  68  Md.  32. 

7  Evving,  J.,  in  Stephens  v.  Barnett,  7 
Dana,  257,  262,  citing  Bethel  v.  Stanhope, 
1  Cro.  Eliz.  810.  See  also  Bacon  v.  Parker, 
12  Conn.  212,  216. 

8  Wms.  Ex.  [258],  citing  Stokes  v. 
Porter,  Dyer,  166  6;  1  Roll.  Abr.  918; 
Wentw.,  c.  14,  p.  325,  14th  ed. ;  Godolph., 
pt.  2,  c.  8,  s.  1 ;  Swinb.,  pt.  4,  s.  23. 

9  Madison  v.  Shockley,  41  Iowa,  451  ; 
Hawkins  v.  Johnson,  4  Blackf.  21,  22. 

10  Hooper  v.  Summersett,  Wight w.  16, 
as  cited  by  Wms.  Ex.  [259]. 

11  The  widow  was  held  not  liable  in  an 
action  at  law  for  a  debt  due  from  the  estate, 
although  she  had  possession  of  some  goods 
belonging  to  the  estate  :  Chandler  v.  Da- 
vidson, 6  Blackf.  367.  And  where  a  wife 
in  destitute  circumstances  uses  the  prop- 
erty of  the  absent  husband  in  the  support 
of  his  family,  before  any  certain  news  of  his 
death,  she  is  not  liable  :  Brown  v.  Benight, 
3  Blackf.  39,  41.     See  also  post,  §  191. 

«  Phallon  v.  Honseal,  3  McCord,  Ch.  42a 
445 


*  416,  *  417  EXECUTORS   DE  SON   TORT.  §  190 

nor  of  term  in  because  interference  therewith  is  a  wrong  to  the  heir  or 

reversion;  devisee,1  nor  of  a  term  of  years  in  reversion,  because  it 

but  entrv upon  lS  incapable  of  entry.2     Entry  upon  the  land  leased  to 

leasehold  in  ^g   decedent   and   possession   claiming   the    particular 

possession  .  ■"■  „         .  «.  n 

creates  the         estate  constitutes  a  tort  executor  or  a  term  tor  years, 
liability.  g0  ^ie  hgjrg  0f  a  mortgagee  who  had  not  taken  posses- 

sion were  held  liable  as  executors  de  son  tort  for  entering  to  foreclose, 
and  taking  the  rents  and  profits,  to  the  extent  of  the  rents  received,4 
and  likewise  one  who,  as  agent  of  the  mortgagee  of  a  chattel  mort- 
gage, after  the  death  of  the  mortgagor  still  in  possession,  takes  pos- 
session of  the  mortgaged  goods,  is  liable  as  executor  de  son  tort  for 
all  goods  seized,  sold,  and  disbursed  in  excess  of  the  mortgage  debt.6 

Demanding  and  receiving  the  debts  of  the  deceased,6  or  making 
acquittances  for  them,  is  such  intermeddling  as  to  create  the  liability 
C  11   tin  °^  executor  de  son  tort ;  or  even  paying  the  decedent's 

debts  due  to  debts,  or  the  fees  for  proving  his  will,7  out  of  the 
the  deceased.  estate  ; 8  likewise,  if  a  man  sue  as  executor,  or  to  an 
action  brought  against  him  as  such  pleads  in  that  character  ; 9  or  if, 
voluntarily  appearing  as  executor  of  a  deceased  defendant,  he  adopts 
the  answer  of  the  deceased  and  contests  the  issues  made  on  the 
merits.10 

§  190.  Status  of  the  Person,  and  other  Circumstances  fixing  the  Lia- 
bility. —  Mr.  Williams  cites  an  English  case  in  which  it  was  held 
that,  if  a  man's  servant  sells  the  goods  of  the  deceased, 
serva^or  as  well  after  his  death  as  before,  by  the  direction  of  the 
principal  and  deceased  given  in  his  lifetime,  and  pays  the  money  aris- 
both  be  liable  ing  therefrom  into  the  hands  of  his  master,  this 
as  executors       luakes  the  master,  as  well  as  the  servant,  *  ex-  \*  4171 

at  son  tort.  '  L  J 

ecutor  de  son  tort.11     So  the  agent  of  an  executor 
de  son  tort,  collecting  the  assets  with  a  knowledge  that  they  belong 
to  the  testator's  estate,  and  that  his  principal  is  not  the  legal  repre- 
sentative, may  himself  be  treated  as  an  executor  de  son  tort.12    It  was 

1  Nass  v.  Van  Swearingen,  7  S.  &  R.  6  Swift  t;.  Martin,  19  Mo.  App.  488, 
192,  195;    King  v.  Lyman,  1   Root,  104;     489,492. 

Mitchol  v.  Lunt,  4  Mass.  654,  658;   Claus-  7  Wms.  [258]. 

sen  v.  Lafrenz,  4  G.  Greene,  224  ;   Morrill  8  Paying   the    decedent's    debts   with 

v.  Morrill,  13  Me.  415.  one's   own    money   does    not    make    one 

2  Wms.  [258],  citing  Kenrick  v.  Bur-  executor  de  son  tort :  Carter  v.  Robbins, 
ges,  Moore,  126.  8  Rich.  29. 

3  Mayor  of  Norwich  i>.  Johnson,  3  Lev.  9  Davis  v.  Connelly,  4  B.  Mon.  136, 
85 ;  Garth  v.  Taylor,  1  Freem.  261.  140. 

*  They  were  held  liable  to  the  mortga-  10  National  Bank  v.  Lewis,  12  Utah, 
gor  in  a  bill  to  redeem  even  after  the  time     84,  99. 

for  redemption,  if  they  had  been  lawful  n  Wms.  [259],  citing  Pad  get  v.  Priest, 

executors, had  expired:  Raskins  v. Hawkes,  2  T.  R.  97. 

108  Mass.  879,  381.  ia  Sharland    v.   Mildon,   5    Hare,  468; 

•  Ex  parte  Davega,  81  S.  C.  413.  Ambler  v.  Lindsay,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  D.  198, 

206  ;  Turner  r.  Child,  1  Dov.  L.  331. 
446 


§  191  ACTS   NOT   CREATING   LIABILITY.  *  417,  *  418 

held  in  Missouri  that  a  person  cannot  be  charged  as  an  executor  of 
his  own  wrong,  by  reason  of  acts  done  as  the  agent  or  servant  of 
another  ; 1  but  the  opinion  in  emphatic  terms  dwells  on  the  innocent 
character  of  the  defendant's  acts,  and  is  hence  consistent  with  the 
qualification  to  this  statement  confining  it  to  cases  where  the  agent 
was  not  aware  of  his  principal's  want  of  authority.  In  this  sense  it 
is  in  harmony  with  the  English  and  other  American  cases.2 

Creditors  of  a  deceased  person,  who,  knowing  that  no 
administration  has  been  granted,  receive   payment  of    reCeive  pay- 
their  claims  from  the  widow,  are  liable  to  the  adminis-    ment  of  their 

.  .  .  .  T  claims  from 

trator  subsequently  appointed,  as  executors  de  son  tort.3    the  widow 
Donees  and  vendees  holding  property  under  fraudulent    knowin£  that 

Til  S"e    1S    n°t  a(l- 

gifts  or  sales  to  them  are  liable  as  executors  de  son  tort*    ministratrix ; 

to  creditors,  although  they  may  not  be  to  rightful  execu-   fraudulent 

tors  or  administrators  in  States  in  which  the  personal    done,es  an(l 

•  i    i  i  vendees, 

representatives  are  not  permitted  to  avoid  the  fraudulent 

conveyances  of  their  testators  or  intestates.5 

A  person  acting  under  void  letters  of   administration   has   been 
described  as  an  executor  de  son  tort;6  and  likewise  an  administrator 
ad   colligendum,   who,    in    excess    of    his    authority   as    yoid  jetters  no 
special   administrator,  sells  or  disposes  of  any  goods,    relief  against 
even  though  they  were  otherwise  subject  to  perish,  and     ia  11"' 
although   his   letters    ad  colligendum   warranted   him   thereto ;    for 
the    judge   himself   could   not   confer   such   authority.7    Administrator 
One  who  administers  upon  the  estate  of  a  fraud-   of  fraudulent 
[*  418]  ulent   *  assignee,  and  takes   possession   of  the 

goods  assigned,  may,  upon  the  death  of  the  assignor,  be  sued 
as  executor  de  son  tort  by  the  creditors  of  the  latter ; 8  but  such  suit 
lies  against  him  only  in  his  representative  character,  not  personally.9 

§  191.  Acts  of  Intermeddling  which  do  not  create  the  Liability. 
—  There  are  many  acts  which  a  stranger  may  perform  without  in- 
curring the  hazard  of  making  himself  liable  as  executor  de  son  tort ; 

1  Magner  v.  Ryan,  19  Mo.  196,  199.  5  Gleaton  v.  Lewis,  24  Ga.  209;  Dorsey 

2  Givens  v.  Higgins,  4  McCord,  286;  v.  Smithsou,  6  Harr.  &  J.  61,  64  ;  Hopkins 
Brown  v.  Sullivan,  22  Ind.  359  ;  Perkins  v.  v.  Towns,  4  B.  Mon.  124  ;  Simouton  v.  Mc- 
Ladd,  114  Mass.  420,  423.  Lane,  25  Ala.  353;    Tucker  v.  Williams, 

3  Mitchell  v.  Kirk,  3   Sneed,  319,  321,  Dudley  (S.  C),  329. 

citing  Mountford  v.  Gibson,  4  East,  441.  6  Bradley  v.  Commonwealth,  31  Pa.  St. 

4  Gleaton  v.  Lewis,  24  Ga.  209  ;  Garner     522. 

v.  Lyles,  35  Miss.  176,  185  ;  Allen  v.  Kim-  7  Wins.  Ex.  [258],  citing  Anon.  Dyer, 

ball,  15  Me.  116;    Sturdivant  v.  Davis,  9  256a;  Wentw.,  c.   14,  p.  324,   14th  ed. ; 

Ired.  L.  365,  367;   Crunkleton  v.  Wilson,  Godolph.,  pt.  2,  c.  8,  §  1. 

1  Browne,  361 ,  364  ;  Clayton  v.  Tucker,  20  8  McMorine   v.   Storey,  4   Dev.    &  B. 

Ga.  452,  464;  Warren  v.  Hall,  6  Dana,  450,  189,  191  ;    Norfleet  v.  Riddick,  3  Dev.  L. 

454.     But  not  where  the   assignment   is  221. 

void  by  reason  of  a  technical  defect,  no  9  Alfriend  v.  Daniel,  48  Ga.  154. 

fraud    being    charged :    Chattanooga    v. 

Adams,  81  Ga.  319. 

447 


*  418,*  419 


EXECUTORS   DE   SON   TORT. 


§191 


Acts  of  charity  notably,  all  acts  or  offices  of  mere  kindness  and  charity,1 
and  kindness,  and  looking  to  the  preservation  of  the  property.2  Mr. 
preservation  Williams  mentions  such  as  locking  up  the  goods  for 
ertv  Create  no  preservation,8  directing  the  funeral  and  paying  the  ex- 
liability,  penses  thereof  out  of  his  own  means  or  out  of  the  effects 
of  the  deceased,4  making  an  inventory  of  his  property,5  feeding  his 
cattle,6  repairing  his  houses,  or  providing  necessaries  for  his  chil- 
Widow  using  dren.7  "Where  the  property  is  not  greater  in  amount 
he^bWaTnot  than  *s  allowed  by  law  for  the  immediate  support  of  the 
liable".  family,  a  widow  is  not  liable  as  executrix  de  son 
tort  for  so  using  the  assets ; 8  and  so  where  the  *  widow  sup-  [*  419] 
ports  the  family  of  one  absent  from  home  before  certain  news 
of  his  death ; 9  or,  being  compelled  to  vacate  the  premises,  moves  the 
furniture,  partly  to  an  auction-room  to  be  sold,  and  partly  to  another 
house  to  be  used  by  her,  with  the  intention  of  accounting  to  a  proper 
representative  ; 10  or  where  she  appropriates  the  wearing  apparel,  of 
less  value  than  debts  which  she  paid,11  or  where  the  assets  appropri- 
ated will  not  pay  the  expense  of  taking  out  administration.12  Courts 
sometimes  refuse  to  hold  one  liable  as  executor  de  son  tort  who  in 


1  Graves  v.  Poage,  17  Mo.  91,  97. 
Says  Judge  Gamble,  in  this  case :  "  It  is 
impossible  that  any  person  can  believe 
that  it  was  the  defendant's  duty  to  leave 
the  gold  and  other  effects  upon  the  ground 
or  in  the  tent  where  Graves  died,  exposed 
to  every  marauder  who  might  pass  by. 
The  Israelites  were  taught  better  law 
when  they  were  commanded  in  this  lan- 
guage :  Thou  shalt  not  see  thy  brother's 
ox  or  his  sheep  go  astray  and  hide  thyself 
from  them :  thou  shalt  in  any  case  bring 
them  to  thy  brother.  And  if  thy  brother  be 
not  nigh  unto  thee,  or  if  thou  know  him  not, 
then  thou  shalt  briug  it  unto  thine  own 
house,  and  it  shall  be  with  thee  until  thy 
brother  seek  after  it,  and  thou  shalt  re- 
store it  to  him  again.  In  like  manner 
shalt  thou  do  with  his  ass,  and  so  shalt 
thou  do  with  his  raiment,  and  with  all  lost 
things  of  thy  brother's." 

2  "  Whoever  comes  into  possession  of 
any  portion  of  the  personal  property  of  an 
intestate  becomes  responsible  for  it  to  the 
administrator  when  appointed.  He  can- 
not safely  deliver  it  to  any  one  else  than 
the  administrator,  or  some  one  who  shows 
a  better  right  to  it  than  himself.  .  .  .  This 
mere  possession  of  the  personal  property 
of  a  decedent,  and  consequent  duty  to  pre- 
serve and  protect  it,  entitles  the  possessor 
to  the  ordinary  legal  remedies  against  a 

448 


mere  wrongdoer  ;  that  is,  any  one  who  in- 
terferes with  the  property  without  a  better 
right":  Cullen  v.  O'Hara,  4  Mich.  132, 
136,  et  seq.,  with  numerous  authorities. 
See  also  Blodgett  v.  Converse,  60  Vt.  410, 
419. 

3  Wms.  Ex.  [261]  ;  Godolph.,  pt.  2,  c.  8, 
§  6  ;  lb.,  §  3,  where  a  man  but  took  a  horso 
of  the  deceased  and  tied  him  in  his  own 
stable:  Wentw.  Ex.  325,  14th  ed.  See 
Brown  v.  Sullivan,  22  Iud.  359. 

4  Harrison  v.  Rowley,  4  Ves.  212,  216, 
and  numerous  writers. 

6  Godolph.,  pt.  2,  c.  8,  §  6. 

6  lb.,  §  8. 

7  lb.,  §  6. 

8  Crash  n  v.  Baker,  8  Mo.  437,  441. 
This  case  was  decided  before  the  enact- 
ment of  the  statute  similar  in  effect  to 
statutes  passed  in  other  States,  author- 
izing the  probate  court  to  dispense  with 
administration  in  such  cases. 

9  Brown  v.  Benight,  3  Blackf.  39  ; 
Chandler  v.  Davidson,  6  Blackf.  367.  See 
ante,  §  189. 

10  Peters  v.  Leeder,  L.  J.  47  Q.  B.  573. 

11  Taylor  v.  Moore,  47  Conn.  278,  the 
reason  given  being  that  by  her  acts 
the  widow  did  not  injure,  but  benefited, 
the  estate. 

12  Bogne  v.  Watrous,  59  Conn.  247. 


§192 


EXECUTORS   DE   JURE    AND   DE   SON   TORT. 


419,  *  420 


good  faith  interferes,  paying  debts  and  assisting  the  beneficiaries  of 
the  estate.1 

The  purchaser  from  an  executor  de  son  tort  does  not  by  his  pur- 
chase  become  executor  de  son  tort  himself ; 2   and   the    purchaser 
possession  of  property  under  a  fair  claim  of  right  does 
not  render  one  liable  as  such ; 3  and  in  such  case  the  bona 
fides  is  a  question  of  fact  referable  to  the  jury,  and  it  is 
error  for  the  court  to  decide  it.4 

No  action  can.  be  maintained  against  any  one,  as  executor  de  son 
tort,  who  has  not  interfered  with  personal  property  of  a  No  one  liable 
deceased  person.5  The  intermeddling  with  the  goods 
of  a  partnership  after  the  death  of  one  of  the  partners 
does  not  constitute  an  executor  de  son  tort,  because  such 
person  is  liable  to  the  surviving  partner ; 6  nor  for  set- 
ting up  a  claim  against  goods  of  the  intestate,  and 
thereby  injuring  their  sale ; 7  nor  for  paying  money 
found  upon  the  person  of  the  deceased  to  his  administra- 
tor in  another  State.8 

§  192.    Coexistence  of  Executor  or  Administrator  de  Jure  and  de 
son  Tort.  —  It  is  sometimes  said  that  at  common  law  the  intermed- 
dling with  the  goods  of  an  estate,  if  probate  or  letters  have 
[*  420]  *  been  granted,  does  not  constitute  the  intermed-    At  common 

dler  an  executor  de  son  tort,  because  creditors  d1mg1wkhied" 
may  bring  their  action  against  the  rightful  representa-  effects  mcus- 
tive,  and  the  intermeddler  is  liable  as  a  trespasser.9  This 
statement  is  to  be  understood  as  simply  affecting  the 
remedy  against  one  who  interferes  with  the  effects  or 
property  of  an  estate  in  the  hands  of  a  legally  constituted 
executor  or  administrator ;  the  interference  is  a  trespass, 
and  punishable  as  such.10  But  the  liability  as  executor 
de  son  tort  is  not  excluded  by  the  fact  that  there  is  a 


from  an  ex- 
ecutor de  son 
tort  not  him- 
self liable. 


who  has  not 
himself  inter- 
meddled; 
nor  one  inter- 
meddling with 
partnership 
effects ; 

nor  for  setting 
up  a  claim 
against  the 
estate. 


tody  of  an  ex- 
ecutor or 
administrator 
creates  no  lia- 
bility as  execu- 
tor de  son  tort, 
but  as  a 
trespasser. 

Existence  of 
a  rightful  ex- 
ecutor does 


1  Portman  v.  Klemish,  54  Iowa,  198. 

2  Smith  v.  Porter,  35  Me.  287,  290,  cit- 
ing 9  Ad.  &  El.  365  (probably  a  misquota- 
tion) ;  Johnson  v.  Gaither,  Harp.  6  ;  Nesbit 
v.  Taylor,  1  Rice,  296. 

3  Smith  v.  Porter,  supra,  citing  Femings 
v.  Jarret,  1  Esp.  335  ;  Densler  v.  Edwards, 

5  Ala.  31,  36;  Claussen  v.  Lafrenz,  4  G. 
Greene,  224 ;  O'Reilly  v.  Hendricks,  2  Sm. 

6  M.  388  ;  Debesse  v.  Napier,  1  McCord. 
106  ;  Alexander  v.  Kelso,  1  Baxt.  5  ;  Baum- 
gartner  v.  Haas,  68  Md.  32. 

*  Ward  v.  Bevill,  10  Ala.  197,  202. 

5  Hence  the  donee  of  a  voluntary  con- 
veyance of  real  and  personal  property,  who 
disposed  of  the  same  during  the  lifetime  of 

vol.  i.  —  29 


the  donor,  is  not  so  liable  :  Morrill  v.  Mor- 
rill, 13  Me.  415. 

6  Hunt  v.  Drane,  32  Miss.  243  ;  Palmer 
v.  Maxwell,  1 1  Nebr.  598. 

7  Barnard  v.  Gregory,  3  Dev.  L.  223. 

8  Nisbet  v.  Stewart,  2  Dev.  &  B.  L. 
24. 

9  Wms.  Ex.  [261],  citing  Anon.,  1 
Salk.  313  ;  Godolph.,  pt.  2,  ch.  8,  §  3.  See 
also  McMorine  v.  Storey,  3  Dev.  &  B.  87  ; 
Bacon  v.  Parker,  12  Conn.  212,  216;  and 
remarks,  cited  by  Williams,  supra,  of  Lord 
Kenyon,  in  Hall  v.  Elliot,  Peake  N.  P.  C. 
86,  87,  and  Sir  T.  Plumer,  M.  R.,  in  Tom- 
lin  v.  Beck,  1  Turn.  &  R.  438. 

10  Schoul.  Ex.  §  197,  citing  1  Salk.  313, 
supra. 

449 


*  420,  *  421 


EXECUTORS   DE   SON   TORT. 


§193 


not  exclude        lawful  representative  of  the  estate.     Where  a  fraudulent 

liability  as  ...  .  -  ,   ,       ,  . 

executor  de  grantee  is  m  possession  of  property  conveyed,  to  him  in 
son  tort.  derogation  of  the  rights  of  creditors,  or  has  become  liable 

by  reason  of  having  disposed  of  such  property  after  the  grantor's 
death,  the  rightful  executor  or  administrator  cannot,  in  many  if  not 
most  of  the  States,  proceed  against  the  grantee ;  the  fraudulent  trans- 
action being  good  as  against  the  grantor  and  all  claiming  through 
him.  In  such  States  the  remedy  of  the  creditors  is  against  such  gran- 
tee as  executor  de  son  tort,  although  there  be  a  lawful  executor.1 
And  it  is  stated  by  Williams,  that  "though  there  be  a  lawful  execu- 
tor or  administrator,  yet  if  any  other  take  the  goods  claiming  them 
as  executor,  or  pays  debts  or  legacies,  or  intermeddles  as  executor,  in 
this  case,  because  of  such  express  claiming  to  be  executor,  he  may  be 
charged  as  executor  of  his  own  wrong,  although  there  were  another 
executor  of  right."  2 

§193.  Nature  of  the  Liability  of  Executors  de  son  Tort. —  An 
Executor  de  executor  de  son  tort  has  all  the  liabilities,  though  none  of 
the  privileges,  that  belong  to  the  character  of  executor.8 
He  is  liable  to  be  sued  by  the  rightful  executor 
*  or  administrator,4  by  a  creditor,8  or  by  a  lega-  [*  421] 
tee ; 6  but  not,  it  seems,  to  the  next  of  kin,  so 
long  as  any  debts  remain  unpaid,7  though  otherwise 
where  there  are  no  debts  owing.8  It  has  also  been  held 
that  the  executor  de  son  tort  cannot  be  called  to  account 
before  the  probate    court ; 9   and   in  some  of  the  States  he  is   not 


son  tort  liable 
to  the  rightful 
executor  or 
administra- 
tor, creditor, 
or  legatee; 
and  to  next 
of  kin  after 
all  debts  are 
paid. 


1  Foster  v.  Nowlin,  4  Mo.  18,  24  ;  How- 
land  v.  Dews,  R.  M.  Charlt.  383,  387; 
Dorsey  v.  Smithson,  6  Harr.  &  J.  61,  63  ; 
Chamberlayne  v.  Temple,  2  Rand.  384, 
397  ;  Shields  v.  Anderson,  3  Leigh,  729  ; 
Osborne  v.  Moss,  7  Johns.  161,  164,  citing 
Ashby  r.  Child,  Styles,  384.  And  see 
authorities  cited  ante,  §   190,  p.  *417. 

-  Wras.  Ex.  [261],  citing  Head's  case, 
r>  Co.  34,  and  other  authorities. 

3  School.  Ex.  §  187,  quoting  Lord 
Cofctenham  in  Carmichael  v.  Carmichael, 
2  l'hill.  Ch.  101. 

'  Mnir  r.  Trustees,  &c,  3  Barb.  Ch. 
477,479;  Stockton  v.  Wilson,  3  Pa.  129, 
130;  McCoy  v.  Payne,  68  Ind.  327,  332, 
citing  Ferguson  v  Barnes,  58  Ind.  169; 
Shaw  v.  Ballihan,  46  Vt.  389,  393. 

■  Rider  v.  Littler,  15  [owa,  65;  Wnis. 
'  ".:.;.  citing  Webnter  >•■  Webster,  lo  Ves. 

Ambler    r.    I.indsav,    L.    R.   3  Ch.    D. 

198,  207  ;  Coote  >-.  Whittington,  L.  R.  16 
Eq.  534  :  Morrow  v.  Cloud,  77  Ga.  111. 
Under  the  Code  of  Alabama  the  creditor 
cannot  sue  the  executor  de  son  tort,  but 

450 


only  the  rightful  representative :  Winfrey 
v.  Clarke,  107  Ala.  355.  A  note  given  to 
a  creditor  of  the  deceased,  by  the  executor 
de  son  tort,  in  renewal  of  the  original  deht 
of  the  deceased,  is  on  good  consideration : 
French  v.  French,  91  Iowa,  140.  In 
Georgia,  where  a  wife  as  executrix  de  son 
tort  of  her  husband's  estate,  having  sold 
all  the  personalty  of  the  estate  and  left 
the  county  with  it,  sued  on  a  promissory 
note  made  to  her  individually,  the  defend- 
ant was  allowed  to  set  off  a  claim  for 
medical  services  due  him  by  the  decedent, 
the  plaintiff  being  sole  heir  of  her  hus- 
band and  having  no  property  of  her  own 
which  could  he  reached  :  Harwood  v.  An- 
drews, 71  Ga.  784. 

6  Hansford  v.  Elliott,  9  Leigh,  79,  85. 

7  Lee  v.  Wright,  1  Rawle,  149,  150; 
Muir  v.  Trusteees,  &c,  3  Barb.  Ch.  477  ; 
Leach  v.  I'illsbnry,  15  N.  II.  137,  139. 

8  Lee  v.  Gibbons,  14  S.  &  R.  105,  110, 
etseq. ;  Bryant  v.  Helton,  66  Ga.  477.  See, 
however,  Haley  v.  Thames,  30  S.  C.  270. 

9  Per  Tilghman,  J.,  in  Peebles'  Appeal, 


§193 


LIABILITY   OP    EXECUTORS    DE    SON    TORT.        *  421    *  422 


answerable  in  a  direct  action  by  a  creditor  for  the  debt,  but  must  be 
proceeded  against  in  an  action  to  account  for  the  property  intermed- 
dled with.1 

The  action  by  a  creditor  must  name  him  as  executor  generally ;  2 
but  his  liability  is  in  its  nature  essentially  distinct  from 
that  of  an  executor  duly  appointed:  the  one  is  founded   creditor." 
on  the  principle  of  lawful  authority,  the  other,  whatever 
may  be  the  form  of  the  action  employed,  arises  out  of  a  wrong  done.8 
Hence  the  executor  de  son  tort  cannot  plead  the  limitation  prescribed 
for  actions  against  executors  and   administrators,4  but  is  liable   as 
executor  of   an  executor  for  the  debt  of  the  original  testator.5     If 
there  be  also  a  lawful  executor,  they  may  be  joined  in  the  suit,  or 
sued  severally ;  but  a  lawful  administrator  cannot  be  joined  in  the 
suit  with  an  executor  de  son  tort.6    But  if  the  executor  de 
[*  422]  son,  tort,  who  *  became   such  by  reason  of  holding  property 
fraudulently  granted  to  him  by  the   deceased,  is  afterward 
appointed  administrator,  the  creditor  has  his  election  to  charge  him 
as  executor  or  as  administrator.7 

If  the  executor  de  son  tort  should,  to  a  suit  by  a  creditor,  plead  ne 
unques  executor,  the  issue  would,  on  proof  of  acts  constituting  him 
executor  de  son  tort,  be  found  against  him,  and  the  judg- 
ment thereon  would  be  that  the  plaintiff  recover  the 
debt  and  costs  out  of  the  assets  of  the  testator,  if  the 
defendant  have  so  much,  but  if  not,  then  out  of  the  de- 
fendant's own  goods.8 

Executors  de  son  tort  are  not  allowed  to  retain   for 
their  own  debts,9  although  of  superior  degree   to   that 


Judgment  if 
plea  of  ne 
unques  exectu 
tor  be  found 
against  him. 


Executors  de 
son  tort  cannot 


15  S.  &  R.  39,  41;  Power's  Estate,  14 
Phila.  289.  See  also  Haley  v.  Thames, 
supra.  The  reason  given  is,  that  an  ex- 
ecutor de  son  tort  has  never  acted  under 
an  officer  having  jurisdiction,  but  under 
usurped  authority  only. 

1  McCoy  v.  Payne,  68  Ind.  327,  333, 
citing  Northwestern  Conference  v.  Myers, 
36  Ind.  375  ;  Wilson  v.  Davis,  37  Ind.  141  ; 
Leonard  v.  Blair,  59  Ind.  510. 

2  National  Bank  v.  Lewis,  12  Utah,  84, 
101  ;  Brown  v.  Durbin,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  170, 
172;  Buckminster  v.  Ingham,  Brayt.  116; 
Pleasants  v.  Glasscock,  1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch. 
17,23;  Gregory  v.  Forrester,  1  McCord, 
Ch.  318,  326  ;  Lee  v.  Chase,  58  Me.  432, 
435. 

3  Brown  v.  Leavitt,  26  N.  H.  493,  495. 

4  Brown  v.  Leavitt,  supra. 

5  Meyrick  v.  Anderson,  14  Ad.  &  El. 
(Q.  B  )  719,  725. 

G  Wms.  Ex.  [266],  citing  Wentw.  328, 


14th  ed. ;  Godolph.,  pt.  2,  c.  8,  §  2;  Com. 
Dig.  Administrator,  c.  3. 

7  Stephens  v.  Barnett,  7  Dana,  257, 
262,  citing  Bethel  v.  Stanhope,  1  Cro.  810. 

8  On  the  same  ground  upon  which  a 
like  judgment  would  go  against  a  right- 
ful executor  or  administrator,  if  defeated 
on  the  plea  of  ne  unques,  —  because  he 
wilfully  pleaded  a  false  plea,  —  the  fact 
of  intermeddling  being  as  fully  within  his 
knowledge  as  that  of  appointment  in  the 
knowledge  of  an  executor  de  jure  •  Hub- 
bell  v.  Fogartie,  1  Hill  (S.  C),  L.  167, 169; 
Campbell  v.  Tousey,  7  Cow.  64, 68  ;  Peters 
v.  Breckenridge,  2  Cr.  C.  C.  518. 

9  "For  otherwise,"  says  Williams,  p. 
[269],  "  the  creditors  of  the  deceased 
would  be  running  a  race  to  take  posses- 
sion of  his  goods,  without  taking  admin- 
istration to  him."  See  Coulter's  Case,  5 
Co.  30,  cited  by  Chapman,  C.  J.,  in  Carey 
v.  Gnillow,  105  Mass.  18,  21 ;  Turner  v. 

451 


*  422,  *  423 


EXECUTORS    DE   SON   TORT. 


§194 


Executor  de 
son  tort  not 
liable  beyond 
the  goods 

taken; 


he  may  plead 
plene  admin- 
is travit. 


retain  for  their   of  the  creditor   suing ; 1  nor  is  it  a  defence  that  he  is 

own  debts.  1  a 

a  legatee. 
§  194.  Extent  of  their  Liability  to  Creditors.  —  The  liability  of 
an  executor  de  son  tort  does  not,  at  common  law,  extend  beyond  the 
goods  which  he  has  administered  ;  for  while  he  is  not 
allowed,  by  his  own  wrongful  act,  to  acquire  any  benefit, 
yet  he  is  protected,  if  he  pleads  properly,  for  all  acts 
other  than  those  for  his  own  advantage,  which  a  rightful 
executor  might  do.3  Thus  he  may,  to  an  action  by  a 
creditor,  plead  plene  administravit,  or  plene  administra- 
vit prceter,  etc.,  and  support  this  plea  by  proof  of  pay- 
ment of  all  just  debts  to  any  other  creditor  in  equal  or 
superior  degree,  as  in  due  course  of  administration ; 4  and 
*  he  is  not  chargeable,  under  such  plea  beyond  the  assets  [*  423] 
which  came  to  his  hands.5  And  even  after  action  brought 
he  may  apply  the  assets  in  hand  to  the  payment  of  a  debt  of  superior 
degree,  and  plead  such  payment  in  bar  of  the  action  ; 6  and  he  may 
also  give  in  evidence  under  the  same  plea,  that  he  has  delivered  the 
assets  to  the  rightful  executor  or  administrator  before  action  brought.7 
An  executor  de  son  tort  may  well  plead  ne  unques  executor,  and  also 
plene  administravit,  and  have  verdict  on  the  latter  issue  if  unsuccess- 
ful in  the  former.8  He  may  deny  the  authority  of  the  creditor  to 
sue,  as  being  barred  by  limitation ; 9  and  the  creditor  must  affirma- 
tively show  that  the  goods  intermeddled  with  were  such  as  the 
creditors  were  entitled  to  have  placed  in  the  hands  of  an  adminis- 
trator.10 

In  America,  the  liability  of  executors  de  son  tort  is,  in  many  of  the 


Child,  1  Dev.  L.  331,  333,  citing  Alexan- 
der v.  Lane,  Yelv.  137  ;  Kinard  v.  Young, 
2  Rich.  Eq.  247,  252 ;  Partee  v.  Caughran, 
9  Yerg.  460 ;  Shields  v.  Anderson,  3 
Leigh,  729 ;  Brown  v.  Leavitt,  26  N.  H. 
493,  497  ;  Baumgartner  v.  Haas,  68  Md. 
32. 

1  Wms.  [269],  citing  Vernon  v.  Curtis, 
2  II.  Bl.  18. 

-  Wilbourn  v.  Wilbourn,  48  Miss.  38, 
45. 

3  Wms.  [267],  and  Perkins's  note  a, 
citing  English  and  American  authorities. 
See  Brown  v.  Walter,  58  Ala.  310,  318; 
and  Roggenkamp  v.  Roggenkamp,  68  Fed. 
R  (C.  C.  A.)  605;  s.  c.  32  U.  S.  App. 
463. 

*  Olenn  v.  Smith,  2  Gill  &  J.  493,  513 ; 
Bewail,  J.,  in  Weeks  v.  Gibbs,  9  Mass.  74, 

77  ;  Olmsted  V.  Clark,  30  Conn.  108. 

■  Wms  [267],  citing  Dyer,  156  b,  mar- 
gin ;  I  Sannd.  265,  note  2,  to  Oaborue  v. 

452 


Rogers  ;  Hooper  v.  Summersett,  Wightw. 
21 ,  per  curiam  ;  Yardley  v.  Arnold,  Carr. 
&  M.  434;  Truett  v.  Cummons,  6  111.  App. 
73 ;  McKenzie  v.  Pendleton,  1  Bush, 
164. 

6  Oxenham  v.  Clapp,  2  B.  &  Ad.  309. 

7  Wms.  [267],  and  authorities.  But 
the  appointment  of  an  administrator  since 
the  institution  of  the  suit,  without  aver- 
ment that  the  assets  have  been  delivered, 
is  no  defence :  McMeekin  v.  Hyne9,  80 
Ky.  343. 

8  National  Bank  v.  Lewis,  12  Utah,  84, 
96,  102.  But  he  cannot  have  a  separate 
trial  of  each  of  the  pleas  of  non  assumpsit, 
ne  unques  executor,  and  that  he  never  inter- 
meddled :  Broduax  v.  Brown,  Dudley, 
(Ga.)  202,  citing  English  authorities  on 
pleading. 

»  Brown  v.  Leavitt,  26  N.  H.  493,  497. 
w  Goff  v.  Cook,  73  Ind.  351  ;  Kahn  v. 
Tinder,  77  Ind.  147. 


§195 


LIABILITY   TO    RIGHTFUL   EXECUTOR.  *  423,  *  424 


States,  fixed  by  statute,  and  is  generally  limited  by  the  value  of  the 
goods  intermeddled  with;1  in  Indiana,2    Georgia,8  and 
North  Carolina,4  a  penalty  is  superadded,  and  in  New    executor  cL 
Hampshire  it  is  double  the  value  of  the  property  inter-   son  ^rt  fixed 

.  bv  statute 

meddled  with.5  It  is  self-evident  that,  if  he  undertake 
to  show  the  application  of  the  assets  of  the  deceased  to  the  payment 
of  his  debts,  he  will  not  be  protected  unless  the  payment  was  made 
under  circumstances  which  would  protect  a  rightful  administrator ;  6 
hence,  if  he  has  paid  more  than  the  just  dividend  to  one  or 
P  424]  more  creditors,  he  will  be  liable  to  others,  in  *  excess  of  the 
amount  of  assets  received,  in  such  amount  as  may  be  necessary 
to  make  up  their  just  proportion.7 

§  195.  Liability  to  the  Rightful  Executor  or  Administrator.  — 
The  liability  of  an  executor  de  so?i  tort  at  the  suit  of  a  rightful  exec- 
utor or  administrator  8  is  necessarily  different  from  that  to  a  credi- 
tor, for  this  among  perhaps  other  reasons,  that  the  intermeddling 
with  the  assets  of  an  estate  under  legal  administration  involves  an 
element  of  wrong  not  included  in  the  intermeddling  when  there  is 
no  lawful  representative ;  viz.  the  infringement  of  the  rights  of  the 
executor  or  administrator.9  Hence  to  an  action  by  the 
rightful  executor  or  administrator  the  executor  de  son 
tort  cannot  plead  in  bar  the  payment  of  debts,  etc.,  to 
the  value  of  the  assets,  or  that  he  has  given  the  goods 
in  satisfaction  of  the  debts  ; 10  and  although  under  a  plea 
of  the  general  issue,  in  an  action  of  trespass  or  trover 
by  a  rightful  executor  or  administrator,  the  payments 
proved  to  have  been  made  by  the  executor  de  son  tort  amount  to  the 
full  value  of  the  goods,  yet  there  must  be  judgment  for  at  least 
nominal  damages.11     He  may  prove,  however,  under  the  general  issue, 

7  Gay  v.  Lemle,  32  Miss.  309,  312; 
Bennett  v.  Ives,  30  Conn.  329,  335. 

8  Ante,  §  193. 

9  In  the  American  States  executors 
and  administrators  are  generally  allowed 
a  compensation  in  the  shape  of  commissions 
on  the  amount  of  property  administered, 
the  deprivation  of  which  may  constitute 
an  element  of  wrong  to  them. 

10  Wins.  [270],  and  English  authorities 
there  cited ;  Buchanan,  C.  J.,  in  Glenn  v. 
Smith,  2  Gill  &  J.  493,  513. 

11  Anon.,  12  Mod.  441  ;  Lord  Ellen- 
borough,  in  Mountford  v.  Gibson,  4  East, 
441,  447;  Woolley  v.  Clark,  5  B.  &  Aid. 
744,  746,  of  which  case  Mr.  Williams  says 
that  it  holds  that  the  defendant  was  not 
entitled  to  show  that  he  had  administered 
the  assets,  but  doubts  whether  it  is  to  be 
understood  as  overruling  the  cases  allow- 

453 


Executor  de 
son  tort  cannot 
plead,  plene 
administravit, 
etc.,  to  an  ac- 
tion by  the 
rightful  execu- 
tor or  admiu- 
trator : 


1  Hill  v.  Henderson,  13  Sm.  &  M.  688  ; 
Leach  v.  House,  1  Bai.  42,  43;  McKenzie 
v.  Pendleton,  1  Bush,  164;  Cook  v.  San- 
ders, 15  Rich.  63 ;  Kinard  v.  Young,  2 
Rich.  Eq.  247  ;  Elder  v.  Littler,  15  Iowa, 
65 ;  Glenn  v.  Smith,  2  Gill  &  J.  493,  513  ; 
Winfrey  v.  Clarke,  107  Ala.  355. 

2  Wilson  i'.  Davis,  37  Ind.  141,  145 
(adding  ten  per  centum  to  the  value  of 
the  property  converted). 

3  Per  McCay,  J.,  in  Alfriend  v.  Daniel, 
48  Ga.  154,  156. 

4  But  the  provision  does  not  apply  to 
every  one  who  may  be  executor  de  son  tort: 
Currie  v.  Currie,  90  N.  C.  553. 

5  Bellows  v.  Goodall,  32  N.  H.  97 ; 
Gen.  L.  1881,  ch.  195,  §  15. 

6  See  cases  infra,  §  195,  as  to  the  lia- 
bility of  an  executor  de  son  tort  in  a  suit 
by  the  rightful  administrator. 


*424,  *  425  executors  de  son  tort.  §  196 

but  may  prove    in  mitigation  of  damages,  payments  made  by  him  in  the 
payments  of       rightful  course  of  administration,  because  it  is  no  detri- 

debts  in  miti-  °  .    .  . 

gation  of  ment  to  the  administrator  de  jure  that  such  payments 

damages.  were  made  by  the  executor  de  son  tort.1    But,  without 

statutory  authority  to  such  effect,  he  cannot  in  an  action  of  trover 
give  in  evidence  payment  of  debts  to  the  value  of  goods  still 
in  his  possession,  but  only  such  as  were  *  sold ; 2  and  such  [*  425] 
recoupment  is  only  allowed  if  the  assets  are  sufficient  to  pay 
all  the  debts  of  the  deceased,  because  otherwise  the  rightful  admin- 
istrator would  be  precluded  from  giving  preference  to  one  creditor 
over  another,  which  is  his  privilege  at  common  law,  and  from  retaining 
for  his  own  debt  in  priority  to  other  creditors  of  equal  degree ; 3  and 
where  neither  the  right  to  prefer  nor  that  of  retainer  exists,  as  in 
most  of  the  American  States,  he  would  be  prevented  from  paying  all 
of  the  creditors  their  just  dividends.4  And  he  cannot,  a  fortiori,  be 
allowed  for  debts  voluntarily  paid  in  a  State  where  such  voluntary 
payment  is  not  a  proper  credit  in  favor  _of  a  rightful  executor  or 
administrator.5 

An  executor  de  son  tort  who  has  used  the  assets  of  an  estate  in 
the  payment  of  debts,  and  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  those  who 
would  have  been  entitled  to  it  in  due  course  of  administration,  will 
be  protected  in  equity  against  the  suit  of  an  administrator  appointed 
subsequently,  because  the  appointment  of  an  administrator  under 
such  circumstances  is  a  useless  and  expensive  ceremony.6 

§  196.  Effect  of  the  Appointment  of  an  Executor  de  son  Tort 
upon  his  Previous  Tortious  Acts.  —  It  has  already  been  mentioned, 
that  the  grant  of  letters  to  an  executor  or  administrator  relates  back, 
so  as  to  legalize  all  previous  acts  within  the  authority  and  scope  of 
a  rightful  representative.7  This  doctrine  is  obviously  applicable  to 
the  acts  of  executors  de  son  tort  who  may  subsequently  obtain  a  grant 

ing  the  defendant  to  recoup  payments  in  8  Wms.  Ex.  [271],  citing  English  au- 

due  course  of  administration  in  mitigation  thorities. 

of  damages.  4  Neal  v.    Baker,  2   N.   H.  477,  478 ; 

1  Chapman,  C.  J.,  in  Carey  v.  Guillow,  Tohey  v.  Miller,  54  Me.  480,  483 ;  Collier 
105    Mass.    18,    21,    citing    Whitehall   v.  v.  Jones,  86  Ind.  342. 

Squire,    Carth.    103,  104;    Mountford   v.  6  Bryant  v.  Helton,  66  Ga.  477;  but  the 

Gibson,   supra;    Icely  v.  Grew,  6  Nev.   &  retention  of  the  property  for  the  support 

Man.  467,  469  note  (a) ;  see  also  Saam  v.  of  the  widow  and  family  is  a  good  defence  : 

Sinn,  4  Watts,  432  ;  Reagan  v.  Long,  21  Barron  v.  Burney,  38  Ga.  264,  268;  Cris- 

Ind.  264,  265;    Tobey  v.    Miller,  54  Me.  pin  v.  Winkleman,  57  Iowa,  523,  526. 
4«0,    4^'J  ;     Dorset*  V.   Frith,  25  Ga.  537,  6  Brown   v.   Walter,  58  Ala.   310,313, 

542  (otherwise  under  the  Code:  Barron  ?>.  citing  Vanderveer  v.  Alston,  16  Ala.  494, 

Burney,  38  Ga.  264,  268);  McConnell  v.  which  contains  a  review   of  the  history 

McConnell,  94    111.  295,  298;    Hostler  v.  of  administration   at   common    law    and 

Bcnll,  2  Ilavw.  179.  under  English  and  Alabama  statutes,  by 

2  Hardy  v.  Thomas,  23  Miss.  544,  546,  Chilton,  J. 

citing  Bulier's  Nisi  I'rius,  48;  Loinax,  Ex.  *  Ante,  §§  173,  184. 

363,  364. 

454 


§  197      VALIDITY   OF   TITLE  ACQUIRED    BY   AN   ALIENEE.     *  425,  *  426 

of  letters;  for  the   executor  who  was  not  qualified  to  Grant  of  letters 
act,  and  the  person  who  had  not  been  appointed  admin-  to  an  executor 
istrator,  were  equally  executors  de  son  tort  if  they  inter-  dates  his  pre- 
meddled.     The  intermediate  acts,  which  were  tortious  vious  actB- 
or  unlawful  for  the  want  of  competent  authority  before  appointment, 
become,  by  relation,  lawful  acts  of  administration,  for   which  the 
actor   must    account;    the    liability   to   account   involves    a 
[*  426]  validity  in  his  acts  which  is  a  protection  to  *  those  who  have 
dealt  with  him.1     So  if,  pendente  lite,  an  executor  de  son  tort 
obtains  administration,    he  may  retain  for  his  own  debt ; 2  and  to 
scire  facias  on  a  judgment  against  him,  or  to  an  action  in  assumpsit, 
plead  in  bar  that  he  has  taken  out  letters,  and  that  the  estate  is  insolv- 
ent.8   The  sale  of  property  or  payment  of  a  legacy  by  an  executor  de 
son  tort  becomes  valid  upon  probate  of  the  will,  or  subsequent  grant  of 
administration,4  and  is  binding  upon  the  lawful  representative.6 

It  is,  however,  to  be  observed  that  only  such  acts  of  the  executor 
de  son  tort  are  legalized  and  made  valid  by  the  subsequent  appoint- 
ment as  would  have  been  valid  had  he  been  the  rightful 
administrator ; 6   and  also  that  the   rights    of   innocent    areTnPvand  in*3 
parties  intervening  must  not  be  affected  by  the  applica-   a  rightful 
tion  of  the  doctrine  of  relation.7 

There  will  be  occasion  to  show,  hereafter,  that  one  who  has  made 
himself  liable  as  an  executor  de  son  tort  is  not,  for  that  reason,  dis- 
qualified to  be  appointed  administrator  of  the  estate. 

§  197.  Validity  of  the  Title  acquired  by  an  Alienee  from  an  Exec- 
utor de  son  Tort.  —  It  would  seem  to  result  from  the  doctrine 
holding^  the  lawful  acts  of  an  executor  de  son  tort  to  be    ,™    .       /. , 

&  The  bona  fide 

good,8  that  the  alienation  of  goods  by  him  for  the  pay-  alienee  of' an 

ment  of  debts  is  good  and  indefeasible.9     Mr.  Williams  ^Ttates 

gives  as  authority  the  statement  of  Lord  Holt,10  that  a  a  good  title  at 

legal  act  done  by  an  executor  de  son  tort  shall  bind  the  common  aw* 

1  Per  Colt,  J.,  in  Hatch  v.  Proctor,  102  ciple,  Whitehall  v.  Squire,  Holt,  45  ;  Witt 
Mass.  351,  354;  Magner  v.  Ryan,  19  Mo.  v.  Elmore,  2  Bail.  L.  R.  595;  Walker  v. 
196,200;  Priestc.  Watkins,  2  Hill  (N.Y.),  May,  2  Hill,  Ch.  22;  Filhour  v.  Gibson, 
225  ;  Clements  v.  Swain,  2  N.  H.  475,  476,  4  Ired.  Eq.  455,  460 ;  Alvord  v.  Marsh, 
and  authorities;  Emery  v.  Berry,  28  N.  H.  12  Allen,  603,  604. 

473,  484 ;  McClure  v.  People,  19  111.  App.  6  Ante,  §  187. 

105;  Rainwater  v.  Harris,  51  Ark.  401.  7  Napton,  J.,  in  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  54 

2  Wms.  [269],  citing  Pyne  v.  Woolland,     Mo.  213,  216. 

2  Ventr.    179,  180;     Williamson  v.  Nor-  8  As   announced  in    Coulter's  Case,  5 

witch,  Sty.  337  ;     Vaughan  v.  Browne,  2  Co.  30  b,  and  authorities  ante,  §§  94,  95. 

Stra.  1106.  9  Graysbrook  v.  Fox,  Plowd.  275,  282. 

8  Shillaber  v.  Wyman,  15  Mass.  322;  Otherwise  where  the  purchaser   is  not  a 

Olmsted  v.  Clark,  30  Conn.  108;  Andrew  creditor  of   the  estate,  or   does  not  take 

v.  Gallison,  15  Mass.  325,  note.  the  property  in  discharge  of   a  debt  due 

*  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  54  Mo.  213,  216 ;  him  by  decedent :  Rockwell  v.  Young,  60 

Pinkham  v.  Grant,  78  Me.  158.  Md.  563. 

6  Vroom  v.  Van  Home,  10  Pai.   549,  10  In  Parker  v.  Rett,  1  Ld.  Raym.  661  • 

558,  citing,  as  establishing  the  same  prin-  s.  c.  12  Mod.  471. 

455 


**  426-428       executors  de  son  tort.  s  193 

«> 

rightful  executor  and  alter  the  property.1  This  statement 
is  open  *to  the  objection  that  it  does  not  define  what  con-  [*427] 
stitutes  a  "  good  "  or  "  legal  "  act  by  an  executor  de  son  tort. 
Mr.  Williams  proceeds  to  show  that  only  such  acts  are  understood 
to  be  valid,  as  against  the  true  representative,  which  the  true  repre- 
sentative himself  would  have  been  bound  to  perform  in  the  course 
of  due  administration ; 2  and  that  it  must  have  been  done  by  one 
proved  to  have  been  acting  at  the  time  in  the  character  of  executor, 
—  not  a  mere  solitary  act  of  wrong,  in  the  very  instance  complained 
of,  by  one  taking  upon  himself  to  hand  over  the  goods  of  the  de- 
ceased to  a  creditor.8  This  principle  implies  that  payment  of  a  debt 
to  an  executor  de  son  tort,  not  acting  in  the  character  of  one  admin- 
istering the  estate,  is  no  protection  against  a  demand  for  the  same 
by  the  lawful  representative.4 

It  may  be  remarked  in  this  connection  that,  although  an  executor 
_  de  son  tort  is  protected  in  what  he  does  in  good  faith  in 

But  the  execu-  ■ 1  .    .  .  ° 

tor  de  son  tort     the  course  of  the  lawful  administration  of  an  estate  so 

rTlut^de-  ^ar  as  ^e  ^as  asse^s>  yet  ^e  acquires  no  demand  against 
mand  reim-  the  administrator  de  jure  for  any  disbursement  by  him 
bursement.  iu  excess  Qf  the  assetS-5 

§  198.  Application  of  the  Doctrine  in  America.  —  Distinguished 
American  writers  on  this  subject  have  expressed  their  disapprobation 
XT  .t        of  the  doctrine  of  liability  as  executor  de  son   tort  in 

No  necessity  •» 

for  the  doctrine  strong  terms,  and  intimate   that  it  meets  with 
Martin**    little*  favor  in  American  courts.6     There  can  [*  428] 
America.  De  no  doubt  that  in  many  of  the  American  States, 

1  The  reason   given  is,   that  creditors  taken  letters  of  administration,  she  is  not 

are  not  bound  to  seek  further  than  him  estopped  by  her  previous  act,  and  relying 

who  acts  as  executor.     Mr.  Williams  also  on  the  previous  case  of  Cullen  v.  O'Hara, 

cites   the  judgment   of  Le  Blanc,  J.,  in  4  Mich.   132;    Woolfork   v.   Sullivan,   23 

Mountford   v.   Gibson,  4   East,  441,  454,  Ala.  548,  555,  holding  that  the  vendee  of 

and   of    Littledale,   J.,   iu    Oxenham     v.  an  executrix  de  son  tort  takes  all  that  she 

Clapp,  1  B.  &  Ad.  313.  has,  —  the  possession,  —  and  that  he  can 

"  Buckley  v.  Barber,  6  Exch.  164,  183.  maintain  it  against  all  the  world  except 
Acts  which  would  be  invalid  if  done  by  the  rightful  administrator  in  a  suit ;  Wil- 
a  lawful  executor,  cannot  be  valid  when  son  v.  Hudson,  4  Harr.  168,  denying  that 
done  by  an  executor  de  son  tort :  Rock-  the  subsequent  appointment  of  the  exec- 
well  v.  Young,  60  Md.  563,  568.  utrix  de  son  tort  as  administratrix  gave 

8  Wins.  [272]  ;  Gilchrist,  J.,  in  Picker-  any  validity  to  her  former  act:    Mitchell 

ing  v.  Coleman,  12  N.   H.  148,  151,  hold-  v.  Kirk,  3  Sliced,  319,  in  which  an  admin- 

ing  that  in  such  case  the  rightful  admin-  istratrix  recovered  from  a  creditor  whom 

istrator  may  maintain  trover  against  the  she  herself  had  paid  before  appointment. 
vendee  ;  Carpenter  v.  Going,  20  Ala.  587,  4  Lee  v.  Chase,  58  Me.  432,  435,  citing 

.v.io,  holding  that  in   an  action  of  trover  Hunter  v.    Wallace,   13   Up.  Can.  Q.  B. 

by  the  rightful   administrator  the  vendee  385  ;  Bartlett  v.  Hyde,  3  Mo.  490. 
cannot  prove  in   mitigation   that  the  pur-  5  De  La   Guerra   v.  Packard,  17    Cal. 

chase-money  was  used  in  the  payment  of  182,192. 

debts;    Morton   V.   Preston,   18   Mich.  60,  >'•  3  Kedf.  on  Wills,  21, note  (6) ;  Schoul. 

71,  holding  that  in  nn  action  <>f  trover  by  Ex.,  §§  184,  187;    Horner,  Pr.  L.,  §  115; 

the  executrix   de  son    tort,  after   she   baa  ante,  §  188. 
456 


§  198        APPLICATION   OF   THE    DOCTRINE   IN   AMERICA.        *  428,  *  429 

in  which  the  common-law  system  of  the  administration  of  the  estates 
of  deceased  persons  has  been  entirely  done  away  with,  this  doctrine 
should  disappear  with  the  conditions  which  called  it  into  being.  There 
is  neither  occasion  nor  room  for  it  in  those  States  which  have  vested 
complete  jurisdiction  in  probate  courts  to  control  the  settlement  of 
estates  of  deceased  persons  :  where  the  title  to  the  personal  property 
remains  in  abeyance  until  an  executor  or  administrator  is  appointed 
by  the  court,  and  any  other  person  undertaking  to  interfere  with  it 
is  known  to  be  without  lawful  authority  to  do  so ;  where  creditors 
of  the  deceased  cannot  be  lawfully  satisfied  out  of  the  property  of 
the  estate  until  they  have  proved  their  claims  in  the  manner  pointed 
out  by  the  law ;  and  where  an  executor  or  an  administrator  can 
neither  prefer  a  creditor  nor  retain  for  his  own  debt.  It  is  quite 
apparent  that  in  such  States  it  would  be  irrational  to  apply  the 
doctrine  of  executor  de  son  tort  to  one  who  unlawfully  appropriates 
the  property  left  by  a  deceased  person,  and  thereby  renders  himself 
liable  as  a  wrongdoer  to  the  one  upon  whom  the  law  casts  the  title : 
which,  by  relation,  attaches  to  him  from  the  time  of  the  decedent's 
death.  No  one's  interest  would  be  subserved :  neither  that  of  the 
creditor,  —  for  he  has  a  safer,  simpler,  and  less  expensive  remedy 
against  a  lawful  administrator,  and  cannot  pretend  that  he  looked 
upon  the  intermeddler  as  rightfully  in  possession  ;  nor  that  of  the 
heir  or  distributee,  —  whose  safety  is  better  secured  by  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  competent  officer  of  the  court,  whose  duty  it  will  be  to 
recover  all  the  property  belonging  to  the  estate  and  dispose  of  it 
according  to  law  ;  nor  yet  that  of  the  intermeddler  himself,  whose 
wrongful  act,  instead  of  subjecting  him  to  intricate  complications, 
the  result  of  which  it  is  impossible  to  foresee,  will  simply  lead  to 
the  punishment  or  reparation  demanded  by  the  law. 

The  office  of  executor  de  son  tort  is  accordingly  abolished  in  New 

York,1  and  declared  by  the  courts  of  Arkansas,2  California,8 
[*  429]  *  Kansas,4  Missouri,5  Ohio,6  Oregon,7  and  Texas,8    And  it  .  abol_ 

to  be  repugnant  to  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the    ished  in  some 
law  of  these  States.9     In  other  States,  whose  adminis- 


of  the  States. 


i  Rev.  St.  p.  449,  §17.     Alluded  to  in  578,  affirmed  in  103  Mo.  339.     See   also 

Field  v.  Gibson,  20  Hun,  274,  276.  Richardson    v.    Dreyfuss,   64    Mo.   App. 

2  Barasien  v.  Odum,  17  Ark.  122,  127 ;  600. 

Rust  v.  Witherington,  17  Ark.  129.  6  Benjamin  v.  Le  Baron,  15  Oh.  517; 

8  Bowden  v.  Pierce,  73  Cal.  459,  463,  Dixon  v.  Cassell,  5  Oh.  533. 

affirmed  in   15  Pac.  R.  64.     The  authori-  ?  Rutherford  v.  Thompson,    14  Oreg. 

ties  relied  on  seem,  however,  to  contain  236,  239. 

mere  dicta.     See  Valencia  v.  Bernal,  26  8  Ansley  v.  Baker,  14  Tex.  607,  610; 

Cal.  328,  335  ;  Estate  of  Hamilton,  34  Cal.  Green  v.  Rugely,  23  Tex.  539. 

464,  468;   Pryor  v.  Downey,  50  Cal.  388,  9  Hanley,    J.,   in   Barasien    v.   Odum, 

400.  supra,  thus  quotes  from  Walker  v.  Byers, 

4  Fox  v.  Van  Norman,  11  Kans.  214,  14  Ark.  246,  252,  as  indicating  the  scope 

217.  of  probate    jurisdiction:    "The    probate 

'  Rozelle  v.  Harmon,  29  Mo.  App.  569,  court  is  intrusted  with  the  custody  of  es- 

467 


429 


EXECUTORS    DE   SON   TORT. 


198 


tration  laws  present  the  same  or  similar  features  as  those  above  men- 
tioned, neither  the  legislature  nor  courts  have  abolished  the  doctrine, 
at  least  not  in  express  terms ; 1  but  it  is  gradually  passing  out  of 
notice,  for  the  reason  that  it  meets  no  practical  want.4 

In  those  States,  however,  in  which  the  common-law  mode  of 
administration  is  still  more  or  less  adhered  to,  —  where,  for  instance, 
But  still  recog-  the  executor  has  power  to  act  before  qualifying,  and 
nized  in  others,  even  before  probate  of  the  will,  where  he  may  pay 
debts  not  proved  before  a  court  or  without  order  of  the  court,  where 
he  is  not  required  to  give  bond,  etc.,  —  the  doctrine  of  executor  de 
son  tort  is  a  natural  and  essential  element  of  their  law.  The  objec- 
tion urged  against  it  by  American  writers,  that  it  subjects  all  of  the 
assets  in  the  hands  of  a  wrongdoer  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  claim  of 
the  creditor  suing,  and  thus,  to  that  extent,  defeats  the  just  and 
equal  distribution,  is  equally  valid  against  the  executor  or  adminis- 
trator de  jure,  under  the  common  law,  who,  by  their  preference,  or 
liability  to  pay  the  creditors  in  the  order  in  which  they  bring  their 
actions,  likewise  defeat  a  "just  and  equal  distribution"  between 
them. 

In  Louisiana  the  common-law  doctrine  of  executor  de  son  tort  is 
not  in  force ;  but  by  statute  one  intermeddling  with  the  estate  of  a 
deceased  person  without  lawful  authority  is  liable  to  both  criminal 
and  civil  actions  ;  but  there  is  no  civil  liability  until  there  has  been 
conviction  in  a  criminal  prosecution.8 


tates  ;  and  that  tribunal  proceeds,  in  rem, 
to  adjust  the  rights  of  all  persons  inter- 
ested in  an  estate,  and  disposes  of  it  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  stat- 
ute ;  having  for  these  purposes  the  most 
summary  and  plenary  powers,  within  the 
scope  of  its  jurisdiction,  conferred  by  the 
constitution  and  statutes,  administering 
both  law  and  equity  within  this  scope,  ac- 


cording to  the  exigency  of  the  rights  to  be 
adjudicated  upon." 

1  The  States  in  which  the  doctrine  is 
recognized  as  still  existing  are  mentioned 
ante,  §  188. 

2  See  remarks  of  Philips,  J.,  in  Rozelle 
v.  Harmon,  29  Mo.  App.  569,  578. 

3  Walworth  v.  Ballard,  12  La.  An.  245  ; 
Carl  v.  Poelman,  12  La.  An.  344. 


4&8 


§  199  WHY   ADMINISTRATION   IS   NECESSARY.  *  430 


[*430]  *  CHAPTER   XXII. 

OP   THE   NECESSITY    OF   OFFICIAL   ADMINISTRATION. 

§  199.  Why  Administration  is  necessary.  —  The  necessity  of  offi- 
cial administration,  that  is  to  say,  of  obtaining  a  grant  of  letters  testa- 
mentary or  of  administration,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  the    ,,       .,     , 

.  .  P  -i-i-  e     Necessity  of 

judicial  sanction  of  payment  of  debts  and  legacies  out  of  administration 

the  estate  and  the  distribution  of  the  residue,  arises  out  ve'stln^of'mr-6 

of  the  common-law  doctrine  that  the  personal  property  sonai  estate  in 

of  a  decedent  descends  to  the  executor  or  administrator,  and^hriiabli- 

while  his  real  estate  descends  to  the  devisees  or  heirs,  ity  of  real  es- 

t 'iif  for  debts 

subject,  under  English  and  American  statutes,  to  the  pay- 
ment of  his  debts  and  legacies.  This  doctrine  is  recognized  substan- 
tially in  all  the  States,  except  Louisiana,  where,  under  circumstances 
pointed  out  by  law,  the  title  to  personal  as  well  as  real  property 
descends  directly  to  the  natural  or  instituted  heirs.  The  direct  con- 
sequence of  this  principle  of  the  law  is,  that  without  due  course  of 
administration  the  claims  of  creditors  cannot  be  lawfully  satisfied, 
and  neither  heirs  nor  legatees  can  obtain  a  legal  title  to  their  lega- 
cies or  distributive  shares ;  and  that  neither  devisees  nor  heirs  can 
hold  the  real  estate  to  which  they  succeed  free  from  the  claims  of 
creditors  of  the  deceased,  against  whom  limitation  does  not,  in  some 
States,  run  after  the  debtor's  death,  until  there  be  lawful  administra- 
tion of  his  estate.1  Another  consequence  is,  that  the  payment  of 
debts  to  the  deceased  can  be  coerced  by  no  one  but  the  lawfully 
appointed  executor  or  administrator,  even  in  equity,  because  there  is 
no  privity  between  the  debtors  and  any  person  other  Administrator 
than  the  legal  representative.2  He  stands  as  the  repre-  represents 
sentative  of  those  interested  in  the  devolution  of  the  the  estate 
personalty  of  the  deceased,  including  creditors  of  the    devolves. 

1  Post,  §  401.     Even  where  the  Statute  be  affirmed  with  certainty  that  they  do  not 

of  Limitations  is  recognized  as  barring  or-  exist  "  :   Brickell,  C.  J.,  in  Costephens  v. 

dinary  debts,  "  there  may  be  debts  existing  Dean,  69  Ala.  385,  389.     See  further  post, 

against  him  which  do  not  fall  within  the  §  202,  p.  *434,  note. 

bar  of  the  Statute  of  Limitations,  —  de-  2  "The  general  rule  in  a  court  of  equity 

faults  as  executor,  or  as  administrator,  or  is,  that  neither  creditors,  nor  distributees, 

in  some  other  fiduciary  capacity,  or  debts  nor  legatees,  can  maintain  a  bill  against 

payable  on  a  contingency,  the  contingency  debtors  of  an  estate,  to  subject  debts  they 

not  happening  on  which  they  are  payable  may  owe  to  the  satisfaction  of  their  de- 

until  a  very  recent  period.     He  had  the  mands " :  Dugger  v.  Tayloe,  60  Ala.  504, 

capacity  to  incur  such  debts,  and  it  cannot  517. 

459 


*  430,  *  431      NECESSITY   OF   OFFICIAL   ADMINISTRATION.  §  200 

estate  as  well  as  legatees  and  distributees ; 1  and  in  the  absence  of  fraud 
his  actions  within  the  sphere  of  his  duties  are  conclusive  and  binding- 
upon  them.2     The  peculiar  status  of  the  executor  de  son  tort 

*  which  at  common  law  follows  the  intermeddling  with  the  [*  431] 
estate  of  a  deceased  person  by  one  not  clothed  with  official 
authority  for  that  purpose,  and  which  has  been  considered  in  a  pre- 
ceding chapter,8  is  also  a  consequence  of  the  devolution  of  title  to 
personal  property  upon  the  executor  or  administrator,  excluding, 
until  administration  be  had,  even  the  distributee,  legatee,  and  credi- 
tor, and  forcing  upon  the  iutermeddler,  in  protection  of  the  interest 
of  creditors  and  distributees,  the  character  of  a  quasi  executor,  liable 
as  such  to  those  who  have  any  claims  against  the  estate. 

§  200.  Cases  holding  Administration  necessary.  —  The  question 
whether  administration  is  indispensable  or  not  is  of  frequent  occur- 
rence, and  the  decisions  arising  thereunder  are  very  numerous.  In  a 
practical  point  of  view  it  is  never  safe,  except  in  those 
pay  debts  or  cases  which  will  be  noticed  further  on,4  to  pay  the  debts 
dlS'dbum  with  °^  a  deceased  person  and  distribute  the  residuum  among 
out  grant  of  those  entitled  under  the  law,  without  complying  with 
letters.  ^e  s^a^u^e  demanding  the  appointment  of  an  executor 

or  administrator,  and  obtaining  the  judgment  of  the  probate  court 
upon  the  questions  arising  in  the  course  of  administra- 

fhatenek°herng  ^on*  ^  *s  ^e^  *n  vari°us  cases,  respectively,  that 
heirs  nor  lega-  neither  heirs  nor  legatees  can  sue  any  person  in  respect 
any  one  but  the  of  the  assets  of  an  estate  but  the  executor  or  adminis- 
executor  or  trator,  nor  legally  distribute  the  estate  among  themselves, 
a  minis  ra  or.  ^^  ^^  payment  of  a  debt  due  the  deceased  to  any  one 
but  a  legally  constituted  executor  or  administrator  will  not  protect 
the  debtor  against  the  demand  of  such  representative,  in  Alabama,5 
Arkansas,6     California,7     Colorado,8    Connecticut,9    Georgia,10    Kan- 

1  Morris  v.  Murphy,  95  Ga.  307  ;  per  ing  the  allowance  of  a  claim  against  the 
Hackney,  Ch.  J.,  in  Harter  v.  Sanger,  138  administrator  conclusive  against  legatees 
Ind.  161  ;  see,  also,  Glover  v.  Patten,  165  and  all  other  creditors)  :  Byrd  v.  Byrd, 
U.  S.  394,  402  ;  Cowen  v.  Means,  47  U.  S.  117  N.  C.  523  (holding  that  the  next  of 
App.  439  ;  s.  c.  78  Fed.  536.  kin  have  no  right  to  be  made  parties  to  a 

2  Morris  v.  Murphy,  95  Ga.  307  (hold-  suit  against  the  estate,  though  alleging 

8  Ante,  ch.  xxi.  and  personal,  goes  into  the  possession  of 

4  Post,  §  201.  the  administrator).     And  see   Estate  of 

5  The  decisions  in  this  State  are  very     Strong,  119  Cal.  663. 

numerous  on  this  point:  see  Costephens  8  Hall  v.  Cowles,  15  Colo.  393,  398. 

V.   Dean,  69  Ala.  885,  in  which   some   of  9  Taber    v.    Packwood,    1     Day,    150; 

them  are  cited.  Roorbach  v.  Lord,  4  Conn.  347,  349. 

'•  Flash  v.  Gresham,  86  Ark.  529,  531.  10  Scranton  v.  Demere,  6  Ga.  92.    But 

Payment   to  the  heirs  is  no  defence  to  an  after  an    adverse   possession    for  twenty 

action  by  the  administrator:   McCostian  years  or  more,  administration  will  be  pre- 

v.  Ramsey,  88  Ark.  141,  147.  sumed  to  protect  an  innocent  purchaser; 

7  Harwoodw.Marye,  8  CaL  580  (holding  Woodfolk  v.  Beatly,  18  Ga.  520. 
that  :ill  property  <>f  decedents,  both  real 
160 


§201 


EXCEPTIONS    PERMITTED    IN    SOME    STATES. 


432 


[*  432]  sas,1  Kentucky,2  Illinois,8  Indiana,4  Iowa,6  *  Maryland,6  Massa- 
chusetts,7 Mississippi,8  Missouri,9  Montana,10  Nebraska,11  New- 
Hampshire,12  New  York,13  North  Carolina,14  Ohio,16  Rhode  Island,16 
South  Carolina,17  Tennessee,18  Texas,19  Wisconsin,20  and  probably  in 
other  States. 

§  201.    Exceptions  permitted  in  some  States.  —  The  rights  of  credi- 
tors to  the  assets  of  a  deceased  person  is  the  principal  reason  for 


1  Cox  v.  Grubb,  47  Kans.  435,  holding 
a  contract  between  a  surviving  partner,  the 
widow  of  a  deceased  partner  leaving  minor 
children  and  individual  creditors,  for  the 
distribution  of  the  estate  without  admin- 
istration to  be  void,  as  against  public 
policy ;  Presbury  v.  Pickett,  1  Kans.  App. 
631,  denying  the  right  of  a  sole  heir  to  sue 
on  a  note  of  small  value  on  the  ground 
that  an  administrator  alone  can  sue. 

2  McChord  v.  Fisher,  13  B.  Mon.  193, 
195. 

8  Leamon  v.  McCubbin,  82  111.  263.  It 
is  held  in  this  State,  that  where  all  the 
debts  of  an  estate  have  been  paid,  and  the 
property  divided  among  the  heirs  pursuant 
to  a  written  agreement  entered  into  by 
them,  so  that  nothing  remained  for  an 
administrator  to  do,  the  appointment  of  an 
administrator  is  unnecessary  ;  and  if  one 
is  appointed,  the  court  will  not  require  the 
property  so  divided  to  be  delivered  to  him  : 
People  v.  Abbott,  105  111.  588;  but  that 
such  an  agreement  among  the  heirs  is 
revocable  by  them  or  any  of  them  before 
it  is  completely  executed,  and  that  the 
appointment  of  an  administrator  at  the 
instance  of  one  of  them  effected  such  revo- 
cation :  Patterson  v.  Patterson,  74  111.  App. 
321. 

4  Carr  v.  Huette,  73  Ind.  378,  citing 
i.  a.  The  Northwestern  Conference  v. 
Myers,  36  Ind.  375,  and  Leonard  v.  Blair, 
59  Ind.  510;  Bowen  v.  Stewart,  108  Ind. 
507,  516. 

5  Haynes  v.  Harris,  33  Iowa,  516;  fol- 
lowed in  Baird  v.  Brooks,  65  Iowa,  40, 
which  annouuces  the  rule  that  no  action 
can  be  maintained  by  the  heirs  on  a  prom- 
issory note,  so  long  as  the  time  fixed  by 


collusion  between  the  administrator  and 
creditor).  As  to  the  conclusiveness  of 
claims  allowed  against  the  estate,  see  post, 
§  392 ;  and  in  some  States  the  administra- 
tor or  executor  also  represents  the  owners 
of  the  real  estate,  and  his  actions  are  con- 


statute  within  which  letters  may  be  grant- 
ed has  not  expired. 

6  Hogthorp  v.  Hook,  1  Gill  &  J.  270, 
294. 

7  Pritchard  v.  Norwood,  155  Mass.  539; 
Lawrence  v.  Wright,  23  Pick.  128,  130; 
Hall  v.  Burgess,  5  Gray,  12,  16. 

8  Marshall  v.  King,  24  Miss.  85,  91, 
citing  Browning  v.  Watkins,  10  Sm.  &  M. 
482,  485. 

9  Craslin  v.  Baker,  8  Mo.  437 ;  Green 
v.  Tittman,  124  Mo.  372;  Hastings  v. 
Meyers,  21  Mo.  519  ;  Bartlett  v.  Hyde,  3 
Mo.  490  ;  State  v.  Moore,  18  Mo.  App.  406 ; 
McMillan  v.  Wacker,  57  Mo.  App.  220 ; 
Adey  v.  Adey,  58  Mo.  App.  408  ;  Jacobs 
v.  Maloney,  64  Mo.  App.  270. 

10  Higgins' Estate,  15  Mont.  474. 

11  Cox  v.  Yeazel,  49  Neb.  343. 

12  Tappan  v.  Tappan,  30  N.  H.  50,  68. 

13  Beecher  v.  Crouse,  19  Wend.  306. 

14  Whit  v.  Ray,  4  Ired.  L.  14;  Davidson 
v.  Potts,  7  Ired.  Eq.  272. 

15  Chappelear  v.  Martin,  45  Oh.  St.  126. 

16  Allen  v.  Simons,  1  Curt.  122. 

17  Bradford  v.  Felder,  2  McCord,  Ch. 
168,  169. 

18  Smiley  v.  Bell,  Mart.  &  Y.  378. 

19  Alexander  v.  Barfield,  6  Tex.  400, 
404.  Pending  an  administration  heirs 
cannot  sue,  save  where  it  is  shown  to  be 
necessary  for  their  protection  :  Lee  v.  Tur- 
ner, 71  Tex.  264  ;  Richardson  v.  Vaughn, 
86  Tex.  93.  But  a  grant  of  administra- 
tion after  a  great  lapse  of  time  should  be 
regarded  as  a  nullity,  unless  special  rea- 
sons existed  therefor:  Cochran  v. Thomp- 
son, 18  Tex.  652,655. 

20  Murphy  v.  Hanrahan,  50  Wis.  485, 
490. 


elusive  even  on  heirs  or  devisees :  see  on 
this  subject,  post,  §  337  ;  but  usually  judg- 
ments against  the  personal  representative 
are  not  binding  on  the  persons  to  whom 
the  real  estate  descends,  because  he  does 
not  represent  them  :  post,  §  466. 
461 


* 432,  * 433         NECESSITY   OF   OFFICIAL    ADMINISTRATION.  §201 

requiring  official  administration,  and  courts,  therefore,  sanction  the 
disposition  of  the  property  of  a  decedent  without  the  appointment  of 
. ,   .  .  x  an  administrator  where  it  is  certain  that  no  debts  are 

Administration  .  . 

held  unneces-     owing.     Ihus,  upon   the  death  ot  an  infant  intestate, 
Sfran infant111     administration  is  held  unnecessary,  because  an  infant  is 
presumed  not  to  have  incurred  any  liability ; 1   but  not 
so  in  the  case  of  the  death  of  a  married  woman; 2  or  adjudged  luna- 
tic;3 and  the  presumption  that  an  infant  has  incurred 
leaves  a  widow   no  liability  is  rebutted  where  he  was  married  and  leaves 
h'  ha\ll^es  on    a  widow,4  or  may  be  rebutted  by  proof  of  existing  lia- 
bilities ; 5  and  in  such  case  administration  is  necessary, 
notwithstanding  the  statutory  prohibition  of  administration  on  the 
estates  of  deceased  minors  who  were  under  guardianship. 

There  is  a  series  of  decisions  in  Alabama,  asserting  that,  when  an 
estate  is  entirely  free  from  debt,  the  distributees  may  in  equity 
obtain  distribution  without  the  delay  and  expense  of  administration;8 
In  some  States  ^ rom  which  Brickell,  C.  J.,  deduces  this  rule : 
equity  will  dis-  *  "  A  court  of  equity  will  dispense  with  an  [*  433] 
mkiistraHon  if  administration,  and  decree  distribution  directly, 
nothing  re-  when  it  affirmatively  appears  that,  if  there  was  an 
but  distribute  administrator,  the  only  duty  devolving  on  him  would  be 
the  estate.  distribution.     Then  administration    is   regarded   as    '  a 

useless  ceremony.'"7  Most  of  these  cases  expressly  emphasize 
that  they  constitute  exceptions  to  the  general  rule,  and  rest  upon 
analogy  with  the  doctrine  that  equity  will  interpose  where  there  is 
collusion  between  the  debtors  and  the  personal  representative ;  or 
where  he  is  insolvent  and  there  is  just  apprehension  of  loss  if  he  is 
permitted  to  collect  the  debts,  or,  as  was  said  by  Chancellor  Kent,8 
"  where  there  is  some  other  special  case  not  exactly  defined,"  9  and 
courts  of  equity  refuse  their  aid,  unless  the  case  very  clearly  shows 
that  an  administrator  would  be  superfluous.10     The  same  doctrine, 

1  Cobb  v.  Brown,  Speers  Eq.  564,  566  ;     administrator,  not  by  the  former  guardian  : 
Bethea  v.  McColl,  5  Ala.  308,  315  ;  Van-     Barrett  v.  Provincher,  39  Neb.  773. 

zant  v.  Morris,  25  Ala.  285,  295  ;  Lynch  v.  6  Trawick  v.  Davis,  85  Ala.  342  ;  Fret- 

Rotan,39  111.  14;  McCleary  v.  Menke,  109  well  v.  McLemore,  52  Ala.  124,  131, citing 

111.  294.     See  Woerncr  on  Guardianship,  earlier  Alabama  cases. 
§  100.  7  Fretvvell  v.  McLemore,  supra,  quoting 

2  Cobb  v.  Brown,  sujira  ;  Patterson  v.  the  last  phrase  from  the  earlier  Alabama 
High,  8  Ircl.  Eq.  52.  cases  cited. 

8  Woerner  on  Guardianship,  §  150.  8  In  Long  v.  Magestre,  1  John.  Ch.305. 

4  Norton   v.   Thompson,    68   Mo.    143,  9  See  Brickell,  C.  J.,  in  Costephens  v. 

146.  Dean,   69   Ala.   385,   388,   quoting    from 

6  George  v.  Dawson,  is  Mo.  407  ;    Al-  Dugger  v.  Tayloe,  60  Ala.  504. 
ford    >'.    Balbert,   7  1    Tex.    346,  354.      In  w  Marshall  v.  Gayle,  58  Ala.  284  ;  Hop- 
Kansas  administration  may  be  granted  on  kins   v.  Miller,  92  Ala.  513    (holding   an 
a  minor's  estate:    Wheeler  v.  St.  J.  Rail-  averment  that  the  plaintiffs  were  the  de- 
road,  31  Kans.  640;  City  v.  Trompeter,  53  cedent's  sole  heirs  at  law  insufficient,  be- 

Kaiis.  150.     An  action    for  i ey  due  a  cause  not  negativing  the  existence  of  other 

deceased  infant  can  only  be  brought  by  an  distributees  ;  and  cases  cited  under  §  200). 
462 


§201 


EXCEPTIONS   PERMITTED    IN   SOME   STATES.      *  433,  *  434 


holding  administration  unnecessary  when  there  are  no  debts  of  the 
estate,  but  only  distribution  to  be  made  to  those  entitled,  and  for  the 
same  reason,  is  applied  in  other  States ;  for  instance,  in  Arkansas,1 
Georgia,2  Indiana,8  Illinois,4  Kansas,5  Louisiana,6  Michigan,7  Min- 
nesota,8 Mississippi,9  Missouri,10  Nebraska,11  Nevada,12  New 
[*  434]  Hampshire,18  *  Pennsylvania, 14  Tennessee,15  Texas,16  Vermont,17 


1  Sanders  v.  Moore,  52  Ark.  376,  allow- 
ing the  heir  to  sue. 

2  Where  distribution  between  adult 
heirs  or  legatees  is  held  good,  at  least  in 
equity,  as  among  themselves  and  against 
strangers,  but  cannot  affect  the  rights  of 
creditors:  Amis  v.  Cameron,  55  Ga.  449, 
451,  citing  earlier  Georgia  cases. 

3  Kobertson  v.  Robertson,  120  Ind.  333, 
337  ;  Fimiegan  v.  Finnegau,  125  Ind.  262; 
Begien  v.  Freeman,  75  Ind.  398 ;  Holzman 
v.  Hibben,  100  Ind.  338  ;  Salter  v.  Salter, 
98  Ind.  522,  all  holding  that,  as  an  ex- 
ception to  the  general  rule,  the  heirs  may 
sue  for  a  debt  owing  to  the  decedent, 
if  he  left  no  debts  to  be  paid  and  there 
is  no  administration,  and  citing  earlier 
Indiana  cases. 

*  McCleary  v.  Menke,  109  111.  294. 

5  McLean  v.  Webster,  45  Ivans.  644,  al- 
lowing the  creditor  of  a  decedent,  with- 
out taking  out  administration,  to  subject 
real  estate  in  the  possession  of  the  heir  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  creditor's  debt,  there 
being  no  other  debts  against  the  estate. 
But  see  Presbury  v.  Pickett,  1  Kans.  App. 
631,  denying  the  right  of  a  sole  heir  of  an 
intestate  without  debts  to  maintain  suit 
on  a  note  due  decedent. 

6  Succession  of  Welch,  36  La.  An.  702  ; 
post,  §  203. 

7  Adult  heirs  having  agreed  upon  the 
settlement  of  an  estate,  there  being  no 
debts,  are  estopped  from  disturbing  it  by 
the  appointment  of  an  administrator: 
Needham  v.  Gillett,  39  Mich.  574;  Foote 
v.  Foote,  61  Mich.  181. 

8  A  bona  fide  payment  of  a  debt  due  an 
estate  made  to  a  sole  distributee,  there 
being  no  creditors  whose  rights  are  af 
fected,  will  operate  to  discharge  the  debtor 
from  liability  to  a  subsequently  appointed 
administrator :  Vail  v.  Anderson,  61  Minn. 
552. 

9  Voluntary  distribution  between  heirs 
capable  of  binding  themselves  is  valid  ; 
but  not  if  parties  are  interested  who  are 
incapable  of  assenting  to  the  distribution 


in  a  binding  manner:  Kilcrease  v.  Shelby, 
23  Miss.  161,  166.  It  is  well  settled  in 
Mississippi  that,  in  the  absence  of  admin- 
istration of  the  estate  of  a  decedent,  a 
court  of  chancery  will  decree  distribution 
among  the  heirs  :  Watson  v.  Byrd,  53 
Miss.  480,  483,  citing  earlier  Mississippi 
cases  ;  Ricks  v.  Hilliard,  45  Miss.  359,  363. 

10  The  Kansas  City  Court  of  Appeals  so 
held  in  McCracken  v.  Caslin,  50  Mo.  App. 
85.  This  decision  is  not  in  accordance 
with  the  other  Missouri  cases.  See  ante, 
§  200. 

11  Dictum  in  Cox  v.  Yeazel,  49  Neb. 
343. 

u  Wright  v.  Smith,  1 9  Nev.  143,  147. 

13  Equity  will  not  interfere  with  the 
voluntary  settlement  of  an  estate  by  adult 
heirs,  except  for  manifest  mistake,  fraud, 
or  misconduct  of  arbitrators,  or  other 
person  concerned  with  the  settlement: 
George  v.  Johnson,  45  N.  H.  456,  citing 
Hibbard  v.  Kent,  15  N.  H.  516,  519;  and 
it  seems  that  the  guardian  may  act  for 
the  ward  so  as  to  bind  him  :  Woodman  v. 
Rowe,  59  N.  H.  453. 

14  If  there  be  no  creditors,  the  heirs 
have  a  complete  equity  in  the  property, 
and  they  may  distribute  it  among  them- 
selves without  administration :  Walworth 
v.  Abel,  52  Pa.  St.  370,  372;  Weaver  v. 
Roth,  105  Pa.  St.  408, 413.  Or,  as  against 
a  mere  intruder,  they  may  maintain  tres- 
pass, trover  or  account  render  :  Roberts  v. 
Messenger,  134  Pa.  St.  298,  310. 

15  Hurt  v.  Fisher,  96  Tenn.  570;  Chris- 
tian v.  Clark,  10  Lea,  630,  638,  citing 
Brandon  v.  Mason,  1  Lea,  615.  But 
division  of  an  intestate's  property  without 
administration  is  not  encouraged  :  Crabb, 
J.,  in  Wright  v.  Wright,  Mart.  &  Y.  43. 

16  Patterson  v.  Allen,  50  Tex.  23,  25  ; 
Webster  v.  Willis,  56  Tex.  468;  North- 
craft  v.  Oliver,  74  Tex.  162. 

17  Taylor  v.  Phillips,  30  Vt.  238 ;  Bab- 
bitt v.  Bowen,  32  Vt.  437. 


463 


*434  NECESSITY   OF   OFFICIAL    ADMINISTRATION.  §  202 

N        .  and  Washington.1     It  is,  however,  difficult   to  perceive 

of  debts  not  how  it  can  be  determined  as  a  matter  of  law  that 
demonstrable.  there  are  no  debts  which  can  be  proved  against  a  de- 
cedent's estate,  before  the  period  allowed  for  proving  claims  has 
expired.2  The  effect  of  a  voluntary  distribution  among  those  entitled 
to  the  decedent's  estate  is  considered  in  connection  with  the  subject  of 
distribution.8  So  where  by  the  statute  administration  cannot  be 
granted  after  the  lapse  of  a  certain  period  of  time,  the  title  to  the 
property  of  the  decedent,  which  may  have  been  in  abeyance  during 
such  period,  vests  in  the  heirs,  so  that  they  may  maintain  an  action 
thereon,4  or  be  sued.5  Nor  will  administration  be  held  necessary  to 
enable  one  to  bring  a  suit  to  cancel  a  conveyance  of  real  estate,  or  to 
vacate  an  unauthorized  will.6  Where  there  is  an  administrator,  and 
the  heirs  or  parties  beneficially  entitled  thereto  are  in  possession  of 
personal  property,  the  administrator  will  not  be  allowed  to  recover  if 
it  appear  that  debts  are  all  paid.7  In  Connecticut  the  statute  pro- 
vides that,  if  all  parties  in  interest  are  capable  of  acting,  they  may 
distribute  the  estate  by  deed  recorded.  If  the  deed  is  not  executed 
and  recorded  as  provided  by  statute,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  preclude  a 
Administra-  regular  distribution  by  the  probate  court.8  It  will  be 
tion  in  small  shown  further  on,  that  in  some  States  administration  of 
estates  of  less  than  a  certain  value,  or  less  than  the 
amount  allowed  the  widow  or  children  absolutely,  is  dispensed 
with.9 

§  202.  Residuary  Legatees  and  "Widows  taking  Estates  'without 
Administration.  —  In  the  States  of  Maine,10  Maryland,11  Massachu- 
setts,12   Michigan,18    Minnesota,14    Nebraska,15    New    Hampshire,18 

1  Tucker  v.  Brown,  9  Wash.  357.  But  while  a  distributee  may  lawfully  take 

2  "  From  the  nature  of  the  case  the  prop-  and  hold  a  promissory  note  belonging  to 
osition  that  there  are  no  debts  provable  the  estate  of  an  intestate,  he  can  convey 
against  the  estate  of  a  deceased  person  is,  no  title  to  the  same  to  another,  as  against 
therefore,  a  negative  proposition,  which  is  an  administrator:  Pritchard  U.Norwood, 
not  susceptible  of  absolute  proof.  No  evi-  155  Mass.  539.  So  payment  to  one  named 
dence  which  could  be  offered  in  support  as  executrix  who  does  not  qualify,  but  dis- 
of  such  a  proposition  could  go  further  than  tributes  the  assets  as  they  would  have  gone 
to  reach  a  strung  degree  of  probability  :"  had  there  been  regular  administration,  is 
Powell  v.  Palmer,  45  Mo.  App.  236  :  and  a  defence  to  an  action  by  an  administrator 
see  also  the  dissenting  remarks  of  Bradley,  subsequently  appointed  :  Langley  v.  Farm- 
J.,  in  Blood  v.  Kane,  130  N.  Y.  514,  on  p.  ington,  66  N.  H.  431. 

522  ;   Higgiiis'  Estate,  15  Mont.  474.  8  Dickinson's  Appeal,  54  Conn.  224. 

*  Post,  §  566.  9  Post,  §  202,  p.  *436. 

4  Phinny    v.    Warren,   52    Iowa,    332,  10  Kev.  St.  1883.  p.  538,  §  10. 

384  ;  Murphy  v.  Murphy,  80  Iowa,  740.  n  Duvall  v.  Snowden,  7  Gill  &  J.  430. 

•'State    v.     Lewellyn,    25  Tex.    797;  12  Pub.  St.  1882,  ch.  129,  §§  6  et  seq.;  ch. 

Patterson  v.  Allen,  50  Tex.  23.  130,  §  8. 

6  Veal  V.  Fortson,  57  Tex.  482,  487.  18  How.  St.  1882,  §  5836. 

7  Abbott   v.  The    People,  10  111.   App.  «  Gen.  St.  Min.  1891,  §  5673. 
f/2,  r,:,,  citing  Lewis  r.    Lyons,  13  111.  117;  «  Cons.  St.  Neb.  1893,  §  1224. 
Woodhouse    v.    Phelps,  51    Conn.    521;  10  Publ.  St.  N.  II.  1891,  ch.  188,  §  13. 
Robinson  v.  Simmons,  146  Mass.  167,  181. 

464 


§202  TAKING   ESTATES   WITHOUT    ADMINISTRATION.      *  434,  *  435 


Ohio,1  Vermont,2  Wisconsin,8  and  Wyoming,4  it  is  pro-  6tates  in  whicb 
vided  that  when  the  person  nominated  in  the  will  as  exe-  sole  or  residu- 
cutor  is  also  the  residuary  legatee,  he  may,  at  his  option,   may  tfke^the 
instead  of  the  regular  administration  bond  required  of  estate  without 
executors,  give  bond  with  sufficient  sureties  conditioned  on  giving  bond 
that  he  will  pay  the  testator's  debts  and  legacies  (in-  t0  pay  debt8- 

eluding,  either  expressly  or  by  implication,  funeral  expenses 
[*  435]  and  the  allowances  to  *  the  widow  and  children),  and  will 

then  be  relieved  from  the  necessity  of  returning  an  inventory, 
or  further  accounting  in  the  probate  court.  An  executor  giving  such 
bond  at  once  becomes  liable  for  all  of  the  debts  of  the    D    A 

,,.,.,.  P  .  Bond  operates 

testator,  but  the  liability  of  the  estate  is  not  extin-  as  admission 
guished ; 6  and  it  operates  as  an  admission  of  sufficient  denTt^pay3" 
assets  and  a  guarantee  to  pay  all  debts,  since  the  exec-  a11  debts, 
utor  files  no  inventory  of  assets,  the  only  means  from  which  it  could 
be  ascertained  whether  they  equal  the  debts  and  legacies.6  The 
bond  cannot  be  surrendered  or  cancelled,  at  least  not  after  the  ex- 
piration of  the  time  within  which  the  law  requires  an  inventory  in 
ordinary  cases  to  be  filed ; 7    but  if  at   any  time   afterward  it  be 


1  Bates'  An.  St.  1897,  §  5997. 

2  Vt.  St.  1894,  §  2375. 

8  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  3795. 

4  Rev.  St.  Wyoming,  1887,  §  2239. 

5  It  was  once  held  in  Massachusetts 
(overruling  the  case  of  Gore  v.  Brazier,  3 
Mass.  523,  540)  that  by  the  giving  of  such 
bond  creditors  lost  their  liens  on  the  real 
or  personal  estate  which  the  executor 
may  have  conveyed  to  bona  fide  purchas- 
ers: Clarke  v.  Tufts,  5  Pick.  337,  340, 
Thompson  v.  Brown,  16  Mass.  172,  178; 
but  the  lien  of  creditors  on  the  testator's 
real  estate  is  expressly  preserved  by  Gen. 
St.  1860,  p.  485.  And  it  is  so  held  under 
the  statute  of  Michigan  in  Lafferty  v. 
People's  Bank,  76  Mich.  35,  46,  51.  This 
case  also  holds  that  the  bond  is  not  a  sub- 
stitute for  the  estate  of  the  deceased,  but 
is  cumulative,  p.  49  (citing  Collins  v.  Col- 
lins, 140  Mass.  502) ;  that  the  residuary 
legatee  cannot  be  sued  personally  (citing 
Jenkins  v.  Wood,  140  Mass.  66),  and  that 
in  selling  the  decedent's  real  estate  the 
act  must  be  his  official  act,  his  individual 
deed  conveying  only  his  individual  in- 
terest as  devisee,  without  discharging 
the  creditor's  lien,  p.  59.  From  this  de- 
cision Judges  Campbell  and  Sherwood 
dissent.  So  in  Kansas  it  is  said  that  "  the 
authorities  strongly  sustain  the  view  that 
an  action  on  the   bond   is  not   the   only 

VOL.    I. —30 


remedy  of  creditors  or  legatees,  and  that 
the  giving  of  such  bond  does  not  close  the 
administration,  nor  wholly  deprive  the 
probate  court  of  jurisdiction  over  the  ex- 
ecutor and  the  estate.  .  .  .  There  may  be 
some  reason  why  an  unliquidated  claim  or 
undetermined  legacy  should  be  presented 
to  the  probate  court  for  allowance ;  but 
there  is  no  necessity,  nor  any  good  pur- 
pose to  be  subserved  by  the  allowance  of 
the  probate  court  of  a  definite  and  fixed 
legacy  " :  Kreamer  v.  Kreamer,  52  Kans. 
597,  599.  It  is  held  that  suit  upon  such 
bond  must  be  brought  within  the  time 
limited  for  suits  against  executors  and 
administrators :  Jenkins  v.  Wood,  134 
Mass.  115. 

6  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Jones  v.  Richardson, 
5  Met.  (Mass.)  247,  249  ;  Conant  v.  Strat- 
ton,  107  Mass.  474,  483,  citing  Fay  v.  Tay- 
lor, 2  Gray,  154,  and  other  Massachusetts 
cases.  See  also  Colwell  v.  Alger,  5  Gray, 
67,  holding  that  the  giving  of  such  bond 
is  a  conclusive  admission  of  assets;  Du- 
vall  v.  Snowden,  7  Gill  &  J.  430;  Bat- 
chelder  v.  Russell,  10  N.  H.  39;  Tarbell 
v.  Whiting,  5  N.  H.  63  ;  Buell  v.  Dickey, 
9  Neb.  285,  293.  See  also  Jenkins  v. 
Wood,   144  Mass.    238. 

7  Alger  v.  Colwell,  2  Gray,  404  ;  Hathe« 
way  v.  Weeks,  34  Mich.  237,  245  ;  Pro- 
bate Judge  v.  Abbott,  50  Mich.  278,  284. 

465 


*  435,  *  436       NECESSITY   OF   OFFICIAL   ADMINISTRATION.  §  202 

deemed  insufficient  the  executor  may  be  ordered  to  give  additional 
bond,  and  removed  for  failure  to  comply  with  such  order.1  Where 
a  widow  gives  such  bond  as  executrix  and  residuary  legatee,  it  is  not 
avoided  by  her  failure  to  inform  the  judge,  as  required  by  the  statute, 
of  her  acceptance  of  the  provisions  of  the  will.2  The  court  may  hear 
evidence  to  determine  whether  a  legacy  be  residuary,  and,  if  it 
appears  that  there  is  no  other  property  undisposed  of,  a  bond  may 
be  given  to  pay  debts  and  legacies.3  And  in  Wisconsin  it  is  held  that 
the  mere  ordering,  receiving,  and  approving  of  the  bond  does  not 
vest  the  title  in  the  executor  unless  the  court  judicially  determine, 
upon  due  notice  and  opportunity  for  hearing  those  interested,  that 
the  executor  is  residuary  legatee  ;  and  the  notice  of  the  probate  of 
the  will  is  not  such  notice  as  is  required.4  Such  residuary  legatee 
can  sell  the  realty  without  an  order  of  the  probate 
estate* real  court.5  In  Alabama  a  sole  legatee  who  is  named  exec- 
utor in  the  will,  but  who  fails  to  qualify  as  such,  can- 
not maintain  an  action  as  the  real  person  in  interest  to  recover  on  a 
note  in  favor  of  the  decedent,  when  it  does  not  affirmatively  appear 
that  there  are  no  debts.6 

*  It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  simple  designation  in  the  [*  436] 
will  of  a  person  as  residuary  legatee  and  executor  does  not 
authorize  him  to  collect  demands  of  his  testator ;  an  appointment  as 
executor  by  the  probate  court  is  necessary.7 

In  Texas  the  statute  provides  that  a  testator  may  provide  in  his 
will  that  "  no  other  action  shall  be  had  in  the  county  court,  in  relation 
St  er-      ^°  ^ie  settlement  of  his  estate,  than  the  probating  and 

mitting  letters  recording  of  his  will,  and  the  return  of  an  inventory 
bv  testamen-  anc*  appraisement  and  list  of  claims  of  his  estate ;  "  8 
tary  provi-  and  if  the  will  does  not  dispose  of  the  whole  estate,  the 
executor  may  account  in  the  county  court,  and  pray  for 
distribution,  as  in  other  cases.9  It  is  there  held,  that  if  the  will 
provides  for  distribution  or  partition,  the  county  court  has  no  juris- 
diction to  adjudicate  thereon.10  So  by  the  statutes  of  Washington 
it  is  provided  that  if  a  testator  provide  the  manner  in  which  the 
estate  shall  be  settled,  and  that  no  letters  shall  be  required,  such 

1  And  after  the  removal  no  judgment  6  Lafferty  v.  People's  Bank,  76  Mich. 

can  he  rendered  against  him  in  an  action  35,  48.     In  Wisconsin  it  is  left  an  open 

previously   brought    against    him    in    his  cmestion  whether  the  statutory  residuary 

representative  character  on  a  debt  of  the  "legatee"  may  be  held  to  include  "de- 

testator:  National    Hank  v.  Stanton,  116  visee  "  :  Jones  v.  Roberts,  supra. 
M;t.s  435,  6  Wood  v.  Cosby,  76  Ala.  557. 

-  Heydockv.  Duncan,  48  N.H.  95,101.         7  Tappan    v.  Tappan,   30  N.  H.  50; 

3  Morgan  v.  Dodge,  44  X.  II.  ii.r>5,  263.  Lafferty  v.   People's  Bank,  76  Mich.  35, 

In  this  case  Bell,  ft  J.,  strongly  discour-  49. 

ages  the  giving  of  Bnch  bonds,  "as  many  8  Sayles'  Tex.  Civ.  St.  1897,  art.  1995. 

persons   have  been   ruined"   thereby:   p.  9  lb.,  art.  2001. 

262.  10  Lumpkin  v.  Smith,  62  Tex.  249. 

*  Jones  '••  Roberts,  84  Wis.  465. 
4CC 


§202 


TAKING   ESTATES   WITHOUT   ADMINISTRATION. 


436 


estate  may  be  settled  without  the  intervention  of  the  court,  in  ac- 
cordance with  such  will.1  A  similar  provision  exists  in  Arizona.2 
In  Georgia  the  statute  permits  the  widow,  when  she  is  sole  heir, 
upon  payment  of  her  intestate  husband's  debts,  to  take  possession 
of  his  estate  without  administration,  and  sue  for  and  recover  the 
same,8  while  in  Maryland  it  is  provided  that  on  the  death  of  a  mar- 
ried woman  intestate,  leaving  a  husband  but  no  descendants,  he  is 
entitled  to  the  personalty  without  administration  unless  she  is 
liable  for  debts  owing  by  her,  but  the  title  is  suspended  until  the 
probate  court  orders  that  it  shall  pass.4 

Provision  is  made  by  statute  in  some  of  the  States  that,  where 
the  property  of  an  estate  does  not  exceed  in  value  the  amount  which 
is  secured  to  the  widow  or  minor  orphans  for  their  im- 
mediate support,  the  probate  court  may  dispense  with    traUon'is'ne- 
ad ministration,  and  authorize  the  widow,  or  minor  chil-    cessary  for 
dren  by  next  friend,  to  collect  and  appropriate  to  their    ceeding  the 
own  use  all  such  property.5     The  soundness  of  the  prin-   amount  ai- 

.  i  ■   i  i  •    •  ii         lowed  to  the 

ciple  upon  which  such  provisions   rest,   or   rather   the    widow  or 
absurdity   of   a   contrary   view,    is   self-evident.      Why   ™r'"uor      ~ 
should  the  law  compel  administration  where  there  is 
nothing  to  administer  ?     The  appointment  of  an   administrator  in 
such  case  could  have  no  possible  effect  but  to  diminish  or  eat  up 
what  the  law  intends  for  the  support  of  widows  and  orphans.     It  is 
held  in  Louisiana,  that  administration   is  not  necessary  if  the  prop- 
erty of  an  estate  is  of  less  value  than  the  expense  of  administration.6 
And  in  Maine  administration  cannot  be  had  on  the  estate  of  an  in- 
testate whose  estate  is  not  worth  at  least  twenty  dollars,  or  owing 
debts  of  that  amount  and  having  realty  of  that  value.7     If  the  prop- 
erty of  the  deceased  debtor  exceed  in  value  the  amount  of  exemption 
in  favor  of  the  widow  and  minor  children,  administration  may  be 
ordered  by  the  probate  court,8  or  the  creditor  may  maintain  a  bill  in 


1  Provided  the  executor  accept  and 
faithfully  administer  the  trust :  Wash. 
Rev.  1891,  §  955.  The  power  of  the 
trustees  is  derived  from  the  will,  and  so 
long  as  they  faithfully  comply  with  its 
provisions  their  acts  cannot  be  called  in 
question  by  any  court :  Newport  v.  New- 
port, 5  Wash.  114. 

2  Rev.  St.  1887,  §  1266. 

3  Acts  1882-3,  p.  47.  Under  this  stat- 
ute a  pending  action  agaiust  the  deceased 
for  libel  is  not  such  a  "  debt "  which, 
being  unpaid,  would  prevent  its  applica- 
tion ;  the  widow,  without  administration, 
may  be  brought  in  to  defend  it,  she  being 
a  quasi  "  personal  representative  "  :  Mc- 
Elhaney  v.  Crawford,  96  Ga.  174. 


*  Dickhaut  v.  State,  85  Md.  451. 

5  Rev.  St.  Mo.  §  2 ;  Pace  u.  Oppenheim, 
12  Ind.  533  ;  Clark  v.  Fleming,  4  S.  E.  R. 
12.  Similar  provisions  exist  j.  a.  in  Ala- 
bama (Howie  v.  Edwards,  113  Ala.  187), 
Arkansas,  California  (and  the  statute  ap- 
plies to  separate  estate  of  deceased  wife; 
Leslie's  Estate,  118  Cal.  72),  Georgia, 
Illinois,  and  Oregon.  And  in  many  States 
administration  is  dispensed  with  when,  on 
the  return  of  the  inventory,  it  appear  that 
the  estate  is  less  than  a  given  amount : 
see  ante,  §  83,  p.  *  172. 

6  Soubiran  v.  Rivollet,  4  La.  An.  328. 

7  Danby  v.  Dawes,  81  Me.  30. 

8  Rev.  St.  Mo.  1889,  §  2. 

467 


*  436,  *  437      NECESSITY   OF    OFFICIAL   ADMINISTRATION.  §  203 

equity  to  subject  the  excess  held  by  the  widow  or  minor  children  to 
the  satisfaction  of  his  debt.1 

§  203.  Administration  in  Louisiana.  —  The  descent  of  property  is 
not  governed  by  the  same  rule  in  Louisiana  as  in  the  other  States, 
but   is  modelled  after    the   law   prevalent  on  the   continent 

*  of  Europe.  Property,  personal  as  well  as  real,  may  there  [*  437] 
pass  directly  to  the  heir,  without  any  official  intervention 
whatever.  Heirs  are  described  as  of  three  kinds :  testamentary,  or 
instituted  heirs  ;  legal  heirs,  or  heirs  of  the  blood ;  and  irregular 
heirs.  They  may,  as  above  suggested,  take  directly  and  absolutely, 
and  in  such  case  become  liable  out  of  their  own  property  for  all 
debts  of  the  decedent,  in  like  manner  as  the  suus  hceres,  or  the 
hceres  necessarius,  under  the  ancient  Eoman  law ; 2  or  they  may 
renounce  the  succession,  in  which  case  they  are  not  liable  for  any 
of  the  debts,  nor  entitled  to  any  of  the  property  of  the  estate  ;  or  they 
may  claim  benefit  of  inventory,  when  an  administrator  is  appointed 
to  manage  the  estate,  pay  its  debts,  and  distribute  the  surplus.8 
Minors  can  only  take  with  benefit  of  inventory,  hence  partition 
between  them  and  adults  can  only  be  made  upon  the  appointment  of 
an  administrator; 4  but  where  a  succession  is  not  in  debt,  the  tutrix 
of  the  minor  children  may  recover  the  property  of  the  succession, 
and  give  valid  acquittances  therefor,  without  administration.5  A 
beneficiary  heir  does  not  represent  the  estate,  and  cannot  be  sued  by 
a  creditor  of  the  succession.6  Where  a  legatee  dies  before  the  tes- 
tator, and  the  latter  leaves  no  debts  to  be  paid,  the  appointment  of 
an  executor  becomes  inoperative ; 7  and  an  administrator  will  not  be 
appointed  unless  there  be  an  absolute  necessity  for  it.8  But  a  judg- 
ment creditor  of  an  estate  can  sustain  no  petitory  action  against  one 
alleged  to  be  in  possession  of  property  belonging  to  the  succession 
when  there  is  no  administrator.9 

1  Cameron  v.  Cameron,  82  Ala.  392,  5  Martin  v.  Dupre',  supra;  Succession 
395.  of  Sutton,  20  La.  An.  150. 

2  Ante,  §  170.  6  State  v.  Leckie,  14  La.  An.  S41. 

3  Code  La.  tit.  "  Successions."  7  Succession  of  Dupuy,  4  La.  An.  570. 

4  Dees  v.  Tildon,  2  La.  An.  412;  Sue-  8  Allemau  v.  Bergeron,  16  La.  An. 
cession  of  Duclolange,    1    La.  An.    181  ;  191. 

Martin  v.  Dupre,  1  La.  An.  239.  9  Louaillier  v.  Castille,  14  La.  An.  777. 


4G8 


[*438] 


*PART   SECOND. 


OF  THE  INDUCTION  TO  THE  OFFICE  OF  EXECUTOR  AND 
ADMINISTRATOR. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

OP  THE    PRELIMINARIES    TO    THE   GRANT    OF   LETTERS    TESTAMENTARY 
AND   OF   ADMINISTRATION. 


Local  courts  in 
England  au- 
thorized toj 
grant  letters 
testamentary 
and  of  admin- 
istration. 


§  204.  Local  Jurisdiction  to  grant  Letters  Testamentary  and  of 
Administration.  —  Whatever  may  have  been  the  law  in  ancient  times, 
it  is  certain  that  at  the  time  of  the  passing  of  the  Court 
of  Probate  Act,1  the  ecclesiastical  court  was,  in  England, 
the  only  court  in  which  the  validity  of  wills  of  person- 
alty, or  of  any  testamentary  paper  whatever  relating  to 
personalty,  could  be  established  or  disputed,  except  cer- 
tain courts  baron.2  In  the  United  States  this  jurisdic- 
tion, and  the  power  to  appoint  executors  and  administrators,  are 
vested  in  probate  courts,  or  courts  having  probate  powers,  by  what- 
ever name  known.8 

It  is  unimportant  to  consider,  in  this  connection,  the  rules  by  which 
the  local  jurisdiction  of  testamentary  courts  was  determined  in  Eng- 
land, previous  to  the  enactment  of  the  statute  of  20  &  21  Vict. 
[*  439]  c.  77,  or  the  doctrine  of  bona  notabilia  affecting  this  *  juris- 
diction.4    The  rule  in  America  is  universal,  that    court  of  pro- 
administration  may  be  granted  in  any  State  or  Territory    b.ate  jurisdic- 

,  ,     .    .    .         ,  ,  „         ,  t     tion  of  the 

where  unadmmistered  personal  property  of  a  deceased  county  or  dis- 

person  is  found,  or  real  property  subject  to  the  claim  of  aomiduuim 

any  creditor  of  the  deceased;  and  that  probate  of  the  of  death  grants 
will  of  any  deceased  person  may  be  granted  in  any  State 
where  he  leaves  personal  or  real  property. 


letters. 


1  20  &  21  Vict.  c.  77. 

2  Wms.  [288].  An  interesting  account 
of  the  ecclesiastical  courts  having  tes- 
tamentary jurisdiction  in  England  is 
given  in  Foster's  "  Doctors'  Commons, 
its  Courts  and  Registries,"  published  in 
London,  1871.  It  is  there  said  that  prior 
to  the  year  1858  there  were  372  such 
courts,  whose  several  names  and  num- 
bers are  thus    stated  :    "  Provincial  and 


Diocesan  Courts,  36  ;  Courts  of  Bishops' 
Commissaries,  14;  Archidiaconal  Courts, 
37  ;  "  of  Peculiar  Jurisdictions  :  "  Roy- 
al, 11  ;  Archiepiscopal  and  Episcopal, 
14 ;  Decanal,  Subdecanal,  etc.,  44 ;  Pre- 
bendal,  88 ;  Rectorial  and  Vicarial,  63 ; 
other  Peculiars,  17;  Courts  of  Lords  of 
Manors,  48  ;  =  372."     See  also  ante,  §  137. 

8  Ante,  §§  140,  142. 

4  Ante,  §  139 ;  post,  §  205. 

469 


*439 


PRELIMINARIES    TO    GRANT    OP    LETTERS. 


204 


Without  re- 
gard to  place 
of  death  or 
situs  of  prop- 
erty. 


Jurisdiction 
depending  on 
residence  of 
the  deceased 
in  the  county, 


As  between  the  several  courts  within  the  same  State  or  sovereignty, 
jurisdiction  attaches  primarily  to  that  tribunal  which  is 
invested  with  probate  powers  for  the  county  or  territo- 
rial district  which  includes  the  domicil  of  the  testator  or 
intestate  at  the  time  of  his  death,  without  regard  to  the 
place  of  his  death  or  situs  of  his  property.1 
To  grant  letters  on  the  estate  of  a  deceased  person  the  probate 
court  must  find  as  a  fact,  and  thus  judicially  determine,  that  the 
deceased  had  his  domicil  in  the  county  or  territorial 
district  over  which  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  extends 
(or,  if  a  non-resident  of  the  State,  that  he  left  property 
there),  for  otherwise  the  court  would  have  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  grant  letters,  or  take  probate  of  a  will.  It  was 
formerly  held  in  many  States,  that  notwithstanding  this  finding  and 
adjudication  by  the  court,  proof  might  be  made  in  a  collateral  pro- 
ceeding showing  that  such  finding  and  adjudication  was  erroneous, 
and  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  decedent  was  at  the  time  of  his  death 
domiciled  in  a  different  county ;  and  that  in  such  case  the  grant  of 
letters  was  void  ab  initio  for  the  want  of  jurisdiction.2  But  the  more 
reasonable  doctrine  is  gaining  ground,  and  is  now  held 
ally  assailable,  in  nearly  all  the  States,  that  letters  so  granted,  while 
they  are  voidable  when  properly  assailed,  are  valid  until 
revoked  in  a  direct  proceeding.3  In  the  following,  and  probably 
other  States,  letters  testamentary  and  of  administration  are  held  to 
be  unimpeachable  collaterally  on  this  ground;  viz.:  in  Alabama,4 
California,5  District  of  Columbia,6  Georgia,7  Louisiana,8  Maine,9 
Massachusetts,10  Mississippi,11  Missouri,12  Montana,13  Nebraska,14 
New  York,15  Oregon,16  Tennessee,17  and  Texas.18  It  is  so  provided 
by  statute  in  England 19  and  in  some  of  the  American  States.20     But 


1  McBain  v.  Wimbish,  27  Ga.  259,  261  ; 
Johnson  v.  Beazley,  65  Mo.  250;  Mc- 
Campbell  v.  Gilbert,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  592; 
Su  'cession  of  Williamson,  3  La.  An.  261  ; 
Holyoke  v.  Raskins,  5  Pick.  20;  Wilson 
v.  Frazier,  2  Humph.  ."30. 

2  See  ante,  §  145,  in  connection  with 
the  subject  of  the  conclusiveness  of  judg- 
ments of  probate  courts. 

8  Sec  post,  §  274,  treating  of  the  con- 
sequences of  revoking  letters  testamentary 
and  of  administral  ion. 

1  Coltarl  v.  Allen,  40  Ala.  155;  Kliug 
V.  Council,  105  Ala.  590. 

6  //,  re  Griffith,  84  Cal.  107,  110. 

''  Railroad  Co.  v.  Gorman,  7  Dist.  Col. 
App.  91,  107. 

7  Tanl  v.  Wigfall,  65  Ga.  412. 

"  Dnson  v.  Dupre',  32    La.   An.  896; 

Garrett  v.    Boling,  .'57  U.  8.  App.  42. 
470 


9  Record  v.  Howard,  58  Me.  225. 

10  McFeeley  v.  Scott,  128  Mass.  16. 

11  Ames  v.  Williams,  72  Miss.  760,  dis 
cussing  the  point  on  principle,  p.  771. 

12  Johnson  v.  Beazley,  65  Mo.  250,  and 
subsequent  cases. 

13  Ryan  v.  Kinney,  2  Mont.  254. 

14  Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Bradley,  51 
Neb.  596,  607 ;  Bradley  v.  Missouri  P.  R. 
Co.,  51  Neb.  653. 

i5  Bolton  v.  Shriever,  135  N.  Y.  65. 
10  Holmes  r.Oregon  R.  R.,  7  Sawy.880. 
17  Eller  v.    Richardson,  89  Tenn.   575, 
579. 

J8  Lyne  v.  Sanford,  82  Tex.  58,  62. 

19  20  &  21  Vict.  c.  77,  §  77. 

20  Massachusetts:  Publ.  St.  1882,  ch. 
132,  §  15;  McFeeley  v.  Scott,  128  Mass. 
16;  Maine  (incorporating  the  Massa- 
chusetts statute)  :    Record  v.  Howard,    58 


§205 


ESTATES   OF    DECEASED    NON-RESIDENTS. 


439,  *  440 


Jurisdiction 
not  lost  by 
change  of 
territory. 


in  Rhode  Island  the  old  rule,  holding  letters  issued  in  a  county  in 
which  the  deceased  was  not  domiciled  at  the  time  of  his  death,  void 
and  collaterally  assailable,  was  announced  in  a  comparatively  recent 
case.1  So  in  Kentucky  2  and  Connecticut.3  In  Montana  a  similar 
view  is  intimated,  but  not  decided.4 

Jurisdiction  once  attaching  is  not  lost  by  a  change  of  the  territorial 
limits  or  boundaries  of  the  county  or  district  after  the 
death  of  the  testator  or  intestate ; 5  but  upon  a  proper 
representation  the  court  before  which  proceedings  are 
pending  may,  it  seems,  by  its  order  to  transfer  the  pro- 
ceedings, confer  jurisdiction  upon  the  court  in  the  new  county  or 
district.6 

If  the  deceased  had,  at  the  time  of  his  death,  no  fixed   Jurisdiction  in 

-I   •         V  county  where 

place  of  residence,  letters  may  be  granted  in  the  county  deceased  resi- 
where  he  died ;  or  if  he  died  abroad,  in  any  county  where  ( 
his  property  may  be  found ;  and  if  he  left  property  in 
more  than  one  county,  then  in  any  of  them.7  It  is 
obvious,  however,  that  there  can  be  but  one  grant  of 
administration  on  the  same  estate  in  the  same  sov- 
ereignty or  State ;  and  since  the  jurisdiction  which  has 

once  attached  remains  until  final  completion  of  the    granted  in  any 
[*  440]   administration,  the  court  first  exercising  *  juris-    terTcan  be 

diction  will  retain  it  to  the  exclusion  of  every    granted  in  any 
other  court  in  the  State.8  same  State. 

§  205.    Jurisdiction    over  the  Estates   of   Deceased    Non-residents. 
—  No  administration  can  be  granted  in  the  case  of  a  deceased  non- 


had  no  fixed 
domicil; 
or  if  he  died 
abroad,  in  any 
county  where 
he  left  prop- 
erty. 
But  if  once 


Me.  225,  commending  the  change  in  the 
law. 

1  People's  Savings  Bank  v.  Wilcox,  15 
R.  I.  258. 

2  Miller  v.  Swan,  91  Ky.  36,  38. 

3  Olmstead's  Appeal,  43  Conn.  110. 

4  The  majority  of  the  court  deciding 
that  the  evidence  did  not  warrant  a  find- 
ing that  the  decedent  resided  in  a  county 
different  from  that  in  which  the  adminis- 
trator was  appointed :  State  v.  Benton, 
12  Mont.  66,  74. 

6  Thus,  if  after  the  death  of  the  intes- 
tate that  portion  of  the  county  in  which 
he  resided  at  the  time  of  his  death  is 
erected  into  a  new  county,  or  attached  to 
another  county,  the  probate  court  of  the 
old  county  still  retains  its  jurisdiction : 
Estate  of  Harlan,  24  Cal.  182,  187  ;  Page 
v.  Bartlett,  101  Ala.  143  ;  Jones  v.  Roun- 
tree,  96  Ga.  230 ;  McBain  v.  Wimbish,  27 
Ga.  259, 261 ;  Bugbee  v.  Surrogate,  2  Cow. 


471  ;    Lindsay  v.    McCormack,    2    A.  K. 
Marsh.  229. 

6  Knight  v.  Knight,  27  Ga.  633,  636. 
And  the  legislature,  in  some  States,  may 
by  special  act  confer  such  jurisdiction  : 
Wright  v.  Mare,  50  Ala.  549. 

7  Leake  v.  Gilchrist,  2  Dev.  L.  73.  In 
Mississippi  an  appointment  was  sustained 
in  a  county  where  the  greater  part  of  the 
personal  property  of  the  decedent  was 
situated,  although  his  domicil  was  in  an- 
other county  in  the  same  State  :  Weaver 
v.  Norwood,  59  Miss.  665. 

8  People  v.  White,  11  111.  341  ;  Wat- 
kins  v.  Adams,  32  Miss.  333 ;  Ex  parte 
Lyons,  2  Leigh,  761  ;  Ramey  v.  Green, 
18  Ala.  771,  774  ;  Pawling  v.  Speed,  5  T.  B. 
Mon.  580 ;  Seymour  v.  Seymour,  4  Johns. 
Ch.  409;  Chow  v.  Brockway,  21  Oreg. 
440;  Estate  of  Scott,  15  Cal.  220;  In  re 
Griffith,  84  Cal.  107, 1 10  ;  Hewitt's  Appeal, 
58  Conn.  223  ;  Gregory  v.  Ellis,  82  N.  G 
225 ;  Slinger's  Will,  72  Wis.  22. 

471 


♦440 


PRELIMINARIES   TO    GRANT    OF   LETTERS. 


§  205 


resident,  unless  he  left  property  within  the  jurisdiction 
be°granted  on  of  the  court  making  the  appointment ;  letters  granted  in 
the  death  of  a     violation   of  this  rule  are  void.1     A  claim  for  damages 

non-resident  -i     i  -i  -i 

unless  there  be    prosecuted  for  the  benefit  of  the  widow  and  children  or 

Pdniien[ster°  nex*  °^  ^in  *s  ne^  *n  Kansas  n°t  to  constitute  assets ; 
and  letters  granted  on  the  estate  of  a  non-resident  hav- 
ing no  other  assets  in  the  State  are  held  void.2  So  in  Indiana 8  and 
in  Kentucky  it  was  held  by  the  Federal  Circuit  Court  that  such  right 
of  recovery  constituted  no  assets  upon  which  administration  could  be 
granted  in  Kentucky  on  the  estate  of  a  deceased  non-resident,  although 
if  recovery  be  had,  it  would,  under  the  statutes  of  Kentucky,  form 
part  of  the  decedent's  personal  estate,  and  be  liable  to  the  payment 
of  his  debts,  and  go  to  the  distributees  like  other  property  of  the 
decedent.4  A  different  conclusion  is  reached  in  other  States,  where 
"  the  fact  that  the  statute  gives  such  a  right  of  action  to  the  personal 
representative,  and  to  him  alone,  implies  the  right  to  appoint,  if 
necessary,  an  administrator  to  enforce  it ; " 6  and  "  where  there  is 
property  or  a  fund  or  right  of  action  which  cannot  otherwise  be  made 
available,  it  is  competent  for  the  probate  court  to  appoint  an  adminis- 
trator for  the  sole  purpose  of  collecting  and  receiving  assets  which 
will  not  be  general  assets  of  the  estate  of  his  intestate  or  liable  for 
his  debts,  but  which  will  belong  to  particular  persons  who  by  law  or 
by  contract  with  the  deceased  will  be  entitled  thereto."  6  In  such 
case,  it  is  for  the  probate  court  to  determine  whether  there  is  an 
apparent  claim,  a  bona  fide  intention  to  pursue  it,  and  that  adminis- 
tration is  necessary  to  its  pursuit.7  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  probate 
court  to  appoint  under  such  circumstances  seems  to  admit  of  no 
doubt ;  for  if  the  right  to  bring  the  action  is  given  to  no  one  but  an 
administrator,  the  refusal  to  appoint  one  would  render  the  statute 
giving  the  remedy  nugatory. 


i  Miller  v.  Jones,  26  Ala.  247  ;  Jeffer- 
sonville  It.  R.  v.  Swayne,  26  Ind.  477  ; 
Thumb  v.  Gresham,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  306; 
Blewit  v.  Nicholson,  2  Fla.  200 ;  Goodrich 
v.  Pendleton,  4  John.  Ch.  549  ;  Christy  v. 
Vest,  36  Iowa,  285 ;  Miltenberger  v.  Knox, 
21  La.  An.  399 ;  Patillo  v.  Barksdale,  22 
Ga.  356 ;  King  v.  U.  S.,  27  Ct.  CI.  529. 

2  Perry  v.  St.  Joseph  R.  R.,  29  Kans. 
420. 

8  Jeffersonville  R.  R.  v.  Swayne,  26 
Ind.  477,  486. 

4  Marvin  v.  Maysville  R.  R.,  49  Fed. 
R.  43C.  But  see  later  Kentucky  case 
infra. 

•'•  1 1 nt <  -hins  v.  St.  Paul  R.  R.,  44  Minn. 
f>  ;  Brown  v.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.,  97  Ky.  228,  232 
Findley  v.  Chicago  R.  R.,  106  Mich,  too 

Morris  r.  Chicago  It.  It.,  65  Iowa,  7li7.  728 
472 


Missouri  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Bradley,  51  Neb. 
596,  600  (this  case  sustains  by  a  unani- 
mous decision  the  doctrine  above  stated, 
as  to  the  power  to  grant  administration, 
though  the  proceeds  would  not  constitute 
assets  in  the  general  sense ;  but  on  the 
question  whether  the  death  of  a  non-resi- 
dent from  an  injury  caused  by  the  negli- 
gence of  railroad  employees  authorizes  the 
court  of  the  county  wherein  the  accident 
happened,  to  grant  letters,  three  commis- 
sioners and  one  of  the  judges  dissent). 

0  Sargent  v.  Sargent,  168  Mass.  420, 
424.  Such  is  the  case  where  the  fund  is 
a  gratuity  paid  by  the  United  States 
Government :  post,  §  306. 

7  Hartford  R.  It.  v.  Andrews,  36  Conn. 
213. 


§  205  ESTATES   OF   DECEASED    NON-RESIDENTS.         *  440,  *  441 

Where  property  of  a  deceased  non-resident  is  found   within  the 
State,  the  court  of  the  county  in  which  it,  or  a  part  of  it,   may  be 
situated,  will  grant  administration  at  the  request  of  any  person  being 
interested.1     In  England  the  property  of  a  non-resident  sufficient  to 
authorize  a  grant  of  administration  was  called  bona  nota- 
bilia ;   this  term  is  not   technically   applicable   in   the   jj&^m>to" 
United  States,  but  writers  and  judges  find  it  convenient 
to  use  it  in  speaking  of  the  jurisdiction  conferred  by  the  several  kinds 
of  property  for  the  purposes  of  administration.    "  Personal  property," 
says  Judge  Cooper  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Mississippi,  "  whether  of 
a  tangible  or  an  intangible  character,  is  considered  as  located,  for  the 
purposes  of  administration,  in  the  territory  of  that  State  whose  laws 
must  furnish  the  remedies  for  its  reduction  to  possession."  2    At  com- 
mon  law,  says  Phelps,  J.,3  the  site  of  administration    Debtg 
in  respect  of  debts  due  a  deceased  person  never  followed 
the  residence  of   the  creditor.     "  They   are   always   bona  notabilia, 

unless  they  happen  to  fall  within  the  jurisdiction  where    T  . 

.  ,     ,        i    ,  7  ,  ...  Judgments. 

he   resided.     Judgments   are  bona  notabilia  where   the 

record  is ;    specialties  where   they   are   at  the  time   of  the 
[*  441"]  *  creditor's  decease  ;  and  simple  contract  debts    (  . 

where  the  debtor  resides."  4  Thus,  it  is  held  contract  debts. 
that  the  court  of  a  county  in  which  the  deceased  non- 
resident had  obtained  a  judgment  is  competent  to  hear  proof  of  his 
will,  and  grant  letters  thereon ; 5  or  where  an  action  will  lie  against 
the  decedent  to  set  aside  a  conveyance  in  fraud  of  his  creditors ; 6  or 
where  his  debtor  resides.7  So  the  place  where  a  life  insurance  com- 
pany has  an  office  and  an  agent  upon  whom  process  may  be  served 
is  the  situs  of  property  so  as  to  support  administration  ,.f  insurance 
on  the  estate  of  the  assured,  although  domiciled  in  an-  polity,  gov- 
other  State  at  the  time  of  his  death,  if  the  policy  of  ernment  debt 
insurance  was  located  in  the  State  granting  the  letters ; 8  and  if  suit 

1  Bowles  v.  Rouse,  8  111.  409,  422;  Murphy  v.  Creighton,  45  Iowa,  179; 
Sprayberry  v.  Culberson,  32  Ga.  299;  Sullivan  v.  Fosdick,  10  Hun,  173,  180; 
Hyman  v.  Gaskins,  5  Ired.  L.  267  ;  Spen-  Swancy  v.  Scott,  9  Humph.  327 ;  Wyman 
cer  v.  Wolfe,  49  Neb.  8.  v.  Halstead,  109  U.  S.  654.     See,  as  to  the 

2  Speed  v.  Kelly,  59  Miss.  47,  51.  situs  of  debts,  post,  §  309. 

8  In  Vaughn  v.  Barret,  5  Vt.  333,  337.  8  New  England  Co.  v.  Woodworth,  111 

To  same  effect,  Bell,  J.,  in  Taylor  v.  Bar-  U.  S.  138,  145  ;   N.  Y.  Life  Insurance  Co. 

ron,   35   N.    H.   484,  494;    Thompson   v.  v.  Smith,  67  Fed.  (C.  C.  A.)  694;  Shields 

Wilson,  2  N.  H.  291  ;  Emery  v.  Hildreth,  r.  Ins.  Co.,  119  N.  C.  380.     See,  however, 

2  Gray,  228,  230  ;  and  see  cases  cited  post,  contra,   Moise  v.  Life  Association,  45  La. 

§  309,  where  this  subject  is  further  treated.  An.  736.      An   interest  in  an  insurance 

4  See  cases  cited  post,  §  309.  policy  payable  upon  the  death  of  another 

6  Thomas  v.  Tanner,  6  T.  B.  Mon.  52,  constitutes  assets  and  will  authorize  the 

58.  grant  of  letters  in  the  county  where  the 

6  Bowdoin  v.  Holland,   10   Cush.    17;  policy  is :    Johnston    v.    Smith,  25   Hun, 

Nugent's  Estate,  77  Mich.  500.  171,  176. 


7  Stearns  v.   Wright,   51    N.   H.    600; 


473 


*441         PRELIMINARIES  TO  GRANT  OP  LETTERS.         §  205 

be  instituted  on  the  policy,  and  subsequently  letters  be  granted  to  an 
administratrix  in  the  State  where  the  company  has  its  home  office, 
the  principle  of  comity  between  States  calls  for  the  refusal  on  the 
part  of  the  courts  of  the  latter  State  to  entertain  jurisdiction  of  a 
second  suit  for  the  same  indebtedness.1  Debts  due  from  the  govern- 
ment may  be  collected  by  the  domiciliary  administrator  in  any  State 
where  the  government  chooses  to  pay ; 2  and  such  claims  are  not 
located  at  the  seat  of  government  so  as  to  be  local  assets  sufficient 
alone  to  support  a  grant  of  letters  on  the  estate  of  a  non-resident 
decedent.3 

The  cause  of  action  against  a  debtor  must  be  one  which  is  enforce- 
able against  him  ; 4  but  if  it  be  a  bona  fide  claim,  the  administra- 
tion will  not  be  avoided,  though  it  prove,  ultimately,  to  be  invalid.5 

Negotiable  promissory  notes,  bonds  payable  to  the  bearer, 
docks'  ^claim's    or  evidences  of  debt  to  which  the  title  passes  by  manual 

delivery  or  simple  indorsement,  are  bona  notabilia  in  any 
State  where  they  may  be  found  ;  but  the  debtor's  residence  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  confer  title  upon  the  ancillary  administrator  unless  they  come 
actually  into  his  hands.6  Shares  of  stock  of  a  railroad  corporation 
are  bona  notabilia  in  the  county  where  the  stock-books  are  kept, 
transfers  made,  and  dividends  paid ; 7  shares  of  stock  in  a  private 
corporation  where  its  place  of  business  is.8     And  a  note  secured  by 

mortgage,  where  the  property  is  situated  out  of  which 

payment  may  be  enforced.9    The  situs  of  real  estate  con- 


Real  estate. 


1  Sulz  v.  M.  Association,  145  N.  Y.  administration  was  granted  in  the  State 
563.  where   the   corporation   and   the   legatee 

2  See  cases  cited  in  §  309.  resided. 

8  King  v.  U.  S.,  27  Ct.  CI.  529  ;  Coit's  9  Clark  v.  Black ington,  110  Mass.  369, 

Estate,  3  D.  C.  Ct.  App.  246.  373  ;   Willard  v.  Wood,  1  Ct.  App.  D.  C. 

4  A  right  of  action  whicli  is  local  to  the  44,  62.  It  is  held  in  Kansas  that  on  the 
State  creating  it  will  not  support  the  grant  death  of  the  owner  of  a  note  secured  by 
of  administration  in  another  State:  Illi-  real  estate  in  another  State,  the  title  to 
nois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cragin,  71  111.  the  note  vests  in  the  domiciliary  adminis- 
177.  trator,  who  may  sue  for  the  foreclosure  of 

5  Sullivan  v.  Fosdick,  10  Hun,  173;  the  mortgage  in  the  State  where  the  land 
Holyoke  v.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.,  22  lies  (a  foreign  administrator  having  au- 
Hun,  75.  thority  to  sue  there),  on  the  ground  that 

6  Goodlett  v.  Anderson,  7  Lea,  286,  the  mortgage  is  a  mere  security,  and  inci- 
289 ;  Shakespeare  v.  Fidelity  Co.,  97  Pa.  dent  to  the  note  :  Eells  v.  Holder,  2  Mc- 
St  i::i,  177;  Beers  v.  Shannon,  73  N.  Y.  Crary,  622.  But  the  ancillary  administra- 
292,  298  ;  Moure  v.  .Ionian,  36  Kans.  271.  tor  lias  not  the  title  to  the  property,  and 

7  Arnold  v.  Arnold,  62  Ga.  627,  637.  hence  cannot  sue  in  another  State  where 

8  Winter  v.  London,  99  Ala.  268.  But  the  land  is  situate:  Moore  v.  Jordan,  36 
the  rights  of  a  legatee  of  stock,  though  Kans.  271.  In  Minnesota  it  is  held  that  a 
living  in  tin-  State  of  the  corporation,  are  foreign  administrator  may  foreclose  a 
determined  by  the  laws  of  the  testator's  mortgage  of  lands  in  that  State,  where 
foreign  domiciL  to  which  he  must  look  for  the  mortgage  is  to  the  decedent,  his  ex- 
their  enforcement :  Russell  v.  Hooker,  67  editors,  administrators,  etc.,  the  exercise 
Conn.  24,  holding  such  stock  to  be  assets  of  such  power  resting  on  contract:  Hol- 
at  th<-  testator's  domicil,  though  ancillary  combe  v.  Richards,  38  Minn.  38.     So  it  is 

•174 


§206  WHAT    CONSTITUTES   DOMICTL   OR   RESIDENCE.      *  441,  *  442 

fers  jurisdiction  to  take  probate  of  a  will  affecting  it,  and 
[*  442]  in  consequence  thereof  to  grant  letters  testamentary  or  *  of 
administration,1  without  reference  to  the  deceased  owner's 
domicil. 

Property  brought  into  the  State  for  collusive  purposes,  or  tem- 
porarily, after  the  owner's  death,  does  not  confer  jurisdiction  to  grant 
administration  thereon  ; 2  but  if  a  debtor  voluntarily  come  to  another 
State,  although  after  the  creditor's  death,  administration  may  be 
had  in  such  State  at  the  instance  of  creditors  or  other  persons  in- 
terested.3 

§206.    "What  constitutes  Domicil  or  Residence.  —  It  is   not  always 
easy  to  prove  what  was  the  domicil  or  place  of  residence  of  a  person 
at  the  time  of  his  death,  so  as  to  fix  the  jurisdiction  over 
his  estate  in  the  proper  forum.     It  has  been  defined  as    domk'n.°n  ° 
being,  in  the  common-law   sense,  the  place  where  one 
has  his  true,  fixed  and  permanent  home  and  principal  establishment, 
to  which  whenever  he  is  absent  he  has  the  intention  of  returning.4 
When  once  acquired,  it  continues  until  by  free  choice 
another  is  substituted  therefor.     Hence  there  can  be  no    abandoned  by- 
abandonment  or  acquisition  of  a  domicil  by  one  who  is    ?ne.nots"J 

.  juris; 

adjudicated  of  unsound  mind,5  or  by  one  not  sxii  juris  ; 

the  domicil  of  the  child  follows  that  of  its  parents,  and  the  domicil 

of  the  wife  follows  that  of  her  husband.6    Absence  from  ... 

nor  without 

the  domicil,  and  residence  elsewhere  for  reasons  of  health,    concurrence  of 
comfort,  business,   recreation,    temporary   convenience,    fac^of^ja^ 
and   the  like,7  do  not  constitute  or  indicate   an  aban-   donment. 

said  in  Mississippi  that  a  note  secured  on  4  Price  v.  Price,  156  Pa.  617  ;  Thorn- 
land  in  that  State  is  not  within  the  statute  dike  v.  Boston,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  242,  245  ; 
requiring  personal  property  to  be  dis-  Gilman  v.  Gilman,  52  Me.  165;  Story, 
tributed  under  its  own  laws,  if  the  raort-  Confl.  L.,  §§  39  et  seq.  The  place  of  resi- 
gage  and  note  are  found  at  the  foreign  deuce  is  prima  facie  a  man's  domicil: 
domicil  of  the  intestate,  who  has  no  credi-  Graveley  v.  Graveley,  25  S.  C.  1,  17.  "A 
tors,  heirs,  or  property  there  :  Speed  v.  person  domiciled  in  Missouri  may  spend 
Kelly,  59  Miss.  47.  the  greater  part  of  a  year,  or  series  of  years 

1  Apperson  v.  Bolton,  29  Ark.  418,437,  at  another  place,  without  thereby  forfeit- 
citing  Clark  v.  Holt,  16  Ark.  257,  265;  ing  his  domicil":  In  re  Walker,  1  Mo. 
Prescott  v.  Durfee,  131  Mass.  477;  Rosen-  App.  404. 

thai  v.  Renick,  44  111.  202, 207  ;  Sheldon  v.  5  As  to  the  domicil  of  persons  of  un- 

Rice,  30  Mich.  296,  302  ;  Bishop  v.  Lalou-  sound  mind,  see  "Woerner  on  Guardianship, 

ette,  67  Ala.  197,  200;   Lees  v.  Wetmore,  §  206,  showing  also  where  the  domicil  of 

58  Iowa,  170,  179.     In  Alabama  it  is  held  the  non  compos  may  be  changed  with  the 

that  the  death  of  an  alien  dying  abroad,  guardian's  consent. 

and  leaving  land  only  in  Alabama,  will  up-  6  By  her  marriage  a  woman  eo  instanti 

hold  the  jurisdiction  of  the  probate  court  acquires  the  domicil  of  her  husband,  which 

of  the  county  where  the  land  lies,  to  grant  is  in  nowise  affected  by  the  fact  that  she 

letters  :  Nicrosi  v.  Guily,  85  Ala.  365.  dies  shortly  thereafter,  and  before  going 

2  Christy  v.  Vest,  36  Iowa,  285 ;  Varner  to  the  State  of  his  domicil :  McPherson  v. 
v.  Bevil,  17  Ala.  286.  McPherson,  70  Mo.  App.  330. 

3  Pinney  v.  McGregory,  102  Mass.  186,  7  The  Supreme  Court  of  "Washington 
189  ;  Fox  v.  Carr,  16  Hun,  434,  437.  seems  unwilling  to  recognize  the  distinc- 

475 


*  442,  *  443   PRELIMINARIES  TO  GRANT  OP  LETTERS. 


§  206 


donment  of  the  doinicil.     To  work  a  change  of  domicil,  there  must 
be  a  concurrence  of  the  intention  to  acquire  a  new  domicil 
with  the  fact  of  having  *  acquired  one  and  abandoned  the  [*  443] 
former  one,  without  the  intention  of  returning  thereto.1 

Where  one  dies  while  in  the  act  of  moving  with  his  family  from 
one  State  to  another,  with  the  intention  of  acquiring  a  new  domicil 
in  the  State  of  their  destination,  and  after  his  death  the 
family  continue  their  journey  with  the  property  of  the 
estate,  it  was  held  that  letters  of  administration  may 
well  be  granted  in  the  place  of  destination  where  the 
family  located.2  It  is  suggested  by  Mr.  Schouler  that 
the  status  of  distribution  and  of  testacy  should  be  rather  according 
to  the  law  of  the  domicil  he  left,  as  the  true  locus  of  a  last  domicil.8 

In  New  York  the  property  of  a  deceased  Indian  of  the  Six  Nations 
is  not  subject  to  administration  by  the  State  authorities,  and  letters 
Domicil  of  granted  are  void ; 4  but  in  Alabama  the  appointment  of 
Indians.  an  administrator  on  the  estate  of  an  Indian,  who  died 


Domicil  of  one 
dying  in  tran- 
sit from  one 
State  to 
another. 


tion  between  domicil  and  residence  made 
in  the  text  as  affecting  the  local  jurisdic- 
tion of  courts  in  granting  administration : 
State  v.  Superior  Court,  11  Wash.  Ill, 
115.  The  difficulty  arises  out  of  the  use 
of  the  word  "permanent"  in  connection 
with  residence.  "  None  of  the  cases  so 
cited  in  any  manner  distinguish  as  be- 
tween permanent  residence  and  domicil," 
says  the  distinguished  judge  rendering  the 
opinion,  which  is,  so  far  as  these  words 
have  any  bearing  upon  the  subject  under 
consideration,  accurately  true.  But  the 
distinction  made  in  the  text,  and  in  the 
cases  cited,  and  in  numerous  other  cases, 
is  between  domicil  and  temporary  resi- 
dence. See  the  definition  of  "  domicil " 
in  Black's  Law  Dictionary  and  other  text- 
books. See  also  Woerner  on  Guardian- 
ship, §  26. 

1  Schoul.  Ex.,  §  21,  citing  Udny  v. 
Udnv,  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  Sc.  451,  458 ;  Story, 
Conn.  L.,  §  45  ;  Wilbraham  v.  Ludlow,  9!) 
Mass.  587;  Haldane  v.  Eckford,  L.  K.  8 
lv|  631,  640;  Colt,  J.,  in  Hallet  v.  Bas- 
sett,  100  Mass.  167,  170.  "The  mere  in- 
tention to  change  the  domicil,  without  an 
actual  removal  with  the  intention  of  re- 
maining, docs  not  cause  a  loss  of  the  domi- 
cil "  :  Slate  v.  Ballett,  8  Ala.  159,  161; 
George  v.  Wataon,  19  Tex.  354;  Walker 
v.  Walker,  1  Mo.  App.  404,  413;  Chal- 
mers v.  Wingfield,  L.  If.  36  Ch.  D,  400; 
Price  '■  Price,  156  Pa,  St.  617;  Fidelity 
,  ,    Pri   ton,  96  Ky.  277. 

476 


2  "  Inasmuch,  however,  as  this  property 
was  in  transitu  when  he  died,  and  after- 
wards reached  its  destination,  and  as  many 
inconveniences  would  result  from  the  ab- 
sence of  power  in  our  county  courts  to 
regulate  its  administration,  it  should  be 
regarded  as  being  at  the  time  of  his  death 
constructively  in  this  State,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances here  presented ;  solely,  how- 
ever, for  the  purpose  of  enabling  a 
county  court  in  this  State  to  grant  admin- 
istration thereon  "  :  Burnett  v  Meadows, 
7  B.  Mon.  277.  See  White  v.  Tenant,  31 
W.  Va.  790,  792,  and  authorities  cited. 

3  The  case  cited  by  him  does  not  sup- 
port the  doctrine  of  his  text,  because  no 
administration  was  granted  in  State  v. 
Hallett,  8  Ala.  159;  but  see  Embry  v. 
Millar,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  300,  cited  in  Bur- 
nett v.  Meadows,  supra,  as  indicating  such 
a  view.  In  White  v.  Tenant,  31  W.  Va. 
790,  it  is  held  that  where  one  left  his  resi- 
dence in  West  Virginia,  and  with  his 
family  moved  to  Pennsylvania,  intending 
to  reside  there,  the  latter  is  his  place  of 
domicil,  although  next  day  he  returned  to 
his  former  home,  and  was  detained  there 
by  sickness  until  his  death. 

4  Because  the  "  Six  Nations "  are 
treated  as  a  nation  with  sovereign  power 
in  some  respects :  Dole  v.  Irish,  2  Barb. 
639;  see  also  United  States  v.  Payne,  4 
Dillon,  387,  and  cases  cited. 


207 


PROOF  OF  DEATH. 


*  443,  *  444 


before  his  nation  became  subject  to  the  laws  of  the  State,  by  the 
orphan's  court  of  the  county  in  which  property  left  by  him  was 
afterward  found,  was  held  valid; *  while  in  California  it  was  held 
that  probate  courts  have  no  jurisdiction  over  the  estate  of  a  person 
who  died  before  the  adoption  of  the  State  constitution.2 

§  207.  Proof  of  Death.  —  The  death  of  the  testator  whose  will  is 
to  be  proved,  or  of  the  intestate  whose  estate  is  asked  to  be 
[*  444]  *  subjected  to  administration,  is  a  question  of  fact 
of  which  proof  must  be  made  before  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  court  attaches.  Ordinarily,  the  death  of  a 
person  leaving  property  for  administration  is  a  matter  of 
such  notoriety  that  proof  is  of  easy  access  among  the 
neighbors,  relatives,  and  persons  interested  in  the  estate. 
the  testator  or  intestate  was  domiciled  abroad,  or  died  away  from 
home  in  a  remote  country  direct  proof  is  not  always  attainable;  and 
death  must  in  such  cases  be  established  by  circumstantial  evidence, 
the  most  usual  of  which  is  such  person's  prolonged  and  unexplained 
absence  from  home  without  being  heard  from.  When  such  absence 
from  home 8  has  continued  for  above  seven  years,4  within 
which  time  no  intelligence  of  his  existence  has  reached 
his  relatives,  friends,  or  acquaintances,  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed that  he  is  dead,5  and  proof  of  these  circumstances, 
unrebutted,  will  support  the  adjudication  of  the  probate 


Death  of  testa- 
tor or  intes- 
tate must  be 
proved  before 
court  has 
jurisdiction. 

But  where 


Presumption 
of  death  arises 
after  absence 
for  seven  years 
without  being 
heard  from. 


1  Brashear  v.  Williams,  10  Ala.  630. 

2  Downer  v.  Smith,  24  Cal.  114;  Hardy 
v.  Harbin,  4  Sawy.  536. 

3  That  is,  from  an  established  place  of 
residence;  for  no  presumption  arises  out 
of  absence  from  any  other  place  :  Stinch- 
fiekl  v.  Emerson,  52  Me.  465 ;  Spurr  v. 
Trimble,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  278,  279.  See 
also  Francis  v.  Francis,  180  Pa.  St.  644. 

4  The  mere  absence  without  being  heard 
from  for  any  period  short  of  seven  years 
does  not  raise  the  presumption  of  death  : 
Newman  v.  Jenkins,  10  Pick.  515  ;  Donald- 
sou  v.  Lewis,  7  Mo.  App.  403,  408.  And 
even  when  the  absence  is  for  more  than 
seven  years,  the  attending  circumstances 
may  be  such  as  to  make  the  presumption 
unreasonable :  Dickens  v.  Miller,  12  Mo. 
App.  408,  413.  Where  a  statute  provides 
that  the  presumption  shall  arise  after  an 
absence  from  the  State  for  a  certain  time, 
it  is  held  not  to  exclude  all  presumptive 
evidence  of  death  where  it  does  not  appear 
that  the  party  left  the  State  :  so  held  in 
Bank  of  Louisville  v.  Board,  83  Ky.  219, 
230 ;  see,  as  to  the  construction  of  a  simi- 
lar statute,  Dickens  v.  Miller,  supi-a  ;  and 


where  the  statute  is  inapplicable,  as  where 
the  deceased  was  not  a  resident  of  the 
State,  the  general  presumptions  of  death 
govern  as  at  common  law :  Flood  v.  Grow- 
uey,  126  Mo.  262. 

5  Best  on  Ev.,  §  409;  Whart.  Ev., 
§  1274.  "  Ordinarily,  in  the  absence  of 
evidence  to  the  contrary,  the  continuance 
of  the  life  of  an  individual  to  the  common 
age  of  man  will  be  assumed  by  presump- 
tion of  law.  The  burden  of  proof  lies 
upon  the  party  alleging  the  death  of  the 
person ;  but  after  an  absence  from  his 
home  or  place  of  residence  seven  years 
without  intelligence  respecting  him,  the 
presumption  of  life  will  cease,  and  it  will 
be  incumbent  on  the  other  party  asserting 
it  to  prove  that  the  person  was  living 
within  that  time  "  :  Howard,  J.,  in  Stevens 
v.  McNamara,  36  Me.  176,  178;  Esterly's 
Appeal,  109  Pa.  St.  222.  But  mere  proof 
of  absence,  without  proof  that  the  absentee 
was  never  heard  of,  is  insufficient  to  cre- 
ate a  presumption  of  death :  Shriver  i\ 
State,  65  Md.  278,  287.  And  hearsay  evi- 
dence that  he  is  alive  is  admissible  :  Dowd 
v.  Watson,  105  N.  C.  476. 

477 


*  444,  *  445        PRELIMINARIES   TO    GRANT   OF   LETTERS.  §  207 

court  necessary  to  give  it  jurisdiction.1  This  presumption  does  not, 
obviously,  attach  to  any  particular  time  within  the  seven  years,  but 
in  the  absence  of  facts  indicating  the  time  of  death,  assumes  the 
absentee  to  have  lived  through  the  whole  period.2 

*  Death  may  also  be  inferred  from  the  absence  of  a  person  [*  445] 
from  his  home,  without  being  heard  from  for  a  period  less 

than  seven  years,  if  proof  be  made  of  other  circumstances 
it  may  be  tending  to  show  his  death.8     Thus,  it  is  held  that  death 

cumstances.  may  be  inferred  from  testimony  showing  that  when  last 
heard  from  the  person  was  in  contact  with  some  specific 
peril  likely  to  produce  death,  or  that  he  disappeared  under  circum- 
stances inconsistent  with  a  continuation  of  life,  when  considered  with 
reference  to  those  influences  and  motives  which  ordinarily  control 
and  direct  the  conduct  of  rational  beings.4  Presence  on  board  of  a 
ship  which  sailed  for  a  given  port  at  which  she  did  not  arrive,  and 
was  never  heard  of  for  more  than  double  the  period  of  her  longest 
voyage,  is  said  to  make  the  death  of  all  on  board  of  her  as  certain 
as  anything  not  seen  can  be,  and  the  time  of  such  death  would  fall 
within  the  period  usually  assigned  as  the  longest  for  such  a  voyage.5 
Evidence  of  one's  long  absence  without  communicating  with  his 
friends,  of  character  and  habits  making  the  abandonment  of  home 
and  family  improbable,  and  of  want  of  all  motive  or  cause  for  such 
abandonment,  was  held  sufficient  to  support  the  presumption  of 
death.6 

The  factum  of  death  may,  it  seems,  be  proved  by  hearsay  evidence ; 
"  for,  as  has  been  said,  that  a  person  has  been  missing  at  a  particular 

1  And  it  matters  not  that  the  relatives  tion  of  the  fact  and  manner  of  his  death 
may  believe  such  person  to  be  alive :  White-  has  reached  the  neighborhood  of  the  tes- 
side's  Appeal,  23  Pa.  St.  114,  116.  tator's  residence;   or  in  case  of  his  being 

2  Eagle  v.  Emmet,  4  Bradf.  117;  domiciled  abroad,  where  such  reputation 
Reedv  v.  Millizen,  155  111.  636  ;  Schaub  v.  has  reached  his  friends  and  relatives  in 
Griffin,  84  Md.  557  ;  Tilly  v.  Tilly,  2  Bland  such  form  as  to  gain  general  credit." 
Ch.  436,  444;  Kauz  v.  Order  of  Red  Ringhouse  v.  Keever,  49  111.470;  North- 
Men,  13  Mo.  App.  341.  This  point  is  very  western  Insurance  Co.  v.  Stevens,  36  U.  S. 
fullv  considered  in  Evans  v.  Stewart,  81  App.  401,  409,  citing  numerous  cases. 
Va.  724,  735,  quoting  and  reviewing  Eng-  4  In  either  case  the  fact  of  death  may 
lish  and  American  authorities,  and  an-  be  inferred  at  such  time  within  seven 
nouncing  the  true  rule  to  be  that  the  onus  years  as  from  the  testimony  shall  seem 
of  proving  death  at  any  particular  period,  most  probable  :  Hough,  J.,  in  Lancaster  v. 
either  within  the  seven  years  or  otherwise,  Washington  Life  Ins.  Co.,  62  Mo.  121, 128  ; 
is  not  with  the  party  alleging  death  at  Davie  i>.  Briggs,  97  U.  S.  628,  634;  White 
such  particular  period,  but  is  with  the  v.  Mann,  26  Me.  361,  370;  Smith  v. 
person  to  whose  title  that  fact  is  essential:  Knowlton,  11  N.  H.  191,  197. 

p.  737,    Seeahro  1 '1, cue's  Trust,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  6  Gerry  v.  Post,  13  How.  Pr.  118,  120; 

Ap.Cafl.  139,151  ;  Davie  r.  Brings,  97  U.  S.  see  also  Johnson  v.  Merithew,  80  Me.lll. 
628;    Hoyt  v.   Newbold,  45  N.  J.  L.  219;  6  Tisdale  V.Connecticut  Life  Ins.  Co., 

Whitely  v.  Equitable  Soc.,  72  Wis.  170.  26  Iowa,  170,  176;  Hancock  v.  American 

3  Redf.  on  Wills,  •»,  note  1  :  "  Where  Life  Ins.  Co.,  62  Mo.  26,  29  ;    Succession 

the  probabilities  of  death  are  corroborated  of  Vogel,  16  La.  An.  139. 
by  circumstances ;  or  «  lure  reliable  reputa- 
478 


§  207  PROOF  OF  DEATH.  *  445,  *  446 

time,  accompanied  with  a  report  and  general  be- 
[*  446]  lief  of  his  death,  must  be,  in  many  cases,  not  *  only   n  Jaerga/ 

the  best,  but  the  only  evidence  which  can  be  sup- 
posed to  exist  of  his  death."  l     It  is  so  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United   States,  in  a  unanimous  opinion,2  and  in  several  of  the 
State  courts.8 

Presumptions  of  survivorship  among  different  persons  exposed  to 
the  same  peril,  and  not  known  to  have  survived,  are  not  entertained 
in    English   or   American   courts.      In    California   and   „ 

T....  •i-ii'-n-  •         i  •  No  presump- 

Louisiana  it  is  provided,  following  in  this  respect  the  tion  of  surviv- 
Code  Napoleon,  that  "  if  several  persons,  respectively  ^^J™"1,.* 
entitled  to  inherit  from  one  another,  happen  to  perish  in  England  or 
by  the  same  event,  such  as  a  wreck,  a  battle,  or  a  con-  menca- 
flagration,  without  any  possibility  of  ascertaining  who  died  first,  the 
presumption  of  survivorship  is  determined  by  the  circumstances  of 
the  fact.  In  the  absence  of  circumstances  of  the  fact,  the  determina- 
tion must  be  decided  by  the  probabilities  resulting  from  the  age, 
strength,  and  difference  of  sex  according  to  the  following  rules  :  If 
those  who  have  perished  together  were  under  the  age  of  fifteen  years, 
the  eldest  shall  be  presumed  to  have  survived.  If  both  were  above 
the  age  of  sixty  years,  the  youngest  shall  be  presumed  to  have  sur- 
vived. If  some  were  under  fifteen  and  some  above  sixty,  the  first 
shall  be  presumed  to  have  survived.  If  those  who  have  perished 
together  were  above  the  age  of  fifteen  years  and  under  sixty,  the 
male  must  be  presumed  to  have  survived,  where  there  was  equality  of 
age  or  a  difference  of  less  than  one  year.  If  they  were  of  the  same 
sex  .  .  .  the  younger  must  be  presumed  to  have  survived  the  older."  4 
The  doctrine  in  England  is  stated,  in  the  syllabus  to  the  case  of  Wing 
v.  Angrave,5  to  be  as  follows:  that  "there  is  no  presumption  of  law 
arising  from  age  or  sex  as  to  survivorship  among  persons  whose 
death  is  occasioned  by  one  and  the  same  cause  ;  .  .  .  nor  is  there 
any  presumption  of  law  that  all  died  at  the  same  time ;  .  .  .  the 
question  is  one  of  fact,  depending  wholly  on  evidence,  and  if 
the  evidence  does  not  establish  the  survivorship  of  any  one,  the 
law  will  treat  it  as  a  matter  incapable  of  being  determined. 
The  onus  probandi  is   on   the  person  asserting  the   affirmative." 6 

1  Primm  v.  Stewart,  7  Tex.  178,  181.        Pr.,  §    1963,  pi.  40;    Hollister  v.  Cordero, 

2  Scott  v.  Ratcliffe,  5  Pet.  81,  86.  76  Cal.  649,  holding  the  murder  of  hus- 
s  Jackson  v.  Boneham,  15  Johns.  226,     band  and  wife  perpetrated  at   the  same 

228;    Jackson  v.  Etz,  5   Cow.  314,  319;  time  to  be  a  calamity  within  the  meaning 

Ringhouse  v.  Keever,  49  111.  470.     Hear-  of  the  Code, 
say  evidence   that   the  person  is  alive  is  6  8  H.  L.  183. 

also  admissible:    Dowd  v.  Watson,   105         •  See  an  interesting  account  of  the  trial 

N.  C.  476.  of  Robinson's  case,  involving  the  question 

4  Robinson  v.  Gallier,  2    South.  L.  R.  of  survivorship,  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  the 

N.  S.  508,  quoting  from  the  Civil  Code  of  United  States  for  the  District  of  Louisiana, 

Louisiana,  art.  936-939;  Cal.  Code  Civ.  published  in  the  Southern  Law  Review. 

479 


**  447-449         PRELIMINARIES  TO    GRANT   OF   LETTERS.  §  208 

*  The  same  doctrine  is  held  by  authors  and  judges  to  pre-  [*  447] 
vail  in  America.1 

§  208.    Administration    on    the   Estates    of   Living    Persons.  —  The 
weight  of  authority  is  very  decidedly  to  the  effect  "  that 
Death  of  the       ftie  decease  0f  the  supposed  decedent  is  a  pre- 

testator  or  in-  rr  " 

testate  neces-      requisite  to  the  jurisdiction  *of  the  court,  and  [*  448J 
junction6       that  (if  sti11  living)  he  is  wholly  unaffected  by 

the  proceedings  for  the  settlement  of  his  estate."  2 
The  doctrine  that  the  grant  of  letters  testamentary,  or  of  admin- 
istration, on  the  estate  of  a  person  in  fact  living,  but  supposed  to  be 
dead,  is  an  act  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  and  therefore  so 
utterly  void  that  no  person  is  protected  in  dealing  with  the  executor 
or  administrator,  even  while  his  letters  remain  unrevoked,  is  firmly 
adhered  to  in  nearly  all  of  the  States  in  which  the  question  has 
arisen,  and  seems  to  command  the  acquiescence  of  even  text-writers. 
Judge  Redfield,  the  illustrious  author  of  an  American  work  on  Wills, 
for  many  years  one  of  the  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Vermont, 
and  one  of  the  editors  of  the  American  Law  Register  during  the  last 
fifteen  years  of  his  life,  rejoices  in  the  recognition  of  this 
doctrine  ; 8  Freeman  is  content  to  *  mention  the  direction  in  [*  449] 
which  the  current  of  decisions  runs  ; 4  and  Schouler  disposes 
of  the  question  in  two  lines,  showing  his  assent  to  the  doctrine  that 
a  grant  of  administration  upon  the  estate  of  a  living  person  is  utterly 
void,  and  protects  no  one  dealing  with  the  appointee.6  Mr.  Gary 
finds  it  "of  course"  that  "the  person  himself,  if  he  returns  alive,  is 
not  bound  by  the  adjudication,  not  being  a  party  in  any  sense;"  but 
deems  it  a  solecism  to  say  that  a  court  does  not  adjudicate  upon  the 
primary  jurisdictional  fact  upon  which  it  proceeds  to  act.6     In  the 

supra,  and  giving  a  concise  and  compre-  73  Md.  403  ;  Smith  v.  Croom,  7  Florida, 

hensive  review  of  the  doctrine  of  survivor-  81  ;  Coye  v.  Leach,  8  Mete.  371. 

ship  under  the  civil  law,  and  in  the  differ-  2  Freem.  on  Judgm.,  §  319  a  (3d  ed.). 

ent  countries  of  Europe.     It  was  held  in  Other  decisions  in  the  same  direction  will 

this  case  that  the  provisions  of  the  Louisi-  be  noticed  infra.     With  the  exception  of 

ana  Code  did  not  apply,  and  the  iustruc-  the  first  two  of  the  cases  cited  by  Free- 

tions  to  the  jury  were  in  consonance  with  man,  which  directly  adjudicate  the  ques- 

the  views  announced  in  Wing  v.  Angrave,  tion  under  consideration,  they  all  contain 

supra.  either  mere  dicta,  or  adjudications  upon 

1  Johnson  v.  Merithew,  80  Me.  Ill,  in  cognate  points  only. 

which  the   court  says,  after   announcing  3  15  Am.  L.  R.  212  et  seq. 

the  law  as  above  stated  :  "  In  the  absence  4  Supra,  p.  448,  note, 

of  evidence  from  which  the  contrary  may  6  Schoul.  Ex.  §  160. 

be  inferred,  all  may  be  considered  to  have  c  Gary,   Pr.  L.  §  287,  note  59.    His 

perished  at  the  same  moment;  not  because  commentary  concerning  the  adjudication 

the   fact   Ls  presumed,  but  because,  from  is  directed  to  the  case  of  Mutual  Benefit 

failure  to  prove  the  contrary  bv  those  as-  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tisdale,  91   U.  S.  238,  in 

sorting    it,   property    rights    must     neces-  which  it  is  held  that  the  Probate  Court 

sarily  be  settled  on  that  theory  "  (p.  116)  ;  does  not  adjudicate  the  death  of  the  per- 

Ehle's  Will,  73  Wis.  445, 458, 460 ;  Newell  son    on    whose    estate     the    letters    are 

p.  Nichols,  75  N.Y.  78;  Cowman w. Rogers,  granted:  p.  243. 
480 


§  209  ESTATES   OF   LIVING    PERSONS.  *  449,  *  450 

former  edition  of  this  work  the  subject  was  deemed  of  such  impor- 
tance as  to  justify  a  more  extensive  discussion ;  and  the  author's 
reasons  for  disagreeing  with  the  current  of  authorities  are  therein 
more  extensively  set  forth  ;  since  then  the  question  has  been  authori- 
tatively laid  to  rest  by  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,1  and  it  will  serve  no  useful  purpose  to  present,  here, 
more  than  a  brief  sketch  of  its  origin  and  history. 

§  209.  Reasons  for  the  Invalidity  of  such  Administration.  —  The 
courts  holding  void  the  grant  of  letters  on  the  estate  of  a  person  not 
really,  but  only  supposed  to  be  dead,  base  the  necessity  of  their  rul- 
ing upon  the  lack  of  jurisdiction  in  the  probate  court.  This  depends, 
it  is  said,  upon  the  fact  of  death ;  there  being  no  death,  there  is  no 
estate  to  administer,  hence  no  basis  for  the  jurisdiction  of  the  probate 
court.  The  casual  remark  of  Justices  Buller  and  Ashhurst.  in  the 
case  of  Allen  v.  Dundas,2  is  generally  referred  to  as  authority.  It  is 
to  be  observed  that  this  case  turned  upon  the  validity  of  an  executor's 
acts  under  a  will  which  had  received  probate,  but  was  subsequently 
found  to  have  been  forged.  The  judges  emphatically  sustained  the 
validity  of  the  probate,  and  of  all  acts  done  thereunder,8  and  then 
remark :  "  The  case  of  the  probate  of  a  supposed  will  during  the  life 
of  the  party  may  be  distinguished  from  the  present,  because  during 
his  life  the  ecclesiastical  court  has  no  jurisdiction."  A  similar  remark 
was  made  by  Chief  Justice  Marshall  in  the  case  of  Griffith  v.  Frazier,4 
to  illustrate  the  invalidity  of  the  judgment  of  a  court  acting  upon  a 
matter  not  within  its  jurisdiction  :  "  Suppose  administration 
[*  450]  to  be  *  granted  upon  the  estate  of  a  person  not  really  dead. 
The  act,  all  will  admit,  is  totally  void."  In  this  case  the 
question  was  upon  the  validity  of  a  judgment  suffered  by  an 
administrator  cum  testamento  annexo,  who  had  obtained  letters 
while  a  regularly  appointed  executor  had  charge  of  the  estate.  The 
question  under  consideration  was  before  the  court  in  neither  of  these 
two  cases. 

In  the  case  of  Burns  v.  Van  Loan,5  the  dictum  of  Judge  Marshall 
is  quoted,  but  the  judgment  was  not  based  upon  this  principle,  there 
being  a  statute  in  Louisiana  regulating  the  property  of  an  absentee, 
which,  as  well  as  the  requirement  of  proof  of  death,  had  been 
ignored  in  the  grant  of  letters,  for  which  reason  the  letters  were 
held  void. 

But  in  the  case  of  Moore  v.  Smith,6  Wardlaw,  J.,  announced  the 
law  to  be,  as  intimated  in  the  dicta  mentioned,  that  there  was  no 

3  Scott  v.  McNeal,  154  U.  S.  34.  ence  of  such  judicial  act  the  law  will  pro- 

2  3  T.  R.  125,  129,  130.  tect  every  person  obeying  it." 

8  Justice  Ashhurst  concluded   his   re-  4  8  Cranch,  9,  23. 

marks  in  these  words  :  "  But  the  founda-  6  29  La.  An.  560,  564. 

tion  of  my  opinion  is,  that  every  person  is  6  1 1    Rich.   L.   569,   572.     Decided   in 

bound  by  the  judicial  acts  of  a  court  having  1858. 

competent  authority ;  and  during  the  exist- 

VOL.  I.  —  31  481 


**  450-452         PRELIMINARIES   TO    GRANT   OP  LETTERS.  §  209 

jurisdiction  in  the  probate  court  unless  there  was  in  truth  a  deceased 
person.  In  the  same  year  the  Supreme  Court  of  North  Carolina  held 
evidence  that  one  upon  whose  estate  administration  had  been  granted 
was  alive,  to  be  admissible  in  a  suit  upon  the  administration  bond, 
on  the  ground  that,  if  such  person  were  alive,  the  bond  would  be 
void.1 

In  Jochumsen  v.  Suffolk  Savings  Bank,2  the  defendant  was  held 
liable  to  one  upon  whose  estate  letters  had  been  granted  after  his 
absence  for  twelve  years,  for  a  debt  which  he  had  already  paid  to  the 
administrator  so  appointed.  Judge  Dewey  reaches  his  conclusion  of 
the  utter  invalidity  of  the  appointment,  and  of  everything  done  by 
virtue  thereof,  from  the  previous  Massachusetts  cases  holding  void 
the  appointment  of  an  administrator  by  the  court  of  a  county  in 
which  the  decedent  did  not  at  the  time  of  his  death  reside ; 8 
and  points  for  confirmation  of  his  view  to  the  dicta  *  men-  [*  451 J 
tioned. 

Other  adjudications  on  this  question  then  followed  in  rapid  succes- 
sion, almost  unanimously  holding  such  administrations,  and  every- 
thing done  in  consequence  thereof,  absolutely  void :  United  States  v. 
Payne,4  Melia  v.  Simmons,6  D'Arusment  v.  Jones,6  Lavin  v.  The 
Emigrant  Industrial  Savings  Bank,7  Stevenson  v.  Superior 
Court,8  Devlin  v.  Commonwealth,9  *  Thomas  v.  The  People,10  [*  452] 
Scott  v.  McNeal,11  Springer  v.  Shavender,12and  Carr  v.  Brown.18 
In  all  of  them  the  same  reason  is  given  for  the  ruling,  to  wit,  the 
want  of  jurisdiction  over  the  subject-matter;  the  dicta  by  Justices 
Ashhurst,  Buller,  and  Marshall,  and  similar  remarks  in  a  number  of 
other  cases,  are  invariably  referred  to.  The  same  doctrine  is  an- 
nounced in  a  dictum  by  Kandall,  C.  J.,  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 

i  State  v.  White,  7  Ired.  L.  116.  9  101   Pa.  St.    273.     Decided  in  1882. 

2  3  Allen,  87.     Decided  in  18G1.  In  1885  the  legislature  of  this  State  regu- 

3  The  doctrine  holding  as  void  letters  lated  the  grant  of  letters  on  the  estates  of 
granted  in  a  county  other  than  that  in  persons  absent  for  more  than  seven  years, 
which  the  decedent  was  domiciled  at  the  and  provided  for  the  safety  of  the  inter- 
time  of  his  death,  is  discussed  ante,  §  204.  ests  of  all  parties  concerned  :  Bright. 
A  statute  of  Massachusetts  had  peremp-  Purd.  Dig.,  Suppl,  18S5,  p.  2184  et  seq. 
torily  Degatived  the  doctrine  so  announced  10  107  111.  517.     Decided  in  1883. 

by  the  court  :   Rev.  St.  Mass.  183G,  ch.  83,  J1  154  U.  S.  34.     Decided  in  1894. 

§    12,  the   wisdom   of   which  statute  was  12  1 1 G  N.  C.  12.     Decided  in   1895,  af- 

commended     by    the     courts     of     Maine  firmed  on  rehearing:  118  N.  C.  33.     In 

(Record   *'.   Howard,  58  Me.  225,  228)  as  this  case  the  heirs  were  not  estopped   to 

well    as  by  those  of    Massachusetts   (Mc-  attack  a  sale  of  land  as  void  on  the  ground 

Feely  v.  Scott,  128  Mass.  16,  1H.     See  the  that  they    had    admitted,  though  errone- 

remarksof  the  editor  reporting  Thompson  ously,  that  their  ancestor  was  dead,  in  the 

1-.  Brown,  16  Mass.  172,  180).  proceeding  to  sell  the  realty.     The  court, 

4  4  Dillon,  887.  Decided  in  1877.  however,  expressly  reserved  the  effect  of 
6  45  Wis.  834.  Decided  in  1878.  letters  granted  on  an  erroneous  presump- 
6  4  Lea,  251.     Decided  in  1880.  Lion  of  death  from  seven  years'  absence. 

1  18  Blatchf.  1.     Decided  in  1880.  13  38  Atl.  R.  9.     Decided  in  July,  189? 

■  r,2  Cal  oo.    Decided  in  1882. 
482 


§  210      ADMINISTRATION   IN   ESTATES  OF  LIVE  PERSONS.      **  452-455 

Florida,1  quoting  a  similar  dictum  from  a  case  decided  in  Virginia, 
to  the  effect  that  there  are  two  exceptions  to  the  conclusiveness  of 
the  judgments  of  probate  courts  collaterally:  "As  where  the  sup- 
posed testator  or  intestate  is  alive ;  or  where,  if  dead,  he  has  already 
a  personal  representative  in  being  when  the  order  is  made  granting 
administration  on  his  estate."  2  So  also  in  Texas.3  An  English  case 
is  also  mentioned  as  holding  void  the  probate  of  a  will  upon  motion 
of  the  supposed  deceased  testator  himself.4 

§  210.    Cases  holding  Administration  of  Estates  of  Living  Persons 

valid —  The  only  cases  met  with  directly  holding  that,  so  far 
I*  453]  *  at  least  as  to  protect  innocent  persons  acting  upon  the  faith 

of  letters  of  administration  issued  by  the  surrogate  upon  due 
proof  as  to  the  death  of  the  intestate  therein  named,  such  letters  are 
conclusive  evidence  of  the  authority  of  the  administrator  to  act,  until 
the  order  granting  them  is  reversed  on  appeal,  or  the  letters  are 
revoked  or  vacated,  are  those  of  Roderigas  v.  East  River  Savings  In- 
stitution 5  and  Scott  v.  McNeal.6  The  former  was  decided  in  the  face 
of  the  case  of  Jochumsen  v.  Suffolk  Savings  Bank.7  The  doctrine 
announced  commanded  the  assent  of  but  four  of  the  seven  judges  of 
the  Court  of  Appeals,  three  of  them  expressly  dissenting,  but  giving 
no  reasons,  and  was  held  by  the  federal  courts  to  be  in  violation  of  the 
Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.8 
The  Roderigas  case  is  mentioned  with  approval  in  later  New 
[*  455]  York  cases ; 9  and  *  Chief  Justice  Beasley,  speaking  for  the 

Supreme  Court  of  New  Jersey,  says  :  "  It  is  not  necessary  to 
affirm  the  doctrine  of  this  [the  Roderigas]  reported  case,  though  in 
passing  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  remark  that  its  reasoning,  not- 
withstanding the  adverse  criticisms  to  which  it  has  been  subjected, 
appears  to  be  of  great  weight."  10  So  Dillon,  J.,  rendering  the  opinion 
in  the  case  of   United  States  v.  Payne,11  remarks,  that  much  may 

1  In  Epping  v.  Robinson,  21   Fla.  36,  9  O'Connor  r.  Huggins,  113  N.  Y.  511 ; 
49.     Decided  in  1884.  Bolton  v.  Schriever,  135  N.  Y.  65.     In  the 

2  Andrews    v.   Avory,    14   Gratt.  229,  latter  case  Peckham,  J.,  observes :  "Criti- 
236,  per  Moncure,  J.  (1858).  cisms  have  also  been  made  in  regard  to 

3  Martin   v.   Robinson,    67    Tex.   368,  the  decision  of  the  first  Roderigas  case. 
375  (1887).  It  is  not  needful  to  refer  to  them,  or  to 

4  In  re  Napier,  1  Phillim.  83.  again  renew  the  discussion,  which,  as  to 

5  63  N.  Y.  460.     Decided  in  1875.  this  State,  was  ended  by  the  decision  in 

6  5   Wash.  309,  decided  in  1892;  but  that  case."     On  a  second  appeal  of  the 
reversed  by  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court.  Roderigas  case  (76  N.  Y.  316),  sometimes 

7  3  Allen,  87.  referred  to  as  shaking  the  authority  of  the 

8  In  Lavin  v.  Emig.  Indust.  Sav.  Bank,  earlier  decision,  the  former  case  was  dis- 
18  Blatch.  1  ;  Scott  v.  McNeal,  154  U.  S.  tinguished,  but  not  overruled. 

34  ;  Carr  v.  Brown,   38  Atl.    R.  9.     The         10  Plume  v.  Howard  Savings  Institution, 
principal   reason   given    is   the   want    of    46  N.  J.  L.  211,  230  (1884). 
notice  to  the  absentee,  for  which  reason         n  4  Dill.  387,  389. 
he  was  not  bound  by  the  judgment  of  the 
surrogate  on  the  question  of  his  death. 

483 


**  455-459         PRELIMINARIES   TO   GRANT   OP   LETTERS.        §§  211,212 

be  said  on  both  sides  of  the  question,  and  that  the  Roderigas  case 
may  be  distinguished  on  solid  grounds  from  the  case  under  considera- 
tion by  him.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Arkansas,  though  expressly 
withholding  their  judgment  upon  the  validity  of  administration  upon 
the  estates  of  living  persons,  nevertheless  held  that  where  the  admin- 
istrator of  the  next  of  kin  of  a  supposed  decedent  was  paid  by  a  bailee, 
under  order  of  the  probate  court,  the  distributive  share  coming  to  his 
intestate  from  such  supposed  dead  ancestor  (who  was  in  fact  alive), 
such  administrator  was  protected  to  the  extent  of  all  bona  fide  pay- 
ments made  by  him  out  of  such  fund  before  learning  that  the  owner 
was  alive.1 

In  the  case  of  Scott  v.  McNeal 2  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  State 
of  Washington  in  a  unanimous  opinion  squarely  follow  the  Roderigas 
case,  deciding,  accordingly,  that  letters  so  granted  cannot  be  collater- 
ally impeached  by  proof  that  the  supposed  decedent  is  in  fact  alive. 
The  argument,  that  by  sustaining  the  validity  of  the  administration 
the  supposed  decedent  would  be  deprived  of  his  property  without  due 
process  of  law,  was  met  by  the  argument  that  "  the  proceeding  is  sub- 
stantially in  rem,  and  all  parties  must  be  held  to  have  received 
notice  of  the  institution  and  pendency  of  such  proceedings  where 
notice  is  given  as  required  by  law."  8 

§  211.  Conclusiveness  of  Judgments.  —  In  the  first  edition  of  this 
work  the  attempt  was  made  to  show  the  necessity  of  giving  effect  to 
the  judgments  of  courts  rendered  within  the  scope  of  the  subject- 
matter  of  their  jurisdiction,  from  which  it  would  follow  that  the 
administration  of  the  estate  of  one  who  was  adjudged  to  be,  but  was 
not  in  reality,  dead,  is  valid  and  binding,  as  to  all  acts  done  in  good 
faith  before  the  recall  of  the  administration  on  the  discovery  that 
the  owner  was  living.  Since  then,  by  the  decision  of  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court,  this  question  has  been  definitively  settled  by 
the  highest  authority ; 4  and  further  discussion  is  there- 
fore omitted  here.  [**  456-459] 

§  212.  Administration  of  Estates  of  Absent  Persons.  — 
Administration  of  property  becomes  necessary,  as  we  have  seen,  when 
its  owner  is,  for  any  reason,  incapable  of  exercising  control  over  the 
same, — of  asserting  his  jus  disponendum.6  The  practical  reason  which 
demands  the  interposition  of  the  State  is  fully  as  strong  when  the  owner 
of  personal  property  —  or  of  real  property  liable  for  his  debts,  or 
for  the  support  of  his  family  —  has  voluntarily  or  by  compulsion  ab- 
sented himself,  so  that  it  is  beyond  his  power  to  provide  for  his 
family  or  satisfy  his  creditors,  as  if  he  were  dead,  insane,  or  a  minor. 

1   Hnarn  v.  Copeland,  54  Ark.  70  (1890).  United  States,  aud  unanimously  reversed: 

S  5  Wash.  225.      Decided  in  1892.  8.  c.  154  U.  S.  34. 

3  Opinion  by  Scott,  J.  (all  the  judges         *  Scott  v.  McNeal,  154  U.  S.  34. 
concurring),  p.  .tik.    This  ease  was  ap-        6  Ante,  §  2. 
pealed    to    the    Supreme    Court    of    the 
484 


I  212  ESTATES   OF    ABSENT   PERSONS.  **  459-461 

It  is  the  office  of  the  State,  in  such  cases,  to  assume  that  control  over 
the  property  left  by  the  owner  which  he,  if  he  could  himself  act,  and 
would  act  rationally,  would  exercise,  —  to  cause  such  property  to  sub- 
serve its  rational  purpose.  At  common  law  the  accomplishment  of 
this  function  is  brought  about  by  the  arbitrary  presumption  of  a  per- 
son's death  after  an  unexplained  absence  from  home  of  seven  years, 

and  subjecting  his  property  to  administration  as  if  he  were 
[*  460]  dead.  *  In  recognition  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  common  law  on 

this  subject,  the  legislatures  of  several  of  the  States  have  given 
voice  to  the  practical  views  of  the  people,  and  provided  means  for  the 
preservation  and  disposition  of  property  under  such  circumstances. 

Thus  it  is  enacted  in  Missouri,  that  if  any  person  be  absent  from 
the  State  for  seven  consecutive  years,  or  shall  have  concealed  himself, 
so  as  not  to  be  heard  of  for  seven  years  by  the  probate  judge  or  the 
absentee's  heirs,  and  not  make  himself  or  his  whereabouts  known  to 
the  probate  judge  or  such  heirs  within  two  years  after  a  notice  of  his 
supposed  death  shall  have  been  published  in  a  newspaper  published 
in  the  county  where  his  property  is  situate,  he  shall  be  presumed  to 
be  dead ;  and  if  letters  testamentary  or  of  administration  shall  be 
granted  upon  such  person's  estate,  all  payment  of  money  or  delivery 
of  property  to  the  executor  or  administrator  of  such  person  shall  be  a 
bar  to  all  actions  or  claims  of  such  absent  person;  and  if  such  person 
do  not  appear  before  an  order  disposing  of  or  distributing  said  estate 
shall  have  been  made  by  such  court,  such  order  shall  be  a  protection 
to  such  administrator  for  obedience  to  any  order  so  made.1 

In  Indiana,  if  a  person  leave  the  State  and  go  to  parts  unknown 
for  five  years,  leaving  property  without  having  made  sufficient  pro- 
vision for  the  management  of  the  same,  and  it  is  made  to  appear  to 
the  court  having  probate  jurisdiction,  after  thirty  days'  notice  to  such 
person  by  publication  in  two  newspapers,  one  published  in  the 
capital  of  the  State  and  the  other  in  the  county,  that  such  property 
is  suffering  waste  or  that  the  family  is  in  need,  he  shall  be  presumed 
to  be  dead,  and  the  court  shall  have  the  same  jurisdiction  over 
the  estate  of  such  person  as  if  he  were  dead,  and  appoint  an  adminis- 
trator of  his  estate  with  all  the  powers,  rights,  duties,  and  liabilities 

of  an  administrator  of  a  decedent.2 
[*  461]       *  In  Louisiana,  if  the  owner  of  property  absent  himself 

without  appointing  some  one  to  take  care  of  it,  a  curator  is 
appointed  to  administer  it,  who  has  the  same  powers,  duties,  and 
annual  compensation  as  a  tutor,  makes  annual  settlements,  and  has 
them  homologated  contradictorily  with  a  curator  ad  hoc  appointed 
for  that  purpose ;  and  if  such  person  has  not  been  heard  of  for  ten 
years,  his  administration  ends,  the  property  is  delivered  to  the  heirs, 

1  Rev.  St.  Mo.  1889,  §§  272,  273.      Baugh  v.   Boles,  66  Ind.  376,  384 ;  Jones 

2  Ann.  Rev.  Ind.  St.  1894,  §  2385;  r.  Detchon,  91  Ind.  154,  156. 

485 


*  461,  *462       PRELIMINARIES   TO    GRANT   OF   LETTERS.  §  212 

or  sold,  and  the  proceeds  paid  into  the  State  treasury  if  there  are 
no  heirs.1 

In  Ehode  Island,  the  last  will  of  a  person  absent  from  the  State 
for  three  years  without  proof  of  his  being  alive  may  be  proved,  and 
administration  granted  on  his  estate  "as  if  he  were  dead."  If  such 
person  afterward  return,  or  appoint  an  agent  or  attorney  to  act  for 
him,  the  administrator  must  deliver  up  to  him  or  such  agent  all  the 
estate  then  remaining  in  his  hands,  after  deducting  all  disbursements 
legally  made,  and  such  compensation  for  his  trouble  as  the  probate 
court  may  deem  reasonable.2  This  statute  is  said,  by  Choate,  J.,  to 
be  unconstitutional,  for  the  same  reason  on  which  he  based  the  un- 
constitutionality of  the  New  York  statute  authorizing  the  decision  in 
Roderigas  v.  East  River  Savings  Institution.  "  The  Rhode  Island 
statute  undertakes  to  do  directly  what  the  New  York  statute  aims  to 
accomplish  by  the  more  indirect  method  of  declaring  a  judicial  deci- 
sion conclusive  against  a  person  not  a  party  to  it.  In  Rhode  Island 
the  court  does  not  go  through  the  form  of  deciding  that  the  person  is 
dead,  but,  conceding  that  he  is  only  absent,  distributes  his  estate 
'as  if  he  were  dead,'  without  the  service  of  any  notice  upon  him 
whatever."  3 

In  Massachusetts,  the  same  substantial  result  is  reached  by  sub- 
jecting the  question  of  the  relative  rights  of  the  parties  affected  by 
the  administration  upon  the  estate  of  one  supposed  to  be  dead,  but 
afterward  appearing  in  person,  to  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  of 
equity,  with  power  to  validate  or  avoid  any  of  the  acts  done.4 

*  Pennsylvania,  also,  has  enacted  an  efficient  and  simple  [*  462] 
remedy  for  the  administration  of  estates  of  absentees  amply 
securing  the  interests  of  such  absentee  if  he  should  subsequently 
return,  and  enabling  payment  of  creditors,  and  distribution  'to  wife, 
children,  or  next  of  kin,  upon  just  and  reasonable  conditions.5 

In  Texas,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  a  will 

probated  before  the  death  of  the  testator  and  administration  on  the 

estate  of  a  living  person  are  void,  except  as  to  the  admin- 

.Rtatutcs  allow-    juration  bond.6     In  Vermont  there  may  be  administra- 
tis such  a<l-  liii 
ministration,       tion    on  the   estate   of  one   who   has  been   absent   and 

?void? °S     unheard  from  for  fifteen  years;   but  if  such   absentee 

return,  he  is  nevertheless  entitled  to  all  his  property, 

and  may  recover  it  from  any  one  having  possession  of  it.7    In  Arkan- 

1  Barns  v.  Van  Loan,  29  La.  An.  560.       turning  its  validity  ;  but  in  Carr  v.  Brown 

2  Pul>.  St.  1882,  p.  476,  §§  8,  9.  38  Atl.  R.  9,  it  is  hold  unconstitutional. 
a  Litvin    v.   The    Emigrant    Industrial         *  L.  Mass.  1873,  pp.  684,  685. 

Bavinga    Hunk,    18    Blatchf.    1,   37.     The  B  Brightly's   Turd.   Dig.,  Supplement 

decision  "f  the  case  w;is  put  upon  another  1885,  p.  2184. 
ground,    however.     And    in    the   case    of  «  Rev.  L.  1888,  art.  1791. 

Bouthwick  v.  Probate  Court,  18  R.  I.  402,         7  St.  1894,  §  2387. 
this  Statute  was  construed,  without  ques- 
486 


§  213  ESTATES   OP   PERSONS   CIVILLY   DEAD.  *  462,  *  463 

sas  presumption  of  death  arises  after  five  years'  unexplained  absence  ; 1 
but  any  property  administered  on  in  consequence  of  such  presump- 
tion may  be  recovered  by  such  person  on  his  subsequent  return, 
together  with  rents,  profits,  and  interest.2  So,  substantially,  in  New 
Jersey.8  Probably  other  States  have  similar  provisions  ;  but  in  view 
of  the  principle  laid  down  in  Scott  v.  McNeal,  to  wit :  that  probate 
courts  have  no  power  to  administer  on  the  estates  of  persons  living, 
and  that  the  disposition  of  the  property  of  living  persons  by  a  court 
without  notice  to  the  owner  is  not  due  process  of  law,  and  there- 
fore a  violation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  the  validity  of  any  such  statute  is  a  matter  of 
grave  doubt.4 

§  213.  Administration  on  the  Estates  of  Persons  Civilly  Dead.  — 
Civil  death,  which  in  England  followed  attainder  of  treason  or  felony, 
and  was  anciently  the  consequence  of  entering  a  monastery,  abjuring 
the  realm,  and  banishment,  was  there  attended  by  the  same  legal 
consequences  as  death  of  the  body.  Hence  a  monk  might,  on  enter- 
ing religion,  make  his  testament,  and  appoint  executors,  and  the 
ordinary  might  grant  administration,  as  in  case  of  other  persons 
dying ;  and  such  executors  and  administrators  had  the  same  powers  as 
if  he  were  naturally  dead.5  Thus  in  Kansas,6  Maine,7  and  Missouri,8 
the  estates  of  convicts  under  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  life  are  to 
be  administered  as  if  they  were  naturally  dead ;  and  in  New  York 
the  statute  provides  that  a  person  sentenced  to  imprisonment  for  life 
shall  be  deemed  civilly  dead,  but  this  is  held  not  to  be  a  divestiture 
of  a  convict's  estate,9  nor  to  give  the  surrogate  jurisdiction  to  grant 
letters  of  administration  on  his  estate.10 

But  in  most  of  the  American  States  the  condition  of  civil  death  is 
not  recognized ;  u  the  constitutions  of  the  several  States,  as 
[*  463]  well  *  as  the  Federal  Constitution,  abolish  attainder  and  cor- 
ruption of  blood ;  and  the  property  of  persons  sentenced  to 
imprisonment  for  life  does  not,  generally,  descend  to  the  heirs  or 
personal  representatives,  like  that  of  deceased  persons.12 

1  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  2903.  See  Beam  "'Chancellor  Kent  apprehended  in 
v.  Copeland,  54  Ark.  70,  referred  to  ante,  Troop  v.  Wood,  4  Johns.  Ch.  228,  the 
§  210.  New  York  statute   to   be   declaratory  of 

2  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  231.  the  existing  law,  enacted  for  greater  cau- 

3  Hoyt  v.  Newbold,  45  N.  J.  L.  219,  tion ;  but  in  Platner  v.  Sherwood,  6  John. 
221.  Ch.  118,  he  says  that  he  was  mistaken  in 

4  Carr  v.  Brown,  38  Atl.  9.  this  view,  and  that  strict  civil  death  was 
6  1  Bla.  Comm.  132.  never  carried  further  by  the  common  law 

6  Gen.  St.  1889,  §  5399.  than   to    persons    professed,   abjured,  or 

7  Rev.  St.  1883,  ch.  64,  §  18.  banished  the  realm. 

8  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  7283.  «  Frazer   v.  Fulcher,   17    Ohio,    260; 

9  Averv  v.  Everett,  110  N.  Y.  317.  Cannon  v.  Windsor,  1  Houst.  143. 
»  In  re'Zeph,  50  Hun,  523. 


487 


464  THE   PROBATE   OF  THE   WILL.  §  214 


*  CHAPTER  XXIV.  [*  464] 

OP   THE   PROBATE   OF  THE  WILL. 

A  will  takes  its  legal  validity  from  its  probate;  that  is,  the  certifi- 
cation by  the  court  or  tribunal  clothed  with  authority  for  such  pur- 
pose that  it  has  been  executed,  published,  and  attested  as  required  by 
law,  and  that  the  testator  was  of  sound  and  disposing  mind.  With- 
out such  proof  it  is  not  a  will  in  the  legal  sense.1 

The  will  may  dispose  of  real  estate,  or  of  personal  property,  and 
different  proof  or  a  difference  in  the  procedure  to  obtain  the  probate 
may  be  necessary  as  to  the  one  or  the  other ;  or  it  may  not  affect 
property  at  all,  but  only  appoint  a  guardian  for  a  minor  and  still 
require  probate  to  give  it  validity.2 

§  214.   Production  of  the  Will  for  Probate.  —  In  many  States  the 

judge  of  probate  or  register  of  wills  is,  by  statute,  made  the  custodian 

of  wills  deposited  with  him  to  that  end.     In  such  States, 

Duty  to  pro-      ft  }s  ^[s  duty,  as  soon  as  he  receives  information  of  the 

pound  will  „  i  --nii-  i 

for  probate.        death  of  any  testator  whose  will  he  has  in  custody,  to 

institute  proceedings  for  the  probate  thereof,  and  to  that 

end  compel  the  attendance  of  the  necessary  witnesses  to  prove  its 

execution  and  the  death  of  the  testator.3     If  the  judge  of  probate  is 

not  the  custodian,  or,  being  so,  neglects  to  proceed  with  the  probate, 

it  is  the  duty  of  the  executor  nominated  in  the  will,  as  well  as  of  any 

other  person  who  may  have  it  in  possession,  to  produce 

Time  for  the       it  for  probate.     The  time  fixed  by  law  for  such  produc- 

!Hiiisnding      tion  is  different  in  the  different  States,  varying  from  the 

time  when  the  custodian  shall  learn  the  testator's  death,4 

to  ten  days,5  fifteen  days,6  thirty  days,7  or  three  months,8  after  the 

day  on  which  he  died.9     Any  person  interested  in  a  will  may  demand 

1  See  post,  §  228,  as  to  effect  of  pro-  7  In  California,  Connecticut,   Illinois, 

bate.  Maine,  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Minne- 

'2  See  as  to  the  necessity  of  proving  sota,  Nebraska,  Nevada,  New  Hampshire, 

wills  appointing  testamentary  guardians,  Rhode  Island,  Texas,  Vermont,  and  Wis- 

Woerner  on  Guardianship,  §  20,  p.  58.  cousin. 

8  A  Btatute  providing  f«>r  the  ante  mor-  8   In  Maryland. 

tem  probate  of  wills  was  held  inoperative  9  In  other   States  no  provision  as  to 

in    Michigan  :    Lloyd    v.    Wayne   Circuit  the  time  within  which  the  production  is 

Judge,  56  Mich.  236,  239,  240.  required  exists;    but  in  all   of   them  au- 

4  Am  in  Iowa.  thority  is  given  to  the  judge  of  probate 

*  In  Colorado.  to  compel  such  production  by  citation  to, 

8  La  Pennsylvania  or  attachment  against,  and,  if  necessary, 

488 


§214 


PRODUCTION  OF  THE  WILL  FOR  PROBATE.   *  464,  *  465 


Penalties  for 
secreting  or 
withholding 
will  from 
probate. 


its  production  and  probate ; 1  even  a  slave  was  allowed 

a  standing  in  court  to  compel  probate  of  a  will   mand^robate. 
[*  465]  bequeathing    him    his    freedom ; 2  and    so    *  an 

executor,  devisee,  or  purchaser  from  a  devisee,  although  the 
estate  has  been  fully  distributed.8 

In  most  of  the  States,  the  secreting,  withholding,  or  refusal  to  pro- 
duce a  will  for  probate,  in  the  possession  of  an  executor  or  other 
person,  is  a  violation  of  the  law  subjecting  such  persons  to 
various  penalties ;  they  are  made  liable,  for  instance,  for 
any  damages  accruing  to  any  person  interested  in  the  will 
so  withheld,  in  California,4  Indiana,5  Iowa,6  Kansas,7 
Maine,8  Massachusetts,9  Nebraska,10  Nevada,11  Ohio,12  and 
Wisconsin;18  a  fine  is  imposed  in  Maryland;14  and  an  action  given 
for  the  use  of  the  estate,  or  a  qui  tarn  action  against  the  person  with- 
holding the  will  in  Connecticut,15  Illinois,16  Maine,17  Rhode  Island,18 
and  Vermont.19  In  Mississippi,  such  withholding  is  punishable  as 
grand  larceny.20  In  Texas,21  the  executor  forfeits  his  right  of  execu- 
torship, if  he  neglect  for  more  than  thirty  days  to  present  the  will 
for  probate. 

In  respect  of  the  time  within  which  a  will  is  allowed  to  be  proved, 
theffe  is  also  considerable  divergence  in  the  several  States.  In  New 
Jersey  probate  of  a  will  within  ten  days  of  the  testator's  death  is 
erroneous,  but   good  until  it  be  reversed  in  a  direct  proceeding.22 


imprisonment  of  the  person  having  a  will 
in  custody.  In  New  York  this  power 
was  held  not  to  be  affected  by  the  statute 
inhibiting  surrogates  from  exercising  any 
power  not  expressly  conferred :  Brick's 
Estate,  15  Abb.  Pr.  12. 

1  Finch  v.  Finch,  10  Ga.  362;  "Stone 
v.  Huxford,  8  Blackf.  452;  Stebbins  v. 
Lathrop,  4  Pick.  33 ;  Enloe  v.  Sherrill,  6 
Ired.  L.  212,  215;  State  v.  Pace,  9  Rich. 
L.  355 ;  Ryan  v.  Tex.  &  Pac.  R.  R.  Co-, 
64  Tex.  239,  242.  "  And  much  liberality 
must  be  extended  to  the  petitioner  by  the 
judge,  in  consideration  of  preliminary 
questions,  because  it  cannot  always  be 
foretold  who  may  be  interested,  or  what 
the  interpretation  of  the  will  may  be  "  : 
Keniston  v.  Adams,  80  Me.  290,  293.  One 
not  interested  cannot  bring  in  a  foreign 
probate  for  allowance :  Besancon  v.  Brown- 
son,  39  Mich.  388,  392. 

2  Ford  v.  Ford,  7  Humph.  92. 

3  Because  a  will  confers  no  legal  title 
without  probate:  State  v.  Judge,  17  La. 
An.  189  ;  Ryan  v.  Tex.  &  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 
64  Tex.  239. 

4  Code  Civ.  Pr.  1885,  §  1298. 


5  Rev.  1894,  §  2752. 

6  Code,  1888,  §  3534. 

7  Gen.  St.  1889,  §  7214. 

8  Rev.  St.  1883,  ch.  64,  §  3. 

9  Pub.  St.  1882,  ch.  127,  §  13. 

10  Cons.  St.  1893,  §  1197. 

11  St.  1885,  §  2673. 

i2  Ann.  St.  1897,  §  5924. 

13  St.  1889,  §  3786. 

14  At  the  discretion  of  the  court :  Publ. 
Gen.  L.  1888,  art.  93,  §  325. 

15  Originally  for  £5,  now  for  $20  per 
month  :  Barber  v.  Eno,  2  Root,  150. 

16  St.  &  C.  Anu.  St.  1895,  p.  269,  f  2 
($20  per  month). 

17  Moore  v.  Smith,  5  Me.  490. 

18  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  473,  §  5  ($100  per 
month).  But  under  the  present  statute 
(Laws,  1896,  p.  704,  §  7)  the  person  with- 
holding the  will  is  liable  in  damages  and 
may  be  imprisoned  for  contempt  until  he 
delivers  it. 

19  St.  1894,  §  2359  ($10  per  month). 

20  Code,  1857,  p.  434,  §  47.  See  Code, 
1880,  §  2973  ;  also  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  1327. 

21  Stone  v.  Brown,  16  Tex.  425,  428. 

22  Will  of  Evans,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  571. 

489 


*  465,  *466        THE  PROBATE  OP  THE  WILL.  §  214 

Perkins,  in  his  American  edition  of  Jarman  on  Wills,1 
time  within  mentions  a  Georgia  statute  requiring  the  registry  within 
which  probate     three  months  after  the  testator's  death,  otherwise  the  will 

to  be  void;  but  this  statute  was  held  inoperative.2  In 
Ohio,  a  devise  is  held  to  lapse,  and  the  estate  devised  to  descend  to  the 
heirs  of  the  testator,  if  the  devisee,  knowing  of  its  existence,  fail  to 
offer  the  will,  or  cause  it  to  be  offered  for  probate  within 
three  years.3  In  Connecticut  *  no  will  is  allowed  to  be  [*  46f>] 
proved  after  the  expiration  of  ten  years  from  the  testator's 
death,  except  in  the  interest  of  minors,  who  have  three  years  after 
reaching  majority  within  which  to  obtain  the  probate.4  In  Maine,6 
Oregon,6  and  Tennessee,7  no  probate  is  to  be  granted  after  the  expira- 
tion of  twenty  years  from  the  testator's  death  ;  and  in  Kentucky  the 
lapse  of  thirty  years  is  prima  facie  a  bar  to  the  establishment  of  a 
will  in  chancery,8  and  in  a  recent  case  it  is  held  that  the  probating 
of  a  will  is  barred  by  the  ten  year  Statute  of  Limitation.9  In  Indiana,10 
a  bona  fide  purchaser  from  the  heirs  of  the  testator  can  hold  against 
his  devisees  if  the  will  is  not  probated  within  three  years ;  in  New 
York  "  and  Ohio,12  if  not  within  four  years.  In  Illinois  no  time  has 
been  designated  within  which  a  will  may  be  probated ;  hence  a  will 
was  admitted  to  probate  thirteen,18  and  in  Massachusetts  sixty-three,14 
years  after  the  testator's  death.  In  North  Carolina,  also,  the  Statute 
of  Limitation  does  not  apply  to  the  simple  taking  of  probate  ;  it  must 
be  set  up,  if  at  all,  to  the  assertion  of  any  rights  claimed  under  the 
will.15  In  New  Jersey  the  will  of  a  married  woman  was  admitted  to 
probate  ten  years  after  her  death,  her  husband's  consent  thereto  being 
held  irrevocable,  although  the  husband  had  administered  the  estate 
until  his  own  death ; 16  and  in  Texas,  although  probate  is  required  to 
be  made  within  four  years,  after  the  expiration  of  which  no  letters 
testamentary  can  be  granted,  a  will  may  be  probated  thereafter  for 

1  Page  218,  note  3.  8  Hunt  v.  Hamilton,  9  Dana,  90. 

2  Harrell  v.  Hamilton,  6  Ga.  37.  9  Allen  v.  Froman,  96  Ky.  313. 

8  Carpenter  v.  Deuoon,  29  Oh.  St.  379,  10  Ann.  St.  1894,  §  2745 ;  unless  devisee 

399.  is  under  disability,  or  the  will  has  been 

4  Goodman  v.  Russ,  14  Conn.  210,  215.  concealed. 

6  Rev.  St.  ch.  64,  §  1.  But  where  the  u  Unless  the  will  is  concealed  hy  the 
will  is  fraudulently  concealed,  the  statute  heirs:  Bliss'  Ann.  Code  (3d  ed.,  1890), 
does  not  begin  to  run  until  it  has  been  §  2628. 

discovered  :  Deake,  Appellant,  80  Me.  50.        W  If  the  devisee  know  of  its  existence 
,;  St.  1 855,  p.  342,  §  30.  and  have  the  same  in  his  power  to  control : 

7  Except  to  infants  or  married  women     Bates'  Ann.  St.  1897,  §  5349. 

at  the  time  of  the  testator's  death,  as  to  13  Rebhan  v.  Mueller,  114  111.  343. 

whom  the  [imitation  is  thirty  years.     The  M  Haddock  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  146 

probate  of  a  will   in   the  probate  court  Mass.  155. 

more  than  thirty  years  after  the  death  of  15  McCormick  v.  Jernigan,   HO  N.  C. 

a  testator  was  held  erroneous,  but  COndu-     406. 

Hive,  Sh.ick.lford,  J.,  dissenting,   holding         M  Camden  Safe  D.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Ingham, 
it.  to  be  void  :  Townscud  v.  Townsend,  3     40  N.  J.  Eq.  3. 
Coldw.  70.  79,  86. 
4  '.10 


§  215     VALIDITY  OP  PROBATE  IN  PROBATE  COURTS.   *  466,  *  467 


the  purpose  of  establishing  a  link  in  the  chain  of  title  ;  and  where 
the  devisee  has  assigned  his  interest  under  the  will  before  probate,  the 
subsecpuent  probate  gives  vitality  to  the  conveyance,  except  against 
an  innocent  purchaser  from  an  heir.1  The  statute  also  makes  an 
exception  when  the  proponent  has  not  been  in  default  in  failing  to 
present  the  will  for  probate  within  the  four  years  ; 2  and  letters  so 
granted  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally.8  In  Michigan  a  legatee,  hold- 
ing a  will  or  having  knowledge  of  its  existence,  must  secure  its  pro- 
bate within  a  reasonable  time  after  he  knows  of  the  testator's  death, 

or  he  may  bar  himself  from  claiming  any  benefit  therefrom.4 
[*  467]       *  §  215.  Validity  of  Probate  in  Probate  Courts.  —  Previous 

to  the  act  creating  the  Court  of  Probates,5  no 
will  or  testamentary  paper  whatever  relating  to  person- 
alty could  be  established  or  disputed  in  any  other  than 
the  ecclesiastical  or  prescriptive  manorial  courts  of  Eng- 
land ;  these  courts,  however,  had  no  jurisdiction  over 
wills  affecting  real  estate,  —  their  sentences  and  decrees 
were  wholly  inoperative  as  to  such.6  Under  the  act 
referred  to,  jurisdiction  to  take  probate  of  wills,  without  distinguish 
ing  between  them  on  the  ground  of  their  disposing  of 
real  or  personal  property,  is  vested  in  the  Court  of  Pro- 
bate thereby  created.  The  probate  may  be  in  the 
"  common  "  or  "  non-contentious  "  form,  granted  by  the 
registrar  upon  the  affidavit  of  the  applicant  showing 
the  testator's  domicil  and  death ;  or  it  may  be  in  the  "  solemn "  or 
"  contentious  "  form,  upon  citation  to  the  widow  and  next  of  kin,  and 
a  regular  trial  by  the  judge.7  This  power  had  long  before  been  exer- 
cised by  the  probate  courts  of  nearly  all  the  States;  the  distinction 
between  wills  of  realty  and  of  personalty  is  now  practically  ignored 
in  the  proceedings  to  obtain  probate,8  except,  perhaps,  in  Maryland 
and  District  of  Columbia,  where  a  will  of  personalty  may  be  ad- 
mitted to  probate  in  the  Orphan's  Court,  and  on  the  testimony  of  one 
of  the  attesting  witnesses,  while  a  will  of  real  estate  must  be  proved 
by  the  testimony  of  all  of  them.9  In  some  of  the  States,  however, 
there   is   still  a   distinction   observed   as   to  the   conclusiveness   of 


At  common- 
law  wills  of 
personalty  re- 
ceived probate 
in  ecclesiasti- 
cal courts  only; 
wills  of  realty, 
in  common-law 
courts  only. 


Statutory  ju- 
risdiction now 
in  probate 
courts  as  to 
both. 


i  Kyan  v.  Tex.  &  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  64  Tex. 
239,  241  ;  Ochoa  v.  Miller,  59  Tex.  460. 

2  Heist  v.  Convention,  76  Tex.  514, 519. 

3  Henry  v.  Roe,  83  Tex.  446. 

4  Foote  v.  Foote,  61  Mich.  181,  194. 
6  20  &  21  Vict.  c.  77,  §  13. 

6  "  Whenever  a  freehold  is  claimed, 
the  original  will  must  be  produced.  .  .  . 
And  such  is  the  jealousy  of  the  common 
law  with  regard  to  ecclesiastical  jurisdic- 
tion, that  neither  an  exemplification  un- 
der the  great  seal,  nor  the  probate  under 


the  seal  of  the  Ecclesiastical  Court,  will 
be    admitted    as    secondary    evidence "  : 
Adams  on  Eject.  *  290  (4th  ed.),  citing 
Ash  v.  Calvert,  2  Camp.  387,  389. 
1  Wms.  Ex.  [290]. 

8  Schoul.  Ex.  §  59,  citing  Shumway 
v.  Holbrook,  1  Pick.  114;  Wilkinson  v. 
Leland,  2  Pet.  627,  655 ;  Bailey  v.  Bailey, 
8  Ohio,  239,  245. 

9  Robertson  v.  Pickrell,  109  U.  S.  608, 
610;  Campbell  v.  Porter,  162  U.  S.  478, 
486. 

491 


*  467,  *  468 


THE   PROBATE    OF   THE   WILL. 


§215 


such  probate.1  But  the  distinction  between  the  several 
Diffhr?tnt  f  methods  of  probate,  variously  designated  as  the  "  com- 
probate.  mon  "  contrasted  with  the  "solemn"  form,  the  "non- 

contentious"  with  the  "contentious,"  or  the  "ex  parte" 
probate  with  the  probate  "per  testes ,"  exists  in  many  of  them,  re- 
quiring different  forms  of  proceeding  in  bringing  about  the 
same  result  secured  by  *  the  English  statute.  Courts  of  pro-  [*  468] 
bate  have  original  exclusive  jurisdiction  in  all  of  the  States 
to  take  probate  of  wills  in  the  common  form,  where  there  is  no 
notice  to  any  of  the  parties,  or  if  parties  are  cited  or  notified  by  pub- 
lication, they  either  fail  to  appear,  or,  appearing,  make  no  objection. 
In  some  instances  the  same  class  of  courts  has  also  jurisdiction  to 
cite  parties  in  interest,  either  upon  demand  of  the  executor  or  other 
person  propounding  the  will,  or  upon  objections  being  made  or  caveat 
filed,  and  in  such  case  grant  probate  in  solemn  form,  which  then  ia 
conclusive. 

Thus    in  California,2  Delaware,8  Florida,4    Georgia,6  Maryland,0 
Mississippi,7  Nevada,  Nebraska,  New  Jersey,8  New  Hampshire,9  and 

1  See  as  to  effect  of  probate,  infra, 
§  228. 

2  Code  Civ.  Pr.  §§  1298-1333.  Parties 
having  no  notice  of  the  probate  may 
contest  within  one  year ;  and  the  decision 
on  such  contest,  as  well  as  the  original 
probate  if  not  contested  within  one  year, 
is  conclusive.  If  the  heirs  appear,  al- 
though not  properly  served  with  notice, 
they  are  bound:  Abila  v.  Padilla,  14  Cal. 
103.  Such  decision  is  not  assailable  if  not 
appealed  from :  State  v.  McGlynn,  20  Cal. 
233 ;  see  McCrea  v.  Haraszthy,  51  Cal.  146. 

8  Rev.  Code,  1874,  p.  539 ;  Davis  v. 
Rogers,  1  Houst.  183. 

4  The  will  may  be  proved  on  the  affi- 
davit of  the  executor  or  other  proponent ; 
any  party  interested  may  contest  within 
seven  years :  Meyer  v.  Meyer,  7  Fla.  292. 

5  Probate  by  one  witness  without  no- 
tice to  any  one  is  conclusive,  if  it  remains 
unchallenged  for  seven  years  (except  as 
to  minors,  wtio  may  interpose  caveat  for 
four  years  after  their  majority) ;  probate 
in  solemn  form  by  all  witnesses  upon 
notice  to  all  parties":  Code,  1882,  §§  2423- 
2426.  Notice  to  the  husband  of  one  next 
of  kin  is  not  sufficient :  Stone  v.  Green,  30 
Ga.  '140;  if  one  of  the  caveators  die,  his 
representative  need  not  he  made  a  party: 
Standi  V.  Kenan,  ■'<■>  Ga.   102  ;  destruction 


»  'I'll''    probate   in    common    form   may 
he  appealed  from,  or  proof  in  solemn  form 
492 


of  the  subject  of  a  legacy  is  no  ground 
for  a  caveat :  Newsom  v.  Tucker,  36  Ga. 
71,  76. 

6  Upon  caveat  by  any  person  in  inter- 
est, there  must  be  a  trial ;  issues  are 
made  up  and  sent  by  the  orphan's  court 
to  the  circuit  court  from  which  appeal 
lies  to  the  court  of  appeals :  Jameson  v. 
Hall,  37  Md.  221,  230;  Schull  v.  Mur- 
ray, 32  Md.  9,  15.  Where  there  is  a 
dispute  in  regard  to  the  facts,  it  is  in- 
cumbent on  the  court  to  order  a  plenary 
proceeding :  Mills  v.  Humes,  22  Md.  346, 
351,  citing  numerous  earlier  cases.  The 
probate  of  a  will  of  personalty  by  the 
probate  court  is  conclusive,  of  realty  only 
prima  facie';  but  a  rejection  is  conclusive 
in  both  classes  of  wills  :  Johns  v.  Hodges, 
62  Md.  525,  533.  The  decision  of  the 
orphan's  court  is  final  and  conclusive  on 
all  the  world  :  McDaniel  v.  McDaniel,  86 
Mil.  623.  Since  the  act  of  1894,  no  will  is 
subject  to  caveat  or  other  objection  to  its 
validity,  after  three  years  from  probate  : 
Garrison  v.  Hill,  81  Md.  551,  holding  the 
act  not  retroactive. 

7  The  issue  of  devisavit  vel  non  is  sent 
for  trial  to  the  circuit  court  and  the  ver- 
dict certified  to  the  prohate  court :  Graves 
v.  Edwards,  32  Miss.  305. 

8  Proceedings   in    this    State   are    the 

Stewart  v 


demanded   within  one  year: 
Harriman,  56  N.  H.  25. 


§215 


VALIDITY    OF   PROBATE   IN   PROBATE    COURTS. 


469 


[*  469]    South  Carolina, 1  the  probate  in  common  form  may  be  *  con- 
tested within  a  limited  time,  and  probate  in  solemn  form,  with 
notice  to  all  interested  parties,  had  in  the  probate  courts.     In  Ala- 
bama,2 Colorado,8  Illinois,4  Indiana,5  Kansas,6  Kentucky,7  Missouri,8 


same  as  in  Maryland  :  on  objections  be- 
fore the  surrogate,  trial  is  had  in  the  or- 
phan's court,  whence  issues  may  be  sent 
to  the  circuit  court ;  a  probate  without 
notice  will  be  set  aside  by  the  ordinary  : 
Will  of  Lawrence,  7  N.  J.  Eq.  215,  221. 

1  Probate  in  common  form,  by  one  wit- 
ness, ex  parte,  is  conclusive,  unless  probate 
in  full  form  be  demanded  within  four 
years  after  removal  of  any  disability, 
whereupon  trial  is  upon  notice  to  all 
parties  and  examination  of  all  the  wit- 
nesses :  Kinard  v.  Riddlehoover,  3  Rich. 
L.  258,  266. 

2  Probate  without  notice  to  the  next 
of  kin  or  widow  may  be  set  aside  in  chan- 
cery within  five  years  :  Hall  v.  Hall,  47 
Ala.  290 ;  although  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
probate  court  to  set  aside  a  probate 
granted  without  notice  to  the  heirs,  upon 
petition  by  such  heirs  :  Sowell  v.  Sowell, 
40  Ala.  243.  Notice  to  the  widow  and 
next  of  kin  is  required  in  all  cases ;  but 
one  who  does  not  contest  in  the  probate 
court,  though  he  testify  for  others  con- 
testing, may  contest  by  bill  in  chancery  at 
any  time  in  five  years  :  Knox  v.  Paull,  95 
Ala.  505,  in  which  Walker,  J.,  remarks 
that  "  the  attempt  to  trace  resemblance 
between  the  methods  of  proving  and  con- 
testing wills  under  the  statute  and  the 
system  which  it  superseded,  suggests  cer- 
tain analogies  which  are  apt  to  mislead, 
as  the  proceedings  under  the  two  systems 
are  widely  dissimilar  in  important  par- 
ticulars." 

3  Probate  may  be  contested  by  parties 
not  notified  and  not  appearing,  in  chan- 
cery, within  two  years ;  or  the  probate 
may  be  appealed  from :  Gen.  L.  1883, 
§§  3508,  3510. 

*  Within  three  years,  in  chancery ;  or 
three  years  after  removal  of  disability ; 
and  parties  may  also  contest  in  the  pro- 
bate court:  Duncan  v.  Duncan,  23  111. 
364,  366 ;  and  appeal  from  it :  Doran  v. 
Mullen,  78  HI.  342  ;  Storey's  Will,  20  111. 
App.  183;  s.  c.  120  111.  244.  The  saving 
clause  in  favor  of  persons  absent  from  the 
State  applies  only  to  persons  temporarily 
absent,  not  to  non-residents  in  general : 


Wheeler  v.  Wheeler,  134  HI.  522,  citing 
cases  pro  and  con  in  various  States.  The 
three  years  within  which  a  contest  may  be 
filed  is  not  so  much  a  statute  of  limita- 
tions as  a  mere  grant  of  jurisdiction 
within  that  time :  Siunett  v.  Bowman, 
151  111.   146. 

6  By  parties  not  present  or  notified, 
within  three  years,  or  two  years  after  re- 
moval of  disability,  in  the  circuit  court : 
Etter  v.  Armstrong,  46  Ind.  197;  Deig  v. 
Morehead,  1 10  Ind.  451.  There  is  a  right  to 
trial  by  jury :  Lamb  v.  Lamb,  105  Ind.  456. 

6  Within  two  years  after  removal  of 
disability,  by  civil  action. 

7  Within  five  years  in  circuit  court; 
or  by  persons  not  present  or  notified  in 
chancery  within  three  years,  on  the  gen- 
eral doctrine  that  a  person  bound  by  a 
judgment  who  was  not  present  or  notified 
may  have  the  judgment  reviewed :  Sin- 
gleton v.  Singleton,  8  B.  Mon.  340,  358, 
et  seq.,  reviewing  numerous  earlier  cases ; 
or  by  writ  of  error  in  circuit  court :  Tib- 
bats  v.  Berry,  10  B.  Mon.  473,  476 ;  or 
appeal :  Walters  v.  Ratliff,  5  Bush,  575, 
citing  Hughey  v.  Sidwell,  18  B.  Mon.  259. 

8  Probate  or  rejection  ex  parte  by  the 
probate  court  is  binding,  and  there  is  no 
appeal ;  but  any  person  interested  may 
within  five  years  institute  proceedings  in 
the  circuit  court  for  the  trial  of  an  issue 
of  devisavit  vel  non :  Kenrick  v.  Cole,  46 
Mo.  85 ;  Duty's  Estate,  27  Mo.  43.  The 
probate  is  a  judicial  act,  and  the  act  of  the 
clerk  admitting  the  will  to  probate  in 
vacation  is  a  mere  conditional  act  and  of 
no  effect  unless  confirmed  by  the  court : 
Snuffer  v.  Howerton,  124  Mo.  637.  The 
proceeding  in  the  circuit  court  contesting 
the  will  is  in  rem,  and  a  non-suit  cannot  be 
taken  ;  the  will  must  be  either  established 
or  rejected  :  McMahon  v.  McMahon,  100 
Mo.  97.  It  is  an  action  at  law,  though  in 
some  respects  partaking  of  a  proceeding 
in  equity :  Garland  v.  Smith,  127  Mo. 
567,  580  ;  and  is  in  the  nature  of  an  appeal 
and  a  trial  de  novo  in  the  circuit  court : 
Norton  v.  Paxton,  110  Mo.  456,  461,  and 
cases  referred  to.  See  also  post,  §  227,  on 
contest  of  wills. 

493 


*  469,  *  470 


THE    PROBATE    OF    THE    WILL. 


§215 


New  York,1  North  Carolina,2  Ohio,8  Pennsylvania,4  Tennessee,5 
Texas,6  Virginia,7  and  West  Virginia,8  the  probate  originally  ob- 
tained ex  parte,  or  in  common  form,  in  the  probate  court,  may 
be  contested  either  in  chancery,  or  by  action  in  a  court  of 
law ;  and  the  proceedings  in  such  court  constitute  *  the  [*  470] 
probate  in  solemn  or  full  form,  or,  as  is  sometimes  said,  per 
testes. 


1  Probate  by  the  surrogate  is  conclu- 
sive as  to  personalty,  prima  facie  as  to 
realty ;  he  cannot  grant  probate  in  solemn 
form :  Wetmore  v.  Parker,  52  N.  Y.  450, 
456;  Burger  v.  Hill,  1  Bradf.  360,  371. 
Rejection  of  the  will  is  conclusive  as  to 
personalty,  but  not  even  presumptive  evi- 
dence as  to  realty :  Corley  v.  McElmeel, 
149  N.  Y.  228  (Bartlett,  J.,  dissenting  on 
the  latter  point) ;  see  also  Anderson  v. 
Anderson,  112  N.  Y.  104,  113  ;  Merriam's 
Will,  136  N.  Y.  58.  The  same  evidence 
is  required  as  to  the  genuineness  of  the 
will  and  testator's  capacity  in  the  case  of 
a  will  of  realty  as  of  personalty ;  and  if 
the  question  is  properly  raised  by  one  in- 
terested in  some  capacity  the  surrogate 
should  admit  or  refuse  probate  of  the 
instrument  as  a  whole  :  Matter  of  Bartho- 
lick,  141  N.  Y.  166. 

2  Upon  caveat,  at  any  time,  proceed- 
ings will  be  removed  into  the  superior 
court.  As  to  the  effect  of  a  caveat  on  the 
powers  of  an  executor  and  further  pro- 
ceedings under  the  will,  see  Palmer's  Will, 
117  N.  C.  133;  Eandolph  v.  Hughes,  89 
N.  C.  428. 

3  Contest  may  be  made  in  the  circuit 
court  within  two  years  :  Hathaway's  Will, 
4  Oh.  St.  383.  See  Mc  Arthur  v.  Scott,  113 
U  S.  340,  385,  et  seq.,  reviewing  the  Ohio 
cases,  and  holding  that,  on  a  contest  in 
chancery,  the  decree  only  affects  parties 
to  the  suit,  being  void  as  to  all  others. 
But  if  the  proper  parties  are  before  the 
court,  if  a  bill  to  contest  is  seasonably 
filed  by  an  infant  heir,  who  is  within  the 
saving  clause  of  the  statute,  the  proper 
decree  is  to  annul  the  whole  order  of  pro- 
bate:  lb.,  p.  387;  Powell  v.  Koehler,  52 
Obi.,  Si.  103.  Post,  §  227,  p.  *500.  The 
rejection  of  B  will  in  the  probate  court, 
onappealed  from,  is  nol  in  this  State  con- 
clusive; but  it  may  lie  offered  again  for 
probate    by     any    other    party    interested 

therein:   Feuchter  v.    Keyl,  48   Oh.  St. 
857  (Minshall,  J.,  dissenting,  p.  70) ;    and 
494 


probably  this  rule  would  apply  even  where 
on  appeal  the  common  pleas  had  refused 
probate  ;  but  it  is  conclusive  on  the  pro- 
ponent ;  "  as  the  action  of  the  probate 
court  is  final  as  to  all  persons  where  the 
will  is  admitted  to  probate,  so  it  is 
equally  final  and  binding  as  to  all  per- 
sons having  due  notice  where  probate  is 
denied  "  :  Missionary  Soc.  v.  Ely,  56  Ohio 
St.  405,  410. 

4  Upon  caveat,  issues  must  be  tried 
in  the  orphan's  court  or  common  pleas 
court ;  probate  is  conclusive  as  to  per- 
sonalty, but  may  be  contested  as  to  real 
estate  by  caveat  and  action  at  law ;  if 
not  contested  within  five  years,  it  is  con- 
clusive also:  Wikoff's  Appeal,  15  Pa. 
St.  281  ;  Cauffmann  v.  Long,  82  Pa.  St. 
72;  Broe  v.  Boyle,  108  Pa.  St.  76,  82. 

5  Proof  by  one  witness ;  but  on  con- 
test at  any  time  within  eighteen  years, 
there  must  be  full  trial  in  the  circuit 
court :  Gibson  v.  Lane,  9  Yerg.  475 ;  Ed- 
mondson  v.  Carroll,  2  Sneed,  678 ;  Miller 
v.  Miller,  5  Heisk.  723. 

6  The  probate  may  be  contested  with- 
in four  years  after  removal  of  disability 
or  discovery  of  fraud,  in  the  circuit 
court. 

7  Probate  is  conclusive  upon  all  parties 
notified  or  appearing ;  but  if  not,  they 
may  impeach  the  probate  in  equity  within 
five  years  :  Spencer  v.  Moore,  4  Call,  423. 
The  jurisdiction  of  the  chancery  court 
on  a  bill  filed  to  impeach  or  establish  a 
will  is  merely  that  of  a  court  of  probate, 
and  confined  to  the  exercise  of  the  special 
and  limited  powers  conferred  upon  it  by 
the  statute  ;  hence  it  cannot  make  any 
orders  respecting  the  estate,  and  a  decree 
appointing  a  receiver  to  rent  out  the  estate 
devised  pendente  lite,  is  void:  Kirby  v. 
Kirby,  84  Va.  627. 

8  Appeal  is  given  within  one  year  to 
circuit  court,  and  review  in  chancery 
within  three  years. 


215 


VALIDITY   OF   PROBATE    IN   PROBATE   COURTS. 


*470 


In  the  States  of  Arkansas,1  Iowa,2  Maine,  Massachusetts,8  Mich- 
igan,4 Minnesota,  Oregon,5  Rhode  Island,  Vermont,  and  Wisconsin,6 
the  probate  obtained  in  the  probate  court  seems  to  have  all  the  force 
and  validity  of  a  probate  in  solemn  form,  and  is  conclusive,  both  as  to 
real  and  personal  estate,  if  not  appealed  from  or  annulled  in  equity 
for  fraud,  or  some  cause  which  gives  equity  courts  jurisdiction  over 
judgments  at  law.7 

In  Louisiana  the  will  must  be  proved  before  the  parish  or  district 
judge ; 8  a  foreign  will  may  be  registered,  or  proved  before  the  court 
in  which  it  is  offered  as  evidence.9 

The  rules  and  effect  of  contest  of  wills  are  further  considered  in 
connection  with  the  revocation  of  probate.10 

The  probate  of  wills  lost,  suppressed,  or  destroyed  n  is  ordinarily 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  probate  courts,  as  coming  within  the  scope 
of  their  general  jurisdiction.12   But  in  most  of  the  United 
States  chancery  courts  exercise  the  power  to  establish 
wills  on  the  ground  that  they  have  been  lost,  suppressed, 
or  destroyed,  and  the  jurisdiction  in  such  cases  seems  to 
be  concurrent,13  unless  the  statute  restrict  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  one  or  other  of  these  courts.     Thus,  it  is  held  in  Tennessee, 
that  where  a  will  has  been  lost,  or  destroyed,  or  suppressed,  by  acci- 


Jurisdiction 
over  probate  of 
lost,  sup- 
pressed, or  de- 
stroyed wills. 


1  Dowell  v.  Tucker,  46  Ark.  438,  449. 
The  probate  court  can  admit  the  will  to 
probate  in  common  form,  or  cause  all 
parties  interested  to  be  summoned ;  in 
case  of  error  it  must  be  corrected  by  ap- 
peal and  not  certiorari :  Petty  v.  Ducker, 
51  Ark.  281, 284  ;  any  party  in  interest  may 
make  himself  a  party  by  perfecting  an 
appeal  from  the  ex  parte  probate  in  com- 
mon form  :  Ouchita  v.  Scott,  64  Ark. 
349. 

2  Proceedings  in  Iowa  are  in  the  cir- 
cuit court :  Code,  §  2312 ;  Murphy  v. 
Black,  41  Iowa,  488  ;  Gilruth  v.  Gilruth, 
40  Iowa,  346;  a  proceeding  to  probate  is 
not  reviewable  de  novo  on  appeal :  Don- 
nely's  Will,  68  Iowa,  126. 

3  Bonnemort  v.  Gill,  167  Mass.  338, 
holding  the  decree  of  probate  to  be  in  the 
nature  of  a  proceeding  in  rem,  to  which  all 
persons  in  interest  may  make  themselves 
parties,  but  are  forever  bound  by  the  de- 
cree whether  they  are  in  fact  parties,  or 
not:  p.  340;  Parker  v.  Parker,  11  Cush. 
519. 

4  In  this  State  the  statute  requires  the 
probate  judge,  in  case  there  are  foreign 
heirs,  to  notify  the  consul  of  the  nation 


where  they  reside,  by  letter,  of  the  appli- 
cation for  probate  ;  this  notice  is  held  to 
be  for  the  sole  benefit  of  such  foreign 
heirs,  not  to  be  invoked  by  any  other 
party,  and  is  not  essential  to  give  the 
court  jurisdiction,  the  probate  being  a 
proceeding  in  rem  :  Rice  v.  Hosking,  105 
Mich.  303. 

5  See  Richardson  v.  Green,  61  Fed. 
(C.  C.  A.)  423,  426,  429,  and  cases  cited. 
After  the  will  has  received  probate  in  the 
common  form,  it  can  be  attacked  by  a  di- 
rect proceeding  between  parties. 

6  O'Dell  v.  Rogers,  44  Wis.  136. 

7  Schoul.  Ex.  §  70,  citing  Smith  Prob. 
Pr.  46. 

8  Voorh.  Civ.  Code,  1889,  art.  1644. 
Succession  of  Eubanks,  9  La.  An.  147  ; 
Hollingshead  v.  Sturges,  16  La.  An.  334. 

9  Voorh.  Civ.  Code,  art.  1688. 

10  Post,  §  227. 

11  As  to  which  see  post,  §  221. 

"  Dower  v.  Seeds,  28  W.  Va.  113,  152, 
and  numerous  cases  cited. 

1S  Dower  v.  Seeds,  supra  ;  Harris  v. 
Tisereau,  52  Ga.  153;  Missionary  Soc.  v. 
Eells,  68  Vt.  497  ;  see  also  Hall  v.  Gilbert, 
31  Wis.  691. 

495 


*  470,  *  471        THE  PROBATE  OF  THE  WILL.  §  216 

dent  or  fraud,  it  can  only  be  set  up  in  a  court  of  chancery  ; 1  in  Ohio, 
California,  and  Vermont,  that  the  jurisdiction  is  confined  to  a  court 
of  probate ; 2  and  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  expressed 
grave  doubt  whether  such  is  the  law  of  Louisiana.8 

§  216.    Method  of  Proof    in    Common    Form.  —  The   probate   of  a 

will  in  common  form  is  in  its  nature  ex  parte,  without  notice  to  any 

one   interested   in  or  against  it,   and   resting,   in   some 

Ex  parte  or        States,  upon  the  evidence  or  affidavit  of  a  single  witness, 

non-cnnten-  ....  .  ,  , 

tious  probate,      which  in  some  instances  may  be  the  executor 

*  or  proponent  himself.  It  "  applies  only  for  con-  [*  471] 
venience,  expedition,  and  the  saving  of  expense,  where  there 
is  apparently  no  question  among  the  parties  interested  in  the  estate 
that  the  paper  propounded  is  the  genuine  last  will  and  as  such  en- 
titled to  probate.  For  contentious  business  before  the  court,  probate 
in  common  form  would  be  quite  unsuitable." 4  According  to  the 
English  ecclesiastical  practice,  in  which  this  form  of  probate  origi- 
nated, a  will  is  proved  when  the  executor  presents  it  before  the  judge 
and  produces  more  or  less  proof  that  the  testament  presented  is  the 
true,  whole,  and  last  testament  of  the  deceased,  whereupon  the  judge 
passes  the  instrument  to  probate,  and  issues  letters  testamentary 
under  the  official  seal.5  Under  the  Court  of  Probate  Act 
Effect  of  pro-  the  executor  may  at  his  pleasure  prove  the  will  in  com- 
mon and  in  mon  or  in  solemn  form,  the  difference  in  effect  being  that 
solemn  form  j.]ie  probate  in  common  form  may  be  impeached  at  any 
time  within  thirty  years  by  a  person  having  an  interest, 
whereupon  the  executor  will  be  compelled  to  prove  it  per  testes  in 
solemn  form;6  whereas,  if  once  proved  in  solemn  form  of  law,  the 
executor  is  not  to  be  compelled  to  prove  the  same  any  more,  and 
the  instrument  remains  in  force,  although  all  the  witnesses  be  dead.7 

1  Buchanan  v.  Matlock,  8  Humph.  390,  4  Schoul.  Ex.  §  66.  But  in  some  States, 
400.  for  instance,  in  Missouri,  there  can  be  no 

2  Morningstar  v.  Selby,  15  Ohio,  345,  contentious  proceeding  until  the  will  has 
362 ;  McDaniel  v.  Pattison,  98  Cal.  86,  94  been  either  admitted  or  rejected  by  the 
(denying  jurisdiction  in  chancery  to  es-  probate  court,  which  can  only  be  in  the 
tablish    a   will  lost   or   fraudulently  sup-  common   form:   Rev.  St.    1889,    §§  8880, 


pressed,  even  as  incidental  to  relief  against 
the  spoliator),  102;  Missionary  Society  v.  8  Schoul.  Ex.  §  66,  citing  Swinb.,  pt.  6, 

Eells,  su[>ra  (holding  that  chancery  can-  §  14,  pi.  1  ;  Wins.  Ex.  [325]. 
not  draw  to  itself  jurisdiction  by  granting  G  So  the  probate  of  a  codicil,  granted 

gome  other  equitable  aid,  but  may  supple-  in  common  form  in  1808,  was  upon  cita- 

iii. -lit  any  shortage  in   the  powers  of  the  tion  of  the  executor  by  the  next  of  kin 

probate  court  by  affording  collateral  equi-  to  prove  it  per  testes  in  due  form  of  law, 

table  relief).  revoked   in   1818  :    Wms.,  citing    Satter- 

»  Gains  v.  Chew,  2  How.  (U.  S.)619,  thwaite  v.  Satterthwaite, 3 Phillim.  1 ;  and 

647.    This  dictum  as  to  the  inherent  power  one  granted  in  1807  was  revoked  in  1820: 

of  equity   in   such    case   was  afterwards  Finucane  v.  Gayfere,  3  Phillim.  405. 
criticised  aa  being  obiter  and  without  the         7  Wms.  Ex.  [334],  citing  Swinb.,  pt.  6 

"  support  of  any  well-considered  cases":  §  14,  pi.  4. 
Broderick's  Will,  21  Wall.  503,  p.  514. 
496 


§216 


METHOD   OP   PROOF   IN   COMMON   FORM.      *471,  *  472 


According  to  the  practice  in  American  probate  courts,  a  similar 
course  is  pursued  in  most  of  the  States ;  usually,  the  executor  (but  it 
may  be  any  other  person  having  an  interest)  presents 
the  will,  and  sets  forth  in  a  petition  (which  may  be  a    Proof  in  com- 
printed  blank  provided  for  such  purpose)  the  facts  of  the    under  Ameri- 
death  of  the  testator,    his  last  domicil,  the  names  and   can  statutes, 
places  of  residence  of  the  surviving  widow  or  husband, 
if  there  be  such,  and  of  the  next  of  kin ;  and  alleging  that  the  paper  or 
papers  presented  constitute  the  last  will  of  the  deceased,  prays  for 
the   probate   thereof  and  for  appointment  of  executor  or  adminis- 
trator, as  the  case  may  be.1    It  is  held  in  some  of  the  States, 
[*  472]  as  has  *  already  been  mentioned,  that  proof  may  be  made  by 
a  single  subscribing  witness  ; 2  but  in  most  of  them  the  testi- 
mony of  both  or  all  subscribing  witnesses  is  required,  if  they  are  liv- 
ing and   within  the  reach  of  the  process  of  the  court.8 
"Whether  the  will  be  proved  by  the  testimony  of  one  or 
all  of  the  witnesses,  or  by  the  affidavit  of  the  executor, 
or  by  other  witnesses,  the  facts  necessary  to  be  proved 
are  in  all  instances  the  same ;  that  the  testator  was  of 
sound  mind,  and  that  he  and  the  subscribing  witnesses  complied  with 
all   the  requirements  of  the  statute  respecting  the  execution   and 
attestation    by  the  requisite  number  of  witnesses.4     The  essential 
qualities  of  a  will  have  been  considered  in  a  former  chapter  of  this 
work,  to  which  reference  is  hereby  made.5 


What  facts 
must  be  proved 
to  obtain  pro- 
bate. 


1  Schoul.  Ex.  §  65.  It  is  not  essential 
that  the  petition  allege  the  testamentary- 
capacity  of  the  testator :  Hathaway's 
Appeal,  46  Mich.  326, 328. 

2  So  provided  by  statute  in  California  : 
Code  Civ.  Pr.  §  1308 :  Massachusetts : 
Pub.  St.  754,  §  1;  Michigan:  Howell's 
St.  §  5802;  Nevada:  Gen.  St.  1885,  § 
2685  ;  and  held  in  Iowa :  Barney  v.  Chit- 
tenden, 2  Green  (Iowa),  165,  176;  and 
Tennessee :  Rogers  v.  Winton,  2  Humph. 
178;  but  in  a  later  case  it  was  held  that 
there  must  he  two  witnesses  to  prove  a 
will  of  personalty  in  Tennessee,  who  need 
not,  however,  be  subscribing  witnesses : 
Johnson  v.  Fry,  1  Coldw.  101.  The  stat- 
utes of  Florida,  Georgia  (Brown  v.  An- 
derson, 13  Ga.  171),  South  Carolina,  and 
Tennessee  (Code,  1884,  §  3012)  contain 
similar  provisions. 

8  Doran  v.  Mullen,  78  111.  342,  344; 
Lindsay  v.  McCormack,  2  A.  K.  Marsh. 
229  ;  Martin  v.  Perkins,  56  Miss.  204,  209 ; 
Butler  v.  Benson,  1  Barb.  526,  533 ;  Arm- 
strong v.  Baker,  9  Ired.  109;  Fry's  Will, 
VOL.  i.  — 32 


2  E.  I.  88,  90 ;  Clarke  v.  Dunnavant,  10 
Leigh,  13,  23:  Staring  v.  Bowen,  6  Barb. 
109,  113.  But  it  is  not  essential  that  the 
subscribing  witnesses  shall  each  testify  to 
all  of  the  essential  facts  :  Tilden  v.  Tilden, 
13  Gray,  110;  Weir  v.  Fitzgerald,  2 
Bradf.  42.  See  post,  §  218,  on  the  effect 
of  want  of  memory  of  subscribing  wit- 
nesses. 

4  Moore  v.  Steele,  10  Humph.  562; 
Johnson  v.  Dunn,  6  Gratt.  625.  The 
handwriting  of  a  testator  who  signed  by 
making  a  mark  cannot  be  proved :  Walsh's 
Will,  1  Tuck.  132;  Matter  of  Reynolds, 
4  Dem.  68 ;  except  by  one  who  saw  him 
affix  the  mark :  Matter  of  Dockstader,  6 
Dem.  106  ;  and  even  though  such  witness 
he  the  only  subscribing  witness;  Matter 
of  Kane,  2  Connoly,  249,  258 ;  and  where 
the  witnesses  seemed  to  remember  the 
circumstances  with  essential  accuracy,  the 
want  of  testamentary  declaration  was  held 
fatal:  Wilson  v.  Hetterick,  2  Bradf.  427. 

5  Ante,  §§  36  et  seq. 

497 


472,  *473 


THE   PROBATE   OF   THE   WILL. 


§217 


Proof  in  sol- 
emn form  re- 
quires notice, 
and  trial  of  an 
issue  of  devisa- 
vit  vel  non. 


§  217.   The  Probate  in   Solemn    Form.  —  The  English    distinction 
between  the  common  or  ex  parte  probate  and  the  probate  in  solemn 
form,  or  per  testes^  has  already  been  mentioned.1     In  some  of  the 
American  States,2  the  only  method  of  probate  provided 
for  is  the  original  proceeding  in  the  probate  court,  which, 
as  it  requires  citation  or  notice  to  all  the  parties  inter- 
ested and  a  regular  trial  of  the  issue  of  devisavit  vel  non, 
with  trial  by  jury  under  the  direction  of  a  judge,  is  sub- 
stantially a  proceeding  in  solemn  form.8    In  others,  how- 
ever, the  proceeding  in  solemn  form  is  materially  different 
from  *  that  primarily  resorted  to  in  the  probate  court,  and  [*  473] 
may  in  some  instances  be  had  in  the  probate  court  also,  but 
must  in  others  be  pursued  in  common-law  or  chancery  courts.4    The 
chief  distinction  here,  as  in  England,  is  the  necessity  of  notice  or 
summons  to  all  the  parties  in  interest  in  the  plenary  proceeding,8 
while  the  other  is  generally  ex  parte.     Another  rule  is, 
All  attesting      that  upon  a  contest,  or  caveat,  where  probate  in  solemn 

witnesses 

required.  form  is  required,  all  the  attesting  witnesses  competent 

to  testify,  and  within  the  reach  of  the  process  of  the 
court,  must  be  examined.6  But  this  rule  is  not  a  universal  one ;  there 
are  cases  in  some  of  the  States  in  which,  on  proceedings  at  law  for 
the  probate  of  a  will,  the  testimony  of  one  or  two  subscribing  wit- 
nesses out  of  a  greater  number  was  held  sufficient  to  establish  it  with- 
out calling  or  examining  them  all;7  in  others  that  the  testimony  of 
one  subscribing  witness,  and  facts  and  circumstances  equal  to  that  of 
another,  are  sufficient.8  But  on  a  contest  or  proof  in  solemn  form, 
all  persons  interested  in  the  will,  as  well  as  all  persons  who  would  in 
the  absence  of  a  will  be  entitled  to  inherit,  must  be  made  parties  by 
publication  or  service  of  notice ; 9  unless  they  appear.10     In  Michigan 


1  Ante,  §  215. 

2  lb. 

8  Sclioul.  Ex.  §  70. 

*  Ante,  §  215. 

6  "  In  proceedings  of  this  nature,  .  .  . 
the  judge  of  probate  having  given  that 
public  notice  which  the  law  requires,  the 
mere  fact  that  some  of  the  heirs  are  in- 
fants, idiots,  or  insane  will  not  defeat  the 
probate  of  the  will":  Dewey,  J.,  in  Par- 
ker v.  Parker,  11  dish.  519,  524.  Where 
the  statute  prescribes  no  form  of  notice 
for  the  parties  to  pursue,  the  sufficiency 
of  notice  is  left  in  the  discretion  of  the 
judge  :  Marry  r.  Marry,  6  Met.  (Mass.) 
,30o,  :t*. 7.  The  proceeding  is  in  rrm,  and 
therefore  none  of  the  parties  ran  dismiss 
the  proceeding,  or  take  a  non-suit:  post, 
§  227,  p.  •500. 
498 


6  Brown  v.  Anderson,  13  Ga.  171,  177; 
Withinton  v.  Withinton,  7  Mo.  589  ;  Chase 
t;.  Lincoln,  3  Mass.  236 ;  Burwell  v.  Cor- 
biL,  1  Rand.  131,  141  ;  Bailey  ;;.  Stiles, 
2  N.  J.  Eq.  220,  232;  Rash  v.  Purnel,  2 
Harring.  448,  449. 

7  Hall  v.  Sims,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  509,  511  ; 
Jackson  v.  Vickory,  1  Wend.  406,  412; 
Walker  v.  Hunter,  17  Ga.  364,  410,  et  seq. ; 
McKcen  v.  Frost,  46  Me.  239,  244. 

8  Suggett  v.  Kitchell,  6  Yerg.  425  ; 
Loomis  v.  Kellogg,  1 7  Pa.  St.  60,  63  ; 
Moore  v.  Steele,  10  Humph.  562,  565; 
Bowling  v.  Bowling,  8  Ala.  538;  Nalle  v. 
Fenwick,  4  Rand.  585,  588. 

9  Crew  v.  Fratt,  119  Cal.  139,  153;  as  to 
the  rules  relating  to  the  contest  of  wills, 
see  post,  §  227. 

10  Crew  v.  Fratt,  supra. 


§  218  PROOF   WITHOUT   SUBSCRIBING   WITNESSES.      *  473,  *  474 

it  is  intimated,  contrary  to  the  English  rule,  that  all  the  subscribing 
witnesses  need  not  be  called,  except  inferentially  in  the  probate 
court.1  The  age  of  the  instrument  to  be  proved  is  held  to  be  an 
important  element  to  be  considered  in  connection  with  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  proof  to  establish  it ;  a  will  forty  years  old  may  be 
proved  by  testimony  which  would  be  insufficient  to  prove  one  of 
recent  date.2  And  it  is  not  essential  that  each  one  of  the  witnesses 
shall  be  able  to  testify  to  all  the  formalities  required  for  the  execu- 
tion and  attestation  of  the  will.8  So  it  is  held  in  Illinois,  that  the 
subscribing  witnesses  must  declare  that  the  testator  was,  in  their 

belief,  of  sound  mind  and  memory,  but  this  may  be  stated  in 
[*  474]  *  equivalent   words ;   it  is  not  essential  that  the  statutory 

formula  shall  be  adhered  to.4 
§  218.  Proof  when  the  Testimony  of  Subscribing  Witnesses  can- 
not be  obtained.  —  It  appears  from  the  discussion  of  the  subject  of 
the  attestation  of  wills  in  a  former  chapter,5  that  the  competency  of 
attesting  witnesses  generally  required  by  the  statute  refers  to  the 
time  of  attestation ;  for  it  may  happen  that  a  witness  has  become 
incompetent  after  the  execution  of  a  will,  but  before  the  death  of  the 
testator.  And  it  was  there  also  shown  that  the  statute  of  Geo.  II.  c. 
6,  which  provides  that  interest  in  the  probate  of  a  will  does  not  dis- 
qualify an  attesting  witness,  but  that  the  act  of  attestation  disquali- 
fies the  witness  from  taking  any  benefit  under  the  will,  has  been 
substantially  enacted  in  most  of  the  States.6  It  is  self-evidently 
indispensable  to  admit  aliunde  evidence  to  prove  the 
will,  if  any  one  or  more  of  the  attesting  witnesses  are    Aliunde  testi- 

t       j     •  ,     jy  ,  ii     i  monyadmis- 

dead,  insane,  or  cannot,  tor  any  reason,  be  compelled  or  sibie  if  that  of 
permitted  to  testify  on  the  probate  thereof.     Thus  where    subscribing 

witnesses  is 

one  of  the  attesting  witnesses  is  probate  judge,  the  will  not  attainable, 
may  be  proved  by  the  other  witnesses;7  where  any  of 
them  are  dead,  insane,  or  incompetent  to  testify,  or  where  their  place 
of  residence  or  whereabouts  is  unknown,  so  that  their  testimony  can- 
not be  obtained,  proof  may  be  made  of  their  handwriting,  and  of  the 
handwriting  of  the  testator,  and  the  will  admitted  to  probate  upon  such 
proof.8  But  in  order  to  make  such  testimony  admissible,  it  must  be 
shown  that  it  is  impossible  to  obtain  that  of  the  subscribing  witnesses, 

1  Abbott    v.   Abbott,    41     Mich.    540,  6  Ante,  §  41, -p.  *  73. 

543.  7  Patten  v.  Tallman,  27  Me.  17,  27 ;  in 

2  Welty  v.  Welty,  8  Md.  15,  21,  citing  some  instances  the  statutes  provide  for 
Lovelass  on  Wills,  418;  23  Law  Libr.  probate  before  another  officer  in  such 
(Wharton's  ed.)  1839,  p.  223;  Jackson  v.  case:  Gen.  St.  Col  1883,  §  3504;  Rev. 
Le  Grange,  19  Johns.  386,  389.  St.  HI.  1885,  p.  2469,  §  5. 

3  Jauncey  v.  Thorne,  2  Barb.  Ch.  40,  »  Miller  v.  Carothers,  6  Serg.  &  R.  215, 
53.  222  ;  Hopkins  v.  De  Graff enreid,  2  Bay, 

4  Bice  v.  Hall,  120  111.  597,  600;  Yoe  187,  192,  Pollock  v.  Glassell,  2  Gratt. 
v.  McCord,  74  111.  33.  439,  460 ;  Snider  v.  Burks,  84  Ala.  53,  56  ; 

5  Ante,  §  41,  p.  *72.  Robinson  v.  Brewster,  140  111.  649. 

499 


474,  *  475 


THE    PROBATE   OF   THE   WILL. 


§218 


be  accounted 
for. 


either  by  taking  their  depositions,  as  is  provided  for  in  some  States 
in  case  of  attesting  witnesses  being  beyond  the  reach  of  the  process 
of  the  court,  or  by  securing  their  personal  attendance.1  Where  the 
statute  does  not  authorize  the  taking  of  the  depositions  of  subscribing 
witnesses,  secondary  evidence  is  admissible,  upon  proof 
of  their   being  beyond   *  reach  of  process  of  the  court  in  [*  475] 

which  proceedings  are  pending.2  In  all  such 
"^bscribine  cases  the  absence  of  the  witnesses  must  be  satisfactorily 
witnesses  must  accounted  for,  after  proof  of  such  diligence  in  the  search 
for  them  and  endeavor  to  obtain  their  testimony  as  is 
required  ordinarily  before  evidence  of  a  secondary  nature 
is  admitted.8 

For  the  same  reason  the  validity  of  a  will  cannot  be  permitted  to 
rest  upon  the  veracity  or  memory  of  the  attesting  witnesses :  to  do 
so  would  be  subversive  of  justice  and  destructive  of  the 
rights  of  the  testator  as  well  as  of  the  beneficiaries  under 
the  will.  Hence  a  will  may  be  established  although 
some  or  all  of  the  subscribing  witnesses  fail  to  remem- 
ber the  essential  facts  to  be  proved,4  or  where  their 
testimony,  biased  by  prejudice,  interest,  or  ill  will,  negatived  such 
facts.5    It  is  held  that  where  there  is  a  failure  of  recollection  by 


Probate  in 
default  of  or 
against  the 
testimony  of 
subscribing 
witnesses. 


1  Graber  v.  Haaz,  2  Dem.  216;  Stow 
v.  Stow,  1  Redf.  305.  In  Illinois,  on  ap- 
peal from  the  probate  court,  from  an 
order  admitting  a  will  to  probate,  the  evi- 
dence is  confined  to  the  subscribing  wit- 
nesses:  Noble's  Will,  124  111.  266.  In 
Mississippi  it  is  held  that,  on  the  ex  parte 
exhibition  of  a  will,  the  subscribing  wit- 
nesses must  be  examined,  and  are  the 
only  competent  witnesses  to  prove  the 
signing,  publication,  and  attestation ;  but 
other  witnesses  may  prove  the  sanity : 
Martin  v.  Perkins,  56  Miss.  204,  209.  In 
the  absence  of  statutory  provision  it  is 
held  that  the  proponent  need  not  obtain 
the  deposition  of  an  attesting  witness  not 
within  reach  of  process:  Denney  v.  Pin- 
ney,  60  Vt.  524. 

2  Bowling  v.  Bowling,  8  Ala.  538; 
Bethell  v.  Moore,  2  Dev.  &  B.  L.  311. 
Engle8  v.   Bruington,  4  Yeates,  345. 

3  Stow  v.  Stow,  1  Redf.  305 ;  Perkins's 
Jarm.  on  Wills,  219.  Thus,  where  one 
voluntarily,  without  mistake  or  accident, 
destroyed  a  will,  he  would  not  be  per- 
mitted to  prove  it  by  secondary  evidence  : 
Wyckoff   V.    Wvrkoff,    16   N.   J.   Eq.  401. 

See,  as  to  diligence  required  in  search  for 
scribing  witnesses,   1    Greenl.   Ev.   § 
074;   Hodnetl  v.  Smith,  2  Sweeney,  401. 
500 


*  McKee  v.  White,  50  Pa.  St.  354,  359  ; 
Hopf  v.  State,  72  Tex.  281,  285;  Marton 
v.  Heidorn,  135  Mo.  608  (in  contentious 
proceeding).  "  Want  of  memory  will  no 
more  destroy  the  attestation  than  insanity, 
absence,  or  death  ;  .  .  .  memory  can  no 
more  be  kept  alive  than  the  body,  and 
hence  the  law  allows  the  attesting  signa- 
ture to  speak,  when  the  tongue  may  be 
silent ;  and  it  attests  that  everything  was 
rightly  done  unless  the  act  attested  be 
impeached,  not  negatively  merely,  but 
positively  "  :  Kirk  v.  Carr,  54  Pa.  St.  285, 
290;  Newhouse  v.  Godwin,  17  Barb.  236, 
255  ;  Beadles  v.  Alexander,  9  Baxt.  604  ; 
Allaire  v.  Allaire,  37  N.  J.  L.  312,  325  ; 
O'Hogan's  Will,  73  Wis.  78. 

5  Lamberts  v.  Cooper,  29  Gratt.  61,  68 ; 
Pollock  v.  Glassell,  2  Gratt.  439,  462,  cit- 
ing numerous  English  cases ;  Vernon  v. 
Kirk,  30  Pa.  St.  218;  Howell's  Will,  5 
T.  B.  Mon.  199,  203;  Peebles  v.  Case,  2 
Bradf.  226,  240 ;  Will  of  Jenkins,  43  Wis. 
610,  612  ;  Loughney  v.  Loughney,  87  Wis. 
92;  Barnewall  v.  Murrell,  108  Ala.  366, 
381  ;  Abbott  v.  Abbott,  41  Mich.  540,  542  ; 
Conselyea  v.  Walker,  2  Dem.  117,  121; 
Mays  v.  Mays,  114  Mo.  536,  541. 


§  219  WITNESSES   DISQUALIFIED   BY   INTEREST.      *  475,  *  476 

the  subscribing  witnesses,  the  probate  of  the  will  can-    importance  of 
not  be  defeated  if  the  attestation  clause  and  the  sur-   attestation 
rounding  circumstances  satisfactorily  establish  its  exe- 
cution.1    The  testimony  of  an  attesting  witness  invalidating  a  will 
ought  to  be  viewed  with  suspicion,2  because  such  person  by  his 
[*  476]  act  of  attestation  solemnly  testifies  to  the  sanity  of  the  *  tes- 
tator;8 it  was  said  that  no  fact  stated  by  such  a  witness 
can  be  relied  on  when  he  is  not  corroborated  by  other  witnesses.4 
But  of  whatever  effect  the  recitals  in  the  attestation  clause  may  be 
where  the  witness  fails  to  remember  what  occurred,  they  are  not 
sufficient    to    outweigh    his    positive    statements    in    contradiction 
thereof.5 

§  219.    Witnesses  Disqualified  by    Interest.  —  The  competency  of 
attesting  witnesses,  to  what  extent  and  in  what  States  an  interest  in 
the  will  disqualifies  them,  and  how  and  when  their  com-   Dj9quaijnca_ 
petency  may  be  restored,  as  well  as  the  effect  of  the  tes-   tion  of  other 

, .  «  ,  .,  j  i  witnesses  by 

tirnony  of  such  witnesses  upon  a  devise  or  legacy  to  interest. 
tbem,  has  been  discussed  in  a  former  chapter  in  connec- 
tion with  the  attestation  of  wills.6  But  one  who  is  not  an  attesting 
or  subscribing  witness  may  also  be  incompetent,  by  reason  of  interest 
in  the  probate,  to  testify.  Thus,  it  was  held  in  Alabama  that  the 
proponent,  being  interested  in  the  question  of  costs,  was  incompe- 
tent to  testify  in  support  of  the  will ; 7  and  in  New  Jersey,  that  an 
executor  was  disqualified  because  of  the  commissions  to  which  he 
would  be  entitled.8  This  subject  is  determined  by  the  law  of  each 
State  in  defining  the  competency  of  witnesses  in  ordinary  cases.  The 
rule  which  excluded  witnesses  on  account  of  their  interest  has  been 
greatly  relaxed  in  most  of  the  States ;  and  it  seems  now  that  one 

1  Rugg  v.  Rugg,  83  N.  Y.  592,  594,  Lewis  v.  Lewis,  11  N.  Y.  220,  224,  citing 
citing  Matter  of  Kellum,  52  N.  Y.  517,  English  and  American  cases  ;  Orser  v. 
and  Trustees  v.  Calhoun,  25  N.  Y.  422,  Orser,  24  N.  Y.  51,  54 ;  Darnell  v.  Busby, 
425;  Will  of  Pepoon,  91  N.  Y.  255,  258  ;  50  N.  J.  Eq.  725,  732 ;  Barr  v.  Graybill, 
Matter  of  Nelson,  141  N.  Y.  152;  Allaire  13  Pa.  St.  396, 399,  distinguishing  between 
v.  Allaire,  37  N.  J.  L.  312;  Brown  v.  the  want  of  memory  by  the  witness  and 
Clark,  77  N.  Y.  369;  1  Am.  Pr.  R.  510,  affirmative  testimony  showing  the  omis- 
and  cases  cited,  p.  517  et  seq.  sion   of  some  essential   requisite  to  the 

2  Lamberts  v.  Cooper,  29  Gratt.  61,  validity  of  the  will.  See  also  Tucker  v. 
68.    As  to  the  importance  of  reciting  all  Sandidge,  85  Va.  546,  571. 

the    formalities   required    in    the   execu-  6  Ante,  §41. 

tion  and  attestation  of  a  will  in  the  at-         7  Gilbert  v.  Gilbert,  22  Ala.  529,  532. 

testation  clause,  see  ante,  §  40,  and  supra,  But  it  is  now  held  that  the  proponent,  who 

note  4.  is  a  party  and  interested  as  a  legatee,  is  a 

8  Webb  v.  Dye,  18   W.  Va.  376,388;  competent  witness  under  the  statute  to 

Young  v.  Barner,  27  Gratt.  96,  103.  prove  the  execution  :    Snider   v.   Burks, 

4  Staples,  J.,  in  Cheatham  v.  Hatcher,  84  Ala.  53,  56. 
30  Gratt.  56,  64,  citing  Kinleside  v.  Har-         8  Snedekers   v.  Allen,  2  N.  J.  L.  35, 

rison,  2  Phillim.  449.  38. 

6  Burke    v.  Nolan,   1   Dem.  436,   442  ; 

501 


*476,  *477  THE   PROBATE   OF   THE   WILL.  §  219 

who  would  be  competent  to  testify  in  an  action  between  himself  and 
the  parties  interested  in  the  probate  of  the  will  is  competent  to  give 
evidence  for  or  against  it.1  In  Maine,  it  is  held  that  the  provision  of 
the  statute  which  excepts  executors,  administrators,  and  heirs  of  a 
deceased  person  from  the  operation  of  the  general  law  providing  that 
no  one  shall  be  excused  or  excluded  from  testifying  on  the  ground 
of  interest  in  the  event  of  the  suit,  as  party  or  otherwise,  does  not  apply 
to  one  named  as  executor  in  a  will,  because  such  person  is  not  really 
and  legally  an  executor  until  the  will  has  been  established,2 
nor  to  one  *  who  opposes  the  probate  as  guardian  of  minor  [*  477] 
heirs.8  In  Massachusetts,  the  exception  from  such  an  ena- 
bling statute  of  "  attesting  witnesses  to  a  will  or  codicil  "  is  held  not 
to  apply  to  an  executor  who  is  also  one  of  the  subscribing  wit- 
nesses;4 which  would,  a  fortiori,  qualify  one  who  is  named  as  execu- 
tor, but  who  is  not  a  subscribing  witness,  as  a  competent  witness  to 
the  probate.  So  in  New  York5  and  North  Carolina.6  In  the  latter 
State  the  statute  of  1866,  removing  the  disqualification  of  interest,  is 
held  to  apply  to  witnesses  in  will  cases,  rendering  legatees  and 
devisees  competent  to  prove  the  will,  except  they  be  attesting  wit- 
nesses.7 In  Missouri,  the  statute  removing  the  disability  of  witnesses 
on  account  of  interest  was  held  to  enable  beneficiaries  under  a  will, 
who  were  not  subscribing  witnesses,  to  testify  in  support  of  its  pro- 
bate ; 8  but  this  was  subsequently  qualified  to  the  extent  of  requiring 
proof  to  be  made  of  due  execution  and  attestation  by  the  subscribing 
witnesses,  and  holding  interested  witnesses  incompetent  to  supply 
such  proof;9  and  later  still  it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  that  a 
legatee  whose  interest  in  the  establishment  of  a  will  still  continues, 
though  not  an  attesting  witness,  will  not  be  allowed  to  testify  as  to 
its  due  execution.10     In  Pennsylvania,  one  appointed  as  executrix  is 

1  Milton  i'.  Hunter,  13  Bush,  163,  168;  112,  which  similarly  construes  a  Massa- 
Harper  v.  Harper,  1  Th.  &  C.  351,  359,  chusetts  statute  of  like  import;  Gamache 
360;  Elliott  v.  Welby,  13  Mo.  App.  19,  v.  Gambs,  52  Mo.  287;  Harris  v.  Hays, 
28.     But  see  as  to  the  law  in  Missouri,  53  Mo.  90,  95. 

infra.  °  Milteubcrger  v.  Miltenberger,  8  Mo. 

2  McKeeu  v.  Frost,  46  Me.  239,  248.  App.  306. 

3  lb.,  p.  249.  I0  Miltenberger  v.  Miltenberger,  78  Mo. 

4  Wymant'.  Symmes,  10  Allen,  153, 154.  27,30.     The  reason   given  is   that  "leg- 

5  Matter  of  Wilson's  Will,  103  N.  Y.  atees  and  devisees  are  not  allowed  to  be 
374.  attesting  witnesses  while  their  interest  as 

6  Verter  v.  Collins,  101  N.  C.  114.  such   continues,   and    the   policy   of    the 

7  Thus  a  devisee  under  a  holograph  law,  as  indicated  in  these  sections  (of  the 
will  was  held  competent  to  prove  the  statute)  would  be  entirely  frustrated  if 
same,  and  that  such  testimony  did  not  they  should  be  permitted  to  prove  the 
avoid  the  devise,  because  the  operative  execution  of  the  will  because  they  had 
\v<>r<ls  of  the  avoiding  act  apply  only  not  signed  it  as  attesting  witnesses." 
to  wills  that  have  attesting  witnesses :  The  cases  of  Garvin  v.  Williams  and 
Hampton  V.  Hardin,  X8  N.  C.  592,  595.  Gamache  v.  Gambs,  supra,  are  alluded  to, 

1  Garvin  v.  Williams,  50  Mo.  206,  212,     and  held  not  in  conflict  with  the  doctrine 
following  Shailer  v,  Buuistcad,  99  Mass.     announced. 
502 


§  220  PROOF   OP  THE  testator's  SANITY.  *  477,  *478 

held  competent  to  testify  to  the  proper  execution  of  a 
will.1     In  some  States  the  legatees  and  heirs  at  law,  in    ^"I^leTm 
a  contest  to  set  aside  a  will,  are  not  competent  witnesses    will  contest, 
to  show  the  testamentary  incapacity  of  the  testator  ; 2  in 
others  a  legatee  is  held  a  competent  witness  to  the  testator's  capa- 
city.8 

There  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  a  legatee  or  other  person  inter- 
ested in  the  will  should  not  be  competent  to  testify  against  a  will,  on 
the  same  ground  which  renders  an  heir  competent  to  testify  in  its  favor, 
where  his  interest  is  diminished  by  the  probate  of  the  will.4  So  the 
incompetency  of  the  deceased's  attorney  or  physician  to  testify  to 
professional  communications  is  waived  by  the  testator's  request  to 
him  to  sign  as  an  attesting  witness;5  and  it  is  generally  held  that 
the  executor  may  waive  the  statutory  inhibition  against  such  testi- 
mony by  the  testator's  physician. 
[*  478]  *  §  220.  Proof  of  the  Testator's  Sanity.  —  The  necessity  of 
making  proof  of  the  testator's  sanity  in  order  to  secure  the  pro- 
bate of  his  will,  and  that  the  burden  of  making  such  proof  rests 
naturally  upon  the  proponent,  has  been  pointed  out  in  a  former 
chapter.6  It  was  there  shown  that  in  a  number  of  States  the  propo- 
nent may  rely  upon  the  ordinary  presumption  of  sanity  as  constituting 
the  prima  facie  proof,  sufficient  in  the  absence  of  rebutting  evidence; 
but  that  in  others  affirmative  proof  is  required  on  this  point,  in 
default  of  which  the  will  cannot  receive  probate.  It  was  also  shown, 
that  the  testimony  of  non-experts  is  necessarily  admissible  to  estab- 
lish the  sanity  or  insanity  of  the  testator  in  proceedings  to  estab- 
lish the  will,7  and  that  there  is  a  difference  between  the  testimony  of 
experts  and  non-experts  in  this,  that  the  latter  must  give  not  only 
their  opinion  of  the  testator's  sanity,  but  also  the  facts  upon  which 
such  opinion  is  based ;  except  that  subscribing  witnesses  are  always 
heard  on  this  question,  and  are  not  usually  required  to  state  the  facts 

1  Combs  and  Hankinson's  Appeal,  105  tions  with  deceased :  Denning  v.  Butcher, 
Pa.  St.  155.  91    Iowa,   425,  433;    Goldthorp's   Estate, 

2  Kerr  v.  Lunsford,  31  W.  Va.  659,  supra.  In  Florida,  on  a  contest  of  a  will, 
669;  Brace  v.  Black,  125  111.  33.  See  it  was  held  that  the  heirs  at  law,  next  of 
Goerke  v.  Goerke,  80  Wis.  516  (disquali-  kin,  and  devisees  are  competent  witnesses 
fying  a  legatee  under  the  circumstances) ;  as  to  the  factum  of  the  execution  of  the 
McDonald  o.  McDonald,  142  Ind.  55,  87  will:  Hay's  v.  Ernest,  32  Fla.  18,  25,  and 
(holding  parties  incompetent  except  as  to  cases  cited. 

such  matters  as  were  open  to  the  obser-  4  Leslie  v.  Sims,  39  Ala.  161  ;  Smalley 

vation  of  alljthe  testator's  acquaintances),  v.  Smalley,  70  Me.  545  ;  Crocker  v.  Chase, 

See  Valentine's  Will,  93  Wis.  45;  Gold-  57  Vt.  413,  421    (excluding  the  witness, 

thorp's  Estate,  94  Iowa,  336  (disqualifying  however,  on  another  ground)  ;    Campbell 

witness  as  to  facts  learned  by  transactions  v.  Campbell,  130  111.  466. 
with  deceased).  5  See   ante,  §   42,   p.*  76,  on  attesting 

8  Foster    v.    Dickerson,    64   Vt.   233 ;  witnesses. 
Brown    v.    Bell,  58    Mich.  58 ;    Henry  v.  6  Ante,  §  26. 

Hall,  106  Ala.  84,  101.     In  Iowa  a  legatee         7  Ante,  §  28,  and  cases  there  cited, 
can  testify,  except  as  to  personal  transac- 

503 


*  478,  *  479        THE  PROBATE  OF  THE  WILL.  §  220 

upon  which  their  opinion  rests.  Testimony  may  be 
monv  isad-  given  as  to  the  mental  condition  of  the  testator  recently 
missible  to  before,  at,  and  shortly  after  the  time  of  making  the  will ; 
tor's  sanity"        an(^  ^  ^s  competent  for  the  witness,  though  neither  an 

expert  nor  attesting  witness,  to  state  whether  he  ob- 
served any  incoherence  of  thought  in  the  testator,  or  anything 
unusual  or  singular  in  respect  to  his  mental  condition  ; 1  whether,  in 
his  opinion,  the  testator  had  mind  enough  to  enable  him  to  have  a 
reasonable  judgment  of  the  kind  and  value  of  the  property  he  pro- 
posed to  dispose  of  by  will ; 2  whether  he  appeared  unconscious  of  what 
was  going  on  around  him,  and  much  prostrated  by  sickness, 
and  did  not  appear  to  *  know  a  certain  individual,  one  of  his  [*  479] 
neighbors  ;  whether  an  endeavor  to  converse  with  him  proved 
unsuccessful  because  he  was  insensible;8  whether  his  eyesight  was 
good  enough  to  have  enabled  him  to  see  the  witness,  if  his  mind  had 
been  right ;  whether  he  looked  at  the  witness  with  a  vacant  stare ; 
and  whether  his  countenance  and  appearance  indicated  childishness  :  4 
and  it  is  said  that  the  testimony  of  opinions  and  impressions  obtained 
from  personal  knowledge  and  actual  observation  in  such  cases  are  "  no 
more  nor  less  than  statements  of  fact  differing  from  ordinary  state- 
ments only  because  of  the  peculiarity  of  the  subject."  5  But  the  mere 
naked  opinion  of  persons  who  are  neither  subscribing  witnesses  nor 
experts  is  inadmissible  ; 6  nor  can  such  persons  be  allowed  to  give  their 
opinion  upon  a  hypothetical  case  proved  by  others,  but  not  witnessed 
by  themselves.7 

1  "  We  do  not  understand  this  to  be  4  Irish  v.  Smith,  8  Serg.  &  R.  573,  578. 
the  giving  of  an  opinion  as  to  the  con-  In  this  case  evidence  was  held  proper 
dition  of  the  mind  itself,  but  only  of  its  that  the  testator's  wife  said  in  presence 
manifestations  in  conversation  with  the  of  her  husband,  sitting  at  the  table,  that 
witness " :  Wells,  J.,  in  Nash  v.  Hunt,  he  did  not  attend  to  business,  that  he 
11G  Mass.  237,  251.  "The  question  was  incapable,  and  that  the  testator  said 
whether  there   was   an  apparent  change  nothing :  p.  578. 

in  a  man's  intelligence  or  understanding,  5  Perkins  in    Wms.  Ex.   [347],  citing 

or  a  want  of   coherence    in  his  remarks,  Campbell,  J.,  in  Beaubieu   v.   Cic'otte,  12 

is  a  matter  not  of  opinion,  but  of  fact,  as  Mich.  459,  507  ;  Potts  v.  House,  6  Ga.  324  ; 

to  which  any  witness  who  has  had  oppor-  Duffield  v.  Morris,  2  Harring.  375 ;  Grant 

trinity  to  observe  may  testify,  in  order  to  v.  Thompson,  4  Conn.  203,  208;  Harrison 

put  before  the  court  or  jury  the  acts  and  v.  Rowan,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  580;  Rambler  v. 

conduct   from    which   the   degree   of  his  Tryon,  7  Serg.   &  R.   90 ;  Townshend    v. 

mental  capacity  may  be  inferred  "  :     Gray,  Townshend,  7  Gill,  10  ;  Dunham's  Appeal, 

J.,  in  Parker);.  Coniins,  110  Mass.  477,487,  27  Conn.  192,  197.     See  also  list  of  cases, 

citing  Hastings  v.  Rider,  99  Mass.  622,  625.  Wms.  Ex.  [346],  note  (d3),  commencing 

2  Bost   v.   Bost,  87   N.    C.   477,  citing  with  Clary  v.  Clary,  2  Ired.  78. 
Lawrence    v.    Steel,   66  N.   C.    584,   and  °  Wms.    Ex.    [346],    citing    numerous 
Borne  v.  Home,  9  Ired.  99.  American  cases,  note  (d8) ;  Ellis  t;.  Ellis, 

•   Halley  v.  Webster,  21    Me.  461,  464.  133  Mass.  469. 
"  These,"  the  court  say,  "  were  not  mere  7  Bell  v.  McMaster,  29  Hun,  272,  citing 

matters  of  opinion,  but  fads,  somewhat  Clapp  v.   Fullerton,  34  N.  Y.    190;  Hew- 

of  n  general   cast,  and  combining  many  lett  v.  Wood,  55  N.  Y.  634;    Appleby  i> 

particulars."  Brock,  76  Mo.  314,  318. 
504 


§  221  PROOF  OF  LOST  WILLS.  *  479,  *  480 

The  testimony  of  educated  practising  physicians  is  admitted  upon 
subjects  of  medical  science  ;  and  it  has  been  held  that  the  difference 
between  the  opinion  of  one  who  has  made  insanity  a 
special  study,   and  that  of  one  who  has  not,  is  in  the    experts?ny  ° 
weight  rather  than  in  the  competency,  of  the  testimony.1 
But  one  who  has  not  made  the  subject  of  mental  disease  a  special 
study  should  not  be  permitted  to  give  his  opinion  on  a  hypothetical 
case,  although  he  might  give  his  opinion  as  to  the  mind  of  a  person 

so  far  as  he  could  testify  from  his  personal  ob- 
[*  480]  servation ; 2  *  and  this   although    he  is  not  the    Physicians  and 

family   physician.3      So    physicians   in   general    coiisid"™^ 
practice  and  sick-nurses  are  supposed  to  be  experts  as  to    experts, 
the  effect,  upon  the  mental  capacity  of  a  patient,  of  the 
progress  of  a  disease  resulting  in  death.4     Ordinarily,  the  witness 
allowed  to  give  his  opinion  on  a  state  of  facts  not  within  his  own 
knowledge,  but  which  is  supposed  to  be  in  evidence  before  the  jury, 
or,  as  is  usually  said,  upon  a  hypothetical  case,  must  first  be  shown  to 
be  an  expert ; 5  and  whether  a  witness  not  shown  to  be  an  expert  is 
qualified  to  express  an  opinion  as  a  conclusion  of  fact,  is  to  be  decided 
by  the  judge  presiding  at  the  trial.6    Whether  one  has  merely  studied 
a  profession  or  science,  without  being  engaged  in  the  practice  of  it,  or 
is  in  full  practice,  and  how  long,  do  not  affect  the  competency  of  such 
person  as  a  witness,  but  may  go  to  his  credit.7    No  preference  is  given 
in  law  to  any  particular  school  of  the  medical  profession.8 

§  221.   Proof  of  Lost  Wills.  —  The  presumption  arising,  where  a 
will  which  was  in  the  possession  of  the  deceased  cannot  be  found 
at  the  time  of  his  death,  that  it  was  destroyed  by  the    The  presump- 
testator   animo   revocandi,    may   be    rebutted   by    -proof    *!on  of  4estruc" 

,  -,  „  ■•  .  J      r  tion  ammo 

that   it  was  destroyed  after   his   death,   or   during  his    revocandi  of  a 
lifetime  without  his  knowledge  or  consent ; 9  or  by  the    bereTutted17 

1  Baxter  v.  Abbott,  7  Gray,  71,  78.  expert,  should  include  only  such  facts  as 
Even  as  to  the  weight  of  such  evidence,  are  admitted  or  established,  or  which  there 
Thomas,  J.,  holds  the  preference  to  be  is  some  evidence  tending  to  establish ;  it 
with  a  family  physician,  whose  opinion  is  not  a  question  as  to  the  weight  of  evi- 
"  should  have  far  greater  weight  with  a  dence,  but  whether  there  was  any  evidence 
jury  than  that  of  any  number  of  physi-  tending  to  prove  the  fact :  Norman's  Will, 
cians  who  had  made  insanity  a  special  72  Iowa,  84  ;  Ray  v.  Ray,  98  N.  C.  566. 
study,  but  who  were  called  to  give  an  6  Commonwealth  v.  Sturtivant,  117 
opinion  upon  what  is  always,  and  neces-  Mass.  122,  137;  Tullis  v.  Kidd,  12  Ala. 
sarily,   an    imperfect   statement    of     the  648,  650. 

facts  and  symptoms  "  :  p.  79.  7  Tullis  v.  Kidd,  supra. 

2  Commonwealth   v.    Rich,     14    Gray,  8  Bowman  v.  Woods,  1  Green  (Iowa), 
335,337.                                                                  441. 

8  Hastings  v.  Rider,  99  Mass.  622,  625;  9  Ante,  §  48,  page  *  91  ;  Happy's  Will, 

Hathorn  v.  King,  8  Mass.  371.  4  Bibb,  553  ;  Gaines  v.  Hennen,  24  How. 

4  Fairchild   v.   Bascomb,   35   Vt.  398,  (U.  S.)  553,  559,  et  seq. ;  Graham  v.  O'Fal- 

408.  Ion,  3  Mo.  507  ;  Kitchens  v.  Kitchens,  39 

6  Kempsey  r.  McGinniss,  21  Mich.  123,  Ga.    168;    Hall   v.   Allen,   31    Wis.    691; 

137.     A   hypothetical  question,  asked  an  Morris  v.  Swaney,  7  Heisk.  591  ;  Baugarth 

505 


*  480  *  481 


THE    PROBATE    OF    THE    WILL. 


§221 


be  admitted 
to  probate, 

upon  proof  of 
destruction  by 
accident. 


testator  himself  while  he  was  under  the  fraudulent  influence  of 
another,1  or  in  a  fit  of  insanity,  when  he  was  incapable  of  under- 
standing the  nature  and  effect  of  his  act,2  and  such  a 
will  may,  upon  positive  proof  of  destruction,  or 
of  *  diligent  search  and  non-existence,  be  ad-  [*  481] 
mitted  to  probate.3  The  proof  must  show  that 
the  destruction  was  unauthorized  and  improper;  4  and  if 
by  some  one  after  the  testator's  death,  that  it  was  acci- 
dental ;  for  if  it  appear  that  the  proponent  destroyed  it  voluntarily, 
without  mistake  or  accident,  he  will  not  be  permitted  to  prove  it  by 
secondary  evidence.5  In  Ohio,  the  proof  must  show  loss  or  destruc- 
tion after  the  testator's  death,  or  it  cannot  receive  probate  unless  pro- 
duced; 6  and  so  in  New  York 7  and  Washington,8  unless  the  same  was 
fraudulently  destroyed  in  the  testator's  lifetime.  Generally,  how- 
ever, the  presumption  of  destruction  animo  revocandi  may  be  rebutted 
by  such  evidence  as  produces  a  moral  conviction  to  the  contrary,9  and 
the  acts  and  declarations  of  the  testator  are  admissible  for  such  pur- 
pose.10    So  also  it  may  be  proved  by  circumstantial  evidence  that  the 


v.  Miller,  26  Oh.  St.  541  ;  Kearns  v. 
Kearns,  4  Harring.  83  ;  Everitt  v.  Everitt, 
41  Barb.  385 ;  Minkler  v.  Minkler,  14  Vt. 
125  ;  Kidder's  Estate,  57  Cal.  282 ;  Ja- 
ques  v.  Horton,  76  Ala.  238,  245. 

i  Voorhees  v.  Voorhees,  39  N.  Y.  463, 
466. 

2  Idley  v.  Bowen,  11  Wend.  227;  Ap- 
person  r.  Cottrell,  3  Port.  51,  65.  See 
cases  cited  ante,  §  48,  p.  *  89,  note. 

3  Cases,  supra ;  Eure  v.  Pittman,  3 
Hawks,  364;  Raster  v.  Raster,  52  Iud. 
531 ;  Wyckoff  t;.  Wyckoff,  16  N.  J.  Eq. 
401  ;  Harris  v.  Harris,  36  Barb.  88 ;  Ap- 
person  v.  Cottrell,  3  Port.  51,  65,  citing 
Trevelyan  v.  Trevelyan,  1  Phillim.  149, 
153. 

*  Idley  v.  Bowen,  11  Wend.  227,  237. 

6  Wyckoff  v.  Wyckoff,  supra. 

6  Sinclair's  Will",  5  Oh.  St.  290. 

f  Code  Civ.  Pr.  §  1865;  Matter  of 
Marsh,  45  Hon,  107. 

8  Harris'  Estate,  10  Wash.  555,  citing 
;•  879. 

3  Will  of  Foster,  13  Phila.  567, 568  (cit- 
ing Davis  v.  Davis,  2  Addams,  223,  226  ; 
I   Redf.  Wills,  329);  s.  c  87  Pa.  St.  67,  75. 

10  Will  of  Foster,  supra  (drawing  a  dis- 
tortion between  the  declarations  of  a 
tentatOT  touching  the  contents  of  a  will, 
which  are  of  little  weight  especially  when 
made  to  importuning  relatives,  and  Buch 
declarations  as  showing  the  testator's  con- 
506 


viction  that  he  has  a  will  in  existence  at 
the  time  of  his  death,  and  citing  Jones 
v.  Murphy,  8  W.  &  S.  275,  Youndt  v. 
Youndt,  3  Grant,  140,  and  Havard  v. 
Davis,  2  Binn.  406) ;  Clark  v.  Turner,  50 
Neb.  290  (holding  likewise:  298);  Valen- 
tine's Will,  93  Wis.  45,  55  ;  McDonald  v. 
McDonald,  142  Ind.  55,  citing  list  of  cases 
on  p.  83 ;  Johnson's  Will,  40  Conn.  5S7, 
588;  Matter  of  Page,  118  Hi.  576,  579; 
Durant  v.  Ashmore,  2  Rich.  184.  So  his 
declarations  that  he  has  no  will,  or  that 
he  has  destroyed  his  will,  are  evidence  to 
show  that  the  will  has  been  revoked  : 
Durant  v.  Ashmore,  supra;  Behrens  v. 
Behrens,  47  Oh.  St.  323 ;  Valentine's 
Will,  93  Wis.  45,  55 ;  Miller  v.  Phillips, 
9  R.  I.  141,  where  declarations  of  the 
testatrix  were  allowed  to  rebut  the  pre- 
sumption of  revocation  by  her  marriage. 
In  New  York  it  was  held  that  declarations 
of  the  deceased  are  incompetent  to  prove 
the  existence  and  contents  of  a  will :  Grant 
v.  Grant,  1  Saudf.  Ch.  235,  237,  citing  Dan 
v.  Brown,  4  Cow.  483,  and  Jackson  v. 
Betts,  6  Cow.  377  ;  but  the  better  opinion 
seems  to  be  that  such  declarations  are  ad- 
missible as  circumstances  :  Hatch  r.  Sig- 
man,  1  Dem.  519,  525  ;  Matter  of  Marsh, 
45  Hun,  107,  reviewing  the  authorities. 
See  Wilbourn  v.  Shell,  59  Miss.  205,  where 
a  holograph  which  the  testator  caused  to 
be  copied  to  correct  the  spelling  and  make 


§  221  PROOF  OF   LOST   WILLS.  *  481,  *  482 

will  has  been  lost  or  destroyed  without  the  knowledge  of 
the   testator.1     Where  a  will  is  detained  by  a  foreign    J^jJ  {Jjjjjjj* 
court,  so  that  the  proponent  cannot  produce  it  for  pro-    court  may  be 
bate,  secondary  evidence  thereof  is  admissible,  as  much    fj^wiii! 

so  as  if  it  were  a  lost  will.2 
[*  482]       *  The  execution  and  attestation  of  the  lost  will  must  be 

proved  with  the  same  certainty  and  fulness  as  in  case   of 
proving  an  existing  will,  including  proof  of  the  testator's 
sanity  or  testamentary  capacity ;  and  by  the  same  wit-   tion  and  a'ttes- 
nesses  which  are  required  to  prove  a  will  produced  for    ta.tl0n  of  lost 
probate.     Thus  the  subscribing  witnesses  must  be  called, 
if  within  reach  of  the  process  of  the  court;  and  if  not,  depositions  of 
such  as  may  be  reached  must  be  taken,  and  if  the  law  does  not  require 
the  depositions  of  witnesses  residing  abroad,  then  proof  may  be  taken 
as  in  case  of  the  death  or  insanity  of  subscribing  witnesses.8     The 
declarations  of  the  deceased  that  he  had  made  a  will  are  not  sufficient 
to  prove  either  the  due  execution  or  the  contents  of  a  will,   unless 
corroborated  by  other  evidence,  and  if  there  is  no  corroborating  evi- 
dence, such  declarations  should  be  rejected ;  4  and  if  there  is  no  legal 
evidence  that  a  will  ever  existed,  there  can  be  no  evidence  of  its 
fraudulent  abstraction  or  suppression.6 

The  contents  of  the  lost  will  upon  which  probate  is  prayed  must 
be  proved  clearly  and  distinctly,6  with  a  sufficient  degree 
of  certainty  to  establish  the  legacies  and  devises,  and    tents  of  lost 
that  none  have  been  omitted.7      It  was  laid  down  by    wil1, 

it  more  legible  and  attempted  to  execute  4  Mercer  v.  Mackin,  14  Bush,  434,  439. 

the  copy,  in  which  he  failed  on  account  of  6  Mercer  v.  Mackin,  supra. 

defective  attestation,  was  admitted  to  pro-  6  In  New  York,  Washington,  Indiana, 

bate,  notwithstanding  its  destruction   by  and  California  two  witnesses  are  required 

the  testator,  on  the  testimony  of  a  single  by  the  statute  to  prove  the  contents  of  a 

witness.  lost  will :  Kidder's  Estate,  66  Cal.  487 ; 

1  Schultz  v.  Schultz,  35  N.  Y.  653.  Harris'  Estate,   10   Wash.  555;   Jones  v. 

2  Loring  v.  Oakey,  98  Mass.  267,  269 ;  Casler,  139  Ind.  382,  389 ;  but  a  correct 
per  Field,  J.,  in  Robertson  v.  Pickrell,  draft  or  copy  of  it  is  in  New  York  and 
109  U.  S.  608,  610.  And  see  Russell  v.  Indiana  held  to  be  equivalent  to  one  wit- 
Hartt,  87  N.  Y.  19,  where  the  foreign  will  ness :  Collyer  v.  Collyer,  4  Dem.  53,  62; 
was  inspected  by  commissioners  of  the  Sheridan  v.  Houghton,  6  Abb.  N.  C.  234  ; 
court;  Matter  of  Delaplaine,  5  Dem.  398,  and  they  need  not  testify  to  the  exact 
affirmed  45  Hun,  225.  language ;  but  must  prove  sufficient  of  the 

8  Bailey  v.  Stiles,  2  N.  J.  Eq.  220,  231  ;  substance  to  enable  the  decree  of  probate 

Graham  v.  O'Fallon,  3  Mo.  507  (granting  to  incorporate  the  whole  will :  McNally  v. 

probate  of  the  lost  will  on  the  evidence  of  Brown,  5  Redf.  372  ;  Jones  v.  Casler,  139 

one  of  the  subscribing  witnesses)  ;  Durant  Ind.  382, 389  ;  the  appointment  of  an  exec- 

v.   Ashmore,   2    Rich.   184    (showing  the  utor  is  not  an  indispensable  part  of  the 

competence  of  attesting  witnesses  to  be  will,  and  it  is  not  essential  to  prove  it : 

the  same  where  the  will  is  lost  as  where  it  Early  v.  Early,  5  Redf.  376.     Each  of  the 

still  exists) ;  Matter  of  Russell,  33  Hun,  witnesses  must  be  able  to  testify  to  all  of 

271  ;  Collyer  v.  Collyer,  4  Dem.  53  ;  Matter  the   disposing   parts   of  the   will:    In   re 

of  Page,  118  111.  576,  578;  Harris'  Estate,  Raser,  6  Dem.  31. 

10  Wash.  555,  558.  f  Will  of  Foster,  supra;  Davis  v.  Sig- 

507 


*  482,  *  483 


THE   PROBATE   OP   THE   WILL. 


§221 


Swinburne,1  that,  "  if  there  be  two  unexceptionable  witnesses  who  did 
see  and  read  the  testament  written,  and  do  remember  the  con- 
tents thereof,  these  two  witnesses,  so  deposing  to  *  the  tenor  [*  483] 
of  the  will,  are  sufficient  for  the  proof  thereof  in  fo.rm  of 
law  ; " 2  but  it  seems  now  to  be  held  in  England  that  the  contents  of 
a  lost  will,  like  those  of  any  other  instrument,  may  be  proved  by  sec- 
ondary evidence ;  that  they  may  be  proved  by  the  evidence  of  a  sin- 
gle witness,  though  interested,  whose  veracity  and  competency  are 
unimpeached  ;  and  that  declarations,  written  or  oral,  made  by  a  tes- 
tator, both  before  and  after  the  execution  of  his  will,  are  in  the 
event  of  its  loss  admissible  as  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents.8  In 
the  absence  of  statutory  provisions  on  this  subject  this  is  recognized 
in  the  several  States  to  be  the  law,  at  least  to  the  extent 
of  establishing  the  contents  by  the  testimony  of  a  single 
witness.4  The  rule  that,  where  one  destroys  a  written 
instrument,  an  innocent  party  will  not  be  required  to 
make  strict  proof,  in  a  judicial  inquiry  concerning  its 
contents,  against  the  spoliator,  is  sometimes  applied  to  a  will ;  where 
part  of  the  heirs  of  a  testator  connive  at  the  destruction  of  his  will, 
an  innocent  legatee  may  obtain  probate  of  the  same  upon  proof  in 
general  terms  of  the  disposition  which  the  testator  made  of  his  prop- 
erty, and  that  the  instrument  purported  to  be  his  will  and  was  duly 


Proof  where 
will  is  de- 
stroyed by 
heirs  at  law. 


ourney,  8  Met.  (Mass.)  487 ;  McBeth  v. 
McBeth,  1 1  Ala.  598.  In  Skeggs  v.  Hor- 
ton,  82  Ala.  352,  a  charge  to  the  jury, 
that  "  unless  the  evidence  of  contents  of 
the  alleged  will  is  clear  and  positive, — 
not  vague  or  uncertain  recollections,  — 
and  of  such  a  character  as  to  leave  no 
reasonable  doubt  as  to  any  of  the  sub- 
stantial parts  of  the  paper,  the  jury  should 
find  for  the  contestants,"  was  said  to  in- 
voke too  strict  a  rule,  and  was  therefore 
rightly  refused. 

i  Swinb.,  pt.  6,  §  14,  pi.  4. 

2   \Vrns.  Ex.  [378]  et  seq. 

8  Perkins's  note  to  Wms.  Ex.  [380]  ; 
Sugden  v.  Lord  St.  Leonards,  L.  R.  1  Pr. 
D.  154  ;  see  opinion  of  Sir  J.  Hannen,  Pr., 
p.  176,  of  Cockburu,  C.  J.,  p.  220  et  seq.,  of 
Jessel,  M.  R.,  p.  238 ;  the  case  of  Brown 
v.  Brown,  8  E.  &  B.  876,  so  holding,  is 
contrasted  with  Wharram  v.  Wharram,  3 
Sw.  &  Tr.  301,  33  L.  J.  (P.  M.  &  A.)  75, 
and  fully  approved  by  all  the  judges  after 
a  full  discussion.  This  case  overrules 
Quick  v.  Quick,  3  Sw.  &  Tr.  442,  holding 
declarations  of  an  alleged  testator  as  to 
tin-  contents  of  a  will  not  produced  incom- 
petent to  prove  its  contents. 

4  Skew's  r.  Horton,  82  Ala.  352; 
508 


Jacques  v.  Horton,  76  Ala.  238,  246 ; 
Lewis  v.  Lewis,  6  S.  &  R.  489,  dictum  by 
Duncan,  J.,  497 ;  Baker  v.  Dobyns,  4 
Dana,  220,  221  ;  Matter  of  Page,  118  111. 
576;  Dickey  v.  Malechi,  citing  earlier 
Missouri  cases,  6  Mo.  177,  184;  Varnon  v. 
Varnon,  67  Mo.  App.  534 ;  Kearns  v. 
Kearns,  4  Harring.  83  (where  the  will 
was  destroyed  by  the  heir  at  law).  See 
Jackson,  C.  J.,  in  Burge  v.  Hamilton,  72 
Ga.  568,  613.  But  in  Tennessee  two  wit- 
nesses are  necessary  :  Hunter  v.  Garden- 
hire,  13  Lea,  658,  662.  Two  witnesses 
are  required  by  statute  in  several  States ; 
see  supra,  p.  *482.  A  long  list  of  cases 
is  given  in  McDonald  v.  McDonald,  142 
Ind.  55,  on  p.  83,  which  hold  declara- 
tions of  the  testator  admissible  to  prove 
the  contents  of  a  lost  will,  if  no  better  evi- 
dence is  admissible.  But  in  many  States 
the  rule  is  followed  that  while  such  de- 
clarations are  admissible  as  corroborative 
of  other  evidence,  yet  the  contents  of  a 
lost  will  cannot  be  proved  solely  by  the 
testator's  declarations  :  Clark  v.  Turner, 
50  Neb.  290,  citing  numerous  cases  and 
deducing  this  to  be  the  better  rule  on 
principle  and  authority. 


§  222  PROBATE   IN   PART   AND   IN    FAC-SIMILE.  *  483,  *  484 

attested  by  the  requisite  number  of  witnesses ;  and  in  such  case  it  is 
not  necessary  to  prove  the  sanity  of  the  testator  by  affirmative  evi- 
dence in  the  absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary.1 

It  appears  from  a  discussion  on  the  revocation  of  wills,  in  a  former 
chapter,2  that  the  execution  of  a  later  will  inconsistent  with  a  former 

one  operates  as  a  revocation  of  the  former  will,  though  the 
[*  484]  revoking  will  is  not  produced.3     Mr.  Williams  *  insists 4  that 

where  the  revocation  of  an  existing  will  is  sought 
to  be  established  by  proof  of  the  execution  of  a  subse-   Proof  of  a  lost 

J    L  .  will  revoking  a 

quent  will,  not  appearing,  the  evidence  ought  to  be  most    former  will, 
clear  and  satisfactory,  and   if  parol  evidence  alone  be 
relied  on,  such  evidence  ought  to  be  stringent  and  conclusive ; 6  yet 
the  proof  may  be  sufficient  to  be  availed  of  as  a  revocation  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  probate  of  the  will  revoked  by  it,  though  insufficient  to 
justify  the  probate  of  the  lost  will.6 

It  seems  to  result  from  the  necessity  of  proving  the  contents  of 
a  lost  will  with  sufficient  certainty  and  clearness  to  admit  of  their 
legal  construction,  that  a  part  only  of  a  lost  or  de-  proof  0f  part 
stroyed  will  where  other  parts  cannot  be  proved,  or  of  a  lost  wil1- 
where  it  is  not  known  whether  the  instrument  contained  other  or  con- 
tradictory provisions,  cannot  be  admitted  to  probate.  It  is  so  held  in 
several  States.7  But  in  others,  isolated  portions  of  lost  wills  clearly 
proved  have  been  established,  although  other  portions  could  not  be 
proved.8  The  subject  of  proving  lost  wills  is  now  regulated  by 
statute  in  many  of  the  States.9  It  is  held  that  there  is  no  trial  by 
jury  to  establish  a  lost  will,  unless  given  by  statute.10 

§  222.    Probate  of  Wills  in  Part  and  in  Fac-simile.  —  Although  it  is 


1  Anderson  v.  Irwin,  101  111.  411,  414 
Kearns  v.  Kearns,  4  Harring.  83.  If 
necessary,  the  law  will  prevent  the  per 
petration  of  a  fraud  by  permitting  a  pre 
sumption  to  supply  the  suppressed  proof 
as  against  the  spoliator  :  Lambie's  Estate, 


5  Citing  ditto  v.  Gilbert,  9  Moore,  P. 
C.  131,  140,  141. 

6  Wallis  v.  Wallis,  114  Mass.  510,  cit- 
ing Helvar  v.  Helyar,  1  Lee,  472  ;  Nelson 
v.  McGiffert,  3  Barb.  Ch.  158, 164  ;  Day  v. 
Day,  3  N.  J.  Eq.  549 ;  and  see  Cunningham 


97  Mich.  49,  55.    But  as  to  the  fact  of  the  in  re,  38  Minn.  169. 

destruction  itself,  it  is  not  sufficient  for  7  Butler   v.  Butler,   5    Harring.    178; 

the  proponent  to  show  that  persons  inter-  Davis  v.  Sigourney,  8  Met.  (Mass.)  487  ; 

ested  to  establish  intestacy  had  an  oppor-  Durfee  v.   Durfee,   8   Met.    (Mass.)    490, 

tunity  to   destroy  the  will;  he  must   go  note ;  Rhodes  v.  Vinson,  9  Gill,  169, 171. 

further  and   show,  by  facts  and  circum-  8  Jackson  v.  Jackson,  4  Mo.  210;  Dickey 

stances,  that  the  will  was  actually,  fraud-  v.  Malechi,  6  Mo.  177  ;   Steele  v.  Price,  5 

ulently,  destroyed  :  Collyer  v.  Collyer,  110  B.  Mon.  58,  72  ;  Burge  v.  Hamilton,  72  Ga. 

N.  Y.  481,  486;  Hard  v.  Ashley,  88  Hun,  568,  623,  632;  Skeggs  v.  Horton,  82  Ala. 

103.  352.     This  is  specially  permitted  as  against 

2  Ante,  §  51,  p.  *98.  the  spoliator  of  a  will  in  favor  of  an  inno- 

8  Jones  v.  Murphy,  8  Watts  &  S.  275,  cent  legatee:   Jones  v.   Casler,  139  Ind. 

citing  Clark  v.  Morton,  5  Rawle,  235,  and  382,  393. 

Lawson  v.  Morrison,  2  Dallas,  286.  9  So  in  Calif ornia,  Colorado,  Minnesota, 

*  Wms.  Ex.  [162].  and  other  States. 

10  Wright  v.  Freltz,  138  Ind.  594. 
509 


*  484,  *  485        THE  PROBATE  OF  THE  WILL.  §  222 

not  the  province  of  the  court  of  probate  to  pass  upon  or  determine 
p  of  will  ^e  lega^  validity  of  the  provisions  of  a  will,  or  whether 
may  receive  they  are  rational  and  capable  of  being  carried  into  effect, 
othwparts  ye*  ^  becomes  necessary  sometimes  to  admit  the  will  to 
thereof  probate  in  part,  and  reject  it  in  part.    For  if  a  court  of 

rejec  probate  be  satisfied  that  a  particular  clause  has  been  in- 

serted by  fraud,  in  the  lifetime  of  the  testator,  without  his  knowledge,1 
or  by  forgery,  after  his  death,2  or  that  he  has  been  induced  by  fraud  or 
undue  influence  to  make  it  a  part  of  his  will,8  probate  will  be 
granted  of  the  instrument,  with  the  reservation  of  that  *  clause.4  [*  485] 
And  so  where  a  page  is  torn  from  an  executed  will  and  another 
substituted  without  re-execution,  the  will,  as  origiually  executed,  will 
be  admitted  to  probate ;  the  contents  of  the  destroyed  page  being 
proved  by  competent  testimony,  no  effect  being  given  to  the  invalid 
substituted  page.5  Or  where  a  clause  is  inadvertently  introduced  in  a 
testamentary  paper,  which  the  testator  has  not  directed  to  be  inserted, 
and  he  executes  the  paper,  not  having  been  read  over  to  him,  probate 
will  be  granted  of  the  remainder  of  the  paper,  omitting  such  clause.6 
And  the  probate  of  a  will  cannot  be  defeated  by  proof  that  there  was 
a  codicil,  which  is  lost  and  not  shown  to  contain  a  revoking  clause.7 
Paper  incor-  ^°  wn^e  a  document  referred  to  in  the  will  and  shown 
porated  by  to  have  been  in  existence  at  the  time  of  its  execution, 
and  which  is  clearly  identified  as  the  document  to 
which  reference  was  made  by  the  testator,  may  be  adjudged  to  form 
part  of  such  will,8  yet  if  such  extraneous  paper  be  not  in  existence 
at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  will,  it  is  not  entitled  to  probate 
as  part  of  the  will,  though  the  will  be  admitted  to  probate.9     And 

1  1  Wms.  Ex.  [377],  citing  Barton  v.  strument,  the  latter  cannot  be  made  part 
Robins,  3  Phillim.  455,  note  (b).  of  the   will,  unless    such   instrument  be 

2  Plume  v.  Beale,  1  P.  Wms.  388.  executed  and  in  existence  when  the  will  is 
8  Ante,  §  34  ;  In  re  Welsh,  1  Redf.  238,     made  :  Hunt  v.  Evans,  134  111.  496,  505  ; 

248;    Burger  v.  Hill,  1  Bradf.  360,  376;  and  see  Tuttle  v.  Berryman,  94  Ky.  553 ; 

Morris  v.  Stokes,  21   Ga.  552  ;  Harrison's  Vestry  v.  Bostwick,  8  Dist.  Col.  App.  452, 

Appeal,  48  Conn.  202  ;  Florey  v.  Florey,  and  in  Be  O'Niel,  91  N.  Y.  516, 523,  Buger, 

24  Ala.  241,  248;  Eastis  v.  Montgomery,  Ch.  J.,  says  :  "It  is  not  believed  that  any 

93  Ala.  293.  paper  or  document  containing  testament- 

4  1  Wm.  [377]  citing  Allen  v.  McPher-  ary  provisions,  not  authenticated  ac- 
Bon,  1  H.  L.  Cas.  191  ;  Melnish  v.  Milton,  cording  to  the  provisions  of  our  Statute  of 
L.  It.  3  Ch.  D.  27.  Wills,  has  yet  been  held  to  be  a  part  of  a 

5  Varnon  v.  Varnon,  67  Mo.  App.  534.  valid  testamentary  disposition  of  property 

6  Goods  of  Duane,  2  Sw.  &  Tr.  590 ;  simply  because  it  was  referred  to  in  the 
Hill  v.  Burger,  10  How.  Pr.  264,  269.  body  of  the  will."     This   statement  was 

7  Sternberg's  Estate,  94  Iowa,  305.  quoted  approvingly  in  Matter  of  Conway, 

8  Dyer  v.  Erring,  2  Dem.  160,  165,  and  124  N.  Y.  455,  460,  by  Judge  Parker  (see 
cases  cited  ;  Silcr  v.  Dorsett,  108  N.  C.  dissenting  opinion  of  Brown,  J.,  p.  466) ; 
300 ;  Newton  v.  Seamen's  Fr.  Soc,  130  while  in  Booth  v.  Baptist  Church,  126 
Mass.  91.  N.  Y.  215,  247,  the  court  say  that  "it  is 

9  In  re  Shillaber,  74  Cal.  144.  So  unquestionably  the  law  of  this  State  that 
where  the   will   refers  to  an  executed  in-  an  unattested  paper  which  is  of  testament' 

510 


§  222 


PROBATE   IN   PART   AND   IN   FAC-SIMILE.  *  485,  *  486 


where  a  man's  mind  gives  way  in  the  very  act  of  dictating  a  will, 
before  completing  all  the  dispositions  he  intends  to  make,  that  part 
which  he  dictated  while  in  possession  of  his  mental  faculties  cannot 
be  set  up  in  his  will.1 

This  principle  of  probate  in  part  has  been  extended  to  cases  in 
which  part  of  a  destroyed  will  only  could  be  proved,  and  probate 
granted  as  to  so  much  of  such  will ; 2  and  relied  on  as  justifying  the 
rejection  of  clauses  held  void  as  being  inconsistent  with  public  policy, 
or  impossible  of  execution,  while  the  remainder  of  the  will  was 
admitted  to  probate.8  But  this  seems  inconsistent  with  Functionof 
the  functions  of  a  court  of  probate,  which  determines  probate  courts 
only  whether  the  instrument  propounded  has  been  exe-  ^"termlne 
cuted  by  the  testator  and  attested  by  the  witnesses  in  validity  of  exe- 
the  manner  prescribed  by  the  statute,  and  that  he  pos- 


sessed sufficient  testamentary  capacity,- 


validity  of 
disposition 
are  determined 
by  courts  of 
construction. 


attestation,  and 
in  Other  words,     testamentary 

whether  the  instrument  is  the  testator's  spontaneous  act, 
expressing  his  last  will  in  the  form  recognized  by  law.     Its  approval 
of  the  will  relates  only  to  the  form :  void  bequests  are    Questjons  ot 
not  validated  thereby,  nor  should  the  probate  distinguish 
between  valid  and  void,  certain  and  uncertain,  rational 
or  impossible,  dispositions  of  the  testator.4      All  such 
questions  are  for  the  courts  of  construction,  which  are 
bound  by  the  judgments  of  courts  of  probate  only  as  to  the  due  execu- 
tion.6   Hence,  although  the  court  of  probate  may  reject  such  portions 

of  the  paper  as  are  not  the  testator's  spontaneous  act  or  will, 
[*  486]  it  cannot,  even  by  consent,  order  any  passage  to  be  *  expunged 

which  the  testator,  being  of  sound  mind,  intended  to  form 
part  of  it.6 

Several  testamentary  papers  and  codicils  may  together  constitute 
the  last  will  of  the  testator,  and  should  all  receive  probate  together, 
as  constituting  one  will.7 


ary  nature  cannot  be  taken  as  part  of  the 
will,  even  though  referred  to  by  that  in- 
strument." 

1  Tabler  v.  Tabler,  62  Md.  601,  607. 

2  Ante,  §  221. 

8  Kenrick  v.  Cole,  61  Mo.  572.  (This 
case  was  subsequently  overruled.  See 
infra.)  The  will  contained  a  clause  in 
conflict  with  the  constitution  of  1865 
(under  which  the  probate  was  granted) 
and  was  admitted  to  probate  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  unconstitutional  clause,  both 
in  the  probate  court  ex  parte  and  in  the 
circuit  court  in  a  proceeding  to  establish 
the  clause  rejected. 

4  See  authorities  on  this  point  post,  § 
228,  p.  *502;  Cox  v.  Cox,  101  Mo.  168 
(overruling  Kenrick  v.  Cole,  sapra ;  Bent's 


Appeal,  35  Conn.  523 ;  s.  c.  38  Conn.  26, 
34 ;  George  v.  George,  47  N.  H.  27,  46). 

5  Hegarty's  Appeal,  75  Pa.  St.  503, 
514,  citing  earlier  Pennsylvania  and 
English  cases;  Hawes  v.  Humphrey,  9 
Pick.  350,  362. 

6  Wms.  [377],  citing  Curtis  v.  Curtis, 

3  Add.  33,  and  many  English  authorities. 
But  though  the  court  cannot  expunge 
any  words  from  the  original  will,  offensive 
passages,  such  as  scurrilous  imputations 
on  the  character  of  another  man,  have 
been  excluded  from  the  probate  and  copy 
kept  in  the  registry  :  Goods  of  Wartnaby, 

4  Notes  of  Cas.  476 ;  Marsh  v.  Marsh,  1 
Sw.  &  Tr.  528 ;  Goods  of  Honywood,  L.  R. 
2  P.  &D.  251. 

7  See  authorities  ante,  §  51. 

511 


*486,  *487        THE  PROBATE  OF  THE  WILL.  §  222 

The  effect  of  interlineations  and  erasures  in  a  will  have  been 
pointed  out  in  an  earlier  chapter.1  Where  alterations  are  satisfac- 
torily shown  to  have  been  made  before  execution,  it  is  usual  to 
engross  the  probate  copy  of  the  will  as  altered,  inserting  the  words 
interlined  in  their  proper  places,  and  omitting  words  struck  through 
or  obliterated.2  But  in  cases  where  the  construction  of  the  will  may 
Probate  in  be  affected  by  the  appearance  of  the  original  paper,  the 
facsimile.  court  will  order  the  probate  to  pass  in  facsimile,  so  as 
to  assist  the  court  of  construction  in  finding  the  meaning  of  the  tes- 
tator.8 This  is  obviously  of  great  importance  where  the  will  is  to 
receive  construction  in  a  court  different  from  that  which  grants  the 
probate,  and  the  court  of  construction  is  denied  access  to  the  original 
will.  The  law  seems  to  be  unsettled  in  England,  whether  the  pro- 
bate copy  is  conclusive  upon  courts  of  law  and  chancery  courts  if  it 
should  contain  obvious  mistakes.  It  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  the 
court  construing  the  will  may  look  at  the  original,4  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  the  probate,  in  facsimile  or  otherwise,  conclusively  settles 
that  the  will  was  executed  in  the  form  shown  by  the  probate.6  Mr. 
Williams  is  of  opinion  that  it  may,  on  the  whole,  be  doubted  whether 
chancery  courts  in  England  have  not  gone  beyond  the  legiti- 
mate *  means  for  construing  wills,  where  they  have  sought  aid  [*  487] 
from  appearances  in  the  will  itself  not  to  be  found  in  the  pro- 
bate, and  whether  the  more  proper  course  is  not  to  apply  to  the  court 
of  probate  for  a  corrected  facsimile  probate,  if  it  be  desired  to  rely  on 
stops,  or  capital  letters,  or  any  marks  which,  in  truth,  are  apparent 
in  the  will,  though  not  in  the  probate.  "  For  until  the  court  of  probate 
has  sanctioned  them  as  legal  parts  of  the  will,  non  constat  that  they 
have  not  been  introduced  by  a  stranger,  or  by  the  testator  himself 
after  the  will  was  executed,  or  otherwise,  so  as  not  properly  to  form 
a  part  of  it.  And  this  can  only  be  decided  in  the  probate  court, 
which  is  bound  to  exclude  from  its  probate,  whether  a  facsimile  pro- 

1  Ante,  §  49.  a  will  was  proved  in  the  original  French 

2  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  53,  pi.  2.  language,  and  under  it,  in  the  same  pro- 

3  Wms.  [331].  If,  for  example,  the  bate,  it  was  translated  into  English,  but,  it 
testator  says,  "  I  give  A.  B.  an  annuity  appeared,  falsely  translated.  The  Master 
of  .£500,  and  I  also  give  him  .£1000;  "  of  the  Rolls  held  that  the  court  might  de- 
and  the  testator  then  strikes  out  down  to  termine  what  the  translation  ought  to  he. 
and  including  the  words  "£500"  :  Gann  In  Comptou  v.  Bloxham,  2  Coll.  201,  the 
v.  Gregory,  3  DeG.,  M.  &  G.  777,  780.  Sup-  Vice-Chancellor  begged  to  have  it  observed 
pose,  again,  the  words  "to  be  equally  that  he  had  sent  for  and  examined  the 
divided  amongst  them  "  interlined  (with-  original  will,  and  had  been  influenced  by 
out  any  caret  to  show  where  they  were  it  in  his  construction.  So  in  Shea  v. 
intended  to  come  in),  and  in  such  a  posi-  Boschetti,  18  Beav.  321,  and  Manning  v. 
tion  that  they  arc  applicable  to  two  sets  Purcell,  7  DeG.,  M.  &  G.  55,  the  original 
of  legatees.  In  such  case,  it  should  seem,  wills  were  examined  for  the  purpose  of 
there  must,  of  necessity,  be  a  facsimile  construction. 

probate.  6  Gann   v.   Gregory,  supra;  Taylor  v. 

*   In  [/Fit  v.   L'Ratt,   1   P.  Wms.  520,     Richardson,  2  Drew.  16. 
512 


§  2*23  PROBATE   OP    HOLOGRAPHIC    WILLS.  *  487,  *  488 

bate  or  not,  all  such,  appearances  on  the  face  of  the  will  as  do  not 
legitimately  belong  to  it  as  a  testamentary  instrument."  * 

The  same  view  seems  applicable  in  the  American  States.  Mr. 
Schouler  says:  "To  construe  a  will  duly  probated,  and  define  the 
rights  of  parties  in  interest,  remains  for  other  tribunals;  they  must 
interpret  the  charter  by  which  the  estate  should  be  settled  in  case  of 
controversy ;  while  the  probate  court,  by  right  purely  of  probate  or 
ecclesiastical  functions,  establishes  and  confirms  that  charter.  But 
in  order  to  do  this,  the  probate  court  throws  out  the  false  or  the 
superseded  will,  or  the  instrument  whose  execution  does  not  accord 
with  positive  statute  requirements ;  it  determines  what  writing  or 
writings  shall  constitute  the  will." 2  Hence  a  decree  by  a  court 
granting  probate  of  a  will,  that  it  is  null  and  void  in  so  far  as  it  con- 
flicts with  the  legal,  constitutional,  and  equitable  rights  of  the  widow, 
can  have  no  legal  effect.3 

§  223.  Probate  of  Holographic  "Wills.  —  The  difference  between 
ordinary  wills,  requiring  attestation  by  subscribing  witnesses  and 
holographic  wills,  is,  as  appears  from  the  discussion  of  this  subject 
in  a  former  chapter,4  that  the  latter  are  valid,  if  written  wholly  by  the 
testator,  without  attestation.  It  was  there  pointed  out  in  what  States 
such  wills  are  admitted  to  probate,  and  also  that  in  some  of  them  the 
statutes  provide  for  the  method  of  proof  by  which  they  must  be  estab- 
lished ;  it  is  not  proper,  therefore,  to  repeat  in  this  connection  the 

statutory  requirements  concerning  their  probate.6    It  is  neces- 
[*488]  sary  to  bear  in  mind,  *  however,  that  proof  must  be  made  that 

the  whole  of  the  instrument  was  written  by  the    Proof  neces- 
hand  of  the  testator,  and  generally  also,  that  he  dated  and    tabTish  T~ 
signed  it.6     In  Kentucky  it  was  decided  that  a  paper   holograph, 
wholly  written  and  subscribed  by  a  person,  with  the  intention  of  mak- 
ing it  his  will,  is  valid  as  a  will,  although  he  may  not  have  thought  it  a 
completed  paper  by  reason  of  a  mistaken  notion  on  his  part  that  the 
law  required  witnesses  to  such  a  paper.7     Proof  should  be  made  in 
strict  accordance  with  the  rules  prescribed  by  the  statute.8    In  some 

1  Wins.  Ex.  [569].  sonalty,  provided  the  handwriting  be  suf- 

2  Schoul.  Ex.  §  85.  ficiently  proved :    Suggett  v.  Kitchell,   6 
8  O'Docherty    v.   McGloinn,    25    Tex.     Yerg.   429 ;    Reagan  v.  Stanley,  1 1  Lea, 

67.  316. 

*  Ante,  §  43.  1  Toebbe   v.    Williams,  80    Ky.    661, 

6  See  also  the  cases  there  cited,  passing  664. 
upon  some  of  the  principles  and  proced-         8  Succession  of  Clark,  11  La.  An.  124. 

ure  involved.  In  this  State  women  cannot  be  snbscrib- 

6  It   is    held   in   some    States    that   a  ing  witnesses  to  a  will,  but  are  competent 

printed  form,  rilled  in  by  the  testator,  is  to   establish   a  holograph  :    Succession  of 

not  a  holographic  will.     Ante,  §  43,  citing  Eubanks,  9  La.  An.  147  ;  and  such  a  will 

Estate  of  Rand,  61  Cal.  468.     In  Tenues-  may  be  admitted  to  probate  upon  proper 

see  a  will  written  by  the  testator's  own  proof,   although  previously   admitted  im- 

hand,  although    not    signed  by  him  nor  properly  :  Succession  of  Clark,  supra. 
attested  by  witnesses,  is  good  as  to  per- 

voi„  1  —  33  *U 


*  488,  *  489  THE   PROBATE   OF   THE    WILL.  §  224 

States  the  handwriting  must  be  proved  by  three  witnesses ; l  in  others 
by  two ; 2  and  in  Kentucky  it  was  held  that  proof  of  handwriting  by 
one  witness,  together  with  proof  of  declarations  by  the  testator  in 
corroboration  thereof,  was  sufficient  to  establish  a  holograph.8  In 
Virginia  it  was  doubted  whether  one  or  two  witnesses  are  necessary.4 
In  England  the  rule  laid  down,  before  the  Wills  Act  of  1838,  in 
respect  of  wills  of  personalty,  allowed  thern  to  be  established  upon 
sufficient  proof  that  the  will  or  signature  was  in  the  handwriting  of 
the  testator.6  Under  this  rule,  it  was  held  to  be  clearly  established 
in  the  ecclesiastical  courts  that  similitude  of  handwriting,  even  with 
a  probable  disposition,  is  not  sufficient  to  establish  a  testamentary 
paper,  without  some  concomitant  circumstances,  as  the  place  of  find- 
ing, or  the  like,  to  connect  it  with  the  party  whose  will  it  is  alleged 
to  be.6  The  same  doctrine  seems  to  be  applicable  to  the  proof  of  the 
handwriting  in  a  holographic  will,  where  the  statute  does  not  control 
it.  Declarations  by  the  testator  are  generally  admissible  in 
connection  *  with  such  evidence,7  but  are  not  alone  sufficient  [*489] 
to  establish  the  will.8 

§  224.     Proof  of  Nuncupative  Wills.  —  The    method    of     proving 
.nuncupative    wills   has   been   extensively   discussed    in    connection 

with  the  statutory  regulations  affecting  this  species  of 
neesssary  to  testamentary  disposition.9  In  consequence  of  the  dis- 
establish nun-  favor  with  which  this  class  of  wills  is  looked  upon  by 
cupative  wills.  .  ,      ,    •    . 

the  courts,10  it  is  necessary  to  observe  the  utmost  strict- 
ness in  fulfilling  the  statutory  requirements  with  reference  to  them, 
and  to  prove  the  testamentary  capacity  and  animus  testandi  by 
the  clearest  evidence ;  any  deviation  therefrom  will,  according  to 
the  unvarying   current   of    authorities,  prove   fatal.11     The  probate 

1  As  in  Arkansas,  North  Carolina,  and  will,   cannot   be   introduced   as   proof  of 
Tennessee.  the  revocation   of  a  holographic  will  of- 

2  As  in  Louisiana :  "  Who  are  familiar  fered  for  probate  :  Allen  v.  Jeter,  6  Lea, 
with  his  handwriting,  having  often  seen  672,  675. 

him    write  in    his  lifetime":     Succession  8  Succession  of  Eubanks,  supra. 

of  Eubanks,  supra.     But  this  rule  applies  9  Ante,  §§  44,  45. 

only  whore  the  probate  is  not  contested;  u  Woods  v.   Ridley,  27  Miss.  119,  146; 

where    it    is    contested    ab   initio,    on    the  deciding,    however,  that    when     properly 

ground   that  the   w;;i   is  a  forgery,  the  proved  they  are  equally  entitled  to  pro- 

ordinary  rules  of  law  apply:    Succession  bate  with  written  wills. 

of  Gaines,  88  La.  An.  128.  u  Broach  v.  Sing,  57   Miss.  115,  116; 

;  Hannah    v.    Peak,   2   A.   K.   Marsh.  Dorsey  v.  Sheppard,  12  Gill  &  J.  192,  198; 

188,  Winn  v.  Bob,   3    Leigh,    140;    Prince   v. 

1  Bedford  f   Peggy,  6  Rand.  316.  Hazleton,  20  Johns.  502;    Tally  v.  But- 

<•  Sharps  Sharp,  2  Leigh,  249, 254.  terworth,  10    Yerg.    501;     Brayfleld    v. 

'    Wmi.    hx.    [850],  citing  numerous  Brayfleld,  3   liar.  &   J.    208;    Webb  v. 

lish  cases.  Webb,  7  T.  B.  Mon.  626,  631 ;  Rankin  v. 

7    But    declarations    that    be     made    a  Rankin,  9  Ired,  L.  150;  St.  James  Church 

Subsequent  will,  in   the  absence  of  all  tea  V.  Walker,  1  Del.  Ch.  284  i  Succession   or 

ti nj  of  the  contents,  execution,  attes-  Domes,  .37  La.  An.  8.'i."5.      in  Iowa  the 

tation,  "r  handwriting  of  such  subsequent  animus  tisi<in<li  was  inferred  from  the  tes- 
B I  i 


#r25 


DECLARATIONS   AS   EVIDENCE. 


*  489,  *  490 


Testator's  dec- 
larations ad- 
missible to 
prove  the 
condition  of 
his  mind; 


of   such  a  will   is,  however,  conclusive,1  and  cannot,  in 
some  States,  be  set  aside  or  contested  in  chancery,  like    nuncupation 
a  written  will,  the   only  remedy  of   a  party  aggrieved   coucluslve- 
being  by  appeal ; 2  but  a  contest  being,  in  some  States,  in  the  nature 
of   an   appeal   from  the  judgment  of  the  probate  court,  every  fact 
which  is  required  to  be  proved  in  order  to  admit  the  will  to  probate 
may  be  disproved  on  the  contest  to  show  it  to  be  invalid.3 

§  225.  Admissibility  of  Declarations  as  Evidence  in  the  Probate 
of  Wills.  —  The  conversations,  statements,  and  declarations  of  the 
testator  are  always  admissible  on  the  question  of  his 
testamentary  capacity,  since  they  are  the  most  direct 
manifestations  of  his  mental  condition;  their  value  as 
evidence  being,  in  this  respect,  fully  equal,  if  not 
superior,   to    that    of   his    acts,    conduct,    behavior,    or 

appearance.     Many  phases  of  insanity  —  delusions,  halluci- 
[*  490]  nations,  and  the  like  —  *  are  capable  of  proof  by  this  means 

only.     Hence   great   latitude   is   allowed   in   proving   decla- 
rations, acts,  and  statements  of  a  testator,  extending  over  many  years, 
to   establish   the    status    of   his  mind   when   he    made 
his  will.4     Of  course  the  declarations  are  not  competent    provTthe  con- 
to  prove  the  truth  of  the  matter  stated  in   them,  and    tent  of  n>s 
when  the  content  of  a  statement  or  declaration  concerns 
a  fact  in  issue  in  the  proceeding,  the  jury  should  be  cautioned  on  this 
point.5     On  an  imputation  of  fraud,  also,  in  the  making  of  the  will 
declarations  of  the  testator  are  admissible  in  evidence  to  show  his 
dislike  or  affection  for  his  relations,  or  those  who  in  the  will  appear 
to  be  the  objects  of  his  bounty,  and  respecting  his  intentions  either 
to  benefit  them  or  to  pass  them  by  in  the  disposition  of  his  property.6 


tator's  expression  of  his  desire :  Mulligan 
v.  Leonard,  46  Iowa,  692. 

1  Bradley  v.  Andress,  27  Ala.  596 ; 
Brown  v.  Harris,  9  Baxt.  386. 

2  Page  v.  Page,  2  Bob.  Va.  424. 

3  Bolles  v.  Harris,  34  Oh.  St.  38,  41. 

4  "  To  enable  the  jury  to  determine  the 
real  state  of  mind,  the  action  of  that 
mind,  as  shown  best  by  conversations, 
declarations,  claims,  and  acts,  is  the  most 
satisfactory  evidence  "  :  Kent,  J.,  in  Rob- 
inson v.  Adams,  62  Me.  369,  413  ;  Rambler 
v.  Tryon,  7  Serg.  &  R.  90,  93,  allowing 
declarations  that  his  wife  and  father-in- 
law  plagued  him,  wanting  him  to  give  her 
all,  or  he  would  have  no  rest,  as  showing 
weakness  of  mind ;  Roberts  v.  Trawick, 
13  Ala.  68,  83  ;  Barker  v.  Barker,  36  N.  J. 
Eq.  259,  268,  holding  a  denial  by  the  testa- 
trix that  she  made  a  will  competent  to 
prove  want  of  testamentary  capacity,  and 


that  the  will  was  never  executed,  but  not 
that  there  was  undue  influence.  See  re- 
marks of  Surrogate  Rollins  in  Hamersley 
v.  Lockman,  2  Dem.  524,  533  ;  Matter  of 
Clark,  40  Hun,  233,  338  ;  Bower  v.  Bower, 
142  Ind.  194  ;  Herster  v.  Herster,  122  Pa. 
St.  239,  258  ;  Hammond  v.  Dike,  42  Minn. 
273.  The  making  of  a  former  will  stands 
on  the  same  footing  to  prove  testamentary 
capacity  that  a  declaration  stands  upon 
Brown  v.  Mitchell,  87  Tex.  140. 

5  Robinson  v.  Adams,  supra;  Boylai 
v.  Meeker,  28  N.  J.  L.  274,  279  ;  Har'ring 
v.  Allen,  25  Mich.  505  ;  Jones  v.  McLel- 
lan,  76  Me.  49 ;  Bush  v.  Bush,  87  Mo.  480, 
485  ;  Herster  v.  Herster,  supra.  See  also 
In  re  Calkins,  112  Cal.  296,  301.  Hence 
declarations  of  the  testator  are  inadmis- 
sible to  prove  the  proper  execution  of  the 
will:  "Walton  v.  Kendrick,  122  Mo.  514. 

6  Howell  v.  Barden,  3  Dev.  442 ;  Nee] 

515 


*  490,  *  491 


THE    PROBATE    OF    THE    WILL. 


§  225 


Declarations 
inadmissible 
to  prove  revo- 
cation of  a  will 


But  such  declarations,  alone  and  unsupported  by  other  facts,  are  not 
only  insufficient  to  prove  undue  influence,  but  their  exclusion,  in  the 
absence  of  other  evidence,  is  not  erroneous.1  Nor  should  declara- 
tions made  so  long  before  or  after  the  making  of  the  will 
that  they  cannot  be  considered  as  of  the  res  gestcp,  be 
admitted  to  prove  the  fact  of  fraud,  circumvention,  or 
imposition.2  The  revocation  of  a  will  cannot  be 
proved  by  *  the  declarations  of  the  testator; 3  but  his  expres-  [*491] 
sions  of  approval  or  dissatisfaction  have  been  held  admissible 
as  bearing  upon  his  intention  in  destroying  the  will,  or  proving  that 
a  lost  will  is  not  revoked.4  Diaries  kept  and  letters  written  by  a 
testator,  either  before  or  after  the  execution  of  the  will, 
letters  subject  are,  like  his  verbal  declarations,  proper  evidence  as  bear- 
to  same  rule.  ^ng  Up0n  hjs  mental  capacity,  and  the  condition  of  his 
mind  with  reference  to  objects  of  his  bounty,  but  not  competent  to 
prove  the  facts  stated  in  them,  or  fraud  or  undue  influence.5  It  has 
been  held  that  the  testator's  declarations  are  competent  to  prove  the 
fact  of  subscription  by  the  attesting  witnesses  where  one  of  them 
denies  or  fails  to  remember  such  fact,  on  the  ground  that  the  testa- 
tor must  certainly  know  about  his  own  acts,  and  has  no  motive  to 
speak  falsely  ; 6  and  in  North  Carolina  the  declarations  of  a  testator 
at  any  time  after  the  making  of  the  will  were  held  competent  to 
prove  that  the  will  in  question  is  not  his  will.7 


v.  Potter,  40  Pa.  St.  483 ;  Penison's  Ap- 
peal, 29  Conn.  399,  402;  Harp  v.  Parr, 
168  111.459,470;  Potter  v.  Baldwin,  133 
Mass.  427  ;  Gardner  v.  Friese,  16  R.  I. 
640  ;  Barbour  v.  Moore,  4  Dist.  Col.  App. 
535  ;  Dye  v.  Young,  55  Iowa,  433 ;  Gold- 
thorp's  Est.,  94  Iowa,  336  ;  Reynolds  v. 
Adams,  90  111.  134,  147  ;  Parsons  v.  Par- 
sons, 66  Iowa,  754  ;  and  see  in  connection 
herewith,  ante,  §  31,  p.  *  48. 

1  Cawthorne  v.  Haynes,  24  Mo.  236, 
239  ;  Rusling  v.  Rusling,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  603, 
608;  Shaw  v.  Shaw,  1  Deni.  21,  24;  Kit- 
rhell  v.  Beach,  35  N.  J.  Eq.  446,  454; 
Storer's  Will,  28  Minn.  9,  12;  Hess's 
Will,  48  Minn.  504;  Peery  v.  Peery,  94 
Tenn  328,  342;  Kirkpatrick  v.  Jenkins, 
90  Tenn.  85  ;  Wurzell  v.  Beckman,  52 
Mich.  IT";  Military  !•.  Young,  94  Ga.  804 
(holding  declarations  inadmissible  to  prove 
undue  influence) ;  In  re  Calkins,  112  Cal. 
L""..  802. 

-  Smith  v    Fenner,  i   Call.  170,  172; 

r     V:,m  leV6,    t     Wash.    < '.  C.    262, 

bailer  i».  Bumstead,  99  Mass.  1 12, 

121,  holding   thai    tin-   value   of    such    evi- 

dence  dependi  upon  its  significance  and 
516 


proximity;  In  re  McDevitt,  95  Cal.  17; 
Rule  v.  Maupin,  84  Mo.  587,  590  ;  Crocker 
v.  Chase,  57  Vt.  413;  Conway  v.  Vizzard, 
122  Ind.  266,  268  (holding  declarations 
admissible  to  show  want  of  testamentary 
capacity,  but  not  on  the  issue  of  undue 
influence).  See  also  Haynes  v.  Hayden, 
95  Mich.  332. 

3  Jackson  v.  Kniffen,  2  Johns.  31  ; 
Reynolds  v.  Adams,  90  111.  134,  147; 
Iloitt  v.  Hoitt,  63  N.  H.  475,  499  ;  Slaugh- 
ter v.  Stephens,  81  Ala.  418;  Kirkpatrick 
v.  Jenkins,  96  Tenn.  85. 

*  Matter  of  Marsh,  45  Hun,  107  ;  Har- 
ring  v.  Allen,  25  Mich.  505,  507 ;  John- 
son's Will,  40  Conn.  587  ;  ante,  §  221,  and 
authorities  there  cited. 

6  Marx  v.  McGlynn,  88  N.  Y.  357,  374. 
Whether  a  memorandum  by  the  testator 
is  admissible,  to  the  effect  that  he  had  on 
that  day  "made  a  will  in  favor  of"  the 
beneficiary  under  the  will  propounded, 
and  adding  the  name  of  the  witnesses, 
was  doubted  in  New  York;  Beekman  v. 
Beckman,  2  Dem.  635,  639. 

r>  Beadles  v.  Alexander,  9  Baxt.  604. 

7  Reel   v.    Reel,    1    Hawks,   248,  267; 


£  226  WILLS  PROVED  IN  A  FOREIGN  JURISDICTION.       *  491,  *  492 

§  226.  Wills  proved  in  a  Foreign  Jurisdiction.  —  The  principle 
requiring  the  title  and  disposition  of  real  property  to  be  governed 
exclusively  by  the  law  of  the  country  or  state  in  which  it  is  situated, 
—  lex  loci  rei  slice,1  —  and  that  requiring  personal  property  to  follow 
the  law  of  the  owner's  domicil,  — lex  domicilii,2  —  together  with  the 
extra-territorial  invalidity  of  municipal  laws  and  regulations,8  have 
heretofore  produced  considerable  divergence  in  respect  of  wills  which 
have  been  executed  and  admitted  to  probate  in  sister  States  or 
foreign  countries,  and  operate  upon  property  situated  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  forum  where  they  are  sought  to  be 
enforced.  It  is  now  a  fully  established  rule  in  Eng-  requiring  pro- 
land,  that  in  order  to  sue  in  any  court  of  law  or  equity,    bate  of  wills 

'  J  *       J '     of  personalty 

in    respect   of  the   personal   rights   or    property    of   a    in  jurisdiction 
deceased   person,   the   plaintiff  must  appear   to   °  te   orum. 
[*  492]  have  *  obtained  probate   of  the  will,    or  letters  of  adminis- 
tration in  the  court  of  probate  there  ; 4  and  this    go  .        t 
is  so   in  America  in  all  the  States  with  the  exception    American 
of   those  in  which  the  statutes  confer    certain   powers    states- 
upon  foreign  executors  and  administrators,  which   may  be  exercised 
by  virtue  of  such  statutory  regulations,5  or  give  validity  to  a  foreign 
probate.6      It    follows    that    a    will    made    in     another    State     or 
foreign    country,   and    proved    there,    disposing    of   property    else- 
where, must,  except  in  the  States  holding  as  above,  be  proved  in  the 
State  where  the  property  is  situated  also,  or  courts  cannot  enforce 
the  provisions  of  such  will.7 

Generally,  the  court  in  which  the  will  is  to  be  proved  anew  will 
adopt  the  decision  of  the  court  in  the  foreign  country 
where  the  testator  died  domiciled  as  to  the  probate  of  a    will  in  coun- 
will  disposing  of  personal  property ;  for  it  is  a  clearly    *"m°f .j^?, 
established  rule,  that  the  law  of  the  country  in  which    lowed  as  to 
the  deceased  was  domiciled  at  the  time  of  his  death  not    Personalty- 

Hester  v.  Hester,  4  Dev.  228  (in  this  case  testamentary  or  of  administration  granted 

objection  was  made  to  the  competency  of  to  him  in  the  country  where  the  deceased 

a  widow  testifying  to  the  declarations  of  died." 

her  husband,  and  overruled  ;  nothing  was  6  Mansfield    v.   Turpin,   32    Ga.   260 ; 

said  as  to  the  competency  of  the  declara-  Karrick  v.  Pratt,  4  Greene  (Iowa),  144. 
tions  as  such).  6  As  to  which  see  infra,  and  p.  *494, 

1  Ante,  §  168.  notes. 

2  See  ante,  §§  157  et  seq.  7  Campbell  v.  Sheldon,  13  Pick.  8,  22  ; 
8  Ante,  §§  157  et  seq.  Campbell  v.  Wallace,  10  Gray,  162  ;  Drake 
*  Wms.  Ex.   [362],  where  the  author  v.  Merrill,  2  Jones  L.  368,  373  ;  Ex  parte 

quotes  a  note  to  the  American  edition  of  Povall,  3  Leigh,  816  ;  Dixon  ?;.  D'Armond, 

his  work,  stating  "  that  it  has  been  estab-  23  La.  An.  200 ;  Pope  v.  Cutler,  34  Mich. 

lished  as  a  rule,  by  repeated  decisions  in  150,   152;  Townsend  v.   Downer,  32  Vt. 

many  of  the  States,  that  the  executor  or  183,  216;  Ward  v.   Oates,  43  Ala.  515; 

administrator  of  a  person  who  dies  dom-  Thiebaut  v.  Sebastian,  10  Ind.  454,  458 ; 

iciled  in  Great  Britain,  or  any  other  for-  Helm  v.  Rookesby,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  49 ;  Ivea 

eign  country,  cannot  maintain  an  action  v.  Allyn,  12  Vt.  589,  594;  Armstrong  v. 

In  the  United  States,  by  virtue  of  letters  Lear,  12  Wheat.  169,  175. 

517 


*  492,  *  493 


THE   PROBATE   OF   THE   WILL. 


§226 


only  decides  the  course  of  distribution  or  succession  as  to  personalty, 
but  regulates  the  decision  as  to  what  constitutes  the  last  will  with- 
out regard  to  the  place  either  of  birth  or  death,  or  the  situation  of 
the  property  at  that  time.1  It  is  provided  by  statute, 
effect  to  foreign  that  the  will  of  a  non-resident,  admitted  to  probate 
probate.  according  to  the  law  of  the  State  in  which  he  resided  at 

the  time  of  his  death,  may  be  admitted  to  probate  upon  the  produc- 
tion of  a  duly  authenticated  copy  thereof  together  with  the 
probate,  without  other  proof,  or  *  notice,  in  the  States  of  Ala-  [*  493] 
bama,2  Arizona,8  Arkansas,4  Colorado,6  Delaware,6  Florida,7 
Georgia,8  Idaho,9  Illinois,10  Indiana,11  Iowa,12  Michigan,18  Missouri,14 
Mississippi,15  New  York,16  North  Carolina,17  Oregon,18  Pennsyl- 
vania,19 South  Carolina,20  Texas,21  Virginia,22  Washington,28  West 
Virginia,24   Wisconsin,26  and    Wyoming;26  and  with   the    difference 


1  Wood  v.  Wood,  5  Pai.  596,  603; 
Moultrie  v.  Hunt,  23  N.  Y.  394  ;  Nelson 
v.  Potter,  50  N.  J.  L.  324.  See  list  of 
American  cases  collected  by  Bigelow  in 
his  note  to  the  eighth  edition  of  Story's 
Conflict  of  Laws,  p.  644,  note  (a).  In 
Louisiana  it  was  held  that  a  will  presented 
for  probate  and  rejected  there,  but  subse- 
quently admitted  to  probate  in  New  York 
where  the  testatrix  was  domiciled  at  her 
death  (which  occurred  in  Louisiana)  and 
thereafter  again  presented  to  the  Louisi- 
ana court  upon  a  duly  authenticated  re- 
cord of  the  New  York  probate,  should  be 
recognized  and  enforced  by  the  Louisiana 
courts :  Gaines'  Succession,  45  La.  An. 
1238. 

2  Dickey  v.  Vann,  81  Ala.  425,  432  ; 
Ward  v.  Oates,  43  Ala.  515,  517  ;  such 
will  cannot  be  contested  :  Brock  v.  Frank, 
51  Ala.  85. 

2  Rev.  St.  1887,  par.  987. 

*  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §§  7429-7431. 

*  Hill's  Ann.  St.  Suppl.  1896,  §  4678; 
Corrigan  v.  Jones,  14  Colo.  311. 

*  Rev.  Code,  1874,  ch.  84,  §  6-9- 
(This  statute  prescribes  the  manner  in 
which  such  will  must  be  certified  in  order 
to  be  need  in  evidence.) 

7   Rev.  St.  1892,  §  1811. 

R  Sni-h  foreign  probate  held  conclusive 
when-  the  will  was  contested  by  all  the 
In  ir-  Thomas  o.  Morrisett,  76  Ga.  384 
(Jackson,   Ch.  J.,  dissenting). 

»  Rev.  St.  1*H7,  §  5317. 

M  St.  &  Cnrt.  Ann.  St.  1896,  ch.  148, 
19. 

"  Ann  St.  1894,  §§  2591-2593.  Such 
51  S 


foreign  probate  cannot  be  contested  in 
Indiana  for  any  cause  :  Harris  v.  Harris, 
61  Iud.  117,  126. 

12  Stanley  v.  Morse,  26  Iowa,  454,  hold- 
ing the  foreign  probate  conclusive ;  Vance 
v.  Anderson,  39  Iowa,  426  ;  but  it  must  be 
shown  that  the  foreign  court  had  juris- 
diction ;  Capper's  Will,  85  Iowa,  83. 

13  Gen.  St.  1890  (Supplement),  §  5805; 
Laws,  1895,  No.  105. 

i*  Rev.  St.  1889,  §§  8900,  8901  ;  such 
probate  is  conclusive  :  Applegood  v.  Smith, 
31  Mo.  166,  169;  this  statute  applies  to 
wills  probated  in  foreign  countries  as  well 
as  in  sister  States:  Gaven  v.  Allen,  100 
Mo.  293,  299.  But  one  dealing  with  lands 
in  this  State  is  not  charged  with  construc- 
tive notice  of  the  probate  of  a  will  in 
another  State:  Van  Syckel  v.  Beam,  110 
Mo.  589,  593. 

15  Ann.  Code,  1892,  §  1829.  The  stat- 
ute has  no  application  to  wills  of  domiciled 
citizens  in  this  State  :  Sturdivant  v.  Neill, 
27  Miss.  157,  165;  Bate  v.  Incisa,  59  Miss. 
513. 

16  Throop's  Ann.  Code,  Civ.  Proced, 
1887,  §§  2703-2705. 

"  Code,  1883,  §§  2156,  2157. 
"  Code,  1887,  §  3083. 

19  Tepp.  &  L.  Dig.  1896,  p.  1454,  §  58. 

20  Rev.  St.  1893,  §  2007. 

21  Rev.  St.  1895,  art.  5353. 

22  Code,  1887,  §  2536. 

28  Code,  1896,  §§  5360,  5361. 
"  Code,  1891,  ch.  77,  §  25. 
25  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  2295. 
*>  Rev.  St.  1887,  §  2246. 


§  22G 


WILLS   PROVED   IN    A    FOREIGN    JURISDICTION. 


*  493,  *  -i'ji 


Even  as  to 
realty,  if  in 
conformity 
with  the  law 
rei  sitae. 


that  notice  is  required  to  be  given  to  persons  interested  likewise 
in  California,1  Connecticut,2  Maine,*  Massachusetts,4  Minnesota,' 
Montana,6  Nebraska,7  Nevada,8  New  Hampshire,9  New  Jersey,10 
Ohio,11  Oklahoma,12  Rhode  Island,18  South  Dakota,14  Tennessee,14 
and  Vermont.16 

In  many  of  these  States  it  is  affirmatively  provided 
that  the  foreign  probate  is  conclusive  only  in  so  far  as 
the  will  concerns  personal  property ;  to  pass  title  to  real 
estate,  it  must  appear,  either  by  proof  furnished  in  the 
forum  loci  rei  sites,  or  by  the  authenticated  copy  of  the  evidence 
upon  which  the  foreign  probate  was  granted,  that  in  the  execu- 
tion, attestation,  and  proof  of  the  will  the  requirements  of  the  law  of 
the  State  in  which  the  land  lies  have  been  complied  with.17 

In  some  of  the  States  the  foreign  probate  seems  to  foreign  probate 
[*  494]  be  made  conclusive  as  to  real  as  *  well  as  to  per-  is  conclusive. 

sonal  property ; 18  but  unless  such  be  the  express  or  necessary 
import  of  the  statute,  it  must  affirmatively  appear  from  such  foreign 
probate,  or  other  proof,  that  the  law  of  the  forum  has  been  observed 
in  making  and  proving  the  will  in  order  to  give  validity  to  its  dis- 
position of  real  estate.19     There  are  some  States,  also,  in  which  the 


1  Code  Civ.  Proced.,  §  1324 

2  Gen.  St.  1887,  §  550. 

8  Rev.  St.  1883,  p.  538,  §  13 ;  Crofton 
v.  Ilsly,  4  Me.  134,  138;  Spring  v.  Park- 
man,  12  Me.  127,  131. 

4  Publ.  St.  1882,  p.  749,  §15;  Dublin 
v.  Chadbourn,  16  Mass.  433,  441  ;  Parker 
v.  Parker,  ,^11  Cush.  519.  Conclusive, 
though  no  notice  was  given  in  the  foreign 
State:  Crippen  v.  Dexter,  13  Gray,  330; 
Shannon  v.  Shannon,  111  Mass.  331. 

6  Bloor  t\  Myerscaugh,  45  Minn.  29, 
30.  But  it  is  error  to  allow  such  will  and 
proceed  to  administration,  unless  it  be 
shown  that  there  is  property  in  the  county : 
Southard's  Will,  48  Minn.  37. 

6  Const.  Codes  &  St.  1895,  §§  2350- 
2352. 

?  Cons.  St.  1892,  §§  1203,  1204  (Code 
Civ.  Proced). 

8  Gen.  St.  1885,  §§  2693,  2694. 

9  Publ.  St.  1891,  ch.  187,  §  13. 

10  Gen.  St.  1896,  p.  2360,  §§  23,  24; 
an  exemplified  copy  of  the  foreign  will 
and  its  probate  is  not  competent  evidence, 
it  must  be  regularly  proved  and  recorded 
in  this  State  :  Graham  v.  Whitely,  26  N. 
J.  L.  254,  258;  see  Allaire  v.  Allaire,  37 
N.  J.  L.  312. 

11  Bates'  Ann.  St.  1897,  §§  5938-5940. 
1  St.  1890,  p.  300,  §§  19-21. 


»  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  705,  §§  10-13. 
"  Comp.  L.  Ter.,  §§  5677-5679. 

15  Code,  1884,  §  3024. 

16  St.  1894,  §§  2365-2369;  Ives  v.  Salis- 
bury, 56  Vt.  565. 

17  So  in  Arkausas,  Kentucky,  Missouri, 
North  Carolina,  Oregon  (see  Clayson's 
Will,  24  Oreg.  542,  547),  Rhode  Island, 
Tennessee,  and  Virginia. 

18  For  instance,  in  Colorado  :  Corrigan 
v.  Jones,  14  Colo.  311  (the  estate  consist- 
ing apparently  in  part  of  cattle  ranches  •' 
p.  312);  Connecticut:  Irwin's  Appeal,  33 
Conn.  128,  140;  Illinois:  Gardner  v. 
Ladue,  47  111.  211;  Maine:  Lyon  v.  Og- 
den,  85  Me.  374 ;  Michigan :  Wilt  v. 
Cutler,  38  Mich.  189,  196;  Minnesota: 
Babcock  v.  Collins,  60  Minn.  73  (leaving 
undecided  the  effect  of  a  foreign  probate 
where  no  notice  thereof  had  been  given  : 
p.  78) ;  Wisconsin  :  Hayes  v.  Lienlokken, 
43  Wis.  509,  511. 

19  Clayson's  Will,  24  Oreg.  542.  547; 
Lindley  v.  O'Reilly,  50  N.  J.  L.  636  ;  Nel- 
son v.  Potter,  50  N.  J.  L.  324  ;  Varner  v. 
Bevil,  17  Ala.  286;  St.  James  Church  v. 
Walker,  1  Del.  Ch.  284;  Richards  v. 
Miller,  62  111.  417  ;  Sneed  v.  Ewing,  5 
J.  J.  Marsh.  460,  465 ;  Crusoe  v.  Butlerr 
36  Mississippi,  150;  Davison's  Will,  t 
Tuck.  479  ;  Hyman  v.  Gaskins,  5  Ired.  L 

519 


•494,  *495 


THE   PROBATE   OF   THE   WILL. 


§226 


probate  of  the  foreign  jurisdiction,  duly  authenticated, 
e^c^toforefen  either  according  to  the  act  of  Congress,  or  in  accord- 
probate  without  ance  with  the  regulations  prescribed  in  the  statutes  of 
probate  anew.  ^^  gtat.eSj  are  an0wed  to  be  given  in  evidence  without 
probate  anew,  or  previous  approval  by  the  probate  court  of  the  loci 
rei  sitae; '  it  is  so  provided  by  statute  in  Florida,2  Georgia,8  Illinois,4 
and  in  some  other  States  the  statute  seems  to  provide  only  for  a 
recording  of  a  foreign  will.5  The  authentication  of  the  probate,  and 
certificate  that  such  authentication  is  in  due  form  of  law  in  the  State 
granting  it,  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the  act  of  Congress  for  the 
authentication  of  records,  is  sufficient  to  entitle  such  will  to  admis- 
sion in  the  courts  of  sister  States  without  proof  of  the  statute  giving 
jurisdiction  to  the  foreign  court.6 

There  is  some  deviation,  also,  on  the  validity  of  wills  exe- 
cuted *  in  a  State  or  country,  according  to  the  requirements  [*  495] 
Probate  of  will   thereof,  in  which  the  testator  was  not  domiciled 
countr^where    ak  ^e  time  of  his  death,  as  to  personal  property  situated 
the  testator        in  the  State  of  his  domicil,  or  some  other  country.    Thus, 
cUed"0'  omi"    a  will  made  in  Massachusetts  by  an  inhabitant  thereof 


267 ;  Holman  v.  Hopkins,  27  Tex.  38 ; 
McCormick  v.  Sullivant,  10  Wheat.  192; 
Pennel  v.  Weyant,  2  Harr.  501,  506  ;  Budd 
v.  Brooke,  3  Gill,  198,  232;  Barstow  v. 
Sprague,  40  N.  H.  27,  31 ;  Goodman  v. 
Winter,  64  Ala.  410,  428;  Williams  v. 
Jones,  14  Bush,  418;  Smith  v.  Neilson, 
13  Lea,  461,  466. 

1  Harris  v.  Anderson,  9  Humph.  779; 
Lancaster  v.  McBryde,  5  Ired.  L.  421, 
423,  citing  Helme  v.  Sanders,  3  Hawks, 
5G3  (but  compare  on  this  point  the  later 
case  of  Drake  r.  Merrill,  2  Jones  L.  368, 
which  seems  to  overrule  the  last  two 
cases);  Shephard  v.  Curriel,  19  111.  313, 
319;  Newman  v.  Willetts,  52  111.  98,  104; 
Walton  v.  Hall,  66  Vt.  455;  Smith  v. 
Neilson,  13  Lea,  461,  466;  Lewis  v.  City 
of  St.  Louis,  69  Mo.  595,  affirmed  in 
I'.radstreet  v.  Kinsella,  76  Mo.  63,  66  ; 
Gaines  v.  Fender,  82  Mo.  497,  505;  and 
Drake  v.  Curtis,  88  Mo.   644. 

>  Rev.  St.  1892,  §  1110.  But  unless 
the  execution  of  the  will  conforms  to  the 
law  of  Florida,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  pass 
real  estate  :  C  roily  V.  Clark,  20  Fla.  849. 

8  Code,  1895,  §  3291. 

4  Long  v.  PattOD,  154  U.  S.  573;  St. 
&  C.  Ann.  St.  1896,  di.  148,  If  10. 

6  In  Missouri  sinh  a  statute  was  held 
to   authorize    a    wi.l     proved    •'•>     another 

State,  in  accordance  with  the  L*«  of  Mis- 

5^0 


souri,  an  authenticated  copy  of  which  was 
recorded  in  the  proper  county  of  the  latter 
State,  to  be  competent  evidence  of  title: 
Applegate  v.  Smith,  31  Mo.  166,  169; 
Bright  v.  White,  8  Mo.  421,  426 ;  Haile  v. 
Hill,  13  Mo.  612,  618.  So  in  other  States ; 
Bromley  v.  Miller,  2  Th.  &  C.  575;  Car- 
penter v.  Deuoon,  29  Oh.  St.  379,  395. 
But  it  is  also  held  in  Missouri,  that  while 
a  foreign  will  need  not  be  probated  anew 
if  complying  with  the  Missouri  law,  yet 
it  must  be  recorded  in  the  latter  State  as 
domestic  wills  are  required  to  be  recorded, 
in  order  to  give  constructive  notice  to 
persons  dealing  with  lands  in  this  State  : 
Keith  v.  Keith,  97  Mo.  223,  229 ;  Van 
Syckel  v.  Beam,  110  Mo.  589;  and  see, 
also,  Slayton  v.  Singleton,  72  Tex.  209, 
212.  And  it  was  held  in  the  United  States 
Circuit  Court,  District  for  Kansas,  that  a 
conveyance  by  a  foreign  executor,  before 
complying  with  the  Kansas  law  as  to  the 
probate  of  the  will,  was  validated  by  the 
doctrine  of  relation,  by  a  subsequent  com- 
pliance with  the  law,  no  rights  of  third 
persons  having  intervened :  Brooks  v. 
McComb,  38  P^ed.  R.  317. 

6  l'uryear  v.  Heard,  14  Ala.  121,  128; 
Robertson  v.  Barbour,  6  T.  B.  Mou.  523, 
528;  Wilt  v.  Cutler,  38  Mich.  189,  198} 
and  see  cases,  supra,  note  1. 


§226  WILLS   PROVED    IN    A    FOREIGN    JURISDICTION.       *  495,  *  496 


must  be  proved  according  to  the  law  of  Massachusetts,  no  matter 
where  it  receives  original  probate  ; a  and  a  will  is  admissible  to 
original  probate  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the  testator's  domicil  at  the 
time  of  his  death,  without  regard  to  where  he  died  or  where  the 
will  was  made.8  While  a  foreign  will  may  be  admitted  to  pro- 
bate upon  proper  proof,  although  it  has  not  been  proved  or  recorded 
in  the  testator's  domicil,8  and  although  it  has  been  declared  void  in 
other  States,4  the  probate  of  a  court  which  is  without  jurisdiction  be- 
cause the  testator  may  have  resided,  but  was  not  domi-  probate  of  for. 
ciled,  in  the  State,  is  void,  and  cannot  support  a  probate 
in  the  State  of  the  domicil.6  And  it  has  been  held  that 
the  proof  must  be  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  the 
domicil  at  the  time  of  death,  although  the  statute  pro- 
vides that  property  may  be  bequeathed  if  the  will  be 
executed  and  proved  "  according  to  the  laws  of  this 
State,  or  of  the  country,  State,  or  Territory  in  which  the  will  shall 

be  made." 6 
[*  496]        *  The  rule  requiring  the  validity  of  a  will  affecting  personal 

property  to  be  tested  by  the  law  of  the  testator's  Law  g0vern- 
domicil  does  not  extend  to  the  execution  or  construction  '"g  power  of 
of  a  power  of  appointment  by  will ;  the  law  of  the  dom-   appom  men  ' 


eign  will  which 
has  not  been 
admitted  to 
probate  at  the 
testator's  dom- 
icil, or  has 
been  rejected 
in  some  State. 


i  Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  749.  So  in  New 
Jersey  :  Wallace  v.  Wallace,  3  N.  J.  Eq. 
616  ;  Mississippi :  Bate  v.  Incisa,  59  Miss. 
513,  517,  citing  numerous  Mississippi 
«ases. 

2  Converse  v.  Starr,  23  Oh.  St.  491. 

8  Varner  v.  Bevil,  17  Ala.  286  ;  Hyman 
v.  Gaskins,  5  Ired.  L.  267 ;  Jaques  v. 
Horton,  76  Ala.  238 ;  Booth  v.  Timoney, 
3  Dem.  416 ;  Gordon's  Case,  50  N.  J.  Eq. 
397. 

*  Rice  v.  Jones,  4  Call,  89. 

5  Stark  v.  Parker,  56  N.  H.  481,  485; 
Desesbats  v.  Berquier,  1  Binn.  336  (in 
which  Yeates,  J ,  p.  347,  cites  Vattel, 
154,  §  85;  2  Huberus,  lib.  1,  tit.  3;  2 
Wolfe,  201 ;  Denizart,  "515 ;  Target,  and 
J^ord  Kaimes,  as  severally  asserting  that 
the  validity  of  a  testament  as  to  its  form 
can  only  be  decided  by  the  judge  of  the 
domicil,  whose  sentence  delivered  in  form 
ought  to  be  everywhere  acknowledged)  ; 
Caulfield  v.  Sullivan,  85  N.  Y.  153,  159; 
Manuel  v.  Manuel,  13  Oh.  St.  458,  463, 
citing  numerous  authorities ;  Morris  v. 
Morris,  27  Miss.  847 ;  Moultrie  v.  Hunt, 
23  N.  Y.  394;  Grattan  v.  Appleton,  3 
Story,  755,  764  ;  Dupuy  v.  Wurz,  53  N.  Y. 
556,  560 ;  and  the  rule  is  the  same  if  the 
testator,  having  made  a  will  in  accord- 


ance with  the  law  of  his  domicil,  subse- 
quently changes  his  residence  and  acquires 
a  new  domicil  in  another  State,  —  the 
will  becomes  void,  unless  it  conform  to 
the  law  of  his  last  domicil :  Story,  Confl. 
L.  §  473;  Schoul.  Ex.  §  17;  1  Redf. 
Wills,  p.  401,  pi.  12. 

Mr.  Wharton,  mentioning  the  English 
statute  of  24  &  25  Vict.  c.  107,  providing 
that  a  will  validly  executed  at  an  actual 
domicil  is  not  affected  by  a  subsequent 
change  of  domicil,  says  that  "  this  amend- 
ment of  the  law  has  been  adopted  gener- 
ally iu  the  United  States "  (Wh.  Confl. 
L.  §  586),  citing  1  Redf.  (3d  ed.)  381, 
Coffin  ».  Otis,  11  Met.  (Mass.)  156,  and 
Manuel  v.  Manuel,  13  Oh.  St.  458.  These 
authorities  do  not,  however,  seem  to  war- 
rant the  statement. 

6  Such  is  the  statutory  provision  in 
several  States,  among  them  in  Missouri. 
Yet  it  was  here  held,  in  the  face  of  this 
statute,  that  a  will  made  in  another  State 
by  a  person  then  a  resident  of  such 
State,  but  who  afterwards  removes  to  this 
State,  and  dies  a  resident  of  this  State,  is 
invalid,  if  not  made  according  to  the  laws 
of  this  State :  Nat  v.  Coons,  10  Mo.  543, 
546 ;  Stewart  v.  Pettus,  10  Mo.  755. 

521 


'496,  *497  THE   PROBATE    OF   THE    WILL.  §  '227 


icil  of  the  donor  of  the  power  and  not  of  the  testator  governs  in  sucl 


case 


The  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  requiring  full 
faith  and  credit  to  be  given  in  each  State  to  the  public  acts,  records, 
and  judicial  proceedings  of  every  other  State,  and  the 
credit  to  for-  act  of  Congress  relating  thereto,  do  not  give  such  acts, 
e.ign  adjudica-  records,  or  proceedings  any  greater  force  and  efficacy 
Constitution  in  the  courts  of  other  States  than  they  possess  in  the 
and  act  of  States  from  which  they  are  taken,  and  apply  onlv  so  far 

Congress.  J ,      .      .  '  ■>  •-, 

as  such  courts  have  jurisdiction.2  Hence  while  the  judg- 
ment of  a  court  admitting  a  will  to  probate  is  binding  on  the  courts  of 
every  State  in  respect  of  all  property  under  its  jurisdiction,  whether 
real  or  personal,  yet  it  establishes  nothing  beyond  that,  and  does  not 
take  the  place  of  the  necessary  formalities  to  make  the  will  valid  in 
respect  of  real  property  in  other  States,  if  wanting.8 

A  late  case  decided  in  Connecticut  holds  that,  where  probate  was 
granted  in  New  York  of  a  will  invalid  in  Connecticut,  but  valid  in 
New  York,  such  probate  was  binding  upon  the  courts  of  Connecticut, 
although  a  probate  court  in  Connecticut  had  previously  decided,  under 
circumstances  giving  it  jurisdiction,  that  the  testatrix  had  died  domi- 
ciled in  Connecticut,  and  had  appointed  an  administrator.4 

§  227.  Revocation  of  Probate  ;  Contest  of  Probate.  —  The  power  to 
revoke  probate  of  a  will  is  exercised  by  English  "courts  of  chancery  in 
„        ..     .       cases  where  it  is  clear  that  probate  courts  are  powerless 

Revocation  in  ....... 

England  by        to  afford  adequate  relief  against  injury  in  consequence 
chancery  °^  fpaud  or  perjury  committed  in  obtaining  the  probate. 

But  in  the  United  States  there  is  no  such  power 
Otherwise  in      in  *  chancery,  except  as  pointed  out  by  statute  [*  497] 
the  United         jn  some  0f  the  States.     "  Wherever  the  power 

to  probate  a  will  is  given  to  a  probate  or  surrogate's 
court,  the  decree  of  such  court  is  final  and  conclusive,  and  not  sub- 
ject, except  on  an  appeal  to  a  higher  court,  to  be  questioned  in  any 
other  court,  or  to  be  set  aside  or  vacated  by  the  court  of  chancery  on 
any  ground."  6  This  language  is  quoted  and  approved  by  Justice 
Bradley  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,6  and  received 

1  Bingham's  Appeal,  64  Pa.  St.  345;  8  Robertson  v.  Pickrell,  109  U.  S.  608, 
S<-\v;i]l  -•.  Wilimr,  132  Mass,  131,  citing  610;  McCormick  v.  Sullivant,  10  Wheat. 
English  cases;  Blount  u.  Walker,  28  S.  C.     192,   202;    Darby   v.   Mayer,  10   Wheat. 

Walton    r.    Hall,    66    Vt.   455,   461  465,  469 ;  McCartney  v.  Osburn,    118  111. 

(holding  probate  of  a  will  in  a  State  of  403,  410;  Osburn  v.  McCartney,  121  HI. 

ancillary  jurisdiction  of  no  effect  to  pass  408,  411  ;   Nelson  v.  Potter,  50  N.  J.  L. 

personalty  in  Vermont  where  the  tostator  324;  Keith  v.  Keith,  97  Mo.  223,  229. 
was  domiciled) ;  iJarm.  *29.  *  Willet's  Appeal,  50  Conn.  330. 

2  Suyd.im  '  Barber,  l«N.  Y.  408,472;  6  State  v.  Mc(;iynn,20  Cal.  233,  268. 
Public  Works  o.  Columbia  College,  17  °  lu  Broderick's  Will,  21  Wall.  503. 
Wall.    521,   -Vj'j  ;     Robertson   v.   Pickrell, 

109  U.  S.  608. 
522 


227 


REVOCATION    OP   PROBATE. 


497,*  493 


the  unanimous  assent  of  the  whole  court,  save  that  Judges  Clifford 
and  Davis  qualified  it  to  the  extent  of  claiming  jurisdiction  for  chan- 
cery courts  in  cases  where  there  is  no  adequate  remedy  in  the  probate 
court  for  a  party  injured  by  perjury  or  fraud.  Judge  Story,  the  stanch 
vindicator  of  the  most  comprehensive  chancery  powers,  says  that  there 
is  but  one  exception  to  the  concurrent  jurisdiction  of  chancery  courts 
in  all  matters  of  fraud,  which  is  fraud  in  obtaining  probate  of  a  will ; 
and  he  finds  it  "  not  easy  to  discern  the  grounds  upon  which  this 
exception  stands  in  point  of  reason  or  principle,  although  it  is  clearly 
settled  by  authority."  l  The  common-law  rule  is  stated  to  be  that  the 
remedy  for  fraud  in  obtaining  a  will  is  exclusively  vested,  in  wills  of 
personalty,  in  the  ecclesiastical  courts  ;  and  in  wills  of  real  estate,  in 
the  courts  of  common  law.2 

The  power  to  revoka  exists,  however,  in  the  probate  court  itself,  in 
all  cases  where  the  court  acted  without  jurisdiction,  without  notice, 
where  the  statute  requires  notice,  or  in  disregard  of  some 
statutory  requirement,  so  that  the  decree  or  judgment  ren-    vacate  probate 
dered  is  void ; 8  and  so  where  a  later  will  is  discovered    in  ProDate 

court. 

subsequently  to  the  probate  of  an  earlier  one, 
[*  498]  there  is  no  doubt  of  the  power  of  the  probate  court  to  *  estab- 
lish the  later  will.4     But  where  a  will  has  been  conclusively 


1  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  440.  Among  the 
cases  so  holding,  see  Gaines  v.  Chew,  2 
How.  (U.  S.)  619;  Ellis  v.  Davis,  109 
U.  S.  485;  Tarver  v.  Tarver,  9  Pet.  174, 
180;  Luther  v.  Luther,  122  111.  558,  565  ; 
Langdon  v.  Blackburn,  109  Cal.  19  ;  Ewell 
w.Tidwell,  20  Ark.  136, 141  ;  Townsend  v. 
Townsend,  4  Coldw.  70,  80;  Slade  v. 
Street,  27  Ga.  17  ;  Booth  v.  Kitchen,  7 
Hun,  255,  259  ;  Walters  v.  Ratliff,  5  Bush, 
575  ;  McDowell  v.  Peyton,  2  Desaus.  313, 
320  (decreeing  that  the  defendants  consent 
to  a  revocation  of  the  probate,  to  enable 
the  ordinary  to  try  the  will  de  novo ;  an 
expedient  also  resorted  to  in  Palmer  c. 
Mikell,  2  Desaus.  342)  ;  Howell  v.  Whit- 
church, 4  Hayw.  49 ;  Burrow  v.  Ragland, 
6  Humph.  481,484;    Lyne  v.  Guardian, 

1  Mo.  410;  Garland  v.  Smith,  127  Mo. 
583;  Stowe  v.  Stowe,  140  Mo.  594,  602; 
Colton  v.  Ross,  2  Paige,  396,  398 ;  Wells 
v.  Stearns,  35  Hun,  323.  In  Tennessee  a 
'.■surt  of  equity  will  set  aside  a  judgment 
rejecting  a  will  in  solemn  form,  obtained 
,Sy  collusion  or  fraud,  and  if  the  will  had 
already  been  probated  in  common  form, 
reinstate  such  probate  :  Smith  v.  Harrison, 

2  Heisk.  230,  242.  See  also  that  equity 
has  power  to  set  aside  a  probate  for  fraud : 
Post  v.  Mason,  26  Hun  (N.  Y.),  187. 


2  Story,  Eq.  Jur.  §  184. 

8  Waters  v.  Stickney,  12  Allen,  1,9, 
et  seq. ;  Lawrence's  Will,  7  N.  J.  Eq.  215, 
221  ;  Roy  v.  Segrist,  19  Ala.  810,  813; 
Sowell  v.  Sowell,  40  Ala.  243,  245. 

*  Per  Gray,  J.,  in  Waters  v.  Stickney, 
12  Allen,  1,11:  "A  court  of  probate  has 
no  more  power  by  a  decree  establishing 
one  testamentary  instrument  to  preclude 
the  subsequent  probate  of  a  later  one 
never  before  brought  to  its  notice,  than 
by  a  decree  approving  one  account  to 
discharge  an  administrator  from  respon- 
sibility for  assets  not  actually  accounted 
for."  This  point  was  commented  on  by 
Justice  Wayne  in  Gaines  v.  Hennen,  24 
How.  553,  567  :  "  Courts  of  probate  may 
for  cause  recall  or  annul  testamentary 
letters,  but  they  can  neither  destroy  nor 
revoke  wills  ;  though  they  may  and  often 
have  declared  that  a  posterior  will  of  a 
testator  shall  be  recognized  in  the  place 
of  a  prior  will  which  had  been  proved, 
when  it  was  not  known  to  the  court  that 
the  testator  had  revoked  it."  To  the  like 
effect,  Bowen  v.  Johnson,  5  R.  I.  112,  119; 
Campbell  v.  Logan,  2  Bradf.  90,  92 ; 
Schultz  v.  Schultz,  1 0  Gratt.  358,  373  ; 
Vance  v.  Upson,  64  Tex.  266,  269.  But 
it  is  held  in  some  States  that  the  propound- 
523 


*  498,  *  499        THE  PROBATE  OF  THE  WILL.  §  227 

established,  the  production  of  a  later  will  for  probate,  not  in  terms 
revoking  the  former,  does  not  raise  the  question  of  revocation,~and 
such  revocation  cannot  be  determined  in  such  proceeding  if  there  is 
room  for  dispute  as  to  construction.  The  probate  of  the  former 
will  should  be  left  to  stand  for  what  it  is  worth,  and  its  effect 
decided  elsewhere.1  It  has  been  held  that  no  lapse  of  time  will  bar 
an  application  for  the  revocation  of  the  invalid  probate  of  a  will,  in 
the  court  which  granted  it ; 3  but  unless  the  power  to  review  or 
revoke  is  conferred  by  statute,  no  merely  erroneous  probate  can  be 
set  aside  by  the  probate  court  after  the  term  at  which  it  was  granted 
has  expired.3  In  Vermont,  however,  probate  courts  have,  as  one  of 
their  "  incidental  and  unnamed  powers  necessary  to  enable  them  to 
work  out  justice  in  the  exercise  of  their  jurisdiction,"  the  power 
to  vacate  a  decree  allowing  probate,  where  the  estate  is  still 
undisturbed.4 

In  most  States,  however,  the  revocation  of  probates  is  regulated  by 
the  statutory  provisions  concerning  the  probate,  as  will  appear  from 
the  consideration  of  this  subject  in  the  opening  sections  of  this 
t  chapter.6  It  may  be  assumed  that,  with  the  exception 
impeachable  of  a  few  of  the  States  in  which  the  probate  of  a  will  in 
collaterally.  ^e  common  fornij  0r  ex  parte,  is  not  conclusive  as  to- 
real  estate  devised,  no  probate,  decreed  by  a  court  having  jurisdiction 
of  probates,  is  impeachable  collaterally  ;  to  annul,  set  aside,  or  revoke 
R  such  probate,  there  must  be  a  direct  proceeding  to  that 

may  be  end  upon  notice  to  all  parties  interested.6     This 

revoked.  may  ^e  ^  appeai  fr0m  the  decree  establishing  *or  [*  4991 

rejecting  the  probate,  by  any  person  interested  in  the  will,7 

ing  of  a  codicil  is  a  contest  pro  tanto,  and  was  attacked  collaterally  for  fraud)  ;  Sul- 

can   be   treated   as  such  only :  Estate   of  livanv.  Rabb,  86  Ala.  433  (in  which  a  will 

Adsit  Mvr.  266  ;  Hardy  v.  Hardy,  26  Ala.  had  been  probated  in  which  there  was  but 

524  •  Watson  v.  Turner,  89  Ala.  220.  one  attesting  witness,  the  statute  requiring 

i'Besancon  v.  Brownson,  39  Mich.  388.  two);  Whitman  v.  Haywood,  77  Tex.  557. 

2  Clagett  v.  Hawkins,  11  Md.  381,  387  ;  Upon  the  contest  of  a  will  the  proceed- 
to  the  same  effect,  Bailey  v.  Osborn,  33  ings  become  inter  partes  in  many  respects, 
f*-      12ft  i.  a.  the  necessity  of  notice  to  parties  in 

»  McCarty  v.  McCarty,  8    Bush,  504,  interest:  see  notes  infra,  especially  p.*  500, 

506  ;  Corby  w.  Judge,  96  Mich.  11.  and  cases  there  cite(L 

»  Hotchkiss  v.  Ladd,  62  Vt.  209.  7  Northampton     v.    Smith,     11     Met. 

6  Ante,  §  215.  (Mass.)    390,  393,   recognizing    the  right 

a  Castro  v.    Richardson,  18  Cal.  478;  to   appeal  in  a  corporation  to  which  the 

Goldtree  r    McAlister,  86  Cal.  93;  In  re  legal  title  to   a  fund    was  devised   to  be 

rThetton,  93   Cal.   203;   Taylor  v.  Tib-  held  in  trust,  althongh  payable  at  a  future 

13   B.   Won.   177,  181,  citing  Well's  and  distant  day;    Cheever  v.    Judge,  45 

WW,  5  Litt.  273 ;  Cochran  v.  Yonng,  104  Mich.  6;    Howe   v.    Pratt,   11    Vt.  255; 

Pa.  8*.  838;  Roberts  v.  Flanagan,  21  Neb.  Scribner  v.  Williams,   1  Pai.  550;   New- 

603;  Kirk  v.  Bowling,  20  Neb.  260;  Dower  house  v.  Gale,  1  Redf.  217;   Havelick  v. 

28  W.  Va.  118,  143;   Winslow  v.  Havelick,  18  Iowa,  414  ;   Will  of  Alexan- 

Donnell'y,  m  [nd.  r,r,:,   (where   the  will  der,  27   N.  J.  Eq.  463;     Buckingham's 

bad  been  probated  In  a  foreign  State  and  Appeal,  57  Conn.  544  (allowing  a  legatee 

524 


$227 


CONTEST    OF    PROBATE. 


*  499  *  500 


but  which,  since  the  right  thereto  is  purely  statutory, 
must  be  pursued  in  strict  compliance  with  the  require- 
ments of  the  statute  ;  *  or  it  may  be  by  contest,  which  any  interested 
person  may  institute  who  was  not  a  party  to  the  original  proceeding 
resulting  in  the  probate  or  rejection  of  the  will,2  either  in  the  court 
which  granted  the  probate,3  or  in    a  superior  court  of  law,4  or  in 
a  court  of  chancery,6  as  may  be  provided  by  the  statute.6      .   . 
These  proceedings  are  in  most  instances  limited  to  a 

given  period  of  time  after  which  the  probate  becomes  abso- 
[*  500]  lutely  conclusive.7      *  Another   form   in  which   the  probate 


under  a  prior  will  to  appeal  from  a  decree 
allowing  a  later  will)  ;  Lawrie  v.  Lawrie, 
39  Kans.  480  (allowing  appeal  from  an 
order  refusing  probate)  ;  Preston  v.  Trust 
Co.,  94  Ky.  295  (appeal  from  refusal  to 
probate) ;  Missionary  Soc.  v.  Ely,  56  Oh. 
St.  405  (appeal  from  refusal  to  probate)  ; 
on  appeal,  in  some  States  the  presumption 
is  in  favor  of  the  probate ;  Rollwagen  v. 
Rollwagen,  3  Hun,  121,  128;  Estate  of 
Sticknotb,  7  Nev.  223,  228. 

1  Dennison  v.  Talmage,  29  Oh.  St.  433- 

2  Worth ington  v.  Gittings,  56  Md. 
542,  547  ;  Gregg  v.  Myatt,  78  Iowa,  703  ; 
Cunningham's  Estate,  54  Cal.  556  ;  Bailey 
v.  Stewart,  2  Redf.  212,224  ;  the  fact  that 
an  heir  who  was  not  made  a  party  appears 
as  a  witness  does  not  estop  him  from  sub- 
sequently instituting  proceedings  to  set 
aside  the  will;  Miller's  Estate,  159  Pa.  St. 
562.  In  New  York  even  one  who  was  a 
party  to  the  original  proceeding  may  con- 
test the  probate,  and  try  again  the  very 
questions  litigated :  Gourand's  Will,  95 
N.  Y.  256  ;  Re  Soule,  1  Connolly,  18,  52. 
A  creditor  of  the  testator  cannot  invoke 
the  power  to  revoke  probate  of  a  will  : 
Heilman  v.  Jones,  5  Redf.  398 ;  State 
National  Bank  v.  Evans,  32  La.  An.  464  ; 
Montgomery  v.  Foster,  91  Ala.  613  ;  nor 
a  purchaser  after  the  probate  of  the  will, 
but  only  those  interested  at  the  time  of 
the  probate:  McDonald  v.  White,  130  111. 
493 ;  nor  the  creditor  of  a  disinherited 
heir:  Shepard's  Estate,  170  Pa.  St.  323; 
nor  one  incapacitated  to  take  a  devise  by 
reason  of  alienage :  Jele  v.  Lemberger, 
163  111.  338.  In  California,  where  the 
statute  saves  to  minors  one  year  after 
removal  of  disability  to  contest  the  validity 
of  a  will,  it  is  held  that  probate  is  not  con- 
clusive upon  a  minor,  where  there  has 
been  no   contest,  although    citation   had 


been  served  upon  him,  and  an  attorney 
appointed  to  represent  him  in  the  probate : 
Samson  v.  Samson,  64  Cal.  327. 

3  Estate  of  Rice,  Myr.  183;  Hubbard 
V.  Hubbard,  7  Oreg.  42,  44 ;  Miller  v. 
Miller,  5  Heisk.  723,  727;  Will  of  Kellum, 
50  N.  Y.  298 ;  Matter  of  Paige,  62  Barb. 
476;  Dickenson  v.  Stewart,  1  Murph.  99; 
Brown  v.  Gibson,  1  Nott  &  McC.  326  (ac- 
cording to  the  common  law  at  any  time 
within  thirty  years). 

*  Leighton  v.  Orr,  44  Iowa,  679,  682  ; 
Kelsey  v.  Kelsey,  57  Iowa,  383. 

6  Johnston  v.  Glasscock,  2  Ala.  218, 
233;  Lyons  v.  Campbell,  88  Ala.  462; 
Knox  v.  Paull,  95  Ala.  505 ;  McCall  v. 
Vallandingham,  9  B.  Mon.  449.  But  one 
who  has  appeared  to  the  original  probate 
and  unsuccessfully  prosecuted  an  appeal 
therefrom,  cannot  thereafter  file  a  bill  in 
chancery  to  contest  the  will  :  Dale  v.  Hays, 
14  B.  Mon.  315,  317  ;  unless  he  withdraws 
before  the  order  admitting  the  will  to  pro- 
bate is  made  :  Dillard  v.  Dillard,  78  Va. 
208.  The  proceeding  in  chancery  is  held 
to  be  binding  only  on  the  parties  to  the 
suit,  bein<r  void  as  to  all  others  :  see  infra, 
p.  *500  on  this  point. 

6  Ante,  §  215.  In  Indiana  a  contest 
may  be  instituted  before  or  after  the  in- 
strument is  admitted  to  probate :  Curry 
v.  Bratney,  29  Ind.  195.  In  Kentucky 
the  probate  can  only  be  set  aside  by  ap- 
peal to  a  higher  court ;  but  an  original 
bill  in  equity  to  set  aside  the  probate  of 
a  will  is  allowed  upon  grounds  which 
would  give  equity  jurisdiction  over  any 
other  judgment  at  law,  or  to  non-residents 
who  were  not  parties  to  the  original  pro- 
ceeding :  Hughey  v.  Sid  well,  18  B.  Mon. 
259. 

7  Matter  of  Becker,  28  Hun,  207  ;  Post 
v.  Mason,  26  Hun,  187  ;  Sbarboro's  Estate 

525 


•500 


THE   PROBATE   OF   THE   WILL. 


§227 


of  a  will  may  be  controlled  is  by  the  right  recognized  in  some 
States  in  the  next  of  kin  to  demand  the  establishment  of  a  will  in 
solemn  form  which  had  been  admitted  to  probate  in  common  form.1 
This  method  does  not  commend  itself  as  a  wise  or  just  rule,  and 
meets  with  little  favor  from  courts.2 

The  original  ex  parte  probate  is  a  proceeding  in  rem  ; 8  but  on  a 
contest,  "  whenever  a  controversy  in  a  suit  between  the  parties  arises 
respecting  the  validity  of  the  will,"  it  becomes  in  some  respects  inter 
partes,*  requiring  notice  to  all  parties  in  interest,5  although  in  gen- 


63  Cal.  5  ;  the  time  limited  is  jurisdictional, 
and  if  the  jurisdictional  facts  are  not  al- 
leged in  the  hill,  demurrer  will  lie: 
Wheeler  v.  Wheeler,  134  111.  522.  See 
also  Sinnet  v.  Bowman,  151  111.  146.  In 
Louisiana  the  prescription  of  five  years 
bars  nullities  of  form  in  the  probate : 
Porter  v.  Hornsby,  32  La.  An.  337.  It  is 
sufficient,  however,  if  the  proceedings  be 
commenced  within  the  time :  Stewart  v. 
Harriman,  56  N.  H.  25  ;  and  if  commenced 
in  time,  amendments  may  be  made,  and 
other  necessary  parties  thereafter  added, 
although  the  statutory  period  had  elapsed  : 
Lilly  v.  Tobbein,  103  Mo.  477;  San  Fran- 
cisco O.  A.  v.  Superior  Court,  116  Cal. 
443 ;  Bradford  v.  Andrews,  20  Ohio  St. 
208;  Miller's  Estate,  166  Pa.  St.  97; 
Stewart  v.  Harriman,  56  N.  H.  25.  But  in 
California  it  is  held  that  amendments  after 
the  time  to  contest  cannot  be  permitted 
which  constitute  other  and  independent 
grounds  of  contest:  In  re  Wilson,  117  Cal. 
262,  268.  Where  by  the  statute  time  is 
given,  in  addition  to  the  period  of  limita- 
tion, after  the  discovery  of  fraud  or  forgery, 
to  contest  a  will,  the  contestant  must  show 
due  diligence,  or  he  will  be  barred :  Kan- 
some  v.  Bearden,  50  Tex.  119,  127.  And 
unless  the  statute  so  provides  the  time 
within  which  contest  of  the  will  is  allowed 
is  not  extended  by  disability  or  fraud  : 
.sic  numi-rous  cases  cited  in  Bartlett  v. 
Manor,  146  Ind.  621,  627  ;  Stowe  v.  Stowe, 
140  Mm.  594. 

1  In  South  Carolina  this  right  is  lim- 
ited to  four  years:  (-'r.iig  v.  Beatty,  11 
S.  C.  375,  37'J,  citing  Kinard  v.  Riddle- 
hoover, .'i  Rich.  258.  [n  Georgia,  to  seven 
vi  ar- :  Vance  v  Crawford,  4  <!a.  445, 
457  ;  IIn w.-ll  v.  Whitchurch,  4  Bayw.  49. 
Contesting  probate  in  common  form  by 
counsel  for  the  Inirs,  but  without  bheir 
knowledge  or  consent ,  in  held  not  to  waive 

526 


their  right  to   probate  in   solemn  form : 
Gray  v.  Gray,  60  N.  H.  28. 

2  Lumpkin,  J.,  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Georgia,  in  Walker  v.  Perryman,  23 
Ga.  309,  317,  says,  in  an  earnest  appeal 
to  the  legislature  to  abolish  the  double 
probate  of  wills  :  "  The  expense  of  attend- 
ing the  re-probate  of  wills,  in  Georgia, 
since  I  have  beeu  on  the  bench,  has  cost 
the  public  more  than  its  Supreme  Court. 
And  this  is  not  all.  A  part  of  the  heirs 
and  legatees  occupying  the  same  status 
precisely  toward  the  litigation  and  its 
subject-matter  fail,  and  a  part  recover! 
A  mischief  so  patent  should  not  be 
tolerated." 

3  See  on  the  original  probate  in  the 
probate  court,  ante,  §§  215  et  seq.  That 
such  proceeding  is  in  rein  and  binding  on 
all  persons,  whether  made  parties  or  not, 
see:  Bonnemort  v.  Gill,  167  Mass.  338, 
340;  Johnes  v.  Jackson,  67  Conn.  8),  90; 
Woodruff  v.  Taylor,  20  Vt.  65 ;  Broderick's 
Will,  21  Wall.  503,  509,  518,  519;  and 
see  Rice  v.  Hasking,  105  Mich.  303. 

4  Bradford  v.  Andrews,  20  Oh.  St.  208, 
222  ;  in  so  far,  for  instance,  as  to  deter- 
mine the  competency  of  witnesses  as 
parties :  Valentine's  Will,  93  Wis.  45,  50, 
(see  cases  on  this  point  pro  and  con,  cited, 
ante,  §219,  p.  *477) ;  or  to  give  the  federal 
courts  jurisdiction  on  the  ground  of  diverse 
citizenship  of  the  parties:  Gaines  v. 
Fuentes,  92  U.  S.  10,  21  (three  judges  dis- 
senting) and  see  cases  so  holding  cited 
ante,  §  156,  p.* 357,  uote. 

5  And  hence  in  some  States  persons 
not  made  parties  are  not  bound  by  the 
decree  :  McArthur  v.  Scott,  113  U.  S.  340, 
387,  following  Holt  v.  Lamb,  17  Oh.  St. 
874,  as  the  law  of  Ohio;  Miller's  Estate, 
159  Pa.  St.  562:  anil  where  a  minor  is  a 
party  in  interest,  a  guardian  ad  litem  must 
be  appointed,  else  he  will  not  be  bound: 


§  227 


CONTEST   OF   PROBATE. 


500 


The  proceed- 
ing must  be 
conducted  to 
a  final  deter- 
mination of 
will  or  no  will. 


eral  the  proceedings  are  held  to  remain  in  rem,1  the  issue  being  will 
or  no  will ;  and  though  such  contest  may  be  in  the  nature  of  an  appeal 
and  trial  de  novo,2  and  be  an  action  at  law,  partaking,  in  some  respects, 
of  a  proceeding  in  equity,3  yet  the  court  must  proceed 
either  to  establish  or  reject  the  will ;  hence  the  contes- 
tant cannot  be  permitted  to  dismiss  or  to  take  a  volun- 
tary non-suit ; 4  nor,  for  the  same  reason,  can  contestant 
be  compelled  to  give  security  for  costs  ; 5  nor  can  the 
issue  be  varied  or  restricted  by  averments  in  the  pleadings  or  by 
the  consent  or  acquiescence  of  the  parties  ; 6  so  also  when  a  will 
is  annulled  at  the  instance  of  one  in  whose  favor  a  longer  time  is 
allowed  to  make  contest  by  reason  of  his  having  been  under  dis- 
ability, the  will  must  be  set  aside  as  an  entirety,  and  the  action 
enures  to  the  benefit  of  all  others  interested,  though  as  to  them 
the  time  within  which  the  will  could  be  attacked  had  elapsed ; 7 
but  on  this  point  the  contrary  has  also  been  held.8 

The  probate  cannot  be  revoked  as  to  some  and  not  as  to  others  ; 
hence  a  judgment  entered  in  pursuance  of  a  stipulation  of  the  parties 

Wells  v.  Wells,  144  Mo.  198.  201,  holding 
also  that  the  contest  is  in  the  nature  of 
an  action  of  probate  in  solemn  form,  when 
all  parties  in  interest  are  required  to  be 
brought  into  court  before  its  right  to  try 
the  statutory  issue  is  exercised,  and  the 
defect  of  parties  may  be  taken  advantage 
of  at  any  time,  even  on  appeal.  So  on 
contest  or  proof  in  solemn  form,  all  per- 
sons interested  either  under  or  against 
the  will  must  be  made  parties  in  the  stat- 
utory method:  Crew  v.  Pratte,  119  Cal. 
139.  The  executor  should  generally  be 
made  a  party  to  such  a  proceeding :  In  re 
Whetton,  93  Cal.  203  ;  Bardell  v.  Brady, 
172  111.  420;  and  see  cases  cited  post, 
§  517,  as  to  the  executor's  rights  on  will 
contests. 

1  Benoist  v.  Murrin,  48  Mo.  48  ;  Harris 
v.  Hays,  53  Mo.  90,  93  ;  San  Francisco  O. 
A.  v.  Superior  Court,  116  Cal.  443,  453; 
and  hence  binding  on  all  persons,  whether 
made  parties  or  not,  if  the  court  have  ju- 
risdiction :  Hazel  v.  Taylor,  1  Head,  594. 

2  Norton  v.  Paxton,  110  Mo.  456,  461  ; 
Hughes  i>.  Burris,  85  Mo.  660 ;  as  to 
whether  such  contest  is  by  appeal  or  by 
original  action,  see  also  ante,  §  215. 

3  Garland  v.  Smith,  127  Mo.  567,  580, 
also  holding  that  the  appellate  court  will 
not  disturb  the  verdict  of  the  jury  on  the 
ground  that  the  verdict  is  against  the  mere 
weight  of  the  evidence  ;  Bryant  v.  Pierce, 
95  Wis.   331,  holding  the  verdict  of  the 


jury  to  have  substantially  merely  the  ad- 
visory effect  of  a  feigned  issue  in  chancery, 
and  that  the  court  would  not  reverse, 
although  in  some  cases  exceptions  were 
well  taken  to  rulings  on  the  evidence. 
Where  the  evidence  is  such  that  the  court 
would  not  sustain  a  verdict  upon  it,  the 
issue  should  not  be  submitted  to  the  jury : 
Herster  v.  Herster,  122  Pa.  St.  239,  264, 
and  cases  cited  ;  McFadin  v.  Catron,  138 
Mo.  197  ;  In  re  Kaufman,  117  Cal.  288  ;  the 
rule  in  will  contests,  as  to  upholding  the 
verdict  of  the  jury,  is  the  same  as  in  other 
cases:  In  re  Wilson,  117  Cal.  262,  269  ; 
Harp  v.  Parr,  168  111.  459,  481.  See  also 
as  to  the  effect  to  be  given  to  the  jury's 
verdict,  ante,  §  23,  p.  *  81,  last  note. 

4  McMahon  v.  McMahon,  100  Mo.  97  ; 
Hutson  v.  Sawyer,  104  N.  C.  1 ;  but  in 
New  York,  if  all  the  parties  are  sui  juris, 
it  seems  they  can  control  the  disposition  of 
the  case:  Lasak's  Will,  131  N.  Y.  624 ; 
see  also  Hazel  v.  Taylor,  1  Head,  594. 

5  Cash  v.  Lust,  142  Mo.  630,  637. 
e  Dew  v.  Reid,  52  Oh.  St.  519,  524.     It 

is  held  that  the  issue  is  made  up  upon  the 
filing  of  the  cat-eat  and  that  no  answer  at 
all  is  necessary  :  Crenshaw  v.  Johnson, 
120  N.  C.  270,  272.  As  to  permitting  of 
amendments,  see  supra,  p.  *499,  last  note. 

7  Powell  v.  Kochler,  52  Oh.  St.  103, 
118  ;  see  Wells  v.  Wells,  144  Mo.  198,  cit- 
ing earlier  Missouri  cases. 

8  Samson  v.  Samson,  64  Cal.  327 

52^ 


500,  *  501 


THE   PROBATE   OF   THE   WILL. 


§  227 


Partial  revoca-  to  the  contest  for  the  revocation,  whereby  the  probate  is 
tion  disallowed,  annulled  merely  as  to  contestant,  is  void.1  The  contest  of 
probate  of  the  will  may,  however,  be  confined  to  a  part  of  the  will 
when  such  part  only  is  attacked  as  having  been  made  under  undue 
influence,  or  obtained  by  fraud.2 

The  right  to  contest  the  validity  of  a  probate  granted  in  the 
method  pointed  out  by  the  statute  may  be  exercised  by  any  person 
Any  person  who  has  a  substantial  interest  in  the  will  so  established,8 
whether  domestic  or  foreign.4  But  since  a  person  can- 
not hold  under  a  will  and  also  against  it,5  one  who 
accepts  a  beneficial  interest  under  a  will  thereby  bars 
himself  from  setting  up  a  claim  which  will  prevent  its 
full  operation,6  at  law  or  in  equity ; 7  and  such 
*  person  will  not,  therefore,  be  allowed  to  contest  a  will,  un-  [*  501] 
less  he  return  the  legacy  received.8  And  if  a  will  be  annulled 
after  the  distribution  of  the  estate,  the  decree  of  distribution  is  not 
thereby  made  void,  but  it  will  protect  and  remain  valid 
as  to  subsequent  purchasers  from  the  distributee ; 9  but 
the  heir  may  pursue  the  property  distributed  in  the 
hands  of  the  distributee.10  So  an  executor  and  all  who 
deal  with  him  on  the  faith  of  a  will  duly  admitted  to  probate  are 
protected  for  acts  done  before  revocation  of  the  probate,11  although 
such  will  be  subsequently  annulled  as  a  forgery.12 

6  Smith  v.  Guild,  34  Me.  443,  447,  cit- 
ing Thellusson  v.  Woodford,  13  Ves.  209 ; 
Hyde  v.  Baldwin,  17  Pick.  303;  Weeks  v. 
Patten,    18    Me.    42;    Benedict   v.   Mont- 


interested  may 

contest 

probate. 

But  not  after 
taking  under 
the  will. 


Revocation 
after  distribu- 
tion does  not 
avoid  decree 
of  distribution. 


1  In  re  Freud,  73  Cal.  555  ;  and  see 
Wells  v.  Wells,  144  Mo.  198. 

2  Lyons  v.  Campbell,  88  Ala.  462. 
But  it  has  been  held  that  if  such  part  is 
inseparable  from  the  whole  will,  and  its 
evisceration  would  subvert,  the  objects  of 
the  testator,  such  partial  contest  is  not 
admissible:  Fishery.  Boyce,  81  Md.  46,51. 
See  in  connection  herewith  the  subject 
of  probate  <>f  wills  in  part,  as  treated  ante, 
§  222. 

3  See  notes  on  previous  page. 

*  Lynch  V.  Miller,  54  Iowa,  516,518; 
a  fortiori,  a  foreign  will,  affecting  lands 
in  the  State  where  it  has  not  been  ad- 
mitted  to  probate,  may  be  contested  when 
offered  as  evidence  in  a  suit  of  ejectment : 
Pennel  v.  Weyant,  2  Harring.  501.  But 
in  some  States  a  foreign  will  duly  authen- 
ticated and  probated  in  the  State  of  the 
forum  cannot  be  contested  in  the  latter  at 
all.  Bee  notes  to  §  ii20,  citing  cases  to 
this  effect  from  Indiana,  Alabama,  and 
other  B 

Pott,  |  161  ;    Smart   v.  Kaslcv,  5  J.  J. 
Marsh  214,215;   Herberl   v    Wren,  7  Cr. 
.:-    i'i.   ton  b  Jones, 9  Pa  81  456,459, 
ig  Whistlerv.  Web  t*  r,  2  Ves.Jr.  867. 
628 


gomery,  7  Watts  &  S.  238,  243. 

7  Smith  v.  Smith,  14  Gray,  532;  Van 
Duyne  v.  Van  Duyne,  14  N.  J.  Eq.  49, 
52 ;  Fulton  v.  Moore,  25  Pa.  St.  468,  476. 

8  Miller's  Appeal,  159  Pa.  St.  562; 
Hamblett  v.  Hamblett,  6  N.  H.  333,  337, 
citing  Bell  v.  Armstrong,  1  Add.  365 ; 
Braham  v.  Burchell,  3  Add.  243.  See  also 
Matter  of  Soule,  1  Connolly,  18,  54 ;  Mat- 
ter of  Peaslee,  73  Hun,  1 13.  But  this  rule 
does  not  apply  to  the  executor,  who  may 
move  to  set  aside  a  probate,  although  he 
has  proceeded  to  act  under  the  will : 
Gaither  v.  Gaither,  23  Ga.  521,  528.  See 
also  post,  §  461,  ]).  *  1017. 

9  Thompson  v.  Samson,  64  Cal.  330 ; 
but  see  Hughes  v.  Burris,  85  Mo.  660. 

10  Thompson  v.  Samson,  supra. 

11  See  as  to  the  consequences  of  revo- 
catios  of  letters  on  mesne  acts  of  the  rep- 
resentative, /lost,  §§  266,  274. 

12  "  Every  person  is  bound  by  the  judicial 
act  of  a  court  having  competent  authority  ; 
and  during  the  existence  of   such  judicial 


§  228 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PROBATE. 


501 


§  228.   Effect  of  the  Probate —  It   has  already  appeared x   that   at 
common  law,    without   the  constat  of  the  probate   court,    no   other 
court  can  take  notice  of  the  rights  of  representation  to  English  stat- 
personal  property,2  and  that  wills  devising   real  estate  ute  requiring 

_  T*i  1  i  "*r»  i        proDtitc  OI  ill! 

must  be  proved  m  the  common-law  courts.  By  the  wills  before 
statute  of  20  &  21  Vict.  c.  77,  §  13,  all  wills,  whether  they  take  effect. 
of  real  or  personal  property,  are  required  to  be  proved  in  the  court  of 
probates.  Similar  statutes  had  long  before  existed  in  most  of  the 
American  States,  and  the  constat  of  the  probate  court  is  necessary  to 
the  validity  of  wills  of  personalty  in  all,  and  of  wills  of  realty  in 
most  of  them.  In  Arkansas,8  Florida,4  District  of  Columbia,5  Mary- 
land,6 New  York,7  Pennsylvania,*  and  probably  in 
other  States,  the  probate  of  the  probate  court  is  neither 
essential  nor  conclusive  as  to  the  validity  of  wills  in 
proving  title  to  real  estate  :  such  will  may  be  contested, 
if  it  has  been  admitted  to  probate  in  the  probate  court,9 


States  allow- 
ing wills  of 
real  estate  to 
be  proved  in 
common-law 
courts. 


act  the  law  will  protect  every  person 
obeying  it":  Justice  Ashhurst  in  Allen 
v.  Dundas,  3  Term  R.  125,  129.  But  pay- 
ments prematurely  made  without  an  order 
of  court,  to  the  legatees,  will  not  be  al- 
lowed in  favor  of  an  executor  under  a  will 
subsequently  annulled  :  Heff  ner's  Succes- 
sion, 49  La.  An.  407. 

1  Ante,  §  215. 

2  Wms.  Ex.  [550]. 

3  Janes  v.  Williams,  31  Ark.  175,  182. 
And  see  Arrington  v.  McLemore,  33  Ark. 
759,  761. 

4  Belton  v.  Summer,  31  Fla.  139,  the 
probate  being  conclusive  as  to  personalty 
but  prima  facie  valid  as  to  realty. 

6  Campbell  v.  Porter,  162  U.  S.  478, 
484;  Perry  v.  Sweeny,  11  Dist.  Col.  App. 
404. 

6  Darby  v.  Mayer,  10  Wheat.  465, 
470. 

1  Corly  v.  McElmeel,  149  N.  Y.  228 ; 
Jackson  v.  LeGrange,  19  Johns.  386,  388  ; 
Upton  v.  Bernstein,  76  Hun,  516,  and  cases 
cited.  But  in  Anderson  v,  Anderson,  112 
N.  Y.  104,  the  court  points  out  that  it  is 
the  policy  of  that  State  to  leave  to  probate 
courts  all  questions  relating  to  the  execu- 
tion of  a  will  and  that  only  in  special  cases 
can  a  court  of  chancery  interfere  ;  and  it 
was  accordingly  held,  that  a  court  of 
equity  was  without  jurisdiction  to  probate 
a  will,  at  least  where  no  trusts  were  in- 
volved, on  the  application  of  a  devisee  of 
the  real  estate.  Probate  or  rejection  by 
the  surrogate  is  conclusive  as  to  person- 
VOL.   i. —31 


alty ;  probate  is  prima  facie  valid  as  to 
realty,  but  rejection  is  of  no  effect  in 
other  actions.  See  ante,  §  215,  p.  *469, 
note. 

8  Smith  v.  Bonsall,  5  Rawle,  80,  citing 
numerous  earlier  cases.  See  infra,  next 
note. 

9  The  decree  of  a  register  admitting  a 
will  to  probate  is  held,  in  Pennsylvania, 
to  be  a  judicial  act,  conclusive  in  all  re- 
spects as  to  personal,  and  presumptive  as 
to  real  property :  Cochran  v.  Young,  1 04 
Pa.  St.  333,  336,  citing  earlier  cases ;  and 
it  must  be  contested  by  appropriate  action 
within  five  years,  or  it  becomes  conclusive 
also  as  to  realty :  Broe  v.  Boyle,  108  Pa. 
St.  76,  82.  The  validity  of  probate  in  the 
probate  court  has  been  discussed  hereto- 
fore :  ante,  §  215,  p.  *469 ;  and  the  effect 
of  revoking  or  annulling  the  probate  upon 
mesne  acts  is  discussed  post,  §§  266  and 
274.  In  New  York  (see  note  ibid.,  supra) 
the  probate  or  rejection  is  conclusive  as  to 
personalty,  and  the  probate  presumptive 
as  to  realty  ;  but  a  rejection  of  probate 
does  not  even  presumptively  invalidate  the 
will  as  to  realty,  when  offered  in  evidence 
in  an  action  where  the  title  is  involved : 
Corley  v.  McElmeel,  supra.  Says  the 
court  (p.  238):  "Notwithstanding  the 
extension  of  the  limits  of  the  surrogate's 
jurisdiction,  we  perceive  no  sufficient  rea- 
son for  departing  from  the  former  rule, 
which  allowed  those  claiming  under  a  will 
to  set  it  up  and  to  establish  their  title  by 
common-law  evidence,  notwithstanding  a 

529 


*  501,  *  502       THE  PROBATE  OP  THE  WILL.  §  228 

or  proved  originally  if  not,  in  all  comrnon-law  courts  in  which  the 
title  to  land  thereby  affected  is   in   issue.     With   these   ex- 
ceptions,   *  however,  neither   courts  of  law  nor  [*  502] 
oth^/states!      °^  equity  will  take  cognizance  of  testamentary 

papers,    or   of  the   rights   depending   upon   them,  until 
after  probate  in  the  probate  court.1     That  such  probate 
will  of  no  is  conclusive,  unless  appealed  from,  set  aside,  or  annulled, 

effect.  jn  ^he  method  pointed  out  by  the  statute,  has  already 

been  stated.2    It  may  be  mentioned,  in  connection  with  this  subject, 
_   ,  that  the  efflux  of  time,  in  some  instances,  operates   to 

Probate  con-  '         .  .  '      *  . 

firmed  by  confirm   a   probate    otherwise    assailable   for    informal- 

lapse  ot  time,      jj.^  or  ren(jers  the  probate  conclusive  after  a    certain 
period.3 

It  has  already  been  remarked  that  it  is  the  function  of  a  court  of 
probate  to  determine  whether  the  instrument  propounded  has  been 
Differen  in  executed  by  the  testator  and  attested  by  the  subscribing 
the  functions  witnesses  in  accordance  with  the  statutory  requirements, 
pro^ate'lnd  of  an(l  whether  he  possessed  sufficient  testamentary  capac- 
construction.  ity  to  make  a  valid  will.4  It  is  no  part  of  the  pro- 
ceeding on  probate  to  construe  or  interpret  the  will  or  any  of  its 
provisions,  or  to  distinguish  between  valid  and  void,  rational  and 
impossible,  dispositions  ;  if  the  will  be  properly  executed  and  proved, 
it  must  be  admitted  to  probate,  although  it  contain  not  a  single  pro- 
vision capable  of  execution,  or  valid  under  the  law.  Hence  the  pro- 
bate does  not  establish  the  validity  of  any  of  its  provisions :  this  is 


failure  to  have  the  will  probated."    (Bart-  8  Dickey  r.   Vann,  81    Ala.  425,  432. 

lett,  J.,  dissenting.)  See  also  Marshall  v.  Marshall,  42  S.  C. 

1  "Wood  v.  Matthews,  53  Ala.  1,  citing  436,  446.  Thus,  a  will  requiring  two  wit- 
numerous  earlier  cases :  Pitts  v.  Melser,  nesses  and  attested  by  only  one  was  held 
72  Ind.  469,  with  a  list  of  Indiana  cases;  conclusively  proved  after  the  lapse  of  seven 
Kerr  v.  Moon,  9  Wheat.  565,  572  ;  Ellis  v.  years .  Parker  v.  Brown,  6  Gratt.  554. 
Davis,  109  U.  S.  485,  495;  Willamette  So  where  three  were  required,  proof  by 
Co.  v.  Gordon,  6  Or.  175,  180;  Dublin  v.  two  was  held  sufficient  after  twenty  years : 
Chadbourn,  16  Mass.  433,  436;  Fotheree  Brown  v.  Wood,  17  Mass.  68.  In  Peun- 
v.  Lawrence,  30  Miss.  416,  419;  State  v.  sylvania  the  probate  becomes  conclusive 
Judge,  &c,  17  La.  An.  189;  Rumph  v.  as  to  real  estate  after  five  years:  KenyoD 
Hiatt.  35.  S.  C.  444.  In  Louisiana  a  will  v.  Stewart,  44  Pa.  St.  179.  Where  notice 
is  without  effect  until  it  is  proved  and  of  probate  is  required  by  statute,  the  omis- 
ordered  to  be  executed  :  Aubert  v.  Aubert,  sion  in  the  record  of  proof  of  such  notice 
6  La.  An.  104  ;  Ochoa  v.  Miller,  59  Tex.  was  not  allowed  to  be  shown  in  deroga- 
460,  citing  earlier  Texas  cases,  p.  461.  tion  of  the  probate   fifteen  years  subse- 

2  Ante,  §  227.  Among  the  cases  so  quently  :  Portz  v.  Schantz,  36  N.  W.  Rep. 
holding,  see  Hegarty's  Appeal,  75  Pa.  St.  (Wis.)  249,  253  ;  s.  c.  70  Wis.  497. 
503,513;  Milliard  v.  Hinford,  10  Ala.  977,  *  Ante,  §  222,  and  authorities  there 
9H3.  Hence  the  powers  of  an  executor  cited;  McLaughlin's  Will,  Tuck.  79; 
nnder  letters  issued  continue  though  there  Lorieux  v.  Keller,  5  Iowa,  196,  201; 
be  slater  will,  until  snch  later  will  receive  Emmons  v.  Garrett,  7  Mackey,  53. 
probate  i   Mom  v.  Lane,  50  N.  J.  Va[.  295  ; 

post,  §§  26B,  274. 

530 


§  228  EFFECT  OF  THE  PROBATE.  *  502 

to  be  determined  by  the  courts  of  construction,  when  any  question 
arises  requiring  their  interposition.1 

1  Cox  v.  Cox,  101  Mo.  168  (overruling  Arthur  v.    Scott,    113    U.   S.   340,    386; 

Keurick  v.  Cole,  61  Mo.  572),  p.  172;  Lilly  Murphy's  Estate,  104  Cal.  554;  Sumner 

v.  Tobbein,  103  Mo.  477,  487  ;  Bent's  Ap-  v.  Crane,  155  Mass.  483.     And  of  course 

peal,  35  Conn.   523 ;   Lusk  v.   Lewis,  32  on   appeal    the    appellate   court    has  no 

Miss.  297,  300  ;  Waters  v.  Cullen,  2  Bradf.  greater  right :  Graham  v.  Burch,  47  Minn. 

354;  Jalliffe  v.  Fanning,  10  Rich.  L.  186;  171,  176. 
Broe  v.  Boyle,  108  Pa.  St.  76,  83;  Mc- 


591 


503 


THE  GRANT  OF  LETTERS  TESTAMENTARY. 


§229 


*  CHAPTER  XXV.  [*  503] 

OF  THE  GRANT  OF  LETTERS  TESTAMENTARY. 

§  229.  How  the  Executor  is  constituted —  Upon  probate  of  the 
Tvill,  letters  testamentary  may  be  granted  to  such  of  the  executors 
Letters  testa-  named  by  the  testator  as  are  willing  to  assume  the 
trust.1  The  court  has  no  discretion  in  this  respect,  but 
must  grant  the  letters  to  the  person  or  persons  nomi- 
nated, unless  such  person  is  disqualified  by  law.2  One 
named  as  executor  is  entitled  to  letters  testamentary, 
although  the  will  contain  no  other  provision  of  any  kind,8  and  an 
Executor  ad-  executor  has  power  generally  to  administer  all  the  per- 
sonal property  of  the  deceased,  although  the  testator 
die  intestate  as  to  a  portion  thereof.4  There  need  be  no 
appointment  by  the  testator  in  direct  terms ;  it  is  suffi- 
cient if  a  person  is  designated  to  discharge  those  duties 
which  appertain  to  the  office  of  executor,  or  that  any 
language  is  used  from  which  the  intention  of  the  testator 
may  be  inferred  to  invest  such  person  with  the  character 
of  executor.6  He  may  also  delegate  the  appointment  of  an  executor 
to  some  third  person,  and  letters  testamentary  will  be  granted  to  the 
person  by  him  named.6  But  the  grant  of  letters  testamentary  to  a 
person  not  named  or  indicated  by  the  testator  is  erroneous,  and  has 
in  South  Carolina  been  held  void.7 


mentary  must 
be  granted  to 
the  testator's 
nominees  if 
qualified. 


ministers  all 
personal  estate 


Any  indication 
by  "the  testator 
sufficient  to 
appoint 
executor. 


1  The  grant  of  general  letters  of  ad- 
ministration, instead  of  letters  cum  testa- 
mento  annero,  has  been  held  void  ;  Fields 
v.  Carlton,  75  Ga.  554,  560. 

2  Holladay  v.  Holladay,  16  Oreg.  147; 
In  re  Banquier,  88  Cal.  302,  309,  and  cases 
cited  ;  Terry's  Appeal,  67  Conn.  181,  hold- 
ing that  the  appointment  of  an  adminis- 
trator with  the  will  annexed  at  the  same 
time  with  the  executor  was  simply  void. 

:;  //,  re  Hickman,  101  Cal.  609. 

4  Matter  of  Murphy,  144  N.  Y.  557; 
Landers  v.  Stone,  45  Ind.  404  ;  Venalile  r. 
Mitchell,  29  Ga.  556 

irpentei  »  Cameron,  7  Watts,  51, 
58;  Wolffe  v.  Loeb,  98  Ala  426;  Grant 
v.  Bpann,  84  Miss.  294,  302;  Nunn  v. 
Owens,  2  Btrobh.  101,  104;  Baveaux  v. 
Hayeaux,  k  I'ai.  333,  336;  Ex  ]>arte  Mc- 
532 


Donnell,  2  Bradf.  32 ;  Myers  v.  Daviess, 
10  B.  Mon.  394;  State  v.  Watson,  2 
Speers,  97,  106. 

6  Bishop  v.  Bishop,  56  Conn.  208 ; 
Ilartnett  v.  Wandell,  60  N.  Y.  346  ;  State 
v.  Rogers,  1  Houst.  569 ;  Jackson  v. 
Paulet,  2  Robert.  Eccl.  344.  So  the  testa- 
tor may  empower  the  survivor  or  sur- 
vivors, in  case  of  the  death  of  any  of  the 
executors,  to  appoint  other  executors  to 
fill  any  such  places  as  may  be  made 
vacant  by  death,  until  the  will  shall  have 
been  wholly  executed,  and  such  appointees 
will  be  clothed  with  the  trust  estate  in 
the  place  of  their  predecessors  :  Mulford 
v.  Mulford,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  68,  76. 

7  Blakcly  v.  Frazier,  20  S.  C.  144,  155; 
see  also  Fields  v.  Carlton,  supra. 


§  229  HOW   THE   EXECUTOR   IS   CONSTITUTED.  *  503,  *  504 

The   test  of  a  constructive   appointment  as  executor,   or   of  an 
executor  according  to  the  tenor  of  the  will,  may  be  found  by  con- 
sidering whether  the  acts  to  be  done  or  the  powers  to 
be  exercised  by  the  person  are  such  as  pertain  to  the   constructive 
office  of  an  executor.     Thus,  the  testator's  decla-   appointment 

of  executor 

[*504]  ration  *  "  that  A.  B.  shall  have  his  goods  after 

his  death  to  pay  his  debts,  and  otherwise  to  dispose  at  his 
pleasure,"  and  the  like  expressions,1  may  suffice  for  this  purpose.  So 
too  the  commitment  of  one's  property  to  "  the  disposition  "  of  A.  B. ; a 
or  the  direction  that  A.  B.  shall  pay  debts  and  funeral  and  probate 
charges,  or  shall  receive  the  property  and  pay  the  legacies ; 3  or  the 
gift  to  A.  B.  of  all  one's  property,  to  apply  the  same  "  after  payment 
of  debts  "  to  the  payment  of  legacies.4  The  appointment  to  a  trust 
under  the  will,  not  essential  to  the  office  of  an  executor,  does  not 
constitute  the  trustee  an  executor  according  to  the  tenor,  for  the 
offices  of  an  executor  and  of  a  trustee  are  distiuct,  and  may  be  vested 
in  different  persons,  and  when  they  are  vested  in  the  same 
person,  the  functions  of  each  are  nevertheless  to  be  performed 
by  him  in  the  respective  capacity,  the  probate  court  having  juris- 
diction over  him  in  the  one,  but  not  in  the  other  capacity ; 6  and 
an  administrator  cle  bonis  non  cum  testamento  annexo,  appointed  after 
the  death  of  an  executor  who  was  also  appointed  trustee  in  the  will, 
does  not  virtute  officii  succeed  to  the  trust.6  But  where  the  testator 
uses  the  word  "trustee,"  and  imposes  duties  involving  the  functions 
of  an  executor,  this  will  be  held  a  good  appointment  as  executor.7 

As  a  testator  may  nominate  several  executors  to  execute  his  will 
jointly,  so  he  may  direct  a  substitution  of  several,  one  after  the 
other,  so  that,  if  the  first  will  not  act,  the  next  may,  and  so  on.8 
And  so  he  may  provide  that  upon  the  death  of  his  executor  another 
shall  complete  the  administration,  in  which  case  the  successor  upon 
his  appointment  possesses  all  the  powers  of,  and  is,  an  executor,  and 
not  an  administrator  de  bonis  non.9    It  is  mentioned  by  Williams,10 

1  Wms.  Ex.  [239];  Schouler,  Ex.  §  36.  tor"  by  the  testator:  Smith  v.  Smith,  15 
Both  these  authors  cite  Henfrey  v.  Hen-  Wash.  239.  As  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
i rey  as  authority  for  this  announcement ;  probate  court  over  testamentary  trusts 
but  the  case,  as  reported  in  4  Moore's  P.  and  trustees,  see  further  ante,  §  151,  p. 
C.  Reports,  pp.  29,  33,  does  not  seem  to  *  346 ;  and  as  to  the  rights  and  duties  of 
raise  this  question.  one  who  is  at  the  same  time  trustee  and 

2  Pemberton  v.  Cony,  Cro.  Eliz.  164.  executor,  see  post,  §  340,  p.  *721. 

8  Pickering  v.  Towers,  2   Cas.  Temp.  6  Knight  v.  Loomis,  30  Me.  204  ;  to 

Lee,  401.  similar  effect,  Simpson  v.  Cook,  24  Minn. 

4  Goods   of   Bell,  L.    R.   4   P.   D.  85.  180,187.     On  this  point  see  post,  §  340,  p. 

And  see  cases  supra.  *  721. 

6  Wheatley  v.  Badger,  7  Pa.  St.  459.  7  Richards  v.  Moore,  5  Redf.  278,  282. 

See  Matter  of   Hawley,  104  N.  Y.  250,  8  Edwards'     Estate,     12     Phila.     85; 

263  ;    Creamer  v.   Holbrook,  99  Ala.  52.  Schoul.  Ex.  §  40,  and  English  authorities. 

And  this  though  the  one  to  whom  purely  9  Kinney  v.  Keplinger,  172  111.  449. 

trust  powers  are  given  is  styled  "  execu-  10  Wms.  Ex.  [242]. 

533 


*504,  *505   THE  GRANT  OF  LETTERS  TESTAMENTARY.        §  230 

on  the  authority  of  Godolphin  x  and  Swinburne,2  that  the  appoint- 
ment may  be  by  implication;  as,  "I  will  that  A. B.  be  my  executor 
if  C.  D.  will  not,"  in  which  case  the  appointment  is  to  C.  D.  if  he 
accept.  Or  where  the  testator  erroneously  supposes  that  one  whom 
he  wishes  to  appoint  is  dead,  and  says  in  his  will,  "Forasmuch  as 
[A.  B.  or  C.  D.]  is  dead,  I  make  E.  F.  my  executor,"  the 
person  supposed  *  to  be  dead  shall  be  executor  if  living.  So  [*  505] 
where  a  man  willed  that  none  should  have  any  dealings  with 
his  goods  until  his  son  came  to  the  age  of  eighteen  years,  except 
A.  B.,  the  latter  was  thereby  appointed  executor  during  the  son's 
minority.3  But  where  executors  were  appointed,  with  a  request  that 
they  were  to  serve  until  the  testator's  son  became  twenty-one  years 
of  age,  this  was  held  not  to  be  an  appointment  of  the  son  to  the 
executorship  when  he  should  arrive  at  the  designated  age.4 

§  230.  Residence  aa  a  Qualification  to  the  Office  of  Executor. — 
At  common  law  non-residence  of  the  testator's  appointee  does  not  dis- 
qualify him  as  executor ;  even  alien  enemies  have  been  allowed  to 
maintain  actions  as  executors.5  The  same  rule  prevails  in  most  Ameri- 
can States  ; 6  but  in  Arkansas,7  Indiana,8  Kansas,9  Ken- 
States  in  which  tucky,10  Missouri,11  Nebraska,12  Oregon,13  and  Fennsyl- 
arTdis-  CntS  vania,14  non-residents  of  the  State  are  not  permitted 
qualified.  to  act  as  executors ;  and  if  an  executor  removes  from  the 

State  after  being  appointed,  his  authority  as  such  will  be 
revoked.15     In   other   States,   also,    non-residents   are   discriminated 

1  Pt.  2,  c.  5,  §  3.  Lemraes,  39  Ark.  399 ;  McCreary  v.  Tay- 

2  Pt.  4,  §  4,  pi.  6.  lor,  38  Ark.  393. 

8  Per   Rhodes,   J.,    in    Brightman    v.  8  Ann.  St.  1894,  §  2394,  construed  in 

Keighley,   Cro.    Eliz.  43,  stating   that   it  Ewing  v.  Ewing,  38  Ind.  390. 

had  been  so  ruled  in  17  Eliz.  9  Gen.  St.  1889,  §  2812. 

4  Frisby  v.  Withers,  61  Tex.  134,  138.  10  St.  1894,  §  3846. 

5  Wins.  Ex.  [229].  n  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  10.     Removal  from 

6  So  in  Alabama  (Keith  v.  Proctor,  114  the  State  does  not  of  itself  revoke  the  ex- 
Ala.  676),  Arizona,  Connecticut,  Colorado  ecutor's  letters  testamentary;  there  must 
(in  the  court's  sound  discretion:  Corrigan  be  action  by  the  probate  court:  State  v. 
v  Jones,  14  Colo.  311),  Delaware,  Florida,  Rucker,  59  Mo.  17,  24. 

[daho,   Ulinois,  Louisiana,  Massachusetts,  12  Cons.  St.  1893,  §  1230. 

Minnesota,  Mississippi,  Nevada,  New  Jer-  13  Code,  1887,  §  1090. 

sey,  North  Carolina,  North  Dakota,  Ohio,  14  Sargent,  J.,  in  Sarkie's  Appeal,  2  Pa. 

Rhode  Island   (Hammond  v.   Wood,  15  R.  St.  157. 

I  566),  South  Carolina,  South  Dakota,  16  Removal  from  the  State  by  an  ex- 
Tennessee,  Texas,  Utah,  Vermont,  Vir-  ecutor  or  administrator  is  held  ground  for 
ginia,  Washington,  West  Virginia,  Wis-  the  revocation  of  letters,  if  the  estate 
consin,  and  Wyoming.  As  to  disqualifica-  suffer  thereby  :  Succession  of  McDonough, 
tioD  of  administrators  by  non-residence,  7  La.  An.  472,  and  the  onus  to  prove  this 
tee po  i  5  241,  [i  *  526,  note.  is  on  the  party  moving  the  revocation: 
Dig  of  St  1894,  §  14.  Becoming  Scott  v.  Lawson,  10  La.  An.  547.  See  as 
nor  resident  after  appointment  and  before  to  non-residence  being  a  ground  for  the 
final  settlement  forfeits  the  letters  granted;  revocation  of  letters  testamentary  and  of 
but  the  vacation  of  the  letters  reqnires  administration,  post,  §  270,  p.  *  576. 
the  action  of  court  on  motion  :  Ilavnes  v. 
634 


§  231  DISQUALIFICATIONS    FOR    EXECUTORSHIP.        *  505,  *  506 

against   in   respect   of   the   office   of   executor.     So,   in 
Georgia,  a  non-resident  of  the  State  may  be  appointed    St,*tce^  ™on. 
and  act  as  such  if  he  has  an  interest  in  the  estate  and    residents  are 
will  give  bond ; 1  but  removal  from  the  State  does  not   Jg^Qi™^iated 
abate   letters   testamentary.2     In  California  a  non-resi- 
dent may  be  granted  letters  testamentary,  but  must  come  into  the 
State  within  a  reasonable   time,  personally  submit   himself   to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court,  and  personally  conduct  the  administration.3 
In  Iowa  the  non-resident  executor  of  a  non-resident  testator  may  be 
appointed  to  administer.4     So  in  Minnesota,  though  the  court  may, 
for  good  reasons,  which,  however,  do  not  render  the  executor  legally 
incompetent,  in  its  discretion  decline  to  grant  him  letters ; 6  and  in 
Maine,6  Michigan,7  and  Ohio8  non-resident  executors  who   fail   to 

account  and  settle  in  the  probate  court  when  required  are  to 
[*  506]   be  *  removed.     In  New  York,  "  an  alien  residing  out  of  the 

State  "  is  declared  incompetent  to  the  office  of  executor ;  but 
this  statute  is  held  not  to  exclude  a  native  of  the  State  who  may 
reside  in  another  State.9  In  Maryland,  the  executor  must  be  a  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States ; 10  and  in  North  Carolina,  it  is  held  that  a 
non-resident  may  renounce  the  office  in  that  State,  though  he  accept 
it  in  the  State  of  the  testator's  domicil.11 

§  231.    Infancy    as    a    Disqualification. — At    common  law  and    in 
many  of  the  American  States  infancy  does  not  operate  as  a  disquali- 
fication to  the  eventual  right  of  executorship ;  but  the 
authority  to  qualify  or  act  as  such  remains  in  abeyance    at  com  mo  If  law 
until  the  infant  reach  the  age  of  majorit}^  or  such  age  as    at  the  ase  of 
may  be  fixed  by  law  or  statute  as  necessary  to  qualify. 
Previous  to   the  statute  of   38  Geo.   III.  c.  87,  §  6,  this  age  was 
fixed  in  England  at  the  age  of  seventeen  years,12  and  this  is  the  law 
in  several  of  the   States ; 18  in  others  the  age  of  eigh- 
teen years  14  is  fixed ;  in  many  it  is  twenty-one  years,15    states; 


1  Code,  1895,  §  3293.  6  Eev.  St.  1883,  ch.  64,  §  21. 

2  Walker    v.    Torrance,    12   Ga.    604.  T  How.  St.  1882,  §  5842. 

The   same  of   administrators:   Brown   v.  8  Bates' Ann.  St.  1897,  §  6017. 

Strickland,  28  Ga.  387.  9  McGregor  v.  McGregor,  33  How.  Pr. 

8  Brown's  Estate,  80  Cal.  381.  456. 

4  And  it  is  error  to  supplant  a  for-  10  Publ.  G.  L.  1888,  art.  93,  §  52. 

eign  executor  of  a  foreign  will  probated  n  Hooper  v.  Moore,  5  Jones  L.  130. 

in  Iowa,  with  an  Iowa  administrator,  un-  12  Wms.    Ex.    [231],    note    (u),   citing 

less  for  good  reasons :   In  re   Miller,  92  Godolph.  pt.  2,  c.  9,  §  2  ;  Swinb.,  pt.  5,  § 

Iowa,  741.  1,  pi  6  ;  Piggot's  Case,  5  Co.  29  a. 

6  Hardin  v.  Jamison,  60  Minn.  112.  ls  In  Colorado  and  Illinois. 
The'court  may  compel  a  non-resident  ex-  14  In  Iowa,  Maryland,  and  Mississippi, 
.ecutor  to  submit  himself  to  the  jurisdiction  See  Christopher  v.  Cox,  25  Miss.  162. 
of  any  of  the  State  courts  when  it  be-  15  In  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Florida,  In- 
comes necessary  for  the  determination  of  diana,  Kansas,  Maine,  Massachusetts, 
a  resident's  claim :  State  v.  Probate  Court,  Missouri,  New  York,  North  Carolina,  and 
66  Minn.  246.  South  Carolina. 

535 


*  506,  *  507   THE  GRANT  OF  LETTERS  TESTAMENTARY. 


§  232 


In  others  at 
eighteen, 
twenty-one, 
or  at  majority. 

Administration 
until  minor  ia 
of  requisite 
age. 


and  in  most  of  the  others  the  age  of  legal  majority. 
Where  an  infant  is  appointed  sole  executor,  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  probate  court  to  appoint  an  administrator  durante 
minore  cetate,  cum  testamento  annexo,  who  is  to  adminis- 
ter the  estate  until  the  infant  has  reached  the  requisite 
age ; x  but  if  other  executors  be  also  named  who  are  of 
full  age,  they  may  execute  the  will  until  the  majority  of  the  infant, 
who  may  then  qualify  and  be  admitted  as  executor.2  As  to  the 
rules  governing  the  appointment  of  an  administrator  durante  minore 
cetate,  see  post,3  in  connection  with  the  appointment  of  adminis- 
trators. 

§  232.  Coverture  as  a  Disqualification  to  the  Office  of  Executrix. 
—  According  to  the  canon  law,  a  married  woman  may  sue  and  be  sued 
alone,  without  her  husband,  and  it  was  held  in  the  spiritual  courts 
of  England  that,  in  the  absence  of  a  writ  of  prohibition, 
*  she  may  take  upon  herself  the  executorship  of  a  will  with-  [*  507] 
out,  or  even  against,  the  husband's  consent  or 
will.4  At  common  law,  however,  the  consent  of  the  hus- 
band is  necessary  to  enable  the  wife  to  assume  the  office 
of  executrix ; 5  but  he  cannot  compel  her  to  assume  the 
office  against  her  will,6  although  she  will  be  bound,  if  the 
husband  administers  as  in  the  wife's  right,  though  against 
her  consent,  in  so  far  that  she  cannot  during  his  lifetime  avoid  or 
decline  the  executorship.7 

In  many  of  the  American  States  married  women  are  not  competent 
to  act  as  executrices,  and  if  a  feme  sole  executrix 
marries,  her  authority  is  thereby  extinguished  ; 8  while 
in  others  she  can  do  so  only  with  the  consent  of  her  hus- 
band, as  in  Alabama,9  Colorado,  Delaware,  Louisiana, 
Maine,10  Massachusetts,11  Mississippi,  New  Jersey,  and 
Wisconsin.     In  California,  Nevada,  and  Texas,  the  mar- 


Consent  of 

husband  is 
necessary  at 
common  law  to 
enable  a 
wife  to  be 
executrix. 


Coverture 
disqualifies  in 
many  States; 

so  in  others 
unless  the  hus 
band  consent. 


1  See  ante,  §  182,  as  to  administration 
durante  minore  atate. 

2  Gary,  Pr.  L.  §  240 ;  3  Eedf.  on  Wills, 
68  ;  Wms.  on  Ex.  [479]. 

3  §  248. 

*  Wentw.  Ex.  375-378. 
6  Wentw.  Ex.  376 ;  Wms.  Ex.  [232] ; 
3  Redf.  on  Wills,  68. 

6  Wms.  Ex.  [234],  citing  Godolph.,  pt. 
2,  c.  10,  §  1  ;  Da  Rosa  v.  De  Pinna,  2  Cas. 
Temp.  Lee,  390. 

7  Wins.  Ex.  [234],  citing  Godolpliin 
and  Wentworth,  tupra;  Wankford  v. 
Wankford,  i  Balk.  299,  30C,  in  Lord 
Holt's  judgment;  Thrustout  v.  Croppin, 
3  W.  HI.  801. 

I     r    instance,  in   Arkansas,   Indiana, 

Kentucky,    Michigan,    Minnesota,    Mia- 
536 


souri,  Nebraska,  New  Hampshire,  Rhode 
Island  (whether  coverture  precludes  the 
appointment  of  a  married  woman,  quaere  : 
Hammond  v.  Wood,  15  R.  I.  566),  Ver- 
mont, Virginia,  and  West  Virginia. 

9  Although  the  statute  requires  the 
consent  of  the  husband  in  writing,  yet 
this  is  held  directory  only  to  the  probate 
court,  and  letters  testamentary  granted  to 
a  married  woman  cannot  be  impeached 
collaterally,  whether  such  consent  appears 
affirmatively  or  not :  English  v.  McNair, 
34  Ala.  40,  49,  citing  earlier  Alabama 
cases. 

1J  Stewart's  Appeal,  56  Mo.  300. 

11  Wiggiii  v.  Swett,  6  Met.  (Mass.)  194, 
196. 


§233 


DISQUALIFICATIONS   FOR   EXECUTORSHIP.        *  507,  *  508 


Mental  and 
moral  dis- 
qualifications. 

Insane  persons, 
criminals. 


riage  of  a  feme  sole  executrix  revokes  her  authority,  but    Marriage  of  a 

•    j  •    i_    l  i     •  feme  sole  exe- 

a  married  woman  appointed  as  such  is  competent  to  act.  Cutrix  revokes 
In  construing  the  California  statute  the  words  "her  her  authority, 
authority  is  extinguished  "  by  the  re-marriage  of  an  executrix,  are 
held  to  mean  "  she  ceases  to  be  competent ; "  and  that  hence  she  is 
not  thereby  deprived  eo  instanti  of  all  her  powers,  but  may  be  pro- 
ceeded against  for  removal.1  In  Iowa,  Massachusetts,2  and  New 
York,  a  married  woman  may  become  executrix  independently  of  her 
husband.  The  common-law  doctrine,  that  the  husband  becomes  exec- 
utor in  right  of  his  wife  upon  marrying  a  feme  sole  executrix,  is 
recognized  in  some  States,8  but  does  not  prevail  generally.4 

§  233.    Mental  Incapacity,  Immorality,  and  other  Disqualifications. 
—  In  most  of  the  States  there  are  statutory  pro- 
[*  508]  visions    *  disqualifying    persons    named   as   ex- 
ecutors,  on  account   of   mental  incapacity  and 
immorality.     Insane   persons,    persons  convicted  of  in- 
famous crime,  and  such  as  are  incompetent  on  account 
of   drunkenness,  improvidence,  or  want  of  understand-   Drunkards, 
ing  or  integrity,  cannot  be  admitted  as  executors.5    In 
Louisiana,  Maryland,  Mississippi,  and  New  York,  no  person  can  be 
appointed  as  executor  who  is  in  law  incompetent  to  bind 
himself  by  contract,  except,  in  some  instances,  married    Persons  in- 

j   •      r\-L  •  i       •     i         n  ii       competent  to 

women ;  and  in  Ohio,  no  person  who  is  legally  incapable    contract, 
of  assuming  the  duties  of  a  trustee.     It  was  held  in  New 
York,  under  a  statute  disqualifying  on  account  of  drunkenness,  im- 
providence, or  want  of  understanding,  that  executorship 
should  be  denied  upon  proof  of  mere  ill-regulated  temper   temper! 
and  want  of  self-control  existing  in  a  high  degree,6  and 
that  a  professional  gambler  is  incompetent  by  reason  of   gambler?"3 
improvidence  ; 7  but  that  an  executor  is  illiterate,  of  nar- 
row means,  and  has  been  guilty  of  misconduct  and  mismanagement, 
is  not  cause,  under  the  statute,  for  superseding  him,  though  it  may  be 
for  requiring  security.8     In  Kentucky  the  immoral  character  of  the 
nominee  by  the  testator  is  held  to  be  no  bar  to  his  appointment  by 


1  Schroeder  v.  Superior  Court,  70  Cal. 
343 ;  McMillan  v.  Hayward,  94  Cal.  357. 
As  to  the  causes  justifying  revocation  of 
letters,  see  post,  §  270. 

2  Publ.  St.  1882,  ch.  147,  §  5. 

3  Lindsay  v.  Lindsay,  1  Desaus.  150; 
Wood  v.  Chetwood,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  311. 
He  becomes  liable  as  co-administrator  for 
any  act  of  administration  afterwards  per- 
formed by  her :  Dowty  v.  Hall,  83  Ala. 
165.  In  Georgia,  letters  granted  to  a 
woman  abate  on  her  marriage,  but  she 
may  nominate  her  husband :  Long  v. 
Huggins,  72  Ga.  776,  788. 


4  Ellmaker's  Estate,  4  Watts,  34. 

5  So  provided  in  the  statutes  of  Ala- 
bama, California,  Colorado,  Delaware, 
Illinois,  Indiana,  Maryland,  Mississippi, 
Nevada,  New  York,  North  Carolina,  Texas, 
and  probably  others. 

6  McGregor  v.  McGregor,  33  How.  Pr. 
456. 

7  McMahon  v.  Harrison,  6  N.  Y.  443, 
affirming  the  Supreme  Court,  and  over- 
ruling the  surrogate,  in  Harrison  v.  Mc* 
Mahon,  1  Bradf.  283. 

8  Emerson  v.  Bowers,  14  N.  Y.  449. 

537 


*  508,  *  509   THE  GRANT  OF  LETTERS  TESTAMENTARY.        §  233 

the   probate   court,1  and  in  Pennsylvania   conviction   as  a  habitual 

drunkard  is  no  disqualification.2  But  in  California  the 
person"  e  paramour  of  a  dissolute  testatrix,  who  had  done  no  work 

for  years,  but  "lived  by  his  wits,"  was  held  an  improper 
person  to  be  appointed  as  executor.3  It  is  held  in  this  State  that  the 
want  of  integrity,  in  order  to  disqualify,  should  be  proved  by  clear 
and  convincing  evidence,  and  that  by  integrity  is  meant  soundness  of 
moral  principle  and  character.4  Touching  the  principle  upon  which 
the  testator's  choice  of  an  executor  is  respected,  Mr.  Schouler  says 
(citing,  however,  only  English  cases,  except  that  of  Sill  v.  Mc- 
Knight 5) :  "  And  so  far  has  our  law  carried  this  principle  as  to  per- 
mit persons  obviously  unsuitable  for  the  trust  to  exercise  it,  to  the 
detriment  of  creditors  and  legatees,  on  the  suggestion  that  the  testa- 
tor, at  all  events,  must  have  confided  in  such  a  person. 
Moreover,  as  courts  have  *  observed  with  a  touch  of  false  [*  509] 
logic,  the  office  of  executor  being  held  in  another's  right,  it  is 
not  tainted  by  his  personal  guilt.6  Hence  not  only  might  persons 
attainted  or  outlawed  for  political  offences  become  executors,  but  even 
those  convicted  of  felony ;  crime  seldom,  if  ever,  operating  to  dis- 
qualify one  for  the  trust."7 

Idiots  and  Idiots  and  lunatics  are  deemed  incapable  of  becoin- 

lunatics.  jng  executors,  both  at  the  common  and  the  civil  law.8 

diT'uaii  n°        Poverty,  or  even  insolvency,  constitutes  no  legal  dis- 
fication.  qualification.9 

It  is  said  to  be  settled  law  in  England  that  where  a  corporation 

aggregate  is  nominated  as  executor,  it  may  appoint  per- 
a<'gregate°nS      sons  styled  syndics  to  receive  administration  with  the 

will  annexed,  who  are  sworn  like  other  administrators,10 
because  they  cannot  prove  the  will,  or  at  least  cannot  take  the  oath 
for  the  due  execution  of  the  office.11  In  the  United  States  the  preva- 
lence of  authority,  once  against  the  competency  of  corporations 
aggregate  to  act  as  executors,13  seems  now  to  turn  the  other  way.     In 

1  Berry  v.  Hamilton,  12  P>.  Mon.  191.  1  Ld.  Raym.  361  ;  Hathornthwaite  v.  Rus- 

a  Sill  v.  McKxright,  7  Watts  &  S.  244.  sell,  2  Atk.  126.     See  post,  §  241,  on  the 

1  Estate  of  l'laisance,  Myr.  117.  appointment  of  administrators. 

*  In  re  Banquier,  88  Cal.  302.  10  Goods  of  Darke,  1    Sw.  &  Tr.  516  ; 

6  7  "Watts  &  S.  244.  Wins.  Ex.  [229]. 

«  Smethurst  v.  Tomlin,  2   Sw.   &  Tr.  "  Wins.  Ex.  [228],  citing  1  Bla.Comm. 

143,  477,    Com.    Dig.    Administrator,    B.    2, 

7  School.  Ex.  §  33,  citing  Wms.  Ex.  Wentw.  Ex.,  c.  1,  p.  39,  and  adding: 
[235]  ;  Co.  Litt.  128a;  3  Bulst.  210;  Kil-  "The  other  grounds  of  the  last  author's 
Ugrew  v.  Killigrew,  1  Vera.  184;  Sme-  doubt  are  stated  to  be:  1st,  because  they 
thorvt  v.  Tomlin,  suj>ra.  cannot  be  feoffees  in  trust,  to  others'  use; 

'   BcbonL  Ex.  §  S3,  giving  as  "a  good  2d,  they  are  a  body  framed  for  a  special 

reason  at  the  outset"  that  such  a  person  purpose." 

cannot  determine  whether  to  accept  the  a  It  is  negatived  in  Maryland:  Presi- 

irn  i  or  not.  dent,  &c.  ?>.   Browne,  34    Md.   450;   and 

I   Wins.  Ex."[285],  citing  Rex  v.  Raines,  formerly  in  New  York:  Thompson's  Es- 


§  234    ACCEPTANCE  OR  REFUSAL  OF  OFFICE  OF  EXECUTOR.    *509,  *  510 

Maryland  it  is  held  that  the   English  doctrine,  allowing   them  to 
designate  one  of  their  number  to  take  administration  with  the  will 
annexed,  is  not  applicable.1     In  New  Jersey  this  doctrine  is  recog- 
nized ; 2  but   whether  a  corporation   aggregate  can  act   as  executor 
when  nominated  was  left  undecided.8     It  appears  from  the  recital  of 
facts  in   the  case  of  Porter  v.  Trail,  that  a  corporation  in 
[*  510]  Philadelphia  is  chartered  by  the  legislature  *  to  act  as  execu- 
tor, and  such  corporations  may  now  be  found  in  many  States, 
permitted   by  statute   to  exercise  the   functions   of   executors    and 
administrators  in  connection  with  trust  funds.4     It  has 
also  been  held  that  a  firm  may  be  nominated  as  execu-    ^ ^esrship 
tors,  and  that  in  such  case  letters  testamentary  will  be    executors, 
granted  to  the  individual  members  of  the  firm.5     And  so 
of  a  corporation  sole ;  the  individual  composing  it  may  be  admitted 
as  executor.6 

§   234.     Acceptance    or    Refusal    of    the   Office   of    Executor — At 
common  law,  and  in  those  of  the  States  in  which  the  authority  of 
the  executor  is  recognized  as  emanating  from   the   will   without  a 
formal    grant    of    letters    testamentary,    the    question    Executor 
whether   a   person   named   in  the  will  as  executor  has    J^.'refufe 
or  has  not  accepted  the  office  is   sometimes   difficult  of    the" office, 
solution.     He  cannot,  of  course,  be  compelled  to  accept  the  execu- 
torship, since  it  is  a  private  office  of  trust  named  by  the  testator, 
and  not  by  the  law  ;  he  may  refuse,  even  if  in  the  life-    but  may  be 
time  of  the  testator  he  has  agreed  to  accept  the  office.7   comPelled  t0 

t»  -ii  o  accept  or 

.But  the  ordinary  was  empowered  by  statute 8  to  convene  refuse. 
before  him  any  person  named  as  executor  in  a  testament,  "  to  the 
intent  to  prove  or  refuse  the  testament ;  "  if  he  appear,  either  on 
citation  or  voluntarily,  and  pray  time  to  consider,  the  ordinary  in 
former  times  might  grant  letters  ad  colligendum,  though  this  practice 
became  obsolete ;  but  if  he  appear  and  refuse  to  act,  or  if  he  fail  to 

tate,  33  Barb.  334.     In  Delaware,  where  tor :  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Bauerle,  143  111. 

foreign  administrators  are   permitted   to  459. 

maintain  actions  as  such,  the  power  of  a  1  President,  &c.  v.  Browne,  supra. 
corporation  aggregate,  as  administrator,          2  Kirkpatrick's  Will,  22  N.  J.  Eq.  463. 
granted  in  another  State,  was  recognized,          8  Porter  v.  Trail,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  106. 
the  court  inclining  to  the  view  that  such          *  Schoul.    Ex.    §   32.     So  in  Pennsyl- 
power  exists  at  common  law :  Deringer  v.  vania,  New  Jersey  (as  appears  from  the 
Deringer,  5  Houst.  416,  430.     In  Illinois,  case  of  Camden  Safe  D.  &  T.  Co.,  supra), 
"where   the   statute  permits   executors  of  New  York,  and  Missouri. 
foreign  wills  to  convey  realty  in  Illinois,          5  In  re  Fernie,  6  Notes  Cas.  657. 
without  probate  anew,  it  was  held,  where          6  Wins.  Ex.  [229],  and  authorities, 
one  of  such  foreign  executors  was  a  cor-          7  Wms.   Ex.    [274],   citing    Doyle   v. 
poration,   that  the   law   of   Illinois   with  Blake,   2     Sch.    &    Lef.    231,   239;    Bac. 
reference   to   foreign   corporations   doing  Abr  Executors,  E.  9 ;  Douglass  v.  Forrest, 
business  in  that  State  must  first  be  com-  4  Bing.  686,  704,  per  Best,  C.  J. ;  Dun- 
plied   with,    before   the   power  conferred  ning  v.   Ocean  National    Bank,   6    Lans. 
could  be  exercised  by  such  foreign  execu-  296,  298. 

8  21  Hen.  VIII.  c.  5,  §  8. 

539 


*  510,  *  511   THE  GRANT  OF  LETTERS  TESTAMENTARY.        §  234 

appear,  administration  cum  testamento  annexo  will  be  granted  to 
another.  By  a  later  statute,1  it  is  provided  that,  if  an  executor 
appointed  in  a  will  die  without  having  taken  probate,  and  whenever 
an  executor  is  cited  and  does  not  appear  to  the  citation,  the  represen- 
tation to  the  testator  and  the  administration  of  his  estate  shall  be 
Right  to  refuse  committed  in  like  manner  as  if  such  person  had  not  been 
may  be  lost.  appointed  executor.2  The  right  to  refuse  may  be  lost  by 
the  executor,  if  he  do  any  act  which  amounts  to  administra- 
tion ;  for  if  he  once  *  admiuister,  it  is  considered  that  he  has  [*  511] 
already  accepted  the  executorship,  and  the  court  may  compel 
him  to  prove  the  will ;  but  if  the  court  accept  his  refusal,  notwith- 
standing he  may  have  acted,  the  grant  of  administration  to  another 
will  be  valid.  These  two  rules  are  laid  down  in  England  with  respect 
to  what  acts  will  render  an  executor  compellable  to  take  probate : 

First,  whatever  the  executor  does  with  relation  to 
mining  accept-  tne  g°°ds  an(^  effects  of  the  testator,  which  shows  an 
ance  or  intention  in  him  to  take  upon  himself  the  executorship,. 

will  regularly  amount  to  an  administration ;  secondly, 
whatever  acts  will  make  a  man  liable  as  executor  de  son  tort  will  be 
deemed  an  election  of  the  executorship.3 

In  the  United  States  this  subject  is,  on  the  one  hand,  of  far 
smaller  importance  than  at  the  common  law,  because  in  most  of 
the  States  an  executor  has  no  authority  to  bind  the  estate  of  his 
testator  without  a  formal  grant  of  letters  testamentary  ;  and  is, 
on  the  other  hand,  more  readily  determined,  since  it  is  mostly 
regulated  by  statutes.4  But  since  administration  with  the  will  an- 
nexed can  only  be  granted  in  default  of  an  executor  named  in  the 
will,  it  is  necessary  that  the  court,  before  granting  such  adminis- 
tration, shall  be  informed  that  the  executor,  or  all  of  several 
No  formality  executors  named,5  have  renounced  the  trust,  or  are 
necessary  to"  incompetent  to  serve.  No  formality  is  necessary  in 
Vnctor'"^'  making  such  proof  beyond  compliance  with  the  re- 
refusal,  quirements  of  the  statute;  it  is  sufficient  if  the  inten- 
tion to  renounce  is  clearly  expressed  in  writing,  and  filed  in  the 

1  21  &  22  Vict.  c.  95,  §  16.  apply  for  letters  within  thirty  days  from 

2  Wins.  Ex.  [275],  citing  Goods  of  the  original  probate  of  the  will  is  a  renun- 
Noddings,  2  Sw.  &  Tr.  15;  Goods  of  Lor-  elation  does  not  apply  to  foreign  execu. 
imer,  2  Sw.  &  Tr.  471;  Davis  v.  Davis,  tors  seeking  ancillary  letters  as  to  whom 
31  L.  J.,  P.  M.  &  A.  216.  the  time   must   in   general   be  computed 

3  Wins.  Ex.  [278],  and  authorities.  from  the   time   of   the  ancillary  probate, 

4  Generally  providing  for  acceptance  but  not  in  all  cases :  Keith  v.  Proctor,  114 
within  a  certain  time,  or  renunciation  of  Ala.  676,  684. 

record   in  the  probate   court.     The  Iowa  6  For  if  one  or  more  of  several  exec- 

Btatnte  providing  for  an  acceptance  within  utors    qualify,  he   or  they   have   all  the 

ten  days  does  nol  apply  to  a  foreign  exe-  powers  which  the  will  confers  upon  the 

cntor  of  a  foreign  will  probated  in  Iowa;  whole   number  of  executors:    Philips  v. 

Jure  Miller,  92  Iowa,  ti.    So  in  Alabama  Stewart,  59  Mo.  491  ;  Columbus  Ins.  Co. 

atutory   provision    that  a  failure  to  V.  Humphries,  64  Miss.  258,  276. 
540 


§  234    ACCEPTANCE  OR  REFUSAL  OP  OFFICE  OF  EXECUTOR.    *  511,*  512 

court 1  at  any  time  before  lie  undertakes  the  office  or  intermeddles  with 
the  estate,2  even  after  propounding  the  will  for  probate,8  or  being 
sworn   as   executor.4     So   it   has   been  held,  that  there    .  .  .  ,.    . 

.  Acts  indicat- 

may   be   a   valid   renunciation   of  the  executorship  by    ing  acceptance 
matter  in  pais,  such,  for  instance,  as  an  express  parol    or  refusal- 
consent  to  the  grant  of  letters  with  the  will  annexed  to  another, 

not  entered  of  record ; 6  and  where  executors  are  appointed 
[*  512]  to  *  sell  lands,  a  neglect  to  qualify  is  prima  facie  evidence  of 

a  refusal  to  act,  and  will  validate  a  sale  made  by  the  acting 
executors.6     A  renunciation  may  be  inferred  from  the  conduct  of  the 
executor  after  being  informed  of  his   nomination,    without    formal 
communication  from  him.7     But  it  will  appear  later  on,  in  connection 
with  the  subject  of  the  appointment  of  administrators  with  the  will 
annexed,8  that   to   support  the   validity   of   such  appointment   the 
record  should  show  the  renunciation  ; 9  and  an  executor  who   has 
entered  upon  the  discharge  of  his  trust  cannot  afterward  resign  it, 
unless  there  be  authority  for  such  resignation,10  as  is  provided  by 
statute   in   many  of  the  States.11     For  the  purpose  of 
granting    letters,   either   testamentary   or   of    adminis-    be  summoned 
tration,   the   probate   court  may,  at   the   instance  of  a    t0  Prove  the 
person  interested,  or  perhaps  upon  its  own  motion,  sum- 
mon the  executor  before  it  to  prove  the  will ; 12  and  as>  the  executor 

cannot  avoid  a  will  by  refusing  to  accept  the  trust,  he       .  „„„„„,  „. 
J     t  °  r  >  and  accept  or 

may  thus  be  compelled  either  to  accept  or  renounce  it,  renounce 
so  that  administration  with  the  will  annexed  may  be  executors  'P- 
granted.18  The  time  when  it  becomes  imperative  for  the  executor 
named  to  accept  or  renounce  is  when  he  is  cited  to  do  so ;  mere 
inaction  and  delay  unaccompanied  by  act  of  intermeddling  with 
the  estate  cannot  amount  to  an  acceptance  against  his  consent.14 
On  the  other  hand,  one  who  takes  possession  of  a  part  of  the 
goods  of  the  testator,  and  disposes  of  them,  is  liable   as  executor, 

1  Commonwealth   v.  Mateer,  16  Serg.  8  Post,  §  245. 

&  R.  416,  418.  9  Thompsons  v.    Meek,  7  Leigh,  419; 

2  Sawyer  v.  Dozier,  5  Ired.  L.  97.  Robertson  v.  McGeoch,  1 1  Pai.  640  ;  De 
8  Mitchell  v.  Adams,  1  Ired.  L.  298.  Peyster  v.  Clendining,  8  Pai.  295 ;  Jud- 
4  Miller  v.  Meetch,  8  Pa.  St.  417.  son  v.  Gibbons,  5  Wend.  224  ;  Newton  v. 
6  Thornton  v.  Winston,  4  Leigh,  152,  Cocke,  10  Ark.  169;  Springs  v.  Irwin,  6 

157,  citing  earlier  Virginia  cases;  Thomp-  Ired.  27. 

sons  v.  Meek,  7  Leigh,  419,   428;  Ayres  10  Haigood  v.  Wells,    1    Hill,    Ch.    59, 

v.  Weed,  16  Conn.  291,  296,  et  seq.  61;    Washington   v.  Blount,  8   Ired.  Eq. 

6  Uldrick  v.  Simpson,  1  S.  C.  283,  286 ;  253,  256 ;  Mussault's  Executor,  T.  U.  P. 
Robertson  v.  Gain,  2  Humph.  367,  381.  Charlt.  259. 

7  Solomon  v.    Wixon,  27   Conn.   520,  u  See    post,   §   273,  and    cases    there 
526 ;  Marr  v.  Peay,  2  Murph.  84.    And  a  cited. 

statutory  provision  that  a  refusal  to  act  as        18  Ante,  §  214. 

executor  shall   be    communicated   to  the        18  Stebbins  v.  Lathrop,  4  Pick.  33,  41. 

probate  court  must  of  necessity  be  direc-         14  Ralston's  Estate,  158  Pa.  St.  645. 

tory   only.  Kilton  v.   Anderson,  18  R.  I. 

136. 

541 


*  512,  *  513 


THE   GRANT   OF   LETTERS   TESTAMENTARY. 


§234 


Death  of  one 
named  as  ex- 
ecutor before 
grant  of  letters 
to  him  is 
equivalent  to 
renunciation. 


although  he  does  not  qualify.1  It  seems  obvious  that 
the  death  of  one  nominated  as  executor  in  a  will  before 
the  grant  of  letters,  and  a  fortiori  before  the  probate  of  the 
will,  amounts  to  a  renunciation ;  and  it  is  important 
to  remember  this  only  in  those  of  the  States  in  which 
the  executor  of  an  executor  succeeds  to  the  executor- 
ship of  the  deceased  executor's  testator :  for  if  the  original  executor 
die  before  completing  the  probate,  he  is  considered  in  point  of  law  as 
intestate  with  regard  to  the  executorship,  although  he  may  have  made 
a  will  and  appointed  executors,  and  although  he  die  after  tak- 
ing the  oath,  if  before  the  passing  of  the  grant.2  *  The  [*  513] 
common-law  rule,  according  to  which  the  execu- 
tor's executor  succeeds  to  the  executorship  of  the 
original  testator 8  is  recognized  in  Florida,4  Georgia,6 
North  Carolina,6  South  Carolina,7  and  perhaps  some 
other  States ; 8  but  in  most  of  them  this  doctrine  is 
repudiated,  either  by  statute  or  the  decision  of  courts.9 
Executor  ^-n    executor   nominated    in   the    will,   who    has    re- 

nominated nounced,  may  retract  his  renunciation,  and  assume  the 
before^anTof  office  at  any  time  before  the  grant  of  letters  testament- 
letters.  ary  to  other  executors,  or  of  letters  of  administration 
with  the  will  annexed.10  So  if  an  acting  executor  has  been  removed 
Renunciation  f°r  cause,11  or  died,12  the  renunciation  of  one  named  as 
may  be  co-executor  may  be  retracted,  and  letters  granted  as  if  it 
death  or  re-        had  not  been  made ; 18  and,  in  the  absence  of  statutory 


States  recog- 
nizing the 
executor's  exe- 
cutor as  execu- 
tor of  original 
testator. 


1  Van  Horn  v.  Fonda,  5  Johns.  Ch. 
388 ;  Worth  v.  McAden,  1  Dev.  &  B.  Eq. 
199. 

2  Drayton's  Will,  4  McCord,  46,  52, 
quoting  from  Toller  on  Executors  [49], 
and  authorities  cited  by  that  author. 

8  Post,  §  350. 

*  Hart  v.  Smith,  20  Fla.  58. 

0  Burch  v.  Burch,  19  Ga.  174,  183. 
But  see  Windsor  v.  Bell,  61  Ga.  671,  675. 

8  Roanoke  Navigation  Co.  v.  Green,  3 
Dev.  434,  holding  that  the  principle  does 
not  apply  if  the  original  testator  desig- 
nated a  successor  in  case  of  the  death  of 
his  executor.  And  the  executor  may  re- 
nounce tlii'  executorship  of  the  original 
estate,  and  retain  that  of  his  own  testator: 
Worth  v.  McAden,  1   Dev.  &  B.  Eq.  199. 

7  Drayton's  Will,  4  McCord,  46;  Lay 
v.  Lay,  10  S.  ('.  208,  220;  Reeves  v.  Tap- 
p;m,  'jl  S.  C.  i  ;  the  doctrine  is  now,  how- 
ever, regulated  by  statute:  Laws,  1880, 
p.  :jM,  no.  809. 

8  Bee  port,  §  850,  where  the  subject  is 
more  fully  discussed. 

MS 


9  Post,  §  350.  The  States  of  Arkansas, 
Delaware,  Kansas,  Kentucky  (but  see 
Carroll  v.  Connett,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  195), 
Maine,  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Minne- 
sota, Missouri,  Nevada,  New  Hampshire, 
New  Jersey,  Ohio,  Oregon,  Rhode  Island, 
Texas,  Vermont,  Virginia,  West  Virginia, 
Wisconsin,  and  others,  have  abolished  the 
doctrine  of  the  transmission  of  the  execu- 
torship to  the  executor's  executor. 

10  Robertsou  v.  McGeoch,  11  Pai.  640; 
Taylor  v.  Tibbats,  13  B.  Mon.  177  ;  Casey 
v.  Gardiner,  4  Bradf.  13;  Davis  v.  Inscoe, 
84  N.  C.  396,  402,  citing  Wood  v.  Sparks, 
1  Dev.  &  Bat.  389.  A  renunciation  prior 
to  the  death  of  the  testator,  for  a  con- 
sideration and  against  the  testator's  will, 
is  of  no  legal  effect :  Staunton  v.  Parker, 
19  Hun,  55,  60.  But  a  renunciation  can- 
not be  retracted  after  letters  have  been 
issued  to  another  :  see  post,  §  243,  p.  *  531. 

11  Codding  v.  Newman,  3  Th.  &  C.  364. 

12  Dempsey's  Will,  Tuck.  51. 

i»  Perry  v.  DeWolf,  2  R.  I.  103,  108  ; 
Judson  v.  Gibbons,  5  Wend.  224,  227. 


§  234   ACCEPTANCE  OR  REFUSAL  OP  OFFICE  OF  EXECUTOR.    *513,  *  514 


regulation  to  the  contrary,  one  of  several  executors 
named  in  a  will,  not  taking  letters  testamentary  when 
his  co-executors  do,  may  come  in  at  any  time  afterward 
and  do  so.1  But  where  there  is  objection  to  one  of 
several  executors  named,  the  issue  of  letters  testa- 
mentary must  be  suspended  as  to  all  until  the 
[*  514]  *  determination  of  the  objection.2  A  widow 
named  as  executrix  has  been  allowed  to  renounce 
the  executorship  and  qualify  as  administratrix  with  the 
will  annexed  ; 8  and  the  act  of  qualifying  as  administra- 
tor before  proof  of  the  will  has  been  held  not  to  consti- 
tute a  renunciation  of  the  right  to  qualify  as  executor 
on  production  of  the  will.4 


moval  of 
grantee  of 
letters. 

One  of  several 
executors  may 
qualify  after 
co-executors. 
But  issue  of 
letters  must  be 
suspended  as 
to  all  if  one  is 
objected  to. 

One  named  as 
executrix  may 
renounce  and 
take  letters  of 
administration. 


1  Savage,  J.,  in  Judson  v.  Gibbons, 
supra,  citing  Toller,  68,  69  ;  Wankford  v. 
Wankford,  1  Salk.  299  ;  5  Co.  28  a ;  9  Co. 
97.  See  also  Matter  of  Maxwell,  3  N.  J. 
Eq.  611,614. 


2  McGregor  v.  Buel,  24  N.  Y.  166. 

8  Briscoe  v.  Wickliffe,  6  Dana,  157,  169. 

4  Thornton  v.  Winston,  4  Leigh,  1 52 


543 


*  615,  *  516  LETTERS   OF   ADMINISTRATION.  §  235 


♦CHAPTER  XXVI.  [*515] 

LETTERS   OF   ADMINISTRATION. 

§  235.    Principles  governing  the  Grant  of  General  Letters  of  Ad- 
ministration. —  Administration  is  granted  upon  the  estates  of  persons 
dying  intestate,  and  cum  testamento  annexo,  upon  the 
ministration       estates  of  those  who  left  a  will,  but   no  executor  com- 
may?ed  •*  petent  or  willing  to  assume  the  office.     Before  letters  of 

executor  can  administration  can  properly  be  granted,  there  must  be 
be  appointed.      proof  to  tlie  satisfactjon  0f  the  probate  court  that  the 

intestate  died  while  domiciled  within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of 
such  court,  leaving  property ;  or  that  he  died  elsewhere,  leaving  prop- 
erty within  such  jurisdiction.  If  he  left  a  will,  it  must  also  be  shown 
that  there  is  no  executor  competent  or  willing  to  execute  it.1  The  grant 
of  letters  of  administration  generally,  after  the  death  of  the  execu- 
tor of  a  testate  estate,  instead  of  letters  cum  testamento  annexo,  has 
been  held  void.2 

Aside  from  the  statutory  regulations,  which  in  every  State  deter- 
mine what  persons  are  entitled  to  the  administration,  and  which  of 
course  must  be  observed  in  appointing  an  administrator  to  office,  the 
discretion  vested  in  probate  courts  in  this  respect  is  to  be  governed 
by  well-known  general  principles.  The  most  important 
Administra-       0f  these  is,  that  administration  should  be  committed  to 

Hon  js  com-  .  . 

mitted  to  the  those  who  are  the  ultimate  or  residuary  beneficiaries 
ficiKeofethe  of  the  estate,  —  those  to  whom  the  property  will  go 
estate,  after   administration.     To  secure  to  them  the  right  to 

administer  is  the  paramount  object  of  the  statutes  fixing 
the  order  of  preference,  and  constitutes  the  aim  and  intention  of 
courts  in  the  exercise  of  such  discretion  as  is  vested  in  them.  It  is 
obvious  that  those  who  will  reap  the  benefit  of  a  wise,  speedy,  and 
economical  administration,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  suffer  the  conse- 
quences of  waste,  improvidence,  or  mismanagement,  have  the  highest 
interest  and  most  influential  motive  to  administer  properly.  Hence 
it  is  said  that  the  right  to  administer  follows  the  right  to 
*  the  personal  property,8  —  a  rule  the  binding  force  of  which  [*  51GJ 

1  Ante,  §  234  ;  jioat,  §  245.  mitted  the  spirit  of  this  rule   to  prevail 

2  Fields  '••  Carlton,  75  Qa.  554,  560.  over  the  letter  of  a  statute  preferring  the 
'■'  The  inclination  of  English,  conrta  5b    next  of    kin   to  the    residuary  legatee: 

t  i  strong  in  this  direction, that  they  per-     Thomas  v.  IJutler,  1  Veutr.  217,219. 
544 


§235 


PRINCIPLES   GOVERNING    THE    GRANT    OF   LETTERS. 


516 


is  recognized  in  America,1  as  well  as  in  England.2  The  correlative 
of  the  rule  is  equally  true,  —  that  administration  should  not  be 
granted  to  one  whose  interests  are  adverse  to  the  estate.3 

The  prominence  of  the  right  of  the  surviving  to  administer  the 
estate  of  a  deceased  spouse  is  strongly  corroborative  of  the  validity 
of  this  rule.     In  England  the  right  belongs  to  the  hus- 
band exclusively  of  all  other  persons,  and  the  court  of   ^"es^"ht  a*S 
probate  has  no  power  or  election  to  grant  it  to  any  other.4   common  law. 
"  The  foundation  of  this  claim  has  been  variously  stated," 
says  Williams.     "  By  some  it  is  said  to  be  derived  from  the  statute 
of  31  Edward  III.,  on  the  ground  of  the  husband's  being  '  the  next 
and  most' lawful  friend'  of  his  wife  ;6  while  there  are  other  authori- 
ties which  insist  that  the  husband  is  entitled  at  common  law  jure 
mariti,   and  independently  of  the  statutes.6    But   the   right,   how- 
ever  founded,    is   now   unquestionable,  and  is  expressly   conferred 
by  statute."  7     This  right  is  said  not  to  be  an  ecclesiastical,  but  a 
civil  right  of  the  husband,  though  administered  in  the  court  of  pro- 
bate.8 

In  the  United  States  the  right  of  the  surviving  husband  or  wife  to 
administer  on  the  deceased  spouse's  estate  is  generally,  but  not  uni- 
versally, accorded  by  statute ;  and  whether  the  reason  be 
found  in  the  husband's  marital  right  to  the  wife's  per-   widow  has  first 
sonalty,   extending   in   some    States    to   her   choses   in    "fty t0  afl" 

minister* 

action,9  or   in  any  of  the   other   causes   suggested,10  it 


1  Donahay  v.  Hall,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  720 ; 
In  re  Davis,  106  Cal.  453,  457;  Thornton 
v.  Winston,  4  Leigh,  152 ;  Sweezey  v. 
Willis,  1  Bradf.  495  ;  Leverett  v.  Dismukes, 
10  Ga.  98  ;  Long  v.  Huggins,  72  Ga.  776  ; 
Cutchin  v.  Wilkinson,  1  Call,  1,  6;  Bie- 
ber's  Appeal,  11  Pa.  St.  157,  161  ;  Lan- 
gan  v.  Bowman,  12  Sm.  &  M.  715,  717; 
Cottle  v.  Vauderheyden,  11  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s. 
17,  20 ;  Jordan  v.  Ball,  44  Miss.  194,  201  ; 
Kirkpatrick's  Will,  22  N.  J.  Eq.  463; 
Dalrymple  v.  Gamble,  66  Md.  298,  306, 
307  ;  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  15  R.  I.  109. 

2  Wms.  Ex.  [418],  citing  Goods  of  Gill, 
1  Hagg.  341,  342. 

3  Estate  of  Heron,  6  Phila.  87,  89 ; 
Owiugs  v.  Bates,  9  Gill,  463,  466.  See 
post,  §  241,  p.  *  525  ;  §  242,  p.  *  529. 

4  Wms.  Ex.  [409],  citing  Humphrey  v. 
Bullen,  1  Atk.  458;  Sir  George  Sands's 
Case,  3  Salk.  22;  Elliott  v.  Gurr,  2 
Phillim.  16. 

5  3  Salk.  22,  supra;  Elliott  t;.  Gurr, 
supra. 

6  Com.  Dig.  Administrator,  B.  6 ;  Watt 
v.  Watt,  3  Ves.  244,  247. 

vol.  i.  — 35 


7  29  Car.  II.  c.  3,  §  25. 

8  Wms.  Ex.  [410],  and  authorities. 

9  Before  the  recent  sweeping  changes 
in  the  law  respecting  the  property  of 
married  women  :  Whitaker  t;.  Whitaker, 
6  John.  112,  117;  Hoskins  v.  Miller,  2 
Dev.  360,  362 ;  Donnington  v.  Mitchell,  2 
N.  J.  Eq.  243  ;  Byrne  v.  Stewart,  3  Desaus. 
135,  143;  Olmsted  v.  Keyes,  85  N.  Y. 
593,  602. 

10  Mr.  Williams  says,  in  note  (e),  p. 
[410],  that  others  have  supposed  that  the 
husband  is  entitled  as  next  of  kin  to  the 
wife,  and  cites  Fortre  v.  Fortre,  1  Show. 
351,  and  Rex  v.  Bettesworth,  2  Stra.  1111, 
1112;  "  but,"  he  adds,  "  it  seems  clear  that 
the  husband  is  not  of  kin  to  his  wife  at 
all."  There  are  numerous  American 
cases  holding  that  husband  and  wife 
are  not  of  kin  to  each  other:  Green  v. 
Hudson  R.  R.,  32  Barb.  25,  28;  Lucas  v. 
N.  Y.  Central  R.  R.,  21  Barb.  245 ;  Wilson 
v.  Frazier,  2  Humph.  30 ;  Storer  v.  Wheat- 
ley,  I  Pa.  St.  506 ;  post,  §  423,  and  cases 
cited. 

545 


*  517,  *  518  LETTERS   OF   ADMINISTRATION.  §  236 

is  *  undeniable  that  they  have,  besides  their  personal  in-  [*  517] 
terest  in  the  estate,  the  control  of  the  interests  of  the  minor 
heirs,  where  there  are  such,  being  the  natural  guardians  of  their  per- 
sons and  estates,  and  thus  unite  in  themselves,  as  the  surviving 
centre  and  head  of  the  family,  a  greater  interest  in  the  estate  than 
any  other  single  person  —  in  all  cases,  at  least,  where  the  deceased 
leaves  minor  children.  The  exceptions  to  the  right  of  husband  or 
wife  to  administer  still  further  corroborate  the  principle  upon  which 
the  rule  is  founded.  It  is  held,  in  several  States,  that 
Unless  the  where  by  ante-nuptial  agreement  or  by  articles  of  separa- 
ante-nuptial  tion  the  property  of  the  husband  or  wife  does  not  pass  to 
agreement,         ^e  survivor,  he  or  she  is  not  entitled  to  the  administra- 

descends  to  /  . 

others.  tion ; x  but  if  it  gave  the  wife  a  power  or  disposal  of  her 

separate  property  which  she  has  not  executed,  or  where 
a  devise  to  a  trustee  for  the  wife's  use  ends  with  her  death,  the  hus- 
band's right  to  administer  is  not  affected.2  So,  too,  in  Louisiana,  the 
beneficial  heir,  whether  present  or  represented,  is  entitled  to  adminis- 
tration in  preference  to  the  surviving  husband  or  wife ; 8  but  the 
natural  tutor  has  as  such  the  right  to  administer  the  estate  of  the 
deceased  spouse,  unless  creditors  or  adult  heirs  demand  the  appoint- 
ment of  an  administrator ; 4  and  this  although  the  surviving  spouse 
has  the  usufruct  of  the  community  property  during  life.6 

§  236.  The  Husband's  Right  to  Appointment.  —  It  appears  from 
the  preceding  section  that  in  England  the  husband's  right  to  admin- 
ister on  the  estate  of  his  deceased  wife  is  absolute,  being  expressly 
confirmed  by  statute.6  The  statutes  of  many  of  the  Ameri- 
can *  States  embody  the  same  or  similar  provisions ;  but  in  [*  518] 
others  the  principle  that  administration  should  follow  the 
right  to  the  personal  property  prevails  over  the  husband's  absolute 
Statutes  of  right.  Thus,  the  husband  is  not  entitled  to  administer 
some  States        ^.j     wife's  estate  to  the  exclusion  of  her  children,  if  they 

deprive  hus-  '    t  J 

band  of  right      inherit;7  nor  if  he  is  excluded  from  any  share  in  her 

1  In    re    Davis,    106    Cal.    453,    457;  4  Labranche  v.  Trepagnier,  4  La.  An. 
Fowler  v.  Sell,  14  Sm.  &,  M.  68  ;  Ward     558. 

v.  Thompson,  6   Gill  &  J.  349  ;  Bray  v.  6  Succession  of  Briukman,  5  La.  An. 

Dudgeon,  6  Munf.  132;  Maurer  v.  Naill,  27. 

5  Md.  324  ;  Govane  v.  Govaue,  1  Har.  &  6  29  Car.  II.  c.  3,  §  25,  which  enacts 
M.  340.  But  in  Illinois  the  statute  is  that  the  Statute  of  Distributions  (22  &  23 
held  to  be  mandatory,  and  that  the  hus-  Car.  II.  c.  10)  "shall  not  extend  to  the 
band  may  administer  though  he  has  by  estates  of  femes  covert  that  shall  die  in- 
posl  nuptial  contract  relinquished  all  his  testate,  but  that  their  husbands  may  de- 
property  rights  in  tin:  estate  :  O'Rear  v.  maud  and  have  administration  of  their 
('rum,  135  111.  294.  rights,  credits,  and  other  personal  estates, 

2  Hart   v.    Soward,   12    I?.   Mon.  391  ;  and  recover  and  enjoy  the  same  as  they 
Payne  V.   Payne,   11    B.  Mon.  138.  might  have  done  before   the  making   of 

:;  Code,  art.   1121  ;  Succession  of  Wil-     said  act":  Wms.  Ex.  [410]. 
liamson,  3  La.  An.  202.  7  Randall  >•.  Shrader,  17  Ala.  333,335; 

Goodrich  i;.  Treat,  3  Col.  408,  411. 
540 


§  237 


THE   WIDOW'S   RIGHT   TO    APPOINTMENT.        *  518,  *  519 


Husband  may 
transfer  his 
right  to  ad- 
minister. 

Husband's 
administrator 
preferred  to 


estate  ; l  but  unless  the  statute  expressly  or  by  necessary    to  administer 
implication  deprive  him  of  this  right,  it  cannot  be  denied    m  certain 
him  ; 2  and  if  any  other  person  shall  administer,  he  is 
considered  in  equity,  with  respect  to  the  residue  after  paying  the 
debts,  as  a  trustee  for  the  husband  or  his  representatives.8 

It  has  been  held  that  the  right  of  the  husband  to  administer  may 
be  transferred  by  him  to  another,  and  that  letters  will  be 
granted  by  the  probate  court  to  his  nominee ; 4  and  that 
upon  his  death,  while  administering  upon  the  estate  of 
his  pre-deceased  wife,  his  executor  or  administrator  is 
entitled  to  administration  de  bonis  non  of  the  wife's 
estate,  in  preference  to  her  next  of  kin.6  So  the  hus- 
band is  entitled  to  administer  although  he  be  a  non-  w.ife's  next  of 
resident,6  and  to  retain  the  wife's  personal  property 
without  administration,7  whether  a  resident  or  not.8 

That  a  marriage  was  voidable   does  not  militate  against  the  hus- 
band's right  to  administer  the  wife's  personal  estate,  unless  sentence 
of  nullity  was  pronounced  before  her  death ; 9  but  a  mar- 
riage absolutely  void  ab  initio  confers  no  rights  upon  the    au"^"^^ 
husband.10     So,  also,  notwithstanding  a  divorce    though  the 
[*  519]  a  memo,  et  thoro,11  or  his  abandonment  of  *  the    beenvoidable* 
wife,   he  is  entitled  to  administer  himself,    or    but  not  if  void, 
nominate  to  the  register  a  fit  person  to  be  appointed.12 

§  237.  The  Widow's  Right  to  Appointment.  —  Under  the  English 
statute,13  the  ordinary  is  directed  to  grant  administration  "  to  the 
widow  or  the  next  of  kin,  or  to  both,"  at  his  discretion ;  and  al- 
though, by  the  seventy-third  section  of  the  Court  of  Probate  Act,14 
the  power  of  the  probate  court  in  making  grants  of  administration, 


1  See  authorities,  §  235,  p.  *  517. 

2  Fairbanks  v.  Hill,  3  Lea,  732  ;  Shura- 
war  v.  Cooper,  16  Barb.  556,  560;  Clark 
v.  Clark,  6  W.  &  S.  85. 

3  Hoppiss  v.  Eskridge,  2  Ired.  Eq.  54  ; 
Weeks  v.  Jewett,  45  N.  H.  540  ;  Williams's 
Appeal,  7  Pa.  St.  259 ;  Allen  v.  Wilkins, 
3  Allen,  321  ;  Kenyon  v.  Saunders,  18 
R.  I.  590. 

4  Patterson  v.  High,  8  Ired.  Eq.  52,  54. 
By  statute  in  California :  Code  Civ.  Pr.  § 
1365;  Montana:  Probate  Act,  1887,  §  55. 

6  Hendren  v.  Colgin,  4  Munf.  231. 

6  Weaver  i>.  Chace,  5  R.  I.  356.  It 
should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  non-resident  was  held  to 
be  within  the  discretion  of  the  court. 
That  he  is  entitled,  although  a  non-resi- 
dent, in  those  States  in  which  non-resi- 
dence is  a  disqualification,  as  indicated  by 
Redfield  (3  Redf.    Wills,  81,  note  8),  is 


not  borne  ont  by  the  authority  cited  . 
Sarkie's  Appeal,  2  Pa.  St.  157,  159;  and 
the  contrary  is  intimated  in  O'Rear  v. 
Crum,  135  111.  294.  The  States  in  which 
non-residence  is  a  disqualification  are 
enumerated  post,  §  241,  p.  *  526,  note. 

7  Robins  v.  McClure,  100  N.  Y.  328. 

8  Willis  v.  Jones,  42  Md.  422  ;  Hub- 
bard v.  Barcus,38  Md.  175. 

9  Wms.  Ex.  [410];  Elliott  v.  Gurr,  2 
Phillim.  19 ;  White  v.  Lowe,  1  Redf.  376  ; 
Parker's  Appeal,  44  Pa.  St.  309;  Smith 
v.  Smith,  1  Tex.  621. 

10  Browning  v.  Reane,  2  Phillim.  69. 
»  Clark  v.  Clark,  6  W.  &  S.  85. 

12  Coover's  Appeal,  52  Pa.  St.  427, 
430 ;  to  similar  effect,  Nusz  v.  Grove,  27 
Md.  391  ;  Altemus's  Case,  1  Ashm.  49. 

13  21  Hen.  VIII.  c.  5,  §  3. 

14  20  &  21  Vict.  c.  77. 

54T 


*  519,  *  520  LETTERS    OF    ADMINISTRATION.  §  237 

and  deciding  to  whom  they  shall  be  granted,  has  been  much  enlarged, 
yet  even  under  it  the  court  is  precluded  from  making  a  joint  grant  to 
a  widow  and  one  of  the  persons  entitled  to  distribution  (but  not  next 
of  kin).1  If  a  joint  grant  is  to  be  made  to  the  widow  and  one  of  the 
next  of  kin,  all  the  other  next  of  kin  must  consent  thereto ; 2  and 
the  modern  English  practice  is  to  favor  the  widow  under  ordinary 
circumstances.3 

In  the  United  States  the  widow  is  usually  preferred  to  all  others  as 
administratrix  of  her  deceased  husband,  but  her  claim  is  neither  so 
generally  recognized,  nor  based  upon  the  same  ground, 
ally  preferred  as  that  of  the  husband  to  the  estate  of  a  deceased 
to  all  others.  wife>  but  has  its  basis  in  the  division  of  interests  be- 
tween her  and  the  kindred.4  Where  the  widow  and  next  of  kin  are 
placed  in  one  class,  as,  for  instance,  in  Massachusetts,6  Nebraska,6 
and  Pennsylvania,7  administration  may  be  granted,  in  the  discretion 
of  the  court  or  register,  to  the  widow  alone,  or  to  the  widow  and  one 
or  more  of  the  next  of  kin,  or  to  one  or  more  of  the  next  of  kin 
without  the  widow. 

As  the  husband's  right  to  administer  on  the  deceased  wife's  estate 
depends  upon  a  valid  marriage,  so  the  widow,  to  entitle 
fu/marriage1*"  fler  t°  administer  her  husband's  estate,  must  be  the  sur- 
oniv entitled  to  viving  wife  of  an  actual  marriage.8  Hence  one  who  co- 
habited with  a  man  who  had  a  wife  living  from  whom 
he  was  not  divorced,  although  unknown  to  her,  and  although 
Divorced  wife  *  sne  fully  believed  herself  to  be  his  lawful  wife,  [*  520] 
not  entitled.  [s  not  entitled  to  administer  ; 9  nor  one  divorced 
a  vinculo.™  And  though  a  marriage  valid  where  contracted  is  in  gen- 
eral valid  everywhere,  yet  in  many  States  if  the  parties  simply  leave 
the  State  of  their  domicil  to  evade  a  prohibited  marriage  by  going 
elsewhere  where  it  is  not  prohibited,  intending  at  once  to  return,  such 

1  Wms.  Ex.  [416],  citing  Goods  of  then  living.  The  decision  is  based  upon 
Browning,  2  Sw.  &  Tr.  634.  a  provision  of  the  Spanish  law,  according 

2  Goods  of  Newbold,  L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  to  which  a  person  marrying  in  good  faith 
285.  shall   enjoy   the   rights   of    a    legitimate 

3  Stretch  v.  Pynn,  1  Cas.  Temp.  Lee,  spouse ;  and  "  putative  matrimony  may 
30 ;  Goddard  v.  Goddard,  3  Phillim.  637  ;  be  converted  into  a  true  marriage,  if,  after 
Goods  "f  Middleton,  L.  R.  14  Prob.  D.  23.  the  celebration,  the  impediment  ceases  to 

4  Ante,  §  235.  exist.     In  the  case,  for  example,  that   a 

6  Cobb  v.  Newcomb,  19  Pick.  336;  man  be  married  to  a  second  wife,  the  first 
Mcfiooch  v.  McGooch,  4  Mass.  348.  living,  if  afterward  this  one  die,  the  sec- 

,;  romp.  St.  Neb.  1887,  ch.  23,  §  178.         ond  wife,  who  was  ignorant  of  the  first 

7  McClellan's  Appeal,  16  Pa.  St.  110,  marriage  of  her  husband,  may,  at  her 
115;  Gyger'a  Estate,  65  Pa.  St.  311,  313.       pleasure,  select  either  to  live  with  him,  or 

'   Byrnes  v.  Dibble,  5  Redf.  383,  385.  be  separated  and  marry  another":  lb.,  p. 

9  O'Gara   v.    Eisenlohr,  38  N.  Y.  296.  629.     See  also,  ante,  §  107. 
Bat   see    Smith    v.    Smith,    1     Tex.   621,        10  Dobson  v.  Butler,  17  Mo.  88;  Ryan 

granting  letters  to  a  widow  who  had  in-  v.  Ryan,  2  Phillim.  332. 
nocently  married  a  man  who  bad  a  wife 
548 


§237  the  widow's  right  to  appointment.      *  520,  *  521 

marriage  will  be  held  void  in  the  State  of  the  domicil.1 
A  divorce  a  mensa  et  thoro  does  not,  as  appears  from  the    menS(,  et  tkoro 
preceding  section,  deprive  the  husband  of  the  right  to    does  not  dis- 
administer,  nor  destroy   the   relation  of   marriage,  but 
merely  suspends  some  of  the  obligations  arising  out  of  that  relation ; 
and  the  right  of  succession  is  not  impaired.2     It  seems,  therefore, 
that  in  such  case,  and  where  the  marriage  was  voidable,  but  not  dis- 
solved during  the  husband's  lifetime,3  the  widow's  right  to  administer 
is  not  affected  ;  and  such  right  is  restored  by  the  annulling  of  a  decree 
of  divorce  a  vinculo  after  the  husband's  death.4     But    Abandonment 
where  a  widow  had   left   her   husband,  renouncing   all    of  husband, 
conjugal  intercourse  with  him,  a  considerable  time  before  his  death, 
her  right  was  held  to  have  been  abandoned  ; 5  and  a  wife, 
divorced  a  mensa  et  thoro  for  adultery  on  her  part,  for-   mensa  for adul- 
feits,  it  should  seem,  her  right  to  the  administration.6   teryheldto 

,  ..  ,  ,         t     ,    '  ,      ,      i  ,  ,  disqualify. 

And  it  has  already  been  remarked,  that  where,  by  ante- 
nuptial agreement,  or  for  any  other  reason,  the  widow  is  not  entitled 
to  any  of  the  property  of  the  husband,  she  also  loses  her  right  to 
administer  it.7 

Where  discretion  is  vested  in  the  court  granting  letters  of  adminis- 
tration, it  is  generally  exercised  in  favor  of  the  widow,  unless  some  good 
reason  be  shown  demanding  a  different  course.8     If  the    _.       .     . 

Discretion  is 

one  of  those  entitled  be  competent,  and  the  other  not,  the    generally  exer- 

appointment  will  of  course  be  confined  to  the  one    clfsedicJ"Javor 
£*  521]  competent ;  but  if  neither  the  widow  nor  *  next 

of  kin  be  under  legal  disability,  their  personal  suitableness 
is  to  be  considered ;  if  the  widow  is  evidently  unsuitable,  some  other 
person  (within  the  class  from  which  the  court  may  select)  coverture  dis- 
will  be  appointed.9  Coverture  disqualifies  a  woman  as  qualifies  in 
administratrix  in  some  of  the  States  ; 10  where  it  does  not, 
the  remarriage  of  the  widow  is  not  per  se  an  objection  to  her  ap- 
pointment ;  u  but  if  administration  be  also  demanded  by  a  child,  the 
second  marriage  might  be  a  circumstance  inducing  the  court  to  give 
preference  to  the  child.12 

1  Stull's  Estate,  183  Pa.  St.  625,  citing  7  Ante,  §  235,  and  authorities  under  p. 
cases  pro  and  con.  *  517. 

2  Per  Rogers,  J.,  in  Clark  v.  Clark,  6  8  Schoul.  Ex.  §§  99,  100. 

W.  &  S.  85,  87 ;  Nusz  v.  Grove,  27  Md.  9  Smith,  Pr.  L.  70 ;  Stearns  v.  Fiske, 

391, 400,  citing  Slatter  v.  Slatter,  1  Younge  18  Pick.  24,  27  ;  Gary,  Pr.  L.  §  267. 

&  C.  28 ;  Lambell  v.  Lambell,  3  Hagg.  10  See  ante,  §  232,  as  to  the  effect  of 

568;  Chappell  v.  Chappell,  7  Eccl.  R.  451.  coverture  upon  executrices,  and  a  list  of 

3  Parker's  Appeal,  44  Pa.  St.  309  ;  the  States  in  which  coverture  disqualifies. 
Fyock's  Estate,  135  Pa.  St.  522  ;  White  v.  And  see  post,  §  241,  p.  *525,  as  to  the  ef- 
Lowe,  1  Redf.  376.  feet  of  coverture  on  administratrices. 

4  Boyd's  Appeal,  38  Pa.  St.  246.  «  Schoul.  Ex.  §   100,  citing  Webb  v. 
6  Odiorne's  Appeal,  54  Pa.  St.  175.           Needham,  1  Add.  494. 

6  Pettifer  v.  James,  Bunb.  16;  Goods  12  Wms.  Ex.  [418],  also  relying  on 
of  Davies,  2  Curt.  628.  Webb  v.  Needham,  supra. 

549 


*521,  *  522  LETTERS   OF    ADMINISTRATION  §§  238,  230 

§  238.  Right  of  Next  of  Kin  to  the  Appointment.  —  It  would  be 
unprofitable  to  repeat  a  statement  of  the  rules  by  which  the  pro- 
pinquity of  kin  is  ascertained  in  order  to  designate  their  preference 
in  the  right  to  administer.  They  are  given  very  fully  in  Williams 
on  Executors,1  as  applicable  under  the  English  statutes  which  are 
copied  or  substantially  followed  in  most  American  States ;  and  in  an 
earlier  chapter  of  this  treatise,2  the  principle  is  indicated  according 
to  which  the  property  of  the  intestate  descends,  or  is  distributable,  in 
Rifhttoad-  s0  ^ar  as  ^ne  course  °f  descent  is  not  fixed  by  the  statute 
minister  in  eo  nomine.  Under  the  fundamental  principle  that  the 
right  of  administration  follows  the  right  of  property^ 
the  rules  there  pointed  out  are  equally  applicable  here.  The  order 
in  which  next  of  kin  are  entitled  to  administer  in  England  is  reca- 
pitulated by  Williams  as  follows,  showing  certain  exceptions  to  the 
rule  of  computation  respecting  succession  to  inheritances :  "  In 
the  first  place  the  children  and  their  lineal  descendants  to  the  re- 
motest degree  ;  and  on  the  failure  of  children,  the  parents  of  the 
deceased  are  entitled  to  the  administration ;  then  follow  brothers 
and  sisters ;  then  grandfathers  and  grandmothers  ;  then  uncles  or 
nephews,  great-grandfathers  and  great-grandmothers,  and  lastly  cous- 
The  husband  ins.3  In  States  where  the  husband  is  entitled  to  his 
of  a  female  wife's  property,  if  the  next  of  kin  be  a  married  womau 
entitled  if  she  and  she  renounces,  the  grant  is  made  to  the  husband  ; 
renounce.  for  ^e  has  an  interest,  and  the  grant  must  fol- 

low the  *  interest,  and  the  wife  cannot  by  renouncing  deprive  [*  522] 

her  husband  of  his  right  to  the  grant.4  The 
b^next  of  kin  preference  given  by  statute  to  the  next  of  kin  is  obli- 
and  appoint  a  gatory  upon  the  court,  and  it  is  error  to  appoint  a  stran- 
ger where  a  son,  who  is  eligible  and  qualified,  asks  to  be 
appointed.5  So  an  adopted  child  having  a  right  of  inheritance  must 
be  appointed  ;  but  otherwise,  if  it  has  no  interest  in  the  estate.6 

It  may  happen  that  disqualification  existing  at  the  time  of  the 
decedent's  death  is  removed  before  the  grant  of  letters.. 
atthe  time°of  In  such  case,  letters  should  be  granted  to  the  person 
application.  entitled  to  the  same  at  the  time  of  the  application 
therefor,  although  such  person  was,  at  the  time  of  the  intestate's 
death,  disqualified.7 

§   230.    Right  of  Creditors  to  Appointment. — It    follows    from    the 
principle,   repeatedly   stated    above,    of    committing   administration 

1  Page  [410]  et  seq.  relating  to  the  adoption  of  children,  while 

2  Ante,  §  72.  conferring   the    right   to   inherit,  do   not 
'   Wins.  Ex.  [425],  citing  2  Bla.  Comm.     create   relationship,   and    citing    on    this 

505,  point  Commonwealth  v.  Nancrede,  32  Pa. 

«  Haynea  p. Matthews,!  Sw.  &  Tr.  460.    St.  389,  and  Shaper  v.  Eneu,  54  Pa.  St 

*   Haves  V.  Hayes.  T.r.  Irul.  395,  398.  304. 

"  Estate   of   McCully,  13   Phila.  296,         1  Griffith  v.  Coleman,  61  Md.  250. 
holding  that  the  statutes  of  Pennsylvania 
560 


§  239  RIGHT   OF   NEXT   OF   KIN   TO    APPOINTMENT.       *  522,  *  523 

to  those  who  have  the  ultimate  interest  in  the  estate,    Jn  some 
that  creditors  or   their   nominees   are   preferred   when    States,  credit- 
the  assets  of  an  estate  are  not  more  than  sufficient  to    in80ivent 
pay  the  debts,  and  funeral  and  administration  expenses,    estates; 
They  are  accordingly  preferred  to  the  next  of  kin  in  some  States,1  in 
others  their  right  is  subordinate  to  that  of  the  next  of   aliter  in  other 
kin,  but  superior  to  that  of  other  persons,2  and  the  right    States- 
of  a  creditor  is  generally  recognized  where  neither  husband  nor  wife, 
nor  any  of  the  next  of  kin,  will  qualify ; 8  and  it  has  been  held  error 
to  refuse  to  appoint  a  creditor  on  the  ground  that  the  debt  is  barred 
by  limitation ;  4  but  if  those  who  are  preferred  by  statute  are  willing 

to  qualify,  it  is  error  to  appoint  a  creditor.5  It  has  been  held 
[*  523]  in  *  North  Carolina,  that  the  assignment  of  a  debt  after  the 

death  of  the  debtor  does  not  constitute  the  assignee  a  creditor 
authorizing  him  to  take  administration,6  and  in  Massachusetts  that  a 
cause  of  action  which  does  not  survive  the  debtor  does  not  support  a 
claim  to  administer  on  the  debtor's  estate  ; 7  but  in  Maryland  a  niece 
by  marriage,  having  paid  the  funeral  expenses  and  taken  an  assign- 
ment of  the  claim  from  the  undertaker,  was  held  entitled  to  admin- 
istration as  the  sole  creditor.8  In  Texas  9  and  Virginia  10  creditors 
have  no  preference.  In  Louisiana  the  creditor  first  applying  has 
preference  over  one  applying  subsequently,  without  regard  to  the 
dignity  or  magnitude  of  their  respective  claims ; u  but  in  Georgia 
the  statute  preferring  him  who  had  the  greatest  interest  was  con- 
strued as  giving  to  a  creditor  of  superior  dignity,  whose  claim  would 
sweep  the  estate,  preference  over  those  who  would  get  nothing, 
although  having  claims  greater  in  amount.12  In  Oregon,  while  in  an 
ex  parte  application  for  letters  a  general  allegation  that  the  petitioner 
is  the  principal  creditor  would  perhaps  be  sufficient  to  give  the  court 

1  Cutlar  v.  Quince,  2  Hayw.  60;  Long  4  Ex  parte  Caig,  T.  U.  P.  Charlt.  159. 
v.  Easly,  13  Ala.  239,  243  (in  Alabama,  But  see  Succession  of  Sarrazin,  34  La. 
when  an  estate  is  reported  insolvent,  the  An.  1168;  Beauregard  v.  Lampton,  33  La. 
administrator  is  removed  and  the  creditors  An.  827. 

appoint  a  person  to  wind  up  the  estate) ;  5  Haxall  v.  Lee,  2  Leigh,  267  ;  Carthey 

Sturges  v.  Tufts,  R.  M.  Charlt.  17.  v.  Webb,  2  Murph.  268. 

2  Hoffman  v.  Gold,  8  Gill  &  J.  79,  84.  6  Pearce  v.  Castrix,  8  Jones  L.  71. 
In  California,  the  court,  in  its  discretion,  The  reason  assigned  is,  that  to  allow  such 
may  appoint  the  nominee  of  the  next  of  creditor  to  administer  would  be  to  tempt 
kin  in  preference  to  a  creditor  :  Estate  of  him  to  abuse  the  administrator's  right  of 
Wyche,  Myr.  85.    So  in  Nebraska:  Comp.  retainer. 

St.  1887,  ch.  23,  §  178.     So,  it  seems,  in  7  Stebbins  v.  Palmer,  1    Pick.  71,  78; 

Georgia,  although  the  estate  is  insolvent,  Smith  i>.  Sherman,  4  Cush.  408,  412. 

and  the  sole   legatee   be  a  minor  repre-  8  Lentz  v.  Pilert,  60  Md.  296,  citing 

sented  by  a  guardian  :  Myers  v.  Cann,  95  English  authorities. 

Ga.  383,  386.  9  Cain  v.  Haas,  18  Tex.  616. 

3  Mitchel  v.  Lunt,  per  Parsons,  C.  J.,  10  McCandlish  v.  Hopkins,  6  Call,  208. 
4  Mass.  654,  659;  Royce  v.   Burrell,  12  u  Succession  of  Beraut,  21  La.  An.  666. 
Mass.  407,  411 ;  Arnold  v.  Sabin,  1  Cush.  12  Freeman  v.  Worrill,  42  Ga.  401. 

*>25  ;  Lentz  v.  Pilert,  60  Md.  296. 

551 


*  523,  *  524  LETTERS   OF   ADMINISTRATION.  §  240 

jurisdiction  (the  next  of  kin  having  refused),  yet  where  a  creditor 
already  appointed  is  sought  to  be  removed  because  the  new  applicant 
is  the  principal  creditor,  a  bare  allegation  is  insufficient ;  he  must 
aver  the  facts  making  him  such. 1  The  administrator  of  one  to  whom 
Administrator  the  deceased  was  indebted  is  a  creditor,  and  may  be 
of  a  creditor,  appointed  to  administer  the  estate  of  the  deceased  debtor, 
although  another  creditor  is  recommended  by  the  widow,  and  by 
creditors  representing  more  than  half  the  indebtedness  of  the 
deceased.2  But  in  Maryland  it  was  held,  that  one  claiming  as 
trustee,  and  not  as  an  individual,  to  be  the  largest  creditor,  is  not 
entitled  to  the  letters ; 3  and  so  it  is  held  that  the  president  of  a 
corporation  to  whom  deceased  was  indebted,  cannot  be  regarded  as  a 
creditor,  so  as  to  entitle  him  to  letters  in  his  individual  name.4 
Where  the  decedent  was  largely  indebted  to  a  county  for  unpaid 
taxes,  which  could  not  be  collected  without  administration,  it  was 
held  proper  that  the  treasurer  of  the  county  should  take  out  letters 
of  administration,  none  of  the  next  of  kin  applying.5 

§  240.  Right  of  the  Public  Administrator  to  the  Administration. — 
It  appears  from  the  consideration  of  the  functions  of  public  ad- 
ministrators in  a  previous  chapter,6  that  they  are  public  officers  in 
a  sense  different  from  that  in  which  executors  or  administrators 
are  also  considered  public  officers,  in  this,  that  they  are  elected  or 
appointed  directly  by  the  people,  or  the  political  appointing  power, 
and  assume  the  administration  of  estates  ex  officio,  or, 
istrators  ad-  when  they  receive  their  authority  over  a  particular 
m'ni.ster'x        estate   from   the   probate   court,   the   grant   to  them  is 

virtute  officii.'1  It  has  also  been  remarked  that 
in  two  of  the  *  States  8  the  public  administrator  takes  charge  [*  524] 
of  estates,  under  circumstances  pointed  out  by  the  statute, 
without  judicial  order,  thus  conferring  upon  him  quasi  judicial 
authority,  subject,  however,  to  the  control  of  the  probate  court  ; 
while  in  other  States  his  authority  in  each  particular  estate  is  derived 
from  appointment  by  the  probate  court. 

The  circumstances  under  which  the  public  administrator  is  en- 
titled to  appointment,  or  is  preferred  in  the  discretion  of  the  court, 
have  been  fully  discussed  in  connection  with  the  statement  of  the 
functions  of  his  office. 

1  Crack  v.  Hammer, 25  Oreg.  472.  municipal   office;    but  if    viewed   as    an 

2  Ex  parte  Ostendorff,  17  S.  C.  22.  office,  it  belongs  to  the  class  of  minor 
8  Gleerj  v.  Reed,  74  M<1.  238.  offices  essential  to  the  proper  conduct  of 
i   Myera  v.  Cann,  95  Ga.  883.  the  government  and  convenience  of  the 

6  Bowes  v.  Stewart,  128  lnd.  507,  511,  people  which  was  not  disturbed  by  the 
510.  reconstruction  of  the  State  after  the  sup- 

\nti,  §  iho.  pressiorj   of    the   rebellion:    McGuire    v. 

7  Fn    Alabama    it    was    held    that    the  Buckley,  58  Ala.  120,  131. 
general  administrator's  might  lie  a  quasi  8  Missouri  and  New  York. 
office,  with  none  <>f  the  attributes  of  a 

552 


§  241  DISQUALIFICATIONS   TO    APPOINTMENT.  *  524,  *  525 

§  241.    Disqualifications  excluding  from  the  Right  to  Appointment. — 

The  persons  entitled  to  the  grant  of  administration  according  to  the 

rules  above  set  forth  may  be  disqualified  by  statutory  provision,  such 

as  infancy,  coverture  of  a  female,  non-residence,  etc.,  in  which  case 

letters  of  administration  must  be  granted  to  some  other  person.     It 

is  safe  to  assume  that  what  will  disqualify  one  from    Disquaiifica- 

acting  as  executor  will  equally  defeat  the  right  toad-    tion  to  the 

office  of  execu- 
minister;1  but  not  all  persons  competent  as  executors    tor  also  dis- 

are  likewise  competent  as  administrator.     Thus,  insol-   qualifies  as 
vency  has  been  held  to  disqualify  one  for  the  office  of 
administrator,  on  the  ground  that  the  beneficiaries  of  the     nso  veac?- 
estate  are  entitled  to  the  security  of  an  administrator's  personal  lia- 
bility, as  well  as  that  of  his  bail ; 2  illiteracy,  because 
one  who  can  neither  read  nor  write  would  be  forced  to       " eracy* 
trust   to   agents,  and  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  designing  persons, 
thereby  exposing  the  interests  of  the  estate  to  danger  of  loss  from 
mismanagement  and  corruption  ; 8  and  so  subjection  to  undue  influ- 
ence of   one  charged  with   fraudulent  designs  against   „  , .    . 

,.  ,T   .,?  ..,..  .  Subjection  to 

the   estate.*    JN  either   poverty  nor  illiteracy,  however,    undue  influ- 
is   ordinarily    deemed  to   deprive   one,    otherwise   pre-   ence* 

ferred,  of  the  right  to  administer  an  estate.5    Another  dis- 
[*  525]  qualification  in  *  administrators,  though  not  in  executors,  or 

in  a  less  degree,  is  that  of  adverse  or  inconsistent    Adverse  in- 
interest.   Where,  for  instance,  one  person  represents  two   tere8t- 
estates  between   which  litigation  ensues :    in   such   case,   he   would 
necessarily  be  both  plaintiff  and  defendant,  to  the  manifest  detriment 
of  justice,  and  the  jeopardy  of  the  interests  of  one  or  both  the  estates.8 
And  so  it  would  be   highly  improper  to  appoint   one,    CI  . 
whether  next  of  kin  or  not,  who  claims  in  his  own  right    against  the 
assets  of  the  estate,  or  which  were  in  possession  of  the   estate- 
intestate  at  the  time  of  his  death,  or  whose  interests  are  in  antago- 

1  As  to  disqualifications  of  executors,  6  In  some  of  the  States  the  statute 
see  ante,  §§  230-233.  inhibits  such   inconsistent  appointments; 

2  Cornpropst's  Appeal,  33  Pa.  St.  537.  in  others,  courts  decide  them  to  be  im- 
"  Insolvency  is  the  state  of  a  person  who,  proper  and  reprehensible  :  State  v.  Bid- 
from  any  cause,  is  unable  to  pay  his  debts  lingmaier,  26  Mo.  483  ;  State  v.  Rein- 
in  the  usual  course  of  trade ; "  a  poor  hardt,  31  Mo.  95.  A  surviving  partner 
person  is  not  necessarily  insolvent :  Le-  should  not  be  appointed  administrator  of 
van's  Appeal,  112  Pa.  St.  294,  300.  the  deceased  partner's  estate:  Heward  v. 

3  Stephenson  v.  Stephenson,  4  Jones  Slagle,  52  111.  336;  Cornell  v.  Gallaher, 
L.  472.  16  Cal.  367.     The  statutory  exclusion  of 

4  Stearns  v.  Fiske,  18  Pick.  24.  a  surviving  partner  extends,  in  California, 
6  Nusz  i>.  Grove,  27  Md.  391  ;  Gregg    to  one  who  had  formerly  been  a  partner 

v.  Wilson,  24    Ind.   227 ;    Estate   of   Pa-     of  the    deceased,  if  any  partnership    ac- 
checo,  23  Cal.  476;    Ballard  v.  Charles-    counts   remain    unsettled:     Garber's  Es- 
worth,  1  Dem.  501  ;   Bowersox's  Appeal,    tate,  74  Cal.  338. 
100  Pa.  St.  434,  437,  followed  in  Wilkey's 
Appeal,  108  Pa.  St.  567. 

553 


•525,  *526 


LETTERS   OF   ADMINISTRATION. 


§241 


nisra  to  the  estate.1  Such  considerations  are  not  permitted  to  interfere 
with  the  right  of  the  executor.2  But  in  Indiana  it  is  held  that  the 
law  does  not  forbid  the  appointment  of  the  same  person  to  administer 
two  or  more  estates,  although  there  be  conflicting  interests.8 

What  has  heretofore  been  said  concerning  the  statutory  disqualifi- 
cations of  executors,4  applies  with  equal  force  to  administrators.  In 
most  of  the  States  an  infant  can  neither  act  as,  nor 
nominate,  an  administrator;5  married  women  are  in 
Coverture.  many  of  the  States  disqualified,6  and  likewise 
Non-residence.    *  non-residents.7     Under  statutes  excluding  per-  [*  526] 


Infancy. 


1  Bieber's  Appeal,  11  Pa.  St.  157,  162  ; 
Heron's  Estate,  6  Phila.  87  ;  Pickering  v. 
Pendexter,  46  N.  H.  69  ;  Owings  v.  Bates, 
9  Gill,  463 ;  Moody  v.  Moody,  29  Ga.  519  ; 
Bridgman  v.  Bridgman,  30  W.  Va.  212, 
221;  Mills'  Estate,  22  Oreg.  210.  But 
because  the  sou  of  the  applicant  for  letters 
b.as  a  large  claim  against  the  estate  is  no 
Teason  to  disqualify  the  father ;  Root  v. 
Davis,  10  Mout.  228,  263;  see  dissenting 
opinion,  p.  276  et  seq. 

2  The  English  doctrine  of  executor- 
ship by  reason  of  being  the  executor's 
executor  assigns  the  uuadministered  ef- 
fects of  the  first  testator  to  the  same  cus- 
tody as  his  executor's  effects,  and  the 
liability  to  account  and  the  duty  to  en- 
force the  accounting  are  united  in  the 
same  person.  So,  in  some  of  the  States, 
the  right  of  the  husband's  executor  to 
letters  de  bonis  non  on  the  pre-deceased 
wife's  estate,  on  which  the  husband  had 
been  administering,  is  still  recognized  as 
superior  to  the  right  of  the  wife's  next  of 
kin :  llendren  v.  Colgin,  4  Munf.  231 ; 
Matter  of  Harvey,3  Bedf.  214,  217,  citing 
authorities ;  while  the  husband's  admin- 
istrator has  no  such  right :  Matter  of 
O'Niel,  2  Redf.  544.  See  also  Perry  v. 
DeWolf,  2  R.  I.  103,  and  In  re  Banquier, 
88  Cal.  302,  as  to  an  executor's  uniting 
different  inconsistent  interests  in  his 
person. 

3  Wright  v.  Wright,  72  Ind.  149. 
«  Ante,  §  233. 

&  And  this  is  so  whether  there  is,  or 
is  not,  any  Other  next  of  kin  capable  to 
administer :  Rea  >'.  Englesing,  56  Miss, 
•it.:; ;  and  i  in-  marriage  of  a  female  infant 
does  nut  qualify  her  to  receive  the  appoint- 
ment: Briscoe  i».  Tarkington,  5  La 
An  692.  And  n  New  Fork  case  holds 
that  letters  granted  to  a  minor  are  abso- 
I 


lutely  void,  as  not  being  within  the  court's 
jurisdiction  :  Knox  v.  Nobel,  77  Hun,  230, 
relying  on  Carow  v.  Mowatt,  2  Edw.  Ch. 
57  ;  while  in  Alabama  letters  to  a  minor 
are  only  voidable,  and  if  ratified  by  the 
administrator  on  majority  cannot  be  re- 
voked :  Davis  v.  Miller,  106  Ala.  154. 

6  It  is  held  that  married  women  may 
be  appointed  administratrices  hi  Mary- 
land :  Binnerman  v.  Weaver,  8  Md.  517  ; 
Pennsylvania  :  Gyger's  Estate,  65  Pa.  St. 
311;  South  Carolina:  Ex  parte  Nuru- 
berger,  40  S.  C.  334 ;  Texas  :  but  uot 
without  the  husband's  consent :  Nickelson 
v.  Ingram,  24  Tex.  630.  In  Massachusetts 
marriage  extinguishes  the  authority  of  a 
joint,  but  not  of  a  sole  administratrix  : 
Barber  v.  Bush,  7  Mass.  510.  In  some 
States,  the  husband  marrying  an  ad- 
ministratrix is  invested  with  her  powers 
during  their  joint  lives  :  Pistole  v. 
Street,  5  Port.  64  ;  Memphis  &  C.  R.  R.  v. 
Womack,  84  Ala.  149,  153.  So  formerly 
in  Arkansas  :  Ferguson  v.  Collins,  8  Ark. 
241. 

7  It  was  held  that  non-residence  does 
not  disqualify  in  Maryland  :  Ehlen  v. 
Ehlen,  64  Md.  360 ;  South  Carolina:  Jones 
v.  Jones,  12  Rich.  623;  New  York;  Mat- 
ter of  Williams,  44  Hun,  67  ;  Robinson  v. 
Oceanic  Co.,  112  N.  Y.  315  (holding  that 
the  non-resident  does  not  in  any  sense  be- 
come resident  so  as  to  be  able  to  maintain 
a  suit  not  otherwise  maintainahle) ;  and 
Virginia  :  Ex  parte  Barker,  2  Leigh,  719. 
In  Iowa,  while  non-residence  does  not 
disqualify,  a  non-resident  ought  not  to  be 
appointed  unless  it  be  made  to  appear 
that  the  interests  of  the  estate,  and  of 
heirs  and  creditors,  will  be  .as  well  pro- 
tected as  by  the  appointment  of  a  resi- 
dent :  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Railroad  v.  Gould, 
64  Iowa,  343.    In  West  Virginia  the  courts 


§  241  DISQUALIFICATIONS   TO    APPOINTMENT.  *  526 

sons  convicted  of  infamous  crime  from  the  right  to  be    _  .   .    , 

..      .  ™      Criminals. 

appointed,   no  degree  or  legal  or  moral   guilt  is  sum- 
cient  to    disqualify,  short  of  conviction    after   indictment    or   other 
criminal  proceeding1  within  the  State.2      Intermeddling 
with  the  goods  of  an  estate,  so  as  to  render  one  liable  as    derstancHmr 
an  executor  de  son  tort,  does  not  per  se  destroy  the  right 
to  administration.     "There  being  no  other  disability,"  says  Charl- 
ton, J.,  "  it  must  be  granted  to  him,  the  court  of  ordinary   taking 
care  to  require  security  commensurate  with  the  mischief  they  have 
reason  to  anticipate  from  his  former  conduct."  3     '•'  Want  of  under- 
standing" must  amount  to  a  lack  of  intelligence,  and  cannot  be  pre- 
sumed from  a  lack  of  information  or  misinformation  of 
the  law;4  and  "improvidence,"  as  a  ground  of   exclu- 
sion, is  such  a  want  of  care  and  forethought  as  would  be  likely  to 
render  the  estate  and  effects  liable  to  be  lost  or  diminished  in  value  ; 5 
it  refers  to  such  habits  of  the  mind  and  body  as  render  a  man  gen- 
erally   and  under   all  ordinary  circumstances  unfit   to   serve.6    An 
applicant  for  letters  of  administration  will  not  be  denied 
them  by  reason  of  his  intemperance,  unless  it  be  of  such 
gross  character  as  would  warrant  overseers  of  the  poor  to  designate 
him  as  an  habitual  drunkard,  or  a  jury  to  adjudge  him  so.7     Where 
one  otherwise  entitled  to  letters  was  non  compos  mentis  and  under 
guardianship,  letters  were  granted  to  his  guardian  in  preference  to 
others.8 

It  need  hardly  be  mentioned,  that  the  appointment  of  himself  by 
a  judge  of  probate  would  be  void,  since  the  essential  element  of 
justice  to  the  parties  interested  would  thereby  be  jeop-  interest  of  the 
arded ; 9  and  it  has  been  held  that  a  judge  of  probate   Jud£e- 

will  not  appoint  a  non-resident  distributee  ity  on  Chittenden  v.  Knight,  2  Lee,  559. 

administrator  if  any  other  distributee  com-  The  cases  holding  that  the  appointment 

petent  to  act   and  willing  to  assume  the  of  the  executor  de  son   tort   as  adminis- 

trust   is   within   the   jurisdiction   of    the  trator  validates  his  previous  acts  are  in- 

court :  Bridgman  v.  Bridgman,  30  W.  Va.  compatible   with    the    theory    that    such 

212,  221  ;  and  in  Wisconsin  the  choice  of  previous  tortious  acts  disqualify:  see  the 

a  non-resident  by  one  preferred  to  admin-  cases  mentioned  ante,  §  196. 
ister   should   be    disregarded :    Sargent's  4  Shilton's  Estate,  Tuck.  73. 

Estate,  62  Wise.  130.     In  California  non-  5  Coope  v.  Lowerre,  supra;  O'Brien's 

residence  is  a  disqualification  :  Estate  of  Estate,  supra ;  Matter  of  Cutting,  5  Dem. 

Beech,  63  Cal.  458;  and  so  in  Pennsyl-  456;  In  re  Connors,  110  Cal.  408;  Root  v. 

vania:    Frick's  Appeal,    114   Pa.  St.  29;  Davis,    10    Mont.    228,    236,    construing 

Illinois  :   Child   v.    Gratiot,  41    111.   357  ;  also  a  statute  disqualifying  for  "  want  of 

Montana:  Probate  Act,  1887,  §  55.  integrity." 

1  Coope  v.  Lowerre,  1  Barb.  Ch.  45.  6  Emerson  v.  Bowers,  14  N.  Y.  449. 

2  A  conviction  in  another  State  will  7  Elmer  v.  Kechele,  1  Redf.  472.  See 
not  disqualify :  O'Brien's  Estate,  3  Dem.  in  connection  herewith  post,  §  269,  p. 
156  ;  8.  c.  67  How.  Pr.  503.  *  573,  note. 

8  Carnochan   v.   Abrahams,    T.  U.  P.  8  Mowry  v.  Latham,  17  R.  I.  480. 

Charlton,    196,   211;    Bingham   v.   Cren-  9  Schoul.  Ex.  §  114. 

shaw,  34  Ala.  683,  686,  relying  for  author- 

555 


526  *  527 


LETTERS    OF    ADMINISTRATION. 


§242 


interested  in  an  estate  cannot  grant  administration  thereon.1 
The  *  appointment   of  a  son  of  the  judge  was  held  to  be  a  [*  527] 
manifest  violation  of  judicial  delicacy  and  pro- 
priety, but  not  void,  in  Alabama ; 2  but  in  Massachusetts 
the  appointment  of  the  brother  of  the  judge's  wife  was  held  void.8 

§  242.  Considerations  governing  the  Discretion.  —  Between  appli- 
cants of  the  same  class,  all  of  whom  are  equally  entitled,  it  is  discre- 
tionary with  the  probate  court  who  shall  be  selected,  and  no  appeal 
lies  from  the  exercise  of  such  discretion  except  in  case  of  gross 
abuse.4  But  it  is  obvious  that,  in  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  ap- 
Designation  by  pointing  administrators,  the  court  is  limited  to  the  selec- 
the  statute  is      ^on  0£  suc}1  persous  as  are  competent  under  the  statute, 

compulsory  on  r  r  7 

the  court.  in  the  order  therein  pointed  out.     Thus,  if  the  widow 

constitute  a  class  by  herself,  as  she  does  in  many  States,  she  must  be 
appointed  if  willing  to  serve,  and  not  disqualified  under  the  statutory 
regulations  of  the  subject,5  no  matter  what  objections  exist  to  her 
administration,  or  how  plausible  they  be.  There  is,  in  such  case, 
no  discretion.6 

So  where  the  statute  makes  a  distinction  of  sex  between  those  oth- 


1  Sigourney  v.  Sibley,  22  Pick.  507, 
citing  earlier  Massachusetts  cases  :  Thorn- 
ton v.  Moore,  61  Ala.  347,  354.  Under 
the  Maine  statute,  a  probate  judge  is  not 
interested  in  an  estate,  so  as  to  disqualify 
him  from  acting,  because  his  aunt  by 
marriage  is  a  legatee  :  Marston,  Petitioner, 
79  Me.  25  ;  but  where  a  probate  judge  is 
appointed  executor  he  cannot,  even  before 
probate,  appoint  a  special  administrator 
on  another  estate  to  which  his  testator 
was  largely  indebted  :  Hussey  v.  Southard, 
90  Me.  296.  In  California,  under  a  stat- 
ute which  disqualifies  a  judge  who  is  re- 
lated to  either  party  within  the  third 
degree,  it  was  held  that  by  "  party  "  was 
meant  not  only  those  who  were  parties  to 
the  record,  but  also  those  whose  interests 
were  represented  by  parties  to  the  record : 
Howell  v.  Budd,  91  Cal.  342  (holding  a 
judge  disqualified  where  one  of  the  parties 
was  represented  by  the  judge's  sons,  who 
had  an  interest  in  the  estate  contingent 
on  the  success  of  their  client). 

2  Plowman  V.  Henderson,  59  Ala.  559, 
564  ;  Koger  v.  Franklin,  79  Ala.  505.  So 
of  a  son-in-law  :  Hine  v.  Hussy,  45  Ala. 
496,  512;  Hayes  v.  Collier,  47  Ala.  726, 
728. 

*  Hall  v.  Thayer,  10.r,  Muss.  219,  and 
cases  cited  on  cognate  principles. 

'  Bowie  v.  Bowie,  7.'1   Md.  232  ;  Wallis 
556 


v.  Cooper,  123  Ind.  40;  Succession  of 
Boudreaux,  42  La.  An.  296 ;  State  v. 
Fowler,  108  Mo.  465. 

6  Radford  v.  Radford,  5  Dana,  156, 
holding  that  residence  in  another  State 
disqualifies  the  widow.  So  in  Iowa,  an 
administrator  already  appointed  will  not 
be  removed  in  order  that  a  non-resident 
widow  may  be  appointed :  O'Brien's  Es- 
tate, 63  Iowa,  622. 

6  Pendleton  v.  Pendleton,  6  Sm.  &  M. 
448 ;  Muirhead  v.  Muirhead,  6  Sm.  &  M. 
451,  holding  that,  where  a  son  had  been 
appointed  within  sixty  days  after  the  in- 
testate's death,  his  letters  were  properly 
revoked  on  the  application  of  the  widow ; 
Matter  of  Williams,  5  Dem.  292,  affirmed 
44  Hun,  67 ;  State  v.  Fowler,  108  Mo.  465. 
"  The  right  to  the  appointment  is  given 
by  law,  and  the  court  has  under  these 
circumstances  no  discretion  concerning 
it  "  :  In  re  Nickals,  21  Nev.  462  ;  to  same 
effect:  McDonald's  Estate,  118  Cal.  277. 
In  Missouri  one  having  a  prior  right  to 
administer  and  whom  the  court  illegally 
passes  by  without  notice,  has  a  right  to 
a  mandamus  in  the  first  instance,  or  to 
appeal  from  the  appointment :  State  v. 
Collier,  62  Mo.  A  pp.  38,  holding  that  the 
question  whether  the  applicant  is  the 
widow  can  be  raised  by  appeal  only. 


§  242        CONSIDERATIONS   GOVERNING   THE   DISCRETION.      *  527,  *  528 


Widow  in 
same  class  with 
next  of  kin  is 
preferred. 

Sole  is  prefer- 
able to  joint 
adminis- 
tration. 


erwise  equally  entitled,  tlie  individuals  composing  the  favored  class 
must  be  appointed,  if  they  apply,  no  matter  how  desirable  the  ap- 
pointment of  one  of  the  other  sex  might  be  to  the  majority  of  those 
interested,1  unless  the  favored  class  are  under  some  statutory  dis- 
ability.2    And  where  an  unmarried  is  preferred  to  a  married  female, 
the  court  cannot  reject  the  application  of  the  former,  although  it  is 
objected  against  her  that  she  is  a  professed  nun,  and  the 
inmate  of  a  convent.3     "Where  the  widow  and  next  of  kin 
are  placed  in  the  same  class  as  to  the  right  of  appoint- 
ment, the  widow,  as  has  already  been  stated,4  is  pre- 
ferred, other  things  being  equal ;  a  sole  being  likewise 
preferred  to  a  joint   administration.6     And  if  there  be 
no  next  of  kin  competent  to   be  appointed,  the 
[*  528]  *  widow  has  the  sole  right.6     It  is  also  held,  that,  where  the 
widow  has  the  sole  right  to  be  appointed,  the    Stranger  may 
court  may,  at  her   desire,  associate  a  stranger  in  blood    be  associated 
with  her,  although  the  next  of  kin  object  thereto ; 7  and    W1     W1  ow' 
may  associate  the  widow  with  an  administrator  already  appointed, 
against  his  protest.8 

The  rule  which  is  the  foundation  of  the  preference  accorded  by  the 
statutes  —  i.  e.  to  commit  the  administration  to  those  who  are  eventu- 
ally entitled  to  the  property  —  is  equally  binding  upon  the 
court,  in  the  exercise  of  the  discretion  vested  in  it  in  choos- 
ing between  several  individuals  placed  by  the  statute  in 
the  same  class  of  preference.  It  follows,  from  this,  that 
the  court  will  rarely  or  never  be  called  on  to  decide  on 
questions  of  the  policy  of  following  the  lineal  or  collateral 
direction  of  kinship,  as  would  be  important  at  the  civil  law,  or  com- 
puting the  propinquity  between  the  lineal  and  collateral  kindred,  as 
would  be  necessary  at  the  common  law;9  but,  having  ascertained  to 
whom  the  property  of  the  intestate  devolves  under  the  statute  gov- 
erning this  subject,10  its  discretion  is  narrowed  to  the  individual  or 
class  of  individuals  so  entitled.11  If  this  class  include  the  widow, 
together  with  children  or  other  next  of  kin,  the  widow  is,  as  we  have 
seen  before,  generally  preferred  ;  but  the  preference  must  yield  where 
she  is  unsuitable,  in  which  case  one  or  more  of  the  next  of  kin  will  be 


Rule  giving 
administration 
to  those  ulti- 
mately inter- 
ested in  the 
estate  should 
guide  discre- 
tion. 


i  Cook  v.  Carr,  19  Md.  1. 

2  Wickwire  v.  Chapman,  15  Barb.  302. 

3  Smith  v.  Young,  5  Gill,  197,  203. 
*  Ante,  §  235. 

6  Wms.  Ex.  [417];  Schoul.  Ex.  §  99; 
3  Eedf.  on  Wills,  83,  pi.  7. 

6  McGooch  v.  McGooch,  4  Mass.  348. 

7  Shropshire  v.  Withers,  5  J.  J.  Marsh. 
210.  See  also  Quintard  v.  Morgan,  4 
Dem.  168,  174,  associating  a  stranger  with 
one  preferred,  where  the  interest  of  the 
estate  require-!  it. 


8  Read  v.  Howe,  13  Iowa,  50. 

9  Schoul.  Ex.  §  103. 

10  As  to  which  see  ante,  ch.  viii. 

11  In  some  States  the  rule  is  enacted  by 
statute,  that  "  the  same  rule  shall  obtain 
in  regard  to  the  granting  letters  of  admin- 
istration on  intestate  estates,  as  regulates 
the  distribution  thereof " :  Leverett  v. 
Dismukes,  10  Ga.  98,  99;  Sweezy  v. 
Willis,  1  Bradf.  495. 


557 


528,  *  529 


LETTERS    OP    ADMINISTRATION. 


§242 


entitled.1  In  selecting  from  among  the  next  of  kin,  the  preference 
may  be  determined  by  the  ratio  in  which  the  parties  are  entitled  to 
distribution  ;  for  if  one  be  entitled  to  more  than  another,  he  \vill  have 
a  greater  interest  in  the  proper  administration  of  the  estate.2  And  in 
cases  of  conflicting  claims,  the  applicant  upon  whom  a  ma- 
jority of  the  parties  in  interest  agree  will  generally  be  *  pre-  [*  529] 
ferred,3  but  not,  of  course,  unless  the  nominee  belong  to  the 
same  class  ;  for  the  order  of  preference  enacted  by  statute  cannot 
Older  preferred  be  changed  or  ignored  to  the  postponement  of  any  per- 
son included  therein.4  Other  things  being  precisely  even, 
the  scale  may  be  inclined  by  the  preference  of  an  older 
over  a  younger  person ; 5  or  of  a  male  over  a  female  ; 6 
of  an  unmarried  over  a  married  woman;7  and  of  one 
accustomed  to  business  over  one  inexperienced.8  Cete- 
ris paribus,  the  fact  that  an  applicant  had  twice  been  a 
bankrupt  militates  against  him,  to  the  preference  of  one 
who  had  not  been  bankrupt ; 9  and  so  does  the  fact  that 
one,  in  addition  to  being  of  the  next  of  kin,  is  also  a 
creditor.10  Nor  will  one  be  appointed  who  is  in  such 
hostility  to  the  others  as  will  disqualify  him  from  fairly 
considering  their  claims.11  The  antagonism  in  interest, 
which  in  some  States  amounts  to  a  statutory  disquali- 
fication,12 is  an  important  circumstance  to  consider  in  passing  upon 


to  younger 
man;  male 
over  female ; 
unmarried 
over  married 
■woman ; 
experienced 
over  inexpe- 
rienced; 
one  who  has 
not  been  a 
bankrupt  over 
one  who  has. 

Hostility  to 
parties  in 

interest. 

Antagonism 
of  interest. 


1  See  ante,  as  to  the  widow's  disquali- 
fication, §§  237,  241.  Disqualification  to 
take  the  administration  under  a  statute 
giving  her  preference  would  seem,  a 
fortiori,  to  disqualify  her  under  a  statute 
placing  her  in  a  class  with  others. 

2  Horskius  v.  Morel,  T.  U.  P.  Charlt. 
69;  Moody  v.  Moody,  29  Ga.  519,  522; 
Quintard  v.  Morgan,  4  Dem.  168. 

8  Mandeville  v.  Mandeville,  35  Ga.243, 
247  (holding  that  in  such  case  the  ordi- 
nary has  no  discretion,  but  must  appoint 
the  nominee)  ;  McBeth  v.  Hunt,  2  Strob. 
L.  335,  341.  Mr.  Williams  says  that  this 
principle  was  recognized  as  early  as  1678, 
in  tin-  case  of  Cartwright,  1  Freera.  258; 
see  Sawbridge  v.  Hill,  L.  It.  2  P.  &  D. 
319;  also  Murdock  v.  Hunt,  68  Ga.  164, 
166.  Bee  post,  §  244,  for  a  fuller  discus- 
sion "f  tin-  effect  given  to  renunciation  or 
■  of  those  entitled  to  administer  in 
favor  "f  their  nominees. 

1  McClellan's  Appeal,  it;  Pa  St.  no, 
115.     Bee  authorities  cited  post,  §  244. 

'    Wins.  Ex.   [427],  citing   Warwick  i'. 

Greville,  I    Phillim.  L22,  125;  Coppin  v. 

558 


Dillon,  4  Hagg.  361,  376  ;  Hill's  Case,  55 
N.  J.  Eq.  764. 

6  In  re  Drowne,  1  Connolly,  163,  169; 
Hill's  Case,  supra ;  rule  that  the  grant  will 
follow  the  interest  preponderates  over  the 
preference  of  a  male  over  a  female ;  Ire- 
dale  v.  Ford,  1  Sw.  &  Tr.  305 ;  Chittenden 
v.  Knight,  2  Lee,  .559.  Resident  adult 
females  are  preferred  to  non-resident 
minor  males  of  the  same  degree :  Wick- 
wire  v.  Chapman,  15  Barb.  302. 

7  Administration  of  Curser,  89  N.  Y. 
401,  404. 

8  Williams  v.  Wilkins,  2  Phillim.  100  ; 
see  Atkinson  v.  Hasty,  21  Neb.  663,  667. 

9  Bell  v.  Timiswood,  2  Phillim.  22. 

I"  Wins.  Ex.  [427],  citing  Webb  v. 
Needham,  1  Add.  494;  Owings  v.  Bates, 
9  Gill,  463,  466. 

11  Under  a  statute  forbiddijig  the  ap- 
pointment of  an  "  incapable  "  person.  It 
was  held  that  neither  of  the  contending 
parties  should  be  intrusted  with  the  power 
of  administration,  because  their  animosity 
would  probably  lead  to  an  abuse  of  the 
trust, ;    Drew's  Appeal,  58  N.  II.  319. 

]-  See  ante,  §  241. 


§  243  RENUNCIATION  OP  THE  RIGHT  TO  ADMINISTER.      *  529,  *  530 

the  relative  claims  of  applicants  in  equal  degree  under  the  statute, 
although,  if  such  person  be  the  only  applicant,  the  court  may  have  no 

power  to  reject  him;1  or,  having  once  appointed  him,  though 
[*  530]  in  ignorance  of  his  unsuitableness  in  *  this  respect,  no  power 

to  remove  him  except  for  cause  arising  after  his  appointment. 
§  243.  Renunciation  of  the  Right  to  Administer.  —  The  preference 
given  bv  statute  mav  be  waived  or  renounced.    Unless  it 

•       .,  •    .  ,     t  .i  •     •  i  i     The  right  to 

is,  the  appointment  or  any  other  person  is  irregular,  and.    administer 
will  be  vacated  upon  demand  of  a  person  having  the    ma-y  beJe~ 

1  •      •  i  a  nounced, 

preference.2     The  renunciation  may  be  spontaneous,   or 
upon  citation  by  some  person  interested ;  *  and  it  will  be  presumed 
—  that   is,  the  exclusive   right   to   administer   will   be    orwa;ve(j 
deemed  —  to  have  been  waived,  if  letters  are    not  ap- 
plied for  by  the  party   preferred  within   the  period  prescribed  for 
such   purpose  by  statute.5    But  until  letters  have  been  granted  to 
some   one   else,  such  person    may  still  apply  and  demand  letters, 
although   the   statutory  period   may   have   expired.6     Renunciation 
should  be  in  writing  and  entered  of  record :   a  mere   parol  renun- 
ciation does  not  amount  to  a  waiver  of  the  right.7     And  where  the 
renunciation  is  coupled  with  a  condition,  which  condition  is  not  per- 
formed, the  parties  renouncing  are  not  thereby  bound,  but  may  insist 
on  their  prior  right.8     Citation  to  parties    having  a  prior  right  to 
administer  cannot  ordinarily  be  issued  before  the  expiration  of  the 
period  fixed  by  statute  within  which  they  must  make  application.9 

1  Estate  of  Brown,  11  Phila.  127;  but  v.  Hasty,  21  Neb.  663,  666;  Garrison  v. 
the  appointment  of  a  surviving  partner  Cox,  95  N.  C.  353,  356 ;  Withrow  v. 
as  administrator  of  the  deceased  partner's     DePriest,  119  N.  C.  541. 

estate,  even  against  the  direct  inhibition  6  Cotton  v.  Taylor,  4  B.  Mon.  357 ; 
of  the  statute,  cannot  be  impeached  col-  Jordan  v.  Ball,  44  Miss.  194,  201. 
laterally:  Estate  of  Altemus,  32  La.  An.  T  Muirhead  v.  Muirhead,  supra; 
364 ;  and  in  Pennsylvania  a  child  of  dece-  Arnold  v.  Sabin,  supra ;  Barber  v.  Con- 
dent  adversely  interested  and  on  unfriendly  verse,  1  lledf .  330 ;  Williams  v.  Neville, 
terms  with  the  others  (who  were  other-  108  N.  C.  559,  561. 

wise   disqualified)    will   be    rejected    and  8  All  the  next  of  kin  having  renounced 

letters  granted  to  a  stranger :  Schmidt's  in  favor  of   the  eldest  among  them,  if  he 

Estate,  183  Pa.  St.  129.  could  find  security,  the  appointment  of  his 

2  Mullanphy  v.  County  Court,  6  Mo.  nominee,  on  his  failing  to  obtain  security, 
563 ;  Muirhead  v.  Muirhead,  6  Sm.  &  M.  was  held  void  :  Riuehart  v.  Rinehart,  27 
451;  Munsey  v.  Webster,  24  N.  II.  126;  N.  J.  Eq.  475.  So  a  widow,  renouncing 
Cobb  v.  Newcomb,  19  Pick.  336;  Curtis  in  favor  of  a  particular  person,  is  not 
u.  Williams,  33  Ala.  570 ;  Curtis  v.  Burt,  bound  by  the  renunciation  if  this  person 
34  Ala.  729;  Brodie  v.  Mitchell,  85  Md.  is  not  appointed:  McClellan's  Appeal, 
516.  16  Pa.  St.  110,  116;  and  a  widow  renounc- 

3  McClellan's  Appeal,  16  Pa.  St.  110;  ing  her  right  as  administratrix,  is  never- 
Williams's  Appeal,  7  Pa.  St.  259  ;  Cobb  theless,  on  the  discovery  of  a  will,  en- 
v.  Newcomb,  supra.  titled   to  letters  cum  testamento  annexo,  if 

*  Arnold  v.  Sabin,  1  Cush.  525,  528.         the   executor  do   not  qualify:   Brodie  v. 

6  Grantham  v.  Williams,  1  Ark.  270;     Mitchell,  85  Md.  516. 
Forrester    v.    Forrester,    37    Ala.    398 ;         9  So  enacted  by  statute   in  Missouri : 
Wheat  v.  Fuller,  82  Ala.  572 ;  Atkinson    Rev.  St.  §§  7-9. 

559 


*530,  *531 


LETTERS    OP    ADMINISTRATION. 


243 


Under  an  established  rule  of  the  English  ecclesiastical  courts,  no  let- 
ters will  be  granted  to  any  person  in  derogation  of  the  right  of  those 
having  priority,  unless  such  parties  are  cited,  or  consent,  even  where 
the  party  who  has  the  right  has  no  interest  in  the  property 
to  be  administered  ; 1  but  this  rule  *  is  not  invariably  applied  [*  531] 
to  cases  where  the  selection  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  court.2 
•In  America  the  rule  is  the  same.  Before  any  one  can  be  appointed 
administrator,  who  is  not  in  the  preferred  class,  notice 
must  be  given  to  those  having  a  prior  right,  to  appear 
and  claim  their  privilege,  or  show  cause  why  the  appli- 
cant should  not  be  appointed.3  To  dispense  with  the 
citation,  those  having  the  preference  should  renounce 
their  claim,  or  signify  their  consent  to  the  grant  of  the  petitioner's 
request  by  indorsement  upon  the  petition,  or  some  other  writing  of 
but  not  bv  record.4  But  no  notice  is  necessary  to  the  other  parties 
applicants  in  in  the  same  class  with  the  applicant;  the  appointment 
the  same  c  ass.    m^  ^e  ma(je  €x  parfe  to  any  of  those  who  are  equally 

entitled.5  Accordingly,  letters  granted  to  strangers,  or  to  persons 
having  no  preference  under  the  statute,  without  notice  to  those  being 
preferred,  will,  upon  the  application  of  those  having  the  right,  be 
revoked,  in  order  that  the  grant  may  be  made  in  accordance  with  the 
statute  ; 6  but  such  grant  is  no  ground  for  revocation  if  the  party 
applying  therefor  had  notice  of  the  original  grant,  either  construc- 


Notice  must  be 
given  to  those 
preferred, 
before  letters 
are  granted 
to  another; 


1  "Wins.  Ex.  [448],  citing  Goods  of 
Barker,  1  Curt.  592,  and  Goods  of  Cnrrey, 
5  Notes  of  Cas.  54,  and  adding  in  a  note : 
"  When  the  next  of  kin  is  of  unsound 
mind,  the  practice  is  that  his  next  of  kin 
must  also  be  cited,  in  order  that  they  may 
take  administration  for  his  use  and  ben- 
efit if  thev  think  proper":  Windeatt  v. 
Sharland,  L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  217. 

2  Wins.  Ex.  [448],  citing  Goods  of 
Rogerson,  2  Curt.  656;  Goods  of  South- 
mead,  3  Curt.  28;  Goods  of  Widger,  3 
Curt.  55 ;  Goods  of  Ilardinge,  2  Curt. 
640. 

8  Ramp  v.  McDaniel,  12  Oreg.  108, 
113.  The  citation  may  be  by  personal 
service,  or  by  posters,  or  newspaper  pub- 
lication, as  prescribed  by  statute  or  the 
rule  of  court  In  South  Carolina  it  has 
been  published  by  being  re-id  in  church 
bv  an  officiating  clergyman.  Sargent  v. 
Fox.  2  McCord,  309 ;  Succession  of  Tal- 
bert,  16La  An.  230;  Torrance  v.  McDou- 
gald,  12  (i:\..  r>26;  Matter  of  Batchelor, 
r,t  lb.'.    Pi 

*  Bchoul.  Ex.  §  U2. 

560 


6  Peters  v.  Public  Administrator,  1 
Bradf.  200.  Raney,  J.,  in  delivering  the 
opinion  in  Robinson  v.  Epping,  24  Fla. 
237,  says,  on  p.  256:  "The  purpose  of 
the  citation  and  its  publication  is  to  lay 
the  foundation  for  going  outside  the 
favored  class,  .  .  .  and  not  to  fix  the 
right  as  between  persons  not  belonging 
to  the  favored  class."  But  in  New  Jer- 
sey, ten  days  notice  must  be  given  to 
those  equally  entitled  before  the  court 
can  act  :  Sayre  i».  Sayre,  48  N.  J.  Eq. 
267. 

6  Rollin  v.  Whipper,  17  S.  C.  32; 
Estate  of  Wooten,  56  Cal.  322,  326 ;  Ow- 
ings  v.  Bates,  9  Gill,  463,  467  ;  Kelly  v. 
West,  80  N.  Y.  139,  145;  Gans  v.  Daber- 
gott,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  184.  Such  letters  are, 
however,  not  void ;  hence  there  is  no 
error  in  refusing  to  grant  letters  to  one 
who  had  a  prior  right,  until  the  adminis- 
trator previously  appointed  be  removed: 
Jones  v.  Rittinger,  110  Ind.  476;  Garri- 
son v.  Cox,  95  N.  C.  353,  355.  And  see 
further  on  this  subject,  post,  §  262,  p. 
*564. 


§244 


EFFECT   OF   RENUNCIATION   OR   WAIVER.        *  531,  *  532 


tively  in  the  mode  prescribed  by  the  statute,1  or  actually  in  any 
method,2  or  failed  to  apply  within  the  time  required  by  the  statute,8 
or  actually  renounced  the  right ; 4  nor  can  there  be  such  revoca- 
tion, except  for  cause  otherwise,  where  the  court  has  made 
[*  532]  *  the  appointment  in  the  exercise  of  its  statutory  jurisdic- 
tion in  selecting  one  or  more  from  a  class  equally  entitled.5 
In  Maryland  no  notice  is  required  to  a  party  preferred  if  he  be  out  of 
the  State;6  nor  is  the  largest  creditor,  there  being  none  of  the  pre- 
ferred class,  entitled  to  notice  ; 7  and  in  New  York  the  public  admin- 
istrator need  only  notify  such  relatives  of  the  decedent  as  are  entitled 
to  a  share  of  the  estate.8 

§  244.    Effect  of  Renunciation  or  Waiver.  —  If  the  person,  or  all  of 
a  class  of  persons,  entitled  by  preference,  have  waived  or  renounced 
their  privilege,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  court  to  appoint  the  one, 
or  one  or  more  of  a  class,  having  the  next  right,  if  there 
be  such ; 9  the  discretion  to  select  between  several  equally   applicable  to 
entitled  being  governed  by  the  same  considerations  as  if   nex/ class  in 

.  preference. 

no  renunciation  or  waiver  had  occurred,10  limited,  how- 
ever, to  the  applicants  before  the  court,  because  the  court  has  no  right 
to  reject  an  applicant  on  the  mere  ground  that  there  may  be  others 
equally  entitled  who  are  better  qualified.11 

Where  the  husband,  widow,  or  next  of  kin  resides  Nominee  of 
abroad,  it  is  usual,  in  England,  to  grant  administration  andrenoeun- 
to  his  nominee ; 12  and  this  rule  is  followed  in  the  United  cin£  ma.v  be 
States   where  the   statutes   do  not  prohibit  it.18    So  a   there  be  no* 


1  Per  Waldo,  C.  J.,  in  Ramp  v.  Mc- 
Daniel,  12  Oreg.  108,  116. 

a  Davis  v.  Smith,  58  N.  H.  16. 

8  Grantham  v.  Williams,  1  Ark.  270 ; 
Spencer  v.  Wolfe,  49  Neb.  813 ;  Cotton  v. 
Taylor,  4  B.  Mon.  357 ;  Jordan  v.  Ball, 
44  Miss  194,  201  ;  Forrester  v.  Forrester, 
37  Ala.  398 ;  but  see  Gans  v.  Dabergott, 
supra. 

*  Estate  of  Keane,  56  Cal.  407,  409 ; 
Kopper  v.  Coerver,  57  Mo.  App.  71.  The 
renunciation  cannot  be  retracted  after 
letters  have  been  issued  to  another :  Pol- 
lard v.  Mohler,  55  Md.  284  ;  Glenn  v. 
Reid,  74  Md.  238 ;  In  re  Bedell,  97  Cal. 
239;  Keith  v.  Proctor,  114  Ala.  676  (case 
of  executor)  ;  even  when  such  letters  are 
subsequently  revoked  :  Lutz  v.  Mahan, 
80  Md.  283. 

6  Brubaker's  Appeal,  98  Pa.  St.  21, 
24,  citing  Shomo's  Appeal,  57  Pa.  St. 
356  ;  Hawkins  v.  Robinson,  3  T.  B.  Mon. 
143,  145. 

•  Ehlen  v.  Ehlen,  64  Md.  360,  362. 

7  McGuire  v.  Rogers,  71  Md.  587. 

vol.  i. —36 


8  And  failure  to  give  notice  can  only 
be  taken  advantage  of  by  those  entitled 
to  the  notice  :  Matter  of  Brewster,  5  Dem. 
259. 

9  Lathrop  v.  Smith,  24  N.  Y.  417,  420 ; 
Atkins  v.  McCormick,  4  Jones  L.  274. 

10  Ante,  §  242. 

11  Halley  v.  Haney,  3  T.  B.  Mon.  141, 
142 ;  Wright  v.  Wright,  Mart.  &  Y.  43. 
One  who  applies  first  must  be  appointed, 
unless  the  later  applicant  has  a  better 
right :  Succession  of  Petit,  9  La.  An.  207  ; 
Succession  of  Nicolas,  2  La.  An.  97. 
But  the  application  need  not  be  a  direct 
personal  one ;  the  appointment  may  be, 
after  citation,  to  another,  without  a  new 
citation  :  Mandeville  v.  Mandeville,  35  Ga. 
243,  246. 

12  Wms.  Ex.  [438]. 

13  Smith  v.  Munroe,  1  Ired.  L.  345,351, 
citing  Ritchie  v.  McAuslin,  1  Hayw.  220  ; 
Estate  of  Robie,  Myr.  226,  and  Estate  of 
Cotter,  Myr.  179,  affirmed  in  54  Cal.  215  ; 
In  re  Dorris,  93  Cal.  611  (all  of  these 
California  cases  preferring  the  non-resi- 

561 


532  *  533 


LETTERS   OP   ADMINISTRATION. 


§244 


other  having      stranger  may  be  appointed  at  the  request  of  one 
preference.         *  having  himself  the  preference,  if  there  be  no   [*  533] 
others  having  preference  over  the  stranger  so  appointed,  or 

if  all  there  be  of  such  acquiesce.1     But  the  right  given 
But  the  prefer-   foy  the  statute  cannot  be  delegated; 2  the  widow,  or  any 

ence  cannot  be       "i  °  ,    '.       .       * 

delegated.  of  those  entitled  by  preference,  may  renounce  their  right, 

but  when  they  do  so,  the  power  to  appoint  under  the 
regulations  of  the  statute,  and  the  duty  to  exercise  the  discretion 
thereby  conferred,  is  still  in  the  probate  court :  hence  the  person  re- 
nouncing cannot  substitute  another  person  and  demand 
his  appointment.3  But  while  the  court  is  in  no  wise 
bound  by  the  nomination  of  the  party  having  renounced, 
yet  the  wishes  and  preferences  of  those  whom  the  statute 
points  out  as  the  fittest  persons  to  administer  the  estate 
will  have  great  weight  in  guiding  the  discretion  of  the 
court.4 

Agreements  to  transfer  the  right  of  administration  from  those 
entitled  under  the  statute  to  other  parties,  for  a  consideration,  — for 
instance,  of  receiving  from  such  party  the  commissions  to   be  al- 


The  wishes  of 
the  party  pre- 
ferred will  be 
considered  by 
the  court  to 
guide  the 
exercise  of 
its  discretion. 


dent  widow's  nominee  to  the  public  ad- 
ministrator) ;  Little  v.  Berry,  94  N.  C. 
433,  437.  In  California  the  nominee  of  a 
non-resident  wife  is  preferred  to  a  brother 
of  the  decedent  :  In  re  Stevenson,  72  Cal. 
164  ;  but  not  where  she  has  remarried, 
since  in  such  case  she  loses  her  status  as 
surviving  wife:  In  re  Allen,  78  Cal.  581, 
585  ;  and  the  nominee  of  a  resident  bro- 
ther, whose  appointment  was  contested  by 
the  public  administrator,  who  was  found 
to  be  a  foreigner  by  birth,  not  able  to  be- 
come a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  was 
held,  in  the  exercise  of  discretion  vested 
in  the  court,  not  entitled  as  against  the 
public  administrator  :  Estate  of  Yee  Yun, 
Myr.  181.  One  not  entitled  to  administer, 
by  reason  of  non-residence,  has  no  author- 
ity, in  the  absence  of  statutory  provision, 
to  select  another  to  represent  him  :  Long 
v.  Hugging,  72  Ga.  776,  790;  Sutton  v. 
Public  Administrator,  4  Dem.  33;  In  re 
MniTsiug,  103  Cal.  585;  but  in  Frick's 
Appeal,  114  Pa.  St.  29,  35,  the  court 
says:  "Generally,  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
register  fco  regard  the  expressed  will  of 
the  parties  entitled  to  the  estate,  whether 
they   reside  within   or  without  the  State, 

and  if  they  are  incompetent   the  trust 

thonld  be  committed  to  their  nominee,  if 

a  fit  person."    Id  California,  by  statute, 
letters    may  be   granted   to   persons   not 
569 


otherwise  entitled,  at  the  written  request 
of  the  person  entitled ;  but  this  does  not 
entitle  a  guardian,  who  has  the  right  to 
administer  for  his  minor  ward,  the  right 
to  confer  such  authority  on  another :  In  re 
Woods,  97  Cal.  428.  In  Montana  the 
surviving  husband  or  wife  is  by  statute 
entitled  to  nominate  the  administrator  in 
his  or  her  place,  and  this  is  held  to  apply 
when  a  widow  is  disqualified  by  reason  of 
her  minority  or  non-residence :  Stewart's 
Estate,  18  Mont.  545. 

1  Patterson  v.  High,  8  Ired.  Eq.  52,  54. 

2  President,  &c.  v.  Browne.  34  Md. 
450,  455  ;  McBeth  v.  Hunt,  2  Strobh.  335, 
341  ;  Ex  parte  Young,  8  Gill,  285. 

8  Cobb  v.  Newcomb,  19  Pick.  336; 
Shomo's  Appeal,  57  Pa.  St.  356  ;  Guldin's 
Estate,  81  *  Pa.  St.  362  ;  Triplett  v.  Wells, 
Litt.  Cas.  49  ;  Matter  of  Cresse,  28  N.  J. 
Eq.  236 ;  In  re  Root,  1  Redf.  257  ;  Sar- 
gent's Estate,  62  Wis.  130,  135  ;  Tanner 
v.  IIuss,  80  Ga.  614. 

4  McBeth  v.  Hunt,  supra;  Muirhead 
v.  Muirhead,  6  Sin.  &  M.  451  ;  Ellmaker's 
Estate,  4  Watts,  34 ;  and  see  authorities 
supra,  p.  *532,  note;  McClelland 's  Appeal, 
16  Pa.  St.  110;  Halliday  v.  DuBose,  59 
Ga.  268;  Frick's  Appeal,  114  Pa.  St.  29, 
35;  Williams  v.  Neville,  108  N.  C.  559; 
Cramer  v.  Sharp,  49  N.  J.  Eq.  558. 


§  245  ADMINISTRATORS    CUM   TESTAMENTO    ANNEXO.        *  533,  *  534 

lowed  by  the  court,  —  are  against  public  policy  and  will 
not  be  sustained;1  an  agreement  between  two  parties,    p^^"^ 
both  equally  entitled,  to  take  joint  administration,  and    administrators 
where  the  principal  labor  and  responsibility  would  fall    ^'ficy.1  P"   1C 

on  one,  that  the  other  would  take  such  portions 
[*  534]  of  the  commissions  as  his  associate  would  *  think  fair  was  held 
valid ; 2  but  there  can  be  no  partnership  in  the  office  of  adminis- 
trator.3 That  one  obtaining  an  appointment  as  administrator  under  an 
agreement  not  to  charge  commissions,  or  to  charge  a  certain  amount, 
is  bound  thereby,  is  mentioned  elsewhere.4 

§  245.    Administrators  cum  Testameuto  annexe  —  The  distinction 
between  an  administrator  generally  and  an  administrator  cum  testa- 
meuto annexo  is,  as  the  name  implies,  and  as  has  already 
been  remarked,5  that  the  former  distributes  the  effects    No  letters  cum 

'  ,,..,.  .,        testamtnto  (in- 

according  to  the  law  of  descent  and  distribution,  while    nexo  will  be 
the  latter  is  bound  in  this  respect  by  the  provisions  of   E*^  0™that 
the  will.     Since  administration  with  the  will  annexed  is    there  is  no  ex- 
granted  only  in  default  of  an  executor  named  in  the  will,    orwmingto  e 
it  is  necessary,  before  such  grant  can  be  made,  that  the   act. 
court  be  fully  satisfied  that  the  executor  named,  if  any, 
or  where  several  are  named,  all  of  them,6  have  renounced  the  trust, 
or  are  unwilling  to  serve,  or  incapable.     No  formality  is  necessary  in 
making  such  proof,7  beyond  the  compliance  with  the  statutory  re- 
quirements on  this  subject ;  but  it  is  necessary  that  the  record  show 
the  renunciation,  or  waiver,  otherwise  letters  cum  testamento  annexo 
may  be  declared  void.8 

1  0  wings  v.  Owings,  1  Har.  &  G.  484  ;  6  For  one  of  several  executors  qualify- 
Brown  v.  Stewart,  4  Md.  Ch.  368  ;  Bowers  ing  has  all  the  power  vested  in  the  several 
v.  Bowers,  26  Pa.  St.  74 ;  Ellicott  v.  Cham-  executors  :  Phillips  v.  Stewart,  59  Mo. 
berlain,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  604,  609  ;  Porter  v.  491  ;  see  ante,  §  179,  p.  *395.  And  an  ex- 
Jones,  52  Mo.  399.  But  an  agreement  ecutor  has  power  to  administer  all  the 
whereby  one  joint  executor  renounced  his  property  of  the  testator,  though  a  part  of 
right  to  letters  testamentary  in  favor  of  it  has  not  been  bequeathed  by  the  will : 
his  co-executor,  in  consideration  of  being  Landers  v.  Stone,  45  Ind.  404.  See  on 
paid  one  half  commissions,  was  held  a  this  latter  point,  ante,  §  178,  and  post, 
valid  agreement :  Ohlendorf  v.  Kanne,  66  §  229. 

Md.  495.     And   a   contract   made   subse-  7  See  ante,  §  234. 

quently   to    an    administrator's    appoint-  8  yjck  v   Vicksburg,   1    How.  (Miss.) 

ment,   and   having  no   connection    there-  379,  439.     But  the  rigidity  of  the  rule  re- 

with,  based  on  a  valuable  consideration,  quiring  jurisdictional  facts  to  be  recited 

to  divide  future  commissions  is  not  illegal :  in  the  record  is  now  much  relaxed,  and  if 

Greer  v.  Nutt,  54  Mo.  App.  4.  the  circumstances  exist  which  authorize 

2  Brown  v.  Stewart,  4  Md.  Ch.  368 ;  the  appointment,  they  may  be  proved  by 
see  also  Bassett  v.  Miller,  8  Md.  548.  As  parol :  see  Peebles  v.  Watts,  9  Dana,  102  ; 
to  agreements  concerning  commissions,  Thompsons  v.  Meek,  7  Leigh,  419,  citing 
see  post,  §  530,  p.  *  1172,  and  cases  there  Geddy  v.  Butler,  3  Munf.  345,  and  Nelson 
cited.  v.  Carrington,  4   Munf.  332,  as  showing 

8  Seely  v.  Beck,  42  Mo.  143,  148.  that  renunciation  might  be  valid,  though 

4  Post,  §  530,  p.  *  1172.  not  shown  of  record  ;  so,  also,  it  has  been 

6  Ante,  §  178.  held,  on  the  ground  that  every  presump* 

563 


*  534  *  535 


LETTERS   OF    ADMINISTRATION. 


§245 


Same  consider- 
ations govern 
the  appoint- 
ment of  an 
administrator 
cum  testamento 
annexo  and  a 


In  granting  letters  cum  testamento  annexo,  the  court  is  governed  by 
the  same  principles  which  determine  the  appointment  of  general 
administrators,  chief  among  which  is,  that  in  the  absence 
of  regulation,  the  right  to  administer  follows  the  right 
to  the  personal  property.  Hence  residuary  legatees  are 
preferred,  in  the  grant  of  letters  cum  testamento  an- 
nexo, to  the  next  of  kin  1  or  widow  ; 2  and  this 
general  admin-   preference    extends  to  the   *  representatives  of  [*  535] 

residuary  legatees  who  survive  the  testator  and 
have  a  beneficial  interest,  such  representatives  being  entitled  to 
letters  cum  testamento  annexo  in  preference  to  the  next  of  kin,8  un- 
less otherwise  determined  by  statute.4  Thus,  in  Massachusetts, 
neither  the  next  of  kin  nor  any  other  person  has  a  claim  to  adminis- 
tration cle  bonis  non  cum  testamento  annexo  upon  the  death  of  a  sole 
executor.5  In  New  York,  under  a  statute  providing  that,  "if  any 
person  who  would  otherwise  be  entitled  to  letters  of  administration 
with  the  will  annexed  as  residuary  or  specific  legatee,  shall  be  a 
minor,  such  letters  shall  be  granted  to  his  guardian,  being  in  all 
other  respects  competent,  in  preference  to  creditors  or  other  persons" 
it  was  held  that,  as  against  the  guardian  of  an  infant  legatee,  but 
neither  residuary  nor  specific,  the  widow  or  other  relative  has  prefer- 
ence.6    So  where  the  legatee  named  is  incompetent  to  administer,  the 


tion  is  in  favor  of  the  validity  of  probate 
judgments,  that  where  an  administrator 
cum  testamento  annexo  was  appointed,  and 
the  record  was  silent  as  to  the  removal  of 
the  executor  who  had  regularly  qualified 
that  the  new  appointment  implied  that 
the  court  found  a  vacancy  to  exist  in  the 
office  of  executor;  and  that  the  appoint- 
ment must  be  upheld  unless  the  record 
affirmatively  shows  that  there  is  no  va- 
cancy: Printup  v.  Patton,  91  Ga.  422, 
434  ;  and  in  Missouri  it  is  held  that  the 
appointment  de  bonis  non  is  of  itself  prima 
facie  evidence  of  a  vacancy  ;  and  this  pre- 
sumption must  prevail  in  a  collateral  pro- 
ceeding until  clearly  disproved  :  Macey  v. 
Stark,  116  Mo.  481,  501  ;  Rogers  v.  John- 
son, 125  Mo.  202,  213  ;  but  on  the  death 
of  one  of  two  executors,  the  survivor  still 
acting,  the  appointment  of  an  adminis- 
trator de  bonis  non  cum  testamento  annexo 
does  not  divest  the  surviving  executor  of 
hit    powdn   or    vacate    his    appointment : 

Packet  v   Owens,  164  Pa.  St.  185.    And 

it  was  held  that  an  executor  and  an  ad- 
ministrator with  the  will  annexed  cannot 
be  appointed  at  the  same  time;  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  latter  is  simply  void  : 
'Perry's  Appeal,  07  Conn  181.  See  also 
504 


authorities  under  §  234,  ante,  and  the  sub- 
ject of  collateral  impeachability  of  the 
judgments  of  probate  courts,  ante,  §  145. 

1  Bradley  v.  Bradley,  3  Redf.  512,  cit- 
ing Ward  in  re,  1  Redf.  254 ;  Russell  v. 
Hartt,  87  N.  Y.  19;  Booraem's  Case,  55 
N.  J.  Eq.  759. 

2  Ante,  §  235.  But  if  there  be  a  par- 
tial intestacy,  the  right  to  the  adminis- 
tration remains  in  the  uext  of  kin,  since 
they  are  entitled  to  the  unbequeathed 
property :  Ellmaker's  Estate,  4  Watts, 
34,  38. 

8  Booraem's  Case,  55  N.  J.  Eq.  759  ; 
Hendren  v.  Colgin,  4  Munf.  231,  prefer- 
ring the  husband's  executor  or  adminis- 
trator to  the  next  of  kiu  of  the  wife ; 
Cutchiu  v.  Wilkinson,  1  Call,  1,6;  Clay  v. 
Jackson,  T.  U.  P.  Charlt.  71.  See  also 
Myers  v.  Cann,  95  Ga.  383,  386 ;  Wms. 
Ex.  [468]  and  authorities. 

<  Williams's  Appeal,  7  Pa.  St.  259; 
Spinning's  Will,  Tuck.  78. 

6  Russell  v.  Hoar,  3  Met.  (Mass.),  187, 
190. 

6  Cluetfc  v.  Mattice,  43  Barb.  417.  But 
whore  the  statute  applies,  the  surrogate 
has  no  discretion  :  Blanck  v.  Morrison,  4 
l)em.  297;  Matter  of  Bowne,  6  Dem.  51. 


§  245  ADMINISTRATORS   CUM   TESTAMENTO   ANNEXO.        *  53,3, 

next  person  named  is  entitled ; 1  and  the  cestui  que  trust,  not  the 
trustee,  is  the  real  party  in  interest,  and  therefore  entitled  to  letters 
cum  testamento  annexo.2  In  Pennsylvania  the  husband  of  an  heiress 
is  not  entitled  to  letters  cum  testamento  ;  8  and  a  power  of  attorney 
from  a  surviving  executor,  which  is  ten  years  old,  was  held  to  be  too 
stale  to  authorize  a  grant  of  letters  with  the  will  annexed.4  In  North 
Carolina,  the  court  of  ordinary  formerly  had  discretionary  power  to 
appoint  any  proper  person  administrator  with  the  will  annexed, 
where  there  is  no  executor  competent  or  willing  to  serve ; 5  now  in 
this  State,6  as  well  as  in  South  Carolina,  the  ordinary  is  bound  to 
observe  the  same  order  of  preference  in  such  case  as  in  the  case  of 
intestacy ; 7  and  if  he  improperly  grant  letters  to  a  stranger,  he 
will  revoke  the  appointment  at  the  request  of  one  preferred.8  Such 
also  is  the  law  in  California,9  and  in  Ehode  Island  where  the  statute 
provides  for  letters  with  the  will  annexed  "  to  such  person  as  the 
court  shall  think  fit"  it  is  held  that  the  appointment  of  one  not 
interested  in  the  will,  though  he  be  next  of  kin,  when  there  is  a 
competent  and  unobjectionable  legatee  desirous  of  the  appointment,  is 

an  erroneous  exercise  of  discretion  which  will  be  set  aside.10 
[*  536]   *  In   Maryland  it  seems  that  the  widow  is  first  entitled  to 

letters  cum  testamento,  next  the  residuary  legatee,  and  then 
the  next  of  kin;  should  these  decline  or  refuse  to  act,  and  the  credi- 
tors or  more  remote  kindred  do  not  apply,  the  court  may  use  its  dis- 
cretion.11 Where  the  widow  of  a  supposed  intestate  renounces  her 
right  to  administer,  on  a  subsequent  discovery  of  a  will  (which  the 
executor  declines  to  administer),  she  is  entitled  to  be  appointed  cum 
testamento,  and  an  appointment  of  the  residuary  legatee  without 
notice  to  her  is  erroneous.12  In  England  one  named  as  executor  can- 
not take  letters  cum  testamento,  because  courts  will  not  make  a  grant 
in  an  inferior  character  to  one  entitled  to  it  in  a  superior  character ; 18 
but  in  Missouri  it  was  intimated  that  one  named  as  executor  in  the 
will,  but  disqualified  by  reason  of  being  one  of  the  subscribing  wit- 
nesses, may  in  a  proper  case  be  appointed  as  administrator  with  the 
will  annexed.14  So  in  New  York  an  administrator  with  the  will 
annexed  may  be  appointed  to  succeed  to  the  duties  and  trust  of  a 

1  Thompson's  Estate,  33  Barb.  334.  cause  another  to  be  associated  with  him : 

8  Ibid.  hi  re  Meyers,  113  N.  C.  545. 

8  Ellmaker's  Estate,  4  Watts,  34.  7  Smith  v.  Wingo,  1  Rice,  287. 

4  Bleakley's  Estate,  5  Wliart.  361.  8  Smith  v.  "Wingo,  supra,  relying  upon 

6  Suttle  v.  Turner,  8  Jones  L.  403 ;  but  Thompson  v.  Hucket,  2  Hill  (S.  C.)  347. 

this  case  seems  overruled  in  Little  v.  Berry,  9  In  re  Li  Po  Tai,  108  Cal.  484. 

94  N.  C.  433,  and  it  was  stated  so  to  be  in  10  Emsley  v.  Young,  19  R.  I.  65. 

Williams  v.  Neville,  108  N.  C.  559,  564,  u  Dalrymple  v.   Gamble,  66  Md.  298, 

and  subsequent  cases.  308. 

8  Little  v.  Berry,  supra.     The  husband  12  Brodie  v.  Mitchell,  85  Md.  516. 

has  the  first  right ;  and  one  having  a  prior  13  Wms.  Ex.  [469],  and  English  author 

right  to  letters  may  transfer  the  right,  or  ities. 

14  Murphy  v.  Murphy,  24  Mo.  526. 
5G5 


*  536,  *  537  LETTERS   OF   ADMINISTRATION.  §§  246,  247 

deceased  executor,  including  a  trust  not  separable  from  the  functions 
of  an  executor;1  and  one  who  unites  the  character  of  testamentary 
trustee  with  that  of  executor  may  be  removed  as  trustee,  and  continue 
to  act  as  executor.2  Where  the  testatrix  named  no  executor,  it  was 
held  that  oral  expressions  of  a  preference  by  the  testatrix  were  en- 
titled to  weight  in  making  the  selection,  other  things  being  equal.3 

§  246.  Administrators  of  Estates  of  Non-Residents.  —  It  appears 
from  the  chapter  on  Domiciliary  and  Ancillary  Jurisdiction,4  that,  in 
consequence  of  the  extra-territorial  invalidity  of  letters  testamentary 
and  of  administration,  the  authority  to  sue  or  defend  as  executor  or 
administrator  must  be  conferred  by  the  law  of  the  forum  in  which 
they  appear.8  It  has  also  been  mentioned  under  what  circumstances 
jurisdiction  is  conferred  to  grant  letters  on  the  estates  of  deceased 
non-residents,6  and  under  which  wills  of  non-residents 
o^an'adminis-  obtain  validity  in  the  several  States,7  and  that  it  is  not 
trator  of  the       necessary  that  the  will  of  a  non-resident  testator  should 

c^tiitc  of  sl  non* 

resident  dece-  be  first  proved  in  the  State  of  his  domicil,8  or  that  ad- 
dent  is  jnde-      ministration  should  first   be  granted    there  before  the 

pendent  of  the  ....,„ 

gr-ant  of  domi-  appointment  of  an  administrator  in  the  State  where  ad- 
cihary  letters.  ministration  may  be  desired.  The  powers  of  one  so  ap- 
pointed are  in  no  manner  impaired  or  affected  by  the  previous  grant  of 
administration  in  the  State  of  the  domicil.9  Since  the  law  of 
the  *  domicil  at  the  time  of  an  intestate's  death  governs  the  [*  537] 
devolution  of  personal  property,  the  selection  of  an  adminis- 
trator will  be  affected,  to  some  extent,  by  such  law ;  but  in  other 
respects  there  is  no  essential  difference  in  the  rules  governing  the 
grant  of  letters  on  the  estates  of  deceased  residents  and  non-residents. 
It  has  also  been  pointed  out,  that  by  the  comity  of  States  the  person 
who  obtains  administration  in  the  State  of  the  domicil,  or  his  attorney, 
is  entitled  to  a  similar  grant  in  any  other  jurisdiction  where  the 
deceased  has  personal  property,10  unless  such  person  is  disqualified  by 
the  law  of  the  ancillary  forum. 

§  247.  Administrators  de  Bonis  Non.  —  If  a  sole  or  all  of  several 
executors  or  administrators  die,  or  resign,  or  be  removed  from 
office  before  the  estate  is  fully  administered,  it  becomes  necessary 
to  appoint  an  administrator  de  bonis  non  —  simply,  or  with  the  will 
annexed,  as  the  case  may  be  —  to  complete  the  administration.  The 
circumstances  under  which  such  letters  are  granted,  as  well  as  the 

1  Matter  of  ( 'lark,  5  Redf.  466.  7  Ante,  §  226. 

2  Quackenbosfl  v.  Southwick,  41  N.  Y.         8  lb. 

117;   Hallock  v.  Ramsey,  22  Hun,  89.  9  Henderson    v.   Clark,  4    Litt.    277; 

a  Matter  of  Powell,  5  Dern.  281.  Cosby  v.  Gilchrist,  7  Dana,  206;    Pond  v. 

4  Ante  §§  157-169.  Makepeace,  2  Met.  (Mass.)  114.     And  see 

6  Taylor  v.  Barron,  .15  N.  II.  484,  and  ante,  §  158  ;  Burnley  v.  Duke,  1  Rand.  108, 

numerous    authorities  cited    ou   p.  495;  112. 

Naylor  v,  Moffatt,  -"J  Mo-  126.  10  Ante,  §  158. 

8  Ante,  §  205. 
566 


§  248  ADMINISTRATORS   DE    BONIS,   AND   SPECIAL.        *  537,  *  538 

powers  and  duties  of  the  officers  so  appointed,  have  been  fully  con- 
sidered in  connection  with  the  subject  of  administrators   N  . 
generally  ; x  it  is  sufficient,  therefore,  to  recapitulate,  in  tor  de  bonis 
this  connection,  that  there  must  be  an  estate  remaining  "^"^unad- 
unadministered,3  and  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of  executor  ministered 
or  administrator,8  otherwise  there  can  be  no  grant  of  let-  vacancy  inthe 
ters   de  bonis  non.     The   considerations  governing   the  office  of  admin- 
preference  in  ordinary  cases  govern  also  in  respect  of 
administrators  de  bonis  non,  whether  of  testate  or  intestate  estates,4 

except  as  otherwise  indicated  by  statutory  rules.  In  New 
[*  538]  York,  for  instance,  the  statute  is  held  to  provide  *  that,  upon 

the  death  of  a  sole  executor  after  having  qualified,  the  widow 
or  next  of  kin  is  entitled  to  letters  de  bonis  non  ;  but  if  he  died 
before  qualifying,  then  the  residuary  legatee  is  entitled  as  against  the 
widow  and  next  of  kin.6  In  Maryland,  the  female  cousin-german  on 
the  father's  side  is  preferred  to  the  male  cousin-german  on  the 
mother's  side,  for  general  letters  as  well  as  for  letters  de  bonis  non.6 
In  Massachusetts,  upon  the  death  of  a  sole  executor  or  administrator, 
neither  widow  nor  next  of  kin  has  a  right  to  the  administration  de 
bonis  non,  but  the  judge  of  probate  appoints  in  his  discretion  ; 7  but 
the  reverse  is  held  in  Maryland,  where  the  Orphan's  Court  is  gov- 
erned by  the  same  rules  of  preference  which  govern  in  the  original 
grant  of  administration.8  In  Mississippi,  upon  the  resignation  of  an 
executor  or  administrator,  the  court  may  appoint  his  successor  at 
once,  without  citation  to  the  parties  in  interest.9  In  California,  it  is 
held  that  one  who  was  rejected  as  not  being  entitled  to  administra- 
tion originally  may  nevertheless  be  granted  administration  de  bonis 
non,  after  the  removal  of  the  original  administrator.10 

§  248.  Administrators  with  Limited  Powers.  —  It  will  appear 
from   a   previous   passage,11   that    limited   administrations   may    be 

1  Ante,  §  179.  s  Ante,  §  179,  p.  *395.     The  grant  of 

2  It  is  not  sufficient  that  there  was  no  letters  de  bonis  non  upon  the  death  of  an 
regular  final  settlement  and  discharge  of  executor,  pending  an  appeal  from  the  pro- 
the  executor  or  administrator.  Where  the  bate  of  the  will,  is  erroneous,  but  not  as- 
property  of  an  estate  was  turned  over  to  sailable  in  a  collateral  proceeding ;  but 
a  legatee,  the  executor  removed,  and  six-  such  appointment  before  the  death  of  the 
teen  years  elapsed,  an  application  for  ad-  executor  would  be  void :  Finn  v.  Hemp- 
ministration  de  bonis  non  by  one  showing  stead,  24  Ark.  Ill,  116. 

no  interest  in  the  estate,  and  resisted  by  *  Schoul.  Ex.  §  129. 

the  legatee,  will  be  refused  :  San  Roman  5  Bradley  v.  Bradley,  3  Redf.  512.    But 

r.  Watson,  54  Tex.  254,  259.     But   if   a  if  no  one  having  superior  right  apply,  the 

final  settlement  be  set  aside  in  chancery,  next  of  kin  may  in  such  case  be  appointed  : 

for  the  allowance  of  a  fraudulent  item  of  Cobb  v.  Beardsley,  37  Barb.  192. 
credit,  the  administration   must  be  com-  6  Kearney  v.  Turner,  28  Md.  408,  423. 

pleted  by  the  appointment  of  an  adminis-  7  Russell  v.  Hoar,  3  Met.  (Mass.)  187. 

trator  de  bonis  non  inthe  probate  court :  8  Thomas  v.  Knighton,  23  Md.  318,  325. 

Byerly  v.  Donlin,  72  Mo.  270.     To  same  9  Sivley  v.  Summers,  57  Miss.  712,  731. 

effect,  Neal  v.  Charlton,  52  Md.  495,  citing         10  Estate  of  Pico,  56  Cal.  413,  420. 
numerous  Maryland  cases.  •  n  Ante,  §  184. 

567 


*  538,  *  539  LETTERS   OF    ADMINISTRATION.  §  248 

granted  under  certain  circumstances,  although  discouraged  by  courts 
and  text-writers  in  America/  because  here  the  tendency  is  to  commit 
administration  at  once  to  those  who  may  be  under  no  present  dis- 
ability, with  full  authority  to  complete  the  settlement  of  the  estate 
without  disturbing  the  course  of  administration  by  placing  it  in  the 
hands  of  persons  claiming  a  superior  right.  But  the  authority  to 
appoint  administrators  ad  colligendum,  ad  litem,  durante  absentia, 
durante  minors  mtate,  or  for  some  special  purpose,  is 
ordinary  cases  sometimes  resorted  to.2  The  rules  governing  the  court  in 
that  the  ap-  selecting  proper  persons  for  appointment  in  such  cases 
shoulTgoto  are  necessarily  different  from  those  controlling  the  ap- 
the  ultimate  pointment  of  general  administrators,  because  the  funda- 
not  applicable  mental  principle  of  having  the  administration  fol- 
to  special  ad-      ]ow  t^e  rig}lt  0f  pr0perty  is  *  inapplicable.     The  \*  5391 

ministrators.  °        ,  ,      -,.  , 

discretion  of  the  court  seems  to  be  limited  only 
by  the  bounds  of  propriety,  and  extends  to  any  discreet,  qualified 
person.  It  is  held  in  New  York  that  the  surrogate  may  limit  the 
authority  of  an  administrator  appointed  to  do  certain  acts  and  no 
others,  although  the  statute  did  not  expressly  authorize  such  limita- 
tion.8 It  is  evident,  however,  that  a  general  administrator  regularly 
appointed  succeeds  to  all  the  rights  and  powers  of  a  special  adminis- 
trator, as  much  so  as  an  administrator  de  bonis  non  succeeds  to  the 
unadministered  effects  of  the  intestate.4  In  Missouri,  where  the 
statute  authorizes  the  probate  court  to  appoint  an  administrator  to 
take  charge  of  the  estate  during  a  contest  of  the  will,5  it  is  held 
that  this  authority  implies  the  power  to  suspend,  during  such  con- 
test, the  authority  of  an  administrator  cum  testamento  annexo,  as  well 
as  that  of  an  executor ;  that  authority  to  grant  letters  "  to  some  other 
person"  means  the  appointment  of  a  person  other  than  the  one 
charged  with  the  execution  of  the  will,  whether  named  in  the  will  or 
not;  and  that  the  statute  preferring  the  widow  in  the  grant  of  admin- 
istration generally  has  no  application  in  such  case.6 

1  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  113,  pi.  5.  Eure  v.  Eure,  3  Dev.  206,  and  Cutlar  v. 

2  Ante,  §§  182-184.  Quince,  2  Hayw.  60. 

8  Martin  v.  Dry  Dock,  92  N.  Y.  70,  74.  6  Rogers  v.  Dively,  51  Mo.  193. 

4  Cowles  v.  Hayes,  71  N.  C.  230,  citing         6  Lamb  v.  Helm,  56  Mo.  420. 


r.r.a 


§  249   ORIGIN  OF  LAW  REQUIRING  ADMINISTRATION  BONDS.    *  540,  *  541 


[*540]  *  CHAPTER   XXVII. 

OP   THE   ADMINISTRATION  BOND. 

§  249.    Origin   of  the  Law   requiring   Administration  Bonds.  —  The 

English  statute,1  requiring  bond  to  be  given  to  the  ordinary  upon 
committing  administration  of  the  goods  of  any  person    _    ,.  , 

.    .         .        °  .     .  -,   •  ,  «  English  statute 

dying  intestate,  is  incorporated  into  the  statutes  or  every   of  22  &  23 
State  in  the  Union.     So  great  has  at  all  times  been  the    ^tniari' SUb" 
anxiety  of  legislators  and  judicial  tribunals  in  this  coun-    adopted  *in 
try  to  protect  the  just  demands  of  creditors  on  the  one    a    states, 
hand,   and  to   vindicate  the   lawful  inheritance   and  dower   to  the 
widow  and  next  of  kin,  on  the  other,  and  so  appropriate  and  efficient 
in  accomplishing  this   desired  end  is  the  administration  bond  con- 
sidered to  be,  that  not  a  single  State  has  ever  ventured  upon  the 
experiment  of  substantially  changing  the  law  in  this  respect.     The 
form  of  such  a  bond,  enacted  "  anno  vices imo  secundo  et  tertio  Caroli 
II.,  "corresponds  substantially  to  the  form  required  by  our  modern 
statutes,  even  to  the  "  two  or  more  able  sureties  "  demanded.     The 
only  noticeable  change  made  in  England,  as  embodied  in  the  Probate 
Court  Act,2  is  the  provision   fixing  the  minimum  of  the   penalty, 
in  recognition  of  the   American  precedent  on  the  subject,  at  double 
the  value  of  the  estate.     The  law  in  the  several  States    Penalty  of  the 
is  uniform   on  this    point,  requiring  the  administrator,    bond  double 

i     .li  .,,     ,,  .,,  itt.  the  amount  of 

whether  with  the  will  annexed,  de  boms  non,  temporary,    the  property 
or  permanent,  to  give  bond  with  two  or  more  sufficient    exceDt'fna3*1' 
sureties,  in  a  sum  at  least  double  the  value  of  such  per-    few  states. 
sonal  property  as  may  come  into  his  possession  belonging  to  the  es- 
tate of  the  decedent;  with  the  exception  of  Louisiana,  where  the 
minimum  is  fixed  at  "  one-fourth  beyond  the  estimated  value  of  the 

movables  and  immovables,  and  of  the  credits  comprised  in  the 
[*541]  inventory  *  exclusive  of  bad  debts,"3  Mississippi,  where  it 

must  equal  the  value  of  the  personal  estate  at  least,4  and 
Florida,  where  the  amount  of  the  penalty  is  in  the  discretion  of  the 
judge.6  In  Pennsylvania,  an  administration  where  no  bond  is  given 
is  by  statute  declared  void,6  and  there,  as  well  as  in  South  Carolina, 

1  21    Henry  VIII.  c.  5,  §  3;  22  &  23  *  Ann.  Code,  1893,  §  1852. 
Car.  II.  c.  10,  §  1.  6  Rev,  gt  1892)  §  1863# 

2  20  &  21  Vict.  c.  77.  e  Act  of  March  15,  1832,  §  27. 
8  Civ.  Code,  1888,  art.  1127. 

569 


*  541,  *  542 


THE    ADMINISTRATION    BOND. 


§   250 


Probate  judge 
liable  for  omit 


No  bond  re- 
quired of  ex- 
ecutors in 
England : 

same  in  several 
States. 


the  register  or  ordinary  neglecting  to  take  the  admin- 
istration bond  is  liable  for  all  damages ;  and  although 
administration  the  damages  do  not  appear  to  result  from  the  neglect, 
bond-  yet  the  law  will  presume  so.1    But  usually  the  letters  are 

not  void,  but  voidable  for  failure  to  give  the  bond.2 

§  250.  Bonds  of  Executors.  —  But  under  the  English  law  execu- 
tors derive  their  authority  from  the  will,  and  not  from  the  grant  of 
the  ordinary,  or  probate  court;  hence  in  England  execu- 
tors are  not  required  to  give  bond.3  The  same  rule, 
perhaps  for  the  same  reason,  prevails  in  Florida,4 
Georgia,6  Louisiana,6  New  York,7  North  Carolina,8 
Pennsylvania,9  and  South  Carolina,10  in  which  States 
executors  are  permitted  to  administer  on  the  estates  of 
their  testators  without  giving  an  administration  bond.  In  other 
States,  no  distinction  is  made  in  the  matter  of  requiring  bonds  be- 
tween administrators  and  executors,  unless  the  testator  expressly 
direct,  by  provision  in  the  will,  that  the  executors  by  him  appointed 
shall  not  be  required  to  give  bond,  in  which  case  the  desire  of  the 
testator  is  complied  with,  unless  the  court,  upon  complaint  of  some 
creditor,  legatee,  or  other  person  interested,  or  even  upon  its  own 
knowledge,  suspect  that  the  estate  would  be  fraudulently  adminis- 
tered or  wasted,  when  it  is  made  the  duty  of  the  court  to  cite  the 
executor  to  show  cause  why  bond  should  not  be  given,  and  in  its 
States  in  which  discretion  compel  it,  or  refuse  letters.  Such  is  the  law 
testator  may  in  Alabama,11  California,12  Colorado,18  Connecticut,14 
ecu^orshaifnot  Illinois,15  Kansas,16  Kentucky,17  Maine,18  Mississippi,19 
be  required  to     Missouri  (since  November  1,  1879),20  Nevada,21 

Ohio,22  *  Oregon,23  Bhode  Island,24  Tennessee,25  [*542] 
Texas,26  Vermont,27  Virginia,28  West  Virginia,29  and  Wiscon- 


1  Boggs  v.  Hamilton,  2  Mill  (S.  C), 
381. 

2  See  post,  §  253. 

3  Lomax,  Ex.  &  Adm.  171  (a.  p.) ;  4 
Burns,  Eccl.  L.  176. 

4  Rev.  St.  1892,  §  1862. 
«  Code,  1895,  §3315. 

8  Unless  there  be  debts  due  by  the  es- 
tate or  property  claimed  by  other  parties, 
in  which  case  the  party  claimant  may  com- 
pel the  testament ary  executor  to  give 
security  for  an  amount  exceeding  by  ono- 
fourt.li  the  amount  claimed  by  him  :  Voorh. 
Rev.  Code,  1888,  art.  1677,  pi.  2. 

~  Code,  Civ.  Pr.  §  20.'?8  ;  Demarest's 
i  i  (iv.  Pr.  Me]'.  802. 

i  Rev.  Code,  i  hh;j,  §  1515. 

•  Pep.  &  L.  Dig.  IK'.m;,  p.  1463,  §§  71, 
81. 

w  Ber.  St.  1898,  §§  2013  ei  ieq. 
570 


11  Code,  1896,  §  66. 

"  Code,  Civ.  Pr.  §§  1388,  1396. 

18  Ann.  St.  1891,  §  4690. 

14  Gen.  St.  1888,  §  548. 

«  St.  &  C.  Ann.  St.  1896,  p.  271, 1  7. 

16  Gen.  St.  1897,  p.  517,  §§  3,  4. 

"  St.  1894,  §  3837. 

18  Rev.  St.  1883,  ch.  64,  §  9. 

W  Ann.  Code,  1893,  §  1836. 

20  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  12. 

21  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  2746. 

22  Bates'  Ann.  St.  1897,  §§  5996,  5997. 
28  Code,  1887,  §  1088. 

24  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  749,  §§  1,  5. 
-■'  Code,  1884,  §§  3063,  3066. 
20  Rev.  St.  1895,  art.  1946. 

27  Felton  v.  Sowles,  57  Vt.  382. 

28  Code,  1887,  §  2642. 

29  Code,  1891,  ch.  85,  §  7. 


§251 


POWER  OP  COURT  TO  ORDER  BOND. 


542,  *  543 


Such  exemp- 
tion applies 
only  to  execu- 
tors nominated 
bv  the  testator. 


sin.1  It  is  obvious  that  the  exemption  in  these  States  is  based  upon 
the  testator's  right  to  dispose  of  his  property  in  the 
manner  deemed  best  by  him,  saving  the  rights  of  credi- 
tors and  of  those  having  legal  claims  upon  him;  which 
includes  the  power  to  exempt  from  the  necessity  of  giv- 
ing bond,  as  a  method  of  gift  to  the  executor.  From 
this  it  follows,  that  the  exemption  in  such  cases  is  personal  to  the 
executor  named  in  the  will,  becoming  inoperative  on  the  failure  or 
xefusal  of  such  person  to  accept  the  trust,  and  has  no  application  to 
other  executors  or  administrators.2     But  in  other  States 

, ,  .  •  i         n    i     r  States  in  which 

the  requirement  to  give   bond  berore  an  executor  can    executors  are 
lawfully  take  charge  of  an  estate  is  as  imperative  and   required  to 

i-i  •  -i        •      •     *  •         »     1  a     g've  D°ud. 

absolute  as  it  is  upon  administrators;  so  in  Arkansas," 
Delaware,4  Iowa,6  Indiana,6  and  Maryland.7  In  several  of  the 
States  where  resident  executors  are  not  required  to  give  bond,  a  dis- 
crimination is  made  against  non-resident  executors,  requiring  them 
to  give  bond  and  account,  in  default  of  which  administrators  with 
the  will  annexed  are  appointed,  either  originally,  or,  after  removal 

of  the  executor,  de  bonis  non.8 
[*  543]        *  §  251.      Power   of    Court  to  order    Bond.  —  In    those  of 

the  States  in  which  an  executor  is  permitted  to  administer 
without  giving  bond,  whether  the  exemption  arise  under   Court  m 
the  statute  or  by  express  direction  of  the  testator,  his    order  bond  to 


1  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  3795. 

2  Langley  v.  Harris,  23  Tex.  564,  570. 
See  also  Fairfax  v.  Fairfax,  7  Gratt.  36,  in 
which  it  is  held  that  the  expression  of  confi- 
dence in  connection  with  the  appointment  of 
executors  in  the  body  of  the  will,  exempt- 
ing them  from  the  requirement  to  give 
bond,  and  the  appointment  of  a  further 
executor  in  a  codicil,  did  not  constitute  an 
exemption  to  the  last-named  executor. 
The  same  principle  is  involved  in  Ex  parte 
Brown,  2  Bradf.  22 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Forney,  3  W.  &  S.  353,  357. 

8  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §  43.  But  in  this 
State  it  was  nevertheless  held  that,  al- 
though the  clerk  could  not  issue  letters 
without  taking  bond,  yet  there  might  be 
«ases  where  the  court  might  dispense  with 
it ;  in  the  case,  for  instance,  of  a  sole  heir 
or  legatee  being  appointed  executor  when 
there  are  no  debts,  because  waste  or  mis- 
management of  the  estate  would  be  guarded 
against  by  motives  of  self-interest,  and  in 
any  event  could  injure  no  one  but  himself : 
Bankhead  v.  Hubbard,  14  Ark.  298,  300. 
It  will  be  observed  that  this  reasoning  ap- 
plies as  fully  to  intestate  estates,  where 


there  is   but  one   heir,   as  to    residuary 
legatees. 

*  Rev.  Code,  Amended,  1874,  ch.  89, 
§  H. 

5  McClain's,  Ann.  Code,  §  3563. 

6  Ann.  St.  1894,  §  2397. 

7  In  this  State,  if  the  testator  so  ex» 
press,  the  court  may  require  bond  only  to 
protect  creditors:  Publ.  Gen.  L.  1888, 
art.  93,  §  41. 

8  So  in  Louisiana:  Rev.  St.  1876, 
§  1461  ;  Succession  of  Davis,  12  La.  An. 
399 ;  Succession  of  McDonough,  7  La. 
An.  472  ;  Yerkes  v.  Broom,  10  La.  An. 
94 ;  Succession  of  Bodenheimer,  35  La. 
An.  1034.  In  New  Jersey  applicants  for 
probate  of  a  will  who  reside  out  of  the 
State  are  required  to  give  bond  for  faith- 
ful administration:  Gen.  St.  1896,  §  195, 
p.  2401.  In  New  York:  Code  Civ.  Pr. 
§  2638.  In  North  Carolina:  Rev.  Code, 
1883,  §  1515.  In  Pennsylvania:  Pep.  & 
L.  Digest,  1896,  p.  1469,  §  81.  In  Texas, 
a  resident,  but  not  a  non-resident,  execu- 
tor may  be  exempted  by  the  testator  from 
giving  bond:  Sayles'  Civ.  St.  1897,  art. 
1922,  1923. 

571 


*  543,  *  544  THE   ADMINISTRATION    BOND.  §  252 

be  given,  office  is  one  of  special  trust  and  confidence,  for  which 

testator  direct  reason  no  bond  is  required  of  him.  But  if  a  court  be- 
otherwise,  come  satisfied  that  the  executor,  who  was  solvent  when 
named  in  the  will,  is  likely  to  become  insolvent,  and  that  there  is 
danger  that  he  may  abuse  his  trust,  or  has  ground  to  suspect  that  he 
will  indirectly  and  fraudulently  administer  the  estate  to  the  preju- 
dice of  creditors  or  legatees,  he  will  be  ordered  to  give  bond  with 
sufficient  surety  to  protect  the  estate.1  In  such  case  any  person  who  / 
has  an  interest  in  the  estate  may  interpose  to  move  for  an  order 
requiring  security,2  and  when  the  interest  is  averred  positively  and 
under  oath  it  cannot  be  questioned  on  the  trial  of  an  application  for 
security.3  And  a  bond  given  by  an  executor  without  sureties, 
although  approved  by  the  judge  of  probate,  is  not  such  a  bond  as 
the  law  contemplates.4 

§  252.    Circumstances  rendering  Bond  necessary.  —  It  is  not  pos- 
sible to  define  with  accuracy  the  precise  circumstances  which  should 
induce  the  probate  court  to  demand  sureties  from  an 
sufficient  by       executor  who  is  otherwise  exempt  under  the  law  or  the 
courts  to  direction  of  the  testator.     Of  these  the  probate  judge 

authorize  •■,■•■,  •  i    •  ,-T 

requirement  must  necessarily  be  the  primary,  and  m  most  cases  tne 
of  bond.  goje  arbiter,  since  an  appellate  court  will  not  interfere 

with  the  exercise  of  his  discretion  unless  his  decision  be  plainly  in 
conflict  with  the  letter  or  spirit  of  the  law.6  The  several  statu- 
tory provisions  on  the  subject  have  been  elucidated  in  a  slight 
degree  only  by  judicial  interpretations,  which  are  usually  para- 
phrases of   the  statute,  and  announcements  that  each  case 

*  presented  must  depend  upon  its  own  peculiar  features  and  [*  544] 
circumstances,  of  which  the  probate  court  is  the  appropriate 
judge.  The  single  object  to  be  achieved  is  the  safety  of  the  estate 
in  the  executor's  hands,  and  its  faithful  administration  according  to 
the  intention  of  the  testator  so  far  as  the  same  is  sanctioned  by  law. 
If  the  probate  judge  is  satisfied  that  this  will  be  accomplished  with- 
out bond,  then  no  bond  is  required.  But  if  he  have  reasou  to  sus- 
pect the  integrity,  the  mental  capacity,  or  even  the  financial  ability 
of  the  executor,  he  should  protect  the  estate  and  the  interests  of 

1  Bellinger  v.  Thompson,  26  Oreg.  320,  alleged    later  will  than  that  admitted  to 

334 ;   per  Rogers,  J.,  in    Commonwealth  probate :    Cunningham  v.  Souza,  1  Kedf. 

v.  Forney,  8  W.  &  S.  353,  355;   Clark  v.  4C.2  ;  and  a  fortiori,  a  legatee :    Sullivan's 

Niles,  42   Miss.  460;   Atwell  v.  Helm,  7  Will,  Tuck.  94;   Felton  v.  Sowles,  5T  Vt. 

Bosh,  504;  Wood  v.  Wood,  4  Pai.  299;  382,383. 

Holmes  -  Cock,  2  Barb.  Ch.  426;  Mande-         8  Merchant's  Will,  Tuck.  17  ;  Smith  v. 

nlle  v.  Mandeville,  8  Pai.475;   Colgrove  Philips,  supra;  Cotterell  v.  Brock,  1  Bradf. 

v.  Horton,  11   Pai.  261 ;    Freeman   v.  Kel-  hh. 

logg,    i    Redf.    218,   22»;    Holderbaum's         *  Abercrombie  v.  Sheldon, 8  Allen, 532. 
Estate,  82  Iowa,  69.  G   Hempstead,  J.,  in    Bankhead  v.  Hub- 

-  For   Instance,  a   creditor:  Smith   v.  bard,  14  Ark.  298, 800  ;  Grigsby  r.  Cocke, 

Phillips,  54  Ala  8 ;  the  proponent  of  a  will  85  Ky.  314;  and  in  Vermont    is  nol   ap- 

wli<>  is  execntrta  and  legatee  under  an  pealable:  Felton  v.  Sowles.  57  Vt.  382. 
572 


S  252  CIRCUMSTANCES  RENDERING  BOND  NECESSARY.      *  544,  *  545 


those  concerned  in  it  by  an  order  requiring  bond  with    M 
sufficient  sureties.      The  mere  poverty  of  an  executor,    of  executor  not 
which  existed  at  the  time  of  the  testator's  death,  with-   su  c,ent' 
out  maladministration  or  loss  or  danger  of  loss  from  misconduct  or 
negligence,  does  not  authorize  the  requirement  of  a  bond;1  nor  the 
fact  that  an  executor  is  not  possessed  of  property  of  his  own  equal 
in  value  to  that  of   the  estate   he  is  to  administer,  if  there  is  no 
ground  to  fear  that  the  trust  funds  in  his  hands  are  in  danger  from 
improvidence  and  want  of  pecuniary  responsibility.2     An  applica- 
tion to  compel  security  from  an  executor  upon  the  ground  of  his 
pecuniary  irresponsibility  should  not  be  entertained,  unless  it  states 
particulars  from  which  it  will  prima  facie  appear  that  the  estate  of 
the  testator  will  not  be  safe  in  the  executor's  hands.8    Insolvency 
is  not  per  se  a  sufficient  ground  to  require  bond  from    jnsoivencv  j 
executors,  when  it  has  not  arisen  since  the  appointment   not  perse" 
by  the  testator.4     In  the  New  York  statute,   the  word    sufficient- 
"precarious"  is  used;  "if  the  circumstances  of  the  executor  are  so 
precarious  as  not  to  afford  adequate  security  for  the  administration 
of  the  estate,"  etc.     This  word  is  held  not  to  be  applicable  to  the 
wealth  or  poverty  of  the  executor,  although  it  might  be  to  his  bank- 
ruptcy.5    On  the  other  hand,  it  is  held  that  the  solvency  of 
[*  545]  the  *  executor  is  no  reason  why  bond  should  not   Nor  is  the 

be  exacted  if  he  is  guilty  of  mismanagement.6 
But  where  other  circumstances  concur,  and  insolvency 
arises  after  the  appointment  by  the  testator,  it  may  be- 
come decisive  on  the  question  of  ordering  security  to 
be  given.7     In  Oregon  it  has  been  decided  that  execu- 


solvency  of 
the  executor 
a  sufficient 
reason  why 
bond  shall  not 
be  required,  if 
guilty  of  mis- 
management. 


1  Where,  under  such  circumstances,  a 
court  of  equity  required  bond  from  an 
executor,  the  Supreme  Court  of  North 
Carolina  annulled  the  order,  and  directed 
the  bond  to  be  surrendered :  Fairbairn  v. 
Fisher,  4  Jones  Eq.  390. 

2  The  surrogate's  decree,  requiring  bond 
under  these  circumstances,  was  reversed 
by  Chancellor  Walworth :  Mandeville  v. 
Mandeville,  8  Pai.  475. 

8  Colgrove  v.  Horton,  11  Pai.  261, 
reversing  order  of  surrogate  requiring 
bond. 

*  Willson  v.  Whitfield,  38  Ga.  269; 
Bowman  v.  Wootton,  8  B.  Mon.  67. 

5  "  The  experience  of  the  world,"  says 
Potter,  J.,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  New  York  in  Shields 
v.  Shields,  60  Barb.  56,  60,  "  if  appealed  to, 
would  demonstrate  the  truth  that  it  is  not 
those  who  have  most  means  in  possession 
that  are  found  to  be  the  safest  and  best 


trustees."     To  the  same  effect,  Cotterell  v. 
Brock,  1  Bradf.  148. 

6  McKennan's  Appeal,  27  Pa.  St.  237 ; 
Shields  v.  Shields,  supra. 

7  Thus,  where  two  of  the  three  execu- 
tors appointed  by  the  testator  had  died, 
and  the  third  had  become  insolvent,  the 
Order  of  the  surrogate  requiring  security 
in  double  the  value  of  the  personal  prop- 
erty, including  the  possible  proceeds  of 
real  estate  which  the  executor  had  power 
to  sell,  was  affirmed :  Holmes  v.  Cock,  2 
Barb.  Ch.  426.  And  where  an  executrix 
married  a  man  who  was  insolvent,  and  who 
had  conveyed  by  deed  to  his  own  children 
all  the  property  he  had,  and  had  mortgaged 
a  negro  belonging  to  the  estate  his  wife 
was  administering,  for  a  private  debt  of 
his  own,  the  decree  of  the  chancellor  dis- 
missing the  bill  to  compel  security  was 
reversed  unanimously,  and  security  ordered 
to  be  given  ■  Powel  v.  Thompson,  4  Desaus. 

573 


*  545,  *  546 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    BOND. 


§253 


Authority  of 
the  administra- 
tor not  com- 
plete until 
bond  is  given. 


tors  in  whom  a  legal  estate  is  vested  merely  for  the  purpose  of 
sale  and  conveyance  are  not  required  to  qualify  fully,  or  to  report 
their  proceedings  to  the  probate  court.1 

§  253.  Invalidity  of  Administration  'without  Bond. — Neither  the 
office  of  administrator,  nor  in  cases  where  the  executor  is  required 
to  give  bond,  that  of  executor,  can  be  regarded  as  filled 
until  the  administration  bond  is  actually  given ; 2  and 
they  cannot  act  as  such  until  they  have  qualified  them- 
selves by  taking  the  oath  of  office  and  giving  the  neces- 
sary bond.8  If  the  bond  is  not  given  when  required  by 
the  probate  court,  although  the  will  direct  that  no  bond  shall  be 
taken,  the  court  may  revoke  the  letters  testamentary.4  And 
one  who,  having  been  appointed  administrator,  fails  *to  give  [*546] 
the  bond,  cannot  afterward  intervene  in  a  contest  between 
creditors  for  administration.5  In  Pennsylvania  this  rule  has  been 
so  rigorously  construed,  that  one  who  acted  under  letters  of  adminis- 
tration otherwise  properly  granted,  but  who  had  given  bond  with 
one  surety  where  the  law  required  two,  was  held  to  act  as  adminis- 
trator of  his  own  wrong,  the  bond  being  held  void,  and  the  letters 
likewise.6  And  so  where  an  administrator  de  bonis  non  gave  bond 
containing  the  conditions  of  an  administrator's  bond  in  chief,  it 
was  held  void.7  In  Massachusetts  it  is  intimated  that  administra- 
tion without  bond  is  void ; 8  but  usually  the  failure  of  the  adminis- 


162.  So  where  the  executor  was  a  single 
man,  without  visible  property  except  a 
claim  against  the  testator's  estate  for  ser- 
vices rendered  his  father  after  reaching 
majority,  where  the  trust  was  to  continue 
for  nearly  twenty  years  and  the  executor 
was  about  to  remove  out  of  the  State,  the 
chancellor  reversed  the  decision  of  the  sur- 
rogate permitting  administration  without 
security  on  the  ground  that  these  circum- 
stances were  sufficient  to  require  security 
for  the  faithful  administration  of  the  estate 
independent  of  the  statutory  provision  re- 
quiring security  in  cases  where  the  execu- 
tor was,  or  was  about  to  become,  a  non- 
resident :  Wood  v.  Wood,  4  Pai.  299,  302. 
See  also  Felton  v.  Sowles,  57  Vt.  382  ; 
Bromberg  v.  Bates,  112  Ala.  363. 

1  Hogan  v,  Wyman,  2  Oreg.  302. 

2  Feltz  v.  Clark,  4  Humph.  79  ;  O'Neal 
v.  Tisdale,  12  Tex.  40;  Commonwealth  v. 
Forney,  3  W.  &  S.  353  ;  Ex  parte  Brown, 
2  Bradf.  22  ;  Gardner  v.  Gantt,  19  Ala.  666 ; 
Diane  v.  Baylies,  1  Humph.  174;  Succes- 
sion of  Rodenheimer,  35  La.  An.  1034. 

'■>  Cleveland  r>.  Chandler,  3  Stew.  489; 
Echols  v.  Marrett,  6  Ga.  443 ;   the  refusal 
574 


of  an  executor  to  qualify  is  prima  facie 
evidence  of  his  refusal  to  act :  Uldreck  v. 
Simpson,  1  S.  C.  283.  Letters  are  not  in- 
valid because  the  bond  is  made  and  signed 
before  appointment ;  Morris  v.  Chicago, 
R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.,  65  Iowa,  727  ;  or  because 
the  bond  is  not  presented  for  approval 
until  several  days  after  issuance  of  the 
letters  and  taking  of  the  oath:  Ions  v. 
Harbison,  112  Cal.  260. 

4  Post,  §  270 ;  Clark  v.  Niles,  42  Miss. 
460.  But  such  order  is  not  final  until  it 
is  enforced,  and  hence  cannot  be  appealed 
from  :  Atwell  v.  Helm,  7  Bush,  504. 

6  Howard  v.  Worrill,  42  Ga.  397. 

6  McWilliams  v.  Hopkins,  4  Rawle, 
382 ;  Bradley  v.  Commonwealth,  31  Pa.  St. 
522.  And  in  Picquet,  Appellant,  5  Pick. 
65,  76,  Parker,  C.  J.,  intimates  that  prob- 
ably the  administration  would  be  void 
where  no  bond  is  given. 

7  Small  v.  Commonwealth,  8  Pa.  St. 
101. 

8  Picquet,  Appellant,  5  Pickering,  65, 
76  ;  Abercrombie  v.  Sheldon,  8  Allen,  532, 
534. 


§254 


WHEN  ADDITIONAL  BOND  MAY  BE  ORDERED.       *  546,  *  547 


But  adminis- 
tration is  not 
usually  void 
for  want  of 
bond. 


Court  may 
order  addi- 
tional bond 
whenever 
necessary. 


trator  to  give  bond  does  not  avoid  the  letters  of  admin- 
istration, but  only  makes  them  voidable; x  nor  does  the 
cancellation  of  the  bond  per  se  revoke  the  appointment, 
or   disqualify   the   administrator   from   bringing   suit.2 
In  Louisiana,  an  executor  is  required  to  settle  up  the 
estate  in  one  year,   and  if  he  does  not,  to  give  bond  at  the  end 
thereof,  in  default  of  which  he  should  be  dismissed,  and  an  admin- 
istrator de  bonis  non  with  the  will   annexed  —  there  called   dative 
executor  —  appointed.8 

§  254.  "When  Additional  Bond  may  be  ordered.  —  Whenever  it 
becomes  apparent  that  the  sureties  of  an  administration  bond  have 
become  insolvent,  or  that  the  penalty  in  the  bond  is  in 
too  small  an  amount,  or  that  the  bond  is  from  any  cause 
insufficient  or  inadequate,  the  executor  or  administrator 
should  be  ruled  to  give  other  or  further  security.4  For 
failure  to  comply  with  such  an  order,  the  executor  or 
administrator  may  be  removed  from  office  by  the  judge  of  probate.6 
Any  person  in  interest  may  petition  the  probate  court  for  an  order 

to  compel  additional  or  better  security,  and  on 
[*  547]  the   trial   of   such  *  motion  it  is    sufficient,    as    interested  may 

already  indicated,  that  their  interest  be  alleged  move.  bornd,ddl" 
under  oath.6  The  service  of  notice  upon  the  executor 
or  administrator  in  such  proceeding  is  generally  prescribed  in  the 
statutes  of  the  several  States;  in  Louisiana  it  has  been  held  that 
service  upon  the  attorney  at  law  of  the  executor,  in  the  absence  of 
the  latter  from  the  State,  was  sufficient.7  On  the  trial  of  a  motion 
for  new  bond,  on  the  ground  of  the  insufficiency  of  the  sureties,  the 
sureties  may  prove  their  sufficiency  by  their  own  oath,  and  then  it 
will  devolve  upon  the  other  party  to  show  their  insufficiency.8  As 
to  the  statement  of  facts  necessary  to  authorize  the  pro- 
bate court  to  order  additional  security,  it  is  sufficient  to 
refer  to  the  provisions  of  the  statutes  upon  the  subject, 
which  generally  indicate  the  circumstances  under  which 
further  or  other  security  may  be  required  with  sufficient 


Statutes  deter- 
mine what 
facts  will 
authorize 
requirement  of 
new  bond. 


1  Harris  v.  Chipman,  9  Utah,  101  ; 
Ryan  v.  Am.  Co.,  96  Ga.  322  ;  Sullivan  v. 
Tioga  R.  R.,  44  Hun,  304,  307  ;  Leather- 
wood  v.  Sullivan,  81  Ala.  458  ;  Ex  parte 
Maxwell,  37  Ala.  362 ;  Jones  v.  Gordon,  2 
Jones  Eq.  352 ;  Spencer  v.  Cahoon,  4  Dev. 
L.  225 ;  Slagle  v.  Entrekin,  44  Oh.  St. 
637, 640 ;  Arrowsmith  v.  Gleason,  129  U.  S. 
86  (a  guardian's  bond). 

2  Clarke  v.  Rice,  15  R.  I.  132. 

8  Peale  v.  White,  7  La.  An.  449. 

4  Killcrease  v.  Killcrease,  7  How. 
(Miss.)  311  ;  Ellis  v.  McBride,  27  Miss. 
155  ;  Atkinson  v.  Christian,  3  Gratt.  448. 


"  A  new  bond  may  always  be  required, 
if  the  original  bond  appear  at  any  time  to 
be  inadequate  "  :  Wells,  J.,  in  Hannum  v. 
Day,  105  Mass.  33,38.  Gary,  in  his  work 
on  Probate  Law,  bases  this  authority  of 
probate  courts  on  their  inherent  powers  to 
prevent  a  failure  of  justice  :  p.  113,  n.  20  ; 
but  it  is  expressly  conferred  in  most,  if  not 
all,  of  the  States  by  statute. 

5  National  Bank  of  Troy  v.  Stanton, 
116  Mass.  435. 

6  Ante,  §  251. 

7  Succession  of  Bobb,  27  La.  An.  344. 

8  Ross  v.  Mims,  7  Sm.  &  M.  121. 

575 


*  547,  *  548 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    BOND. 


§255 


clearness.  Insolvency,  death,  or  removal  from  the  State  of  the 
sureties,  and  inadequacy  of  the  penalty,  are  the  most  usual.  The 
insolvency  of  the  principal  in  the  bond,  while  the  sureties  remain 
solvent,  is  no  ground  for  increasing  the  amount  of  the  bond.1  In 
California  the  powers  of  the  executor  may  be  suspended  until  the 
application  for  an  order  to  give  new  bond  can  be  heard.2 

§  255.  Nature  of  the  Liability  of  Sureties ;  Effect  of  New  Bonds. 
—  The  liability  of  a  surety  on  an  administrator's  bond  is  co-exten- 
sive with  the  liability  of  the  principal  in  the  bond.8  The  refusal  or 
neglect  of  the  principal  to  obey  or  comply  with  the 
judgment  or  decree  of  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction 
constitutes  a  breach  rendering  the  sureties  liable,  and 
they  are  bound  and  concluded  by  such  judgment  against 
the  principal,4  unless,  of  course,  there  was  collusion  or 
fraud  between  the  principal  and  those  who  seek  satis- 
faction out  of  the  sureties,  which  must  be  established 
in  a  direct  proceeding.5  But  the  judgment,  to  bind  the  sureties, 
must  self -evidently  be  one  that  is  enforceable  against  the  principal; 
unless  there  be  a  judgment  to  be  satisfied  de  bonis  pro- 
priis,  the  sureties  are  not  liable;6  their  liability  does 
not  arise  until  the  default  of  their  principal  has  been 
fixed.7  Hence  sureties,  though  not  parties  to  the  rec- 
ord, nor  beneficially  interested  in  proceedings  against 
executors  or  administrators,  are  allowed  to  ap- 
peal from  judgments  against  *  their  principals ; 8  [*  548] 
and  the  Statute  of  Limitations  runs  from  the  de- 
cree or  order  fixing  the  liability,  and  not  from  the  death 
of  an  administrator  who  dies  before  the  estate  is  finally 
settled.9  The  conclusiveness  upon  the  surety  of  a  judg- 
ment against  his  principal  is  held  to  extend  to  a  decree 
rendered  after  the  death  of  the  administrator,  upon  an 


Sureties  are 
concluded  by 
judgment 
against  their 
principal, 

unless  obtained 
by  fraud  or 
collusion. 


Only  judg- 
ments enforce 
able  against 
the  principal 
bind  the 
sureties, 

and  they  may 
appeal  from 
judgments 
against  the 
principal. 

Statute  of 
Limitations 
runs  from  the 
judgment 
fixing  the 
liability. 


i  Sharkey's  Estate,  2  Phila.  276. 

2  Estate  of  White,  53  Cal.  19. 

3  Ward  v.  Tinkham,  65  Mich.  695, 
703. 

4  Nevitt  v.  Woodburn,  160  111.  203; 
Deobold  v. Oppermann,  ill  N.  Y.  531,536; 
Speer  v,  Richmond,  3  Mo.  App.  572,  573 ; 
People  >'.  Stacy, 11  111.  App.  506;  Frank  v. 
People,  147  Til .  105,  111  ;  Ilolden  v.  Curry, 
85  Wis.  504,512;  Bellinger  v.  Thompson, 
26  '  >reg.  320, 347  ;  Martin  v.  Tally,  72  Ala. 
23  30  McClellanv.  Downey,  63  Cal  520 ; 
Morrison  v.  Lavell,  B1  Va.  519  ;  Slagle  v. 
Entrekin,  44  Oh.  St.  637.  Sec  Woernexon 
Guardianship,  §  15. 

*  Wolff  v.  Schaeffer,  4  Mo.  App.  307, 

576 


375,  affirmed  in  74  Mo.  154,  158;   Scofield 
v.  Churchill,  72  N.  Y.  565,  570. 

6  Wilbur  v.  Hotto,  25  S.  C.  246 ;  Ben- 
nett v.  Graham,  71  Ga.  211. 

7  Grady  v.  Hughes,  80  Mich.  184. 

8  McCartney  v.  Garneau,  4  Mo.  App. 
566,  567  ;  People  v.  Stacy,  11  111.  App.  506, 
508;  Bush's  Appeal,  102  Pa.  St.  502,  504. 
In  Maine  the  surety  cannot  appeal,  except 
in  the  principal's  name,  see  §  544,  p.  *  1  l'.i4, 
note. 

9  Williams  v.  Flippin,  68  Miss.  680; 
George  v.  Elms,  46  Ark.  260.  Delay  on 
the  part  of  the  beneficiaries  in  calling  the 
executor  l"  account  does  not  dischargo 
his  sureties:  Biggins  v.  Itaisch,  107  Cal. 
210. 


§255 


NATURE    OF   THE   LIABILITY    OP   SURETIES. 


548 


account  submitted  by  the  administrator's  personal  rep-  Conclusiveness 
resentative ; l  but  this  doctrine  is  repudiated  elsewhere,  rendered  after 
on  the  theory  that  as  there  is  no  technical  privity  be-  administrator's 
tween  an  administrator  in  chief  and  a  succeeding  admin- 
istrator de  bonis  non,  acts  or  admissions  by,  nor  judgments  against, 
the  former  are  not  admissible  against  the  latter,  although  the  ad- 
ministrator de  bonis  non  is  concluded  by  rightful  acts  of  administra- 
tion of  his  predecessor,2  and  that  hence  the  judgment  ascertaining 
the  indebtedness  of  the  administrator  in  chief  to  the  estate  at  the 
time  of  his  death,  in  an  accounting  by  his  personal  representative 
to  which  the  surety  was  no  party,  is,  as  to  the  surety,  res  inter  alios 
acta*  The  general  rule  appears  to  hold  judgments  against  princi- 
pals in  bonds,  who  have  not  had  their  day  in  court,  competent,  but 
not  conclusive  evidence  against  their  sureties,4  although  it  has  also 
been  held,  that  such  judgment  is  not  evidence  at  all  against  the 
surety;5  but  administration  bonds  are  held  to  form  an  exception  to 
this  general  rule,  and  sureties  on  such,  in  respect  of  their  liability 
for  the  default  of  their  principal,  to  be  classed  with  those  sureties, 
who  covenant  that  their  principal  shall  do  a  particular  act.6  The 
sureties  are  the  privies  of  the  administrator  and  precluded  from 
questioning  any  lawful  order  made  by  the  court  having  jurisdiction 
over  the  principal.7 

It  is  obvious  that  the  purpose  of  a  new  or  additional  bond  ordered 
by  the  court  ex  mero  motu,  or  moved  by  some  interested  person  for 
the  better  protection  of  the  estate,  or  voluntarily  given 
by  the  principal  in  anticipation  of  such  an  order,  is  to 
add  the  security  resulting  from  the  new  to  that  afforded 
by  the  old  bond.  Hence  the  estate  is  protected,  after 
the  giving  of  the  new  bond,  by  both  sets  of  sureties; 
those  on  the  first  bond  remaining,  and  those  on  the  sec- 
ond bond  becoming,  liable  for  any  breach  happening 
after  the  new  bond  is  given.8    Where  the  condition  of 


Additional 
bond  is  cumu- 
lative, if  re- 
quired by  the 
court  ex  mero 
motu,  or  on 
motion  of  some 
one  interested 
in  the  estate  as 
beneficiary. 


1  Williams  v.  Flippin,  68  Miss.  680, 
688  ;  Judge  v.  Quimby,  89  Me.  574. 

2  Martin  v.  Ellerbe,  70  Ala.  326. 
8  lb.  334. 

4  Munford  v.  Overseers,  2  Rand.  313, 
315  (suit  on  a  sheriff's  bond)  ;  Craddock 
v.  Turner,  6  Leigh,  116,  122;  Lyles  v. 
Caldwell,  3  McC.  225  ;  Ordinary  v.  Condy, 
3  Hill  (S.  C),  313  ;  Bryant  v.  Owen,  1  Ga. 
355,  369  (on a  guardian's  bond)  ;  Weir  v. 
Monahan,  67  Miss.  434,  455. 

5  McKellar  v.  Bowell,  4  Hawks,  34  (on 
a  guardian's  bond). 

6  Irwin  v.  Backus,  25  Cal.  214,  223, 
quoting  from  Lyles  v.  Caldwell,  3  McCord, 

vol.  i.  —  37 


225,  and  quoted  as  authority  in  Nevitt  v. 
Woodburn,  160  111.  203,  209. 

»  Gerrould  v.  Wilson,  81  N.  Y.  573,  583 ; 
Scofield  v.  Churchill,  72  N.  Y.  565,  570. 

8  "  The  plain  intent  of  these  acts  was, 
that  the  security  should  be  accumulative, 
and  not  an  entire  substitution  of  the  one 
bond  for  the  other  " :  Per  Holmes,  J.,  in 
State  v.  Drury,  36  Mo.  281 ,  286  ;  see  Wood 
v.  Williams,  61  Mo.  63 ;  State  v.  Fields,  53 
Mo.  474,  477  ;  Haskell  v.  Farrar,  56  Mo. 
497.  So  where,  upon  application  of  one 
who  erroneously  supposed  himself  to  be  a 
surety,  an  ineffectual  decree  was  made 
discharging  him,  and  another  bond  was 
577 


*  548,  *  549  THE   ADMINISTRATION    BOND.  §  255 

the  bond  is  that  the  principal  shall  "account  for,  pay,  and  deliver 
all  money  and  property  of  said  estate,"  the  sureties  on  the  last  bond 

are  liable  for  the  loss  following  any  defalcation,  conver- 
and  additional  sion,  or  devastavit  committed  by  the  principal,  whether 
bondsmen  are     before  or  after  the  giving  of  the  last  bond,  because  the 

non-payment  after  an  order  by  the  court  having  juris- 
diction constitutes  a  distinct  breach  of  the  bond;1  the  same  result 
follows  where  the  terms  of  the  bond  are  to  "do  and  perform  all 
other  acts  which  may  be  required  of  him  at  any  time  by  law."2  In 
such  case  both  sets  of  sureties  are  liable :  the  first,  because  the  con- 
version or  other  misconduct  leading  to  the  loss  of  the  assets  occurred 
during  the  time  when  they  were  sureties;  the  last,  because 
the  non-payment  constituted  a  breach  while  they  *  were  [*  549] 
such.3  But  the  sureties  themselves  are  entitled  to  relief  in 
case  of  the  insolvency  of  either  principal  or  co-surety  on  the  bond, 
,-...,  or  when   any  of  the  co-sureties  have  died  or   left  the 

Original  sure-  J 

ties  are  exon-  State,  or  when  the  principal  is  wasting  or  mismanag- 
ed js  g."^  ing  the  estate.  Provision  is  made  by  statute  in  many 
on  their  States  enabling  sureties  to  protect  themselves  against 

future  liability  on  their  bonds  by  moving  for  an  order 
against  their  principal  to  give  counter  security,  or  a  new  bond,  and 
in  default  thereof  to  revoke  his  authority.4  So  where  one  of  several 
sureties  is  released,  his  co-sureties  are  not  liable  for  subsequent 
breaches,  if  a  new  bond  is  given.6  In  Missouri  the  statute  dis- 
tinctly points  out  the  effect  of  a  new  or  additional  bond :  if  given 
in  response  to  the  complaint  of  a  person  bound  as  security  in  the 
bond,  the  sureties  on  the  first  bond  are  discharged  from  any  mis- 
conduct of  the  principal  after  the  new  bond  is  accepted  and  filed; 

given,  it  was  held  that  both  bonds  were  2  Pinkstaff  v.  People,  59  111.  148,  150. 

valid ;  and  that  each  set  of  sureties  was  To  same  effect :  Scofield  v.  Churchill,  72 

responsible,    inter  sese,   in   proportion   to  N.  Y.  565 ;   Lacoste   v.  Splivalo,  64  Cal. 

the  amount  of  the  bonds  and  the  liability  35;  Foster  v.  Wise,  46  Oh.  St.  20,  and 

incurred  :  Brooks  v.  Whitmore,  142  Mass.  authorities  cited. 

399.    The  law  is  the  same,  mutatis  mutandis,  3  State  v.  Berning,  74  Mo.  87,  97,  af- 

as  that  governing  liability  of  sureties  on  firming  6  Mo.  App.  105  ;  Lewis  v.  Gambs, 

successive  guardians'  bonds  ;  for  a  discus-  6  Mo.  App.  138,  141. 

sion  of  which  see  Woerner  on  Guardian-  4  Brooks  v.  Whitmore,  139  Mass.  356. 

■hip,  §  48,  pp.  142  et  seq.  5  State   v.   Barrett,    121    Ind.   92.     It 

1    Wolff    v.    Schaeffer,    74    Mo.    154,  was  held  in  Veach  v.  Rice,  131  U.  S.  293, 

L 58,  affirming  s.  C.  4   Mo    App.  307,  375.  that  where  the  court  allowed  the  resigna- 

The  sureties  on  an  administration  bond  tion  of  one  of  two  administrators  in  due 

ar<     liable    fur   assets    misapplied    before  form,   and   the   remaining    administrator 

the  execution  of  the  bond  :    Bellinger  v.  thereupon  gives  a  now  bond,  the  sureties 

Thompson,  26  Oreg.  320,  341,  and  cases  on  the  joint  bond  of  both  are  exonerated 

rind.     I'.nt    the   mere   proof  that  assets  for  devastavit  thereafter  committed.    See 

(aim- into  i  Ik-  administrator's  hands  docs  on  this  subject  Woerner  on  Guardianship, 

nol   make  out  a  prima  facu   Liability  as  §43. 
f.,r  devastavit  t   State   v.   Hiither,  4    Mo. 
App.  575 

578 


§  255  EFFECT    OF   NEW   BONDS.  *  549,  *550 

if  given  in  compliance  with  an  order  of  court  made  "whenever 
it  shall  appear  necessary  and  proper,"1  the  new  bond  is  simply 
cumulative,  and  the  old  sureties  remain  liable.  In  some  States  a 
surety  on  an  administration  bond  is  entitled  to  be  relieved  from 
future  liability  under  it  on  his  own  motion,  by  simply  guret  ma  . 
alleging  that  he  conceives  himself  to  be  endangered  by    relieved  from 

\'       }     '\'t     r    f 

his   suretyship  without  making  any  proof  whatever;2   subsequent  de- 
while  in  others  proof  is  required  of  one  or  more  of  the    fault  by  his 
facts  named  in  the  statute  as  authorizing  such  surety's 
release.8     The  probate  court  cannot,  however,  relieve  a  surety  from 
liability,  save  in  pursuance  of  some  statutory  provision,4  which  must 
be  strictly  complied  with.6 

Before  any  such  order  can  be  made,  there  must  be  notice  or  cita- 
tion to,  or  an  appearance  by,  the  administrator;6  but  he  cannot  be 
cited  for  the  purpose  of  accounting  and  taking  bond  for  Notice  must 
the  balance  that  may  be  found  in  his  hands.7  The  be  given  to  the 
proper  relief  is  an  order  directing  the  executor  or  ad-  a  mmis  ra  or' 
ministrator  to  give  a  new  bond  with  additional  sureties,  or  to  re- 
voke, in  default  thereof,  the  letters  granted,  and  appoint  an  admin- 
istrator de  bonis  non.6  An  order  to  pay  the  money  found 
[*  550]  *  to  be  due  from  the  administrator  into  court,  is  self-evi- 
dently  void,  as  well  as  a  commitment  for  contempt  of  court 
in  refusing  to  obey  such  order.9  But  if  the  surety  himself  be  ap- 
pointed administrator  de  bonis  non,  his  liability  on  the  bond  consti- 
tutes a  debt  which  becomes  assets  in  his  hands,  although  the  amount 
has  not  been  fixed  by  any  account  or  judgment  rendered,  and  for 
which  his  sureties  are  liable.10 

If  upon  revocation  of  the  letters  of  an  administrator  for  want  of  a 
new  bond  ordered  on  the  motion  of  his  surety,  letters  de  bonis  non 
be  granted  to  the  same  person,  the  former  sureties  are  thereby  fully 
discharged,  because  the  administrator  and  his  successor  are  the  same 

1  Wood  v.  Williams,  61  Mo.  63  ;  State  Thompson,   26   Oreg.   320,  345,   and   au- 

v.  Wolff,  10  Mo.  App.  95,  98  (holding  the  thorities  cited. 

provision  discharging  former  sureties  in-  6  Clark  v.  Amer.  Sur.  Co.,  171  111.  235. 

applicable  to  the  public  admiuistrator).  6  Gilliam  v.  McJunken,  2    S-   C.  442, 

3  De  Lane's  Case,  2  Brev.  167   (Bay,  449.     Notice  to  the  heirs  is  not  generally 

J.,    dissenting),    affirmed    in    McKay    v.  required:  Clark   v.  Amer.  Sur.   Co.,  171 

Donald,  8  Rich.  L.  331 ;  Lewis  v.  Watson,  111.  235. 

3  Redf.  43;  Johnson  v.  Fuquay,  1  Dana,  7  Waterman  v.  Bigham,  2  Hill  (S.  C), 

514;    Harrison  v.   Turbeville,  2   Humph.  512. 

242,  245  ;  Jones  v.   Ritter,   56   Ala.   270,  8  Owens  v.  Walker,  2  Strobh.  Eq  289 ; 

280 ;    People  v.  Curry,  59  111.  35 ;   Allen  Waterman  v.  Bigham,  supra ;  Gilliam  v. 

v.  Sanders,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  203.  McJunken,  supra ;  Morgan  v.  Dodge,  44 

8  Valcourt    v.  Sessions,  30  Ark.  515;  N.  H.  255,  with  a  collection  of  numerous 

Sanders  v.  Edwards,  29  La.  An.  696  ;  see  authorities. 

Missouri  cases,  supra,  p.  *  548 ;  Succession  9  Gilliam  v.  McJunken,  supra. 

of  Boutte',   32   La.    An.    556;    Sifford  v.         10  This   and    similar   points   are    more 

Morrison,  63  Md.  14.  fully   discussed  post,   §    311.     See    cases 

*  Such   release  is  void:   Bellinger   v.  cited  p.  *653,  note. 

579 


550,  *  551 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    BOND. 


§255 


Original  sure- 
ties discharged 
if  the  former 
administrator 
be  appointed 
de  bonit  non. 


How  liable  if 
there  is  no 
revocation  of 
authority,  but 
a  new  bond. 


person,  so  that  there  can  be  no  accounting  between  the 
old  and  the  new  administration,  and  it  must  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  administrator  de  bonis  non  has  received 
from  himself  all  the  assets  belonging  to  the  estate.1 
But  where  a  new  bond  is  given,  and  there  is  no  revoca- 
tion of  authority,  the  liability  continues  in  the  old  as 
well  as  in  the  new  sureties,  and  in  such  case,  as  be- 
tween themselves,  the  new  sureties  are  primarily,  the 
old  collaterally  liable.  If  the  first  sureties  are  made 
to  pay,  they  are  entitled  to  be  reimbursed  in  full  from 
the  second  sureties;  but  if  these  pay,  they  are  not  entitled  to  re- 
cover from  the  former.  And  hence,  if  the  former  sureties  are 
released,  the  latter  are  not  thereby  affected;  but  if  the  latter  are 
released,  this  will  discharge  the  former  also.2  In  Tennessee  it  is 
held  that  in  such  case  the  second  set  of  sureties  are  primar- 
ily liable  to  the  *  extent  of  their  bond,  and,  if  they  prove  [*  551] 
insufficient,  the  first  sureties  are  liable  for  any  conversion 
before  their  release ;  the  second  sureties  account  first  for  any  default 
after  their  suretyship,  then  for  any  that  may  have  been  committed 
before.8  In  Illinois  the  sureties  may,  if  the  executor  or  administra- 
tor, on  their  motion,  give  a  new  bond  relating  back  to  the  time  of 
the  original  grant  of  letters,  be  discharged  from  all  liability  for  past 
as  well  as  future  acts;  but  unless  the  new  bond  be  given  in  such 
form,  the  release  can  only  be  as  to  future  default.4  In  the  absence 
of  statutory  provisions  on  the  subject,  the  surety  discharged  from 
further  liability  is  clearly  liable  for  all  breaches  of  the  bond  during 
the  time  he  was  surety.5  And  in  Ohio,  if  a  new  bond  is  given,  not 
on  petition  of  a  surety,  but  for  the  protection  of  the  estate,  as  be- 
tween these  two  sets  of  sureties  for  breaches  before  the  second  bond 
was  given,  the  old  sureties  are  primarily  liable,  and  if  the  new  sure- 


1  Enicks  v.  Powell,  2  Strobh.  Eq.  196, 
206  ;  Whitworth  v.  Oliver,  39  Ala.  286 ; 
Steele  v.  Graves,  68  Ala.  17,  21;  Lingle 
v.  Cook,  32  Gratt.  262.  It  was  held  in 
Alabama,  that  where  an  administrator  re- 
signed, and  was  again  appointed,  with 
new  sureties,  the  beneficiaries  may  bold 
either  set  of  sureties  for  a  balance  decreed 
against  him  for  the  first  administration  ; 
but  where,  both  administrations  being 
settled  (in  the  samo  day,  the  balance  as- 
certained on  the  settlement  of  the  first 
administration  is  carried,  at  the  instance 
of  th<-  distributees,  as  a  debt  into  the 
second,  the  sureties  on  the  first  bond  are 
thereby  released:  Modawell  n.  Hudson, 
BO  Ala.  265. 

Id  v  Pelot,  l  McMullen  Eq.  369, 
:     Bnt  see  dissenting  opinions  of  Chan- 

580 


cellors  Dunkin  and  Johnson,  both  hold- 
ing that  in  such  case  the  sureties  on  the 
first  bond  were  discharged  :  p.  389  et  seq. 
To  the  same  effect,  Trimmier  v.  Trail,  2 
Bai.  L.  480,  486 ;  Joyner  v.  Cooper,  2 
Bai.  L.  199;  People  v. Curry,  59  111.  35; 
People  v.  Lott,  27  111.  215.  The  second 
bond  becomes  the  primary  security,  even 
to  such  of  the  sureties  on  the  first  bond 
as  did  not  petition ;  but  where,  by  an 
error,  the  balance  is  shown  to  be  much 
smaller  than  the  true  balance  on  the  ap- 
plication for  new  security,  the  first  bond 
is  primarily  liable  to  the  extent  of  such 
error:  Hobo  v.  Vaiden,  20  S.  C.  271. 

8  Morris  v.  Morris,  9  Ileisk.  814. 

*  North,  Prob.  Pr.  §§  262,  263  ;  People 
v.  Lott,  supr-<i ;  People  V.  Curry,  supra. 

6  McKim  v.  Blake,  132  Mass.  343. 


§  255  EFFECT   OF   NEW    BONDS.  *  551 

ties  are  compelled  to  pay  they  may  recover  the  whole  amount  from 
the  former.1  In  Virginia  and  West  Virginia  the  statute  provides 
that  a  new  bond,  without  any  express  provision  therein  to  that 
effect,  shall  bind  the  obligors  therein  to  indemnify  the  sureties  in 
the  former  bond  against  all  loss  or  damage  in  consequence  of  execut- 
ing the  former  bond.2 

It  is  sometimes  of  importance  to  ascertain  in  what  capacity  a 
principal,  who  has  given  bond  as  executor  or  administrator,  and 
also  as  guardian,  trustee,  or  other  fiduciary,  with  different  sureties, 
is  chargeable  with  assets.  In  such  case  it  is  to  be  remembered  that, 
where  the  obligation  to  pay  and  the  right  to  receive  are  united  in 
the  same  person,  the  law  operates  the  appropriation  of  the  fund  to 
the  discharge  of  the  debt.3  Hence,  where  an  administrator  who  is 
also  guardian  of  a  minor  distributee,  has  made  final  settlement,  and 
there  is  an  order  directing  the  payment  of  the  distributive  shares, 
such  order  will  operate  to  charge  him  in  his  capacity  as  guardian, 
and  relieve  his  sureties  on  the  administration  bond;4  but  until  such 
final  settlement  is  made,  or  the  assets  accounted  for,  the  former 
sureties  remain  liable;5  and  where  the  share  due  the  minors  is  not 
ascertained  until  after  their  majority,  the  debt  becomes  payable  to 
them  and  not  their  former  guardian,  and  the  sureties  on  the  admin- 
istration bond  are  not  discharged.6  So  where  a  surviving  partner  is 
executor  of  the  deceased  partner,  his  sureties  on  the  executor's  bond 
do  not  become  liable  for  his  acts  as  surviving  partner  until  the  part- 
nership affairs  are  wound  up  and  the  interest  of  the  estate  therein 
ascertained.7  But  where  an  administrator  has  no  further  use  for  assets 
as  such,  and  is  also  guardian  of  a  distributee,  he  will  be  treated  as 
holding  them  as  guardian,  even  if  he  has  not  made  final  settlement.8 

But  the  efficacy  of  bonds  cannot  be  permitted  to  be  endangered  or 
destroyed  by  applying  this  doctrine  to  the  transfer  of  the  mere  in- 
debtedness of  a  fiduciary  from  himself  in  one,  to  himself  in  another 
capacity,  so  as  to  exonerate  his  sureties  in  the  former  capacity,  and 
either  throw  the  burden  on  another  set  of  sureties,  or  entail  the  loss 
on  the  beneficiaries,  without  some  overt  act  manifesting  the  transfer 
of  actually  existing  assets.9     It  has  been  held  in  Maryland  that  the 

1  Corrigan  v.  Foster,  51  Oh.  St.  225.  5  Ruffin  v.  Harrison,  81  N.  C.  208,  217 ; 

2  Lingle  v.  Cook,  32  Gratt.  262,  274 ;  Cluff  v.  Day,  124  N.  Y.  195  ;  Bellinger  v. 
Hooper  v.  Hooper,  29  W.  Va.  276,  299.  Thompson,  26  Oreg.  320,  339. 

3  Ruffin  v.  Harrison,  81  N.  C.  208,  212,  6  Burnside  v.  Robertson,  28  S.  C.  583, 
citing  earlier  cases ;  State  v.  Cheston,  61  588. 

Md.  352,  373,  and  numerous  cases.  7  Hooper  v.  Hooper,  32  W.  Va.  526. 

*  Ruffin  v.  Harrison,  supra,  affirmed  in  8  United   States   v.   May,  4  Mack.  4, 

8.  c.  86  N.  C.  190  ;  Bell  v.  People,  94  111.  citing  numerous  Maryland  cases ;  Fielder 

230;  Seegar  v.  Betton,  6  Har.  &  J.  162;  v.  Rose,  61  Mo.  App.  189. 
Coleman   v.    Smith,    14   S.  C.   511,   514;  •  State  v.  Branch,  112  Mo.  661,  669; 

Chick  v.  Farr,  31  S.  C.  463,  476  ;  Woolley  Gilmer  v.  Baker,  42  W.  Va.  72,  92  ;  Pro- 

v.  Price,  86   Md.  176,  reviewing   earlier  bate  Court  v.  Angell,  14  R.  I.  495  ;  Potter 

Maryland  cases.  v.  Ogden,  136  N.  Y.  384, 397,  402  ;  Conkey 

581 


♦551,  *552 


THE   ADMINISTRATION   BOND. 


§25C 


mere  technical  devastavit  committed  by  failing  to  keep  the  funds  of 
the  estate  marked  and  separate  from  the  fiduciary's  own  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  show  that  the  assets  have  been  actually  wasted,  so  as  to 
charge  the  sureties  on  his  bond;  in  such  case,  unless  it  be  further 
shown  that  the  fiduciary  was  insolvent,  or  embarrassed,  or  not  able 
to  meet  promptly  every  demand  that  could  lawfully  be  made  upon 
him,  the  presumption  of  transfer  by  operation  of  law  applies,  and 
the  first  sureties  are  not  liable.1  On  the  other  hand  it  is  decided  in 
Missouri  that  the  solvency  of  a  curator,  at  the  time  of  taking  from 
himself  a  receipt  as  trustee,  showing  the  transfer  to  him  as  trustee 
of  the  ward's  estate,  does  not  relieve  his  sureties  on  the  curator's 
bond.2 

*§  256.  Technical  Execution  of  the  Bond.  —  The  form  in  [*  552] 
which  bonds  are  to  be  taken  from  executors  and  administra- 
tors is  generally  prescribed  by  statute,  and  errors  may  be  avoided 
by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  and  attention  on  the  part  of  the 
probate  judge  or  clerk.  In  some  instances,  these  bonds 
have  been  construed  with  technical  strictness  against 
the  obligees,  and  held  void  as  statutory  bonds  where 
they  deviated  from  the  statutory  form ; 8  but  the  general 


Bonds  con- 
strued strictly 
against 
obligees. 


v.  Dickinson,  13  Mete.  (Mass.)  51.  See 
this  subject  treated  iu  connection  with  the 
liability  of  sureties  on  guardian's  bonds, 
in  Woerner  on  Guardianship,  §§  98,  102. 

1  State  v.  Cheston,  51  Md.  352,  382. 

2  State  v.  Branch,  126  Mo.  448;  and 
see  s.  c.  134  Mo.  592,  criticising  Tittman 
v.  Green,  108  Mo.  22. 

3  As  in  the  cases  of  Mc Williams  v. 
Hopkins,  4  Rawle,  382  ;  Bradley  v.  Com- 
monwealth,   31     Pa.    St.    522;     Picquet, 


the  bonds  were  nevertheless  good  common- 
law  bonds.  But  in  Ohio  bonds  are  con- 
strued with  the  utmost  rigor  against  the 
obligees ;  Eanney,  J.,  in  McGovney  v. 
State,  20  Ohio,  93,  which  was  a  suit  on 
an  executor's  bond,  adopts  and  indorses 
the  language  of  the  majority  of  the  court 
in  State  v.  Medary,  17  Ohio,  554,  565: 
"  The  bond  speaks  for  itself,  and  the  law 
is  that  it  shall  so  speak,  and  that  the  lia- 
bility of  sureties  is  limited  to  the  exact 


Appellant,  5  Pick.  65,  and  Small  v.  Com-  letter  of  the  bond.  Sureties  stand  upon 
mon wealth,  8  Pa.  St.  101,  cited  under  §  253, 
ante ;  also  Arnold  v.  Babbit,  5  J.  J.  Marsh. 
665  ;  Cowling  v.  Nansemond  Justices,  6 
Rand.  349,  holding  that  the  omission  of 
the  names  of  the  obligees,  of  the  execu- 
tor, and  of  the  court  made  the  bond  fa- 
tally defective;  Huberts  v. Colvin,3  Gratt. 
358,  deciding  that  no  action  can  be  brought 
on  an  administrator's  bond  containing  no 
provision  for  the  benefit  of  creditors; 
Frazier  v.  Frazier,  2  Leigh,  642,  and 
Walker  r  Crosland,  3  Rich.  Eq.  23,  hold- 
ing the  bond  of  an  administrator  with  the 
will  annexed   in  tin-   form  of  an  ordinary 

administrator's  bond,  containing  no  refer- 
ence  to  the  will,  bad  as  a  statutory  bond  ; 
to  same  effect,  I  rw  v.  Crockett,  77  Me. 
157  ;  also  Morrow  <•  Peyton,  8  Leigh,  .r>4. 
In  some  of  these  cases  it  is  intimated  that 

082 


the  words  of  the  bond,  and  if  the  words 
will  not  make  them  liable,  nothing  can. 
There  is  no  construction,  no  equity  against 
sureties.  If  the  bond  cannot  have  effect 
according  to  its  exact  words,  the  law  does 
not  authorize  the  court  to  give  it  effect  in 
some  other  way,  in  order  that  it  may  pre- 
vail." It  was  accordingly  held  that  parol 
evidence  was  inadmissible  to  show  that 
the  name  of  the  testator  was  inserted  in 
the  bond  as  James  L.  Findley  instead  of 
Joseph  L.  Findley  by  a  mistake  of  the 
clerk,  and  that  on  account  of  the  variance 
there  could  he  no  recovery  under  the 
bond.  The  decision  in  the  case  of  State 
i\  Medary,  referred  to  above,  was  rendered 
against  the  dissent  of  Hitchcock,  J.,  who 
contended  for  a  more  liberal  construction, 
and  cited  Gardener  v.  Woodyear,  1   Ohio, 


§25G 


TECHNICAL   EXECUTION    OF    THE   BOND.        *  552,  *  553 


rule  is  to  construe  them  rigorously  against  the  obligors,  and  with 
the  utmost  liberality  in  favor  of  the  parties  to  be   protected   by 
them.1      Bonds    have    been    held   good    and   sufficient 
although  not   signed   by  the   administrator2   (but  this    construe  them 
must  not  be  understood  as  applying  to  an  ordinary  ad-    strictly  against 
ministration  bond,  which  is  void  even  as  to  the  sureties 

when  not  signed  by  the  principal 3),  and  although  the  names 
[*553]  of  the  sureties  did  not  appear  in  *  the  body  of  the  bond,4 

when  no  amount  of  penalty  is  mentioned ; 5  or  the  name  of 
the  decedent  is  omitted,6  or  misrecited; 7  and  a  blank  left  in  a  bond 
at  the  time  of  signing  may  afterward,  before  approval  or  acceptance, 
be  filled  in.8  So  a  bond  complete  on  its  face  and  otherwise  valid, 
will  bind  the  sureties  in  favor  of  innocent  obligees,  though  the  sure- 
ties signed  it  on  the  strength  of  an  understanding  that  the  bond 
should  not  be  delivered  until  signed  by  certain  other  persons  as  co- 
sureties, who  in  fact  did  not  do  so.9  And  an  executor's,  guardian's, 
or  administrator's  bond  will  be  obligatory  and  effective,  although  its 
conditions  are  not  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of 
the  statute,  but  provide,  in  different  and  more  general  terms,  for  the 
faithful  execution  of  the  trust.10    Thus,  a  bond  conditioned  that  the 


170,  State  v.  Findley,  10  Ohio,  51,  and 
Reynolds  v.  Rogers,  5  Ohio,  169,  176,  in 
support  of  his  position  and  as  inconsistent 
with  that  of  the  majority  opinion. 

1  Rose  v.  Winn,  51  Tex.  545  ;  Ordinary 
v.  Cooley,  30  N.  J.  L.  179;  Gerould  v. 
Wilson,  81  N.  Y.  573,  577. 

3  Where  a  new  surety  was  required,  a 
bond  reciting  the  former  bond  and  exe- 
cuted by  the  single  new  surety  was  held 
to  be  in  proper  form:  Patullo's  Case, 
Tuck.  140.  The  bond  may  be  signed 
before  the  appointment  is  made :  Morris 
v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  R.,  65  Iowa, 
727. 

8  Wood  v.  Washburn,  2  Pick.  24 ; 
Weir  v.  Mead,  101  Cal.  125,  citing  author- 
ities pro  and  con. 

4  If  the  sureties  signed,  sealed,  and 
delivered  it,  they  are  bound :  Joyner  v. 
Cooper,  2  Bai.  L.  199,  resting  on  the  au- 
thority of  Stone  v.  Wilson,  4  McCord, 
203.  See  also  Woerner  on  Guardianship, 
§  40,  citing  cases  so  holding  on  guardians' 
bonds. 

6  In  such  case  the  bond  will  be  con- 
strued with  reference  to  the  law  in  pursu- 
ance to  which  it  is  given,  and  the  sureties 
are  liable  for  the  amount  for  which  the 
law  directs  such  bonds  to  be  given.  And 
it  is  immaterial  that  at  the  time  of  the 


execution  of  the  bond  no  inventory  had 
been  filed :  Soldini  v.  Hyams,  1 5  La.  An. 
551,  and  authorities  cited  in  Mason  r. 
Fuller,  12  La.  An.  68 ;  Shaker's  App., 
43  Pa.  St.  83,  87.  See  Woerner  on  Guar- 
dianship, §  40,  for  numerous  cases  of 
guardians'  bonds  held  valid,  though  ir- 
regular and  informal. 

6  Since  the  grant  of  letters  and  the 
execution  of  the  bond  are  parts  of  one 
and  the  same  transaction,  the  letters  may 
be  referred  to,  to  explain  the  ambiguity 
of  the  bond  in  which  the  name  of  the 
decedent  is  left  out :  State  v.  Price,  15 
Mo.  375. 

f  White  v.  Spillers,  85  Ga.  555. 

8  Rev.  St.  Ohio,  1880,  §  6.  But  in  an 
official  bond  the  penalty  cannot  be  in- 
serted by  a  third  person,  in  the  absence 
of  the  obligor,  without  express  authority 
under  his  hand  and  seal :  State  t;.  Boring, 
15  Ohio,  507,  approved  in  Famulener  v. 
Anderson,  15  Oh.  St.  473.  See  Woerner 
on  Guardianship,  §  40. 

9  This  seems  to  be  the  sounder  rule, 
though  cases  may  be  found  holding  the 
sureties  under  such  circumstances  not 
liable :  see  Belden  v .  Hurlbut,  94  Wis. 
562,  citing  a  number  of  cases  pro  and  con. 

10  Probate  Court  v.  Strong,  27  Vt.  202 ; 
Lanier  v.  Irvine,  21  Minn.  447  ;  Judge  of 
583 


*  553,  *  554 


THE    ADMINISTRATION    BOND. 


§256 


executor  shall  administer  according  to  the  will  was  held  valid; !  so  a 
bond  of  an  administrator  de  bonis  non  expressed  to  be  "with  the  will 
annexed,"  although  otherwise  in  the  form  of  an  ordinary  adminis- 
tration bond;3  and  where  a  residuary  legatee  gave  the  bond  as  exe- 
cutor, containing  conditions  not  required  of  a  residuary  legatee  and 
omitting  an  important  condition  required  by  law,  it  was  held  that 
this  was  a  good  common-law  bond,  and  sufficient  to  support  the 
grant  of  letters.3  It  is  also  held  that  a  bond  payable 
*"to  the  Governor,"  instead  of,  as  the  statute  required,  "to  [*554] 
the  State,"  is  not  for  that  reason  void.4  A  bond  may  be 
voidable  at  the  option  of  the  obligees,  but  binding  on  the  obligors; 6 
and  one  defective  by  reason  of  the  mistake  or  ignorance  of  the  clerk 
will  be  aided  in  equity  as  against  the  sureties.6  So  it  is  said  that 
the  conjunction  "  or  "  should  be  construed  as  "  and, "  if  necessary  to 


Probate  v.  Claggett,  36  N.  H.  381  ;  Pettin- 
gill  v.  Pettingill,  60  Me.  411;  Casoni  v. 
Jerome,  58  N.  Y.  315 ;  Ordinary  v.  Cooley, 
30  N.  J.  L.  179,  and  authorities;  Hol- 
brook  t\  Bentley,  32  Conn.  502 ;  Peebles 
»>.  Watts,  9  Dana,  102  ;  Newton  v.  Cox, 
76  Mo.  352;  McFadden  v.  Hewett,  78 
Me.  24,  28. 

1  Where  the  statute  prescribes  that 
executors  shall  give  bond  "in  the  same 
manner  administrators  are  by  law  obliged 
to  be  bound,"  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
executor's  bond  should  be  in  the  precise 
form  of  an  administrator's  bond ;  and  the 
condition  in  the  administrator's  bond  to 
"administer  according  to  law"  is  prop- 
erly stated  in  an  executor's  bond  to 
"  administer  according  to  the  will,"  the 
law  requiring  the  executor  to  administer 
according  to  the  will :  Hall  v.  Cushing,  9 
Pick.  395. 

2  Hartzell  v.  Commonwealth,  42  Pa. 
St.  453. 

8  Cleaves  v.  Dockray,  67  Me.  118,  con- 
taining a  list  of  authorities  in  support  of 
the  doctrine,  that  a  bond  may  be  good  at 
common  law  although  not  in  conformity 
with  the  statute :  Ware  v.  Jackson,  24 
Me.  166;  Lord  v.  Lancey,  21  Me.  468; 
Clap  v.  Cofran,  7  Mass.  98;  Sweetser  v. 
Hay,  2  Gray,  49  ;  Stephens  v.  Crawford, 
S  G&  499 ;  Williams  v.  Shelby,  2  Orcg. 
141  ;  m  such  case,  however,  the  bond  can- 
not !)(■  sued  in  the  name  of  a  successor 
to  t be  judge  to  whom  it  ie  given :  Fryo  v. 
Crockett,  77  Me.  157  ;  the  writ  in  a  suit 
on  such  a  bond  may  be  amended  by  in- 
serting the  name  of  a  person  as  prose- 
IS84 


cutor:  Waterman  u.  Dockray,  79  Me. 
149.  And  also  in  support  of  the  proposi- 
tion, that  a  bond  is  not  in  all  cases  void 
as  a  statutory  bond  merely  because  it 
does  not  in  all  respects  conform  to  the 
statute:  Van  Deusen  v.  Hay  ward,  17 
Wend.  67 ;  Morse  v.  Hodsdon,  5  Mass. 
314;  Proprietors  of  Union  Wharf  v. 
Mussey,  48  Me.  307 ;  Commissioners  v. 
Way,  3  Ohio,  103;  Postmaster  General 
v.  Early,  12  Wheat.  136;  Commonwealth 
v.  Laub,  1  Watts  &  S.  261  ;  Baldwin  v. 
Standish,  7  Cush.  207.  To  which  may  be 
added  United  States  v.  Hodson,  10  Wall. 
395,  with  the  authorities  there  cited.  See 
also  McChord  v.  Fisher,  13  B.  Monroe, 
193,  in  which  it  is  held  that,  although 
letters  granted  in  a  county  which  was  not 
the  intestate's  domicil  at  the  time  of  his 
death,  and  in  which  he  had  no  personal 
property,  were  void,  yet  the  bond  given 
by  an  administrator  so  appointed  was  a 
good  bond  at  common  law.  So  it  is  else- 
where held,  that  a  bond  voluntarily  given 
is  a  good  common-law  bond  though  the 
court  had  no  power  to  require  it :  see  au- 
thorities cited  in  Bellinger  v.  Thompson, 
26  Oreg.  320,  337;  and  Woerner  on 
Guardianship,   §  40. 

4  Sikes  v.  Truitt,  4  Jones  Eq.  361.  To 
the  same  effect,  Johnson  v.  Fuquay,  1 
Daua,  514;  Wiser  v.  Blachly,  1  John.  Ch. 
607;  Farley  v.  McConnell,  7  Lans.  428, 
430. 

6  Cohea  v.  State,  34  Miss.  179. 

6  Armistead  v.  Bozman,  1  Ired.  Ecj 
117;  Sikes  v.  Truitt,  supra. 


§257 


AMOUNT   OF   THE   PENALTY. 


*  554,  *  555 


give  validity  to  the  bond; *  and  that  a  strict  and  technical  conformity 
to  the  statute  is  not  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  bond,  if  it  sub- 
stantially conform  thereto,  and  does  not  vary  in  any  matter  to  the 
prejudice  of  the  rights  of  the  party  to  whom  or  for  whose  benefit  it 
is  given.2  Where  a  bond  contains  more  than  the  statute  prescribes, 
the  stipulations  not  required  by  the  statute  may  be  rejected  as  sur- 
plusage, and  the  bond  still  be  regarded  as  a  statutory  bond,  and  sued 
on  as  such.8  Although  the  statute  require  two  sureties,  the  bond  is 
valid  if  signed  by  only  one.4  But  the  alteration  of  an  administra- 
tion bond  executed  by  the  principal  and  two  sureties,  by  increasing 
the  amount  of  the  penalty  with  the  consent  of  the  principal,  but 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  sureties,  discharges  the  latter;  and 
the  execution  of  such  bond  by  two  additional  sureties  who  did  not 

know  of  the  alteration  is  void.5 
[*  555]       *  §  257.    Amount  of  the  Penalty.  —  The  amount  in  which 

security  is  to  be  given  is  necessarily  left  to  the  discretion  of 
the  probate  court,  the  statutes  generally  fixing  a  mini- 
mum only,  below  which  the  amount  must  not  be  ordered. 
In  Louisiana  the  amount  of  the  bond  is  fixed  by  the  law 
at  one  fourth  beyond  the  estimated  value  of  the  mov- 
ables and  immovables,  and  of  the  credits  comprised  in 
the  inventory  exclusive  of  bad  debts ; 6  and  in  Missis- 
sippi in  a  penalty  at  least  equal  in  value  to  such  estate 
as  the  law  determines  shall  be  under  his  charge;7  in  the  other 
States,  at  double  the  value  of  the  personal  property  of  any  kind,8 
including  the  proceeds  of  sale  of  real  estate,  where  the  power  to  sell 
is  given  by  will,  which  may  come  into  the  hands  of  the  executor  or 
administrator  by  virtue  of  his  office.9     The  clerk  and  court  taking 


Amount  of 
bond  in  the 
discretion  of 
the  court, 
above  the 
minimum 
prescribed  by 
statute. 


1  Outlaw  v.  Farmer,  71  N.  C.  31. 

2  Farley  v.  McConnell,  supra ;  Casoni 
v.  Jerome,  58  N.  Y.  315. 

3  Woods  v.  State,  10  Mo.  698,  citing 
Grant  v.  Brotherton,  7  Mo.  458,  as  an- 
nouncing the  doctrine  that  a  bond  given 
under  a  statute  is  valid,  although  not  in 
the  words  of  the  statute,  unless  the  stat- 
ute prescribe  a  form,  and  declare  bonds 
not  in  accordance  therewith  void. 

4  Steele  v.  Tutwiler,  68  Ala.  107. 

6  The  first  two  sureties  were  dis- 
charged by  the  alteration  of  the  bond 
without  their  consent;  the  last  two,  be- 
cause their  signing  was  upon  the  under- 
standing that  they  were  bound  only  with 
the  first  two :  Howe  v.  Peabody,  2  Gray, 
556. 

6  Civ.  Code,  art.  1041  ;  Voorhies,  Rev. 
St.  §  1477;  Feray's  Succession,  31  La. 
An.  727. 


7  Ellis  v.  Witty,  63  Miss.  117;  Code, 
1880,  §  1995. 

8  See  as  to  rule  in  California :  Kidd'g 
Estate,  Myr.  239.  New  York :  Suttou  v. 
Weeks,  5  Redf.  353.  In  case  of  ancillary 
letters:  Matter  of  Prout,  128  N.  Y.  70. 
By  "  value  "  is  meant  the  value  as  esti. 
mated  by  the  court :  Williams  v.  Verne, 
68  Tex.  414,  418. 

9  In  the  construction  of  wills,  as  in 
equity,  land  directed  to  .be  sold  and  con- 
verted into  money  is  treated  as  money : 
Craig  v.  Leslie,  3  Wheat.  563,  577  ;  Alii- 
eon  v.  Wilson,  13  Serg.  &  R.  330  ;  Gray  v. 
Smith,  3  Watts,  289.  Rogers,  J.,  in  Com- 
monwealth v.  Forney,  says :  "  As  an  ex- 
ecutor is  appointed  on  a  special  trust  and 
confidence  reposed  in  him  by  the  testator, 
he  is  not  required,  in  the  first  instance,  to 
give  security  for  the  faithful  execution  of 
the  trust.    But  as  the  confidence  of  the 

585 


*555,  *556 


THE    ADMINISTRATION    BOND. 


257 


Duties  of  the  ^ie  bond  are  required  to  satisfy  themselves  of  the  sol- 
court  in  taking  vency  of  the  sureties  offered,  and  for  this  purpose  may 
examine  the  sureties  themselves,  the  principals,  or  any 
other  person,  under  oath;  and  the  bond  should  not  be  accepted 
unless  signed  by  a  sufficient  number  of  sureties  who  appear  to  be 
perfectly  solvent,  owning  property  in  excess  of  their  debts  and  lia- 
bilities, and  of  what  may  be  exempt  from  execution  under  the  law; x 
and  the  aggregate  amount  of  the  property  so  owned  by  the 
*  several  sureties  should  equal  at  least  the  penalty  of  the  [*  556] 
bond.'2  It  is  generally  required  that  the  sureties  be  inhabi- 
tants of  the  State; 8  and  certain  classes  of  persons  are  in  some  States 
forbidden  from  being  received  as  sureties  on  administration  bonds.4 
But  such  provisions  are  considered  directory  merely,  and  not  de- 
signed to  invalidate  the  bond  where  the  law  is  disregarded.5  Under 
the   English   Probate  Act,6  the  court  or  registrar  taking   bond    is 


testator  may  be  abused,  on  complaint  that 
the  executor  is  likely  to  prove  insolvent, 
&c,  the  Orphan's  Court  may  compel  him 
to  give  security,  &c.  in  such  sums,  and 
with  such  sureties,  as  they  may  think 
reasonable.  When  such  a  step  is  taken, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  have  regard 
to  the  will,  and  especially  to  the  value  of 
the  estate,  whether  real  or  personal ;  and 
when  the  will  contains  a  power  to  sell 
real  estate  for  payment  of  debts  or  for 
other  purposes,  to  exact  bail  sufficiently 
large  to  cover  the  amount  arising  from 
the  sale  of  the  real  as  well  as  the  personal 
property.  So  on  the  death  of  the  execu- 
tor, or  when,  being  unwilling  or  unable  to 
comply  with  the  order  of  the  court,  he  is 
dismissed,  the  same  course  may  and  ought 
to  be  pursued  as  regards  the  administra- 
tor cum  testamento  annexo."  3  W.  &  S. 
353,  355,  et  serj.  So  where  the  executor 
has  power  to  charge  the  whole  estate,  the 
bond  should  be  determined  by  the  value 
of  the  whole  estate,  real  and  personal : 
Ellis  v.   Witty,  63  Miss.  117. 

1  But  the  judge  cannot  arbitrarily  re- 
ject a  bond  as  to  the  sufficiency  of 
which  no  reasonable  doubt  exists :  Car- 
penter v.  Probate  Judge,  48  Mich.  318. 
Sureties  on  the  bond  who  are  legatees, 
With  DO  property  except  as  derived  from 
the  will,  are  not  sufficient:  Ellis  V.  Witty, 
63  Mies.  117,  120. 

2  I'.nt  the  acceptance  of  an  insolvent 
rnrety  will   not  affect  the  validity  of  the 

appointment  or  the  acta  of  the  adminis- 
trator: Ilerriman  V.  Janney,31  La.  An.  270, 

5  Hf, 


280 ;  nor  the  fact  that  the  bond  is  insuffi- 
cient :  Mumford  v.  Hall,  25  Minn.  347, 353. 

3  See  the  statutory  provisions  on  this 
subject  in  the  several  States.  But  the 
non-residence  of  the  sureties,  or  of  a 
sole  surety,  is  not  a  sufficient  cause  to 
vitiate  the  sale  of  lands  for  the  payment 
of  debts,  after  consummation  and  confirm- 
ance  :  Johnson  v.  Clark,  18  Kans.  157,  167  ; 
and  in  Massachusetts,  where  a  bond  was 
signed  by  two  inhabitants  of  the  State 
and  one  who  was  described  as  an  inhab- 
itant of  another  State,  it  was  held  suffi- 
cient, if  approved  and  accepted  by  the 
probate  court,  to  qualify  the  administra- 
tor to  act:  Clarke  i\  Chapin,  7  Allen, 
425  et  seq.  Nor  is  their  non-residence  in 
the  county  where  application  is  made  a 
sufficient  reason  for  refusing  administra- 
tion: Barksdale  v.  Cobb,  16  Ga.  13.  And 
in  South  Carolina  sureties  are  not  re- 
quired to  be  resident  in  the  State :  Jones 
v.  Jones,  12  Rich.  L.  623.  Nor  in  Ken- 
tucky :  Rutherford  v.  Clarke,  4  Bush,  27. 

4  So  in  Missouri  no  judge  of  probate, 
sheriff,  marshal,  clerk  of  court,  or  deputy 
of  either,  and  no  attorney  at  law,  shall  be 
taken  as  security  in  any  bond  required 
in  the  probate  court:  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  20. 
The  reason  for  excluding  the  officers 
mentioned  is  patent  enough ;  attorneys 
at  law,  however,  seem  to  be  discriminated 
against  rather  as  a  protection  to  them 
from  the  annoyance  of  their  clients  than 
from  motives  of  public  policy. 

6  Hicks  V.  Chouteau,  12  Mo.  341. 
6  20  &  21  Vict.  c.  77,  §  82. 


§257 


AMOUNT   OF   THE  PENALTY. 


556 


authorized  to  take  more  bonds  than  one,  "so  as  to  limit  the  liability 
of  any  surety  to  such  amount  as  the  court  or  district  registrar  shall 
think  reasonable."  This  seems  a  wise  and  highly  beneficial  meas- 
ure, commending  itself  to  the  favorable  consideration  of  the  legisla- 
tive authorities,  but  seems  not,  thus  far,  to  have  received  any 
attention  or  favor  in  America.1 


1  In  Baldwin  v.  Standish,  7  Cush.  207, 
and  People  v.  Lott,  27  111.  215,  the  appel- 
late courts  criticise  the  approval,  by  the 
probate  court,  of  several  smaller  bonds 
in  lieu  of  one  bond  of  the  required  amount, 
but  held  the  bonds  given  to  be  valid.  It 
is  not  clear  why,  if  they  were  valid  stat- 
utory bonds,  the  practice  of  taking  such 
should  be  discouraged.  It  may  be  un- 
wise, of  course,  to  permit  courts  of  special 
jurisdiction,  created  by  statute,  to  tran- 
scend the  limits  of  their  statutory  powers ; 
and  in  this  view  the  substitution  of  several 
smaller  bonds  for  the  one  bond  required 
by  the  statute,  is  against  the  policy  of 
the  law.  But  probate  tribunals  are  more 
keenly  aware,  probably,  than  appellate 
courts,  of  the  hardships  connected  with 
the  giving  of  bonds  by  executors,  admin- 
istrators, and  guardians ;  and  how  much 
more  rational  it  would  be  to  permit  the 
taking  of  bonds  in  which  the  surety  is 
allowed  to  limit  his  liability  to  an  amount 
which  he  might  feel  able  to  lose  without 
ruin  to  himself  and  his  family,  —  pro- 
vided such  bonds  aggregate  the  amount 
deemed  sufficient  to  protect  the  estate  un- 
der administration,  —  rather  than  to  insist 
on  single  bonds,  exceeding  in  amount,  in 
many  cases,  the  total  estate  of  each  single 
surety,  and  thus  compel  them  to  assume 
the  risk  of  being  reduced  from  affluence 
to  poverty.  The  statute  alluded  to  in 
the  text  is  designed  to  afford  the  relief 
by  legislation  which  the  probate  judges 
in  the  cases  mentioned  above  undertook 
to  accomplish  without  legislative  sanc- 
tion, —  that  of  allowing  the  principal  to 
give  two,  three,  or  even  more  bonds,  in 
limited  amounts,  aggregating,  however, 
the  total  penalty  required,  who  might 
find  it  impossible  to  obtain,  or  against 
his  conscience  to  ask,  sureties  to  stand 
each  for  the  whole  amount. 

Other  English  statutes  have  been  en- 
acted, the  principle  of  which  might  with 
profit  be  extended  to  the  American  law 
touching  administration  bonds.    Thus,  by 


the  act  of  6  &  7  Wm.  IV.  c.  28,  it  was 
provided  that  deposits  of  stock  or  ex- 
chequer bills  might  be  made  in  lieu  of 
giving  security  by  personal  bonds.  Why 
could  not  collateral  security  be  received 
in  America,  —  government,  State,  or  other 
safe  bonds,  notes  secured,  or  even  money, 
to  be  deposited  in  the  county  treasury 
and  held  as  long  as  necessary  to  protect 
the  estate  under  administration?  or  even 
the  administrator's  or  guardian's  recog- 
nizance, to  operate  as  a  lien  on  his  real 
estate,  if  sufficient,  until  discharged  by 
order  of  the  court  1  This  would  consti- 
tute unexceptional  security,  if  regulated 
by  proper  legislation,  and  would  secure 
the  services  of  the  most  efficient  and  trust- 
worthy persons,  who  under  the  existing 
law,  refuse  to  serve  in  any  fiduciary  ca- 
pacity, because  they  deem  it  both  unwise 
and  unjust  to  their  friends  to  ask  them 
to  become  personally  liable  on  a  bond. 

The  statute  of  1  &  2  Vict.  c.  61,  pro- 
viding for  the  acceptance  of  the  guaranty 
of  the  Guaranty  Society,  in  lieu  of  bonds 
with  personal  sureties,  from  any  person 
required  by  virtue  of  his  office  to  give 
bond,  was  followed  by  a  number  of  simi- 
lar enactments  in  England  and  Canada, 
and  within  a  few  years  past  Surety  In- 
surance Companies  have  been  incorpo- 
rated in  many  of  the  States,  enabling 
executors,  administrators,  curators,  guar- 
dians, &c.  to  assume  their  trusts  upon 
giving  the  bond  or  guaranty  of  a  com- 
pany organized  and  chartered  to  this 
end.  The  rapid  increase  of  the  number 
of  these  corporations,  the  readiness  with 
which  the  State  legislatures  give  them 
legal  existence  (they  are  recognized  by 
law  in  California,  Connecticut,  Florida, 
Georgia,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Maine,  Massa- 
chusetts, Michigan,  Missouri,  Nebraska, 
New  Jersey,  New  York,  Oregon,  Penn- 
sylvania, Rhode  Island,  Wisconsin,  and 
perhaps  other  States),  and  the  favor  which 
they  enjoy  at  the  hands  of  the  public, 
are  sufficient  evidence  that  they  meet  a 
587 


*  557  *  558 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    LOND. 


§  258 


*  §  258.    Joint  or  Separate  Bonds.  —  When  there  are  sev-  [*  557] 
eral  executors  or  administrators,  they  may,  in  some  of  the 
States,  *  either  give  one  joint  bond,  or  each  a  separate  bond.1  [*  558] 

Where  separate  bonds  are  given,  each  must  be 
may  give  a         in  a  penalty  as  high  as  that  required  for  a  joint  bond, 
joint,  or  each  a    Decause  each  executor  or  administrator  is  lawfully  en- 

Qpnnrnfp       inn.  * 

titled  to  take  into  possession  and  administer  any  or  all 
of  the  assets,  and  the  court  cannot  control  them  in  this 
right.2  But  if  a  joint  bond  be  given,  even  though  ex- 
empt in  the  will  from  giving  bond,  its  effect  is  to  make 
them  both  liable  to  the  obligees,  as  trustees  for  credi- 


separate  bond. 

If  separate, 
each  must  be 
in  the  full 
amount  of  the 
penalty. 


both3principals  ^ors  an(^  others  having  an  interest  in  the  estate,  to  the 
are  liable  to  the  extent  of  the  assets  which  come  into  their  joint  posses- 
assets  coming  sion.8  At  common  law,  under  which  executors  were  not 
to  their  joint  required  to  give  bond,  an  executor  was  not  liable  for 

possession.  *  °  '  . 

the  malfeasance  of  a  co-executor,  unless  it  could  be 
shown  that  he  had  concurred  therein,  or  that  there  had  been  joint 
possession  of  the  estate,  from  which  it  would  be  inferred  that  one 
executor  had  yielded  to  the  control  of  the  other,  who  squandered  it.* 
Not  as  The  same  rule  is  adhered  to  in  America  as  to  co-admin- 

executors,  istrators  and  co-executors;  the  executor  or  administra- 

deeply  felt  want  and  offer  a  remedy  for  beyond    the    power  of    courts,    personal 

a  grievous  evil.     Giving  bond  for  faithful  sureties,  or  parties  in  interest.      No  class 

and  proper  administration  of  estates  held  of  persons  will  hail  with  profounder  grati- 

in  trust  is  by  them  reduced  to  a  business  fication  the  success  of  these  corporations 

question,  and  no  longer  involves  the  haz-  than  courts  of  testamentary  jurisdiction, 

ard    of   ruin   to   confiding   and   generous  as  furnishing  them   with  the   most   effi- 

frieuds  and  their  families  ;  honest,  capa-  cient  assistance  in  protecting  the  interest 

ble  business  men  are  enabled  to  assume  of    those    over   whom   their    jurisdiction 

the  management  of  trust  estates  without  extends. 

placing  themselves  under  galling  obliga-  The  attempt  has  been  made  to  induce 

tions  to  bondsmen,  the  contemplation  of  legislatures  to  make  the  premium  paid  for 

which  has  hitherto  deterred  the  very  best  such  bonds  a  charge  upon  the  estate;  and 

class  of  men  from  becoming  trustees.  it  is  not  easy  to  distinguish  between  these 

But  the  greatest  benefit  arising  out  of  costs  and  other  costs  deemed   necessary 

the  operation  of  Surety  Insurance  Com-  for  the    protection   and  preservation    of 

panics   lies   in   the  fact  —  not  that   they  estates  ;  but  without  legislative  authoriza- 

offer  the  most  certain  indemnity  to  those  tion  courts  decline  to  allow  the  expense 

whose   interests  have   suffered    in   conse-  of  such  bonds  as  costs  of  the  administra- 

quence  of  lack  of  integrity  or  skill  on  the  tion:  Eby's  Estate,  164  Pa.  St.  249. 

part  of  trustees,  which  they  unquestion-  x  As  controlled  by  statutory  provisions 

ably  do  (Bee  remarks  of  the  President  of  on  this  subject  in  the  several  States, 

the  High  Court  of  Justice  in  Carpenter  v.  2  See  post,  §§  346  et  seq. 

Solicitor,   I,.  It.  7  P.  D.  235),  —  but  that  8  Ames  v.  Armstrong,  106   Mass.  15; 

thej    tend    very    greatly    to    prevent   the  Braxton  v.  State,  25  Ind.  82;  Pritchard  v. 

occurrence  of  defalcations  and  maladmin-  State,  34  Ind.  137;    Moore  r.  State,  49 

i     r.uioiiH.      It    is  their  interest,  and  they  Ind.   558;    in    this   case,    Buskirk,    C.  J., 

provide   themselves   with   the   menus,  to  dissenting,  says,  "  In  my  opinion,  the  cases 

keep   under  surveillance   and    control    the     of  Braxton  v.  State,  and  Pritchard  i>.  State, 
conduct  of  the  executor  or  guardian   for     should  be  squarely  overruled  "  :  p.  562. 
whom  they  stand  a-  surety,  toan  extent         4  Post.  §  S48. 


§  259  APPROVAL   AND    CUSTODY    OF    BONDS.  *  558,  *  559 

tor,  as  stick,  is  not  liable  for  waste  committed  by  his  co-executor, 
nor  for  assets  which  the  latter  received  and  misapplied,  without  his 
own  knowledge  or  fault.1  But  it  is  held  in  most  States  that  the 
effect  of  giving  a  joint  bond  is  to  make  the  principals  but  as  sureties 
liable  for  each  other  as  sureties,  so  long  as  the  joint  for  each  other- 
administration  continues;2  while  in  some  of  them  this  doctrine  is 
denied,  and  it  is  asserted  that  they  are  jointly  liable  for  joint  acts, 
and  each  separately  liable  for  separate  acts,  because  they  signed 
as  principals,  and  not  as  sureties.8  The  principals  are 
[*  559]  *  bound,  however,  to  protect  the  joint  sureties  from  the  con- 
sequences of  each  other's  acts;4  whether  the  sureties  in  a 
joint  administration  bond  are  liable  to  one  of  the  joint  administra- 
tors for  the  default  of  the  other  has  been  held  both  ways.5  An 
anonymous  case  is  mentioned  in  a  Pennsylvania  report,  where  an 
insolvent  administrator  was  allowed  to  recover  against  his  own  sure- 
ties for  the  benefit  of  the  creditors  of  the  estate ;  but  the  bond  was 
not  an  administration  bond,  and  the  case  does  not  affect  the  prin- 
ciple under  consideration.9 

§  259.  Approval  and  Custody  of  Bonds.  —  The  administration 
bond  must  be  approved  and  attested  or  certified  by  the  court,  judge, 
or  clerk  taking  the  same;  if  taken  by  the  judge  or  clerk    _  t.      . 

.  °  '  J  ,  Duties  of  court 

in  vacation,  it  should  be  reported  to  and  approved  by    in  approving 
the  court  at  its  next  regular  term ;  it  should  be  recorded   bonds- 
in  a  book  kept  for  that  purpose,  and  the  original  filed  with  the 
papers  pertaining  to  the  estate,  and  a  careful  compliance  with  the 
requirements  of  the  statute  with  reference  to  the  taking  of  bonds  is 

1  State  v.  Wyant,  67  Ind.  25,  33,  citing  and  he  cannot  be  held  liable  as  a  surety," 
Call  v.  Ewing,  1  Blackf.  301,  Ray  v.  and  overruling  the  cases  of  Braxton  v. 
Doughty,  4  Blackf.  115,  and  Davis  v.  State,  supra,  Pritchard  v.  State,  supra, 
"Walford,  2  Ind.  88.  and     Moore     v.     State,    supra,    to     the 

2  Brazier  v.  Clark,  5  Pick.  96 ;  New-  extent  of  announcing  that  under  the 
comb  v.  Williams,  9  Mete.  (Mass.)  525;  statute  of  Indiana  there  can  be  no  joint 
Towne  v.  Ammidown,  20  Pick.  535 ;  Boyd  administration  bond,  and  where  such  a 
v.  Boyd,  1  Watts,  365  ;  Clarke  v.  State,  6  one  is  given  it  will  be  treated  as  the 
Gill  &  J.  288  ;  Caskie  v.  Harrison,  76  Va.  separate  bond  of  each  one  of  the  principals. 
85,  93;  Green  v.  Hamberry,  2  Brock.  403,  *  Little  v.  Knox,  15  Ala.  576;  Dobyna 
420;  Morrow  v.  Peyton,  8  Leigh,  54;  v.  McGovern,  15  Mo.  662;  Stephens  v. 
Hooper  r.  Hooper,  29  W.  Va.  276,  299  ;  Taylor,  62  Ala.  269 ;  Eckert  v.  Myers, 
Eckert  v.  Myers,  45  Oh.  St.  525 ;  Albro  v.  45  Oh.  St.  525 ;  McCoun  v.  Sperb,  53 
Robinson,  93  Ky.  195.  Hun,  165;  Albro  v.  Robinson,  93  Ky.  195. 

8  But  the  sureties  are,  of  course,  liable  5  That   they  are   not   liable :   Nanz  v. 

for  the  joint  acts  of  both,  and  the  separate  Oakley,  37  Hun,  495 ;  Hoell  v.  Blanchard, 

acts  of  each:  Sandford,  Ch.,  in  Kirby  v.  4  Desaus.  21  ;  that  they  are  liable:    see 

Turner,   reported    in    Hopkins   Ch.    309;  State  v.  Wyant,  supra,  and  Nanz  v.  Oakley, 

Nanz  v.   Oakley,   120  N.  Y.  84;  and  see  120  N.  Y.  84,  reversing  s.  c.  in  37  Hun, 

State  v.  Wyant,  supra,  quoting  the  dissent-  supra. 

ing  opinion  of  Buskirk,  C.  J.,  in  Moore  v.  6  Gibson,  C.  J.,  in  Wolfinger  v.  Fors- 

The  State,  49  Ind.  558,  "  He  executed  the  man,  6  Pa.  St.  294. 
bond  as  a  principal,  and  not  as  a  surety, 

589 


559,  *  560 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    BOND. 


§260 


Mor  strict  *  ^ne  ^n^  °f  ju^ges  an(l  clerks.  But,  while  the  courts  of 
some  states  some  States  require  a  strict  and  technical  adherence  to 
than  in  others.  the  directions  of  the  statute,  and  hold  bonds  insufficient 
which  are  not  taken  in  conformity  therewith,1  these  formalities  are 
generally  deemed  to  be  directory  only,  and  a  variance  from  them  in 
matters  not  essential  to  the  nature  of  the  contract  of  the  sureties 
will  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  bond.2  An  administrator's  bond 
is  an  official  document,  and  cannot  be  removed  from  the 
office;  if  needed  as  evidence  a  *  certified  copy  is  sufficient.8  [*  560] 
If  it  as  well  as  the  record  thereof  is  lost  or  destroyed,  it  may 
be  substituted  as  the  record  of  a  probate  court.4 

§  260.  Special  Bonds.  —  In  some  of  the  States  special  bonds  are 
required  to  be  given  whenever  it  becomes  necessary  to  sell  real 
Bond  to  sell  estate  for  the  payment  of  debts  or  legacies,  upon  the 
real  estate.  theory  that  the  ordinary  administration  bond  covers 
only  the  personal  estate  coming  into  the  hands  of  the  executor  or 
administrator.  This  subject  is  fully  considered  in  connection  with 
the  sale  of  real  estate  by  order  of  the  probate  court,  to  which,  in 
order  to  avoid  repetition,  reference  is  hereby  made.6  It  appears 
from  the  authorities  there  cited,  that  in  such  case  the  sureties  on 
the  regular  administration  bond  are  not  liable  for  the  misapplication 
or  loss  of  the  funds  arising  from  the  sale  of  lands.6 

Where  a  will  makes  the  same  person  executor  and 
trustee,  the  executor's  bond  cannot  be  construed  as  con- 
ditioned for  the  performance  of  the  duties  belonging  to 
the  trustee;  a  separate  bond  should  in  such  case  be 
given  as  trustee.7 


Executor's 
bond  does  not 
extend  to  the 
acts  of  the 
same  person 
as  trustee. 


1  Mathews  v.  Patterson,  42  Me.  257, 
holding  that  each  probate  bond  must  be 
specifically  acted  on  by  the  probate  judge, 
as  required  by  the  statute ;  see  ante,  §  256. 

2  Thus  it  is  held  in  Missouri,  that  an 
administrator's  bond  is  valid,  though  not 
approved  by  the  court:  James  v.  Dixon, 
21  Mo.  538;  Henry  v.  State,  9  Mo.  778; 
State  v.  Farmer,  54  Mo.  439 ;  Brown  v. 
Weatherby,  71  Mo.  152.  So  in  Wiscon- 
sin :  Cameron  v.  Cameron,  15  Wis.  1.  In 
Georgia:  Ford  v.  Adams,  43  Ga.  340.  In 
Indiana:  State  v.  Chrisman,  2  Ind.  126. 
In  Alabama  it  was  held  that  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  raise  ;i  violent,  if  not  a  conclusive, 
presumption  that  the  bond  was  received 

by  the  COnrt  as  the  security  required  by 

the  statute,  when  it  is  found  upon  the  files 
without  any  evidence  accompanying  it 
that  it,  has  been  r<  jected,  and  that  the 
principal  lias  proceeded  to  execute  the 
duties  <>f  his  office:  McClure  o.  Colclough, 

b    Ala.  65,  7'2,  resting  Upon   the  authority 
590 


of  Bank  of  United  States  v.  Dandridge,  12 
Wheat.  64,  and  Apthorp  v.  North,  14 
Mass.  167. 

8  Miller  v.  Gee,  4  Ala.  359. 

4  Tanner  v.  Mills,  50  Ala.  356.  A 
minute  entry  of  the  court,  reciting  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  administrator,  the  ap- 
proval of  the  bond,  its  amount,  and  the 
names  of  the  sureties,  is  competent  evi- 
dence, and,  if  not  rebutted,  sufficient  to 
authorize  the  substitution.  But  a  decree 
of  substitution  is  not  conclusive  as  to  the 
execution  of  the  bond. 

6  Post,  §  472. 

6  See  also  Kobinson  v.  Millard,  133 
Mass.  236,  denying  the  liability,  although 
the  administrator  charged  himself  in  his 
administration  account ;  Probate  Court  ». 
Hazard,  13  It.  I.  3,  where  the  sale  was 
under  a  power  in  the  will,  and  numerous 
authorities  on  the  subject  are  reviewed. 

1  Hinds  v.  Hinds,  85  lud.  312,  315. 


§  260  SPECIAL   BONDS.  *  560 

It  appears  from  a  former  chapter 1  that  residuary  legatees  may  in 
some  States  dispense  with  the  necessity  of  official  administration  by 
giving  bond  to  pay  any  debts  that  may  be  due  from  the  B0nd  0f  re3id. 
testator,  and  legacies.  Such  bonds,  when  given  by  an  uary  legatee, 
executor  who  is  also  the  sole  or  residuary  legatee,  operate  as  a  con- 
clusive admission  of  assets,  because  it  is  conditioned  that  the  debts 
shall  be  paid,  and  are  strongly  discouraged  in  a  New  Hampshire 
case.2 

1  Ante,  §  202. 

2  Morgan  v.  Dodge,  44  N.  H.  255.     See  authorities  under  §  202. 


591 


$61 


PROCEDURE    IN    OBTAINING    LETTERS. 


§261 


♦CHAPTER  XXVni. 


[*  561] 


OP   THE   PROCEDURE   IN   OBTAINING   LETTERS   AND   QUALIFYING    FOR 

THE   OFFICE. 


§  261.  The  Petition  for  the  Grant  of  Letters  Testamentary  or  of 
Administration.  —  There  was  occasion  in  a  former  chapter *  to  point 
Rule  requiring   ou*  *ne  diversity  of  decisions  upon  the  question  of  the 


jurisdictional 
facts  to  be 
affirmatively 
shown  by  the 
record. 


validity  or  conclusiveness  of  the  judgments  and  decrees 
of  probate  courts,  and  to  show  that  in  some  of  the  States 
these  are  assailable  in  collateral  proceedings,  and  will 
be  held  void  unless  the  record  recites  all  the  facts  upon 
which  the  jurisdictional  power  of  the  court  to  render  them  depends. 
In  these  States  the  rule  is  stated  to  be,  that  the  record  must  show 
R  j      ,  .  the  facts  giving  jurisdiction,  or  the  judgment  rendered 

most  States,       will  be  held  void.2     In  the  majority  of  States,  however, 

tmSifferred  tne  rule  is  less  stringent>  and  jurisdiction  will  be  either 
in  collateral       presumed  or  inferred  from  such  facts  as  may  be  stated, 


1  On  the  Nature  of  Probate  Courts  in 
America,  ch.  xv.,  and  especially  §§  145, 
146. 

2  Vick  v.  Vicksburg,  1  How.  (Miss.) 
379, 439.  It  was  held  in  this  case  that  the 
appointment  of  an  administrator  de  bonis 
turn  with  the  will  annexed  was  void,  be- 
cause it  did  not  aver  the  death  or  removal 
of  the  executor.  So  it  is  held  in  Illinois, 
that,  before  an  estate  can  be  committed  to 
the  public  administrator,  it  must  affirm- 
atively appear  that  there  is  no  relative  or 
creditor  in  the  State,  and  that  the  appli- 
cation was  made  by  a  party  in  interest, 
otherwise  the  proceedings  will  be  non 
coram  judice,  ami  void:  Unknown  Heirs 
v.  Baker,  23  111.  484.  In  New  York,  to 
give,  validity  to  a  deed  of  land  executed 
under  a  sale  by  virtue  of  a  surrogate's 
order,  it  most  be  affirmatively  shown  that 
BO  account  ,,f  the  j,(.rs.,iial  estate  and  of 
the  debts  wot  presented  to  the  surrogate : 
Ford  v.  Walsworth,  15  Wend.  149;  in 
Kentucky,  that  an  order  of  the  county 
court  setting  aside  an  executor  and  ap- 
pointing an   administrator  should   show 


the  reason  for  so  doing :  Bronaugh  v. 
Bronaugh,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  621.  In  Ne- 
braska the  petition  for  the  appointment 
must  allege  the  vital  points  conferring 
jurisdiction,  or  the  proceeding  will  be 
void:  Moore  v.  Moore,  33  Neb.  509.  In 
Michigan,  that  the  appointment  of  an 
administrator  is  void,  unless  the  record 
shows  all  jurisdictional  facts,  i.  a.,  the  in- 
terest of  the  applicant :  Shipman  v.  But- 
terfield,  47  Mich.  487  ;  Haug  v.  Primeau, 
98  Mich.  91  ;  Besancon  v,  Brownson,  39 
Mich.  388,  392.  In  this  State  the  jurisdic- 
tional facts  which  the  petition  must  allege 
are  that  the  person  whose  estate  is  to  be 
administered  died  intestate,  and  was  at  the 
time  of  his  death  either  an  inhabitant  or 
resident  of  the  county  in  which  the  ap- 
plication is  made,  or,  if  he  died  out  of  the 
State,  that  ho  left  an  estate  in  the  county 
to  be  administered.  If  these  facts  appear, 
the  court  has  jurisdiction  to  appoint  an 
administrator  upon  the  petition  of  a  party 
interested  :  Wilkinson  v.  Conaty,  65  Mich. 
614,  621. 


§  261  THE   PETITION   FOR  LETTERS.  *  561,  *  562 

or  from  the  judgment  or  decree  itself.1  So,  for  in-  proceedings 
stance,  the  statement  in  the  petition  referring  to  the  £l™t  rendered? 
decedent  as  "  late  of  "  a  county  named,  is  held  a  suffi- 
cient averment  of  the  decedent's  domicil  in  such  county  at 
[*562]  the  *time  of  his  death.2  Although  the  petition  must  be 
verified,  and  the  averment  of  the  applicant  "  to  the  best  of 
his  knowledge  and  belief"  is  insufficient,8  yet  objection  on  this  score 
cannot  be  made  in  a  collateral  proceeding,  and  does  not  avoid  the 
surrogate's  jurisdiction.4  So  it  has  been  held,  that,  while  an  order 
appointing  an  administrator  with  the  will  annexed  is  defective  in 
not  showing  that  the  executor  named  in  the  will  refused  to  qualify, 
it  is  still  valid  if  in  fact  he  did  so  refuse ;  and  this  may  be  shown  to 
support  the  order  when  collaterally  questioned ; 6  and  that  prima 
facie  evidence  that  unadministered  assets  remain  is  sufficient  to 
support  the  appointment  of  an  administrator  de  bonis  non  with  the 
will  annexed.6 

But  while  it  may  not  in  all  cases  be  absolutely  necessary  to  sup- 
port the  jurisdictional  power  of  the  court  by  a  recital  of  all  the 
facts,  yet  it  is  of  the  highest  importance  that  a  record   What  shoul(j 
should  be  made  of  all  facts  and  circumstances  which   be  shown  by 
call  forth  the  judicial  powers  of  the  court.     The  peti-   x  e  recor  ' 
tion  of  the  applicant  for  letters  affords  the  most  convenient  means 
for  proper  allegations,  so  that  the  finding  upon  it  may  constitute  an 
adjudication  of  all  the  necessary  facts.     The  averments    Content8  of 
should  include,  among  other  things,  first,  the  death  of   the  petition 
the  person  whose  estate  is  to  be  administered,  his  place     or  et  eis' 
of  domicil  at  the  time  of  his  death,  and  whether  he  died  testate  or 
iutestate;  next,  if  he  left  a  will,  that  it  has  been  admitted  to  pro- 
bate, and  the  name  or  names  of  the  persons  nominated  executors; 
third,  if  the  application  be  for  letters  of  administration  with  the 
will  annexed,  that  no  executor  has  been  named,  or  that  all  so  named 
have  renounced,  died,  or  are  incompetent  to  serve,  and  the  circum- 
stances conferring  upon  the  applicant  the  right  to  administer  the 
estate;  fourth^  the  names  of  the  widow,  husband,  next  of  kin,  or 
heirs,  as  the  case  may  be ;  fifth,  the  nature  of  the  goods,  effects,  or 
other  estate  left  by  the  deceased,  and  its  estimated  value;    sixth, 
if  the  application  be  for  letters  of  administration   generally,  the 
relation    or    kinship    between    the    deceased    and    the   applicant; 

1  See  ante,  §§   143,   145;   Johnston   v.  8  Sheldon  v.  Wright,  7  Barb.  39  ;  Rod- 
Smith,   25    Hun,   171,    176;   Robinson   v.  erigas  v.  East  River  Inst.,  76  N.  Y.  316. 
Eppin.g,  24  Fla.  237.                                               *  Sheldon  v.  Wright,  supra ;  Pleasants 

2  Abel  v.  Love,  17  Cal.  233 ;  Town-  v.  Dunkin,  47  Tex.  343  ;  In  re  Miller,  32 
send  v.  Gordon,  19  Cal.  188.  These  cases  Neb.  480.  It  seems  that  in  Alabama  the 
were  decided  under  a  statute  construed  as  petition  need  not  be  sworn  to :  Davis  v. 
requiring  jurisdictional  facts  to  be  shown  Miller,  106  Ala.  154. 

of  record  to  validate  the  judgment.  *  Peebles  v.  Watts,  9  Dana,  102. 

6  Pumpelly  v.  Tinkham,  23  Barb.  321, 
VOL.  I.  —  38  593 


*  563,  *  56-i  PROCEDURE   IN    OBTAINING    LETTERS.  §  262 

seventh,  if  the  application  be  for  letters  *  de  bonis  non,  the  [*  563] 
death,  removal,  or  resignation  of  the  former  executor  or  ad- 
ministrator, or,  if  there  were  several,  of  all  of  them;  eighth,  if  the 
decedent  was  at  the  time  of  his  death  a  non-resident  of  the  county, 
the  existence  of  property  within  the  county,  or  other  circumstance 
showing  the  necessity  of  administration;  and,  generally,  whatever 
facts  may  exist  which,  under  the  law  of  the  State  and  the  particular 
circumstances,  may  have  a  bearing  upon  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
to  grant  letters,  the  right  of  the  applicant  to  be  appointed,  and 
the  amount  of  the  bond  to  be  required,  or  whether  any  bond  be 
necessary.1 

§  262.   Notice  to  Parties  entitled  to  Administer.  —  It  has  already 
been  shown2  that  letters  granted  to  a  stranger,  or  to  one  whose 
claim  to  the   administration  is  inferior  to  that  of   an- 
N«  ^tters  other,  will  be  revoked  upon  the  application  of  one  hav- 

pranted  with-     ing  a  superior  right,  unless  such  applicant  had  been 
out  notice  to       notified  or  cited  before  the  grant  was  made.     The  grant 

all  having  an  °  .... 

equal  or  supe-  to  one  of  several  parties  having  equal  claims  will  not, 
th^app^cant.  as  a  general  thing,  be  revoked  for  the  want  of  notice, 
on  the  application  of  another,  unless  there  be  a  statu- 
tory requirement  to  give  notice  or  issue  citation  to  all  entitled;  but 
it  is  evidently  wise  and  just  that  notice  should  be  given  to  all  who 
are  in  the  same  degree  of  preferment,  so  that  the  most  suitable  per- 
son may  be  selected,  and  possible  disqualifications  or  objections 
pointed  out  before  the  appointment  is  made.8  The  petition  of  the 
applicant  must,  as  already  stated,4  show,  among  the  other  facts 
necessary  to  give  the  court  jurisdiction,  his  interest  in  the  estate  to 
be  administered;5  on  the  same  principle,  one  showing  no  interest 
cannot  intervene  or  object  to  an  appointment.6  And  where  the  stat- 
ute provides  for  citation,  it  must  be  served  upon  all  of  those 
*  having  a  prior  right,  who  have  not  renounced,  and  must  [*  564] 
conform  to  the  requirements  of  the  statute.7     Failure  to  cite 

1  The  importance  of  embodying  in  the  constituted  an  adjudication  of  the  ques- 

petition  all  the  jurisdictional  facts  appears  tion  of  residence  unassailable  collaterally, 

from  the  language  of  Judge  Sawyer  in  a  no  matter  how  clear  the  fraud  or  error  of 

case  decided  in  the  Ninth  Judicial  Dis-  the  allegation  be :  Holmes  v.  Oregon  R. 

trict  of  the  United  States,  arising  upon  the  R.  Co.,  7  Sawy.  380.     For  cases  holding 

validity  of  letters  granted  by  a   county  that  lack  of  jurisdiction  cannot  be  asserted 

court  in   Oregon.     The   statute   of    that  collaterally  on  the  ground  that  decedent 

State  provides  that  the  applicant  for  let-  was  not  a  resident  of  the  county,  see  ante, 

ters   of  administration   shall  set  forth   in  §  204. 

his    petition    the   facts  necessary  to  give  2  Ante,  §  243. 

the  court  jurisdiction  ;  the  petition  under  8  See  ante,  §  243,  p.  *531. 

consideration  net  forth,  /.  a.,  that  the   in-  4  Ante,  §  261,  p.  *  561,  note  2. 

testate  was  at  the  time  of  his  death  an  6  Shipman  v.  Hutterfield,  47  Mich.  487, 

inhabitant  of  the  county  in  which  letters  Besancon  v.  Brownson,  39  Mich.  388,392. 

were  granted,  and  it,  is  held,  both  by  the  6  Succession    of    Berfuse,  34  La.  An. 

District  and  the  Circuit  Court,  that  the  r>99 ;  Drexel  v.  Berney,  1  Dem.  163. 

grant  of  letters  in  response  to  the  petition  7  Hence,  if  the  statute  require  the  ap- 
594 


§  262 


NOTICE    TO    PARTIES    ENTITLED. 


564 


the  widow,  or  the  next  of  kin,  is  an  irregularity,  for  which  the  letters 
may  be  revoked,  but  does  not  generally  render  them  absolutely 
void;1  yet  it  has  sometimes  been  held  to  avoid  the  administration.2 
But  one  having  such  notice  as  would  be  conveyed  by  the  statutory 
mode  of  service  cannot  complain  that  the  statute  was  not  observed; 3 
nor  one  who  voluntarily  enters  an  appearance.4 

All  parties  to  whom  citation  or  notice  is  given,  or 
who  have  a  beneficial  interest  in  the  estate  to  be  admin- 
istered, may  appear  and  oppose  the  appointment  of  a 
particular  applicant ;  and  the  interest  giving  such  a 
person  a  standing  in  court  may  be  shown  at  the  hear- 
ing, without  having  been  previously  adjudicated.6 

The  statute,  in  some  of  the  States,  prescribes  a  limi- 
tation to  the  right  of  granting  administration  in  a  given 
number  of  years  after  the  decedent's  death.6 

Provision  is  made  in  Massachusetts,  that,  upon  due 
notice  to   legatees   and   creditors,    letters   testamentary 
may  be  granted  to  an  executor  without  sureties  on  his 
bond ;  and  it  is  held  that  publication  in  the  newspaper    without  bond 
of  the  executor's  request  is  sufficient  notice,  although  a  minor  is 
interested  who  has  no  guardian.7 


Such  parties 
have  the  right 
to  appear  and 
be  heard  upon 
the  application 
for  letters. 


Time  within 
which  admin- 
istration will 
be  granted. 

Notice  to  lega- 
tees of  applica- 
tion for  letters 
testamentary 


plicant  to  pray  for  the  appointment  of 
the  petitioner,  a  citation  conforming  to  an 
application  praying  for  the  appointment 
of  the  public  administrator  (not  petition- 
ing) is  insufficient :  Batchelor  v.  Batche- 
lor,  1  Dem.  209,  211  ;  s.  c.  in  64  How.  Pr. 
350. 

1  Kelly  v.  West,  80  N.  Y.  139,  145 ; 
Sheldon  v.  Wright,  7  Barb.  39  ;  James  v. 
Adams,  22  How.  Pr.  409;  Garrett  v. 
Boling,  37  U.  S.  App.  42,  60 ;  and  see,  on 
this  point,  ante,  §  243,  p.  *  531,  and  author- 
ities there  mentioned. 

3  Torrance  v.  McDougal,  12  Ga.  526. 

8  Davis  v.  Smith,  58  N.  H.  16. 

*  Spencer  u.  Wolfe,  49  Neb.  8. 

6  Thus,  a  natural  child  pretending  to 
have  been  legally  acknowledged  by  her 
deceased  parent  can  oppose  the  applica- 
tion of  collateral  heirs  for  the  administra- 
tion of  the  succession ;  and  the  proof  of 
parentage  and  acknowledgment  may  be 
made  on  trial  of  the  opposition  in  the  ap- 
plication for  administration  :  Succession 
of  Hel>ert,  33  La.  An.  1099.  And  see 
post,  §  263. 

6  In  Connecticut  administration  can- 
not be  granted  after  seven  years  from  the 
death  of  the  intestate  ;  but  a  will  may  be 


proved  at  any  time  within  ten  years  after 
the  testator's  death  :  Lawrence's  Appeal, 
49  Conn.  411,  422.  In  Massachusetts, 
where  administration  may  be  granted 
more  than  twenty  years  after  the  dece- 
dent's death  upon  property  which  there- 
after first  comes  to  the  knowledge  of  a 
person  interested  therein,  if  applied  for 
within  five  years  after  it  becomes  known, 
knowledge  is  not  necessarily  to  be  imputed 
from  the  fact  that  such  person  was  the 
brother  of  the  intestate  and  knew  of  his 
death :  Parsons  v.  Spaulding,  130  Mass. 
83.  In  Illinois  the  limit  is  seven  years, 
unless  circumstances  prevented  an  earlier 
application  for  letters :  Fitzgerald  v. 
Glancy,  49  111.  465,  469.  Statutory  pro- 
visions are  also  found  in  Iowa  :  Phinny  v. 
Warren,  52  Iowa,  332  ;  and  Texas  :  Patter- 
son v.  Allen,  50  Tex.  23  (four  years),  25. 
In  Tennessee  administration  cannot  be 
granted  (with  certain  exceptions)  more 
than  twenty  years  after  the  decedent's 
death  :  Rice  v.  Henly,  90  Tenn.  69 ;  in 
Kentucky  administration  granted  after 
twenty  years  is  declared  to  be  void  :  Gen. 
St.  1894,  §  3895. 

7  Wells  v.  Child,  12  Allen,  330. 

595 


*565  PROCEDURE   IN   OBTAINING   LETTERS.  §§263,264 

*  §  263.  Nature  of  the  Proceeding.  —  The  grant  of  letters  is  [*  565] 
said  to  be  a  proceeding  in  rem  in  the  strictest  sense,1  and  in 
Proceedings       a  contest  for  the  right  of  administration  there  are  strictly 
said  to  be  no  parties  plaintiff  or  defendant.    The  applicants  are  all 

actors,  some  of  whom  may  withdraw  and  others  come  in 
at  any  time  during  the  progress  of  the  cause,  even  after  appeal.2  The 
decedent's  property  rights  should  not  be  litigated  in  such  proceed- 
An  person  ings.3  Objections  to  the  grant  of  letters  will  be  heard 
in  interest  may  from  any  person  claiming  under  oath  to  be  interested, 
be  a  party.  ^  yg  ^^it  to  appear  is  disputed,  the  question  will  be 
decided  upon  proof,4  and  if  it  be  found  that  he  is  a  mere  stranger, 
and  not  interested  as  creditor,  heir,  or  legatee,  he  cannot  be  heard 
even  to  object  that  there  are  other  persons  having  priority  over  the 
applicant  under  the  law.8  The  grant  must  be  during  the  term  suc- 
ceeding the  publication  of  notice  and  citation  by  the  clerk,  where 
such  notice  and  citation  are  required ;  but  the  application  may  be 
continued  from  term  to  term  by  order  of  the  court,  without  new 
notice ;  parties  in  interest  are  bound  to  take  notice  of  such  continu- 
ances.6 This  subject  is  more  fully  considered  in  the  chapter  on  the 
Nature  of  American  Probate  Courts.7 

§  264.     Nature  of  the   Decree,   and  its   Authentication.  —  Letters 
testamentary  or  of  administration  can  be  granted  only  by  the  decree 

or  order  of  the  probate  court  in  term  time ; 8  but  pro- 
be granted  by  vision  is  made  in  most  of  the  States,  that  during  vaca- 
or°bbvjudgert'  tion  letters  may  be  issued  by  the  judge  or  clerk  of  the 
or  clerk  in         court,    which  will  be  ratified  by  the  court  at  the  next 

regular  term  thereof  unless  valid  objection  be  made 
against  the  appointee.9  Appointment  by  the  clerk  without  action  of 
the  court  is  held  to  be  a  ministerial,  not  a  judicial  act,  and  therefore 

1  Quidort  v.  Pergeaux,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  contemplated  by  the  statute  to  deny  the 
472  477.  authority  of  the  clerk  to  appoint;  aud  see 

2  Atkins   v.   McCormick,   4   Jones    L.  Rayburn  v.  Rayburn,  34  W.  Va.  400  (by 
274.  a  divided  court)  ;  Judd  v.  Ross,   146  111. 

8  In  re  McCarty,  81  Mich.  400 ;  Grimes  40,  holding  that  where  the  clerk  issues 

r.  Talbert,  14  Md.  109.  the  letters  to   one   before   the   statutory 

4  P,urwell  v.  Shaw,  2  Bradf.  322 ;  Fer-  period  had  expired  within  which  others 

ris's  Will,  Tuck.  15.     See  ante,  p.  *  564.  had  a  prior  right  to  the  appointment,  but 

6  Burton  v.  Burton,  4  Harr.  73.  where  the  record  failed  to  show  when  the 
0  .McGehee  v.  Ragan,  9  Ga.  135.  court  had  approved  the  appointment,  it 

7  Ante,  §  148.  would    he  presumed   in  a  collateral   pro- 
*  Lawson   v.  Mosely,  6   La.  An.  700.  ceeding  that  such  approval  was  not  made 

As  to  public  administrators  acting  with-  until  authorized  bylaw.     It  is  held,  that 

out  appointment,  see  ante,  §  180.  letters  granted  in  vacation  are  valid  until 

J   Brown  v.  King,  2  Iml.  520,  holding  rejected  by  the  court,  and  that  subsequent 

that  where  in  such  case  a  person  notifies  action  by  the  court,  recognizing  the  grant, 

[erV  thai  he  u  a  creditor  and  intends  will  constitute  a  valid  approval,  without  a 

t..  apply  for  letters  as  soon  as  tint  law  per-  formal  entry  of  confirmation  of  record: 

mitt,  thin  was  held  not  such  a  controvert-  Macey  v.  Stark,  116  Mo.  481,  496. 
in"  of  Mir-   right  to  administer  as  was 


§  264  NATURE   OF   THE   DECREE.  ** 565-567 

its  validity  may  be  inquired  into  collaterally.1  Letters  purporting 
to  be  granted  by  the  proper  authority,  in  due  form,  and 
[  *  566]  *  sealed  with  the  office  seal  of  the  court,  are  good  without 
the  signature  of  the  clerk  until  set  aside  for  informality.2 
But  in  Louisiana,  where  the  probate  judges  may  appoint  adminis- 
trators of  estates  of  less  value  than  $500  without  the  notice  or  bond 
required  in  other  cases,  when  no  one  would  give  the  bond,  and  clerks 
are  authorized  to  administer  small  successions,  it  is  held  that  neither 
of  these  provisions  authorizes  the  clerk  to  appoint  administrators.3 
And  letters  cannot  be  issued  by  a  deputy  clerk  in  his  own  name.4 

The  memorandum  by  the  clerk  of  the  qualifying  of  the  executor,  im- 
mediately following  the  entry  of  the  will  of  record,  is  sufficient  record 
evidence  of  the  grant  of  letters  testamentary  and  quali- 
fication  of  the  executor  ;  and  the  failure  of  the  clerk  to    clerk  to  record 
record  letters  testamentary  as  required  by  the  law  does    £he  oMment 
not  vitiate   his   authority.5     But   the   authority  of  the    does  not  vitiate 
clerk  to  appoint  administrators  does  not  relieve  them    etters- 
of  the  necessity  of  rendering  an  order  in  making  the  appointment ; 
and  until  such  order  is  rendered,  the  appointment  is  invalid,  and  a 
party  with  a  better  right  to  such  appointment  is  in  time  to  present 
his  application.6 

The  delivery  of  letters  is  not  necessary.7     The  order  by  the  proper 
court,  that  "  R.  be  and  hereby  is  appointed  administrator    Appointment 
on  giving  proper  bond,"  fixing  the  amount  of  the  bond    J^T'S  ^"not 
and   the   surety,  is  an  absolute  and   not  a  conditional    delivered. 
grant,  if  the  bond  be  filed  on  the  same  day.8     Possession  of  letters 
by  the  person   to    whom    they  purport  to   have   been    Evidence  of 
granted,   is  prima  facie  proof   of   delivery ;  °   and  the    authority. 
proper  proof  of  appointment  is  the  letters  of  administration  or  a 
certified  copy  thereof,  or  of  the  order  of  appointment.10     The  words 
"  given  under  my  hand  and  seal  of  office,"  with  date  and  signature 
of  the  ordinary,   constitute  a  sufficient    authentication  of  letters  of 
administration ; u  and  a  clerk's   certificate,   with  his  signature  and 
official    seal,    is   complete   evidence  of  the  appointment ; 1J 
[*  567]  but  letters  not  authenticated  by  the  seal  of  the  court  *  grant- 

1  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cragin,         »  State  v.  Price,   21   Mo.   434 ;   Bow- 
71  111.  177,  180.  man's  Appeal,  62  Pa.  St.  166;   Weir  v. 

2  Post  v.  Caulk,  3  Mo.  35.  Monahan,  67  Miss.  434,448. 

8  Wilson  v.  Imboden,  8  La.  An.  140.  «  Tucker  v.  Harris,  13  Ga.  1 ;  Hoskins 

But  see  Succession  of  Picard,  infra,  refer-  v.  Miller,  2  Dev.  L.  360. 

ring  to  the  act  of  1 880,  authorizing  clerks  »  McNair  v.  Dodge,  7  Mo.  404 ;  Hensley 

to  issue  letters.  v.  Dodge,  7  Mo.  479.    See  Eller  v.  Richard- 

4  Stewart  v.  Cave,  1  Mo.  752.  son,  89  Tenn.  575. 

6  Wright  v.  Mongle,  10  Lea,  38.  w  Davis  v.  Shuler,  14  Fla.  438. 

6  Succession   of  Picard,    33   La.    An.  »  Witzel  v.  Pierce,  22  Ga.  112.     And 

1135.    Letters,  issued  in  the  absence  of  an  see  Harris  v.  Chipman,  9  Utah,  101. 

order  therefor  signed  by  the  judge  or  clerk,  12  Davie  v.  Stevens,  10  La.  An.  496. 
are  void :  Wirt  v.  Pintard,  40  La.  An.  233. 

597 


oo7 


PROCEDURE   IN    OBTAINING    LETTERS. 


§265 


ing  them  are  inoperative,  and  not  admissible  in  evidence.1  A 
sheriff  is  not  by  virtue  of  his  office  the  administrator  of  any  de- 
ceased person ;  he  must  first  be  empowered  to  act  by  the  probate 
court.2  A  widow  testifying  that  "she  was  acting  in  the  capacity  of 
surviving  wife  of  her  deceased  husband "  does  not  thereby  prove 
that  she  had  properly  qualified  to  enable  her  to  control  the  commu- 
nity estate.3 

§  265.  Oath  of  Office.  — The  oath  of  office  which  executors  and  ad- 
ministrators are  required  to  take  before  entering  upon  the  discharge 
Authority  is  °^  tne^r  duties  is  the  decisive  ceremony  clothing  them  with 
complete  on  the  title  to  the  personal  property  of  the  deceased  testator 
oath  ofmS  °  or  intestate,  and  all  the  authority  and  responsibility  con- 
office,  nected  with  their  office.  The  refusal  of  an  executor  to 
take  this  oath  is,  even  in  England,  tantamount  to  a  refusal  of  the 
executorship,  and  must  be  so  recorded.  So  the  refusal  to  give  bond 
and  take  the  oath  required  by  the  law  amounts  to  the  refusal  of  the 
office  of  administrator.4  The  form  of  the  oath  is  usually  prescribed  by 
Who  mav  ad-  statute,  and  may  be  administered  by  the  judge  or  clerk 
minister  oath.  0f  the  probate  court ;  but  this  is  not  essential ;  it  may 
be  taken  before  any  officer  competent  to  administer  oaths,  and  trans- 
mitted to  the  probate  court.5  Unless  they  qualify,  neither  an  exec- 
utor nor  an  administrator  has  authority  to  act ;  what  they  attempt  to 
do  as  such  is  void,6  or  the  act  of  an  executor  de  so?i  tort.1 

In  some  States  it  is  necessary  for  the  administrator  to  take  an  ad- 
ditional oath  before  selling  real  estate  under  order  of  the  probate 
court.  This  is  treated  of  in  connection  with  the  sale  of  real  estate 
for  the  payment  of  debts. 8_ 


i  Tuck  v.  Boone,  8  Gill,  187. 

2  Hence  a  judgment  entered  against 
a  "sheriff  as  administrator  ex  officio" 
cannot  bind  the  estate :  Davis  v.  Shuler, 
supra. 

3  Roberts  v.  Longley,  41  Tex.  454. 

*  Burnley  v.  Duke,  1  Rand.  108;  Mun- 
roe  v.  James,  4  Munf.  194,  198. 

5  Succession  of  Penny,  13  La.  An. 
94.     The  oath  may  be  taken  before  ap- 


pointment :  Morris  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  Pac. 
R.  R..  65  Iowa,  727. 

6  Moore  v.  Ridge-way,  1  B.  Mon.  234 ; 
Carter  v.  Carter,  10  B.  Mon.  327.  Where 
letters  of  administration  are  granted,  the 
fact  that  the  oath  is  not  taken  until  after 
the  letters  are  issued,  is  an  irregularity 
merely  :  Gallagher  v.  Holland,  20  Nev.  1 64. 

7  Ante,  ch.  xxi. 

8  Post,  §  472. 


r,w 


§XM 


CONCLUSIVENESS   OF   DECREE   GRANTING   LETTERS. 


568 


[*  568] 


♦CHAPTER   XXIX. 


ON   THE   REVOCATION   OF   LETTERS   TESTAMENTARY   AND   OF 
ADMINISTRATION. 


§  266.    Conclusiveness  of  the  Decree  or  Order  granting  Letters.  — 

Letters  testamentary  and  of  administration,  granted  by  a  court  having 
jurisdiction  for  such  purpose,  are,  while  unrepealed,  con- 
elusive  evidence  of  the  authority  of  the  grantees,  and    be  questioned 
cannot  be  impeached  collaterally,  even  for  fraud,1  al-   coIlaterall/» 
though  they  may  be  revoked  or  annulled  in  the  method   but  may  be 
pointed  out  by  statute  to  that  end,  in  a  direct  proceed-   anmiiiedhi & 
ing,  or  by  appeal.     Until  such  revocation  by  the  decree    direct  pro- 
of a  competent  court,  or  appeal,  it  cannot  be  questioned 
in  either  a  common-law  or  chancery  court,  and  it  follows  that  the  acts 
of  an  executor  or  administrator  are  valid,  even  though  the  probate 
of  the  will  or  the  grant  of  letters  was  erroneous,  or  obtained  upon 
fraudulent  representations,  or   under  a  forged  will.2     The    binding 
necessity  of  this  principle   has   been   enlarged  upon  in  a  previous 
chapter,  in   connection  with  the  subject  of  jurisdiction   of  probate 
courts,8  and  again  when  considering  the  nature  of  the  proof  necessary 


1  See  on  this  subject,  ante,  ch.  xv., 
and  especially  §§  145,  146.  Among  the 
cases  specially  holding  that  letters  testa- 
mentary and  of  administration  cannot  be 
questioned  in  a  collateral  proceeding  may 
be  mentioned:  Sadler  i».  Sadler,  16  Ark. 
628,  632;  Simmons  v.  Saul,  138  U.  S.  439  ; 
Bryan  v.  Walton,  14  Ga.  185,  196;  Emery 
v.  Hildreth,  2  Gray,  228;  Flinn  v.  Chase, 
4  Denio,  85  ;  Burnley  v.  Duke,  2  Robins 
(Va.)  102,  129  ;  Morgan  v.  Locke,  28  La 
An.  806 ;  James  v.  Adams,  22  How.  Pr 
409  ;  Riley  v.  McCord,  24  Mo.  265,  269 . 
Quidort  v.  Pergeaux,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  472; 
Belden  v.  Meeker,  47  N.  Y.  307  ;  Pleas- 
ants v.  Dunkin,  47  Tex.  343  ;  Buehler  v. 
Buffington,  43  Pa.  St.  278,  293;  Hart  v. 
Bostwick,  14  Fla.  162,  174  ;  Succession  of 
Lee,  28  La.  An.  23,  24  ;  Barclay  v.  Kimsey, 
72  Ga.  725;  Plume  v.  Howard  Savings 
Institution,  46  N.  J.  L.  211;  Wheat  v. 
Fuller,  82  Ala.  572;  Kling  v.  Connell,  105 
Ala.  590;  Ex  parte  Crafts,  28  S.  C.  281  ; 


Johnson  v.  Johnson,  66  Mich.  525 ;  Mills 
v.  Hern  don,  77  Tex.  89  ;  Missouri  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bradley,  51  Neb.  596. 

2  Peebles'  Appeal,  15  S.  &  R.  39  ;  Kit- 
tredge  v.  Folsom,  8  N.  H.  98  ;  Schluter  v. 
Bowery  Bank,  117  N.  Y.  125,  130;  Frank- 
lin v.  Franklin,  91  Tenn.  119;  Allen  v. 
Dundas,  3  Term  Rep.  125  (case  of  a 
forged  will) ;  Spencer  v.  Cahoon,  4  Dev.  L. 
225  ;  Record  v.  Howard,  58  Me.  225,  228; 
Fisher  v.  Bassett,  9  Leigh,  119;  Price  v. 
Nesbitt,  1  Hill  (S.  C.)  Ch.  445,  461  ;  Ben- 
son v.  Rice,  2  N.  &  McC.  577  ;  Shephard  v. 
Rhodes,  60  111.  301  ;  Smith  ».  Smith,  168 
111.  488,  496 ;  Thompson  v.  Samson,  64 
Cal.  330,  332  ;  Seldner  v.  McCreery,  75 
Md.  287,  295  ;  Reed  v.  Reed,  91  Ky.*267  ; 
Hudnall  v.  Han,  172  111.  76.  And  see,  as 
to  the  effect  of  the  annulment  of  a  will 
on  contest  on  the  distribution  previously 
made,  text  near  end  of  §  227. 

3  Ante,  §§  145,  146. 

5  (9 


*  568,  *  569  REVOCATION    OF    LETTERS.  §  267 

to  establish  the  residence  and  death  of  the  testator  or  intes- 
tate.1    The  effect  of  appeal  from  the  grant  of  *  letters  will  [*5G91 
be  considered  in  connection  with  the  general  subject  of  ap- 
peals from  judgments  or  orders  of  the  probate  court.2 

Letters  granted  by  a  court  having  no  jurisdiction,  being  void,  gain 
no  validity  by  the  mere  lapse  of  time.  Sales  of  real  estate  have 
T    ,     .  been  held  void,  and  the  purchaser  for  that  reason  held 

Letters  bv  a  .     '  .        ■*■ 

court  not  hav-  to  nave  obtained  no  title,  more  than  twenty  years  after- 
are  voiddlCtl°n  ward-8  Nor  can  letters  granted  during  the  pendency  of 
a  contest  of  the  will,  which  are  on  that  account  void, 
be  supported  as  a  grant  of  letters  pendente  lite.*  But  where  the 
authority  is  suspended  by  an  appeal  from  the  decree  appointing  the 
administrator,  it  is  revived  upon  dismissal  of  the  appeal,  and  dates 
back  to  the  original  appointment  without  further  action.5  It  is  held 
in  Minnesota,  that  the  appointment  of  an  administrator,  where  one 
already  exists,  although  not  authorized  by  the  statute,  is  a  mere 
irregularity,  but  not  void,6  but  in  North  Carolina  such  second  ap- 
pointment is  void.7  An  appointment  made  by  a  court  having  no 
jurisdiction  is  a  nullity;  hence  the  appointment  of  another,  by  a 
court  having  jurisdiction,  as  administrator  of  the  same  estate,  is 
good  without  formally  annulling  the  first  appointment.8 

§  267.  Jurisdiction  to  revoke  Letters.  —  The  power  to  revoke  the 
authority  of  executors  (which  in  England  is  usually  termed  the 
revocation  of  probate 9)  and  of  administrators  is  in  some  States  ex- 

1  Ante,  §§  204-211.  trators  (ante,  §  171),  renders  it  necessary 

2  Post,  §§  542  et  seq.  to  distinguish  between  the  revocation 
8  Ilolyoke  v.  Haskins,  5  Pick.  20.  of  probate  —  the  consequence  of  which 
4  Slade  v.  Washburn,  3  Ired.  L.  557.  would  seem  to  destroy  the  validity  of  the 
8  Fletcher  v.  Fletcher,  29  Vt.  98.     See  will  —  and  the  removal  of   the  executor, 

on  this  point  post,  §  547,  p.  *1204.  or  revocation  of  the  letters  testamentary 

6  Culver  v.  Hardenbergh,  37  Minn,  granted  to  him,  which  leaves  all  the  tes- 
225.  As  to  the  nullity  of  appointing  an  tameutary  dispositions  intact,  except  as 
administrator  de  bonis  non  before  the  to  the  nomination  of  the  person  who  is  to 
office  of  the  administrator  in  chief  has  execute  them :  Schoul.  Ex.  §  157,  note  (4). 
been  vacated  by  death,  resignation,  or  In  those  States  in  which  the  authority  of 
removal,  Bee  ante,  §  180,  p.  *  395;  also,  as  the  executor  is  conditioned  upon  appoint- 
to  the  appointment  of  another  adminis-  ment  by  the  probate  court,  it  seems  in- 
trator  for  the  same  succession  in  the  accurate  to  confound  the  revocation  of 
same  State,  by  another  court,  or  the  court  probate  with  the  removal  of  the  executor  ; 
of  another  county,  ante,  §  204,  p.  *  439.  for    though    the  former    conditions    the 

7  Bowman's  Estate,  121  N.  C.  373.  latter   as   a   necessary    incident,   yet   the 

8  Ex  jiarte  Barker,  2  Leigh,  719.  latter  does  not  condition  the  former.  So 
'J  The  change   introduced    in  most   of     with  regard  to  administration :  revocation 

the  American  States,  of  ascribing  the  of  administration  would  seem  to  imply  that 
authority  of  the  executor  to  the  appoint-  there  is  no  estate  liable  to  be  administered, 
ment  by  the  probate  court,  rather  than  to  and,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  that  no 
the  Domination  by  the  testator,  as  in  one  has  authority  as  administrator ;  while 
England,  which  bus  been  commented  on  the  revocation  of  letters  granted  only  with- 
in connection  with  the  subject  of  the  dis-  draws  the  authority  of  the  person  admin- 
tinction  between  executors  and  adminis-  istering,  which  may  be  conferred  upon 
600 


§  267 


JURISDICTION   TO    REVOKE   LETTERS.  *  569,  *  570 


ercised  by  courts  of  equity,  when  they  obtain  Power  to  re- 

T*  5701  -jurisdiction  over  the  executor  or  *  administra-  v?ke  authorit7 

L  J   °  of  executors  or 

tor,  under  the  well-known  rule,  that,   where  a  administrators 

court  of   equity  obtains  jurisdiction  for  one  purpose,  sti^exer- 

it  will  retain  it  until  full  and  satisfactory  justice  is  cised  by  courts 

rendered  to  all  the  parties  concerned.1     Thus,  in  a  case  °  equity' 

calling   for  the  intervention  of   chancery,  an  executor  may  be  re- 
strained  from   squandering  and  disposing  of  the  property  of   his 

testator,  and  removed,  or  a  receiver  appointed ; 2  and  an  but  in  extreme 

administrator  may  be  removed.8    But  where  this  author-  cases  onbr. 
ity  exists  in  courts  of  chancery  at  all,  it  will  be  exercised  in  extreme 
cases  only.4 

In  most  of  the  States,  however,  the  power  to  revoke  the  letters 

granted,  or,  as  it  is  more  usually  termed,  to  remove  an  executor  or 
administrator,  is  vested  exclusively  in  the  probate 
courts ; 5  superior  courts  exercising,  in  such  cases,  ap- 
pellate jurisdiction  only,6  or  granting  the  assistance  of 
equity  where  the  lower  court  is  without  the  necessary 
power  to  accomplish  justice.7 


and  is  in  most 
States  vested 
exclusively  in 
probate  courts. 


some  other  person. — The  consequences, 
therefore,  of  a  revocation  of  probate,  or 
of  administration,  must  be  to  annul  the 
will,  or  basis  of  administration,  constitut- 
ing rather  a  judicial  declaration  that  the 
■will,  or  estate  demanding  administration, 
never  existed,  while  the  removal  of  the 
executor  or  administrator,  or  the  revoca- 
tion of  letters  testamentary  or  of  adminis- 
tration, is  followed  by  the  same  conse- 
quences as  would  be  brought  on  by 
the  death  of  the  executor  or  adminis- 
trator. 

i  Walker  v.  Morris,  14  Ga.  323.  The 
Code  of  Georgia  provides  that  "  the  judg- 
ment of  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction 
may  be  set  aside  by  a  decree  in  chancery, 
for  fraud,  accident,  or  mistake,  or  the  acts 
of  the  adverse  party  unmixed  with  the 
negligence  or  fault  of  the  complainant  "  ; 
Code,  1882,  §  3595  (§§  3537,  3514,  of  for- 
mer codes),  which  is  held  to  authorize  the 
revocation  of  letters  of  an  executor  or 
administrator  by  decree  in  chancery.  See 
Bivins  v.  Marvin,  96  Ga.  268. 

2  Chappell  v.  Akin,  39  Ga.  177  ;  Cooper 
v.  Cooper,  5  N.  J.  Eq.  9,  11  ;  Bolles  v. 
Bolles,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  385  ;  Clemens  v. 
Caldwell,  7  B.  Mon.  171;  Walters  v. 
Hill,  27  Gratt.  388,  401  ;  Long  v.  Wortham, 
4  Tex.  381 ;  Wilkins  v.  Harris,  Winst.  Eq. 


(Part  II.)  41 ;  Harmon  v.  Wagener,  33 
S.  C.  487,  496;  Werborn  v.  Kahn,  93 
Ala.  201  ;  Henry  v.  Henry,  103  Ala.  582; 
Bivins  v.  Marvin,  96  Ga.  268.  And  see 
discussion  of  concurrence  of  probate  and 
chancery  jurisdiction  over  administrators 
in  the  case  of  Goodman  v.  Kopperl,  67 
111.  App.  42,  48,  et  seq.  (s.  c.  affirmed  169 
111.  136). 

3  Wallace  v.  Walker,  37  Ga.  265.  The 
administrator,  who  had  obtained  letters 
of  administration  by  fraudulently  repre- 
senting that  the  deceased  died  intestate, 
knowing  that  he  had  left  a  will,  was  re- 
moved upon  the  suit  of  a  foreign  execu- 
tor, under  a  statute  authorizing  the 
domiciliar  executor  of  another  State  to 
use  all  process  and  remedies  as  if  he  had 
qualified  in  Georgia. 

4  Handle  v.  Carter,  62  Ala.  95,  101  ; 
Goodman  v.  Kopperl,  169  111.  136. 

5  Hosack  v.  Rogers,  11  Pai.  603,  606; 
Chew  v.  Chew,  3  Grant  Cas.  289 ;  Taylor 
v.  Biddle,  71  N.  C.  1,  5;  Holbrook  w. 
Campau,  22  Mich.  288;  Succession  of 
Williams,  26  La.  An.  207  ;  Bolles  v.  Bolles, 
44  N.  J.  Eq.  385. 

6  Ledbetter  v.  Lofton,  1  Mnrph.  224  ; 
Wilson  v.  Frasier,  2  Humph.  30. 

7  Leddel  v.  Starr,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  159, 
163. 

601 


*  570,  *  571  REVOCATION   OF   LETTERS.  §  268 

§  268.    Recall  of  Letters  granted  -without   Authority  in   the    Court. 

—  It  is  evident  that  the  judgment  or  decree  of  any  court  is  conclu- 
sive and  binding  upon  the  court  rendering  it,  as  well  as 
erfvTrantcd      against  all  the  world.1     Hence,  where  the  probate  court 
can  be  recalled    has  once  regularly  conferred  the  appointment,  it  caunot 

onlv  for  cause;  ,,       .  ,  ,     n  •  ,    , 

remove  the  incumbent  except  tor  causes  recognized  by 
the  law  as  sufficient,  and  in  the  manner  authorized  by  statute.  But 
it  is  an  inherent  power  in  every  judicial  tribunal  to  correct 

an  error  which  it  may  have  *  committed,  when  no  [*  571] 
SithoufTuSr-  Positive  rule  of  law  forbids  it.2  "This  power," 
ity  in  the  court,  says  Gray,  J.,  "does  not  make  the  decree  of  a  court  of 
STairytime  probate  less  conclusive  in  any  other  court,  or  in  any  way 
impair  the  probate  jurisdiction,  but  renders  that  juris- 
diction more  complete  and  effectual."  8  It  is,  therefore,  the  duty 
of  the  court,  upon  the  application  of  any  party  in  interest,  or  even 
ex  mero  motu,*  to  annul  or  revoke  letters  granted  upon 
some0pa°rty0hi  proof  of  the  death  of  a  person  who  subsequently  appears 
interest,  or  ex  alive; 6  or  where  it  is  shown  that  there  was  no  jurisdic- 
tion, the  decedent  being  domiciled  at  the  time  of  his 
death  in  another  county,6  or  that  he  was  a  non-resident  of  the  State 
having  no  property  therein,7  or  that  the  will  was  admitted  to  pro- 
bate through  fraud  or  error,8  or  that  a  later  will  or  codicil  should  be 
admitted;9  or  where  a  will  is  found  to  have  been  already  probated,10 
or  is  discovered  after  grant  of  letters  of  administration  generally;11 
or  where  an  administrator  with  the  will  annexed  is  appointed  in 
derogation  of  the  executor's  right,12  or  one  not  preferred  is  appointed 
administrator  before  the  expiration  of  the  period  during  which  pref- 

1  See  ante,  §  146.  The  jurisdiction  to  grant  letters  on  estates 

2  McCabe  v.  Lewis,  76  Mo.  296,  301  ;     of  deceased  non-residents  of  the  State  is 
"  The  power  to  revoke  is  necessarily  in-     discussed  ante,  §  205. 

herent  in  the  Orphan's  Court,  and  a  part  8  Hambcrliu  v.  Terry,  1  Sin.  &  M.  Ch. 

of  the  essence  of  the  power  delegated  to  589. 

them  of  granting  administration":    Dal-  9  Waters  v.  Stickney,  12  Allen,  1,  4. 

rymple  v.  Gamble,  66  Md.  298,  311.  10  Watson  v.  Glover,  77  Ala.  323. 

8  Waters  v.  Stickney,  12  Allen,  1,  15.  u  Edelen    v.   Edelen,    10   Md.  52,  56; 

*  County  Court  v.  Bissell,  2  Jones  L.  Fatton's  Appeal,  31  Pa.  St.  465;  Kittredge 

387  ;  Watson  v.  Glover,  77  Ala.  323,  325 ;  v.  Folsom,  8  N.  H.  98,  107  ;  Broughton  v. 

see  Radford  v.  Gaskill,  20  Mont.  293,  295.  Bradley,   34   Ala.    694.     If    properly   au- 

<  Sec  ante,  §§  208-211,  on  the  validity  thenticated  it  makes  no  difference  that  it 

of    administration    on    the    estate    of   a  is  a  foreign  will:  Dalrymple  v.  Gamble, 

person   who   is   not   in   reality  dead,  and  66  Md.  298.    The  letters  of  administration 

authorities  there  cited.  Donaldson  v.  Lewis,  so  granted  are  voidable  only  :  post,  §  274. 

7  Mo.  Ajip.  403.  But  where  full  administration  has  been 

0   Wilson    v.    Frazier,    2     Humph.    30;  had  and  final  distribution  decreed,  it  is  not 

Johnson    v.   Corpenning,  4   Ired.  Eq.  216.  necessary  that  such  decree  be  first  revoked 

The  grant  in  hih  h  case  is  not  absolutely  before  probating  the  will:  Stackhouse  v. 

void,  but  only  voidable:    see  cases  cited  Berryhill,  47  Minn.  201. 
ante,  §  204.  u  Baldwin  v.  Buford,  4  Yerg.  16. 

7  Mallory  v.   Railroad,  53   Kans.  557. 
602 


§  269  THEORY   OF   REMOVAL   FOR   CAUSE.  *  571,  *  572 

erence  is  given  by  statute  to  others;1  or  where  administration  is 
improperly  granted,  there  being  no  estate  to  administer;2  or  where 
it  is  granted  to  a  person  or  by  a  judge  disqualified,8  or  by 
[*  572]  mistake  to  one  not  *  preferred,4  or  who  refuses  to  give  bond;  6 
or  where  an  administrator  de  bonis  non  was  appointed  while 
there  was  an  acting  executor  or  administrator.6  In  all  of  these  cases 
the  letters  granted  are  either  void  —  in  which  event  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  court  to  revoke,  or  rather  to  declare  null,  its  appointment,  so 
as  to  correct  the  record  and  prevent  further  mischief  from  being 
done,  as  soon  as  the  true  facts  become  known  to  it,  whether  by  evi- 
dence, or  otherwise  —  or  they  are  voidable,  and  may  be  revoked 
upon  the  application  of  some  person  having  an  interest  in  the  estate, 
and  upon  notice  or  citation  to  the  person  to  be  removed.7 

§  269.    Theory  of  Removal  for  Cause.  —  The  grounds  upon  which 
an  executor  or  administrator  will  be  removed  for  cause  are  manifold, 
and  are  commonly  designated  in  the  statutes.     In  Mis- 
souri the  statute  provides  for  the  revocation  of  letters    statutory 
in  the  following  cases,  which  may  be  looked  upon  as  a   causei> for 
fair  and  comprehensive  resume  of  the  provisions  on  this 
subject  in  the  several  States:   "If  any  executor  or  administrator 
become  of  unsound  mind,  or  be  convicted  of  any  felony  or  other  in- 
famous crime,  or  has  absented  himself  from  the  State  for  the  space 
of  four  months,  or  become  an  habitual  drunkard,  or  in  any  wise 
incapable  or  unsuitable  to  execute  the  trust  reposed  in  him,  or  fail 
to  discharge  his  official  duties,  or  waste  or  mismanage  the  estate,  or 
act  so  as  to  endanger  any  co-executor  or  co-administrator,  the  court, 

1  Mullauphy  v.  County  Court,  6  Mo.  Davis  v.  Miller,  106  Ala.  154  (where  one 
563 ;  Mills  v.  Carter,  8  Blackf.  203 ;  appointed  was  a  minor,  but  ratified  the 
Williams's  Appeal,  7  Pa.  St.  259  ;  Thomp-     appointment  on  reaching  majority). 

*on  v.  Huckett,  2  Hill  (S.  C.)  347;  Dun-  *  Morgan  v.  Dodge,  44  N.  H*  255  ;  or 

ham  v.  Roberts,  27  Ala.  701  ;   Barber  v.  upon  fraudulent  representations  :   ante,  § 

Converse,  1   Redf.   330;   Stoever  v.  Lud-  146;   Marston  v.  Wilcox,  2  111.  60;   and 

wig,  4  S.  &  R.  201  ;  Skidmore  v.  Davies,  when  made  ex  parte,  even  if  the  fraudulent 

10  Pai.  316  ;  Vreedenburgh  v.  Calf,  9  Pai.  representation  be  the  result  of  carelessness 

128;  Proctor  v.  Wanmaker,  1   Barb  Ch.  or  mistake,  and  made  by  one  entitled  in 

302 ;   Public   Administrator   v.  Peters,    1  the  same  class  with  others,  and  who  might 

Bradf.   100;    McCaffrey's  Estate,  38  Pa.  have  been  entitled  had  the  true  state  of 

St.  331 ;  Neidig's  Estate,  183  Pa.  St.  492;  facts  been  given :  Lutz  v.  Mahan,  80  Mo. 

Wilson  v.  Hoss,  3  Humph.  142  ;  Moore  v.  233.     In  New  York,  the  "  false  suggestion 

Moore,  1  Dev.  352;  Kerr  v.  Kerr,  41  N.  of  a  material  fact  "  authorizing  the  revoca- 

Y.  272,  278.  tion  of  letters  must  be  made  to  the  tribunal 

2  Estate  of  Huckstep,  5  Mo.  App.  581,  granting  the  letters,  and  not  to  one  pre- 
582 ;  Townsend  v.  Pell,  3  Dem.  367.  ferred   to    administer  :    Corn    v.  Corn,  4 

8  As  where  the  probate  judge  grant-  Dem.  394. 
ing  letters   is   interested    in   the   estate :  5  Morgan  v.  Dodge,  supra. 

Cottle,  Appellant,  5  Pick.  483  ;  Sigourney  6  Creath  v.  Brent,  3  Dana,  129  ;  Springs 

v.  Sibley,  21  Pick.  101,  and  s.  c.  22  Pick.  v.  Erwin,  6  Ired.  L.  27  ;  Griffith  v.  Frazier, 

507 ;    or  letters  are  granted   to  his  son :  8  Cr.  9. 

Roger  v.  Franklin,  79  Ala.  505;  or  to  a  7  Gary  Pr.  L.  §314;  Schoul.Ex.  §  155  ; 

minor:  Carow  v.  Mowatt,  2  Edw.  Ch.  57 ;  see  infra,  §  269,  and  post,  §  274. 

603 


*  572,  *  573  REVOCATION   OF   LETTERS.  §  269 

upon  complaint  in  writing,  made  by  any  person  interested,  supported 
by  affidavit,  and  ten  days'  notice  given  to  the  person  complained  of, 
shall  hear  the  complaint,  and,  if  it  finds  it  just,  shall  revoke  the 
letters  granted."1  In  addition  to  this,  it  is  made  the  duty  of  the 
court  to  revoke  letters  of  administration  whenever  a  will  of  the  sup- 
posed intestate  is  found  and  receives  probate,  and  letters  testamen- 
tary when  the  probate  of  a  will  upon  which  they  were  issued  shall 
be  set  aside ; 2  and  also  to  revoke  the  letters  of  an  executrix 
or  administratrix  upon  her  *  marriage,3  and  of  an  executor  [*  573] 
or  administrator  becoming  non-resident; 4  and  when  an  ex- 
ecutor or  administrator  fails,  upon  service  of  citation,  or  publication 
of  citation  if  he  cannot  be  found,  to  make  settlement,  his  letters- 
may  be  revoked.5  In  the  nature  of  things,  a  power  which  may  be 
Discretion  to  invoked  in  such  a  variety  of  instances  must  largely  de- 
be  exercised  pend  upon  the  discretion  of  the  judge  for  its  proper 
exercise.  It  is  easy  enough  to  legally  ascertain  whether 
a  man  has  been  adjudged  insane,  or  convicted  of  infamous  crime,  or 
become  a  non-resident  or  an  habitual  drunkard;  or  whether  an  exec- 
utrix has  married.  But  it  is  also  apparent  that  these  facts  do  not 
in  themselves  constitute  incapacity  to  administer:  they  are  the  mere 
indicia  from  the  existence  of  which  the  law  conclusively  presumes 
the  existence  of  the  incapacity.6  In  contemplation  of  law  the  in- 
capacity may  exist  without  these,  or  any  specially  defined  symp- 
toms; hence,  in  its  solicitude  to  protect  estates  of  deceased  persons 
and  secure  efficient  administration  thereof,  it  clothes  the  judge  of 
probate  with  power  to  ascertain  the  incapacity  from  other  sources, 
—  if  lie  become  "  in  any  wise  incapable  or  unsuitable  to  execute  the 
trust,"7  or  "fail  to  discharge  his  official  duties,"  or  "waste  or  mis- 
manage the  estate,"  —  and  if  ascertained,  to  revoke  the  aiithority 
granted.  Where  the  interest  of  the  administrator  is  adverse  to  the 
estate,  for  instance,  it  is  clear  that  he  is  an  "  unsuitable  "  person  to 

1  Rev.  St.  1889,  §  42.  ness  is  cause  for  the  removal  of  an  admin- 

2  II).,  §§  39,  40.  istrator,  without  also  showing  that  the 
8  Hi.,  §  41.  administrator  had  thereby  become  ineapa- 
4  lb.,  §  10.  ble  of  discharging  his  duties:  Gurlcy  v. 
6  lb.,   §    221.      Refore  the  revision  of    Butler,  83  Ind.  501.     The  statute  in  this 

1879  revocation  was   compulsory  in  such  State  provides  that  an  administrator  may 

case.     See  Wagner's  Statutes,  ch.  2,  art.  be   removed  "where,  .  .  .  from   habitual 

v.,  §  8;    l.ni   in  the  revision  of    1879  the  drunkenness,  ...  he  is  rendered  incapa- 

word  "shall"  w.is  changed  to  "may."  ble  of  discharging  his  trust  to  the  interest 

'  The  (Hurt's  discretion  will  not  be  of  the  estate." 
reviewed  unless  abused:  McFadden  v.  T  In  Pennsylvania  the  Orphan's  Court 
Ross,  98  Ind.  134  ;  In  re  Graber,  111  Cal.  removed  two  executors  on  the  ground  that 
432;  Holiday's  Estate,  18  Oreg.  168.  In  one  was  largely  insolvent,  and  the  acts  of 
Bowen  v.  Stewart,  128  Ind.  507,  it  is  held  the  other  were  "of  a  character  so  doubt- 
that  a  proceeding  to  remove  an  adminis-  ful  that  wo  feel  that  the  estate  would  be 
tratOT  II  a  proceeding  in  which  the  subject  to  risks  at  his  hands,  from  which 
statute  for  change  of  venue  does  not  apply,  il  should  be  relieved":  Estate  of  Green- 
In  [ndiana  il  \t  held  that  habitual  drunken-  tree,  12  Phila.  10. 
cm 


§  269  THEORY  OP  REMOVAL  FOR  CAUSE.      **  573-575 

administer  it,  and  in  such  case  nothing  but  some  controlling  neces- 
sity will  justify  his  retention  as  administrator.1  So  where  there  is 
such  hostility  between  the  administrator  and  the  legatees  or  distrib- 
utees as  will  prevent  a  proper  management  of  the  estate.2 
[*  574]  The  discretion  vested  in  *  judges  of  probate  is, 
therefore,  not  an  arbitrary  one,  as  at  one  time 
it  was  supposed  to  be  in  the  ordinary  at  common  law,8  who  might 

repeal  an  administration  at  his  pleasure,  nor  yet  so  nar- 

.  ,    ,  .        p  j  nor  too  narrow, 

row  as  to  prevent  him  from  granting  administration  to 

the  wife  after  appointing  the  father,  in  ignorance  of  the  existence  of 
a  wife,  on  the  ground  that,  having  exercised  the  power  of  appoint- 
ment, his  hands  are  closed;4   but  to  be  exercised   in 
furtherance  of  the  paramount  end  and  aim  of  the  law.    ance'of  the 
Such  is  the  law  in  every  State  of  the  Union,  although   °biect  of  the 
couched  in  different  phraseology, — as  well  as,  at  this 
day,  in  England.5     Yet,  while  the  safety  and  efficient  administra- 
tion of  the  estate  is  the  paramount  object  to  be  accomplished,  courts 
will  not  permit  this  consideration  to  control  personal  rights,  or  to 
lead  to  the  impeachment  of  the  competency  or  integrity  of  an  ap- 
pointee merely  because  some  other  person  may  be  better  qualified 
for  the  trust.    Where  the  appointment  of  an  adminis- 
trator is  left  to  the   unconditioned   discretion   of  the    t0r  ca"notS  ™' 
judge,  he  will  be  controlled  by  this  consideration   in    be  removed  on 
making  the  selection ;  but  having  made  it,  the  appointee    that  one  better 
can  be  removed  only  upon  proof  of  such  facts  as  con-    QuaIlfied.  may 

,  .  .     .  .  °e  appointed. 

stitute  a  breach  of  the  trust,  in  ascertaining  which  the 
judge  may  be  aided  by  considering  whether  the  conduct  or  acts  com- 
plained of  render  the  principal  liable  on  his  bond;  since,  as  a  gen- 
eral proposition,  the  liability  of  the  surety  arises  only  No  revocation 
upon  misconduct  of  the  principal.  And  there  should  without  notice. 
never  be  a  revocation  without  due  notice  to  the  party,  informing 
him  of  the  matters  alleged  against  him,  and  enabling  him 
[*  575]  to  defend.6     It  *  is  held  in  California,  that  the  administra- 

*  Kellberg's  Appeal,  86  Pa.  St.  129.  Sm.  &  M.  245;  Muirhead  v.  Muirhead,  6 
2  Kimball's  Appeal,  45  Wise.  391.  Sm.  &  M.  451 ;  Hanifan  i>.  Needles,  108 
8  Wms.  Ex.  [576],  who  quotes  Brown     111.  403 ;  Schroeder  v.  Superior  Court,  70 

v.  Wood,  Aleyn,  36.  Cal.  343 ;  Murray  v.  Oliver,  3  B.  Mon.  1  ; 

*  Sir  George  Sands'  Case,  Siderfin,  179.  Gasque  t\  Moody,  12  Sm.  &  M.  153  ;  God- 
6  "  It  is  now  agreed  that  the  adminis-     win  v.  Hooper,  45  Ala.  613 ;  Vail  v.  Givan, 

tration,  though  granted  to  the  next  of  kin,  55  Ind.  59  ;  Hostetter's  Appeal,  6  Watts, 

may  be  repealed  by  the  court,  not  arbi-  244 ;    Levering  v.  Levering,  64  Md.  399, 

trarily,  yet  where  there  shall  be  just  cause  410;  Patten's  Estate,  7  Mackey,  392,  404. 

for  so  doing ;  of  which  the  temporal  courts  But  in  Mississippi  the  revocation  was  held 

are  to  judge  "  :  Wms.  on  Ex.  [577].  proper  without   notice,  where,  upon  the 

6  An  administrator  cannot  be  removed  complaint  of  his  surety,  citation  issued  to 

without  legal  cause,  denned  in  the  statute,  the   administrator,   which    could   not    be 

and  after  notice  to  him  :    Bieber's  Appeal,  served  because  he  was  a  non-resident  of 

11  Pa.  St.   157;   Wingate  v.  Wooten,  5  the  State:  Hardaway  v.  Parham,  27  Miss. 

605 


*  575  REVOCATION   OF   LETTERS.  §  270 

Right  to  tor  has  no  right  to  have  the  issues  tried  by  a  jury ; 1 

jury  trial.  bul;  in  Indiana,  this  is  doubted.2     In  the  latter  State, 

and  in  North  Carolina,  an  answer  to  the  application  and  other  plead- 
ings may  be  filed.8 

§  270.  Causes  justifying  Revocation  of  Letters.  —  There  are  numer- 
ous adjudications  indicating  the  particular  acts  or  line  of  conduct 
T,  .     ,     .         which  require  the  removal  from  office  of  an  executor  or 

L  sing  trust  ■»■ 

funds  for  pri-  administrator,  as  well  as  those  which  do  not  justify  the 
vate  purposes.  revocation  of  their  authority.  The  most  fruitful  source 
of  trouble  and  litigation  is  the  unwarranted  application  of  the  trust 
funds  to  the  private  use  of  the  executor,  administrator,  guardian,  or 
curator,  and  one  which  but  too  often  leads  to  their  own  financial 
ruin,  as  well  as  the  destruction  of  the  estates  committed  to  their 
care.  The  temptation  to  employ  the  funds  in  the  hands  of  a  trustee 
in  private  speculations  promising  ample  returns,  or  even  in  his  own 
apparently  safe  and  lucrative  business  is  sometimes  overpowering  in 
unscrupulous  persons,  but  equally  fraught  with  most  disastrous 
results  when  yielded  to  in  good  faith,  and  without  suspicion  that  it 
involves  a  violation  of  the  law.  Absurd  as  it  may  appear,  yet  many 
of  the  cases  under  this  branch  of  the  law  concern  those  who  in  good 
faith  believe,  and  many  more  those  who  make  a  specious  pretence  of 
believing,  that  a  guardian  or  administrator,  having  been  appointed 
to  take  charge  of  an  estate,  and,  it  may  be,  given  bond  for  its  faith- 
ful administration,  may  legally  treat  the  funds  as  their  own,  being 
liable  only  to  produce  them  when  the  proper  time  shall  arrive.  An 
estate  in  the  hands  of  such  a  person  is  not  safe,  and  it  would 
seem  that  he  is  "unsuitable  to  execute  the  trust  reposed  in  him."4 

103.   And  so  in  South  Carolina:  McLaurin  tion,  and  not  through  dishonesty  or  want 

v.  Thompson,  Dudley,  335,  the  appoint-  of  fidelity,  neglected  to  keep  the  fund  in- 

ment  of  another  heing  held  a  sufficient  vested,  mingled  it  with  his  own  and  used 

revocation  of  the  authority  of  an  adminis-  it,  and  claimed  to  have  appropriated  the 

trator  who  left  the  State.      In  Alabama  whole  of  it  in  a  manner  not  authorized, 

notice  by  publication  is  sufficient  to  a  uon-  although  for  the  benefit  of  the  cestui  que 

resident  executor  or  administrator :    Craw-  trust,  Jones,  J.,  of  the  Superior  Court  of 

ford  v.  Tyson,  46  Ala.  299.     So  in  Cali-  the  City  of  New  York,  held,  that  "one 

fornia  it  is  held  that  the  probate  court  may  who  has  so  failed  properly  to  understand 

revoke  letters  and  appoint  a  new  adminis-  his  duties,  and  by  reason  of  such  failure 

trator  without  notice  to  an  administrator  haf   exposed   the  fund  to  the  hazard   of 

who  has  been  judicially  declared  insane,  being  lost  by  his  insolvency,  has  in  fact 

or,  it  seems,  convicted  of  crime;    In  re  allowed   the  corpus  to  be   eaten   up,  and 

Blinn,  99  Cal.  216.  keeps  the  fund  still   exposed   to   hazard 

1  Doyle's  Estate,  Myr.  68.  and  loss  by  reason  of  business  vicissitudes, 

2  Phelps  v.  Martin,  74  Ind.  339,  341;  and  also  exposed  to  entangling  litigation 
but  see  BlcFadden  v.  Ross,  93  Ind.  134.  in  case  of  his  decease,  should  not  be  re- 

8  McFadden  v.  Ross,  supra;  Edwards  tained  as  trustee":    Deen  v.  Cozzens,  7 

v.  Cobb,  '>■>  N.  C.  4,  9,  commenting  on  the  Robt.   (N.  Y.)  178.    To  the  same  effect, 

method  of  procedure.  Clemens   v.    Caldwell,  7    B.   Monr.    171; 

t   Hence,   where   a   trustee   for   minor  Hake  v.  Stott,  5  Col.  140.     So  the  sale  of 

children  had,  although  with  a  good  inton-  stock  belonging  to  the  estate  in  his  indi- 
606 


§  270 


CAUSES  JUSTIFYING  REVOCATION  OF  LETTERS. 


576 


[*  576]  *  Accordingly,  one  who  is  squandering  the  estate,1  or  is 
wasting,  neglecting,  or  mismanaging  it,'2  or  guilty  of  gross 
carelessness  in  its  management,3  or  refuses  to  inventory  property 
pointed  out  to  him  as  having  been  conveyed  in  fraud,4  or  to  redeem 
property  at  the  request  of  a  creditor,5  or  fails  to  make  and  return 
an  inventory  of  the  estate,6  or  to  perform  the  duties  of  his  trust,7  or 
the  orders  of  court  in  reference  thereto,8  or  gives  unauthorized  pre- 
ference to  creditors,9  or  conveys  property  of  the  estate  to  his  sure- 
ties to  indemnify  them,10  or  procures  the  fraudulent  allowance  of  a 
claim  in  his  own  favor  against  the  estate,11  or  fails  to  render  his 
annual  account  when  required,12  will  be  removed,  and  an  adminis- 
trator de  bonis  non  appointed.  So  where  one,  who  was  a  resident  of 
the  State  when  appointed,  becomes  a  non-resident; 18  but  in  Georgia 
it  is  held  that  the  removal  from  the  State  of  either  an  executor  or 
an  administrator  after  appointment  is  not  a  sufficient  ground  to 
revoke  his  authority;14  in  Vermont,  he  will  not  be  removed,  if 
his    non-residence  was   known   at  the   time    the    appointment   was 


vidual  name,  without  authority  of  court, 
is  sufficient  in  Maryland  to  justify  an  ex- 
ecutor's removal :  Levering  v.  Levering, 
64  Md.  399,  412. 

1  Newcomb  v.  Williams,  9  Met.  (Mass.) 
525;  Emerson  v.  Bowers,  14  Barb.  658. 

2  Lucich  v.  Medin,  3  Nev.  93 ;  Travis 
v.  Insley,  28  La.  An.  784 ;  Fernbacher 
v.  Fernbacher,  4  Dem.  227,  243;  s.  c.  17 
Abb.  N.  C.  339 ;  Gray  v.  Gray,  39  N.  J. 
Eq.  332. 

8  Rogers  v.  Morrison,  21  La.  An.  455; 
Reynolds  v.  Ziuk,  27  Gratt.  29. 

4  Andrews  v.  Tucker,  on  the  ground 
that  creditors  have  a  right  to  try  the  ques- 
tion of  fraudulent  conveyance :  7  Pick. 
250;  Minor  v.  Mead,  3  Conn.  289. 

5  But  not  when  the  estate  has  no  funds 
available  for  such  purpose :  Holladay's 
Estate,  18  Oreg.  168,  170;  Glines  v. 
Weeks,   137   Mass.  547,  550. 

6  Oglesby  v.  Howard,  43  Ala.  144; 
Williams  v.  Tobias,  37  Ind.  345;  Estate 
of  Brophy,  12  Phila.  18;  Hubbard  v. 
Smith,  45  Ala.  516  (if  the  omission  was 
wilful) ;  Matter  of  West,  40  Hun,  291  ; 
McFadden  v.  Ross,  93  Ind.  134;  Holla- 
day's  Estate,  supra. 

7  Marsh  v.  The  People,  15  HI.  284, 
287  ;  Chew  v.  Chew,  3  Grant  Cas.  289 ; 
Wildridge  v.  Patterson,  15  Mass.  148. 

8  Wright  v.  McNatt,  49  Tex.  425,  429  ; 
Carey  v.  Reed,  82  Md.  383,  394. 

9  Foltz  v.  Prouse,  1 7  111.  487. 


10  Fleet  v.  Simmons,  3  Dem.  542. 

11  Owens  v.  Link,  48  Mo.  App.  534. 

i2  Taylor  v.  Biddle,  71  N.  C.  1  ;  Arm- 
strong v.  Stowe,  77  N.  C.  360 ;  Brown  v. 
Ventress,  24  La.  An.  187 ;  Colliers  v. 
Hollier,  13  La.  An.  585. 

13  Succession  of  Winn,  27  La.  An. 
687  ;  Hall  v.  Monroe,  27  Tex.  700 ;  Suc- 
cession of  Vogel,  20  La.  An.  81;  Craw- 
ford v.  Tyson,  46  Ala.  299;  Harris  v. 
Dillard,  31  Ala.  191  ;  Yerkes  v.  Broom,  10 
La.  An.  94;  Frick's  Appeal,  114  Pa.  St 
29,  34  ;  Trumble  v.  Williams,  18  Neb.  144. 
But  in  Louisiana  the  absence  of  an  execu- 
tor or  administrator  is  no  cause  for  re- 
moval unless  the  estate  shall  thereby 
suffer:  Succession  of  McDonough,  7  La. 
An.  472 ;  and  the  onus  to  prove  this  is  on 
the  party  moving  the  revocation  :  Scott  v. 
Lawson,  10  La.  An.  547.  In  Texas  the 
court  may  temporarily  suspend  the  au- 
thority of  an  executor  on  account  of  his 
absence,  and  appoint  a  receiver  :  Long  v. 
Wortham,  4  Tex.  381.  In  Missouri,  non- 
residence  of  an  executor  or  administrator 
disqualifies  him ;  but  there  must  be  an 
order  of  court  declaring  his  removal  on 
that  ground:  State  v.  Rucker,  59  Mo.  17. 
So  in  'Arkansas  the  removal  of  an  ex- 
ecutor from  the  State  does  not  per  se 
vacate  the  letters  :  Haynes  v.  Semmes,  39 
Ark.  399. 

14  Walker  v.  Torrance,  12  Ga.  604; 
Brown  v.  Strickland,  28  Ga.  387. 

607 


*577  REVOCATION    OF   LETTERS.  §  271 

made,1  and  *  in  Wisconsin  it  is  held  to  be  discretionary  with  [*  577] 
the  probate  court  to  remove  or  not  on  the  ground  of  non- 
residence.2  The  marriage  of  an  administratrix,  in  the  absence  of 
statutory  provision  to  the  contrary,  is  a  revocation  of  her  authority.8 
The  duty  to  revoke  follows  self -evidently  from  the  refusal  or  neglect 
of  an  executor  or  administrator  to  give  the  bond  required  by  the 
court;4  but  even  in  this  case  notice  and  opportunity  to  furnish  the 
surety  should  be  given.5  Where  an  executor  joined  the  Confederate 
army  and  left  the  Federal  lines,  he  was  held  to  have  forfeited  his 
trust ; 6  and  in  Arkansas  it  was  held  that  the  probate  court  properly 
appointed  an  administratrix  in  place  of  one  who  became  a  soldier, 
and  was  therefore  unable  to  give  proper  attention  to  the  estate, 
thereby  impliedly  revoking  his  authority.7  Acrimonious  and  hos- 
tile feelings  between  the  executor  and  the  testator's  widow,  and 
between  him  and  a  legatee,  intercepting  efficient  and  prudent  man- 
agement of  the  estate,  has  been  held  sufficient  cause  for  removal;8 
and  so  the  refusal  of  an  executor  to  permit  his  co-executors  to  in- 
spect and  examine  the  papers  belonging  to  the  estate,9  or  an  attempt 
by  false  representations  and  suggestions  to  buy  the  interest  of  a 
residuary  legatee  for  an  inconsiderable  sum.10 

§  271.  "What  deemed  Insufficient  to  justify  Revocation. — The 
cases  negativing  the  propriety  of  revocation  under  the  circumstances 
Causes  deemed  in  evidence  therein  are  at  least  fully  as  instructive  as 
insufficient  to     those    already  mentioned.     So  it  is  held  that,  before  a 

authorize  re-  ,  ,,  ,..,..  * 

moval.  creditor   can    have  the  administratrix   of   a   succession 

removed,  he  must  allege  and  show  that  he  has  been  injured  by  the 
maladministration  complained  of,11  and  the  court  has  no  au- 
thority to  remove  one  upon  the  complaint  of  his  *  co-executor  [*  578] 

l  A  fortiori,  ii  the  motion  comes  from  Scott,   49  Tex.  430;    Cohen's   Appeal    2 

one  who  has  heen  sued  for  a  debt  to  the  Watts,   175  ;  Garrison  v    Cox,  95   N.  C. 

testator  hv  the  executor  :  Wiley  v.  Brain-  353  ;  Clark  v.  Niles,  42  Miss.  460. 

1   11  Vt   107  5  See  authorities  under  §  269,  ante. 

1I(2  Cutler  v.  Howard,  9  Wise.  309.  6  Hcbert  v.  Jackson,  28  La.  An.  377. 

"Kavanaugh   v.  Thompson,    16    Ala.  7  English,  C.  J,  in  rendering  the  opra- 

817-    Duhme    -'.    Young,   3    Bush,    343;  ion,  says,  <' Non-management,  by  absence 

Teschemncher  v.   Thompson,  18  Cal.   11,  as  a  soldier  on  duty  in  the  field  remote 

20.     Bui  see  Hamilton  v.  Levy,  41  S.  C.  from  the  estate,  might  be  as  disastrous  a8 

374      It    is  held   in   California  that  mar-  mismanagement.  ...  It  would  have  been 

riage  does  not  deprive  her  eo  instanti  of  more  regular  to  revoke  bis  letters  directly 

her  powers   but  renders  her  incompetent,  in  the  order  appointing  her,  but  his  let- 

BO  thai  -be  may  be  proceeded  against,  for  ters  were  by  implication  revoked":  Berry 

suspension  and  removal :  Cosgrove  v.  l'it-  v.  Bellows,  30  Ark.  198,  207. 

man,  103  Cal  268,  'JVC.    See  ante,  §  232,  8  Estate  of  Pike,  45  Wise.  391. 

a-  to  the  effect  o!  coverture  upon  '-seen-  9  Chew's  Estate,  2  Parsons,  153. 

trices,  and  a  list  of  the  States,  in  which  10  Lett  v.  Emmett,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  535. 

coverture  disqualifies.  And  see  Woerner  on  Guardianship,  §  36, 

<  Succession  of  fle  Flechier,  1   La.  An.  for  causes  justifying  the  removal  of  a 

20;  Davenport  v    [rrine,   »  J.J.   Marsh,  guardian. 

60  ;  In  n    Brinson,  73  N.  C.  278  ;  Hills  v.  »  Succession  of  Decuir,  23  La.  An.  166. 
608 


§  271  INSUFFICIENT   TO    JUSTIFY   REVOCATION.      *  578,  *  579 

■who  is  not  injured;1  nor  should  an  executor  be  removed  upon 
a  ground  rendering  him  unsuitable,  which  existed  and  was  known 
at  the  time  of  his  appointment,  without  proof  that  this  ground 
continued  to  exist.2  Failure  to  make  settlement  is  a  cause  for 
removal ;  but  where  the  heirs  divided  the  whole  estate  among 
themselves,  there  being  no  debts,  this  was  held  a  good  administra- 
tion, and  that  the  failure  to  make  returns  where  there  was  no  occasion 
for  them  was  not  a  sufficient  cause  for  revocation  ;8  nor  where  there 
is  a  mere  omission,  without  citation,  where  the  proof  shows  no  neg- 
lect or  wilful  default ; 4  nor  does  the  failure  to  file  an  inventory  within 
the  time  limited,5  or  to  file  accounts,  constitute  a  forfeiture  to  the 
right  of  administration  ijoso  facto,  but  must  be  judicially  declared.6 
The  refusal  to  account  for  moneys  which  the  executors  received 
from  the  testatrix  more  than  twenty  years  before  her  death,  and  the 
fact  that  almost  the  whole  of  her  estate  consists  of  debts  due  from 
the  executors,  are  not  sufficient  causes  for  their  removal  as  unsuitable 
to  the  trust.7  In  New  Jersey  it  was  decided  that  a  court  of  equity 
has  jurisdiction  to  restrain  an  executor  who  abuses  his  trust  from 
further  interfering  with  the  estate  ;  but  it  is  not  sufficient  to  charge, 
in  general  terms,  an  abuse ;  the  facts  showing  the  abuse  must  be 
stated  ;  and  the  fact  that  ten  years  have  elapsed  since  the  death  of 
the  testator,  and  that  the  executor  has  not  settled  his  account  in  the 
Orphan's  Court,  is  not  sufficient,  nor  the  additional  fact  that  he  has 
failed  in  business,  and  that  three  years  before  the  filing  of  the  bill  he 
was  discharged  in  bankruptcy.8  Bankruptcy  and  insolvency  may  be 
good  cause  for  the  removal  of  an  administrator,  although  it  does  not 
ipso  facto  impair  his  official  authority ; 9  but  poverty  is  not,10 
[*  579]  unless  the  condition  of  the  appointee  has  *  subsequently  be- 
come changed.11  An  administrator  should  not  be  removed  on 
the  mere  ground  that  he  can  neither  read  nor  write,  nor  because  he 

1  Dowdy  v.  Graham,  42  Miss.  451,  458;     remove  him  :  Hanifan  v.  Needles,  108  111. 
Pattin's  Estate,  7  Mackey,  392,  405.  403,  411  (two  judges  dissenting). 

2  Lehr  v.  Tarball,  2  How.  (Miss.)  905;  5  In  re  Graber,  111  Cal.  432. 

Drake  v.  Green,   10  Allen,  124,  holding,  6  McCleland   v.  Bideman,  5   La.   An. 

also,  that  the  existence  of  such  ground  at  563. 

the  time  of  the  appointment  constituted  7  Hussey  v.  Coffin,  1  Allen,  354 ;  Win- 
no  defence  to  the  revocation,  if  it  con-  ship  v.  Bass,  12  Mass.  199. 
tinued  to  exist.  8  Cooper  v.  Cooper,  5  N.  J.  Eq.  9. 
8  Harris  v.  Seals,  29  Ga.  585.  9  Edwards's  Estate,  12  Phila.  85 ;  Lox- 
4  Dowdy  v.  Graham,  supra ;  Succession  ley's  Estate,  14  Phila.  317;  Dwight  v. 
of  Head,  28  La.  An.  800.  In  Illinois  it  Simon,  4  La.  An.  490 ;  McFadgeu  v. 
is  held  that,  on  refusal  to  make  settle-  Council,  81  N.  C.  195;  Shields  v.  Shields, 
ment,  the  next  step  is  an  attachment  for  60  Barb.  56. 

contempt,  and  if,  when  brought  before  the  10  Shields  v.  Shields,  supra ;  Freeman 

court,  he  still  refuses  to  make  settlement,  v.  Kellogg,  4  Redf.  218,  224;  Postley  v. 

the  court  is  then  required  to  deal  with  Cheyne,  4  Dem.  492. 

him  as  for  contempt,  and  for  this  cause  u  Wilkins  v.  Harriss,  1  Wins.  (N.  C.) 

Eq.  No.  2,  41. 

VOL.  I.  —  39  609 


*  579,  *  580  REVOCATION   OF   LETTERS.  §  271 

has  a  slight  knowledge  of  the  English  language,1  if  he  performs  his 
duties  properly.2     It  is  the  duty  of  administrators  to  contest  doubt- 
ful claims  against  the  estate,  and  one  is  not  therefore  liable  to  be 
removed  for  reasonable  delay  in  the  administration  caused  by  the  dis- 
cbarge of  this  duty.3     Errors  of  judgment  not  amounting  to  malfeas- 
ance are  not  ground  for  removal.4     Where  an  administrator  is  ap- 
pointed  in  place  of  one  having  priority  under  the  statute,  but  who 
fails  to  give  the  bond  or  to  apply  within  the  limited  time  allowed 
him,  the  former  cannot  be  removed  to  make  place  for  the  latter,  be- 
cause he  is  subsequently  able  to  give  the  bond,6  or  makes  the  applica- 
tion.6    In   Louisiana,  executors  and  administrators  are  required  to 
deposit  the  funds  of  the  estate  in  the  manner  pointed  out  by  statute  ; 
but  the  failure  to  deposit  a  sum  but  slightly  greater  than  the  amount 
of  the  cost  of  administration  is  not  a  sufficient  ground  for  removal.7 
A  trustee  is  not,  at  common  law  and  under  the  law  in  most  of  the 
States,  permitted  to  acquire  property  by  purchase  at  the  trustee  sale  ; 
but  such  a  purchase  is  not  in  itself  proof  of  waste  or  mismanagement, 
and  hence  not  a  ground  for  the  removal  of  an  executor.8     The  court 
will   not  remove   an   administrator   regularly   appointed,   upon   the 
suggestion  of  a  party  who  was  privy  to  the  appointment,  that  the 
administrator  is  indebted  to  the  estate,  which  is  denied  by  the  ad- 
ministrator ;  the  proper  remedy  is  to  surcharge  the  administrator's 
account  in  the  Orphan's  Court ; 9  but  where  an  administrator  has  an 
adverse  personal  interest  in  an  action  against  himself  as  adminis- 
trator, and  made  no  defence  to  the  same,  he  should  be  re- 
moved  upon  proof  of   the  existence  of   a   *  defence,  or  of  [*  580] 
the  bona  fide  belief  of  its  existence  on  the  part  of  the  dis- 
tributees ; 10  so  where  there  is  a  direct  conflict  of  interest  between 
the  administrator  and  the  estate.11     In  New  York  it  was  held  that  an 
executor's  letters  would  not  be  revoked  at  his  own  request,  on  the 
ground  that  he  has  interests  as  surviving  partner  of  the  deceased, 

1  Hassoy  v.  Keller,  1  Dem.  577  ;  Gregg  ton,  61  Tex.  690 ;  and  this  although  the 

v.  Wilson,  24  Ind.  227.  letters  were  granted  prematurely,  if  the 

-   Estate    of    Pacheco,    23    Cal.    476;  party  entitled  had  not  applied  within  the 

Gregg  t'.   Wilson,  24   Ind.    227.     "  As  a  time  allowed  :  Sowell  t'.  Sowell,  41  Ala. 

genera]    rule,  however,"  says  Frazer,  J.,  359;  Markland  v.  Albes,  81  Ala.  433. 

"  it  might  be   better  if  those  wholly  un-  7  Peale  v.  White,  7  La.  An.  449. 

educated    were    not    appointed    to    such  8  Webb  v.  Dietrich,  7  Watts  &  S.  401. 

positions  of  trust  and  responsibility."  9  Maloney's  Estate,  5  Pa.  Law  J.  R. 

Andrews  u.Carr,  2  R.  I.  1 17,  holding  139. 

that  a  delay  of  five  months  to  petition  for  10  Simpson  v.  Jones,  82  N.  C.  323.     See, 

a  new  trial  on  a  judgment  obtained  against  however,  Murray  v.  Anzell,  16  R.  I.  692, 

the  estate  was  nol  unreasonable.  holding  that  such  cause  of  unsuitableness 

I  Succession  of  Sparrow,  39  La.   An.  must  exist  at  the  time  of  the  removal. 

696.  n  Mill's   Estate,   22    Oreg.  210.      See, 

<>   Williams's  Case,  1*  Abb.  I'r.  350.  in    conuectiou     herewith,  ante,  §    269,  p* 

*  .linkins    v.    Sapp,    8    Jones    L.     510;  *573. 

Cola  '•  Dial,  12  Tex.  LOO  j  Mayes  v.  Houh- 
610 


§  272  WHO   MAY   MOVE   FOR   REVOCATION.  *  580,  *  581 

antagonistic  to  his  duties  as  executor ; J  it  is  no  ground  for  removal 
of  an  executor  that  the  will  was  contested  subsequently  to  his  ap- 
pointment,2 nor  that  he  fails  to  sell  land,  although  the  direction  in 
the  will  is  imperative,  where  the  time  of  selling  is  left  to  his  dis- 
cretion.8 And  so,  although  the  payment  by  an  administrator  of  his 
own  debt  out  of  the  estate  is  a  breach  of  trust,  for  which  he  may  be 
removed,  yet  if  the  interest  of  those  concerned  has  not  been  imper- 
illed by  the  amount  used,  the  sum  being  small  in  comparison  with 
the  funds  remaining  in  his  hands,  and  no  improper  or  dishonest 
motives  can  be  imputed  to  him,  he  should  not  be  removed.4  So  pay- 
ment of  money  by  him  under  a  forged  order  of  court,  no  negligence 
being  disclosed  under  the  circumstances,  is  not  sufficient.6  "An 
executor  may  commit  errors  in  his  accounts,  or  make  mistakes  in 
his  construction  of  the  will ;  these  the  court  will  correct,  but  will 
not  remove  the  executor,  unless  there  is  wilful  misconduct,  waste,  or 
improper  disposition  of  the  assets."  6 

§  272.    Who  may  move  for  Revocation.  —  Courts  will  not  permit 
one  who  has  no  direct  interest  in  the  estate  or  who  cannot  be  bene- 
fited by  the  order  which  he  prays  for,  to  prosecute  for         . 
the  removal  of  an  executor  or  administrator.      Hence    no  interest  can- 
it  is  required  that  in  the  petition  or  motion  the  interest   IVot  demand,   . 

^  , r  the  removal  of 

of  the  party  presenting  it  shall  be  stated,  and  wherein  an  executor  or 
it  has  been  or  is  about  to  be  affected  by  the  party  to  be  administrator- 
removed.  And  it  is  not  sufficient  to  charge  mismanagement,  misap- 
plication of  funds,  or  maladministration  in  general  terms,  but  the 
facts  must  be  stated  which  constitute  the  alleged  cause  for  removal, 
and  must  be  supported  by  affidavit.7  Nor  will  a  motion 
for  removal  be  heard  in  a  collateral  proceeding,  but  removed  in  a 
only  by  direct  action,8  upon  petition  and  citation,9  the    collateral  pro- 

•  j.        ,.....,..  '  ceeding. 

service  of    which   is  a  jurisdictional  fact,   and 
[*  581]  *  must  affirmatively  appear  from  the  record  to  give  validity 

to  the  order  of  removal.10     Having  appeared,  however,  he 
cannot  subsequently  object  that  he  had  no  notice.11    The    Wh 
motion  may  be  made  by  a  creditor  for  the  removal  of  an    demand  the 
administrator  who  was  appointed   in  contravention  of   removal- 

1  Because  the    Surrogate's  Court   has  penter  v.    Gray,  32  N.  J.    Eq.  692 ;    Mc- 

ample    jurisdiction    to    adjust    equities:  Fadgen  v.  Council,  81  N.  C.  195. 
Becker  v.    Lawton,  4  Dem.  341.  1  Neighbors  v.   Hamlin,  78  N.  C.   42; 

3  Elwell    v.    Universalist    Church,   63  Vail    v.   Givan,  55   Ind.    59 ;    Succession 

Tex.  220.  of  Calhoun,  28    La.    An.  323 ;    White  v. 

3  If  he  acts  bona  fide :  Haight  v.  Bris-  Spaulding,  50  Mich.  22. 

bin,  96  N.  Y.  132.  8  Succession  of  Boyd,  12  La.  An.  611. 

4  Killam  v.  Costley,  52  Ala.  85.  9  Succession  of  Williams,  22  La.  An.  94 
6  In  re  Welch,  86  Cal.  179.  i°  People  v.  Hartman,  2  Sweeny,  576, 
G  Aldrich,  J.,  in  Witherspoon  v.  Watts,  579. 

18  S.  C.  396,  422,  citing  Stairly  v.  Rabe,         "  Ferris  v.  Ferris,  89  111.  452. 
McMull.  Eq.  22.     To  similar  effect,  Car- 

611 


*  581,  *  582  REVOCATION   OF   LETTERS.  §  272 

the  creditors'  right  within  the  time  during  which  they  have  priority 
over  strangers,1  or  when  he  has  been  injured  by  the  rnal-administra- 
tion  alleged; 2  by  the  widow  of  the  decedent; 3  by  a  legatee  under  a 
will,  when  the  judgment  declaring  it  null  has  been  appealed  from;4 
by  the  assignee  of  a  devisee  or  legatee ; 6  by  sureties  conceiving 
themselves  in  danger  from  the  conduct  of  the  administrator;6  and, 
a  fortiori,  by  any  of  the  heirs  of  a  solvent  estate.7  So  a  railroad 
company,  against  whom  the  administrator  has  brought  an  action  for 
negligence  causing  the  death  of  the  intestate,  may  test  the  validity 
of  the  administrator's  appointment,  because  a  judgment  obtained 
upon  the  action  brought  would  not  constitute  a  bar  to  a  further  suit 
on  the  same  cause  of  action  if  the  appointment  were  void,8  but  not 
where  the  appointment  is  only  voidable.9  But  only  next  of  kin 
may  contest  the  appointment  of  an  administrator  on  the  ground  that 
he  is  not  next  of  kin;10  and  where  a  stranger  and  a  next  of  kin 
applied  contemporaneously  for  letters,  and  the  stranger  was  ap- 
pointed upon  the  withdrawal  of  the  application  by  the  next  of  kin, 
he  has  no  right  to  ask  for  the  removal  subsequently.11  One  not  of 
the  next  of  kin  has  no  right  to  ask  for  the  removal  of  the  authority 
of  the  public  administrator.12  One  whose  appointment  as  adminis- 
trator is  void  because  an  administrator  had  already  been  ap- 
pointed by  a  court  whose  appointment  was  voidable  but  *  not  [*  582] 
void,  has  no  such  interest  in  the  estate  as  to  enable  him  to 
move  for  revocation  of  the  voidable  appointment.18  An  illegitimate 
child  has  no  right  to  ask  for  the  removal  of  his  mother  as  adminis- 
tratrix on  the  ground  that  she  was  not  lawfully  married  to  the  in- 
testate, because  he  would  have  no  right  to  administer.14  Where  a 
non-resident  is  disqualified,  he  is  incompetent  to  petition  for  the 
revocation  of  letters  granted  to  others.15  The  creditor  of  an  execu- 
trix, but  not  of  the  testator,  has  no  interest  in  the  estate.16  If  the 
application  for  the  removal  is  on  the  ground  of  premature  appoint- 

1  Ward  v.  Cameron,  37  Ala.  691.  ministrator will  protect:  Chicago, B.  &  Q. 

2  Succession   of  Decuir,  23    La.    An.     R.  R.  v.  Gould,  64  Iowa,  343. 

166.  10  Edmundson    v.     Roberts,     1     How. 

8  Evans  v.  Buchanan,  15  Ind.  438.  (Miss.)  322. 

4  Newhouse  v.  Gale,  1  Redf.  217.  u  Having  renounced  his  right  by  im- 

6  Yeaw  v.  Searle,  2  R.  I.  164  ;  Susz  v.  plication :  Cole  v.  Dial,  12  Tex.  100. 

Font,  4  Dem.  346.  Vi  Estate  of  Carr,  25   Cal.    585.    Nor 

6  I)e  Lane's  Case,  2  Brev.  167  ;  Hard-  has  the  public  administrator  authority  to 
away  v.  I'arliain,  27  Miss.  103.  And  see,  provoke  the  removal  of  an  executor  or 
Bl  to  the  right  of  sureties  to  be  relieved,  administrator:  Succession  of  Burnside, 
ante,  \  255.  34  La.  An.  728;  Tittman  v.  Edwards,  27 

7  Reed  >'.  Crocker,  12  La.  An.  445.  Mo.  App.  492. 

'  Jeffersonville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bwayne,  1S  Coltart  v.  Allen,  40  Ala.  155. 

26  Ind.  477;    Malloryv.  R.  R„  53  Cans.  14  Myatt  v.  Myatt,  44  111.  473. 

557.    To  same  effect,  Donaldson  v,  Lewis,  1G  Prick's  Appeal,  1 14  Pa.  St.  29. 

7  Wo,  App  408.  10  Carroll  v.  Huio,  21  La.  An.  561. 

'*  Sinn-  payment  to  the  de  facto  ad- 
r,\2 


§  273    RESIGNATION  OF  EXECUTORS  AND  ADMINISTRATORS.    *  582,  *583 

ment,  it  must  be  made  within  such  time  after  the  party  in  priority- 
learns  of  the  appointment  as  the  statute  gives  him  originally  after 
the  death  of  the  intestate.1  The  judgment  of  the  probate  court 
granting  letters  testamentary  cannot  be  collaterally  assailed  by  a 
motion  to  remove  the  executor  on  the  ground  that  he  was  not  named 
in  the  will.2  An  application,  made  in  proper  time,  for  the  removal 
of  an  administrator  appointed  upon  the  widow's  relinquishment 
within  the  time  allowed  to  the  widow  to  qualify,  is  not  waived  by  a 
subsequent  application  for  the  removal  of  the  widow,  who  was 
appointed  upon  the  resignation  of  the  administrator  first  appointed.8 

It  seems  that  any  person  interested  in  the  estate  may  prosecute 
for  the  removal  of  an  executor  or  administrator,  independently  of 
other  parties  having  a  like  interest,  unless  the  court  should  require 
such  other  parties  to  be  brought  in.4 

§  273.     Resignation    of   Executors    and    Administrators.  —  At    the 
common  law,  any  act  of  intermeddling  with  the  effects  of  an  estate 
by  the  person  nominated  as  executor  bound  him  as  an 
acceptance  of  the  executorship,  and  he  could  not  sub-    allowed  to  re- 
sequentlv  renounce  his  character  as  executor,5  nor  resign    s'g»  at  com" 

tl  »/  .     ,  mon  law. 

the  trust.6  So  with  regard  to  the  office  of  administra- 
tor; the  probate  court  has  no  power  to  accept  the  resignation  of  an 
administrator  once  duly  appointed  and  qualified,  with-  Nor  an  admin- 
out  statutory  authorization.7  It  was  so  held  in  istrator. 
[*  583]  *  Wisconsin 8  before  the  authority  was  given  by  statute.9  In 
Illinois,10  Nebraska,11  and  North  Carolina,12  it  was  held,  that, 
while  there  was  no  law  allowing  an  administrator  to  resign,  yet  the 
acceptance  of  his  resignation  by  the  probate  court  amounts  to  a  revo- 
cation of  his  authority;  and  in  Minnesota  it  is  said  that  a  resigna- 

1  Edwards"  v.  Bruce,  8  Md.  387.  circumstances   alluded  to  being  that  the 

2  Grant  v.  Spann,  34  Miss.  294.  first  administrator  never  took  possession 
8  Curtis  v.  Burt,  34  Ala.  729.                      of  the  effects,  nor  attempted  to  exercise 

4  Estate  of  Pike,  45  Wis.  391.  any  control  over  them,     nd  informed  the 

5  Sears  v.  Dillingham,  12  Mass.  358,  probate  court  that  he  could  not  act.  This 
■with  a  citation  of  English  authorities  ;  case  would  not  seem,  therefore,  to  go  to 
ante,  §  234.  the  extent  of   establishing  the  power   of 

6  Mitchell  v.  Adams,  1  Ired.  L.  298  ;  a  probate  court  to  accept  the  resignation 
Haigood  v.  Wells,  1  Hill,  Ch.  59,  61  ;  of  an  administrator  appointed  and  quali- 
Washington  v.  Blount,  8  Ired.  Eq.  253,  tied,  and  who  had  entered  upon  the  dis- 
256  ;  In  re  Mussault,  T.  U.  P.  Charlt.  259 ;  charge  of  his  duties,  without  statutory- 
Driver  v.  Riddle,  8  Port.  343  ;  Thomason  authority  to  that  end. 

v.  Blackwell,  5  St.  &  P.  181.  8  Sitzman  v.  Pacquette,  13  Wis.  291. 

7  Flinn  v.  Chase,  4  Denio,  85,  90.  In  9  At  least  by  implication :  Rev.  St. 
the  case  of  Comstock  v.  Crawford,  3  Wall.  1878,  §  3804.  This  section  is  retained  in 
396,  404,  Mr.  Justice  Field  says:  "The  Saub.  &  Berrym.  St.  1889,  §  3804. 
power  to  accept  the  resignation  and  make  10  Marsh  v.  The  People,  15  111.284,  286. 
the  second  appointment,  under  the  circum-  n  Trumble  v.  Williams,  18  Neb.  144, 
stances   of  this  case,  were  necessary  inci-  148. 

dents  of  the  power  to  grant  letters  of  ad-        12  Tulburt  v.    Hollar,  102  N.  C.  406, 
ministration  in  the  first  instance ;  "   the     409. 

613 


*  583,  *  584  REVOCATION    OF   LETTERS.  §  273 

tion  tendered  might  be  a  good  ground  for  removal,  and,  if  accepted 
by  the  court  and  entered  in  the  form  of  an  order  in  the  record,  might 
be  taken  to  have  the  effect  of  a  removal.1 

The  reservations  against  the  validity  of  the  resignation  of  execu- 
tors and  administrators  will  be  found,  in  most  of  the  cases  above 
cited,  to  be  directed  against  a  liability  incurred,  generally  to  ac- 
count, etc. ;  for  it  would  be  absurd  to  permit  one  who  has  wasted  or 
converted  the  estate,  or  in  any  way  made  himself  liable  to  creditors, 
legatees,  or  distributees,  to  escape  responsibility  by  resignation,2  or 
.  by  declaring  his  possession  that  of  a  legatee,  and  not  of 

by  statute  in  the  executor.3  It  is  now  generally  provided  by  statute 
most  States.  ^n  ^e  severai  States,  that  for  reasons  deemed  sufficient 
by  the  probate  court  it  may  accept  the  resignation  of  an  executor  or 
administrator,  and  relieve  him,  after  settlement  of  his  account, 
from  the  trust.4  It  was  held  in  Illinois8  and  in  Massachusetts,  in 
the  absence  of  a  statute  authorizing  resignation,  that,  where 
the  interest  of  the  estate  collided  with  *  that  of  the  executor,  [*  584] 
the  acceptance  of  the  resignation  of  the  latter  by  the  probate 
court  constitutes  an  order  of  removal  on  the  ground  of  "unsuitable- 
ness."  6  So  in  Missouri  the  duty  of  the  administrator  of  two  estates, 
one  of  which  it  was  contended  was  indebted  to  the  other,  to  resign 
one  of  them,  was  indicated  by  the  Supreme  Court.7  In  Alabama,  it 
was  ruled  that,  where  an  administrator  accepted  the  office  of  probate 
judge,  he  did  not  thereby  vacate  his  office  as  administrator;8   but 

1  Rumrill  v.  First  National  Bank,  28  6  Where,  for  instance,  the  executor 
Minn.  202  ;  followed  in  Balch  v.  Hooper,  shows  that  the  prosecution  of  his  per- 
32  Minn.  158.  sonal  claims    against  the   estate  conflict 

2  It  was  held  in  California  that  the  with  his  duties  as  executor :  Thayer  v. 
statute  allowing  an   administrator  to  re-  Homer,  11  Met.  (Mass.)  104. 

sign  after  settling  his  accounts  excluded  7  State  v.  Bidlingmaier,  26  Mo.   483, 

his  right  to  do  so  without  having  settled  :  affirmed  in  31  Mo.  95. 
Havnes  v.   Meeks,    10  Cal.   110.      So  in  8  Whitworth    v.    Oliver,  39   Ala.   286, 

Driver  v.  Riddle,  supra,  the  statute  of  Ala-  290.     The  question  arose  in  a  suit  against 

bama  is  alluded  to  as  granting  the  right  the  administrator's  sureties,  and  for  the 

to  resign,    expressly  providing,  however,  furtherance  of  justice  in  that  case  it  may 

the   continuing   liability  of   the  adminis-  not    have  been  necessary  to    appoint  an 

trator  and  his  sureties  for  any  assets  not  administrator  de   bonis  non.     But  for  the 

duly    accounted    for.    To    same     effect,  ordinary  purposes  of  administration   the 

Coleman   v.    Raynor,    3    Coldw.   25,   29 ;  election  of  an  administrator  to  the  office 

where  the    resignation   is   accepted  pend-  of  judge  of  probate  with  jurisdiction  over 

in/    the   settlement  of  his  accounts,  the  the  estate    administered    by  him,   seems 

court  may  nevertheless  settle  his  accounts,  to  be  highly  suggestive  of  the  propriety 

and  h<ar  ami  determine  exceptions  thereto,  of  resignation  or  removal  as  administrator, 

and  ascertain  the  amount  due  from  him,  A  litigant  claiming  adversely  to  the  ad- 

as  if  lie  had   not   resigned  :  Slagle  v.  En-  ministrator  would  be  at  some  disadvantage 

trekin,   44    Oh.   St.    637,   639.      And  see  before  the  judge,  who  would  so  much  more 

authorities  cited  pott,  §  274,  p.  *  589.  readily    understand    and    appreciate    the 

8  Bin!  v.  Jones,  5  La.  An.  643,  645.  force     of     the     administrator's    position 

4  School  Hx.  §  156.  than   that  of  his   opponent. 
6  Marsh  g,  The  People,  supra. 
flit 


§  274  CONSEQUENCES   OF   REVOCATION   OF   LETTERS.       *  584,  *  585 

the  propriety  of  a  voluntary  resignation  by  the  judge  of  his  previ- 
ous office  of  administrator  was  not  questioned. 

The  right  to  resign  is  not,  however,  an  absolute  or  arbitrary 
right;  it  can  only  be  accorded  upon  proof  of  circumstances  showing 
it  to  be  consistent  with  the  interests  of  the  estate.1  Right  to  resign 
Hence  the  parties  interested  in  the  estate  should  have  is  not  absolute, 
notice  of  the  intended  resignation,  either  by  publication  or  other- 
wise. The  method  of  notice  is  generally  provided  by  statute; 2  and 
it  is  held  in  Georgia,  that,  if  not  complied  with,  the  order  granting 
a  discharge  is  void;  8  and  so  in  New  Jersey.4 

§  274.  Consequences  of  the  Revocation  of  Letters.  —  The  effect 
of  the  revocation  of  letters  testamentary  and  of  administration, 
and  of  the  resignation  of  the  executor  or  administrator,  is 
[*  585]  *  necessarily  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  subject  of 
jurisdiction  of  probate  courts,6  executors  de  son  tort,6  and  of 
the  powers  and  duties  of  administrators  de  bonis  non; 7  and  on  several 
other  occasions  the  principle  upon  which  the  validity  of  the  mesne 
acts  of  an  executor  or  administrator  after  appointment  and  before 
revocation  depends,  has  been  discussed.8  It  may  nevertheless  be  of 
utility  to  add,  in  this  connection,  some  considerations  on  this  sub- 
ject, although,  perhaps,  to  some  extent  in  recapitulation  of  what 
has  been  said  before. 

Mr.  Williams,  in  his  great  treatise  on  Executors  and  Administra- 
tors, says  on  this  subject,  that  the  first  important  distinction  to  be 
considered  is  between  grants  which  are  void,  and  such 
as  are  merely  voidable,  — the  mesne  acts  of  an  executor    Dlstinctlon  he- 

J  '  ,  tween  acts  of 

or  administrator  between  the  grant  and  its  revocation   an  administra- 

1  In  New  York  it  is  held  that  an  alle-  administration,  to  a  successor :  Macey  v. 
gation  that   the  petitioner  "is  too  busy     Stark,  116  Mo.  481,  503. 

with   her    own  private    matters,  and    no  8  Head   v.   Bridges,   67   Ga.  227,  232, 

longer  desires  to  be    busied"   with   her  Speer,  J.,  dissenting,  239,  on  the  ground 

trust,  is  not  a  "  sufficient  reason  "  to  au-  that  there  was  no  proof  in  the  record  that 

thorize  the   resignation  of  an  executrix,  there  had  been  no  service,  in  the  absence 

under  the  statute :  Baier  v.  Baier,  4  Dem.  of  which  the  recital  of  service  must  be 

162.     An  executor,  although  he  may  re-  deemed  conclusive.     Also  Barnes  v.  Un- 

sign,  cannot  retract  a  renunciation :  Mat-  derwood,  54  Ga.  87. 
ter  of  Suarez,  3  Dem.  1 64.  *  Vail  v.  Male,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  521,  the  rule 

2  In  Missouri,  by  publication  in  a  news-  of  court   requiring  at  least   thirty  days' 
paper  for  four  consecutive  weeks  before  notice,  unless  the  court  order  otherwise, 
the  beginning  of  the  term  at  which  the  5  Ante,  ch.  xvi. 

application  is  to  be  made :  Rev.  St.  1889,  6  Ch.  xxi. 

§  43.     In  a  collateral  proceeding  it  is  not  7  Ante,  §  179. 

necessary  to  show  an  express  order  accept-  8  See  as  to  the  validity  of  the  admin- 

ing  a  resignation  ;  and  the  publication  of  istration  on  the  estate  of  a  person  not 
the  requisite  notice  will  be  presumed  in  actually  dead,  ante,  §§  208-211  ;  also  ante, 
such  case  when  there  is  an  approved  §  266,  as  to  the  validity  of  acts  before 
settlement  professing  to  be  made  "  upon  revocation  ;  and  ante,  §  227,  on  p.  *501,  as 
resignation,"    followed   by   a   change    of     to  the  effect  of  the  annulment  of  a  will 

after  distribution  thereunder. 

615 


*  585,  *  586  REVOCATION    OF   LETTERS.  §  274 

tor  under  void,  being,  in  the  former  case,  of  no  validity.  The  neces- 
under  void-  sity  °f  th.is  rule  is  self-evident :  a  void  grant  is  no 
able,  letters.  grant,  and  acts  depending  for  their  validity  upon  offi- 
cial authority  in  the  actor  are  wholly  void  in  the  absence  of  such 
authority.  So  far,  then,  as  the  original  appointment  of  an  executor 
was  made  by  a  court  having  no  power  to  make  such  an  appointment, 
—  whether  for  want  of  jurisdiction  generally  or  in  the  particular 
case  that  may  be  in  question,  —  all  that  the  person  so  appointed  has 
done  under  color  of  his  appointment  must  be  treated  precisely  as  if 
done  by  a  stranger.  The  revocation  in  such  case  amounts  simply  to 
an  official  declaration  of  the  nullity  of  what  has  been  done,  "  for  the 
sake  of  correcting  the  records  and  preventing  further  mischief."  * 

Mr.  Williams  then  proceeds  to  cite  and  quote  from  a  number  of 
English  cases,  showing  that  many  such  acts  were  held  void  under 
circumstances  which  seem  to  make  the  ruling  incompatible  with 
principles  of  strict  justice  and  wise  policy ;  thus  all  acts  performed 
by  an  administrator  who  obtained  letters  on  the  concealment  of  a 
will,2  or  by  one  appointed  before  the  executor  had  renounced,3 
or  by  an  executor  who  obtained  probate,  knowing  *  that  there  [*  586] 
was  a  later  will  by  the  same  testator,4  have  been  held  void, 
so  that  the  later  appointed  executor  or  administrator  was  allowed  to 
maintain  trover  or  detinue  to  recover  property  from  one  who  had 
purchased  of  the  former  appointee.8  The  justice  and  wisdom  of  this 
principle  would  seem  to  be  limited  to  such  persons  as  acted  with 
knowledge  or  notice  of  the  invalidity  of  the  authority  of  the  execu- 
tor or  administrator.  But  to  visit  upon  one  who  has  no  means  of 
detecting  it  the  consequences  of  a  fraud  practised  upon  the  court 
granting  letters,  or  of  a  mistake  in  the  effect  of  the  evidence  pro- 
duced before  it,  and  who  relies  upon  the  validity  of  the  unreversed 
decrees  and  judgments  of  a  court  created  by  the  law  for  the  purpose 
of  rendering  them,  seems  a  mockery  of  justice  and  the  perversion  of 
law  into  a  snare.  As  if  in  melioration  of  the  harshness,  not  to  say 
injustice,  of  the  rule  applied  in  these  cases,  the  privilege  accorded 
to  executors  de  son  tort  to  recoup,  in  damages,  payments  made  in 
due  course  of  administration,  is  extended  to  the  vendees  of  an  exec- 
utor or  administrator  under  void  letters.6  But  this  privilege  does 
not  extend  to  an  executor  knowingly  acting  under  a  void  probate;  in 

1  School.  Ex.  §  100,  p.  220.  the  sale  as  if  made  with  his  consent  for  his 

'  Wins.    Ex.   [586],   citing   Abram   v.  use:  Wins.  Ex.  [587], 

Cunningham,  2  Lev.  182;  Graysbrook  v.         fl  Wins.  Ex.  [588],  citing  Graysbrook  v. 

Fox,  Plowd,  270.  Fox,  supra,  in  which  "it  was  laid  down 

3  Abram  v.  Cunningham,  supra  ;  Bax-  by  the  court  that,  if  the  sale  had  been 

tei  and    Bale's  Case,  l    Leon.  90;   and  see  made  to  discharge   funeral   expenses   or 

Throckmorton  v,  Hobby,  I  Brownl.  51,  debts,  which  t  lie  executor  or  administrator 

1  \V-iu]lc\  v.  Clark,  5  B.  &  Aid.  744.  was  compellable  to  pay,  the  sale  would 

u  Or  In'  might  bring  assumpsit  f'>r  the  have  been  indefeasible  forever." 

proceeds,    waiving   the  tort  and    treating 
010 


§  274  CONSEQUENCES   OF   REVOCATION   OF   LETTERS.      *  586,  *  587 

the  case  of  Woolley  v.  Clark,1  such  an  executor  was  not  allowed  to 
give  evidence  of  the  administration  of  assets.  In  this  case,  the  dis- 
tinction is  broadly  drawn  between  one  who  acts  with  knowledge  or 
notice  of  the  defect  in  the  authority,  and  one  who  has  no  such 
notice:  "Where  a  party  obtains  a  judgment  irregularly,  which  is 
afterward  set  aside  for  irregularity,  he  is  not  justified  in  acting 
under  it;  but  the  sheriff  is  justified."  And  this  view  seems  to  be 
recognized  in  many  English  cases,  even  in  that  in  which  Justices 
Ashhurst  and  Buller  uttered  the  dictum,  that  the  case  of  a  probate 
of  a  supposed  will  during  the  life  of  a  party  may  be  distinguished 
from  a  case  where  a  party  acts  under  the  authority  of  a  court 
[*  587]  of  law.  "  Every  person  is  bound  to  pay  *  deference  to  a 
judicial  act  of  a  court  having  competent  jurisdiction,"  says 
Justice  Ashhurst.2  And  Justice  Buller:  "I  am  most  clearly  of 
opinion  that  it  [probate  of  a  will]  is  a  judicial  act;  for  the  ecclesi- 
astical court  may  hear  and  examine  the  parties  on  the  different  sides 
whether  a  will  be  or  be  not  properly  made ;  that  is  the  only  court 
that  can  pronounce  whether  or  not  the  will  be  good.  And  the  courts 
of  common  law  haire  no  jurisdiction  over  the  subject.  Secondly, 
The  probate  is  conclusive  till  it  be  repealed ;  and  no  court  of  com- 
mon law  can  admit  evidence  to  impeach  it."8  It  was  held  early  in 
the  reign  of  Queen  Elizabeth,  that  a  sale  or  gift  by  an  administrator, 
whose  authority  was  subsequently  vacated,  stood  unaffected  thereby.4 

The  cases  giving  rise  to  the  application  of  this  principle  in  Amer- 
ica turn  mostly  upon  the  question  of  the  residence  of  the  decedent 
at  the  time  of  his  death;  for  it  was  formerly  held  in  many  States, 
that  the  probate  court  has  no  jurisdiction  to  grant  probate  or  letters 
unless  the  decedent  died  an  inhabitant  of  the  county,  or  leaving 
property  therein,  and  that  letters  granted  where  such  was  not  the 
fact,  and  all  acts  done  upon  the  authority  thereof,  are  void.  This 
doctrine  is  now  very  generally  giving  way  to  the  safer  one  of  hold- 
ing them  voidable,  but  good  until  revoked.6 

So,  also,  the  discovery  of  a  will  will  not  make  void  letters  of 
administration  granted  generally ;  but  until  revoked  all  persons  act- 
ing in  good  faith  with  the  administrator  will  be  protected.6 

If  the  grant  is  only  voidable,  another  distinction  is  taken  between 
a  proceeding  by  citation  to  revoke  the  letters  granted,  and  an  appeal 

1  5  B.  &  Aid.  744.  gift.     But  if  the  gift  be  by  covin,  it  shall 

2  Allen  v.  Dundas,  3  T.  R.  125,  129.  be  void  by  the  statute  ":  Packman's  Case, 
8  lb.,  pp.   130,  131,  citing  Kerrick  v.     6  Co.  19.     To  the  same  effect,  Semine  v. 

Bransby,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  421,  pi.  4.  Semine,  2  Lev.  90. 

4  "  Forasmuch  as  the  first  administra-  5  See  ante,  §  204. 

tor  had  the  absolute  property  of  the  goods  6  Ante,  §  266 ;  Schluter  v.  Bowery  Bank, 

in  him,  he  might  give  them  to  whom  he  117  N.  Y.  125;   Franklin  v.  Franklin,  91 

pleased.     And  although  the  letters  of  ad-  Tenn.  119;   see  also  Smith  v.  Smith,  168 

ministration  be  afterwards  countermanded  111.  488,  496. 
and  revoked,  yet  that  cannot  defeat  the 

617. 


*  587,  *  588  REVOCATION    OF   LETTERS.  §  274 

from  the  judgment  of   the   court  of  probate,   which  is 
Distinction  be-   taken  to  reverse  a  former  sentence.1     The  appeal  sus- 

tween  citation  .  .  .  «     , 

to  revoke  a  pends,  until  its  termination,  the  powers  of  the  person 
IuddablieeaTant'  against  whose  appointment  it  is  taken,  and  all  of  his 
from  judgment  intermediate  acts  are  ineffectual.  If  anything  is  neces- 
fe«ers?S  sarJ  to  ^e  done  ^or  tne  estate  during  the  prose- 

cution *  of  the  appeal,  it  is  within  the  power  of  [*  588] 
the  probate  court  to  appoint  an  administrator  pendente  lite."1 
The  bond  of  an  executor  is  not  vacated,  but  only  suspended,  by  the 
appeal  from  the  order  appointing  him.3  Where  an  order  of  revoca- 
tion is  appealed  from,  it  is  held  in  some  States  that  the  appeal  sus- 
pends the  order  of  revocation,  and  leaves  the  letters  in  full  force 
and  effect;4  while  elsewhere  the  authority  of  the  executor  pending 
the  appeal  is  denied.5  But  on  an  appeal  from  the  order  granting 
letters,  such  letters  cannot  be  granted  pending  the  appeal.6 

A  revocation  upon  citation,  where  the  grant  of  letters  was  voidable 
only,  leaves  all  lawful  acts  done  by  the  first  administrator  valid  and 
binding,  as  though  his  authority  had  not  been  questioned ;  all  sales 
of  real  or  personal  property  made  lawfully  by  the  executor  or  ad- 
ministrator, and  with  good  faith  on  the  part  of  the  purchaser,  are 
and  shall  remain  valid  and  effectual,  and  the  payment  to  him  of  a 
debt  to  the  estate  will  be  a  legal  discharge  to  the  debtor.  This  is 
self-evident,  and  it  would  be  a  waste  of  time  and  space  to  examine 
the  very  numerous  cases  so  holding.7  Beside  the  cases  bearing  upon 
this  subject  which  are  cited  ante,  in  connection  with  the  several 
subjects  mentioned  in  the  opening  of  this  section,  there  will  be  occa- 
sion to  cite  others,  in  connection  with  the  relation  which  several 
executors  or  administrators  of  the  same  estate  bear  to  each  other, 
which  also  touch  upon  the  effect  of  revocation  and  resignation. 

It  may  be  mentioned,  however,  that  since  the  removed  executor  or 
administrator  has  no  further  authority  to  act,  or  bind  the  estate,  he 
cannot  be  held  liable  for  any  act  affecting  the  estate  after  his  re- 
moval.8 To  a  suit  pending  against  him  at  the  time  of  his  removal 
he  may  plead  the  revocation  of  his  authority  in  bar,9  at  least  if  he 

1  Wms.  Ex.  [588].  5  So  in  Georgia:  Thompson  v.  Knight, 

2  Fletcher  v.  Fletcher,  29  Vt.  98,  102;  23  Ga.  399;  Louisiana:  Succession  of 
Arnold  v.  Sabin,  4  Cush.  46.     And  see  In     Townsend,  37  La.  An.  408. 

re  Moore,  80  Gal.  72.  6  State   v.  Williams,  supra ;    Offutt  v. 

*  Hence,  if  the  original  grant  is  affirmed  Gott,  12  Gill  &  J.  385.     See  as  to  the  effect 

on  appeal,  no  new  bond  need  he  given  by  of  an  appeal,  post,  §§  547  et  sen. 
the   executor:    Dunham   v.  Dunham,   16  7  Schluter  v.  Bowery  Bank,  117  N.  Y. 

Gray,  .r)77.  125,  130;  Franklin  v.  Franklin,  91  Tenn. 

I  So  in   Maryland  :   State  v.  Williams,  119  j  see  ante,  §  206,  and  cases  cited. 
u  (Jill,    I72j    Mississippi:    Mnirhead    v.         8  Marsh  v.  The  People,  15  111.  284. 
Muirhead,  8  Sol  &M.  211;  Pennsylvania:         9  Morrison  v.   Cones,  7  Blackf.  593 ; 

Bhanfflei  V.  Stoerer,  4  S.  &  11.202.     See  Broach    v.   Walker,  2    Ga.  428;    Hall   v. 

alio  port,  §  r>47.  Peannan,  20  Tex.  168. 

018 


§  274  CONSEQUENCES   OF   REVOCATION   OF   LETTERS.      *  588,  *  589 

has  settled  his  account; x  and  such  suit  must  be  further 
[*  589]   *  prosecuted  in  the  name  of  a  new  representative  of  the 

estate,  or  be  dismissed.2  Hence  a  decree  for  the  sale  of 
lands  to  pay  debts,  on  application  of  the  decedent's  creditors,  is 
void,  if  the  administrator's  resignation  has  been  accepted  before 
the  rendition  of  the  decree.8  After  revocation,  removal,  or  resigna- 
tion, the  former  executor  or  administrator  cannot  complete  a  sale 
which  he  has  been  negotiating  on  behalf  of  the  estate,4  nor  collect 
assets; 5  but  the  court  has  jurisdiction  to  settle  his  accounts  as  though 
he  were  still  in  office.6 

It  is  held  in  New  York  that  an  executor,  whose  let-    n      ..      , 

'  Cessation  of 

ters  have  been  revoked  on  the  ground  of  having  been  cause  of  revo- 

ad judged  a  lunatic,  is  not  entitled  to  rehabilitation  in  rSXut?tethe 

office  on  judicial  restoration  to  sanity.     The  principle  person 
involved  extends  equally  to  removals  for  any  cause.7 


1  Cogburn  v.  McQueen,  46  Ala.  551, 
565. 

3  Per  Bell,  J.,  in  Wiggin  v.  Plumer,  31 
"N.  H.  251,  266 ;  National  Bank  v.  Stanton, 
116  Mass.  435;  Brown  v.  Pendergast,  7 
Allen,  427. 

8  Wright  v.  Thornton,  87  Tenn.  74. 

4  Owens  v.  Cowen,  7  B.  Mon.  152,  157  ; 
Bender  v.  Bean,  52  Ark.  132,  143.  Post, 
§474. 


5  Stubblefield  v.  McRaven,  5  Sm.  &  M. 
130,  133. 

6  Casoni  v.  Jerome,  58  N.  Y.  315,  322  ; 
Nevit  v.  Woodburn,  160  111.  203,  213; 
Slagle  v.  Entrekin,  44  Oh.  St.  637,  639;  In 
re  Hood,  104  N.  Y.  103 ;  In  re  Radowich, 
74  Cal.  536  ;  and  see  authorities  ante,  §  273, 
p.*  583. 

7  Matter  of  Deering,  4  Dem.  81. 


819 


*PART   THIRD.  [*590] 

OF  THE  PROPERTY  TO  WHICH  THE  TITLE   OF  EXECU- 
TORS  AND  ADMINISTRATORS   EXTENDS. 


There  is  no  occasion  to  repeat  citation  of  authorities  on  the  propo- 
sition, that,  at  common  law  and  in  all  the  States,  all  mere  personal 
All  personal  property,  including  chattels  real,  goes  to  the  executor  of 
property  goes     a  testator,  and  to  the  administrator  of  an  intestate,  or 

to  the  6XGCllt0r 

or  adminis-  of  a  testator  in  case  no  executor  accepts  or  qualifies, 
trator.  r^Q  s[ngie  exception  that  may  be  mentioned  is,  that  by 

special  custom  heirlooms  go  to  the  heir  or  devisee,  and  although  they 
are  mere  chattels,  cannot  be  devised  apart  from  the  realty.1 

Heirlooms  in  the  strict  sense  are  said  to  be  rare,2  and  seem  not  to 
be  recognized  in  America ; 3  they  are,  according  to  the  ancient  au- 
Except  heir-  thorities,  such  goods  and  chattels  as,  though  not  in  their 
looms.  nature  heritable,  have  a  heritable  character  impressed 

upon  them,4  although  Blackstone  describes  them  as  generally  being 
such  things  as  cannot  be  taken  away  without  damaging  or  dismem- 
bering the  freehold.6  This  subject  is  not  of  sufficient  importance  to 
justify  further  consideration  here ;  the  law  as  to  the  cognate  sub- 
ject of  fixtures  not  severable  from  the  inheritance  will  be  treated 
hereinafter.6 

Family  portraits  specifically  bequeathed  have  been  held  to  consti- 
Family  por-  ^ute  no  Par*  °^  *he  testator's  personal  estate,  and  that 
traits.  therefore  the  administrator  cum  testamento  annexo  has 

no  right  to  them.7     So  an   administrator   has   no  property 
Cadaver  of  the    *  in   the  cadaver  of  his   intestate,   and   cannot  [*  591] 
deceased.  maintain   an   action   for   its   wilful   and  negli- 

gent mutilation ;  but  may  sue  for  injury  to  the  wearing  apparel  of 
the  deceased.8  In  a  case  arising  in  Rhode  Island,9  Potter,  J.,  reviews 
the  Roman,  canon,  and  ecclesiastical  law,  and  reaches  the  conclusion, 

1  2  Blacket  *429 ;  1  Schouler  on  Per-  of  England  are  mentioned  as  being  heir- 

■onal  Property,  1 1  k.  looms  descendible  to  the  next  successor. 

«  Hap.  &  L.  Law  Diet.  "  rleirloomB."  Wins.  Ex.  [722]. 

8  I  Washb.  R.  Prop.  oh.  l,  pi.  if,.  »  Post,  §§  280  et  seq, 

*  Byng  r.  Byng,  10  II.  I-  <  'as.  171, 183.  7  Estate  of  Mosely,  12  Phila.  50. 

Bee  authoritiei  in  Wins.  Ex.  [721].  8  Griffith  v.  Railroad,  23  S.  C.  25. 

'■  2  Blackrt.  *  127.     The  crown  jewels         9  Pierce  v.  Proprietors,  10  R.  I.  227. 
t$2U 


PROPERTY   TO   WHICH   TITLE   EXTENDS.  *  591 

that,  while  a  dead  body  is  not  property  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  com- 
mon law,  yet  the  relatives  have  rights  over  it  which  courts  will  pro- 
tect.1 So  in  Minnesota  this  right  of  the  widow  or  next  of  kin  is  fully 
maintained,  and  it  is  held  that  for  any  infraction  thereof — such  as 
an  unlawful  mutilation  of  the  remains  —  a  recovery  may  be  had  for 
the  injury  to  the  feelings  and  mental  suffering  resulting  proximately 
from  the  wrongful  act,  though  no  actual  pecuniary  damage  is  done.8 
In  Indiana  the  proposition  is  announced,  that  the  bodies  of  the  dead 
belong  to  the  surviving  relations  as  property,8  and  that  they,  and  not 
the  administrator,  have  the  right  to  the  custody  and  burial  of  the 
same.4    So  in  Pennsylvania.6 

1  lb.,  pp.  235,  239.  See  a  learned  dis-  touching  the  interment  and  erecting  of  a 
sertation  on  this  subject  in  a  note  to  the  monument :  Thompson  v.  Deeds,  93  Iowa, 
referee's  report  in  the  Matter  of  opening     228. 

Beekman  Street,  by  Surrogate  Bradford,  s  Bogert  v.  Indianapolis,  13  Ind.  134, 

appended  to  4  Bradf .  p.  503.  138. 

2  Larson  v.  Chase,  47  Minn.  307  (de-  4  Renihan  v.  Right,  125  Ind.  536. 
claring  the  widow's  right  paramount  to  5  Wynkoop  v.  Wynkoop,  42  Pa.  St.  293, 
the  next  of  kin).     See  also,  as  to  the  re-  302  (excluding  the  right  of  the  adminis- 
spective  rights  of  widow  and    daughter  tratrix  and  wife). 


621 


*  592,  *  593  property  in  possession.  §§  275,  276 


*  CHAPTER   XXX.  [*592] 

OP   PROPERTY   IN   POSSESSION. 

§  275.  Joint  and  Partnership  Property.  —  Since  it  was  found  most 
convenient  to  consider  the  law  affecting  the  estates  of  deceased  part- 
Partnership  ners  in  connection  with  the  effect  produced  by  the  death 
property.  0f  a  member  of  a  partnership,  it  is  not  necessary  to  men- 

tion the  subject  here  further  than  to  refer  to  the  chapter  where  it  is 
treated.1 

It  is  one  of  the  characteristics  of  joint  ownership  of  property,  per- 
At  law,  exec-  sonal  as  well  as  real,  that,  when  one  of  the  joint  owners 
utors  and  ad-      ^      ^is  interest  passes  at  once  to  the  survivor  or  surviv- 

roinistr3.toi  s  A 

have  no  title  ors,  excluding  the  personal  representatives  as  well  as 
heWmYomt  heirs  an(*  distributees  from  any  title  therein.2  But  in 
ownership,  equity,  the  owners  of  a  mortgage  made  to  several  mort- 
butmav  have  gagees  jointly  were  held  to  be  owners  in  common  of  the 
in  equity.  rnoney  secured  thereby,  the  right  to  which,  on  the  death 

of  one  of  them,  passes  to  his  executor  or  administrator.8  From  this 
principle  Mr.  Williams  deduces  the  rule  that  at  law  the  right  of  a 
joint  owner  passes,  on  his  death,  to  the  survivor  or  survivors,4  but 
in  equity  to  his  executor  or  administrator.6 

§  27G.  Real  Estate.  —  There  will  be  occasion  hereafter,  in  connec- 
tion with  the  law  regulating  the  liability  and  powers  of  executors  and 
administrators  in  respect  of  real  estate,6  as  Avell  as  in  treating  of  the 
sale  of  real  estate  for  the  payment  of  debts,7  to  dwell  upon  the  circum- 
Real  estate  stances  under  which  real  estate  will  pass  to  the  personal 
to  ^f^and1^'  representative  for  administration.  It  will  be  sufficient, 
devisees.  therefore,  to  mention  in  this  connection  the  general  rule, 

that  in  the  absence  of  statutory  provisions  the  real  estate,  or  lands,  tene- 
ments, and  hereditaments,  of  a  deceased  person,  go  directly  to 
Unless  other-     the  heirs  or  devisees.     *  Exceptions  to  this  rule  [*  593] 
wise  directed      are  enacted  in  many  States  whose  statutes  direct 

by  statute,  J  .    . 

that  realty  and  personalty  are  alike  subject  to  administra- 
te winn  liable     ^        g  jn  t}ie  0t]iers  real  estate  is  likewise  subject  to  be 

for  the.  pay-  ' 

ment  of  debts,    administered  in  case  it  becomes  necessary,  from  the  lack 

1  Ante,  §§  123  et  $eq.  e  Post,  §§  338  et  seq. 

2  1  School,  Pen.  Pr.  188.  »  Post,  §§  463  et  seq. 

8  Vickcrs  v.  Cowill,  1  Heav.  529.  8  These    States   are  enumerated,  post, 

'  \Vm,s.  Ex.  [650].  §337. 

»  Wins.  Kx.  [1900], 


§276 


REAL   ESTATE. 


593 


of  sufficient  personalty,  to  pay  the  decedent's  debts,  so  that  in  these 
States  the  realty  descends  to  the  heir  or  devisee  subject  to  a  naked 
power  to  be  sold  on  the  happening  of  the  contingency    or  under  a 
named.1     It  is  also  to  be  mentioned  here  that  executors,    Neuter  b/ 
and  under  some  circumstances  administrators  cum  testa-   will. 
mento  annexo,  are  sometimes  vested  by  will  with  power  to  dispose  of 
real  estate.    In  this  respect  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to  decide  whether 
the  devise  is  to  the  executor,  or  to  the  devisee  with  a  naked  power 
in  the  executor.     Judge  McCreary  has  adopted,  on  this 
point,  the  rule  as  laid  down  by  Judge  Redfield : 2  "It  is 
said  the  devise  of  the  land  to  the  executors  to  sell  passes 
the  title ;  but  a  devise  that  executors  may  sell  or  shall 
sell  lands,  or  that  they  may  or  shall  be  sold  by  the  ex- 
ecutors, gives  them  only  a  naked  power  of  sale."  8     The 
power  to  sell  may  be  granted  by  implication,4  where,  and 
to  the  extent  to  which  it  is  necessary  to  carry  out  the 
testator's   intention,6  but  will  not  be  implied  from  the 
mere  fact  that  lands  are  charged  with  the  payment  of  debts,6  or  that 
distribution  is  to  be  made  after  the  executor's  death,7  or  that  he  is 
directed  to  "  divide  "  it.8 

Real  estate  directed  by  the  testator  to  be  unconditionally  sold  by 
his  executor  is  by  the  doctrine  of  equitable  conversion  and  a  contract 
deemed  to  be  converted  into  personalty  from  the  mo-  ve'tTit  into" 
ment  of  the  testator's  death,  and  the  proceeds  are  assets  personalty. 
in  the  executor's  hands  ; 9  so  if  the  deceased  in  his  lifetime  con- 
tracts for  the  sale  of  real  estate  held  by  him,  it  is  considered  in 
equity  a  conversion  of  the  land  into  money,  the  vendor's  interest 
ceases  to  be  real  estate,  becoming  a  chose  in  action  which  goes  to  his 
personal  representative,  and  the  legal  title  is  held  only  as  a  security 
for  the  payment  of  the  debt.10 


Devise  to  sell 
passes  the  title; 

but  the  mere 
direction  or 
authorizing  of 
a  sale  confers  a 
naked  power. 

Power  to  sell 
maj*  be  granted 
by  implication, 


1  This  subject  is  fully  discussed,  post, 
§§  463  et  seq. 

2  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  137,  pi.  2,  note  (1), 
citing  Sugd.  on  Powers,  8th  ed.  112,  an 
authority  also  cited  by  Williams,  Ex. 
[654],  who  reaches  the  same  conclusion. 

3  Beadle  v.  Beadle,  2  McCrary,  586, 595. 
See  Cohea  v.  Jemison,  68  Miss.  510,  517, 
and  cases  there  cited.  Also  Simmous  v. 
Spratt,  26  Fla.  448,  458. 

*  Per  Wilde,  J.,  in  Tainter  v.  Clark,  13 
Met.  (Mass.)  220,  228;  Cahill  v.  Russell, 
140  N.  Y.  402.  And  see  cases  cited,  §§  339 
et  seq.  on  this  point. 

5  Walker  v.  Murphy,  34  Ala.  591,  594; 
Gray  v.  Henderson,  71  Pa.  St.  368;  Lind- 
ly  v.  O'Reilly,  50  N.  J.  L.  636  ;  Cohea  v. 
Jemison,  68  Miss.  510;  Ebey  v.  Adams, 
135  111.  80,  85. 


8  Post,  §  490,  p.  *  1096,  where  this  sub- 
ject is  discussed ;  Fox's  Will,  52  N.  Y. 
530,  536  ;  Owen  v.  Ellis,  64  Mo.  77. 

7  Waller  v.  Logan,  5  B.  -Mon.  515, 
522. 

8  Gammon  v.  Gammon,  153  111.  41. 

9  Post,  §  342  and  cases ;  also  §  339,  p. 
*719. 

10  Bender  v.  Luckenbach,  162  Pa.  St. 
18,  22,  and  cases  cited  ;  Williams  v.  Had- 
dock, 145  N.  Y.  145  and  authorities;  Hyde 
v.  Heller,  10  Wash.  586.  Even  where  the 
purchaser  is  given  an  option  not  exercised 
until  after  the  testator's  death,  on  his 
election  to  purchase,  the  money  goes  to 
the  legatees,  and  not  to  the  devisees: 
Newport  v.  Sisson,  18  R.  I.  411. 


623 


593,  *  594 


PROPERTY   IN   POSSESSION. 


§§  277,  278 


include  all 
leases  for  a 
time  certain ; 
estates  at 
will  and  by 
sufferance. 

Residue  of 
lease  pur  autre 
vie. 


The  effect  of  a  sale  of,  or  contract  to  sell,  realty  theretofore  de- 
vised, on  the  rights  of  the  devisee  and  personal  representative,  has 
been  considered  elsewhere.1 

§  277.  Chattels  Real,  which,  as  already  remarked,  go  to  the  ex- 
Chattels  real  ecutor  or  administrator,  include  all  leases  of  lands  or 
tenements  for  a  definite  space  of  time,  measured  by 
years,  months,  or  days,  or  until  a  day  named ; 2  also 
estates  at  will,  by  sufferance,  and,  generally,  any  estate  in 
lands  not  amounting  to  a  freehold.3  So  the 
residue  *  after  the  death  of  a  tenant  pur  autre  vie  [*  594] 
goes  to  the  executor  or  administrator ; 4  and  by 
analogy  to  the  provision  of  the  English  Statute  of  Frauds  5 
(directing  that  an  estate  pur  autre  vie  might  be  devised,  and  should 
be  chargeable  for  debts  on  debtor's  death,  in  the  hands  of  the  heirs 
of  a  special  occupant,  or  of  the  executor  or  administrator  if  there 
were  no  occupant)  the  interest  of  an  assignee  of  a  lease  for  lives, 
although  a  freehold,  passed  on  his  death  to  his  executor  or  adniin- 
istrator.6  Text-writers  also  mention  the  estate  known 
ant  on  the  as    terms    attendant    upon    the    inheritance,7    which   in 

inheritance.       equity,  it  is  said,  is  regarded  as  being  confined  to  the 
freehold,  and  inseparable  from  it.8 

By  statute  in  some  of  the  States  leases  exceeding  a  given  number 
of  years,  or  certain  other  interests,  which  at  common  law 
would  be  personalty,  are  to  be  treated  as  real  estate  with 
reference  to  the  rights  of  the  administrator.9 

§  278.  Chattels  Real  of  the  Wife.  —  It  is  familiar  doc- 
trine that  at  common  law  the  wife's  interest  in  her  chattels 
real  may  be  divested  by  the  husband  at  any  time  during 
coverture.  But  he  may  permit  them  to  remain  in  statu 
quo,  and  if  in  such  case  the  wife  survive,  they  are  hers 
to  the  exclusion  of  his  executors  and  administrators,1* 


made  real 
estate  by 
statute. 

Husband  may 
divest  his  wife 
of  her  interest 
in  chattels  real. 

Unless  he  does, 
they  remain 
hers  on  his 
death. 


1  Ante,  §  53. 

2  2  Kent  Com.  *  342  ;  Schee  v.  Wiseman, 
79  Ind.  389;  Lewis  v.  Ringo,  3  A.  K. 
Marsh  247  ;  Murdock  v.  Ratcliff,  7  Ohio, 
119;  Payne  v.  Harris,  3  Strobh.  Eq.  39; 
Gutzweiler  v.  Lackmann,  39  Mo.  91,97; 
Gay  ex  parte,  5  Mass.  419;  Brewster  v. 
Hill,  1  X.  II.  350;  Thornton  v.  Mehring, 
117  111.  55;  Rocker  v.  Walworth,  45  Oh. 
St.  169  (holding  that  the  personal  repre- 
sentative of  the  lessee  becomes  assignee, 
by  virtue  "f  his  office,  of  the  term  ;  hence 
if  such  representative  enters  ami  receives 
the  rents,  he    heroines  personally  liable  to 

the  le  box  for  accruing  rents,  to  the  extent 
of  the  profits  during  inch  occupancy); 
Mulloy  v.  Kyle,  26  Neb.  SIS. 


8  Rap.  &  L.  Law  Diet.,  "Chattels 
Real ;  "  Wms.  Ex.  [675]. 

*  3  lledf.  pn  Wills,  143  et  seq.,  pi.  4-6. 

5  29  Car.  II.  c.  3,  §  12. 

6  Mosher  v.  Yost,  33  Barb.  277,  279. 

7  When  a  term  is  created  for  a  particu- 
lar purpose,  and  this  purpose  has  beeu 
accomplished,  the  termor  is  held  in  equity 
as  trustee  for  the  owner :  Wms.  Ex. 
[1675]. 

8  3  Rcdf.  on  Wills,  143,  pi.  3;  Schoul. 
Ex.  §  221. 

9  Such  a  statute  is  found,  for  instance, 
in  Colorado:  McKee  v.  Howe,  17  Colo. 
538. 

W  Schoul.  Hush.  &  Wife,  §  164;  Wms- 
Ex.  [690] ;  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  146,  pi.  12. 


§  279 


MORTGAGES. 


594,  *  595 


He  cannot  di- 
vest her  by 
will. 


To  divest 
wife's  title  it 
must  be  com- 
pletely altered 
during  cover- 
ture. 


unaffected  by  testamentary  disposition  or  charge.1  The 
disposition  by  the  husband,  in  order  to  divest  his  wife's 
interest  in  chattels  real,  must,  as  a  general  principle, 
be  such  as  to  effect  a  complete  change  of  the  interest 
held  by  husband  and  wife  jointly.2  Thus  recovery, 
after  ejectment,  by  the  husband  in  his  own  name,  is 
sufficient ; 8  but  where  the  husband  had  taken  the  lease 
into  custody,  applied  to  an  attorney  to  collect  the  rent,  and  the  wife 
seemed  unwilling  to  execute  a  power  of  attorney  to  prosecute  in  the 
name  of  both,  whereupon  the  husband  relinquished  his  intention,  it 
was  held  that  the  husband  had  not  thereby  altered  the  title.4  So  if 
the  husband  mortgages  the  wife's  term  and  makes  default  in  payment, 
by  reason  whereof  the  mortgagee's  title  becomes  absolute,  the 
[*  595]  wife's  right  by  survivorship  is  defeated ;  but  *  if  the  mort- 
gagee's title  is  defeated  by  payment  at  maturity,  her  interest 
is  not  affected.6 

Power  in  the  husband  to  divest  the  whole  of  his  wife's  estate  in 
chattels  real  includes  power  to  divest  any  part  thereof.    „  . . 

.„,  .  ,  .  „  ^ ut  he  may 

Hence,  if  he  alone  grants  a  portion  of  the  wife  s  term,    partially  divest 
reserving  rent,  he  makes  himself  the  owner  of  the  term    Wlfe  s  tltle> 
so  granted,  and  the  rent  reserved  will  go  to  his  executor ; 6  but  the 
residue  will  survive  to  the  wife.7 

If  the  husband  survive,  he  is  entitled  to  his  wife's  chattels  real 
not  disposed  of  by  him  during  coverture,  and  of  which  he  if  husband  sur- 
had  possession  jure  uxoris ;  not   as  her  executor  or  ad-    v,ive>  his  wife'8 

chattels  tro  to 

rninistrator,  but  by  right  of  survivorship.8     Hence,  if  he    him  in  his 
should  himself  die  without  having  administered  on  the    mantal  rignt- 
wife's  estate,  her  chattels  real  go  to  his  executor  or  administrator.9 

§  279.    Mortgages,  as  well  as  deeds  of  trust  to  secure  the  payment 
of  debts  to  the  decedent,  always  go  to  the  executor  or   Mort_a  es 
administrator,10  even  though  the  estate  was  in  process  of   to  personal  rep- 
foreclosure   at   the   time  of   the  testator's  death11  and 


reseutative. 


i  1  Bish.  on  Mar.  Women,  §  188 ;  Stew. 
Husb.  &  Wife,  §  145.  Both  of  these 
writers  cite  as  authority,  besides  Coke 
(Litt.  46  6,  351  a),  Roberts  v.  Polgrean,  1 
H.  Bl.  535  ;  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  146,  pi.  13. 

2  Wms.  Ex.  [691]. 

8  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  146,  pi.  13;  Brett 
v.  Cumberland,  3  Bulst.  163,  164. 

4  Daniels  v.  Richardson,  22  Pick.  565, 
570. 

6  Wms.  Ex.  [692],  citing  Young  v. 
Radford,  Hob.  3  b,  which,  however,  turns 
upon  a  mortgage  made  by  husband  and 
wife,  and  surviving  to  the  husband  by 
the  wife's  death  before  the  day  of  pay- 
ment. 

6  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  146,  pi.  14. 
vol.  i.  —  40 


7  Wms.  Ex.  [694],  citing  as  authority 
two  cases  from  Cro.  Eliz. 

8  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  147,  pi.  15. 

9  Wms.  Ex.  [695];  Roberts  v.  Pol- 
grean, 1  H.  Bl.  535. 

10  Smith  v.  Dyer,  16  Mass.  18 ;  Taft  v. 
Stevens,  3  Gray,  504 ;  Long  v.  O'Fallon, 
19  How.  (U.  S.)  116,  125;  Burton  v. 
Hintrager,  18  Iowa,  348 ;  Webster  r. 
Calden,  56  Me.  204,  210;  Clark  v.  Black- 
ington,  110  Mass.  369;  Ladd  v.  Wiggin, 
35  N.  H.  421  ;  Shoolbred  v.  Drayton,  2 
Desaus.  246  ;  Clapp  v.  Beardsley,  1  Vt. 
151,  167;  Williams  v.  Ely,  13  Wis.  1,  6; 
Copper  v.  Wells,  1  N.  J.  Eq.  10;  Hem. 
menway  v.  Lynde,  79  Me.  299. 

11  Fay  v.  Cheney,  14  Pick.  399  ;  Dewey 

625 


*  595,  *  596  PROPERTY  IN   POSSESSION.  §  280 

although  the  heirs  obtained  possession  before  he  appointment  of 
an  administrator.1  So,  also,  the  real  estate  acquired  by  an  executor 
So  real  estate  or  administrator  in  satisfaction  of  a  judgment  for  a  debt 
debt  due  uTthe  ^ue  ^ne  deceased  is  held  by  him  in  trust  until  it  appears 
deceased.  that  it  is  not  needed  to  pay  debts  or  expenses  of  ad- 

ministration, when  the  title  passes  to  the  heirs.2  The  equity  of 
_,    ..     .  redemption   in   the    mortgagor  descends   to   his    heirs. 

demption  goes    Hence  it  is  usually  held  that,  while  the  surplus 
to  the  heirs.       proceeds  of  a  sale  *  during   the  lifetime  of  the  [*  596] 
mortgagor  constitute  personal  property  going  to  the  executor 
the  surplus  of  a  sale  after  his  death  represents  real  estate  and  goes  to 
the  heirs.8 

It  follows  from  the  law  giving  to  executors  and  administrators  the 
custody  of  real  as  well  as  of  personal  estate,  as  is  provided  by  statute 
Surplus  of  sale  in  some  States,  that  such  surplus  remaining  after  pay- 
'"eT^the^x-  men^  °f  the  debt  secured  and  expenses  of  sale  likewise 
ecutor.  goes  to  the  executor  or  administrator.4     And  it  is  held 

in  Delaware  that  such  surplus  should  be  paid  to  and  held  by  the 
executor  or  administrator  until  it  appear  that  it  is  not  needed 
for  the  payment  of  debts.5  So  in  Massachusetts,  the  surplus 
proceeds  of  a  sale  under  a  power  directing  such  surplus  to  be  paid 
to  the  mortgagor  or  his  assigns  may  be  recovered  by  the  mortgagor's 
executor,  although  devised  to  others,  who  holds  it,  first  to  the  use 
of  the  widow,  next  for  payment  of  debts,  and  lastly  to  the  uses  of 
the  will.6  In  Pennsylvania,  by  statute,  the  surplus,  after  payment 
of  liens,  raised  by  a  sheriff's  sale,  must  be  paid  to  the  personal 
representative,  to  be  distributed  by  order  of  the  Orphan's  Court,  the 
jurisdiction  of  which  is  exclusive.7  The  vendor's  lien  for  unpaid 
purchase-money,  being  a  chose  in  action,  goes  to  the  executor  or 
administrator,  and  not  to  the  widow  or  heirs  as  such.8 

§280.  Chattels  Animate. — Domestic  animals,  being  personal 
property,  go  to  the  executor  or  administrator.  Of  animals  ferce 
Domestic  ani-  naturce  only  such  go  to  the  personal  representative  as  are 
ee'toPand**"  connned>  or  "*  the  immediate  possession  of  man ;  such  as 
animals/ens      tame  pigeons,  deer,  rabbits,  pheasants,  partridges,  etc. ; 

v.  Van  Deusen,  4  Pick.  19;  Stevenson  v.  Blaekf.  165;  Chaffee  ».  Franklin,  1 1  It.  I. 

Polk,  71  Iowa,  278,  290.  578;   Jones  on  Mortg.  §  1931  ;    see  also 

1  Haskins  v.  Ilawkes,  108  Mass.  .'579;  Garlick  v.  Patterson,  2  Chev.  27.  And 
Demarest  v.  Wynkoop,  3  John.  Ch.  129.  the  profits  of  such  surplus  belong  to  the 

2  Webber  v.  Webber,  6  Me.  127;  heirs  until  measures  are  taken  to  subject 
Boylston  v.  Carver,  4  Mass.  598  ;  Gibson  the  same  to  the  payment  of  debts :  Allen 
v.  Bailey,  9  N.  II.  108.     See,  in  connection  v.  Allen,  12  It.  I.  301. 

herewith,  post,  §  307,  and  authorities.  4  Butler  v.  Smith,  20  Oreg.  126,  131. 

8  Cox  v.  McBomey,2  Sandf.  561,  563;  6  Vincent  v.  Piatt,  5  Harr.  164,  167. 

Sweezey  V.  Willis,   1   Bradf.  495;   Moses  6  Varnum  v.  Meserve,  8  Allen,  158. 

0.  Murgatroyd,   J   John.  Ch.  119;  Bogert  7  Weimer  v.  Karch,  153  Pa.  St.  385. 

v.  l-'urman,  10  Pai.  496  ;   Dunning «;.  Ocean  8  Evans  v.  Enloo,  70  Wis.  345,  348. 
Bank,  01  \.   Y.  497 ;  Shaw  v.  Iloadley,  8 
020 


§"281 


CHATTELS    ANIMATE   AND    VEGETABLE.         *  596,  *  597 


or  animals  kept  in  a  room,  cage,  or  the  like ;  fish  in  a   naiura  in  po*. 
box,  tank,  or  net ; 1  doves  in  a  dove-house  ; 2  or  animals    8e3Slon- 
wounded   so   as   to   prevent    their    escape,8   or   killed ;    or   oysters 
artificially  planted  in  a  bed  clearly  separated  and  marked  out  for  the 
purpose.4     But  animals  ferce  natures,  in  so  far  as  they    Fera  natura 
belong  to  a  privilege  connected  with  landed  possession,    j^^h  the' 
such  as  deer  in  a  park  (not   so  tame  or  reclaimed  from    land. 

their  wild  state  as  to  become  personal  property),  fish  in  a 
[*  597]  pond,  and  the  like,  will  go  to  the  heir,  if  the  *  deceased  held 

a  freehold   estate,  or  to  the   executor,  as   accessory  to  the 
chattel  real,  if  he  held  a  term  for  years.5 

§  281.  Chattels  Vegetable. — Chattels  vegetable,  being  the  fruit  or 
other  parts  of  a  plant  when  severed  from  its  body,  or  the  plant  itself 
when  severed  from  the  ground,  go  to  the  executor  or  ad-    _    .x 

.    .  -r.  1111  t  Fruit  or  plants, 

mmistrator.     But  unless  they  have  been  severed,  trees    when  severed 
and  the  fruit  and  produce  therefrom  follow  the  nature  of    from  l}e    . 

wr  ground,  go  to 

the  soil  upon  which  they  grow,  and  when  the  owner  of  the  executor  or 

the  land  dies  they  descend  to  the  heir  or  person  entitled  administrator- 

to  the  land.6    But  even  growing  timber,  trees,  and  grass  may,  under 
special  circumstances,  become  chattels,  and  as  such  pass 

to  the  executor  or  administrator ;  where,  for  instance,  ber  ^d^nisY 

the  owner  of  the  fee  grants  the  trees  on  land  to  another,  may  &° 10  the 

expeutor 

they  become  personalty.7     Or  the  owner  in  fee  simple    under  certain 
may  sell  the  land  and  reserve  the  timber  or  trees,  and    CIrcum3tances- 
they  thereby  become  personalty  and  go  to  the  personal  representative.8 


1  Buster  v.  Newkirk,  20  John.  75  ; 
Pierson  v.  Post,  3  Cai.  175. 

2  Commonwealth  v.  Chace,  9  Pick.  15. 
8  But  simple  pursuit  is  not  sufficient  to 

create  ownership  :  Buster  v.  Newkirk  and 
Pierson  v.  Post,  supra. 

4  Fleet  v.  Hegeman,  14  Wend.  42 ; 
Decker  v.  Fisher,  4  Barb.  592  ;  Lowndes 
v.  Dickerson,  34  Barb.  586. 

5  Ferguson  v.  Miller,  1  Cow.  243,  hold- 
ing that  a  swarm  of  bees  in  a  bee  tree 
belong  to  the  owner  of  the  soil  where  the 
tree  stands ;  and  if  he  gives  license  to  two 
persons  successively  to  take  them,  they 
become  the  property  of  him  who  first 
takes  possession,  although  the  other  first 
marked  the  tree.  Wms.  Ex.  [704],  with 
English  and  American  authorities. 

6  Green  v.  Armstrong,  1  Denio,  550, 
554.  Grass,  clover,  hay,  and  fruits  hang- 
ing on  trees  go  with  the  land:  Kain  v. 
Fisher,  6  N.  Y.  597  ;  Matter  of  Chamber- 
lain, 140  N.  Y.  390;  Evans  v.  Iglehart,  6 
G.  &  J.  171,  173;  Craddock  v.  Riddles- 


barger,  2  Dana,  205,  206;  Mitchell  v. 
Billingsley,  17  Ala.  391,  393;  Price  v. 
Bray  ton,  19  Iowa,  309  (distinguishing  be- 
tween trees  planted  by  the  owner  of  the 
realty  and  trees  planted  by  a  tenant  for 
the  purposes  of  trade) ;  Maples  v.  Mil- 
Ion  (drawing  the  same  distinction,  but 
holding  it  inapplicable  between  mortgagor 
and  mortgagee),  31  Conn.  598,  600.  See 
also  next  section  in  connection  herewith. 

7  Wms.  Ex.  [707].  Growing  trees  by 
a  valid  sale  in  writing  by  the  owner  of 
the  fee  iii  land  are  severed,  in  contempla- 
tion of  law,  from  the  land,  and  become 
chattels  personal :  Warren  v.  Leland,  2 
Barb.  613,  618 ;  but  a  mortgage  of  grow- 
ing trees  or  grass  by  the  owner  of  the  fee 
of  the  laud  does  not  work  a  severance 
until  it  becomes  absolute  by  non-perform- 
ance of  the  condition :  Bank  of  Lansing- 
burgh  v.  Crary,  1  Barb.  542,  545. 

8  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  151,  pi.  2,  citing 
Herlakenden's  Case,  4  Co.  62  a. 

627 


597,  *  598 


PROPERTY   IN   POSSESSION. 


§282 


A  distinction  is  also  made  in  England,  and  has  been  recognized  in 
America,  between  trees  fit  for  timber  and  such  as  are  not,  —  the 
former,  when  severed  by  the  tenant  during  his  term,  or  by  the  act 
of  a  stranger,  or  by  tempest  or  other  providential  act,  becoming 
the  property  of  the  owner  in  fee;  the  latter,  that  of  the 
tenant.1 

*  §  282.   Emblements,  as  against  the  heir,  belong  to  the  [*  598] 
executor  or  administrator.     "  The  vegetable   chattels  called 
Emblements      emblements,"  say  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania,2 
oi°  admhiistra-    "  are  *ne  corn  an(^  other  growth  of  the  earth  which  are 
tor ;  produced  annually,  not  spontaneously,  but  by  labor  and 

industry,  and  thence  are  called  fructus  industrialist  The  term 
includes  every  product  of  the  earth  yielding  an  annual  profit  as  the 
result  of  labor  and  manuring;  such  as  corn,  wheat,8  grain,  hops, 
saffron,  hemp,  flax,4  melons  of  all  kinds,5  and  the  like.  But  roots, 
such  as  carrots,  parsnips,  turnips,  skerrets,  &c,  are  said  to  belong  to 
the  realty,  because  it  is  not  right  that  the  executor  should  "  dig  and 
break  the  soil,"  6  except  potatoes,  which  are  held  to  come  within  the 
description  of  emblements.7  The  reason  of  the  rule  is,  that 
where  the  occupant  of  land  has  sown  or  planted  the  soil 
with  the  intention  of  raising  a  crop,  and  his  estate  deter- 
mines without  his  fault  before  harvest  time,  he  should 
not  lose  the  fruit  of  his  labor ; 8  to  accomplish  which  the 
law  gives  to  him,  or,  if  the  tenancy  is  ended  by  his  death,  to  his  ex- 
ecutors or  administrators,  the  profit  of  the  crop.9  Hence  the  right 
Emblements  are  *s  confined  to  that  kind  of  crop  which  actually  repays  the 
annual  crops,      labor  by  which  it  is  produced  within  the  year,  excluding 


because  he  who 
sows  should 
not, without  his 
fault,  lose  the 
fruit  of  his 
labor. 


1  Bewick  v.  Whitfield,  3  P.  Wms.  266, 
268 ;  Herlakenden's  Case,  4  Co.  63  a ; 
Brackett  v.  Goddard,  54  Me.  309;  Kit- 
tredge  v.  Woods,  3  N.  H.  503,  506  (dic- 
tum). But  iu  Illinois  it  was  held  that 
logs  hewn  and  lying  loosely  upon  the 
land,  although  cut  with  the  view  of  erect- 
ing a  granary  on  the  land,  do  not  pass 
under  a  deed  for  the  land  ;  Cook  v.  Whit- 
ing, 16  111.480,482;  Wincher  r.  Shrews- 
bury, 3  111.  283. 

"  Per  Bead,  J.,  in  Beiff  v.  Beiff,  64  Pa. 
St.  134,  137.  The  statement  is  taken  from 
Wins.  Ex.  and  will  he  found  at  p.  [710]. 

»  McGee  v.  Walker,  106  Mich.  521. 

*  Toll.  Ex.  150. 

6  Wentw.  Ex.  158. 

<  Wentw.  Ex.  152.  Williams  caUs  at- 
tention to  Lord  Coke's  statement,  that  if 
the  tenant  plant  mots,  his  executors  shall 
have  the  year's  crop;  and  suggests  that 
it  would  he  so  held  to-day  :  Ex.  L710]- 
C28 


7  Per  Bailey,  J.,  in  Evans  v.  Boberts, 
5  B.  &  C.  829,  832.  The  reasoning  upon 
which  this  case  was  decided  would  in- 
clude all  roots,  and  this  seems  the  better 
doctrine. 

8  "  He  that  plants  must  reap  "  :  Gwin 
v.  Hicks,  1  Bay,  503  ;  Poindexter  v.  Black- 
burn, 1  Ired.  Eq.  286,  289. 

»  Thornton  v.  Burch,  20  Ga.  791,  792. 
The  administrator  of  a  devisee  for  life  is 
entitled  to  crops  sown  by  the  life-tenant, 
and  not  the  remainderman :  Corle  v. 
Monkhouse,  47  N.  J.  Eq.  73;  but  where 
there  is  a  bequest  of  one-third  during  life 
of  all  grain  raised  on  certain  land  as  soon 
as  harvested  and  ready  for  market,  the 
title  and  possession  of  the  land  being 
vested  in  others,  the  administrator  of  the 
legatee  is  not  entitled  to  recover  the  value 
of  one-third  of  the  crop  planted  but  not 
harvested  prior  to  the  death  of  the  lega- 
tee :  Miller  v.  Wohlford,  119  Ind.  305. 


§  282  EMBLEMENTS.  *  598,  *  599 

fruit-growing  trees  *  and  growing  crops  of  grass,  clover,  but  not  fruit 
€tc,  though  sown  from  seed,  and  though  ready  to  be  cut  tT.ees>  fe'ras8'or 
for  hay.2  So  it  has  been  held  that  a  border  of  box 
planted  by  a  tenant  (not  a  gardener)  belongs  to  the  realty  ; 8  so  straw- 
berries although  planted  or  paid  for  by  the  incoming  tenant.4 
[*  599] *  That  the  executor  or  administrator  is  always  entitled  to 
emblements  as  against  the  heir  has  already  been  remarked, 
though  it  is  otherwise  as  against  the  dowress.6     But  the    „  .  , 

°  .        °       .  .  Executor  takes 

executor  of  a  tenant  in  fee  is  not  entitled  to  emble-  emblements  as 
ments  as  against  the  devisee,  on  the  ground  that  by  the  hffrinDufneot 
devise  of  the  land  itself  the  growing  crops  went  with  it,  the  dowress, 
thereby  excluding  the  executor.6  This  distinction,  nor  evisee* 
though  fully  established,  is  said  by  both  English  and  American  judges 
to  be  a  capricious  one,7  and  is  ignored  in  Indiana,8  and  abolished  by 
statute  in  New  York,9  as  well  as,  it  seems,  in  Alabama.10  That  the 
administrator  is  not  entitled  to  the  growing  crop  sown  and  planted 
after  the  intestate's  death  seems  a  self-evident  proposition  ; u  but 
whether  a  crop  so  sown  goes  at  the  administrator's  sale  of  the  land 
for  the  payment  of  the  intestate's  debts  to  the  purchaser,  is  another 
question,  on  which  different  conclusions  have  been  reached.  It  is 
held  in  Indiana,  that  since  such  purchaser  acquires  title  from  the 
administrator,  he  obtains  only  what  the  administrator  could  sell ;  to 
wit,  whatever  came  to  the  administrator  from  his  intestate,  including 
the  emblements  or  growing  crop  on  the  land  when  the  intestate  died, 
hence  he  took  no  part  of  the  growing  crop  subsequently  sown  by  the 

1  Redfield  mentions  an  exception  in  the  followed  in  Hathorn  v.  Eaton,  70  Me.  219, 
case  of  nurserymen  who  plant  and  culti-  221  ;  Lord  Ellenborough  in  West  v. 
vate  trees  for  sale,  which  may  be  removed  Moore,  8  East,  339,  343  ;  Shofner  v. 
by  the  executor  or  administrator  as  per-  Shofner,   5  Sneed,  94. 

soualty :   3   Redf.    on    Wills,    151,   pi.   4,  8  Humphrey  v.  Merritt,  51    Ind.  197, 

citing  Penton  v.  Robart,   2  East,  88,  per  200,  holding  that  emblements  go   to  the 

Kenyon,  C.  J.,  90.     But  not  if  the  trees  executor  as  part  of  the  personal  estate, 

were  to  be  transplanted  to  the  orchard :  and  not  to  the  devisee. 
Wyndham   v.    Way,  4   Taunt.  316;   nor         9  Under  the  statute  crops  produced  by 

unless  proof   be  made  that  the  trees  or  care  and  cultivation  go  to  the  executor, 

shrubs   were   intended   to  be   treated   as  and  are  assets  to  pay  debts  even  as  against 

chattels:    Maples    v.    Millon,    31    Conn,  the  devisee:   Andrews,  J.,  in  Matter  of 

598.  Chamberlain,  140  N.  Y.  390,  392  ;  when 

2  Evans  v.  Iglehart,  6  Gill  &  J.  171,  the   land   is   devised,   the    crop    growing  - 
188 ;  Kain  v.  Fisher,  6  N.  Y.  597  ;  Matter  thereon  is  treated  as  if  it  were  specifically 
of  Chamberlain,  140  N.  Y.  390 ;  Craddock  bequeathed  to  the  devisee  of  the   land: 
v.  Riddlesbarger,  2  Dana,  205,  206.  Stall  v.  Wilbur,  77  N.  Y.  158. 

8  Empson  v.  Soden,  4  B.  &  Ad.  655.  10  Blair  v.  Murphree,  81  Ala.  454,  giving 

4  Watherell  v.  Howells,  1  Camp.  227.  the  executor  or  administrator  a  reasonable  - 

6  As  to  dowress,  see  infra.  option  to  make  such  crops  assets. 

6  Wms.  Ex.  [713];  Budd  v.  Hiler,  27  n  Fetrow  v.  Fetrow,  50  Pa.   St.   253, 

N.  J.  L.  43,  52 ;  per  Mclver,  J.,  in  Huff  v.  256  ;   Rodman  v.  Rodman,  54   Ind.  444, 

Latimer,   33  S.  C.  255,   258 ;   Fetrow   v.  446 ;  relied  on  in  Kidwell  v.  Kidwell,  84 

Fetrow,  50  Pa.  St.  252.  Ind.  224,  228. 


7  Dennett  v.  Hopkinson,  63  Me.  350, 


629 


599 


PROPERTY   IN   POSSESSION. 


§282 


heirs.1  In  Illinois  and  Missouri,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  argued,  that 
as  between  vendor  and  vendee  growing  crops  pertain  to  the  realty,2 
that  the  sale  of  land  by  an  administrator  is  equivalent  to  a  sale  by 
the  heir,3  and  that  a  sale  of  the  reversion  carries  with  it  all  rents 
under  a  previous  lease,  which  the  grantee  can  recover  in  his  own 
name  (unless  they  have  been  reserved  by  the  instrument  of  convey- 
ance),4 wherefore  the  purchaser  at  the  administration  sale  takes  the 
growing  crop  with  the  land,5  —  a  conclusion  which  would  seem 
rational  enough,  if  the  equivalence  of  a  sale  by  an  heir  and  by  an 
administrator  be  conceded.6 

So  it  is  self-evident,  that  where  a  widow  or  minor  children  are 
entitled  by  statutory  provision  to  the  product  of  the  homestead  and 
messuages,  the  executor  or  administrator  is  excluded.7 

In  America  the  subject  of  emblements  is  regulated  in  many  States 

by  statute.     In  most  of  them  it  is  provided,  that  if  the  owner  die 

e.  ,  .  between  the  last  day  of  December  and  the  first  day  of 

Statutes  regu-  J  ,  * 

lating  title  to  March,  emblements  go  to  the  heir;  but  if  he  die  after  the 
emblements.  £rgt  ^  of  ]yfarc]1>  emblements  severed  before  the  last 
day  of  December  following  are  assets  in  the  hands  of  the  executor  or 
administrator.8     In  North  Carolina  the  statute  continues  the  lease  of 


i  Barrett  v.  Choen,  119  Ind.  56,  59. 
2  Powell  v.  Rich,  41  111.  466,  469. 
«  Selb  v.  Montague,  102  111.  446,  451. 

4  Foote  v.  Overman,  22  111.  App.  181, 
184. 

5  Foote  v.  Overman,  supra ;  Page  v. 
Culver,  5  .  Mo.  App.  606,  610. 

6  The  case  of  Selb  v.  Montague,  cited 
in  the  Missouri  and  Illinois  cases,  supra, 
as  establishing  this  proposition,  turned 
upon  the  widow's  right  to  dower  in  lands 
mortgaged  by  her  husband,  and  sold  after 
his  death  by  order  of  the  probate  court  for 
the  payment  of  debts.  The  court  distin- 
guishes between  mortgaged  lands  sold  by 
the  husband  (in  which  case  the  widow  is 
entitled  to  dower  in  the  whole  land,  if  the 
purchaser  obtains  discharge  of  the  mort- 
gage), and  the  payment  of  the  mortgage 
by  the  heir  after  the  husband's  death  (in 
which  case  she  takes  no  dower  in  the  land 
ho  released  without  contributing  to  the 
payment  <>f  tin-  mortgage  debt).  It  is  in 
connection  with  this  question  that  the 
court  announce  the  above  proposition,  to 
show  that  .i  s:il«-  by  the  administrator  is 
equivalent  to  a  Bale  by  the  heir  (and  there- 
fore equivalent  to  a  discbarge  of  the  intes- 
tate's debt  by  the  heir).  It  does  not  seem 
to  -ii-t:iiu  the  proposition  in  the  sense  in 
which  it  i-  applied  in  the  case  <>f  Page  v. 

630 


Culver.  In  the  case  of  Foote  v.  Overman, 
supra,  the  contention  seems  to  have  been 
between  the  tenants  of  the  heirs  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  heirs  themselves  and 
the  purchaser  at  the  administration  sale  ; 
which  accounts  for  the  emphasis  put  upon 
the  rule,  that  a  sale  of  the  reversion  car- 
ries the  rents  subsequently  maturing  under 
a  previous  lease.  The  court  expressly 
state,  that  in  their  opinion  the  doctrine  of 
emblements  has  no  application.  But  in 
the  Missouri  case  the  controversy  was  be- 
tween the  purchaser  at  the  administration 
sale  and  the  heirs  as  such,  who  were  sued  as- 
having  unlawfully  converted  the  crops  on 
the  land  purchased  at  the  administration 
sale.  This  case,  then,  is  irreconcilable 
with  the  Indiana  case  of  Barrett  v.  Choen, 
119  Ind.  56. 

7  Where  the  widow  has  the  right  to 
emblements,  which  is  disregarded  by  the 
administrator,  who  sells  the  crop  and  ac- 
counts for  the  proceeds  as  part  of  the 
estate,  she  may  waive  the  right  to  sue  for 
conversion,  and  pursue  and  obtain  the  pro- 
ceeds :  Willits  v.  Schuyler,  .*5  Ind.  App.  1 1 8. 

8  Green  v.  Outright,  Wright,  738 ; 
Thompson  v.  Thompson,  6  Munf.  514; 
Waring  v.  Purcell,  1  Hill  (S.  C.)  Ch.  193, 
196;  Singleton  v.  Singleton,  5  Dana,  87, 
93. 


§  283 


FIXTURES. 


599,  *600 


titled  to  emble- 
ments. 

Emblements  of 
an  estate  held 
by  husband 
and  wife  go  on 
his  death  to  his 
executor. 


a  tenant,  in  lieu  of  emblements,  until  the  end  of  the  lease  year 
current  at  the  time  of  the  death  terminating  it,  to  the  end  that  he 
may  mature  and  gather  the  crops.1  The  Alabama  statute,  giving  to 
the  personal  representatives  the  option,  reasonably  exercised,  to 
complete  and  gather  the  crop,  or  not,  is  held  to  be  incompatible  with 
his  common-law  right  to  emblements  as  against  the  heir ;  and  that 
hence  the  growing  crop  passes  to  the  heirs,  subject  to  the  adminis- 
trator's statutory  authority  to  elect  to  make  it  assets.2 

The  widow  is  entitled  to  the  crop  growing  on  the  land  assigned  to 
her  as  dower,  "she  being  then  in  de  optima  possessione    Dowress  en- 
viri,  above  the  executor."  8     So  if  she,  as  dowress,  sow 
the  land  and  marry,  the  crop  will  go  to  her  on 
[*  600]  the    *  husband's    death   in   preference    to    his 
executor   or   administrator;    but  if   she   marry, 
and  her  husband  sow  the  land  and  die,  the  crop  will  go  to 
his  executor ;  *  for  it  is  well  established  that,  upon  the 
termination  of  a  freehold  estate  held  by  the  husband  in  right  of  his 
wife,  the  emblements  will  go  to  the  husband  or  his  representatives.5 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add,  that  where  the  law  gives  emblements, 
it  also  gives  the  right  of  entry,  egress,  and  regress,  so  far  as  may  be 
necessary  to  cut  and  remove  them.6 

§  283.    Fixtures,  as  between  the  Heir  and  the  Personal  Representa- 
tive. —  Fixtures  are  annexations  of   chattels  to  the  freehold  which 
may,  according  to  concomitant  circumstances,  assume  the  character  of 
either  real  or  personal  estate.7     In  its  technical  sense    Fjxturesare 
the  word  signifies  such  things  only  of  a  personal  nature    things  ofa  per- 
as  have  been  annexed  to  the  realty,  and  which  may  be    annexed  to  the 
afterward  severed  or  removed  by  the  party  who  united   r^lty'-  r™ov* 
them,  or  his  personal  representatives,  against  the  will  of   party  who 
the  owner  of  the  freehold ;  but  it  is  often  used  indiscrimi-   united  them; 
nately  in  reference  to  those  articles  which  are  not  by  law  removable 
when   once   attached  to  the   freehold,  as  well  as  those    things  not  so 
which  are  severable  therefrom.8     Questions  concerning    rfmova°le  are 

.  ^  °     also  called  fix- 

fixtures  are   divided  by  text-writers   into  such  as  arise    tures. 
between,  1st,  vendor  and  vendee,  including  mortgagor  and  mortgagee ; 


1  King  v.  Foscue,  91  N.  C.  116,  118. 

2  Wright  v.  Watson,  96  Ala.  536;  if 
the  representative  does  elect  to  complete 
and  gather  the  crop,  all  proper  expenses 
are  to  be  deducted  before  creditors  can 
claim  anything  from  the  proceeds  :  Naftel 
v.  Osborn,  96  Ala.  623. 

3  Budd  v.  Hiler,  27  N.  J.  L.  43,  53  ; 
Wms.  Ex.  [717];  Anon.,  Dyer,  31 6  a.  But 
she  is  not  entitled  to  the  grass  or  fruits  in 
her  husband's  land  not  assigned  for  dower : 
Kain  v.  Fisher,  6  N.  Y.  597.     Per  Stone, 


Ch.  J.,  in  Blair  v.  Murphree,  81  Ala.  454, 
457,  and  cases  cited  (recognizing  the  com- 
mon-law rule  to  be  altered  by  statute). 

4  Haslett  v.  Glenn,  7  Harr.  &  J.  17,  24. 

5  Hall  v.  Browder,  4  How.  (Miss.)  224, 
230. 

6  Penhallow   v.  Dwight,  7  Mass.   34; 
Parham  v.  Tompson,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  159. 

7  Washb.  on  Real  Prop.,  bk.  1,  ch.  1, 
pi.  18. 

8  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  **418,  419. 

631 


600,  *  G01 


PROPERTY   IN   POSSESSION. 


§  283 


2d,  heir  and  personal  representative;  3d,  landlord  and  tenant;  and 
4th,  executor  of  tenant  for  life  and  reversioner  or  remainderman.1 
The  subject  in  hand  demands  the  consideration  chiefly  of  the  second 
and  fourth  classes  ;  the  others  will  be  noticed  only  in  so  far  as  they 
furnish  principles  or  rules  applicable  to  all.  The  cases  turning  upon 
the  law  of  fixtures  are  very  numerous  both  in  England  and  America, 
nor  are  they  in  every  instance  harmonious  ;  but  it  is  neither  necessary 
nor  compatible  with  the  limits  of  this  work  to  follow  them 
in  detail  or  *  even  to  notice  all  the  rules  laid  down  by  authors  [*  601] 
on  this  subject.  The  leading  principles  only  can  be  given,  and 
such  illustrations  as  may  be  decisive  of  them ;  referring  those  in  want 
of  a  fuller  discussion  to  the  elementary  works  and  the  multitude  of 
decisions  therein  referred  to.  The  annotators  to  the  latest  edi- 
tions of  Kent's  Commentaries  have  added  valuable  suggestions  and 
reflections  upon  the  effect  of  late  decisions  on  this  much-vexed 
subject. 

The  maxim,  Quicquid  plantatur  solo  solo  ceclit,  is  said  to  apply 
with  most  rigor  in  favor  of  the  inheritance,  and  against  the  right  of 
the  personal  representative  to  disannex  therefrom  and  consider  as  a 
According  to  personal  chattel  anything  which  has  been  affixed  thereto.2 
Anciently  there  seems  to  have  been  no  exception  between 
the  executor  and  heir  of  the  tenant  in  fee  to  the  rule  that 
whatever  was  affixed  to  the  freehold  descends  to  the 
heir;8  but  in  modern  times  some  relaxations  have  ob- 
tained with  respect  to  fixtures  put  up  by  the  tenant  in 
fee  for  the  purposes  of  trade,  and  for  ornament  or 
domestic  convenience.4  The  chattels  first  held  to  pass 
to  the  executor  as  trade  fixtures  were  a  cider-mill, 
"though  deep  in  the  ground  and  certainly  affixed  to  the 
freehold ; "  6  a  fire-engine  set  up  for  the  benefit  of  a  col- 
liery by  a  tenant  for  life,6  machinery  for  calico-printing 
erected  by  a  copartnership,7  a  granary  built  on  pillars 


the  ancient 
rule  things 
affixed  to  the 
freehold  de- 
scended to  the 
heir. 

In  modern 
times  fixtures 
used  in  trade 
and  for  orna- 
ment or  domes- 
tic convenience 
go  to  the  ex- 
ecutor ; 

such  as  a  cider- 
mill, 

fire-engine, 


1  Washb.  on  Real  Prop.,  bk.  1,  cb.  1, 
pi.  19  ;  the  same  distinction  is  observed  in 
Broom's  Legal  Maxims,  omitting  that  be- 
tween vendor  and  vendee,  *417,  also  in 
Wins,  on  Ex.  [731]  et  seq.  where  this  sub- 
ject is  elaborately  and  thoroughly  treated, 
with  a  copious  collection  of  American  au- 
thorities in  Perkins's  annotation  to  the 
i.th  American  edition;  see  also  3  Redfield 
00  Wills,  156  et  seq.,  and  2  Kent's  Com. 
**342  ft  seq. 

2  Broom's  Leg.Max. *418. 

I  Qodolphin,  pt.  2,  ch.  U,  §  1  ;  Touch- 
Htone,  p.  470;  Nov's  Maxims,  p.  51. 

•    Wins.  Ex.  [732],  [741],  and  authori- 
ties; llarkncss  v.  Bean, 26  Ala.  493,  496. 
632 


6  Ex  relatione  Wilbraham,  in  Lawton 
v.  Lawton,  3  Atk.  13. 

6  Lawton  v.  Lawton,  3  Atk.  13.  "This 
case,"  says  the  English  annotator,  "  prob- 
ably turned  upon  a  custom  "  :  p.  16  of  1st 
Am.  from  3d  London  ed. 

7  Trappes  v.  Harter,  3  Tyrw.  603.  The 
case  was  between  the  assignees  in  bank- 
ruptcy of  mortgagors  and  the  mortgagees ; 
In  rendering  the  opinion,  Lord  Lyndhurst 
remarked  :  "  We  are  of  opinion  that,  with 
respect  to  machinery  of  this  description, 
erected  by  the  bankrupts  for  the  purposes 
of  trade,  it  would  have  passed  to  the  execu- 
tor, and  not  to  the  heir  "  :  p.  625. 


284 


MODERN   STATEMENT   OF   THE   RULE.  *  601,  *  602 


in  Hampshire;1  also,   as  fixtures  set  up  for  ornament    machinery, 
and  domestic   convenience,   a  furnace,  though  fixed  to   granary, 
the  freehold  and  purchased  with  the  house,  and  the  hang-    furnace, 
ings  nailed  to  the  wall ; 2  also  tapestry  and  iron  backs  to    tapestry, 

chimneys.3     But   the   English   judges   have   in    chimney 
[*  602]  several  *  modern  instances  adhered  to  the  old  rule    backs- 

between  executors  and  heirs.4     It  seems,  therefore,  that  the 
law  is  by  no  means  clearly  settled  respecting  the  right  of  the  execu- 
tor of  the  tenant  in  fee  to  fixtures  set  up  for  ornament    In  America 
or  domestic  convenience.6     The  American  cases  are  not   J*^8  may 
more  harmonious.     Thus,  a  furnace  so  placed  in  a  house 
that  it  cannot  be  removed  without  injury  to  the  house  goes  to  the 
heir; 6  but  a  still  set  up  in  a  furnace,  in  the  usual  man-   0r  personal 
ner,  for  making  whiskey,  is  not  real,  but  personal  prop-    property. 
erty.7     And  marble  slabs  resting  on  brackets  screwed  into  the  wall 
were  held  to  be  personalty ;  but  a  bell  hung  upon  an  axle  resting 
upon  a  wooden  frame  placed  upon  a  platform  in  the  cupola  of  a  barn 
was  held  to  belong  to  the  realty.8     All  of  these  cases  are  reconcil- 
able  upon  the   old  rule  applied  with  reference  to  the    01dru]e 
nature  of  fixtures,  to  wit:  If  a  personal  chattel  is  so 
affixed  to  the  freehold  as  to  be  incapable  of  being  detached  there- 
from without  violence  and  injury  to  the  freehold,  it  becomes  a  fix- 
ture, and  goes  with  the  real  estate ;  but  if  it  is  not  so  annexed,  it 
remains  a  chattel,  whether  the  annexation  be  for  use,  for  ornament, 
or  from  mere  caprice.9 

§284.    Modern  Statement  of  the  Rule.  —  The  old  notion  of  phys- 
ical attachment  is  said,  by  some  courts,   to  be  exploded;  the  true 
criterion  to  determine  whether  fixtures  constitute  a  part    criterion  of 
of  the  realty  or  not,  or  rather,  whether  property  usually    fixtures  de- 
treated  as  personal  becomes  annexed  to  and  goes  with    CUmstances  of 
the  realty  as  fixtures,  must  depend  upon  the    circum-    each  case 

.  .,,.,  „,  ,.  viewed  in  the 

stances  of  each  case,  viewed  m  the  light  of  the  policy    light  of  policy 
of  the  law  and   of  the  intention  of  the  parties.10     In    and  intention. 


1  By  the  custom  :  Coram  Eyre,  Ch.  B., 
Summer  Assizes,  1724,  apud  Winchester. 

2  Squier  v.  Mayor,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  430. 
And  see  Lord  Keeper  in  Beck  v.  Rebow, 
1  P.  Wins.  94. 

3  Harvey  v.  Harvejr,  2  Stra.  1141. 

1  So  in  Winn  v.  Ingilby,  5  B.  &  Aid. 
625,  set  pots,  ovens,  and  ranges  were  held 
to  go  to  the  heir ;  in  Colegrave  v.  Dias 
Santos,  2  B.  &  C.  76,  stoves,  coaling  cop- 
pers, and  blinds ;  and  in  King  v.  St.  Dun- 
stan,  4  B.  &  C.  686,  stoves  and  grates  fixed 
with  brick-work  in  the  chimney  places,  and 
cupboards  standing  on  the  ground  sup- 
ported by  holdfasts,  all  removable  without 


injury  to  the  freehold,  were  held  to  belong 
to  the  heir,  and  not  the  executor. 

5  Wms.  Ex.  [739]. 

6  Main  v.  Schwarzwaelder,  4  E.  D. 
Smith  (N.  Y.),  273;  Tuttle  v.  Robinson, 
33  N.  H.  104. 

T  Burk  v.  Baxter,  3  Mo.  207  ;  Moore  v. 
Smith,  24  111.  512  ;  Terry  v.  Robins,  5  Sm. 
&  M.  291  ;  Crenshaw  v.  Crenshaw,  2  Hen. 
&  Munf.  22  ;  McClintock  v.  Graham,  3 
McC.  (S.  C.)  553. 

8  Weston  v.  Weston,  102  Mass.  514. 

9  Providence  Gas  Co.  v.  Thurber,  2 
R.  I.  15. 

10  Quinby  v.  Manhattan  Co.,  24  N.  J. 
533 


*  603  PROPERTY   IN   POSSESSION.  §  284 

other  *  words,  whatever  chattel  is  so  affixed  to  the  free-  [*  603] 
hold  as  to  be  detachable  therefrom  without  substantial  in- 
jury, with  the  view  and  for  the  purpose  of  its  more  complete  enjoy- 
ment as  a  chattel,  remains  a  chattel,  and  may  be  removed  as  such; 
but  if  attached  to  the  freehold  without  such  intention,  it  will  be 
incorporated  therewith.1  A  house,  fence,  or  other  erection  on  the 
land  of  another,  with  the  mutual  intention  that  it  is  to  be  held  as 
the  builder's  property,  continues  to  be  personal  property,  and  may  be 
Road-bed  of  a     removed  at  the  end  of  the  license.2     So  the  road-bed  of 

railroad  mav  a  railway  and  the  rails  fastened  to  it  may  be  trade  fix- 
be  personalty;  J  J 
hay-scales  "  tures  removable  as  personal  property,8  while  hay-scales, 
realty;  annexed  to  the  realty  in  the  usual  manner,  go  to  the 
heirs  as  real  estate,  although  they  had  been  included  in  the  inven- 
water-wheeis  ^ory  as  personalty.4  So  water-wheels,  millstones,  run- 
mill-stones,  ning  gear,  and  bolting  apparatus  of  a  grist  and  flouring 
e  •,  rea  y,  rnill,  and  other  fixtures  of  a  like  nature,  are  constituent 
parts  of  the  mill,  descending  with  the  real  estate,6  while  carding 
carding  ma-  machines,  looms,  and  other  machinery  used  in  manufac- 
chmes,  looms,  during  cloth,  which  are  complete  in  themselves  and 
sonalty;  capable  of  being  used  in  one  place  as  well  as  in  another, 
not  requiring  to  be  fitted  in  the  building  and  fixed  to  it  only  to 
give  stability  to  the  machinery,  are  held  to  be  personalty,6  but  if 
but  machinery,  machinery,  though  so  constructed  as  to  be  portable  and 
aJth'  "ellfi  on-  easily  conveyed  from  place  to  place  as  may  be  desired, 
able,  be  realty,  is  affixed  with  the  intention  and  for  the  purpose  of  being 
used  as  a  permanent  structure  in  connection  with  the  building,  it 
becomes  part  of  the  realty;7  and  such  intention  maybe  presumed 
Bam-vard  ma-  from  the  circumstances.8  Manure  from  the  barn-yard 
nure  is  realty;  0f  a  homestead,  although  neither  rotten  nor  incorpo- 
rated with  the  ground,  but  in  a  pile  for  future  use,  belongs  to  the 

Eq.  2G0,  264;  Washb.  R.  Pr.,  bk.  1,  ch.  1,  2  Hence  a  house  built  on  a  man's  lot 

pi.  18;  Hill  v.  Sewald,  53  Pa.  St.  271,  274,  with  his  wife's  money,  with  the  agreement 

citing  numerous  authorities  ;    Thomas  v.  that  it  remains  her  property,  on  her  death 

Davis,  70   Mo.  72,  76  ;    Equitable  Co.  v.  goes  to  her  administrator,  who   may  ob- 

Christ,  2  Flip.  599  ;  Green  v.  Phillips,  26  tain    equitable   relief  in   a   proper   case ; 

Gratt.  752,  762 ;  Manwaring  v.  Jenison,  61  Brown  v.  Turner,  113  Mo.  27. 

Mich.  117,  134,  citing  numerous  cases.  8  Northern  Railway  v.  Canton,  30  Md. 

1  "  Physical  annexation  to  realty  is  not  347,  352;  so  a  depot:  Railroad  v.  Deal, 

necessary  to  convert  :i  chattel  into  a  fix-  90  N.  C  110. 

tare.    If  the  article,  either  fast  or  loose,  be  4  Dudley  v.  Foote,  63  N.  II.  57. 
indispensable  in  carrying  <>n  the  specific  5  House  v.  House,  10  Pai.  158;   Lap- 
business,  it  becomes  part  <>f  the  realty":  ham  v.  Norton,  71  Me.  83. 
Morn-'-  Appeal,  88  Pa  St.  868,  383  ;  Ege  6  Tobias  v.  Francis,  3  Vt.  425  ;  Gale  v. 
v.  Kill*-,  H4  Pa.  St.  333,  340.    So  an  article  Ward,  14  Mass.  352  ;  Walker  v.  Sherman, 
which  would  otherwise  be  deemed  a  fix-  20  Wend.  636;  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  161,  pi.  4  ; 
tnrc   may,   by  severance  and    the   under-  Hill  v.  Wentworth,  28  Vt.  428,  432. 
standing  of  the  parties,  become  a  chattel :  7  Potter  v.  Cromwell,  40  N.  Y.  287. 
Sampson  v.  Graham,  96  Pa.  St.  405,  408.  8  Voorhces  v  McGiunis,  48  N.  Y.  278. 
68 1 


$284 


MODERN    STATEMENT   OF   THE   RULE. 


603,  *  604 


livery  stable 
manure  per- 
sonalty; 

enclosure  be- 
longs to  the 
realty,  though 
detached. ; 


not  used  as  a 
fence,  per- 
sonalty. 

Hop-poles, 


realty ; 1  but  manure  made  in  a  livery  stable,  or 
[*  604]  in  any  manner  not  connected  with  *  agriculture 

or   husbandry,   is  personalty,  and   goes   to   the 
executor.2    A  fence  enclosing  a  field,  of  whatever  mate- 
rial or  construction,  whether  having  posts  inserted  in 
the  ground  or  not,   is  part  of  the  freehold ; 3  nor  does 
it  cease  to  be  so,  though  accidentally  or  temporarily  detached  there 
from  without  intent  on  the  part  of  the  owner  to  divert    rails  in  9tack8f 
it  permanently  from  its  use ; 4  but  rails  in  stacks,  not 
having  been  used  for  a  fence,  are  personalty.6     On  the 
same  principle,  hop-poles,  necessary  in  cultivating  hops, 
are  part  of  the  real  estate,  though  taken  down  for  the 
purpose  of  gathering  the  crop,  and  piled  in  the  yard  with  the  in- 
tention of   being   replaced   in   the   season   of   hop-raising.6      That 
keys,  doors,  windows,  bolts,   rings,  etc.,  belonging  to  a 
house,  though  temporarily  detached  therefrom,  belong   etec^s'  oc  s' 
to  the  realty,  is  self-evident.     So  with  pictures,  glasses, 
etc.,  taking  the  place  of  wainscoting;    for  "the  house 
ought  not  to  come  to  the  heir  maimed  and  disfigured."7 
As  between  devisee  and  executor,  the  rule  is  that  a  de- 
visee shall  take  the  land  in  the  same   condition  as  it 
would  have  descended  to  the  heir;  hence  he  is  entitled 
to  all  the  articles  affixed  to  the  land,  whether  annexed 
before  or  subsequent  to  the  date  of  the  devise;  for  if  a   as  it  would  go 
freehold   house   be   devised,    fixtures   pass,  but   if   the 
tenant  for  life  or  in  tail  devise  fixtures,  his  devise  is  void,  he  having 
no  power  to  devise  such  fixtures  as  would  pass  to  the    and  executor  i3 
executor.8     The  executor  is  therefore  entitled  to  all  the 
fixtures  -as  against  the  devisee,  that  he  would  be  enti- 
tled to  as  against  the  heir.9     But  there  seems  to  be  no 
doubt  that  if,  from  the  nature  and  condition  of  the  prop- 
erty devised,  it  is  apparent  that  the  testator  intended  the  fixtures  to 
go  with  the  freehold  to  the  devisee,  they  will  pass  to  him,  although 
of  a  character  which  would  go  to  the  executor  as  against  the  heir.10 

1  Fay  v.  Muzzey,  13  Gray,  53;  Plumer 
v.  Plumer,  30  N.  H.  558,  568 ;  Kittredge 
v.  Woods,  3  N.  H.  503 ;  Lassell  v.  Reed, 
6  Me.  222  ;  whenever  made  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  husbandry  :  Snow  v.  Perkins,  60 
N.  H.  493 ;  Norton  v.  Craig,  68  Me.  275. 

2  Snow  v.  Perkins,  60  N.  H.  493; 
Dauiels  v.  Pond,  21  Pick.  367;  Needham 
v.  Allison,  24  N.  H.  355. 

8  Smith  i>.  Carroll,  4  Green  (Iowa), 
146 ;  Glidden  v.  Bennett,  43  N.  H.  306 ; 
Kimball  v.  Adams,  52  Wis.  554. 

*  Goodrich  v.  Jones,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
142. 


pictures, 
glasses,  etc., 
instead  of 
wainscoting, 
realty. 

As  between 
devisee  and  ex- 
ecutor, devisee 
takes  the  land 


entitled  to  fix- 
tures as  he 
would  be 
against  the 
heir. 


6  Clark  v.  Burnside,  1 5  111.  62. 

6  Bishop  v.  Bishop,  11  N.  Y.  123. 

7  Cave  v.  Cave,  2  Vern.  508 ;  Guthrie 
v.  Jones,  108  Mass.  191  ;  Ward  v.  Kil- 
patrick,  85  N.  Y.  413. 

8  Broom's  Leg.  Max.  **  423,  424. 

9  Wms.  Ex.  [739]. 

10  So  where  a  testator  devised  his  free- 
hold estate,  consisting  of  a  brew-house  and 
malt-house  in  lease,  with  the  plant  and 
utensils,  it  was  held  that  the  plant  passed 
with  the  brew-house,  on  the  ground  that 
the  testator  intended  to  devise  the  plant 
as  well  as  the  shell  of  the  brew-house : 

635 


605,  *  606 


PROPERTY   IN   POSSESSION. 


§  285 


*  §  285.  Fixtures  as  between  Personal  Representative  of  [*  605] 
Life  Tenant  and  Remainderman.  —  Since  the  heir  is  more 
favored  in  law  than  the  remainderman  or  reversioner,  in  this  respect, 
or  rather,  since  the  law  is  more  indulgent  to  the  executor  of  the 
particular  tenant  than  to  the  executor  of  the  tenant  in 
right  to  fix-  fee>  it  follows  that  all  the  authorities  which  establish 
tures  as  against   the  executor's  right  to  fixtures  as  against  the  heir  will 

the  heir  applies  ,  .  °        .  ? 

a  fortiori  aPPv   a  fortiori   against   the   remainderman   or  rever- 

mainderm *  ""  si°lier-1  As  between  landlord  and  tenant,  there  is 
great  deviation  from  the  rule,  that  what  has  been  once 
annexed  to  the  freehold  becomes  a  part  of  it,  and  it  would  be  erro- 
neous to  conclude  that,  because  a  fixture  set"  up  for  ornament  or 
domestic  convenience  has  been  decided  to  be  removable  as  between 
landlord  and  tenant,  therefore  such  fixture  may  be  claimed  as  per- 
sonalty by  the  executor  of  a  tenant  for  life,  etc. ;  still,  there  is  much 
similarity  between  the  two  classes,  and  although  the  case  of  a  tenant 
for  life  is  not  quite  so  strong  as  that  of  a  common  tenant,  yet  the 
reasoning  is  closely  analogous  between  them.2  It  is 
held,  in  this  respect,  that  the  privilege  established  in 
favor  of  tenants  in  trade  does  not  extend  to  agricultural 
tenants,  so  as  to  entitle  them  to  remove  erections  for  the 
purposes  of  husbandry.3  But  a  pump  erected  by  a  ten- 
ant at  his  own  expense,  although  in  doing  so  an  open 
well  was  arched  over,  and  the  pump  was  attached  to  a 
perpendicular  plank  fastened  at  the  upper  end  by  an  iron  bolt  to  an 
adjacent  wall,  was  held  to  be  removable  as  a  tenant's  fixture.4  So 
the  executor  of  a  tenant  by  the  curtesy  was  held  to  be  entitled,  as 
against  the  remainderman,  to  an  engine,  cotton-gin,  and  condenser, 
which  were  attached  to  a  mill  by  the  tenant  for  the  mixed  purpose 
Tenant's  exec-  of  trade  and  agriculture.5  It  is  obvious  that  the  exec- 
utor and  ^     an(j  administrator  of  a  tenant  take  the  same 

administrator 

take  same  property  in  fixtures,  as  against  the  *  owner  of  [*  606] 


Right  of  ten- 
ants in  trade 
does  not  ex- 
tend to  agricul 
tural  tenants  ; 

but  a  pump 
erected  by 
tenant  may  be 
removed. 


Wood  v.  Gaynon,  Ambl.  395.  It  will  be 
noticed  that  this  rule,  like  the  analogous 
one  with  regard  to  emblements,  ante,  § 
282,  p.  *  599,  is  but  the  application  of  the 
familiar  principle,  that  in  the  construction 
of  wills  the  intention  of  the  testator,  if 
ascertainable  from  the  instrument,  must 
govern. 

1  Broom's  L,  M.  *42G;  Wms.  Ex. 
[7.l| 

-  Wms.  Ex.  [744];  (J ray,  J.,  in  Bain- 
way  v.  Cobb,  9fl  Mass.  457. 

:1  So  the  tenant  of  a  farm  under  a  lease 

for   twenty-one    years,    who   fifteen    years 

before  the  expiration  <>f  his  term  erected 
thereon  at  his  own  expense  a  substantial 
636 


beast-house,  carpenter's  shop,  fuel-house, 
pump-house,  and  fold-yard  wall,  and  before 
the  expiration  of  his  term  pulled  down  the 
erections,  dug  up  the  foundations,  and 
carried  away  the  materials,  leaving  the 
farm  in  the  same  condition  in  which  he 
entered  upon  it,  was  held  liable  to  the 
reversioner  for  the  value  of  the  build- 
ings: Klwes  v.  Maw,  3  East,  38.  And  see 
cases  cited  in  Wms.  on  Ex.  [745],  and 
notes  (s)  and  (t). 

4  Grymes  v.  Boweren,  6  Bing.  437 : 
McCracken  v.  Hall,  7  Ind.  30;  Wall  v. 
Hinds,  4  Gray,  256,  272,  et  seq. 

6  Overman  v.  Sasser,  107  N.  C.  432. 


§  286  SEPARATE  PROPERTY  OP  THE  WIFE.     *  606,  *  607 

the   fee,  or  the  reversioner,   as   the   testator  or  intes-    property  in 

tate  had  therein ;  and  that  the  legal  right  of  a  tenant    fixtu[es  a?  , 

decedent  had. 
to  remove  fixtures  may  be  governed  by  express  stipula- 
tion, usually  inserted  in  a  lease  for  this  purpose.1     The  privilege  of 
removing  fixtures  should  be  exercised  by  a  tenant  during  his  term; 
for  if  he  omit  to  do  so,  it  will  be  presumed  that  he  voluntarily  relin- 
quishes his  claim  in  favor  of  the  landlord.2 

The  subject  of  fixtures  has  engaged  the  attention  of  legislative 
authorities.  To  the  extent  of  the  statutory  provisions  they  are, 
of  course,  controlling;  but  where  the  statute  enacts  a  rule  statutory 
for  a  class  of  cases,  it  does  not  extend  to  cases  not  within  regulations, 
such  class.  Thus  it  was  held  in  New  York,  that  the  statutory  rule 
of  fixtures  between  the  personal  representatives  and  the  heirs  of  a 
deceased  party  is  not  controlling  in  cases  between  vendor  and  vendee.3 

§  286.  Separate  Property  of  the  Wife.  —  The  law  in  regard  to 
the  separate  property  of  married  women  has  of  late  undergone  great 
changes,  both  in  England  and  America;  there  has  been  and  still  is  a 
strong  tendency  in  both  countries  to  supersede  the  common-law 
rules  on  this  subject  by  the  principles  of  the  civil  law,  and  to  accord 
to  married  women  as  a  legal  right  what  formerly  they  could  enjoy 

only  under  the  segis  of  a  court  of  equity.4    It  is    propertvse- 
[*  607]  *  necessary,  therefore,  to  remember,  that  in  all    cured  to"  wife 

,  ,         ,    ,     ,  .    .  .         p         survives  to  her 

cases  where  by  statutory  provision  property  ot  a   0n  her  hus- 
married  woman  is  secured  to  her  against  the  power  or    hand's  death, 

1  Broom's  L.  M.  **  429,  430.  Phillips   v.  Graves,  20   Oh.  St.  371,  381, 

2  Talbot  v.  Whipple,  14  Allen,  177,  thus  pithily  describes  this  strange  anom- 
181 ;  White  v.  Arndt,  1  Whart.  91  ;  Dar-  aly  in  English  and  American  jurispru- 
rah  v.  Baird,  101  Pa.  St.  265;  State  v.  dence :  "Courts  of  law  and  courts  of 
Elliot,  1 1  N.  H.  540 ;  if  not  removed  dur-  equity  coexistent  in  the  same  realm,  — 
ing  the  term,  the  right  is  renounced,  the  former  merging  the  legal  existence  of 
although  the  tenant  subsequently  take  a  the  wife  in  the  husband,  the  latter  rec- 
new  lease  :  Shepherd  v.  Spaulding,  4  Met.  ognizing  her  separate  existence,  —  the 
(Mass.)  416;  Hedderich  v.  Smith,  103  Ind.  former  declaring  her  incapable  of  acquir- 
203,  and  authorities  cited ;  Marks  v.  Ryan,  ing,  holding,  or  disposing  of  property,  — 
63  Cal.  107;  Watriss  v.  Bank,  124  Mass.  the  latter  recognizing  her  ability  to  ac- 
571  ;  Smith  v.  Park,  31  Minn.  70.  quire,  control,  and  dispose  of  her  estate, — 

3  McRea  v.  Central  Bank,  66  N.  Y.  the  former  denying  her  capacity  to  con- 
489,  495.  tract,  or  to  sue  or  be  sued,  —  the  latter 

4  Married  women,  under  the  coexist-  enforcing  her  agreements  by  granting  re- 
ence  of  legal  and  equitable  principles  lief  both  for  and  against  her !  —  And  yet 
governing  their  property,  are  placed  in  no  conflict  of  jurisdiction,  for  the  simple 
this  anomalous  predicament :  that  prop-  reason  that  courts  of  law  take  jurisdiction 
erty  which  is  theirs  in  their  own  right  of  the  wife's  general  property  and  give  it 
and  name  (legal  property)  they  can  neither  all  to  the  husband,  and  courts  of  equity 
control,  enjoy,  nor  alienate ;  but  property  take  exclusive  cognizance  of  her  separate 
which  is  not  theirs  in  law,  that  is,  which  estate  and  control  it  for  her  sole  benefit, 
is  held  for  them  by  a  trustee  (equitable  While  the  judge  declares  her  contracts 
property)  is  completely  within  their  con-  absolutely  void,  the  chancellor  proceeds  in 
trol,  to  be  disposed  of  or  aliened  at  their  rem  and  charges  her  separate  estate  as 
personal  pleasure.     Judge  Mcllvaine,  in  equity  and  good  conscience  require." 

637 


607,  *  608 


PROPERTY   IN   POSSESSION. 


§  286 


and  on  her 
death  before 
that  of  the  hus- 
band goes  to 
her  executor  or 
administrator. 

Chattels  owned 
by  the  wife  at 
time  of  mar- 
riage become 
the  husband's 
property, 

and  go  to  his 
•executor  or 
administrator 
on  his  death ; 


control  of  the  husband,  it  will  survive  to  her  after  his  death,  and 
the  husband's  executor  or  administrator  has  no  title 
thereto;  and  if  the  husband  survive  the  wife,  such  prop- 
erty will  go  to  her  executor  or  administrator,  and  the 
husband  has  no  interest  therein  unless  he  administer  on 
her  estate,  or  take  the  property  by  virtue  of  some  statu- 
tory provision.  But  at  common  law  the  husband  is  en- 
titled to  and  becomes  the  owner  of  all  chattels  which  the 
wife  owned  before  marriage,  or  which  come  to  her  during 
the  existence  of  the  marriage,  whether  she  survives  him 
or  not;  and  consequently,  though  she  survive  him,  they 
will  go  to  his  executor  if  he  makes  a  will,  or  to  his  ad- 
ministrator if  he  dies  intestate.  But  if  property  be  con- 
veyed or  bequeathed  to  or  settled  upon  her,  through  the  interven- 
tion of  trustees,  or  even  without,  for  her  separate  use, 
such5 property  it  will  not,  upon  his  death,  become  a  part  of  the  bene- 
forhersepa-  ficial  estate  of  his  executors  or  administrators.1  To 
accomplish  this  purpose  it  is  necessary  that  the  con- 
veyance to  the  wife  should  show  the  clear  intention  of  the  donor  to 
deprive  the  husband  of  his  marital  rights.2  A  separate  estate  may 
be  created  in  a  feme  sole  as  well  as  a  married  woman,  which  after 
marriage  will  be  good  against  the  husband's  marital  rights;  and 
where  such  estate  is  created  without  the  intervention  of  trustees,  the 
husband  will  take  the  legal  title,  but  equity  will  regard  him  as  a 
trustee  for  the  wife.8 

*  It  is  sometimes  held,  that  an  expre&?  trust  for  the  benefit  [*  608] 
of  a  married  woman  in  personal  property  ceases  upon  dis- 
coverture,4  and  is  not  revived  upon  a  second  marriage.6 


1  Wms.  Ex.  [749]  et  seq.,  citing  Co. 
Lit.  351  b ,  Jamison  v.  May,  13  Ark.  600 ; 
Hopper  v.  McWhorter,  18  Ala.  229  ;  Par- 
ker v.  Converse,  5  Gray,  336;  Gully  v. 
Hull,  31  Miss.  20.  And  although  the  wife's 
chattels  become  the  husband's  by  virtue 
of  the  marital  relation,  he  may  waive  his 
rights  as  such,  and  by  his  declarations, 
acts,  and  dealings,  free  and  relieve  her 
property  from  his  marital  claims :  Clark 
v.  Clark,  86  Mo.  114,  123. 

2  Williams  v.  Claiborne,  7  Sm.  &  M. 
488;  Carroll  v.  Lee,  3  G  &  J.  504 ;  Halo 
v.  Stone,  14  Ala.  803;  Hubbard  v.  Bug- 
bee,  58  Vt.  172,  177;  Duke  v.  Duke,  81 
Ky.  308;  Hart,  r.  Leete,  104  Mo.  315. 
The  words  "to  her  ami    her  heirs'  proper 

use  "'lo  cot  create  a  Beparate  estate  in  a 
legacy  to  a  married  daughter:  Rudiaell  v. 
Watson,  2  Dev.  Eq,  430. 

8  Riley  v.   Riley,  25  Conn.  154;  Fears 
038 


v.  Brooks,  12  Ga.  195;  Robert  v.  West, 
15  Ga.  122,  134,  et  seq. ;  Fellows  v.  Tann, 
9  Ala.  999,  1003;  Shirley  v.  Shirley,  9 
Pai.  363 ;  Waters  v.  Tazewell,  9  Md.  291 ; 
Nix  v.  Bradley,  6  Rich.  Eq.  43  ;  Bridges 
v.  Wilkins,  3  Jones  Eq.  342 ;  Beaufort 
v.  Collier,  6  Humph.  487  ;  Gordon  v.  Eans, 
97  Mo.  587,  601  ;  Schafroth  v.  Ambs,  46 
Mo.  114.  Even  in  case  of  a  direct  gift 
from  husband  to  wife  :  Thomas  v.  Hark- 
uess,  13  Bush,  23. 

*  Roberts  v.  Moseley,  51  Mo.  282,  286. 

6  On  the  ground  that  an  attempted 
restriction  of  a  gift  to  the  separate  use  of 
a  married  woman  is  impracticable  :  11am- 
ersley  v.  Smith,  4  Whart.  126,  128.  It  is 
hold  in  a  number  of  Pennsylvania  cases, 
that  a  trust  for  coverture  can  take  effect 
only  if  immediate  marriage  is  contem- 
plated :  Ogden's  Appeal,  70  Pa.  St.  501  ; 
Dodson  v.  Ball,  60  Pa.  St.  492  ;  Hepburn's 


$287 


THE   WIFE'S   SAVINGS. 


608,  *  609 


§  287.    Ante-nuptial  and  Post-nuptial  Settlements.  —  Ante-nuptial 
settlements  of  money,  jewels,  furniture,  or  other  mov- 
ables, by  the  husband  upon  the  wife,  are  valid  against   erty  settled  on 
the  husband  and  all  claiming  under  him,  as  well  as  his    the  wife  goes 

°  .  .to  her,  not  to 

creditors.1     The  title  of  the  wife  is  good,  even  against   the  husband's 
creditors,  and  a  fortiori  against  the  executor  or  admin-    rePreseIltatlve. 
istrator,  although  the  settlor  contemplated  defrauding  his  creditors, 
if  the  future  wife  had  no  notice  and  did  not  participate     , .      , 
in  the  intent.2     So  an  agreement   before   marriage,  in    settled  in  fraud 
writing,  that  the  wife  shall  be  entitled  to  specific  parts    of  credltors- 
of  her  personal  estate  to  her  specific  use,  will  be  enforced  in  equity, 
although  the  legal  title  be  vested  in  the  husband  by  the  subsequent 

marriage ; 8  the  husband  in  such  case  becomes  trustee  for  his 
[*  609]  wife's  separate  use,  and  the  trust  will  bind  his  executors  *and 

administrators.4  But  a  promissory  note  given  by  a  husband 
to  his  wife  before  marriage  becomes  a  nullity  by  the  marriage, 
and  is  not  revived  by  the  death  of  the  husband  ;6  it  remains  valid, 


Appeal,  65  Pa.  St.  468,  and  many  others. 
So  in  North  Carolina:  Apple  v.  Allen, 
3  Joues  Eq.  120;  Miller  v.  Bingham,  1 
Ired.  Eq.  423 ;  Lindsay  v.  Harrison,  8 
Ark.  302.  In  Kentucky  it  is  held  that  a 
separate  estate  may  be  made  to  extend 
to  a  particular  coverture,  or  to  any  num- 
ber, regardless  whether  before  or  during 
coverture.  It  is  always  a  question  of  in- 
tention with  the  conveyor  or  devisor: 
Duke  v.  Duke,  81  Ky.  308,  311. 

1  2  Sugd.  on  Vend.  &  Purch.,  bottom 
p.  715,  and  authorities;  Vogel  v.  Vogel, 
22  Mo.  161 ;  De  Barante  v.  Gott,  6  Barb. 
492 ;  Miller  v.  Goodwin,  8  Gray,  542 ; 
Tisdale  v.  Jones,  38  Barb.  523  ;  Williams 
v.  Maull,  20  Ala.  721.  Ante-nuptial  con- 
tracts intended  to  regulate  and  control 
the  interest  which  each  shall  take  in  the 
property  of  the  other  during  coverture 
or  after  death  will  be  enforced  in  equity 
according  to  the  intention  of  the  parties. 
The  court  will  impose  a  trust  commen- 
surate with  the  obligations  of  the  con- 
tract :  Johnston  v.  Spicer,  107  N.  Y.  185. 
To  same  effect,  Desnoyer  v.  Jordan,  27 
Minn.  295;  Forwood  v.  Forwood,  86 
Ky.  114.  Such  a  contract  is  binding 
on  the  wife,  unless  the  provision  is  so 
disproportioned  to  the  husband's  means 
as  to  create  a  presumption  of  fraud : 
Smith's  Appeal,  115  Pa.  St.  319  ;  Achilles 
v.  Achilles,  151  111.  136;  and  see  further 
on  the  subject  of  presumed  fraud  from  the 


relation    existing    between    the    parties, 
ante,  §  118,  p.  *264,  note  5. 

2  Clay  v.  Walter,  79  Va.  92;  Andrews 
v.  Jones,  10  Ala.  400,  421  ;  Bunnel  v. 
Witherow,  29  Ind.  123,  132;  Frank's  Ap- 
peal, 59  Pa.  St.  190,  194;  Tunno  v. 
Trezevant,  2  Desaus.  264 ;  Magniac  v. 
Thompson,  7  Pet.  348,  393 ;  Prewit  v.  Wil- 
son, 103  U.  S.  22. 

8  In  some  States  even  an  oral  ante- 
nuptial agreement  to  this  effect  was  held 
good:  Southerland  v.  Southerland,  5 
Bush,  591  ;  Child  v.  Pearl,  43  Vt.  224 ; 
Riley  v.  Riley,  25  Conn.  154;  at  least  upon 
waiver  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds :  Kirksey 
v.  Kirksey,  30  Ga.  156.  But  the  Statute 
of  Frauds  is  generally  a  defence  against 
an  executory  ante-nuptial  marriage  con- 
tract:  Lloyd  v.  Fulton,  91  U.  S.  479; 
Bradley  v.  Saddler,  54  Ga.  681,  684. 

*  2  Sugd.  on  Vend.  &  Purch.  [718],  and 
American  authorities  by  Perkins,  note  (d1). 

5  Chapman  v.  Kellogg,  102  Mass.  246  ; 
Ingham  v.  White,  4  Allen,  412;  Abbott 
v.  Winchester,  105  Mass.  115;  Patterson 
v.  Patterson,  45  N.  H.  164;  Smiley  v. 
Smiley,  18  Oh.  St.  543.  But  such  a 
note  remains  in  force  after  the  marriage 
by  virtue  of  the  statute  of  New  York: 
Wright  v.  Wright,  59  Barb.  505.  So  in 
Iowa  :  Logan  v.  Hall,  19  Iowa,  491 ;  and 
it  seems  in  Massachusetts  :  Butler  v.  Ives, 
139  Mass.  202,  disapproving  Chapman  v. 
Kellogg,  and  Abbott  v.  Winchester,  supra. 
639 


*  609  *  610 


PROPERTY   IN    POSSESSION. 


§287 


however,    if  the   statute  secures  the  wife's  personal   property  to 
her.1 

Post-nuptial  settlements,  as  well  as  gifts  by  the  husband  to  the 
wife  during  coverture,  are  valid  against  himself  and  all  who  claim 
_  ,       ..  ,       as  volunteers  under  or  through  him,2  and  even  against 

Post-nuptial  °  '  ° 

creditors,  unless  fraudulent  as  to  them.8  They  are 
deemed  fraudulent  if  the  debts  of  the  settlor  were  con- 
siderable at  the  time  of  making  the  settlement,  and 
would  be  defeated  thereby ; 4  or  if,  though  not 
*  indebted  at  the  very  time,  yet  he  became  so  [*  610] 
shortly  afterward,  so  that  it  may  be  presumed  that  he  made 
the  settlement  with  a  view  to  becoming  indebted  at  a  future  time.6 
But,  in  general,  debts  subsequently  incurred  will  not  defeat  a  post- 
nuptial settlement,  nor  will  the  presumption  of  fraud  arise  if  the 
debts  were  inconsiderable,  or  if,  though  considerable,  the  settlement 
itself  provides  for  their  payment,  or  if  they  are  secured  by  mortgages 
or  other  means.6     The  reservation  by  the  husband  of  a  power  to 


gifts  to  wife 
valid  against 
all  claiming 
under  husband, 
and  against 
creditors  if  not 
fraudulent. 


1  Stone  v.  Gazzam,  46  Ala.  269;  see 
cases  in  preceding  note. 

2  Paschall  v.  Hall,  5  Jones  Eq.  108  ; 
Teasdale  v.  Reaborne,  2  Bay,  546,  550; 
Rogers  v.  Ludlow,  3  Sandf.  Ch.  104; 
Butler  v.  Rickets,  11  Iowa,  107;  Barker 
v.  Koneman,  13  Cal.  9  ;  Scogin  v.  Stacy, 
20  Ark.  265  ;  Brackett  v.  Waite,  4  Vt. 
389;  Sims  v.  Rickets,  35  Ind.  181;  Ban- 
croft v.  Curtis,  108  Mass.  47  ;  Hunt  v. 
Johnson,  44  N.  Y.  27  ;  Mayfield  v.  Kil- 
gour,  31  Md.  240. 

8  Moore  v.  Page,  111  U.  S.  117;  Ber- 
trand  v.  Elder,  23  Ark.  494 ;  Picquet  v. 
Swan,  4  Mas.  (U.  S.  C.  C.)  443  ;  Wiley  ». 
Gray,  36  Miss.  510;  Leavitt  v.  Leavitt, 
47  N.  H.  329  ;  Larkin  v.  McMullin,  49 
Pa.  St.  29;  Kane  v.  Desmond,  63  Cal. 
464;  Pomeroy  v.  Bailey,  43  N.  H.  118; 
Killer  v.  Johnson,  27  Md.  6 ;  Gilligan  v. 
Lord,  51  Conn.  562  ;  Fisher  v.  Williams, 
56  Vt.  586;  Tootle  v.  Coldwell,  30  Kan. 
125. 

4  Borst  v.  Corey,  16  Barb.  136,  139; 
Gardner  v.  Baker,  25  Iowa,  343;  Kuhn 
v.  Stansfield,  28  Md.  210;  Jones  v.  Mor- 
gan, 6  La.  An.  630 ;  William  &  Mary 
College  v.  Powell,  12  Gratt.  372,  381  ; 
Williams  v.  Avery,  38  Ala.  115;  Allen  v. 
Walt,  9  Ileisk.  242;  Clayton  v.  Brown, 
30  Ga.  490;  Reynolds  v.  Lansford,  16 
Tex.  286.  Bat  the  presumption  of  fraud 
may  be  rebutted;  Tbacber  v.  Phinney, 
7  Allen,  146;  Woolstone's  Appeal,  ->\  Pa. 
St.  452 ;   Babcock  v.   Eckler,  24  N.   Y. 

640 


623  ;  Belford  v.  Crane,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  265  ; 
Potter  v.  McDowell,  31  Mo.  62  ;  Walsh  r. 
Ketchum,  84  Mo.  427  ;  Norton  v.  Norton, 
5  Cush.  524 ;  Filley  v.  Register,  4  Minn. 
391  ;  Freeman  v.  Burnham,  36  Conn. 
469,  473;  Sweeney  v.  Damron,  47  111. 
450,  457.  See  an  elaborate  discussion 
of  the  principles  applicable  to  a  volun- 
tary conveyance  between  creditors  of  the 
grantor  and  claimants  under  the  deed,  by 
JJ.  Baldwin  and  Stanard,  in  the  case  of 
Hunters  v.  Waite,  3  Gratt.  26,  op.  pp.  32- 
72,  citing  English  and  American  text- 
books and  decisions  :  Ellinger  v.  Crowl 
17  Md.  361  ;  Anninu.  Annin,  24  N.  J.  Eq. 
184  ;  Phelps  v.  Morrison,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  195 ; 
Kipp  v.  Hanna,  2  Bland  Ch.  26 ;  Moritz 
v.  Hoffman,  35  111.  553  ;  Tripner  v.  Abra- 
hams, 47  Pa.  St.  220;  Reade  v.  Living- 
ston, 3  Johns.  Ch.  481 ;  Woodson  v. 
Pool,  19  Mo.  340.  A  conveyance  from 
husband  to  wife  without  consideration 
is  void  as  against  existing  creditors,  al- 
though no  fraud  be  actually  intended; 
Robinson  ?•.  Clark,  76  Me.  493 ;  Watson 
v.  Riskamire,  45  Iowa,  231. 

5  Case  v.  Phelps,  39  N.  Y.  164  ;  Town- 
send  v.  Maynard,  45  Pa.  St.  198;  Phillips 
v.  Wooster,  36  N.  Y.  412.  It  matters  not 
as  to  subsequent  creditors  that  the  con- 
veyance includes  all  the  husband's  realty, 
and  is  a  large  proportion  in  value  of  all 
bis  property  :  Thompson  v.  Allen,  103 
Pa.  St.  44,  48. 

6  Gridley  v.  Watson,  53  111.   186,  193; 


§  288 


wife's  savings  from  separate  trade.     *  610,  *  611 


revoke  the  limitations  in  favor  of  the  wife  is  said  by  Fraud  presum- 
Williams  to  be  a  badge  of  fraud;1  but  the  contrary  is  vatLnTpower 
held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  indicat-  to  revoke; 
ing  that  the  absence  of  such  a  power  is  often  considered  a  badge  of 
fraud.2     So,  fraud  may  be  presumed  from  continual  pos- 
session in  the  husband  after  a  transfer  purporting  to  be  tinual  posses- 
absolute.3     Where  the  settlement  after  marriage  is  made  ?lon.  by}he^ 

.  ■  o  husband  after 

for  a  valuable  consideration,  the  presumption  of  fraud  gift, 

fails,  though  the  husband  be  indebted  at  the  time.4     A   uniess  made 
written  agreement  before  marriage  is  a  good  considera-   for  a  valuable 
tion,  but  not  a  verbal  agreement.6     A  contract  in  con- 
sideration of  the  settlement  of  existing  differences,  and  the  avoid- 
ance of  future  difficulties  and   dissensions,  or  of   the  return  of   a 
wife  who  is  legally  justified  in  her  absence  from  the  husband,   is 

founded  on  a  valid  consideration.6     In  the  case  of  Lloyd  v. 
[*  611]  *  Fulton,7  Mr.  Justice  Swayne,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,   lays  down  this  rule 
upon  the  subject  of  post-nuptial  marriage  settlements :    Rule  by  Su- 
"  Prior  indebtedness  is  only  presumptive,  and  not  con-    £[et™e  t? °-"rj; 
elusive  proof  of  fraud,  and  this  presumption  may  be    States. 
explained  and  rebutted.     Fraud  is  always  a  question  of  fact  with 
reference  to  the  intention  of  the  grantor.     Where  there  is  no  fraud 
there  is  no  infirmity  in  the  deed.     Every  case  depends  upon  its  cir- 
cumstances, and  is  to  be  carefully  scrutinized.     But  the  vital  ques- 
tion is  always  the  good  faith  of  the  transaction.     There  is  no  other 
test." 

§  288.    The    Wife's    Savings    from     Separate     Trade,     Pin-money 
Gifts,  etc.  —  A  wife  may  also  acquire  separate  property  by  carrying 


Bridgford  v.  Riddell,  55  111.  261,  267 
Brookbank  v.  Kennard,  41  Ind.  339 
Stephenson  v.  Donahue,  40  Oh.  St.  184 
White  v.  Bettis,  9  Heisk.  645. 

1  Wms.  Ex.  [754],  on  the  authority  of 
1  Roper,  Husband  &  Wife,  p.  *315. 

2  Jones  v.  Clifton,  101  U.  S.  225,  229. 

3  Moore  v.  Page,  111  U.S.  117,  119; 
Putnam  v.  Osgood,  52  N.  H.  148,  153,  et 
seq.;  Coolidge  v.  Melvin,  42  N.  H.  510; 
Rothchild  v.  Rowe,  44  Vt.  389.  Where 
real  and  personal  property  were  conveyed, 
it  was  held  that  the  notice  of  the  wife's 
general  ownership,  furnished  by  the  re- 
corded deed,  would  be  such  a  presump- 
tion of  ownership  of  the  personal  prop- 
erty on  the  premises  as  would  reasonably 
lead  any  person  observing  the  husband's 
use  of  the  property  to  conclude  that  he 

VOL.  I.  — 41 


was  using  it  as  hers  :  Gilligan  v.  Lord,  51 
Conn.  562,  568. 

4  Barnum  v.  Farthing,  40  How.  Pr. 
25;  Duffy  v.  Insurance  Co.,  8  W.  &  S. 
413  ;  Medsker  v.  Bonebrake,  108  U.  S.  66, 
73  ;  Atlantic  Bank  v.  Tavener,  130  Mass. 
407,  410;  Bean  v.  Patterson,  122  U.  S. 
496  ;  Dice  v.  Irvin,  110  Ind.  561. 

5  But  not  if  the  settlement  is  for  more 
than  the  agreement  stipulated  :  Saunders 
v.  Ferrill,  1  Ired.  L.  97.  See  Smith  v. 
Allen,  5  Allen,  454 ;  Peiffer  v.  Lytle,  58 
Pa.  St.  386  ;  Izard  v.  Izard,  1  Bailey  Eq. 
228;  Wood  v.  Savage,  2  Doug.  (Mich.) 
316;  Simpson  v.  Graves,  Riley  Ch.  232, 
237.  But  see,  where  parol  agreement  is 
held  sufficient,  ante,  p.  *  608,  note  3. 

6  Burkholder's  Appeal,  105  Pa.  St.  31, 
37. 

7  91  U.  S.  479,  485. 

641 


*611,  *612 


PROPERTY    IN   POSSESSION. 


§  288 


Money  saved 
by  the  wife 
with  husband's 
consent  goes  to 
her  at  his 
death, 


on  a  business  or  trade  on  her  own  account,  by  permis- 
sion of  the  husband,  either  in  consequence  of  an  express 
agreement  between  her  and  her  husband  before  the  mar- 
riage, in  which  case  it  will  be  binding  also  against  cred- 
itors,1 or  where  he  consents  during  the  marriage,  in 
which  case  it  will  be  void  against  creditors,  but  binding  on  him  and 
except  as  his  personal  representatives.2     And  the  savings  of  the 

husbTnd^6         w^e  arising  from  her  separate  property,  gifts  from  the 
creditors.  husband  to  the  wife,  pin-money,  and  similar  allowances 

to  her,  or  jewels  or  other  things  purchased  by  her  out  of  her  sepa- 
rate estate,  belong  to  her,  and  do  not  constitute  assets  in  the  hands 
of  the  husband's  executor  or  administrator.8  But 
to  establish  a  gift  by  the  husband  to  the  *  wife,  [*  612] 
there  must  be  clear  and  incontrovertible  proof, 
and  nothing  less  than  an  irrevocable  gift,  either  to  some 
person  in  trust  or  by  some  clear  and  distinct  act,  will 
do.4  Stocks  purchased  by  the  husband  in  the  name  of 
himself  and  his  wife,  money  loaned  out  on  securities 
taken  in  the  name  of  husband  and  wife,  and  property 
purchased  in  their  joint  names  or  in  the  wife's  name, 


Gift  by  hus- 
band to  wife 
must  be  estab- 
lished by  clear 
testimony. 


Property  put 
by  husband  in 
joint  name  of 
husband  and 
wife  goes  to 
her,  and  not  to 


his  executor  or    will  all  be  presumed,   in  cases  clear  of  fraud,  to  have 
administrator.     ^een  intended  as  an  advancement  and  provision  for  the 


1  Young  v.  Jones,  9  Humph.  551 ; 
Young  v.  Gori,  13  Abb.  Pr.  13,  note, 
p.  15;  Sanford  v.  Atwood,  44  Conn.  141, 
143;  see  also  State  v.  Smit,  20  Mo.  App. 
50,  54. 

2  Rogers  v.  Fales,  5  Pa.  St.  154 ;  Gen- 
try v.  McReynolds,  12  Mo.  533  ;  Jones  v. 
Reid,  12  W.  Va.  350  (not  deciding  as  to 
the  validity  of  such  an  agreement  as 
against  creditors),  365. 

3  Barron  v.  Barron,  24  Vt.  375  ;  Rich- 
ardson v.  Merrill,  32  Vt.  27  ;  Nelson  v. 
Hollins,  9  Baxt.  553  ;  Miller  v.  William- 
son. 5  Md.  219;  Rush  v.  Vought,  55  Pa. 
St.  437  ;  Towers  v.  Hagner,  3  Whart.  48, 
56,  et  seq. ;  Yardley  v.  Raub,  5  Whart.  117; 
Kee  v.  Vasser,  2  Ired.  Eq.  553 ;  Merritt 
v.  Lyon,  3  Barb.  110;  Rawson  v.  Penn. 
I;,  i;  Co.,  2  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  220;  Eddins  v. 
Buck,  23  Ark.  507;  Peck  v.  Bruinniagim, 
81  Cal.  440;  Churchill  v.  Corker,  25  Ga. 
479;  Skillman  v.  Skillman,  13  N.  J.  Eq. 
403;  Weill  v.  Treadwell,  28  Miss.  717; 
Dale  v.  Lincoln,  62  111.  22;  Coates  v. 
Gerlach,  44  Pa.  St.  43;  Vance  v.  Nbgle, 
to  Pa.  St.  170  ■  Butterfield  v.  Stanton,  44 
Miss.  IS;  Pinney  v.  Fellows,  i">  Vt.  525; 
Wood  v.  Warden,  SO  Ohio,  518  ;  Button 
v.  Ilutton,  8  Pa.  St.   100;  Hosor  v.  Resor, 

642 


9  Ind.  347  ;  Thompson  v.  Mills,  39  Ind. 
528  ;  Bent  v.  Bent,  44  Vt.  555  ;  Goree  v. 
Walthall,  44  Ala.  161.  Anagree'ment  be- 
tween husband  and  wife,  whereby  the 
former  receives  her  personal  property  to 
hold  as  trustee  for  her  minor  children,  is 
enforceable  in  equity :  Hammons  v.  Ren- 
frew, 84  Mo.  332. 

4  George  v.  Spencer,  2  Md.  Ch.  353 ; 
Woodson  v.  Pool,  19  Mo.  340;  Manny  v. 
Rixford,  44  111.  129;  Jennings  v.  Davis, 
31  Conn.  134 ;  Herr's  Appeal,  5  W.  &  S. 
494  ;  Crissman  v.  Crissman,  23  Mich.  217  ; 
Woodford  v.  Stephens,  51  Mo.  443;  Trow- 
bridge v.  H olden,  58  Me.  117;  Hayt  a. 
Parks,  39  Conn.  357  ;  Williams's  Appeal, 
106  Pa.  St.  116.  Where  a  wife  deposited 
money  in  a  bank,  mostly  the  proceeds  of 
her  own  earnings,  in  the  absence  of  evi- 
dence showing  the  same  to  have  been 
done  with  the  consent  of  the  husband,  or 
other  evidence  of  a  gift,  he  is  entitled  to 
the  money  at  her  death :  McDermott's 
Appeal,  106  Pa.  St.  358.  But  her  sepa- 
rate title  to  personalty  may  be  established 
by  words,  acts,  and  conduct,  as  well  as  by 
writing:  McCoy  v.  Hyatt,  80  Mo.  130; 
Bctt.es  r.  Mngoon,  85  Mo.  580;  Armitage 
v.  Mace,  96  N.  Y.  538. 


§289  THE   WIFE'S   PARAPHERNALIA.  *  612,  *  613 

wife,  and  on  surviving  him  she  will  be  entitled  thereto,  as  against 
his  executors  or  administrators  if  he  has  not  aliened  them  during 
his  lifetime.1     Pin-money,  being  intended  not  for  the    pjn.money 
sustentation  of  the  wife,  but  for  her  dress  and  orna-   g°es  to  her  to 

tli'*  extent  of  3L 

ments  in  a  station  suitable  to  the  degree  of  the  husband,    year's  ailow- 
cannot   be   claimed   against  the  husband's  executor  or   ance- 
administrator  for  a  period  farther  back  than  one  year's  allowance, 
nor  where  the  wife  dies  can  it  be  claimed  by  her  repre-    But  on  her 
sentatives  at  all.     Where  it  is  settled  upon  the  wife  by   Jefreprerent*- 
an  ante-nuptial  agreement,  it  is  payable  to  her  as  against   tives  at  all. 

creditors;  but  her  savings  out  of  pin-money,  or  other  allow- 
[*613]  ances  by  the  husband  not  in  pursuance  of  an  *  ante-nuptial 

contract,  as  well  as  jewels  so  purchased  by  the  wife  out  of 
them,  will  be  assets  to  pay  the  husband's  debts,  although  protected 
from  voluntary  claims.2  But  in  the  United  States  there  is  little  or  no 
occasion  for  the  application  of  any  rules  concerning  pin-money ;  this 
subject,  as  well  as  that  of  paraphernalia,8  is  generally  merged  in,  and 
governed  by,  the  statutory  provisions  for  the  protection  of  married 
women  and  the  support  of  the  family  upon  the  death  of  the  husband.4 
§  289.  The  Wife's  Paraphernalia.  —  Paraphernalia  of  the  wife 
include  her  wearing  apparel  and  ornaments,  suitable  to  her  station 
in  life.  It  is  held  in  England  that  what  constitutes  paraphernalia 
is  a  question  to  be  decided  by  the  court,  depending  upon  the  rank 
and  fortune  of  the  parties;  and  the  books  are  full  of  cases  distin- 
guishing between  the  nature  and  value  of  the  jewels,  ornaments, 
and  garments  as  constituting,  or  not,  the  wife's  paraphernalia.6    In 

1  Draper   v.   Jackson,   16    Mass.   480;  Bristor  v.  Bristor,  93  Ind.  281.     See  also 

Phelps  t'.   Phelps,  20  Pick.  556;  Sanford  Adams  v.  Brackett,  5   Met.   (Mass.)  280; 

v.  Sanford,  5   Lans.   486,  495 ;  61    Barb.  Fowler  v.   Rice,  31   Ind.    258  ;    Bergey's 

293.     And  after  the  wife's  death  they  go  Appeal,  60  Pa.  St.  408 ;  Sawyers  v.  Baker, 

to  her  administrator,  if  in  her  name  alone :  77  Ala.  461;  Gainus  v.  Cannon,  42  Ark. 

Leland  v.  Whitaker,  23  Mich.  324.     If  the  503. 

husband   purchase   land   with    his  wife's  2  See  the  case  of  Digby  v.  Howard,  4 

money,  and   without   her    knowledge   or  Sim.  588,  for  a  discussion  of  this  subject ; 

consent  takes  the  deed  in  his  own  name,  the  decision  of  the  Vice-Chancellor,  allow- 

and  afterward  sell  such  laud,  she  is  en-  inp  the  wife's  representatives  to  recover 

titled   to   the  amount  received    therefor,  against  the  husband's  estate,  was  reversed 

And  if  he  buy  land  with  money  partly  hers  by  the  House  of  Lords,  8  Bligh,  n.  s.  224, 

and  partly  his  own,  taking  the  deed  In  his  269.      See  also   Miller  v.    Williamson,  5 

own  name  without  her  knowledge  or  con-  Md.  219,  236. 

sent,  she  is  entitled  to  recover  from  the  3  Post,  §  289. 

estate  the  amount  so  invested  :    Daytou  4  Ante,  ch.    ix.  ;    Clawson  v.  Clawson, 

v.  Fisher,  34  Ind.  356.     If,  on  the  other  25  Ind.  229,  231  ;  Rawson  v.  Penn.  R.  R. 

hand,  the  husband  receives  the  rent  from  Co.,   2    Abb.    Pr.   n.    s.   220;     Savage  v. 

his   wife's    separate    estate,    the   circum-  O'Neil,  44  N.  Y.  298  ;  Beard  v.  Dedolph, 

stances  showing  that  the  wife  did  not  in-  29  Wis.  136 ;  Teague  v.  Downs,  69  N.  C. 

tend  to  charge  the  husband,  and  that  he  280. 

did  not  intend  to  account,  then  the  courts  5  See  Wms    Ex.  and  quotations  from 

cannot,  after  his  death,  charge  his  estate  :  decided  cases,  pp.  [763]-[770j. 

643 


*  613,  *  614  PROPERTY   IN   POSSESSION.  §  289 

America,  as  with  regard  to  the  analogous  subjects  of  pin-money  and 
other  allowances  by  the  husband,  the  statutes  of  most  States  contain 
specific,  and  in  some  cases  very  minute,  provisions  on  the  rights  of 
the  wife  and  widow  to  her  paraphernalia,  which  are  considered,  in 
their  connection  with  the  estates  of  deceased  persons,  in  a  separate 
chapter.1  At  common  law,  gifts  as  paraphernalia  are  distinguish- 
able from  gifts  by  the  husband  for  the  wife's  separate  use  in  this, 
that  she  may  dispose  of  the  latter  absolutely,  but  can  neither  give 
away  nor  bequeath  the  former  by  her  will;  and  that  the  husband 
may  sell  or  give  them  away  during  his  lifetime,  but  cannot  during 
her  life  dispose  of  them  by  will.3  So  they  are  liable,  at  common 
law,  and  in  States  in  which  they  are  not  secured  to  the  wife  by 
statutory  enactment,  for  the  husband's  debts,  but  not  to  satisfy  the 
husband's  legacies;  and  where  the  creditor  has  a  double  fund,  he 
has  no  right  to  subject  the  widow's  paraphernalia  to  the  satisfaction 
of  his  debt ;  but  all  other  property,  whether  real  or  personal, 
is  to  be  first  applied  to  *  the  payment  of  debts.8  And  where  [*  614] 
the  husband  has  pledged  his  wife's  paraphernalia,  the  widow 
has  a  right  to  have  them  redeemed  by  the  executor  or  administrator.* 
Nor  are  jewels  and  other  gifts  in  the  nature  of  paraphernalia  by 
third  persons,  for  her  separate  use,  liable  for  the  husband's  debts.6 

1  Ante,  ch.  ix.  *  Graham  v.  Londonderry,  3  Atk.  393. 

2  Wins.  Ex.  [766],  and  authorities.  6  See  ante,  §  288. 

3  lb.,  p.  [767]  et  seq. 


644 


§  290  SURVIVAL   OP  ACTIONS   AT   COMMON   LAW.      *  615,  *  616 


[*615]  *  CHAPTER   XXXI. 

TITLE   OP   EXECUTORS   AND    ADMINISTRATORS   TO    CHOSES   IN   ACTION. 

§  290.    Survival  of  Actions  at  Common  Law.  —  The  ancient  rule 
of  the  common  law,  Actio  jiersonalis  moritur  cum  persona,  left  only 
such  actions  to  be  brought  by  the  executor  or  adminis- 
trator as  were  founded  on  some  obligation  or  duty,  in-    ^i™™0^^ 
eluding  debts  of  all  descriptions,  with  respect  to  which   actions  not 
the  executor  or  administrator  is  the  only  representative    obiigation^r 
of  the  deceased  recognized  by  law,  so  that  no  provision    dlltv  die  wita 
in  a  contract,  nor  any  stipulation  or  agreement,  can 
transfer  to  another  his  exclusive   rights   derived  from  such  repre- 
sentation.1    Actions  for  injuries  to  the  person  or  property  of  another, 
for  which  damages  only  could  be  recovered  (tort,  malfeasance,  mis- 
feasance), or  arising  ex  delicto  (trespass  de  bonis  asportatis,  trover, 
false   imprisonment,  assault,  battery,  slander,    deceit,  diverting  a 
watercourse,  obstructing  lights,  escape,  etc.),  in  which  the  declara- 
tion at  common  law  imputes  tort  to  person  or   property,  and   the 
plea  is  not  guilty,  are  said  to  die  with  the  person  by  or  to  whom  the 
wrong  was  done.     This   rule  was  modified  by  a  series  of  English 
statutes,2  notably  that  of  4  Edw.  III.  c.  7,   giving  an    Modified  by- 
action  in  favor  of  a  personal  representative  for  injuries    statutes- 
to  personal  property,  and  3  &  4  Wm.  IV.  c.  42,  §  3,  giving  an  action 
in  favor  of  personal  representatives  for  injuries  to  real  estate,  and 
against  personal    representatives   for  injuries  to   real   or   personal 
estate ;  so  that  actions  are  now  maintainable  by  and  against  execu- 
tors and  administrators  in  all  cases  where  the  value  of  personal  prop- 
erty has  been  reduced  by  injury  thereto,  whatever  form  of  action 
may  be  necessary  to  secure  the  remedy,  and  for  injury  to  the  real 
estate,  and  the  damages  recovered  declared  to  be  personal 
[*  616]  estate.8    The  most  important  alteration  of  *the  law  on  this 

1  Wms.  Ex.  [785]  et  seq.  "The  true  8  Wentworth,  in  his  work  on  Execu- 
test  as  to  survival  against  an  executor  tors,  thus  expresses  his  opinion  that  an 
was  whether  the  cause  of  action  had  its  executor  ought  to  have  his  action  on  the 
basis  in  a  property  right,  and  necessarily  statute  of  Edward  III.  for  grass  consumed, 
involved  the  breach  of  a  contract  obliga-  by  the  cattle  of  a  trespasser :  "  When 
tion  " :  Stanley  v.  Vogel,  9  Mo.  App.  98,  meadow  ground  which  yearly  conceiveth 
100;  Cregin  v.  Brooklyn  Co.,  83  N.  Y.  (Sol  sine  komine  generat  herbam)  shall  be 
595,  597.  ready  to  be  delivered  of  her  burthen,  if  a 

2  Mentioned  in  Wms.  Ex.  [790]  et  seq.  stranger  put  in  a  herd  of  cattle  which 

645 


*  616,  *  617  TITLE   TO    CHOSES   IN   ACTION.  §  291 

subject  is  that  of  9  &  10  Vict.  c.  93,  amended  by  27  &  28  Vict. 
c.  95,  giving  an  action  to  executors  and  administrators  for  the 
death  of  one  killed  through  the  wrongful  act,  neglect,  or  default 
of  another.  Similar  statutes  have  been  enacted  in  most  of  the 
American  States,  and  are  a  fruitful  source  of  lawsuits  against  rail- 
road and  other  corporations.1 

§  291.  Reason  of  the  Rule.  —  The  accurate  and  logical  import  of 
the  rule  that  actio  personalis  moritur  cum  persona,  seems  to  be,  that  ■ 
for  injuries  to  the  person  alone,  not  affecting  property  of  any  kind, 
the  remedy  ceases  upon  the  death  of  the  doer  or  sufferer.  Legisla- 
tive enactments,  both  in  England  and,  with  few  if  any  exceptions,  in 
America,  spring  from  a  recognition  of  the  maxim  in  this  sense,  and 
the  judiciary  in  both  countries,  when  not  controlled  by  statutory 
enactment  to  the  contrary,  is  guided  by  it  in  its  rulings.  The  law 
exacts  reparation  from  the  wrongdoer,  whether  the  wrong  affects 
the  person  or  the  property  of  another;  it  makes  compensation  by  a 
judgment  in  favor  of  the  person  aggrieved  against  the  aggressor,  in 
a  sum  of  money  deemed  to  be  the  equivalent  of  the  injury  suffered. 
But,  under  the  artificial  common-law  system  respecting  the  devolu- 
tion of  property  upon  the  owner's  death,  there  can  be  no  reparation 
for  a  wrong  done  (the  remedy  for  which  is  an  action  ex  delicto) 
where  one  of  the  parties  is  dead;  "for,"  says  Blackstone,2  "neither 
the  executors  of  the  plaintiff  have  received,  nor  those  of  the  de- 
fendant have  committed,  in  their  own  personal  capacity,  any  man- 
ner of  wrong  or  injury."  Actions  arising  ex  contractu  were  allowed 
to  survive  both  to  and  against  executors  and  administrators,  "being 
indeed  rather  actions  against  the  property  than  the  person,  in  which 
the  executors  have  now  the  same  interest  that  their  testator  had 
before."8  So  Lord  Ellenborough :  "Executors  and  administrators 
are  the  representatives  of  the  temporal  property,  that  is,  the  debts 
and  goods  of  the  deceased  but  not  of  their  wrongs,  except 

*  where  these  wrongs  operate  to  the  temporal  injury  of  the  [*  617] 
personal  estate.  .  .   .  Although   marriage  may  be  regarded 

as  a  temporal  advantage  to  the  party  as  far  as  respects  the  personal 
comforts,  still  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  an  increase  of  the  individual 
transmissible  estate.  .  .  .  Loss  of  marriage  may,  under  circum- 
stances, occasion  a  strict  pecuniary  loss  to  a  woman,  but  it  does-  not 
necessarily  do  so."4     In  this  view  no  action  lies  against  or  by  an 

swallow  up  ami  tread  down  this  fruit  of  J  See  post,  §  295. 

her   womb    before   the   mower   with    his  2  3  Rla.  Comm.  302. 

scythe  come  as  a  midwife  to  help  her  dc-  8  Ibid. 

livery,  if  then,  by  the  hasty  death  of  the  4  Chamherlain  v.  Williamson,  2  M.  & 

owner  before  action  brought,  this  great  Selw.  408.    See  also  Finlay  v.  Chirney, 

trespass  should  be  dispunishable,  it  were  L.  R.  20  Q.  B.  Div.  494,  498;  Sawyer  v. 

contrary,  as   methinks,  to  the  purpose  of  Concord  Railroad,  58  N.  H.  517  ;  Jenkins 

said  statute,  and    a   great  defect   iu  the  v.  French,  58  N.  II.  532. 
law."     Wentw.  Ex.  107  (14th  ed.). 
646 


§  292         STATUTES   REGULATING    SURVIVAL   OF   ACTIONS.    *  617,  *  618 

executor  or  administrator  for  a  tort  committed  to  one's  person,  feel* 
ings,  or  reputation,  i 

But  an  injury  to  property  involves  a  wrong  to  others  beside  the 
immediate  sufferer,  that  is  to  say,  to  all  who  have,  from  their  rela- 
tion to  the  owner,  an  interest  in  the  property;  and  these,  whether 
personal  representatives,  heirs,  or  devisees,  are  entitled  to  and  have 
their  remedy.  Thus,  as  heretofore  mentioned,2  personal  actions  sur- 
vive in  all  cases  arising  ex  contractu,  and  by  English  statutes  this  is 
extended  to  actions  for  injury  to  personal  or  real  estate.8  So,  al- 
though the  right  to  sue  on  a  covenant  real  descends  to  the  heirs  of 
the  covenantee,  or  goes  to  his  assigns,  to  the  exclusion  of  his  exec- 
utor or  administrator,  yet  if  such  covenant  had  been  broken  during 
the  lifetime  of  the  covenantee  his  executor  or  administrator  might 
sue  upon  it;4  but,  on  the  other  hand,  though  there  may  have  been 
a  formal  breach  during  the  ancestor's  lifetime,  yet,  if  the  substantial 

damage  has  taken  place   since  his  death,  the  real  and  not 
[*  618]  the  personal  representative  is  the  proper  *  plaintiff.5      On 

this  theory,  too,  the  rule  is  grounded  that  no  action  ex  delicto 
can  be  sustained  against  an  executor  or  administrator  unless  the 
estate  in  his  hands  was  benefited  by  the  tort;«  and  the  statute  of  4 
Edward  III.  c.  7,  gives  a  remedy  to  the  executor  of  the  person  in- 
jured, but  does  not  extend  to  the  representatives  of  the  wrongdoer.7 
§  292.  American  Statutes  regulating  the  Survival  of  Actions. — 
The  tendency  of  legislation  in  America,  wherever  it  diverges  from 
the  common-law  rule  above  mentioned,  is  uniformly  in  the  direction 

1  As  for  assault,  trespass,  battery,  lifetime,  nor  for  certain  wrongs  done  by 
slander,  seduction  of  a  daughter,  breach  a  person  deceased  in  his  lifetime  to  an- 
of  promise  of  marriage  (unless  special  other,  respecting  his  property,  personal 
damages  be  alleged :  Chamberlain  v.  or  real,  for  remedy  be  it  enacted,"  &c. : 
Williams,  supra),  or  like  wrongs  to  the  3  &  4  Wm.  IV.  c.  42,  §  2.  It  was  held, 
feelings:  Broom's  L.  M.  *912;  3  Bla.  even  before  the  enactment  of  this  statute, 
Comm.  302  ;  Clarke  v.  McClelland,  9  Pa.  that  trespass  de  bonis  asportatis  lay  by  an 
St.  128  ;  or  for  the  felonious  or  negligent  executor  for  the  cutting  and  carrying 
killing  of  a  husband,  father,  or  other  rela-  away  of  corn  :  Emerson  v.  Amell,  Freem. 
tive  or  person :  Wyatt  v.  Williams,  43  22 ;  and  for  cutting  and  carrying  away 
N.  H.  102,  105,  with  numerous  authori-  trees :  Williams  v.  Breedon,  1  Bos.  &  Pol. 
ties;  or  for  injuries  affecting  the  life  and  329. 

health  of  the  deceased,  arising  out  of  the         4  Com.  Dig.  tit.  Covenant,  B.  1. 
unskilfulness    of    medical    practitioners  :  5  Wms.  Ex.  [803]  et  seq. 

Vittum  v.  Gilman,  48  N.  H.  416;  Jenkins         6  People   v.   Gibbs,  9  Wend.   29,  34; 

v.  French,  58  N.  H.  532;  or  for  enticing  Cravath    v.    Plympton,    13    Mass.    454; 

away  a  servant :    Huff   v.   Watkins,   20  Wilbur  v.   Gilmore,  21    Pick.  250,   252 ; 

S.  C.  477.  Osborn  v.  Bell,  5  Denio,  370,  376;  Higgins 

2  Ante,  §  290.  v.  Breen,  9  Mo.  497,  500. 

8  The  object  of  these  statutes  to  secure         7  Wheatley   v.   Lane,   1    Saund.    (5th 

the  remedy  in  this  sense  is  generally  ex-  Am.   from   last    London    edition)   216  a, 

pressed   in   the   preamble,   e.   g. :    "And  note    (1),    by    Mr.    Serjeant    Williams; 

whereas  there  is  no  remedy  provided  by  Coker  v.  Crozier,  5  Ala.  369 ;  Daniel,  J., 

law  for  injuries  to  the  real  estate  of  any  in  Henshaw  v.  Miller,   17  How.  (U.  S.) 

person   deceased,   committed   during   his  212,  220. 

647 


*  618,  *  619 


TITLE   TO    CHOSES   IN    ACTION. 


§  292 


of  increasing  the  liability  of  tortfeasors  and  their  estates,  and  cor- 
respondingly augmenting  the  authority  of  executors  and  administra- 
tors to  maintain  action  for  injuries  to  the  person  or  property  of 
their  deceased  testators  or  intestates.1  Thus  actions  are  expressly 
given,  both  to  and  against  executors  and  administrators,  for  replevin, 
for  injuries  to  the  person  (except  libel  and  slander),  for  the  deten- 
tion or  conversion  of  personal  property,  against  officers  for  misfeas- 
ance, malfeasance,  or  nonfeasance  either  of  themselves  or  their 
deputies,  and  in  all  cases  of  fraud  or  deceit,  in  Illinois,2  Maine,8 
Massachusetts,4  Ohio,6  Ehode  Island,6  and  Vermont.7  All 
actions  at  law  whatsoever,  except  for  slander,  *  libel,  and  [*  619] 
trespass,  and  to  recover  real  estate,  survive  to  and  against 
the  personal  representatives  in  Iowa,8  Kentucky,9  Maryland,10  Mis- 
sissippi,11 and  Pennsylvania.12  The  statutes  enumerate  the  kinds  of 
actions  and  the  circumstances   under  which  they  may  be  brought 


1  "  The  ancient  strictness  of  the  rule 
has  been  constantly  giving  way  before  a 
more  enlightened  civilization  and  a  more 
full  and  perfect  development  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  natural  justice.  Judicial  exposi- 
tions of  the  statutes,  which  have  been 
passed  touching  the  survivorship  of  ac- 
tions and  causes  of  action,  seem  to  have 
been  made  in  the  same  liberal  spirit  which 
has  led  to  the  various  enactments.  If  the 
language  of  the  statute  will  allow  it,  no 
reason  is  perceived  why  such  a  construc- 
tion should  not  be  adopted  as  will  give  to 
executors  and  administrators,  for  the 
benefit  of  heirs  or  creditors  as  the  law 
may  require,  authority  to  institute  or 
maintain  suits  for  the  recovery  of  such 
damages  as  the  deceased  party,  whom 
they  represent,  may  have  suffered  in  his 
lifetime,  either  in  his  person  or  his  prop- 
erty, by  reason  of  the  tortious  or  other 
acts  of  any  person,  in  the  same  manner 
as  the  party  injured  might  have  done  if 
living":  May,  J.,  delivering  the  opinion 
in  Hooper  v.  Gorham,  45  Me.  209,  212. 

2  St.  &  C.  Ann.  St.  1896,  ch.  3, 1f  123. 

8  The  statute  mentions  replevin,  tro- 
ver, assault  and  battery,  trespass,  case, 
petitions  for  ami  actions  <>f  review,  in  ad- 
dition to  common-law  remedies:  St.  1883, 
ch.  87,  §  8. 

*   Pub.  St.  1882,  ch.  165,  §  1. 

6  Mentioning  actions  for  mesne  profits, 
for  injuries  to  real  or  personal  property, 
for  deceit  or  fraud  :  Hates'  Ann.  St.  1897, 
§  497.0. 

9  Waste,     replevin,     trover,     trespass, 

G48 


case ;  but  allowing  neither  vindictive  or 
exemplary  damages,  nor  damages  for  out- 
raged feelings  of  the  injured  party  :  Pub. 
St.  1882,  ch.  204,  §§  8  et  seq.  Ejectment 
survives  to  and  against  personal  or  real 
representative,  as  the  right  may  descend  : 
lb.,  §  11. 

7  Ejectment  or  other  possessory  action, 
replevin,  trover,  trespass,  case:  St.  1895, 
§  2446  ;  and  for  a  bodily  hurt  or  injury 
where  the  party  dies  pending  suit :  § 
2447. 

8  With  no  exception  whatever:  Code, 
1897,  §  3443.  Special  provision  that  the 
civil  remedy  does  not  merge  in  the  crim- 
inal, but  may  be  enforced  in  addition  to 
the  punishment :  §  3444. 

9  Excepting  also  assault  and  battery, 
criminal  conversation,  and  so  much  of 
action  for  malicious  prosecution  as  is  in- 
tended to  compensate  for  personal  injury  : 
St.  1894,  §  10. 

10  Specially  mentioning  actions  for  ille- 
gal arrest,  false  imprisonment,  and  for 
violating  certain  articles  of  the  declara- 
tion of  rights  and  the  provisions  of  the 
habeas  corpus  act  as  surviving :  Publ. 
Gen.  L.  1888,  art.  93,  1  104. 

11  All  personal  actions  without  any  ex- 
ception whatever,  at  law  or  in  equity : 
Ann.  Code,  1892,  §§  1916,  1917. 

12  Excepting  for  wrongs  done  to  the 
person:  Pep.  &  L.  Dig.  1896,  p.  1492, 
§  139.  But  actions  for  injuries  to  the 
person  by  negligence  or  default  also  sur- 
vive:  Mahor  v.  Phil.  Co.,  181  Pa.  St. 
391. 


§  292         STATUTES   REGULATING    SURVIVAL   OF   ACTIONS.    *  619,  *  620 


"by  and  against  executors  and  administrators  in  respect  of  the  rights 
and  liabilities  of  their  testators  and  intestates,  differing  in  slight 
degree  from  the  rules  above  mentioned,  in  Alabama,1  Arkansas,3 
California,8  Delaware,4  Kansas,5  Missouri,6  New  Jersey,7  New 
York,8  North  Carolina,9  South  Carolina,10  Virginia,11  and  West 
Virginia.12  The  statutes  of  Indiana18  and  Oregon14  announce  the 
rule  literally :  "  A  cause  of  action  arising  out  of  an  injury  to  the 
person   dies   with    the   person   of   either    party,"   excepting    cases 

in  which  an  action  is  given  for  injuries  resulting  in 
[*  620]  *  death,    and   in   Indiana   actions    for   seduction,   malicious 

prosecution,  and  false  imprisonment;  all  other  causes  of 
action  survive,  except  actions  for  breach  of  promise  to  marry.  In 
Minnesota 15  every  cause  of  action  survives,  whether  arising  out  of 
contract  or  not,  except  for  injuries  resulting  in  death.  In  Georgia 
no  action  for  a  tort  abates  by  reason  of  the  death  of  either  party, 
where  the  wrongdoer  received  any  benefit  from  the  tort  complained 
of,16  but  the  common-law  rule  as  to  the  survival  of  actions  is  not 
changed.17  So  in  New  Hampshire.18  In  Wisconsin,  actions  to 
recover  personal  property,  for  converting  same,  for  assault  and 
battery,  false  imprisonment,  or  other  damage  to  the  person,  trespass 


1  Code,  1896,  §§  35,  36.  All  actions 
upon  contract,  express  or  implied,  all  per- 
sonal actions  except  for  injuries  to  the 
person  or  reputation,  and  real  actions  for 
title  or  possession  of  lauds  in  which  per- 
sonal representatives  have  an  interest. 

2  For  wrongs  done  to  the  person  or 
property  except  slander  and  libel ;  eject- 
ment for  lands  in  possession  of  others 
upon  which  the  decedent  has  made  im- 
provements under  claim  of  possession  by 
virtue  of  pre-emption  or  entry  in  the  land 
office  :  Dig.  of  St.  1894,  §§  5908,  5909. 

8  For  waste,  conversion,  trespass,  and 
actions  which  deceased  had  against  a 
surviving  partner  :  Code  Civ.  Pr.  §§  1582- 
1585. 

4  For  all  personal  actions  except  as- 
sault and  battery,  defamation,  malicious 
prosecution  or  injury  to  the  person,  or 
upon  penal  statutes  :  Laws  as  Amended, 
1874,  p.  643,  §  2. 

6  In  addition  to  actions  surviving  at 
common  law,  actions  for  mesne  profits, 
injuries  to  the  person,  to  real  or  personal 
estate,  and  for  deceit  or  fraud :  Gen.  St. 
1897,  p.  214,  §§  420,  421. 

6  For  all  wrongs  done  to  the  property, 
rights,  or  interests  of  another  (except 
slander,  libel,  assault  and  battery,  false 
imprisonment,  or  actions  on  the  case  for 


injuries  to  the  person)  :  Rev.  St.  1889,  §§ 
96,  97. 

7  For  trespass  to  the  person  or  prop- 
erty: Rev.  1895,  p.  1496,  §  4. 

8  All  actions  on  contract  and  to  re- 
cover debts  and  effects,  and  trespass  to 
personal  or  real  property :  Banks  &  Br., 
9th  ed.  (1896),  p.  1907. 

9  All  actions  except  slander  (but  slan- 
der of  title  survives),  libel,  false  imprison- 
ment, assault  and  battery,  or  other  injuries 
to  the  person  not  resulting  in  death,  and 
cases  where  the  relief  could  not  be  en- 
joyed, or  granting  it  would  be  nugatory 
after  death:  Code,  1883,  §§  1490  et  seq., 
§  1497. 

10  Rev.  St.  1893,  §§  2319,  2323. 

11  Code,  1887,  §§  2655,  2656. 

w  Code,  1891,  ch.  85,  §§  19  et  seq. ;  see 
Martin  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.,  151  U.  S.  673, 
692. 

15  Rev.  St.  1894,  §  282  ;  Feary  v.  Hamil- 
ton, 140  Ind.  45. 

i*  Code,  1887,  §  369. 

15  St.  1878,  p.  825,  §  1. 

lfi  Code,  1895,  §  3825. 

17  Brawner  v.  Sterdevant,  9  Ga.  69.  See 
Thompson  v.  Central  Railroad,  60  Ga. 
120. 

18  Sawyer  v.  Concord  Railroad,  58  N.  H. 
517,  519. 

649 


*  620,  *  621  TITLE    TO    CHOSES   IN    ACTION.  §  293 

de  bonis  asportatis,  and  for  damages  to  real  and  personal  property, 
survive,  in  addition  to  those  surviving  at  common  law.1 

§  293.  Actions  for  Injuries  to  Property.  —  It  results  from  the 
preceding  sections,  and  from  the  general  rule  that  personal  property 
descends  to  executors  and  administrators,  that  they  alone  can  sue 
and  be  sued  upon  all  personal  contracts.  The  same  principle  extends 
to  the  recovery  of  specific  personal  property  belonging  to  the  dece- 
dent, upon  whose  death  the  legal  title  vests  at  once  in  the  personal 
representative;  and  to  the  recovery  of  its  value  if  it  has  been  con- 
Trover,  tres-  verted,  or  of  damages  for  injury  thereto.  This  has 
pass,  case,          been  held  to  include  actions  in  trover,2  replevin,8  tres- 

replevm,  .  . 

conversion.  pass,4  case,6  debt  for  conversion,6  and,  a  fortiori,  for  a 
conversion  after  the  intestate's  death,  though  before  the  appointment 
of  the  administrator.7  So,  also,  an  action  against  a  sheriff  for  a 
False  return.  false  return,8  and  an  action  by  a  husband  against  a  car- 
Loss  of  wife's  rier  f°r  kne  l°ss  °^  nis  W1fe's  services  and  expenses  paid 
services.  in  consequence  of  injuries  received  by  her  through 

the  carrier's  negligence;9  but  all  right  of  action  *for  the  [*  621] 
loss  of  her  society  and  its  comfort  to  him  dies  with  him.10 

The  reason  of  the  rule  holds  good  also  with  respect  to  covenants 

affecting  the  realty,  but  not  running  with  the  land,  as 
running  with  well  as  to  real  covenants  running  with  the  land  for  all 
,and-  breaches   during   the    decedent's   lifetime,    occasioning 

re^covenants  special  damages.  Thus  it  is  said  that  there  is  a  distinc- 
during  dece-       tion  between  a  covenant  of  seisin  and  right  to  convey, 

which  are  personal  covenants  not  running  with  the  land, 
because,  if  not  true,  there  is  a  breach  at  once  which  constitutes  a 
chose  in  action  descending  to  the  executor;  and  the  covenant  of 
warranty  and  for  quiet  enjoyment,  which  are  prospective,  there 
being  no  breach  until  ouster  or  eviction,  wherefore  they  run  with  the 
land  conveyed,  descending  to  the  heirs.11    For  this  reason  the  action 

1  Sanb.  &  B.  1898,  §  4253.  9  Cregin  v.  Brooklyn  Co.,  75  N.  Y.  192, 

2  Manwell  v.  Brings,  17  Vt.  176,  181  ;  196;  per  Simpson,  J.,  in  Eden  v.  Railroad, 
Enbanks  v.  Dobbs,  4  Ark.  173  ;  Smitb  v.  14  B  Mon.  204,  206.  vSo  an  action  by  the 
CJrove,  12  Mo.  51  ;  Parrott  v.  Dubignon,  father  for  injuries  to  bis  minor  son  :  James 
T.  T.  1'.  Charlt.261  ;  Jahus  v.  Noltiug,  29  v.  Christy,  18  Mo.  162.  But  in  Maryland 
Cal.  507,  511.  it  is  held  that  an  action  for  the  loss  of  the 

3  Reist  v.  Beilbrenner,  11  Serg.  &  It.  wife's  services  and  expenses  for  medical 
131  ;  Halloek  v.  Mixer,  16  Cal.  574.  and  other  attendance  on  her  inconsequence 

4  Snider  v.  Crov,  2  John.  227.  of  injuries  from  an  assault  and  battery, 

6  Aldrich  v.  Howard,  8  R.  I.  125.  survives  neither  at  common  law  nor  under 

*  Klrod  v.  Alexander,  4  Ileisk.  342,  the  Maryland  statute :  Ott  v.  Kaufman,  68 
350.  Md.  57,  contrasting  the  Maryland  with  the 

7  Hutchina  v.  Adams,  3  Me.  174  ;    Hoi-     New  York  statute. 

brook  o.  White,  18  Wend.  591.  10  Cregin  v.  Brooklyn  Co.,  83  N.  Y.  595, 

*  Jewetl  v.  Weaver,  10  Mo.  234;  Paine  597;  Grosse  v.  Delaware  R.  R.,  50  N.  J.  L. 
r.  Olmer, 7  Mass. 817 ;  Bolbrook  v.  White,    317. 

18  Wend  S91.     But  sec  infra,  cases  hold-        u  4  Kent  Cora.* 472;  Hamilton  v.  Wil- 
ing the  contrary,  §  294.  son,  4  John.  72 ;  covenant  to  pay  taxes 
650 


§  293  ACTIONS   FOR   INJURIES   TO   PROPERTY.        *  621,  *  622 

for  breach  of  covenant  of  seisin,  or  of  the  right  to  convey,  does  not 
lie  by  the  heirs,  but  must  be  brought  by  the  executor  or  adminis- 
trator.1 So  the  administrator  may  sue  for  a  breach  of  covenant  to 
convey  land,2  or  sue  a  surety  on  the  bond  of  a  covenantor  for  the 
payment  of  rent,8  or  maintain  replevin  for  trees  wrongfully  cut  from 
the  testator's  land  during  his  lifetime,4  and  recover  damages  for  in- 
jury to  the  rental  value  or  for  trespass,  committed  upon  the  land 
before  the  death  of  the  owner,5  even  in  an  action  on  the  case.6 
Where  the  estate  of  the  deceased  in  the  land  was  not  a  freehold,  so 
that  it  descends  as  a  chattel,  the  executor  or  administrator  may  self- 
evidently  bring  action  of  forcible  entry  and  detainer  for  an  entry,7 
or  sue  for  a  trespass  committed  thereon,  either  before  or  after  the 
decedent's  death,8  or  sell  or  otherwise  dispose  of  the  right.9  And 
while  it  is  clear,  that,  for  any  injury  to  lands  descending  to  heirs 
or  devisees  after  the  ancestor's  or  testator's  death,  the  heirs  or  de- 
visees alone  can  sue,10  and  that  the  executor  or  adminis- 
['*  622]  trator  *  can  bring  no  possessory  action  in  such  case ; u  yet 
where,  under  the  statute  or  a  testamentary  provision,  the 
executor  or  administrator  is  put  in  charge  of  the  real  as  well  as  of 
the  personal  estate,  any  action  necessary  to  protect  the  same  against 
wrongdoers,  or  to  recover  damages  for  injuries  thereto,  including 
ejectment  for  possession,  must  lie  in  favor  of  such  executor  or  ad- 
ministrator.12    So  the  action  of  ejectment  is  given  where  land  be- 

runs  with  the  land,  for  breach  of  which  the  Howcott   v.  Coffield,  7  Ired.  L.  24  ;   Ten 

heirs  must  sue,  especially  if  the  substantial  Eyck   v.   Runk,  31    N.   J.    L.   428,   432; 

breach   is  after  the  death:    Hendrix  v.  Upper  Appomattox  Co.  v.  Hardings,  11 

Dickson,  69  Mo.  App.  197.  Gratt.  1. 

1  Hamilton  v.  Wilson,  supra;  Kellogg  7  Winningham  v.  Crouch,  2  Swan,  170. 
v.  Wilcocks,  2  John.  1  ;  Beddoe  v.  Wads-  8  Schee  v.  Wiseman,  79  Ind.  389. 
worth,  21  Wend.  120,  123;  Burnham  v.  9  Bowers  v.  Keesecker,  14  Iowa,  301. 
Lasselle,  35  Ind.  425  ;  Watson  v.  Blaine,  10  Aubuchon  v.  Lory,  23  Mo.  99  ;  Noon 
12  Serg.  &  R.  131, 138  ;  Kellogg  v.  Malin,  v.  Finnegan,  29  Minn.  418  ;  Sloggy  v.  Dil- 
62  Mo.  429;  Grist  v.  Hodges,  3  Dev.  L.  worth,  38  Minn.  179  (holding  that  the 
198,  201.  heirs  alone  are  liable  for  damages  resulting 

2  Laberge  v.  McCausland,  3  Mo.  585.         from  the  continuance  of  a  nuisance  after 
8  Such    covenant   on  the   part  of  the     the  intestate's  death) ;  Ayers  v.  Dixon,  78 

surety  not  running  with  the  land,  "for  N.  Y.  318,  324  (a  breach  of  covenant  after 

although  rent  savors   of  the  realty,  any  death).     Webb  v.  Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  623. 

warranty  or  insurance  of  rent  is  a  purely  ll  Brown    v.    Strickland,   32   Me.    174; 

personal   contract":    Walsh  v.   Packard,  Emeric  v.  Penniman,  26  Cal.  119;   Bur- 

165  Mass.  189,  191.  dyne  v.  Mackey,  7  Mo.  374  ;  Peck  v.  Hen- 

4  Halleck  v.  Mixer,  16  Cal.  574,  579.  derson,  7  Yerg.  18. 

5  Webster  v.  Lowell,  139  Mass.  172;  12  Noon  v.  Finnegan,  32  Minn.  81  ;  Page 
Proust  v.  Bruton,  15  Mo.  619;  Griswold  v.  Tucker,  54  Cal.  121;  Sanchez  v.  Hart, 
v.  Met.  R.  R.,  122  N.  Y.  102;  Marcy  v.  17  Fla.  507  ;  Gunther  v.  Fox,  51  Tex.  383, 
Howard,  91  Ala.  133  ;  Kennedy  v.  Wil-  387  ;  Oury  v.  Duffield,  1  Ariz.  509 ;  Black 
son,  1  Md.  102  ;  Haight  v.  Green,  19  Cal.  v.  Story,  7  Mont.  238  ;  Golding  v.  Golding, 
113,  117;  Lake  Roland  Co.  v.  Frick,  86  24  Ala.  122, 129;  Russell  v.  Erwin,  41  Ala. 
Md.  259,  269.  292,  302  ;    Sorrell  v.  Ham,  9  Ga.  55  ;   Jen- 

6  Howcott  v.  Warren,  7  Ired.  L.  20;  nings  v.  Monks,  4  Met.  (Ky.)  103,  105; 

651 


*  622,  *  623  TITLE   TO   CHOSES   IN   ACTION.  §  294 

comes  assets  for  the  want  of  sufficient  personalty  to  pay  debts,1  or 
under  license  from  the  probate  court.2  And  on  the  same  principle 
an  action  on  street  assessment  is  maintainable  against  the  executor 
or  administrator,  if  he  is  in  charge  of  the  property  assessed.8 

§  294.  Actions  for  Injuries  to  the  Person.  —  We  have  seen  that 
actions  ex  delicto  for  personal  injuries  by  or  against  executors  and 
administrators  can  only  be  brought  by  virtue  of  some  statutory  pro- 
vision,4 and  it  may  be  profitable  to  notice  the  interpretations  put 
upon  some  of  these  statutes  by  the  courts. 

Thus,  an  action  for  personal  injuries  to  the  deceased  caused  by  a 
defect  in  the  highway  was  held  to  survive  under  the  statute  of 
Injuries  caused  Maine  giving  actions  of  "trespass  and  trespass  on  the 
by  defect  in  case  "  to  executors  and  administrators;5  so  under  the 
negiigence°of  statute  of  Massachusetts  mentioning  "action  of  trespass 
public  carrier.  on  ^e  case  for  damage  to  the  person."6  Similarly  in 
Vermont,7  and  in  case  of  injury  by  reason  of  a  carrier's  negligence 
in  Illinois,8  Iowa,9  and  North  Carolina.10  But  actions  for  such 
injuries  are  denied  to  the  representatives  of  the  injured  person  in 
Florida,11  Maryland,12  Missouri,13  and  West  Virginia.14     In 

*  Wisconsin  it  was  held  that  so  much  of  an  action  for  dam-  [*  623] 
ages  against  a  telegraph  company,   for  permitting  its  wires 

to  endanger  the  highway,  as  seeks  to  recover  for  injury  to  the  per- 
son, abates,  but  so  much  as  is  for  injury  to  property,  and  probably 
so  much  as  is  for  expenses  of  medical  attendance,  etc.,  survives.16 
In  New  York  the  letting  of  a  house  to  a  tenant,  with  the  knowledge 
that  it  was  in  an  unhealthy  condition,  in  consequence  whereof  the 
tenant's  children  sickened,  and  one  of  them  died,  was  held,  if 
actionable  during  the  lessor's  lifetime,  not  to  survive  against  his 
personal  representative,  being  an  injury  to  the  person.16     That  the 

Barlage  v.  Railway,  54  Mich.  564,  569  ;  on  plaintiff  by  defendant's  cow,  the  action 

Greenleaf  v.  Allen,  127  Mass.  248.     And  survives  the  death  of  either  party  :   Wehr 

see  post,  §  337,  and  authorities  there  cited,  v.  Brooks,  21  111.  App.  115. 

enumerating  the  States  in  which  the  rep-  9  Kellow  v.  Central  Railway,  68  Iowa, 

resentative  has   statutory  authority  over  470,  481. 

the  realty.  10  Peebles   v.    North   Carolina  Co.,   63 

i  Carruthers  v.  Bailey,  3  Ga.  105.  N.  C.  238. 

2  Bornel!  v.  Malony,  36  Vt.  636 ;   Mc-  «  Jacksonville  Co.  v.  Chappell,  22  Fla. 

Farland  v.  Stone,  17    Vt.    165.     And   see  616. 

Hall  v.  Bank,  145  Mo.  418.  V1  Baltimore  Co.  v.  Ritchie,  31  Md.  191, 

8  Parker  v.  Bernal,  66  Cal.  113.  198. 

4  Ante,  §§  290,  292.  13  Stanley  v.  Vogel,  9  Mo.  App.  98. 

5  Hooper  v.  Gorham,  45  Me.  209.  14  Martin  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R.,  151  U.  S. 

6  Demond  v.  Boston,  7  Gray,  544.  673,  692,  citing  Virginia  and  West  Vir- 

7  Eames  v.    Brattleboro,   54   Vt.  471,  ginia  cases. 

475.  15  Randall  v.  Northwestern  Co.,  54  Wis. 

8  Chicago  &   E.  I.  R.  R.  v.  O'Connor,     140,  149. 

1  19  111.  586  ,    Holton  v.  Daly,  106  111.  131,         1B  Victory  v.  Krauss,  41  Hun,  533. 
136     Bo  also  in  case  of  injuries  indicted 


§  294  ACTIONS    FOR   INJURIES   TO    PERSON.  *623,  *  624 

action  for  assault  and  battery  does  not  survive  the  death    Assault  and 
of  either  party,  and  abates  upon  the  death  of  plaintiff,    battery, 
has  been  decided  in  Kentucky,1  Missouri,2  North  Carolina,8  Penn- 
sylvania,4 and  Texas;5  but  in  Tennessee  it  was  held  that  by  force 
of  the  statute  all  actions  survive  except  wrongs  affecting  the  char- 
acter of  the  plaintiff,  and  that  therefore  it  was  not  only  the  right, 
but  also  the  duty  of  the  personal  representative  of  a  plaintiff  in  an 
action  for  assault  and  battery  to  revive  the  suit  after  an  appeal  by 
the  defendant;6  and  such   action   likewise  survives    in  Arkansas,7 
Iowa,8   and,   it   seems,   in  Wisconsin.9      The   action  for-  malicious 
prosecution  survives  in  Vermont  under  the  statute  pro-    Malicious 
viding  that  the  death  of  neither  party  shall  defeat  an    prosecution, 
action  to  recover  damages  for  any  bodily  hurt  or  injury,  but  that 
the  same  may  be  prosecuted  by  or  against  the  representatives  of  the 
deceased  party;10  and  likewise    in  Kentucky,   notwithstanding  the 
statutory  exception   that  no  action  shall  survive  for   "so  much  of 
the  action  for  malicious  prosecution  as  is  intended  to  recover  for  the 

personal  injury."  n     But  it  is  held  not  to  survive  in  Arkan- 
[*  624]  sas,12  California,13  *  Maryland,14  and  Massachu-    L-,  , 

setts.15    The  action  for  libel  is  held  not  to  sur- 
vive in  Massachusetts,16  but  otherwise  in  Iowa;17  so  of 
slander,  which  does  not  survive  in  Georgia,18  Massachusetts,19  nor 
Ohio,20  but  does  so  in  Iowa21  and  in  Maine.22     In  New  York  it  was 
held  that  an  action  of  slander  by  a  firm  survives  to  the  living  mem- 
bers upon  the  death  of  one  of  them.28     Seduction  is  a 
tort  to  the  person,  actionable  only  to  the  extent  of  the     e  uc  10n' 
loss  of  services,  etc.,  by  the  person  entitled  thereto;  and  is  held  not 
to  survive  under  the  statute  of  North  Carolina,  saving  such  actions 
of  trespass  as  are   not  brought  for  vindictive  damages.34     So  held 
also  in  Georgia26  and  New  York.26     But  in  Iowa,  under  the  statute 

1  Anderson  v.  Arnold,  79  Ky.  370.  ing  that  it  does  not  survive  against  the 

2  Nor  in  an  action  against  a  constable     wrongdoer). 

and  his  sureties  for  unnecessary  assault,         14  Clark  v.  Carroll,  59  Md.  180,  182. 
will  the  action  survive  against  the  sureties         15  Nettleton  v.  Dinehart,  5  Cush.  543. 
upon  the  constable's  death  :  Melvin  v.  Mc-         w  Walters  v.  Nettleton,  5  Cush  544. 
Vey,  48  Mo.  App.  421.  "  Carson  v.  McFadden,  10  Iowa,  91. 

8  Hannah   v.    Railroad   Co.,  87   N.  C.         18  Per  Lumpkin,  J.,  in  Brawner  v.  Ster- 

351.  devant,  9  Ga.  69. 

*  Miller  v.  Umbehower,  10  S.  &  R.  31.  »  Walters  v.  Nettleton.  suvra. 

6  Harrison  v.  Moseley,  31  Tex.  608.  20  Long  v.  Hitchcock,  3  Ohio,  274. 

6  Kimbrough  v.  Mitchell,  1  Head,  539.  21  Carson  v.  McFadden,  supra. 

7  Ward    v.   Blackwood,   41    Ark.  295,         22  By  force  of  the  statute  directing  the 

survival  of  actions  on  the  case:  Nutting 

8  McKinlay  v.  McGregor,  10  Towa,  111.  v.  Goodridge,  46  Me.  82. 

8  Hiner  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  71  Wis.  74, 82.         23  shale  v.  Schantz,  35  Hun.  622. 
l°  Whitcomh  v.  Cook,  38  Vt.  477, 481.  24  McClure  v.  Miller,  4  Hawks,  133. 

11  Huggins  v.  Toler,  1  Bush,  192.  «  Brawner  v.  Sterdevant,  9  Ga.  69. 

12  Ward  v.Blackwood,  41  Ark.  295.299.         26  George  v.  Van   Horn,  9  Barb.  523; 
18  Harker  v.  Clark,  57  Cal.  245  (decid-  People  v.  Tioga,  19  Wend.  73. 

653 


298 


*  624,  *  625  TITLE  TO   CHOSES   IN   ACTION.  §  294 

providing  that  no  cause  of  action  either  ex  delicto  or  ex  contractu 
abates  by  the  death  of  either  party,  if  from  the  "  legal  nature  of  the 
case  it  can  survive,"  it  is  held  that  an  action  of  seduction  commenced 
by  the  injured  party  survives  on  her  death  to  her  administrator.1 
Enticing  away  The  action  for  enticing  away  or  harboring  a  servant  is, 
a  servant.  [n  South  Carolina,  held  to  be  not  in  assumpsit  on  any 

supposed  promise,  express  or  implied,  but  clearly  ex  delicto,  for  a 
wrong   done,  and   does   not  survive.2      In  general,  the   action   for 

breach  of  promise  to  marry  does  not  survive  without 
promise  to  allegation  of  special  damages;3  but  in  North  Carolina 
marry.  ^  ^g  ^g}^  that  such  action  survives  against  the  executor 

Divorce.  0£  ^q  deceased.4     As  a  suit  for  divorce  is  a  personal 

action,  the  death  of  either  party  before  decree  abates  the  proceedings, 
and  they  cannot  be  continued  against  the  executor  of  the  deceased 
husband  to  answer  the  wife's  demand  for  the  allowance  of  additional 
counsel  fees  for  services  rendered  during  the  husband's  life- 
time.6    It  was  held  in  Massachusetts,  *  that  an  action  sur-  [*  625] 

vived  to  the  administrator  of  one  whose  death 
a  prac  ice.  was  caused  by  the  negligent  delivery  of  poison  instead 
of  a  harmless  medicine,  under  the  statute  which  provides  for  the 
survival  of  all  "  actions  of  tort  for  assault,  battery,  imprisonment, 
or  other  damage  to  the  person;"8  in  Michigan  an  action  for  mal- 
practice survives  against  his  executors,7  and  in  Indiana,  a  physician 
is  liable  to  the  husband  in  damages  for  malpractice  in  treating  his 
wife,  and  if  the  cause  of  action  arise  out  of  a  breach  of  the  contract 
for  skilful  treatment,  it  will  survive  the  wife's  death;8  but  no 
action  survives  in  whatever  form  against  a  physician's  executor  for 
malpractice,  to  recover  for  injuries  to  the  person,9  although  the 
physician's  surviving  partner  may  be  held.10  It  is  also  held  that 
such  action  does  not  survive  in  New  Hampshire,11  although  it  be  in 

form  assumpsit,12  and  in  New  York.18     In  Pennsylvania 

Attornev  s  . 

neglect.  an  action  against  an  attorney  for  damages  suffered  in 

Deceit  or  consequence  of  his  neglect  was  held  not  to  abate  on  the 

fraudulent         defendant's  death.14     The  action   for  deceit  or  fraudu- 

representation.     j^     rei)resentation    |g    hel<J    to    survive,     both    to    and 

against  executors  and   administrators,   under   the  statutes  of  New 

1  Shafer  v.  Grimes,  23  Iowa,  550.  6  McCurley  "•  McCurley,  60  Md.  185. 

2  Huff  v.  Watkins,  20  S.  C.477,  480.  °  Norton  v.  Sewall,  106  Mass.  143. 
8  So  held  in  Massachusetts:  Smith  v.  7  Norris  v.  Judge,  100  Mich.  256. 

Sherman,  4   <'ush.  408,412;    Stehhins  v.  8  Long  v.  Morrison,  14  Iud.  595. 

Palmer,  1  Pick.  71,  78  ;  Chase  v.  Fitz,  132  »  Boor  v.  Lowrey,  103  Ind.  468. 

Mass.  359.     In  Maine  :    Hovey  v.  Page,  55  10  Hess  v.  Lowrey,  122  Ind.  225. 

Me.  142.     In  Pennsylvania :   Lattimore  v.  n  Vittum  v.  Oilman,  48  N.  II.  416. 

Simmons,  18  Serg.  &  R.  183.     New  York :  V2  Jenkins  v.  French,  58  N.  H.  532. 

Wade  v.  Ealbfleisch,  58  N.  Y.  282.     See  18  Best  v,  Vedder,  58  How.  Pr.  187. 

ant<,  §  291.  "  Miller  v.  Wilson,  24  Pa.  St.  114,  122. 
*  Bhnlex  v.  Milleape,  71  N.  C.  297. 

654 


§  294  ACTIONS   FOR   INJURIES   TO    PERSON.  *  625,  *  626 

York,1  Missouri,2  and  North  Carolina;8  in  Alabama,  the  remedy- 
is  given  in  such  case  to,  but  not  against,  the  personal  representa- 
tive;4 in  Georgia,  it  is  doubted  whether  the  remedy  survives  to  the 
plaintiff's,  but  is  held  not  to  survive  against  the  defendant's  execu- 
tors,5 while  in  Massachusetts6  and  Virginia7  it  abates  with  defend- 
ant's death.  In  Missouri,  it  was  held  that,  where  one  fraudulently 
induced  another  to  marry  him,  he  having  then  a  lawful  wife  living, 
an  action  in  assumpsit  lies,  for  the  value  of  the  labor  performed  by 
her  while  believing  she  was  his  wife,  against  the  wrongdoer's 
administrator;8  but  in  New  York  it  was  held  that  an  action  for 
damages  does  not  survive  in  such  case.9 

It  appears  from  a  previous  statement,10  that  in  some    in- 
r_*  626]  stances  *  actions   for   false  return  by  an  officer   Misfeas  n 

have  been  held  to  survive,  on  the  ground  that  the    malfeasance  of 
plaintiff's   property  right  was  thereby  violated.       But   °  cers' 
in  most  States  such  or  like  actions  are  held  to  abate  and  not  to  sur- 
vive  against  or  to  executors  and  administrators.     Thus  an   action 
does  not  lie  against  or  by  an  executor  or  administrator  for  the  false 
return  of  a  sheriff, u  nor  for  the  nonfeasance  of  a  deputy, 12  or  of  a 
constable.18     So  it  was  held  in  Vermont  that  an   action   against  a 
director  of  a  national  bank  for  neglect  of  duty  abates  at  his  death, 
and  cannot  be  revived  against  his  representatives.14     Actions  against 
the  trustees  or  other  officers  of  a  manufacturing  corporation  for  the 
recovery  of  a  penalty  imposed  by  statute,  for  the  omission  to  report, 
or  for  otherwise  violating  the  law,  does  not  survive  the  death  of  the 
defendant,15  or  plaintiff.16     In  Missouri,  the  prosecution    y.  ,    .      f 
for   the   violation  of   a  city    ordinance    abates   by   the    ordinance  of 
death  of  the  defendant,  and  cannot  be  revived.17     And    aC)tF- 
so  the  rule  that  qui  tarn  actions  on  penal  statutes  do  not    Qui  tam 
survive  prevails    in   the  federal  courts,  even  in  States    actlons- 
allowing   violations  of   penal    statutes  to   be   prosecuted   after   the 

1  Haight  v.  Hayt,  19  N.  Y.  464,  467,         8  Higgins  v.  Breen,  9  Mo.  497,  500. 
474 ;  so  a  cause  of  action  for  a  conspir-        9  Price  v.  Price,  75  N.  Y.  244. 

acy  to  cheat  and  defraud  the  intestate:         10  Ante,  §  293. 

Brackett  v.  Griswold,  103  N.  Y.  425,  428.  »  Valentine  v.  Norton,  30  Me.  194,  201 ; 

2  Baker  v.  Crandall,  78  Mo.  584.  Barrett  v.  Copeland,  20  Vt.  244. 

8  Arnold  v.  Lanier,  Car.  Law  Rep.  143.  u  Cravath  v.  Plympton,  13  Mass.  454. 

4  In  analogy  with  the  statute  of  4  Edw.  18  Logan  v.  Barclay,  3  Ala.  361  ;  Gent  v. 

III.  c.  7  ;  Coker  v.  Crozier,  5  Ala.  369.  Gray,  29  Me.  462.      So  the   administra- 

6  Newsom  v.  Jackson,  29  Ga  61.  tor  is  the  proper  party  to  sue  for  property 

6  Cutting  y.  Tower,  14  Gray,  183;  Read  exempt  illegally  taken  under  execution: 
v.  Hatch,  19  Pick.  47.     But  in  Cutter  v.  Staggs  v.  Ferguson,  4  Heisk.  690. 
Hamlen,  147  Mass.  471,  it  is  held  that  an  u  Witters  v.  Foster,  26  Fed.  Rep.  737. 
action  for  deceit  in  letting  ad  welling-house  15  Stokes  v.   Stickney,   96   N.    Y.  323; 
infected  with  a  contagious  disease,  thereby  Diversey    v.    Smith,    103    111.    378,    385; 
causing  an  injury  to  the  person,  survives  Mitchell  v.  Hotchkiss,  48  Conn.  9. 
against  the  defendant's  executor.  16  Brackett  v  Griswold,  103  N.  Y.  425. 

7  Henshaw  t».  Miller,  17  How.  (U.  S.)  17  Carrollton  v.  Rhomberg,  78  Mo.  547, 
212,  224.  549. 

655 


*  626,  *  627 


TITLE    TO    CHOSES    IN    ACTION. 


295 


Actions  for 
infringing 
copyright. 


offender's  death.1     But  actions  for  the  infringement  of 
a  copyright  survive  against  the  representative   of  the 
offending  party.2 
§  295.    Actions    for     Injuries    resulting    in     Death    do    not    lie    at 
common  law,  as  already  indicated.8     But  in  England  and  most  of 
the  American  States  actions  are  authorized  by  statute  for  the  wrong- 
ful act,  neglect,  or  default  of  any  person  or  corporation  resulting  in 
the  death  of  the  person  injured.     Such  actions  are  now  given,  for 
instance,  in  Alabama,4  Arkansas,5  Connecticut,6  California,7 
♦Delaware,8  Florida,9  Georgia,10  Illinois,11  Indiana,12  Iowa,18  [*  627] 
Kansas,14  Kentucky,15  Maine,16  Maryland,17  Massachusetts,18 
Michigan,19    Minnesota,20    Missouri,21    Nebraska,22   Nevada,28   New 
Hampshire,24   New  Jersey,26  New  York,26  North  Carolina,27  North 
Dakota,28  Ohio,29  Oregon,80  Pennsylvania,81  Bhode  Island,82  South 
Carolina,88  South  Dakota,84   Texas,35  Tennessee,36  Vermont,87  Vir- 


1  Schreiber  v.  Sharpless,  110  U.  S.  76. 
To  similar  effect,  holding  that  the  action 
given  to  a  common  informer  to  recover 
from  the  owner  of  a  building  in  which 
money  was  lost  by  gaming,  does  not  sur- 
vive against  the  representatives  of  the 
defendant :  Yarter  v.  Flagg,  143  Mass. 
280.    * 

2  Atterbury  v.  Gill,  2  Flip.  239. 

8  Ante,  §  290 ;  Connecticut  Co.  v.  New 
York  Co.,  25  Conn.  265,  272. 

4  Code,  1896,  §  11. 

6  Little  Rock  &  F.  S.  Railway  Co.  t;. 
Townsend,  41  Ark.  382,  387. 

6  Gen.  St.  1888,  §§  1008  et  seq. 

1  Code  Civ.  Pr.,  §  377. 

8  Laws  as  amended  1874,  p.  644,  §  2. 

9  Duval  v.  Hunt,  34  Fla.  85. 

10  Code,  1895,  §  3828. 

11  St.  &  C.  Ann.  St.  1896,  p.  2155,  H  1. 
"  Burn's  Ann.  St.  1894,  §  285. 

13  Worden  v.  Humeston  R.  R.,  72  Iowa, 
201. 

14  Gen.  St.  1897,  §  418. 

16  St.  1894,  §  6.  In  this  State  the  ne- 
glect must  be  wilful,  "implying  actual 
malice,  or  anti-social  recklessness  "  of  such 
nature  that  contributory  negligence  on 
the  part  of  the  person  injured  is  no  defence  : 
Louisville  R.  R.  v.  McCoy,  81  Ky.  403, 
411,  413. 

19  Rev.  St.  1883,  ch.  51,  §  68.  Laws, 
1891,  ch.  124. 

17  Pub.  Gen.  L.  1888,  art.  67,  p.  1020. 
"  Pub.  St.  1882,  ch.  112,  §  212. 


19  How.  St.  1882,  §§  8313,  8314. 

20  Gen.  St.  1891,  §  5578.  In  this  State 
an  action  lies  against  a  steamboat  by  name 
for  the  wrongful  killing  of  the  administra- 
tor's intestate :  Boutiller  v.  Steamboat,  8 
Minn.  97. 

21  Rev.  St.  1 889,  §  4425. 

22  Comp.  St.  1891,  ch.  21  (p.  399). 

23  Gen.  St.  1885,  §  3898. 

24  Pub.  St.  1891,  ch.  191,  §  12. 

26  Rev.  1895,  p.  1188. 

*  Code  Civ.  Pr.,  §§  1902  et  seq. 

27  Best  v.  Kinston,  106  N.  C.  205. 

28  Code,  1895,  §§  5974  et  seq.    ' 

29  Wolf  v.  Railway,  55  Oh.  St.  517; 
Russell  v.  Sunbury,  37  Oh.  St.  372. 

80  Putnam  v.  So.  P.  Co.,  21  Oreg.  230. 

81  Deni  v.  Pa.  R.  R.,  181  Pa.  St.  525, 
(holding  that  the  benefit  of  the  statute 
does  not  extend  to  the  nonresident  alien 
mother  of  the  person  killed). 

82  Gen.  L.  1896,  p.  807,  §  14;  see 
Lubrano  v.  Mills,  19  R.  I.  129. 

83  Rev.  St.  1893,  §§  2315  et  seq. 

34  Belding  v.  Railway  Co.,  3  S.  D. 
369. 

36  Rev.  St.  1895,  art.  3017  et  seq. 

36  The  statute  of  Tennessee  provide* 
that  the  right  of  action  of  a  person  dying 
from  injuries  received,  or  in  consequence 
of  the  wrongful  act  or  omission  of  another 
shall  not  abate  or  be  extinguished  by  his 
death,  but  shall  pass  to  his  personal  repre- 
sentative for  the  benefit  of  his  widow  and 
next   of    kin,   free    from    the   claims   of 


87  St.  1894,  §§  2451,  2452. 


656 


§  295  ACTIONS  FOR  INJURIES  RESULTING  IN  DEATH.      *  627,  *  628 


ginia,1  Washington,2  West  Virginia,8  Wisconsin,4  and  Wyoming.5 
In  Michigan  the  remedy  given  by  statute 6  against  municipal  corpo- 
rations for  neglecting  to  keep  highways  and  bridges  in  repair,  is 
held  to  survive  to  the  personal  representative  of  the  person  injured; 
and  if  an  executor  fails  to  bring  an  action,  the  probate  court  may 
appoint  an  administrator  de  bonis  non  to  do  so,  although  the  executor 
has  been  discharged.7 

The  action  is  in  all  of  these  States  intended  for  the  benefit  of  the 
widow;  in  most  of  them  for  the  benefit  of  the  widow,  children,  or 

next  of  kin,8  or  for  the  widow  and  next  of  kin;9  in  some, 
[*  628]  for  the  husband,  widow,  and  heirs ; 10  in  others,  if  there  *  be 

no  widow,  to  children,11  or  half  to  the  widow  and  half  to  the 
children,12  or  to  be  distributed  among  wife,  husband,  parent,  and 
child.13  In  some  of  the  States  the  action  may  be  brought  by  the 
widow,  husband,  parent,  or  other  person  entitled  to  the  proceeds;14 
but  generally  the  suit  is  brought  by  the  personal  representative  for 
the  benefit  of  the  persons  named  in  the  statute,  not  as  representing 
the  estate  in  such  cases,  but  the  persons  for  whose  benefit  the 
remedy  is  given.15  Hence  the  amount  recovered  is  not  assets  in  the 
hands  of  the  executor  or  administrator;16  if  the  persons  for  whose 


creditors:  Fowlker  v.  N.  K.  R.,  9  Heisk. 
829,  830.  The  amendment  of  1871,  giving 
the  right  of  action  to  the  widow,  and  if 
none,  to  the  children  or  personal  repre- 
sentatives, was  held  to  apply  to  an  action 
commenced  before  it  went  into  effect : 
Collins  v.  E.  Tenn.  R.  R.,  9  Heisk.  841. 
Where  the  wife's  death  is  caused,  the  sur- 
viving husband  is  entitled  to  all  damages 
recovered,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  wife's 
next  of  kin :  R.  R.  v.  Johnson,  97  Tenn. 
667. 

1  Code,  1887,  §§  2903  et  seq.  It  makes 
no  difference  that  the  fund  was  received 
by  compromise  and  no  judgment  was  ob- 
tained :  Powell  v.  Powell,  84  Va.  415. 

2  Code,  1896,  §  4106. 

3  Code,  1891,  p.  725. 

*  Sanb.  &  B.  1898,  §  4253. 

6  Rev.  St.  1887,  §§  2364  a,  2364  6. 

6  Pub.  Acts,  1887,  p.  345,  act.  264. 

7  Merkle  v.  Bennington,  68  Mich.  133, 
146. 

8  So  in  Alabama,  Indiana,  and  Kansas. 

9  In  Arkansas,  Illinois,  Nebraska,  New 
Jersey,  New  York,  and  Vermont. 

10  In  Connecticut,  Nevada,  Rhode  Is- 
land, South  Carolina,  Texas,  and  Wis- 
consin. So  also  in  Kentucky,  where, 
however,  the  word  "  heirs  "  has  been  con- 
strued to  mean  "  children,"  excluding 
vol.  i.  —  42 


collaterals :  Jordan  v.  Cin.,  &c.  R.,  89  Ky. 
40. 

11  Georgia. 

12  New  Hampshire. 

is  Virginia  and  West  Virginia.  In  Ohio 
for  the  wife  or  husband  and  children ;  if 
none,  for  the  parents  and  next  of  kin,  the 
jury  determining  the  amounts :  Wolf  v. 
Railway,  55  Oh.  St.  517. 

14  For  instance,  in  Kentucky,  Missouri, 
and  Pennsylvania. 

15  Munro  v.  Dredging  Co.,  84  Cal.  515, 
528  ;  Hicks  v.  Barrett,  40  Ala.  291  ;  Little 
Rock  Railway  t'.  Townsend,  41  Ark.  382, 
387  ;  Perry  v.  St.  Joseph  Railroad  Co.,  29 
Kans.  420,  422  ;  Baker  v.  Railroad,  91  N. 
C.  308;  Stuber  v.  McGentie,  142  N.  Y. 
200;  Wolf  v.  Railway,  55  Ohio  St.  517. 
But  as  to  the  law  of  Oregon  see  Putnam 
v.  So.  Pac.  Co.,  21  Oreg.  230,  233. 

16  See  authorities  in  preceding  note. 
But  the  administrator  is  liable  for  the 
misapplication  of  such  funds  to  the  parties 
for  whose  benefit  the  suit  was  brought : 
Perry  v.  Carmichael,  95  111.  519,  530.  In 
Minnesota,  funeral  expenses,  duly  al- 
lowed, and  demands  for  the  support  of 
deceased  incurred  in  consequence  of,  or 
after,  the  injuries  causing  death,  are  to  be 
deducted  and  paid:  State  v.  Probate  Court, 
51  Minn.  241. 

657 


628 


TITLE   TO    CHOSES   IN    ACTION. 


§295 


Damages  re-  benefit  the  action  is  authorized  are  not  in  existence,  the 
covered  are  statutes  of  Virginia  and  West  Virginia  provide  that  the 
amount  recovered  shall  be  assets;  but  elsewhere  it  is 
held  that  in  such  case  the  action  does  not  lie.1  Whether  such  action 
is  property,  or  bona  notabilia  so  as  to  support  a  grant  of  administra- 
tion on  a  non-resident's  estate  when  there  is  no  other  property,  is 
considered  in  a  previous  chapter.2  Ln  some  of  the  States  it  is  held 
that  the  husband  has  no  action  for  the  killing  of  his  wife.3  In 
Arkansas,4  Indiana,5  Minnesota,6  New  York,7  Ohio,8  Pennsylvania,9 
No  action  sur-  and  Texas,10  the  statute  is  construed  as  abating  the  action 
wrongdoer's'  '  ^y  the  death  of  the  defendant,  and  that  no  action  sur- 
representative.  vives  against  the  representatives  of  the  wrongdoer.  It 
is  held  that  the  administrator  has  the  power,  without  the  order  of 
Right  to  the  probate  court,  to  compromise  a  suit  for  the  killing 

compromise.       0f  his  intestate ;  the  right  to  sue  involves  the  right  to 
control  the  disposition  of  the  suit.11 

Attention  may  be  called  to  the  distinction  between  statutes  giving 
a  cause  of  action  to  the  representative  for  injuries  suffered  by  his 
intestate  or  testator  during  his  lifetime,  and  such  as  give  an  action 
founded  on  his  death,  or  on  the  damages  resulting  from  his  death  to 
the  widow,  next  of  kin,  or  other  person  in  whose  favor  the  action  is 
given. 12     The  measure  of  damages  is  furnished  in  the  former  case  by 


1  Russell  v.  Sunbury,  37  Oh.  St.  372, 
376 ;  Railway  Co.  v.  Lilly,  90  Tenn.  563, 
with  a  list  of  cases  cited ;  Western  U.  T. 
Co.  v.  McGill  (C.  C.  A.),  57  Fed.  R.  699, 
701,  and  cases  cited.  In  Alabama  it 
seems  that  in  such  cases  nominal  damages 
only  can  be  recovered :  James  v.  Rich- 
mond R.  R.,  92  Ala.  281. 

2  Ante,  §  205. 

8  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Winn,  42  Ga. 
331  ;  see  also  cases  cited  in  Western  U.  T. 
Co.  v.  McGill,  57  Fed.  R.  (C.  C.  A.)  699. 

4  Davis  v.  Nichols,  45  Ark.  358,  hold- 
ing that  the  action  in  favor  of  the  widow 
and  next  of  kin  abates  by  the  defendant's 
death,  but  not  the  action  in  favor  of  the 
estate. 

6  Hamilton  v.  Jones,  125  Ind.  176. 

6  Green  v.  Thompson,  26  Minn.  500. 

7  Begerich  v.  Keddie,  99  N.  Y.  258,  over- 
ruling Yertore  v.  Wiswall,  16  How.  Pr.  8. 

8  Russell  o.  Sunbury,  37  Oh.  St.  372, 376. 

9  Moe  v.  Smiley,  125  Pa.  St.  136. 

10  Johnson  v.  Farmer,  89  Tex.  610. 

11  Washington  v.  L.  &  N.    R.,  136  111. 

49;  Parker  v.  P.  8.  Co.,  17  R.  I.  370;  so 
where  the  widow  is  given  the  right  of 
action,  she    may  compromise    the   claim, 
658 


though  the  benefits  go  partially  to  her 
children :  Natchez  v.  Mnllins,  67  Miss. 
672;  Holder  v.  Railroad,  92  Tenn.  141; 
but  where  the  administrator  brings  the 
suit  for  the  benefit  of  the  widow  and 
children,  the  widow  alone  cannot  effect  a 
compromise :  Railroad  v.  Acuff,  92  Tenn. 
26 ;  nor,  in  some  States,  where  the  ad- 
ministrator has  the  sole  right  to  sue,  can 
the  beneficiaries  make  a  binding  compro- 
mise, but  only  the  administrator  :  Yelton 
v.  R.  R.,  134  Ind.  414;  while  in  others  the 
beneficiaries,  at  least  before  suit  brought 
by  the  administrator,  may  release  the  per- 
son liable  :  Sykora  v.  Case,  59  Minn.  130; 
and  it  is  held  that  a  stranger  cannot  com- 
promise such  a  claim,  though  be  be  after- 
wards appointed  administrator,  so  as  to 
estop  him  as  administrator  from  subse- 
quently bringing  the  suit :  Stuber  v.  Mc- 
Entee,  142  N.  Y.  200.  In  Ohio  the  ad- 
ministrator by  statute  may  compromise, 
with  the  consent  of  the  court  appointing 
him:  Rev.  St.  §  6135. 

13  Such  statutes  are  frequently  found 
coexisting:  see,  for  instance,  Rev.  St.  Mo. 
§§  2121,  2122  ;  Belding  v.  Railway  Co.,  3 
S.  Dak.  369. 


§  295  ACTIONS  FOR  INJURIES  RESULTING  IN  DEATH.        *  628,  *  629 

the  loss  and  suffering  of  the  deceased  party  caused  by  the  injury  up 
to  the  time  of  his  death;  while  in  the  latter  case  death  is  the  cause 
of  action,  and  the  damages  are  measured  by  the  loss  to  the  person 
in  whose  interest  the  action  is  brought  in  consequence  of 
[*  629]  such  death.1  In  some  of  the  States,  the  amount  *  recoverable 
for  the  death  of  a  person  is  determined  by  statute,2  or  not  to 
exceed  a  maximum  stated.3  It  is  also  held  that  the  common-law 
doctrine  of  merger  of  a  civil  action  in  a  felony  does  not  apply.4  It 
is  held  under  some  of  the  statutes  that  when  the  injured  brings  suit 
and  recovers  damages  in  his  lifetime,  and  his  death  afterwards  results 
from  the  injury,  his  personal  representatives  cannot  maintain  an 
action.6  Under  a  statute  of  Connecticut  providing  that  "actions  for 
injuries  to  the  person,  whether  the  same  do  or  do  not  result  in  death, 
shall  survive  to  the  executor  or  administrator,"  it  was  doubted 
whether  an  action  can  be  maintained  for  instantaneous  killing;  but 
where  the  death  is  not  instantaneous,  punitive  damages  may  be  re- 
covered.6 In  some  States  the  personal  representative  cannot  main- 
tain an  action  for  an  instantaneous  killing.7  In  Tennessee,  whose 
statute  does  not  distinguish  between  the  cause  of  action  given  to 
the  party  injured,  or  his  representatives,  and  that  given  to  those 
who  were  damaged  by  his  death,  it  is  held  that  damages  may  be 
awarded  not  only  for  the  mental  and  bodily  suffering,  expenses,  and 
loss  of  time  resulting  to  the  deceased,  but  also  for  the  loss  and 
deprivation  resulting  to  the  parties  for  whose  benefit  the  right  of 
action  survives.8 

It  may  be  noticed,  also,  that  an  action  against  husband  and  wife 
for  the  wife's  wrong  abates  with  her  death.9 

The  authorities  are  conflicting  on  the  question  whether  statutes 
creating  this  right  of  action  have  extra-territorial  validity.  It  is 
well  recognized  that  penal  statutes  will  not  be  enforced  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  State  having  enacted  them,10  but  that  "whenever,  by 
either  the  common  law  or  the  statute  law  of  a  State,  a  right  of 

1  Needham  v.  Grand  Trunk  Co.,  38  «  Murphy  v.  New  York  R.  R.  Co.,  29 
Vt.  294,  302.     See  also  Munro  v.  Dredg-    Conn.  496. 

ing  Co.,  84  Cal.  515,  523  ;  Davis  v.  Rail-  »  Railroad  Co.  v.  Pendergrass,  69  Miss. 

way,  53  Ark.  117,  126.  425,  and  cases  cited  from  other  States. 

2  For  instance,  in  Missouri,  the  only  8  Nashville  Railroad  v.  Prince,  2  Heisk. 
amount  that  can  be  recovered  is  $5,000,  580,  587  (overruling  Louisville  Railroad 
neither  more  nor  less  :  Rev.  St.  §  2121.  v.  Burke,  6  Coldw.  45,  49),  approved   in 

8  As  in   Virginia,  where  it  cannot  ex-  later  cases,  notably   in  that  of    Collins 

ceed  $10,000:  Code,   1887,  §  2903;  same  v.   East    Tennessee   Railroad,   9    Heisk. 

in  West  Virginia  :  Code,  1887,  p.  709,  §  6 ;  841,  850. 

and  Ohio:  Rev.  St.  §  6135.  »  Roberts  v.  Lisenbee,  86  N.  C.  136. 

4  Lankford  v.  Barrett,  29  Ala.  700.  1°  Herrick  v.  Minneapolis  R.    R.    Co., 

5  Hecht  v.  R.  R.,  132  Ind.  507  and  31  Minn.  11,  13;  Adams  v.  Railroad,  67 
cases  cited ;  Littlewood  v.  Mayor,  89  N.  Y.  Vt.  76  (construing  the  Massachusetts 
24;  Legg  t>.  Britton,  64  Vt.  652.  statute);   Dale  v.   R.   R.   Co.,  57   Kan*. 

601. 

650 


*  629,  *  630 


TITLE   TO    CHOSES   IN    ACTION. 


§295 


action  lias  become  fixed  and  a  legal  liability  incurred,  that  liability 
may  be  enforced  and  the  right  of  action  pursued  in  any  court  which 
has  jurisdiction  of  such  matters,  and  can  obtain  jurisdiction  of  the 
parties."1  Hence,  where  a  statute  gives  a  right  of  action  to  a  per- 
sonal representative  for  the  death  of  the  intestate,  an  administrator 
appointed  in  another  State  is  held  entitled  to  maintain  the 
action  in  such  State.2  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  *  held  [*630] 
that  an  administrator  cannot  maintain  an  action  under  the 
statute  of  another  State  authorizing  an  action  by  the  personal  repre- 
sentative of  one  who  came  to  his  death  by  the  default  of  another;  * 
nor  in  the  State  giving  the  action,  if  the  injury  was  committed  else- 
where.4 But  in  States  recognizing  the  authority  of  foreign  admin- 
istrators to  sue,  a  foreign  administrator  may  maintain  such  an  action 
in  the  State  where  the  injury  occurred  and  the  right  of  action  exists.8 
It  is  sometimes  emphasized  that  such  statutes  only  of  other  States 
will  be  enforced  as  are  not  against  the  policy  of  the  State  in  which 
the  remedy  is  sought;  and  that  the  similarity  or  coincidence  of  stat- 
utes in  the  two  States  is  indicative  of  the  coincidence  of  their  policy.6 
So,  although  a  foreign  administrator  may  id  general  maintain  a  suit 
in  a  State  recognizing  the  authority  of  foreign  administrators,  yet 
he  will  not  be  permitted  to  maintain  an  action  for  iujuries  resulting 
in  death,  if  he  has  not  the  authority  to  bring  such  action  in  the 
State  under  which  he  holds  his  appointment,7  since  the  action  cannot 
be  maintained  if  it  is  not  given  where  the  injury  was  inflicted.8  In 
some  States  it  is  held  that  the  action  for  an  injury  inflicted  in  an- 


1  Dennick  v.  R.  R.  Co.,  103  U.  S.  11, 
18  ;  Stoeckman  v.  Terre  Haute  R.  R.  Co., 
15  Mo.  App.  503,  506;  Boyce  v.  Wabash 
R.  R.  Co.,  63  Iowa,  70,  72  ;  Burns  v.  Grand 
R.  R.  Co.,  15  N.  East.  (Ind.)  230,  231  ; 
Evey  v.  Mex.  Cent.  81  Fed.  (C.  C.  A.) 
294. 

2  Dennick  v.  R.  R.  Co.,  supra ;  Herrick 
r.  Minneapolis  R.  R.  Co.,  31  Minn.  11,  15  ; 
Selma  It.  It.  Co.  v.  Lacey,  49  Ga.  106,  111 ; 
Missouri  Pacific  Railway  v.  Lewis,  24  Neb. 
846;  Higgins  v.  R.  R,  155  Mass.  176. 

8  Woodard  v.  Michigan  It.  It.  Co.,  10 
Oh.  St.  121  ;  Richardson  v.  New  York 
Central  It.  It.  Co.,  98  Mass.  85,  92; 
McCarthy  v.  Chicago  R.  It.  Co.,  18  Kaus. 
40  ;  Taylor  v.  Pennsylvania  It.  It.  Co.,  78 
Ky.  348. 

*  Whitford  v.  Panama  R.  R.  Co.,  23 
N.  Y.  465,  467  ;  Needhani  v.  Grand  Trunk 
It.  It.  Co.,  38  Vt.  294,  310;  Hover  v. 
Pennsylvania  Co.,  25  Oh.  St.  667;  Davis 
V.  N.  V.  &  N.  B.  It.  It.,  143  Mass.  301; 
J)»  Ilarn  v.  Railway,  86  Tex.  68. 
660 


6  Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Cutter,  16 
Kans.  568 ;  Jeffersonville  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hendricks,  41  Ind.  48,  72  ;  Hartford  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Andrews,  36  Conn.  213 ;  Marvin  v. 
Co.,  49  Fed.  R.  436;  Memphis  Co.  v. 
Pikey,  142  Ind.  304. 

6  Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Doyle,  60  Miss 
977,  983 ;  Leonard  v.  Columbia  Co.,  84 
N.  Y.  48,  52  ;  Morris  t;.  Chicago  R.  R.  Co., 
65  Iowa,  727,  731 ;  Railway  Co.  v.  Rich- 
ards, 68  Tex.  375,  378;  Vawter  v. 
Missouri  R.  R.  Co.,  84  Mo.  679,  684  ;  Ash 
v.  B.  &  O.  It.  It.,  72  Md.  144  ;  Burns  v. 
Grand  R.  R.  Co.,  15  N.  East.  It.  (Ind.) 
230.  To  divest  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
federal  court  the  dissimilarity  must  be 
such  as  to  conflict  with  the  settled  public 
policy  of  the  State  in  which  the  action  is 
brought :  Evey  v.  Mex.  Cent.  294. 

7  Limekiller  v.  Hannibal  It.  R.  Co.,  33 
Kans.  83,  88. 

8  Hamilton  v.  Han.  &c.  R.  R.,  39  Kans. 
56  ;  Louisville  &.  M.  R.  R.  v.  Williams, 
113  Ala.  402. 


§  296 


PROPERTY    FRAUDULENTLY    CONVEYED.  *  630*  *  631 


other  State  must  be  brought  by  the  person  to  whom  the  right  to  sue 
is  given  in  such  other  State ; 1  while  in  a  federal  court  it  was  held 
that  where  by  the  law  of  the  State  where  the  cause  of  action 
accrues  the  administrator  may  maintain  the  action  for  the  benefit  of 
the  next  of  kin,  he  may  sue  in  a  foreign  State  in  which  the  action 
is  given  to  the  widow  direct,  on  the  theory,  it  seems,  that  he  is,  in 
such  case,  rather  an  express  trustee  for  the  beneficiaries  than  a  per- 
sonal representative  of  the  deceased; 2  but  ordinarily  a  foreign  admin- 
istrator cannot  sue,  unless  permitted  by  statute.8 

§  296.  Property  conveyed  by  Decedent  in  Fraud  of  Creditors. 
—  At  common  law  and  under  English  statutes  4  the  transfer  of  prop- 
erty in  fraud  of  the  rights  of  creditors  is  void  as  to 
them,  but  good  and  binding  between  the  parties  thereto. 
The  same  principle  is  embodied  in  the  American  stat- 
utes, from  which  it  follows  that,  as  the  representative 
of  a  decedent,  the  executor  or  administrator  cannot 
impeach  the  conveyance  of  his  testator  or  intestate  on 
the  ground  of  fraud.6  But  the  personal  representative  is  also  the 
representative  of  the  creditors;  hence,  although  he  is 
never  allowed  to  recover  the  property  from  the  fraudu- 
lent grantee  for  the  benefit  of  the  heir  or  devisee, 
[*631]  *  because  they  are  equally  bound  with  the 
grantor,  yet  he  may  consistently  do  so  in  favor 
of  creditors  of  an  insolvent  estate.  Provision  is  there- 
fore made  by  statute,  in  some  of  the  States,  enabling  executors  and 
administrators  of  insolvent  estates  to  recover  property  fraudulently 
conveyed  by  their  testators  or  intestates,  and  the  property  so  recov- 
ered becomes  assets  for  the  payment  of  debts ;  and  in  some  States 
it  is  so  held  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  that  effect.  It  is,  accord- 
ingly, held  that  the  personal  representative  may  recover  property 
fraudulently  conveyed  by  the  decedent,  if  it  be  necessary  to  pay  his 
debts,  in  Arizona,6  California,7  Connecticut,8  Indiana,9  Iowa,10  Loui- 


Transfer  of 
property  in 
fraud  of  cred- 
itors valid  be- 
tween the  par- 
ties, but  void 
as  to  creditors. 


Executors  and 
administrators 
may  in  some 
States  recover 
from  fraudu- 
lent donee  in 
favor  of 
creditors. 


1  Asher  v.  R.  R.,  126  Pa.  St.  206  ;  see 
also  Wooden  v.  W.  R.  R.,  126  N.  Y.  10,  16. 
So  in  New  Jersey  it  is  held  that  though 
under  the  New  Jersey  statute  the  admin- 
istrator must  sue,  yet  where  the  cause  of 
action  arises  in  Pennsylvania  where  the 
widow  must  sue,  no  action  can  he  main- 
tained by  a  New  Jersey  administrator : 
Lower  v.  Segal,  59  N.  J.  L.  66. 

2  Wilson  ».  Tootle,  55  Fed.  R.  211. 

8  Maysville  Co.  v.  Wilson,  16  U.  S. 
App.  236. 

*  Particularly  13  Eliz.  c.  5. 

6  Bump  on  Fraud.  Conv.,  ch.  16.  See 
collection  of  authorities  on  this  point, 
p.  445  (3d  ed.). 


6  Rev.  St.  Ariz.  1887,  §  1192. 

7  Forde  v.  Exempt  Fire  Co.,  50  Cal. 
299,  302. 

8  Andruss  v  Doolittle,  11  Conn.  283, 
287  ;  Minor  v.  Mead,  3  Conn.  289  ;  Booth 
v.  Patrick,  8  Conn.  106;  Freeman  v.  Burn- 
ham,  36  Conn.  469  ;  Bassett  v.  McKenna, 
52  Conn.  437. 

9  Martin  v.  Bolton,  75  Ind.  295.  The 
administrator  de  bonis  non  may  maintain 
an  action  to  set  aside  a  fraudulent  convey- 
ance by  his  predecessor  of  property  bought 
with  trust  funds  :  Duffy  v.  Rogers,  1 1 5 
Ind.  351. 

10  Cooley  v.  Brown,  30  Iowa,  470. 

661 


631 


TITLE   TO    CHOSES   IN    ACTION. 


§296 


siana,1  Maine,2  Massachusetts,8  Michigan,4  Minnesota,6  Montana," 
^Nebraska,7  Nevada,8  New  Hampshire,9  New  York,10  North  Caro- 
lina,11 North  Dakota,12  Ohio,18  Oklahoma,14  Pennsylvania,16  South 
Dakota,16  Tennessee,17  Vermont,18  Washington,19  and  Wisconsin,20 
principally  upon  the  theory  that  in  insolvent  estates  the  administrator 
represents  the  creditor.  In  most  of  these  States,  when  the  adminis- 
trator refuses  to  bring  such  action,  and  the  estate  proves  insufficient 
to  pay  the  debts,  creditors  may  bring  suit  themselves,  making  the 
representative  a  party  defendant,21  or  object  to  the  settlement  of  an 
estate  as  insolvent,  alleging  the  existence  of  property  fraudulently 
conveyed,22  while  in  others  it  is  held  that  a  creditor  cannot  main- 
tain the  bill;  if  the  administrator  refuses  to  do  so,  after  an  offer 
of  proper  indemnity,  he  should  be  removed  and  another  appointed.28 


1  Sullice  v.  Gradenigo,  15  La.  An.  582 ; 
Judson  v.  Connolly,  4  La.  An.  169. 

2  McLean  v.  Weeks,  61  Me.  277,  280 ; 
Brown  v.  Whitmore,  71  Me.  65;  Frost 
v.  Libby,  79  Me.  56. 

3  Martin  v.  Root,  17  Mass.  222,228; 
Holland  v.  Cruft,  20  Pick.  321, 328  ;  Chase 
v.  Eedding,  13  Gray,  418  ;  Welsh  v.  Welsh, 
105  Mass.  229 ;  Drinkwater  v.  Drink- 
water,  4  Mass.  354 ;  Yeomans  v.  Brown, 
8  Met.  (Mass.)  51,  56. 

4  How.  St.  1882,  §  5884.  The  defend- 
ant should  be  permitted,  on  payment  of 
the  claims  against  the  estate  and  the 
costs  of  proceeding  to  retain  the  land  sub- 
ject to  the  widow's  dower  right :  109 
Mich.  128. 

6  St.  Minn.  1884,  §  4506. 

6  Code  Mont.  1895,  §  2738. 

7  St.  1887,  ch.  23,  §§  211-213. 

8  St.  Nev.  1885,  §  2871. 

9  Cross  v.  Brown,  51  N.  H.  486  ;  Abbott 
v.  Tenney,  18  N.  H.  109;  Preston  v.  Cut- 
ter, 64  N.  II.  461. 

10  McKnight  v.  Morgan,  2  Barb.    171 
Bate  v.  Graham,  11  N.  Y.  237,  240,  242 
Brownell    v.    Curtis,    10   Pai.    210,    218 
Lichtenberg  v.  Herdifelder,  103  N.  Y.  302, 
306;  so  also  where  there  is  an  apparent 
lien  by  a  fraudulent  mortgage,  or  even 
where  the  mortgage  on   record  lias  been 
forged  :   N:ii ionnl  Hank  v.  Levy,  127  N.  Y. 
549,  55:5. 

11  Code,  1888,  §§  1446,  1447. 

i-    Rev.  Code  V  I).  1H95,  §  6480. 
"  McCflU   ".    Pixley,  48   Ob.   St.  379; 
Done]   V.  Clark,  55  Oh.  St.  294. 
14  Rev.  St.  Okl.  1893,  §  1390. 
16  Stewart   v.    Kearney,   6   Watts,  453  ; 
662 


Pringle  v.  Pringle,  59  Pa.  St.  281 ;  Bous- 
lough  v.  Bouslough,  68  Pa.  St.  495,  499. 

16  Dak.  Terr.  Laws,  1887,  §  5868. 

17  Pitt  v.  Poole,  91  Tenn.  70. 

18  McLane  v.  Johnson,  43  Vt.  48,  60. 
Before  the  statute  to  this  effect,  the  ad- 
ministrator's authority  was  denied :  Peas- 
lee  v.  Barney,  1  Chip.  331,  334 ;  Martin 
v.  Martin,  1  Vt.  91,  95. 

19  Code,  Wash.  1896,  §  5455. 

20  Sanb.  &  B.  Ann.  St.  1889,  §  3832. 
As  soon  as  the  administrator  is  satisfied 
of  the  fact  that  there  is  a  deficiency  of 
assets,  it  is  his  duty  to  bring  an  action  to 
recover  property  fraudulently  conveyed, 
even  before  the  exact  amount  is  ascer- 
tained :  Andrew  v.  Hiuderman,  71  Wis. 
148,   150. 

21  Harvey  v.  McDonnell,  113  N.  Y.  526, 
holding  that  the  plaintiff  need  not  be  a 
judgment  creditor ;  see  also  Tuck  v. 
Walker,  106  N.  C.  285,  289;  Ohm  v. 
Superior  Court,  85  Cal.  545,  holding  that 
only  a  judgment  creditor  can  sue ;  fol- 
lowed in  Murphy  v.  Clayton,  114  Cal. 
662  (where  the  executor  was  the  fraudu- 
lent grantee)  ;  and  in  Tennessee  the  cred- 
itor need  not  join  the  representative  :  Pitt 
v.  Poole,  91  Tenn.  70,  73,  citing  earlier 
cases;  Allen  v.  McRae,  91  -Wis.  226  (the 
creditor  may  sue  whenever  there  is  reason 
to  apprehend  an  insufficiency  of  assets)  ; 
Rutherford  v.  Alyea,  54  N.  J.  Eq.  411 
(holding  that  one  who  was  not  a  judg- 
ment creditor  and  had  not  presented  bis 
claim  f>>r  allowance  could  not  maintain 
the  action). 

22  Cray  v.  Wright,  16  Ind.  App.  258. 
M  Putney  v.  Fletcher,  148  Mass.  247. 


§296 


PROPERTY   FRAUDULENTLY    CONVEYED.        *  631,  *  632 


In  Ohio  it  is  held  that  where  the  fraudulent  grantee  has  conveyed 
the  real  estate  to  an  innocent  purchaser  the  administrator  of  an  in- 
solvent estate  may  maintain  an  action  against  the  fraudulent  gran- 
tee for  the  value  of  the  land.1 

In  other  States  the  creditor  is  driven  for  his  remedy  to  a  court  of 
chancery,   because  the  executor  or  administrator  is  not    t>  ^  •     iL 

.     J  ,  ..  .  But  in  other 

permitted  to  assail  or   impeach  the  acts  of  his  testa-    States  the 

tor  or   intestate.     It  is  so   held   in  Alabama,2 
[*632]    Arkansas,8  Florida,4  Georgia,6  Illinois,6  *  Ken- 
tucky,7   Maryland,8    Mississippi,9    Missouri,10 
North  Carolina,11  Ohio,12  Rhode  Island,13  South  Caro- 
lina,14 Tennessee,16  Texas,16  and  Virginia." 


2    personal  repre- 
sentative can- 
not impeach 
the  acts  of  his 
testator  or 
intestate. 


i  Doney  v.  Clark,  55  Oh.  St.  294. 

2  Marler  v.  Marler,  6  Ala.  367 ;  Wal- 
ton v.  Bonham,  24  Ala.  513;  Davis  v. 
Swanson,  54  Ala.  277 ;  and  in  a  proper 
case  a  receiver  will  be  appointed :  Wer- 
born  v.  Kahn,  93  Ala.  201. 

3  Eubanks  v.  Dobbs,  4  Ark.  173. 

*  Holliday  v.  McKinne,  22  Fla.  153, 
168,  176. 

5  Beale  v.  Hall,  22  Ga.  431,  457. 

6  Harmon  v.  Harmon,  63  111.  512; 
Eads  v.  Mason,  16  111.  App.  545,  548; 
White  v.  Russell,  79  111.  155  ;  Majorowicz 
v.  Payson,  153  111.  484. 

7  Commonwealth  v.  Richardson,  8  B. 
Mon.  81,  93. 

8  Kinnemon  v.  Miller,  2  Md.  Ch.  407 ; 
Dorsey  v.  Smithson,  6  Har.  &  J.  61,  63 


authorizing  the  executor  or  administrator 
to  recover  such  lauds,  if  needed  for  the 
payment  of  debts:  Bates'  Ann.  St.  1897, 
§§  6139,  6140.  But  the  action  must  be 
brought  in  the  common  pleas  court : 
Spoors  v.  Coeu,  44  Oh.  St.  497. 

13  Estes  v.  Howland,  15  R.  I.  127. 

"  King  v.  Clarke,  2  Hill  (S.  C),  Ch. 
611  ;  Chappell  v.  Brown,  1  Bai.  528,  531  ; 
Anderson  v.  Belcher,  1  Hill  (S.  C),  L. 
246,  248.  But  in  this  State,  as  in  some 
others,  the  administrator  may  be  made  a 
party  to  a  proceeding  in  equity  at  the 
suit  of  creditors,  and  the  property  will  be 
recovered  and  distributed  to  creditors  by 
the  chancery  court :  Thomson  v.  Palmer, 
2  Rich.  Eq.  32 ;  and  the  personal  represen- 
tative is  a  necessary  party :  Sheppard  v. 


9  Armstrong  v.  Stovall,  26  Miss.  275,     Green,  48  S.C.I  65.  But  it  seems  that  where 


277  ;  Winn  v.  Barnett,  31  Miss.  653,  659 ; 
Blake  v.  Blake,  53  Miss.  182,  193. 

10  McLaughlin  v.  McLaughlin,  16  Mo. 
242 ;  Brown  v.  Finley,  18  Mo.  375 ;  George 
v.  Williamson,  26  Mo.  190. 

11  Coltraine  v.  Causey,  3  Ired.  Eq.  246. 
Subsequent  to  this  case  a  statute  author- 
ized the  recovery  by  an  administrator  of 
all  property  fraudulently  conveyed,  and 
such  real  estate  as  descends  at  law  to  the 
heirs,  and  only  such  as  would  have  been 
liable  to  execution  or  attachment  by  a 
creditor  of  the  grantor  in  his  lifetime. 
It  was  held  under  this  statute,  that  lands 
which  a  debtor  paid  for  and  caused  to  be 
conveyed  to  his  son,  to  defeat  his  credi- 
tors, could  not  after  his  death  be  recov- 
ered by  his  administrator  :  Rhem  v.  Tull, 
13  Ired.  L.  57. 

12  So  held  formerly :  Benjamin  v.  Le 
Baron,  15  Ohio,  517  (Birchard,  J.,  dis- 
senting) ;   but  now   changed  by  statute, 


the  administrator  is  himself  a  creditor  he 
may  impeach  a  conveyance  by  his  intes- 
tate :  Winsmith  v.  Winsmith,  15  S.  C.  611 ; 
Werts  v.  Spearman,  22  S.  C.  200,  215. 

15  Lassiter  v.  Cole,  8  Humph.  621  ; 
Sharp  v.  Caldwell,  7  Humph.  415  ;  Moody 
v.  Fry,  3  Humph.  567.  But  contra:  Marr 
v.  Rucker,  1  Humph.  348. 

16  The  decisions  in  this  State  are  not 
pointed.  Connell  v.  Chandler,  13  Tex.  5, 
Cobb  v.  Norwood,  11  Tex.  556,  Avery 
v.  Avery,  12  Tex.  54,  57,  and  Willis  v. 
Smith,  65  Tex.  656,  658,  deny  the  power 
of  the  administrator  to  recover;  while  it 
is  intimated  that  the  administrator  is  the 
proper  party  to  sue  to  set  aside  the  fraudu- 
lent conveyance  for  the  benefit  of  cred- 
itors in  Danzey  v.  Smith,  4  Tex.  411,  and 
Hunt  v.  Butterworth,  21  Tex.  133,  141. 

17  Backhouse  v.  Jett,  1  Brock.  500,  507  ; 
Thomas  v.  Soper,  5  Munf.  28.  See  Spooner 
v.  Hilbich,  92  Va.  333. 

663 


*  632,  *  633  TITLE  TO   CHOSES   IN   ACTION.  §  297 

As  in  other  cases,  there  must  be  an  exhaustion  of  the  personaltv 
Personalty  before  real  estate  fraudulently  conveyed  can  be  sold  to 
must  first  be  pay  the  fraudulent  grantor's  debts,1  and  the.  proceeds 
of  such  sale,  whether  on  suit  by  a  creditor  or  by  the 
asseteVpay  executor  or  administrator,  become  assets  for  the  pay- 
debts  only,  ment  of  debts  only.2  In  an  early  case  the  excess  over 
the  amount  necessary  to  pay  the  debts  was  held  to  be  distributable 
Excess  will  be  to  the  next  of  kin  or  legatees,  as  an  incident  to  the  ad- 
restored  to         ministration : 3  but  the  true  rule  is  to  restore  such  excess 

fraudulent  ' 

grantee.  to  the  fraudulent  grantee,4  because  the  fraudulent  con- 

veyance is  good  between  the  parties  thereto  and  their  representa- 
tives, binding  all  persons  but  creditors.5 

*  In  a  number  of  States  the  creditor  having  recovered  such  [*  633] 
property  by  proceedings  after  the  debtor's  death,  in  a  court  of 
chancery,  has  a  prior  claim  thereon  for  the  payment  of  his  debt.8  So 
it  is  held  that  the  plaintiff  in  a  creditor's  action  commenced  in  the 
debtor's  lifetime,  acquires  a  lien  upon  the  choses  in  action  and 
equitable  assets  which  gives  him  a  right  of  priority  to  payment  there- 
out, which  is  not  displaced  by  the  death  of  the  debtor  before 
judgment.7 

§  297.  Annuities  and  Rent  Charges.  —  An  annuity  is  defined  to 
be  a  yearly  payment  of  a  certain  sum  of  money  granted  to  another 
Annuity  as  ^or  ^e>  or  ^0T  a  ^erm  °f  years,  and  charged  upon  the 
personalty  person  of  the  grantor  only.  When  charged  upon  real 
sonal  repre-  estate,  it  is  most  commonly  called  a  rent  charge.8  As 
sentative;  personal  property,  an  annuity  passes   to   the    personal 

rent  charge  to     representative;  but  if  granted  with  words  of  inheritance 
it  is  descendible  and  goes  to  the  heir,  to  the  exclusion  of 
the   executor.9      The   apportionability   of    annuities    is    mentioned 
elsewhere.10 

Dividends  upon  shares  in  a  corporation  bequeathed  to  the  testa- 
tor's widow  for  life,  declared  after  her  death  for  a  period 
which  expired  during  her  life,  are  included  in  the  be- 

1  Clement  v.  Cozart,  107  N.  C.  695;  Blackf.  141,  143;  George  v.  Williamson, 
Field  v.  Andrada,  106  Cal.  107  ;  Ruther-    26  Mo.  190. 

ford  v.  Duryea,  54  N.  J.  Eq.  411.  T  First  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Shuler,  135  N.  Y. 

2  McCall   v.  Pixley,   48   Oh.    St.  379,     163,  171. 

388;    Danzey   v.    Smith,   supra;    Lee   v.  8  Abb.  Law  Diet.,  tit.  Annuity. 

Chase,  58  Me.  432,436;  Cross  v.  Brown,  9  As   where   a   testator  gave  his  real 

51  N.  H.  486,  488 ;  Welsh  v.  Welsh,  105  and  personal  estate  to  his  wife,  subject  to 

Mass.  229.  an  annuity  of  .£50  to  A.  B.  forever ;  it  was 

:i  Martin  v.  Knot,  17  Mass.  222,  228.  held  that,  for  the  want  of  the  word  heirs 

*  McLean  v,  Works,  61  Me.  277,  280;  in  the  gift,  the  annuity  passed,  on  the 
Bank  of  United  States  V.  Bnrke,  4  Blackf.  death  of  A.  B.,  to  his  personal  representa- 
141,  148.  tives  :  Taylor  V.  Martindalo,  12  Sim.  158; 

6  Burtch  v.  Elliott,  3  Tnd.  99;  Ko-  Parsons  v.  1 'arsons,  L.  R.  8  Eq.  Cas.  260. 
chelle  v.  Harrison,  8  Port.  851.  w  Post,  §§  301,  459. 

*  Bans  of  United     ■  Bnrke,  4 

66 1 


§§  298,  299   APPRENTICES,  COPYRIGHTS,  PATENTS,  ETC.  *  633,  *  634 

quest,  and  her  executor  may  recover  them.1  This  subject,  so  far 
as  the  same  affects  the  relative  rights  of  legatees  for  life  and  remain- 
dermen 2  in  stock  dividends 8  is  discussed  in  connection  with  the  sat- 
isfaction of  legacies  by  the  executor. 

§  298.    Apprentices  and  Servants.  —  Upon  the  death  of  a  master, 
both  his  servants  and  apprentices  are  discharged,  and    Servants  and 
therefore  the  executor  or  administrator  of  the  former  can    apprentices 
bring  no  action  to  enforce  the  contract  of  service  after    by  the  master's 
his  death ;  nor  do  they  take  any  interest  in  an  appren-   death> 
tice  bound  to  the  deceased,4  unless  the  infant,  with  the  consent  of 
the  father,  had  bound  himself  by  indenture  to  a  trades-    uniess  tnev 
man,  his  executors  and  administrators,  such  executors  or    have  bound 
administrators  carrying  on  the  same  trade  or  business.5    0neand  his 
In  Vermont  it  is  held  that  the  indenture  of  apprentice-    executors  and 
ship   is   not   necessarily   avoided   by  the  death  of  the    and  these  carry 

master,  but   becomes  voidable   merely ;   and   if   on  the  trade- 
[*  634]  *  the  apprentice  serve  the  administrator  of  the  deceased  mas- 
ter, he  acquires  the  rights  and  incurs  the  duties  of  an  ap- 
prentice to  him.6 

§  299.  Copyrights  and  Patents.  —  The  right  of  an  author  to  the 
exclusive  sale  or  use  of  his  intellectual  productions,  including  books, 
maps,  charts,  pamphlets,  magazines,  engravings,  prints,  dramatic 
and  musical  compositions,  paintings,  drawings,  photographs,  sculp- 
ture, models,  busts,  and  designs,  and  the  right  of  inventors  origi- 
nating any  new  and  useful  art,  machine,  manufacture,  or  composition 
of  matter,  or  any  new  and  useful  improvement  therein,  are  species 
of  property  unknown  at  common  law,  and  of  purely  statutory  origin, 
both  in  England  and  America.  For  the  encouragement 
and  development  of  learning  and  literature,  and  to  pro-  pate^rtfare^n 
mote  the  progress  of  useful  arts  and  sciences,  Congress    America,  per- 

sonal  property 

has  secured  to  the  author  or  inventor  the  absolute  and   going  to  the 
indefeasible  interest  and  property  in  his  literary  produc-    ^ecutor  or 

r      1        J  .  administrator. 

tion  or  the  subject  of  his  invention  for  a  specified  time, 
which,  upon  certain  conditions,  may  be  extended  for  a  further  term 
of  years.  During  this  period  the  law  has  impressed  upon  these 
productions  all  the  qualities  and  characteristics  of  property,  has 
enabled  the  author  or  inventor  to  hold  and  deal  with  the  same  as 
property  of  any  other  description,  and  on  his  death  it  passes,  with 
the  rest  of  his  personal  estate,  to  his  legal  representatives,  becoming 
part  of  his  assets.7     The  patent  may  be  applied  for  and  obtained  by 

1  Johnson    v.    Bridgewater    Manufac-         5  Wms.   Ex.   [816],   citing   Cooper   v. 
turing  Company,  14  Gray,  274.  Simmons,  7  H.  &  N.  707. 

2  Post,  §  456.  6  Phelps  v.  Culver,  6  Vt.  430.     See  on 

3  Post,  §  457.  the   subject    of  apprentices   in   America, 
*  Wms.    Ex.    [813,   814] ;  3   Eedf.   on     Woerner  on  Guardianship,  §  47,  p.  159. 

Wills,  287,  pi.  38.  *  Wilson  v.  Rousseau,  4  How.  (U.  S.) 

646,  674 ;  Dudley  v.  Mayhew,  3  N.  T.  9. 
665 


*  634,  *  635  TITLE   TO    CHOSES   IN   ACTION.  §  299 

the  executor  or  administrator,  and  is  then  vested  in  him  not  as  part 
of  the  general  assets  of  the  estate,  but  in  trust  for  the  heirs  or  devi- 
sees, "  in  as  full  and  ample  a  manner,  and  under  the  same  condi- 
tions, limitations,  and  restrictions,  as  the  same  was  held,  or  might 
have  been  claimed  or  enjoyed,  by  the  inventor  in  his  or  her  life- 
time." 1  It  is  obvious,  that  an  extension  of  the  term  of  letters  patent 
and  copyright  may  likewise  be  granted  to  and  held  by  the  personal 
representatives ; 2  and  in  such  case  the  assignee  of  the  patentee 
under  the  original  patent  acquires  no  right  under  the  extended 
patent,  unless  such  right  be  expressly  conveyed  to  him  by  the 
patentee.3     The  right  of  personal  representatives  to  sell  or 

*  assign  a  copyright  or  patent  follows  from  its  quality  as  [*  635] 
Administrator    property,  and  may  be  made  by  one  of  two  or 

may  sell  or        more   administrators.4     Action   for   infringement   of   a 

assign  copv-  .    .  ° 

right  or  pa'tent.  patent  may  be  brought  by  the  administrator,  and  where 
Administrator  a  moiety  has  been  assigned  by  the  patentee  he  may  sue, 
niaysuefor  in  conjunction  with  the  surviving  assignee;5  and  he 
of  pa^fnTor  may  commence  his  action  in  the  United  States  Circuit 
copyright.  Court  of  another  State  without  qualifying  as  adminis- 

trator in  such  State;  and  the  same  right  extends  to  the  assignee  of  the 
administrator.6  Where,  in  a  suit  for  the  infringement  of  a  patent 
right,  the  defendant  dies  before  the  granting  of  a  decree,  a  bill  of  re- 
vivor may  be  filed  against  the  decedent's  personal  representative.7 
The  analogous  subject  of  trade-marks  is  governed  by  similar  prin- 
ciples, and  the  authority  of  personal  representatives 
with  reference  thereto  is  much  the  same  as  with  refer- 
ence to  copyrights  and  patents.8  Paxson,  J.,  passing  upon  the  ques- 
tion of  the  right  of  heirs  or  distributees  to  use  the  trade-mark  of  the 
ancestor,9  says  that,  while  the  cases  are  not  uniform  on  this  subject, 
there  is  ample  and  recent  authority  that  a  business  and  accompany- 
ing trade-mark  may  pass  from  parent  to  children  without  adminis- 
tration; and  that  the  business  may  be  divided  among  the  children, 
and  each  will  have  the  right  to  the  trade-mark  to  the  exclusion  of 
all  the  world  except  the  co-heirs.  He  quotes  from  the  opinion  of 
Lord  Cranworth,10  who  argued  that,  when  a  manufacturer  dies,  those 

1  Curtis's    Law    of    Patents,    §    177;  239;  Brooks  v.  Bicknell,  supra,  438 ;  Pitts 
Stimpson    v.    Rogers,    4     Blatchf.    333.  v.  Jameson,  15  Barb.  310,  316. 
Goodyear  v.  Ilullihan,  3  Fish.  251,  254.  5  Story,  J.,  arguendo,   in    Whittemore 

2  Washburn    v.  Gould,  3  Story,  122;  v.  Cutter,  1  Gall.  429,  431. 

Brooks  v.  Bicknell,  3  McLean,  250;  also  6  Smith  v.  Mercer,  3  Pa.  Law  Jour. 

432.  Rep.  529,  533  (b.  p.  448). 

«  Woodworth    v.    Sherman,   3    Story,  '  Kirk  v.  Du  Bois,  28  Fed.  Rep.  460. 

171  ;  Wilson  ".  Rousseau,  supra,  McLean  8  Brownie  on  Trade-Marks,  §  365,  1st 

and    Woodbury,  .J.I ,  dissenting,   holding  ed. 

that  the  extension   would  enure  to  those  9  Tratt's  Appeal,  117  Pa.  St.  401,  413. 

gnees  who  had  by  express  agreement  10  Leather  Cloth  Co.  v.  American  Co., 

secured  an  interest  In  the  extension.  11  II.  L.  523,  534. 

1  Wintermute  v.  Redingtou,  1  Fisher, 
i  66 


§  300  rents.  *  635,  *  636 

who  succeed  him  (grandchildren  or  married  daughters,  for  instance), 
though  not  bearing  the  same  name,  yet  ordinarily  use  the  original 
name  as  a  trade-mark,  and  will  be  protected  against  infringement  of 
the  exclusive  right  to  that  mark  because,  according  to  the  usages  of 
trade,  they  would  be  understood  as  meaning,  by  the  use  of  their 
grandfather's  or  father's  name,  no  more  than  that  they  were  carry- 
ing on  the  manufacture  formerly  carried  on  by  him.     So  Field,  J., 

in  Kidd  v.  Johnson,  100  U.  S.  617,  620. l 
[*  636]       *  §  300.    Rents.  —  The  general  rule  is,  that  rents  accruing 

after  the  deceased  owner's  death  belong  to  the  heirs  or  devi- 
sees, as  an  incident  to  the  ownership  of  the  land  which 
descends   to   them.2     According  to  this   principle,  the    after  deceased 
payment  of  rent  to  an  executor  or  administrator  under  a   owner's  death 

.  go  to  heirs. 

lease  from  him  after  the  testator's  or  intestate  s  death 
is  no  discharge  as  against  the  heirs,8  and  may  be  recovered  by  them 
even  if  the  estate  is  insolvent,  unless  there  has  been  some  action  to 
subject  the  land  to  the  power  of  the  executor  or  administrator.4  The 
right  of  the  heirs  attaches  to  rents  accruing  under  a  leasehold  ex- 
tending beyond  the  lessor's  life,  if  there  be  a  reversion  to  himself 
and  his  heirs ; 5  but  if  a  lessee  for  years  make  an  underlease,  reserv- 
ing rent,  such  rent  accruing  after  his  death  goes  to  the  executor  or 
administrator,  because  his  estate  was  but  a  chattel  interest.6 

But  if  the  real  estate  is  necessary  to  pay  the  debts  of  the   de- 
ceased, the  executor  or  administrator  may  be  ordered  to    unless  needed 
take   possession  of  it  and  collect  the  rents  therefrom,    to  pay  debts 
and,  if  these  are  insufficient,  to  sell  the  same,7  or,   in    °    ecease  " 

1  The  reason  why  a  trade-mark  may  8  Haslage  v.  Krugh,  25  Pa.  St.  97. 
pass  "  without  administration,"  as  sug-  4  Kimball  v.  Sumner,  62  Me.  305 ; 
gested  by  Paxson,  J.,  supra,  seems  to  be  Brown  v.  Fessenden,  81  Me.  522  ;  Towle 
that  a  trade-mark  can  have  no  value  ex-  v.  Swasey,  106  Mass.  100;  Gibson  v. 
cept  in  connection  with  the  business  to  Farley,  16  Mass.  280;  Clift  v.  Moses, 
which  it  attaches;  and  as  creditors  are  44  Hun,  312,  314.  The  same  principle 
not  usually  in  condition  to  realize  the  is  applicable  to  the  damages  due  for  land 
value  of  the  trade-mark,  either  by  carry-  taken  for  a  railroad :  Boynton  v.  Peter- 
ing on  the  business  themselves  or  by  sell-  borough  Company,  4  Cush.  467 ;  Camp- 
ing to  one  who  will,  its  chief  element  as  bell  v.  Johnston,  1  Sandf.  Ch.  148;  and  to 
an  asset  is  wanting.  But  it  seems,  also,  damages  for  cutting  down  trees:  Fuller 
that  cases  may  arise  in  which  the  trade-  v.  Young,  10  Me.  365,  372  ;  Smith  v.  Bland, 
mark  of  a  deceased  testator  or  intestate  7  B.  Mon.  21. 

is  of  value  to  creditors,  or  a  subject  of  6  Markel's  Estate,  131  Pa.  St.  584,  611 ; 

contention  between  heirs,  when  adminis-  Stinson  v.  Stinson,  38  Me.  593 ;  Foltz  v. 

tration  may  become  necessary.  Prouse,  17   111.  487,  493;   Bloodworth  v. 

2  See  post,  §  513  ;  Ball  v.  First  National  Stevens,  51  Miss.  475. 

Bank,  80  Ky.  501,  503,  and  earlier  cases  6  Wms.  Ex.  [818] ;  3  Redf.  on  Wills, 

cited;   McClead   v.    Davis,  83   Ind.    263;  183,  pi.  8. 

Stewart  v.  Smiley,  46  Ark.  373 ;   Crane  7  On    this    subject,    see    post,   §§  463 

v.  Guthrie,  47  Iowa,  542,  545 ;  Shouse  v.  et   seq.,  treating   of  the  liability  of  real 

Krusor,  24  Mo.  App.  279 ;  Le  Moyne  v.  estate  for  the  debts  of  deceased  persona. 

Harding,  132  111.  23;  Dexter  v.  Hayes,  88 

Iowa,  493. 

667 


*  636,  *  637  TITLE   TO    CHOSES   IN   ACTION.  §  301 

some  States,  even  take  possession  thereof  without  the  order  of 
court.1  It  will  appear  hereafter,  in  connection  with  the  subject  of 
the  duties  of  executors  and  administrators  in  respect  of  real 

estate,2  that  in  a  *  number  of  States  the  distinc-  [*  637] 
States  where  ^on  between  real  and  personal  property  has  been 
the  real  estate  abolished,  so  that  both  go  to  the  personal  representa- 
theTxecutor  tive  for  administration.  In  such  States  the  rents  self- 
or  adminis-  evidently  go  to  the  executor  or  administrator  during  the 
period  of  administration. 

It  is  also  clear,  that,  where  the  real  estate  is  devised  to  an  exec- 
utor for  purposes  of  administration,  the  rents  must  be  paid  to  the 
person  administering.3 

Rents  which  had  accrued  prior  to  the  death  of  the  testator  or  in- 
testate are  mere  choses  in  action,  and  therefore  payable  to  the  per- 
sonal representative.4 

The  subject  of  the  personal  representative's  liability  for  rents  is 
more  fully  treated  later.5 

§  301.  Apportionment  between  Life  Tenant  and  Remainderman. 
—  If  a  lessor  make  a  lease  of  land  of  which  he  owns  part  in  fee 
and  part  for  a  term  of  years,  reserving  one  entire  rent  for  the 
whole,  the  rent  accruing  after  his  death  will  be  apportioned  between 
No  apportion-  the  heir  and  the  executor.6  But  at  common  law  there 
ment  of  rent  could  be  no  apportionment  of  rent  accruing  to  succes- 
cessive  owners  sive  owners,  so  that,  if  a  life  tenant  died  before  the  rent 
at  common  law.  reserved  under  a  lease  made  by  him  became  due,  the 
rent  was  lost  both  to  his  executor  and  to  the  reversioner,  —  to  the 
former,  because  no  rent  had  become  due  to  the  testator  when  he 
died;  to  the  latter,  because  he  was  not  the  lessor  of  the  tenant.7 
To  remedy  this  difficulty,  the  statute  of  11  Geo.  II.  c.  19,  §  15,  was 
enacted,  providing  that  where  any  tenant  for  life  died  before  the 
time  at  which  rent  reserved  under  a  demise  from  him,  determining 
with  his  death,  became  due,  the  executor  or  administrator  of  the 
lessor  might  recover  from  the  under-tenant  the  proportion  of  rent 
which  had  accrued  at  the  time  of  the  lessor's  death.8  Similar  stat- 
utes exist  in  many  of  the  American  States,  referring  generally,  like 

1  "If  the  estate  is  insolvent,  and  set-  the  collection  of  all  rents:  McDowell  v. 

tied    in    the    insolvent    course,    it    is   the  Hendrix,  71  Ind.  286. 
duty   of  the  administrator   to  take   pos-         4  McDowell  v.  Hendrix,  67  Ind.  513, 

session  of  it,  take  care  of  it,  and  take  the  517;    King   v.    Anderson,    20    Ind.   385; 

rents    and    profits":    Lucy    v.   Lucy,   55  Logan  v.  Caldwell,  23  Mo.  372 ;  Bealey  v. 

N.  II.  9,  10;  Berginv.  McFarland,  26  N.  IT.  Blake,    70  Mo.   App.   229;  Ball   v.   First 

583,  536.     The  law  in  most  other  States,  National    Bank,   80    Ky.   501  ;    Parker  v. 

•  r,  requires  some  order  of  the  pro-  Chestnutt,  80  Ga.  12. 
bate  ".nit  to  divest  the  heirs  of  the  right        5  Post,  §  513. 
of  possession.  ''  3   Kedf.  on  Wills,  183,  pi.  9;  Wms, 

a  Post,  §  337.  Ex.  [818],  citing  English  authorities. 

a  GlaciUB  r.   Fogel,  *8  N.  V.   434,  444,  7  Wins.  Kx.   [821],  with  authorities, 

as  where  by  the  will  he  is  charged  with         8  Stillwell  v.  Doughty,  3  Bradf.  359. 


§301 


APPORTIONMENT   BETWEEN    OWNERS. 


637,  *  638 


the  British  statute,  to  leases  from  life  tenants,  expiring  with  the  life 
of  the  lessor.  Where  the  lease  is  by  a  tenant  in  fee,  or  in  any  case 
where  it  is  binding  upon  the  heir  or  person  entitled  in  remainder, 

the  lessee  is  bound  to  pay  the  rent,  the  whole  of  which  will 
[*  638]  then  go  to  the  heir  or  remainderman,  no  matter  how  much  *  of 

it  was  earned  before  his  estate  took  effect  in  possession.1 
The  same  rule  with  reference  to  apportionment  applies    Nor  of 
to  annuities ;  they  are  not  in  their  nature  apportionable    annuities, 
either  in  law  or  equity,2  except  annuities  for  the  mainte- 
nance  of   the  widow,  or  married  women  living   apart 
from  their  husbands,  or  infants,  in  which  case  they  are 
apportionable  on  the  ground  of  necessity.8    But  there 
is  a  distinction  to  be  drawn  between  an  annuity,  no  part  of  which 
is  payable  unless  the  annuitant   live  until  it  becomes    Aliter  as  to 
due,  and  the  accruing  interest  upon  a  given  sum  pro-   interest- 
ducing  an  income,  in  which  case  the  beneficiary  is  entitled  to  all  the 
interest  earned  at  the  time  of  his  death.4     The  subject  is  also  regu- 
lated by  statute  in  several  States,5  and  will  again  be  referred  to  in 
connection  with  satisfaction  of  legacies. 


except  when 
given  for  main- 
tenance of 
widow  or 
minor  children. 


i  3  Redf.  on  Wills,  184,  pi.  12 ;  Fay  v. 
Holloran,  35  Barb.  295;  Sohier  v.  El- 
dredge,  103  Mass.  345,  351 ;  Bloodworth 
v.  Stevens,  51  Miss.  475.  But  where  a 
lessee  under  a  life  tenant  pays  the  rent  to 
the  representative  of  the  life  tenant  for  a 
period  subsequent  to  the  lessor's  death, 
the  reversioners  may  recover  therefor : 
Price  v.  Pickett,  21  Ala.  741. 

2  Tracy  v.  Strong,  2  Conn.  659,  664; 
Waring  v.   Purcell,   1  Hill   (S.  C),   Ch. 

193,  199  ;  Wiggin  v.  Swett,  6  Met.  (Mass.) 

194,  201  ;  McLemore  v.  Blocker,  Harp. 
Eq.  272,  275  ;  Manning  v.  Randolph,  4  N. 
J.  L.  144;  Heizer  v.  Heizer,  71  Ind.  526; 
Dexter  v.  Phillips,  121  Mass.  178. 

8  Gheen  v.  Osborn,  17  Serg.  &  R.  171 ; 
Pisher  v.  Fisher,  5  Pa.  L.  J.  Rep.  178; 
Ex  parte  Rutledge,  Harp.  Ch.  65 ;  Gould, 
J.,  in  Tracy  v.  Strong,  supra ;  Blight  v. 
Blight,  51  Pa.  St.  420;  Earp's  Appeal,  28 
Pa.  St.  368,  374;  Dexter  v.  Phillips,  121 
Mass.  178,  180;  Lackawanna  Iron  Co.'s 
Case,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  26 ;  per  Clark,  J.,  in 
Quinn  v.  Madigan,  65  N.  H.  8. 

4  Because  interest  becomes  due  de  die 
in  diem:  Story  Eq.  Jurisp.,  §  480,  note 
(p.  469  of  12th  ed.).  As  there  is  no  diffi- 
culty in  making  apportionment,  there  is  no 
necessity  for  the  rule :  Earp's  Appeal, 
supra  :  and  so  it  has  been  held  that,  where 
no  period    or    day   has   been  mentioned 


upon  which  the  annuity  should  be  paid, 
the  rule  that  annuities  cannot  be  ap- 
portioned is  not  applicable :  Reed  v. 
Cruiksbank,  46  Hun,  219;  but  on  appeal 
this  doctrine  was  held  to  be  inconsistent 
with  the  authorities  and  the  case  reversed : 
Kearney  v.  Cruikshank,  117  N.  Y.  95,  100. 
Dividends  from  profits  on  business  of 
incorporated  companies  are  not  only  con- 
tingent, but  uncertain  in  amount  until  the 
expiration  of  the  full  period  for  which 
they  are  declared,  and  are  not  apportion- 
able :  Granger  v.  Bassett,  98  Mass.  462, 
469;  Foote,  .Appellant,  22  Pick.  299; 
Sweigart  v.  Berk,  8  S.  &  R.  299,  302; 
Quinn  v.  Madigan,  65  N.  H.  8. 

6  Kearney  v.  Cruikshank,  117  N.  Y. 
85;  Weston  v.  Weston,  125  Mass.  268. 
In  Massachusetts  it  was  held  that,  under 
the  statute  of  that  State,  where  a  testator 
had  directed  a  residue  in  trust  to  be  sold 
and  invested  in  a  particular  security,  the 
income  to  be  paid  as  an  annuity  to  his 
son's  widow  during  her  life  and  on  her 
death  to  provide  for  her  children,  the  life 
tenant  was  entitled  to  the  proceeds  of 
coupons  of  bonds  representing  the  fund 
maturing  after  the  testator's  death ;  and 
upon  the  death  of  the  life  tenant,  the 
interest  was  to  be  apportioned :  Sargent  v. 
Sargent,  103  Mass.  297. 

669 


**  638-640 


TITLE   TO   CHOSES  IN  ACTION. 


§  302 


in  action  sur- 
vive to  her,  if 
the  husband 
had  not  re- 
duced them  to 
possession. 


§  302.    The  Wife's  Choses  in  Action.  —  At  common  law,  marriage 
is  a  qualified  gift  to  the  husband  of  the  wife's  choses  in  action,  upon 
Wife's  choses     condition  that  he  reduce  them  to  possession  during  its 
continuance.      If  he  die  before  his  wife,  without  hav- 
ing   reduced    such    property    into    possession, 
*  she,  aDd  not  his  executors  or  administrators,    [*  639] 
will  be  entitled  to  it.1    There  is  a  distinction, 
however,  in  some  of  the  States  at  least,  between  choses  in  action 
which  accrued  to  the  wife  before,  and  those  which  accrued  to  her 
during  coverture;   for  the  latter  the  husband  may  bring  action  in 
his  own  name,  disagree  to  the  interest  of  his  wife,  and  a  recovery 
thereon  in  his  own  name  is  sufficient  to   defeat  the  wife's 
survivorship.2    *  What  amounts  to  a  reduction  into  posses-  [*  640] 
1  Hair  v.  Avery,   28   Ala.   267,  273 ;    well  argued  and  thoroughly   considered, 


Rice  v.  McReynolds,  8  Lea,  36 ;  Lock- 
hart  v.  Cameron,  29  Ala.  355  ;  Moody  v. 
Hemphill,  75  Ala.  268 ;  Andover  v.  Mer- 
rimack Co.,  37  N.  H.  437,  444;  Burr  v. 
Sherwood,  3  Bradf.  85;  Arnold  v.  Rug- 
gles,  1  R.  I.  165,  178;  Bell  v.  Bell,  1  Ga. 
637  ;  Killcrease  v.  Killcrease,  7  How. 
(Miss.)  311  ;  Barber  v.  Slade,  30  Vt.  191 ; 
Stephens  v.  Beal,  4  Ga.  319,  323;  Ster- 
ling v.  Sims,  72  Ga.  51  ;  Weeks  v.  Weeks, 
5  Ired.  Eq.  Ill,  120;  Lenderman  v.  Len- 
derman,  1  Houst.  523 ;  Baker  v.  Red,  4 
Dana,  158  ;  Willis  v.  Roberts,  48  Me.  257, 
261 ;  Kellar  v.  Beelor,  5  T.  B.  Monr.  573  ; 
Whitehurst  v.  Harker,  2  Ired.  Eq.  292  ; 
Goodwin  v.  Moore,  4  Humph.  221  ;  Wal- 
den  v.  Chambers,  7  Oh.  St.  30 ;  Bone 
v.  Sparrow,  11  La.  An.  185;  Pinkard  v. 
Smith,  Little's  Sel.  Cas.  331  ;  Rogers  v. 
Bumpass,  4  Ired.  Eq.  385. 

2  Boozer  v.  Addison,  2  Rich.  Eq.  273. 
In  Connecticut  it  is  held,  as  the  settled 
law  of  the  State,  that  a  chose  in  action 
accruing  to  the  wife  duriug  coverture 
vests  absolutely  in  the  husband :  Fourth 
Ecclesiastical  Society  v.  Mather,  15  Conn. 
587,  598,  reciting  numerous  authorities. 
In  Massachusetts  the  decisions  are  con- 
flicting; the  cases  of  Albee  v.  Carpenter, 
12  Cush.  382,  Commonwealth  v.  Mauley, 
12  Pick.  173,  Goddard  v.  Johnson,  14 
Pick.  852,  and  Hapgood  v.  Houghton,  22 
Pick.  480,  distinctly  holding,  the  first  two 
that  a  chose  in  action  accruing  to  the 
wife  during  coverture  rests  absolutely  in 
tiic  husband,  the  other  two  that  lie  may 

brin^  suit  thereon  in  his  own    na after 

\er  death ;  while  in  Eayward  v.  Hayward, 

20  Pick.   517,  which  seems  to  have  been 

070 


it  is  deliberately  announced  that,  if  the 
husband  die  before  reducing  into  posses- 
sion a  chose  in  action  accruing  to  the  wife 
during  coverture,  it  survives  to  the  wife. 
In  Maine,  Willis  v.  Roberts,  48  Me.  257, 
Maryland,  Bond  v.  Conway,  11  Md. 
512,  Rhode  Island,  Wilder  v.  Aldrich, 
2  R.  I.  518,  and  Tennessee,  Cox  v.  Scott, 
9  Baxt.  305,  310,  it  is  expressly  held 
that  such  choses  survive  to  the  wife,  if 
the  husband  die  before  reducing  them  to 
possession.  In  Delaware  it  was  so  de- 
cided, although  the  husband  had  made 
an  equitable  assignment  of  his  wife's 
chose,  but  died  before  it  was  reduced  to 
possession:  State  v.  Robertson,  5  Harr. 
201.  In  New  York  a  distinction  was 
taken  between  an  action  which  must  be 
brought  in  the  name  of  the  husband  and 
wife,  which,  unless  the  husband  obtained 
satisfaction,  would  survive  to  the  wife, 
and  one  which  the  husband  might  bring 
in  his  own  name ;  and  it  was  held  that 
taking  a  new  security,  or  novating  the 
debt  to  the  wife  in  his  own  name,  author- 
ized him  to  bring  suit  thereon  in  his  own 
name,  and  destroyed  the  wife's  right  of 
survivorship  :  Searing  v.  Searing,  9  Pai. 
283.  Where  a  suit  for  the  wife's  choses 
in  action  is  brought  in  chancery,  it  is  ne- 
cessary to  join  the  wife,  and  the  court 
will  then  see  that  the  husband  make  a 
suitable  provision  for  the  wife,  unless  she 
consents  to  waive  it :  Schuyler  v.  Hoyle, 
5  Johns.  Ch.  196,  210,  reviewing  the  Eng- 
lish authorities.  So  in  Missouri :  Pickett 
v.  Everett,  1 1  Mo.  568  ;  and  in  this  State  it 
is  held  that  in  a  suit  for  choses  accruing 
to  the  wife  during  coverture  the  husband 


§  302 


THE  WIFE'S   CHOSE8   IN   ACTION. 


♦640  *  641 


The  mere  in- 
tention of  the 
husband  is  not 
sufficient  to  di- 
vest the  wife's 
ownership. 


sion  by  the  husband  is  a  question  of  much  nicety  and  difficulty, 
upon   which    the   authorities    are    by   no   means   precise,    nor  the 
rules  in  the  several  States  uniform.1     The  mere  inten- 
tion,  without  some  act  divesting  the  wife's  right  and 
making  his  own  absolute, — such  as  a  judgment  recov- 
ered in  an  action  commenced  by  him  in  his  own  name 
alone,  or  an  award  of  execution  to  him  upon  a  judg- 
ment recovered  by  him  and  his  wife,  or  the  receipt  of  the  money,  or 
decree  for  payment  to  him  or  for  his  use,  —  is  not  sufficient  to  defeat 
her  survivorship.3     It  has  been  held  that  he  may  sell  or    He  may  sell 
assign  her  choses  for  a  valuable  consideration,  and  thus    y^ao^ con- 
defeat  her  right,8  although  the  choses  assigned  be  no    sideration. 
further  reduced  to  possession  during  coverture; 4  but  he  cannot  make 
a  voluntary  assignment  or  gift  of  them  without  consideration  unless 
the  assignment  or  gift  be  consummated  by  actual  reduction  during 
coverture.5     So  the  assignment  of  the  wife's  choses  as  a 
collateral  for  the   husband's   debt  simply  puts  the  as- 
signee in  the  husband's  place;  it  is  not  of  itself  a  reduc- 
tion into  possession,  and  if  the  husband  die  before  any- 
thing further  is  done,  neither  the  assignee  nor  the  hus- 
band's personal  representatives  have  any  further   in- 
terest therein.6    An  assignment  by  an  insolvent  husband   for  the 
benefit  of  his   creditors,    under  the  insolvent  law,  will  defeat  her 
right,  although  he  die  before  her;7  but  a  general  assignment,  with- 
out referring  to  the  wife's  choses  in  action,  does  not  include 
[*  641]  *  them,  nor  is  the  assignee  of  a  bankrupt  under  the  bank- 


Vendee  takes 
place  of  the 
husband,  and 
must  reduce  to 
possession  be- 
fore husband's 
death. 


may  at  his  election  join  his  wife  or  not ; 
and  if  he  sues  alone  and  recovers  judg- 
ment, it  is  an  election  to  have  the  chattel 
in  his  own  right  freed  from  the  right  of 
survivorship  in  the  wife ;  if  he  joins  her 
in  the  suit,  her  right  of  survivorship  will 
continue  :  Leakey  v.  Maupin,  10  Mo.  368, 
372.  In  Ohio,  choses  in  action  belonging 
to  the  wife  at  the  time  of  the  marriage, 
not  reduced  into  possession  by  meaus  of 
a  judgment  obtained  during  coverture  in 
the  husband's  name  alone,  or  by  assign- 
ment for  a  valuable  consideration,  or  by 
taking  new  securities  in  his  name  alone, 
survive  to  the  wife,  and  on  her  death 
before  the  husband's  go  to  her  heirs  : 
Dixon  v.  Dixon,  18  Ohio  R.  113. 

1  Chitty  on  Contr.  225;  Snowhill  v. 
Snowhill,  2  N.  J.  Eq.  30,  36. 

2  Brown  v.  Bokee,  53  Md.  155,  169. 

8  Hill  v.  Townsend,  24  Texas,  575; 
Abington  v.  Travis,  15  Mo.  240.  "The 
assignment  availed  to  pass  the  right  to  the 


assignee  to  collect  and  have  the  proceeds 
as  his  absolute  property,  if  collected  during 
the  coverture,  just  as  the  husband  might 
have  done  if  he  had  kept  and  reduced  it 
into  possession  himself"  :  O'Connor  v.  Har- 
ris, 81  N.  C.  279,  282. 

4  Browning  v.  Headley,  2  Rob.  (Va.) 
340. 

8  Hartman  v.  Dowdel,  1  Rawle,  279, 
281 ;  Siter's  Case,  4  Rawle,  468. 

6  Hartman  v.  Dowdel,  supra;  Latou- 
rette  v.  Williams,  1  Barb.  9  ;  Croft  v.  Bol- 
ton, 31  Mo.  355. 

7  Richwine  v.  Heim,  1  Pa.  Rep.  373 ; 
Shuman  v.  Reigart,  7  W.  &  S.  168.  But 
in  New  York  the  creditors  in  such  case 
take  subject  to  the  wife's  right  by  sur- 
vivorship if  the  husband  dies  before  the 
assignee  has  reduced  such  property  to 
possession :  Van  Epps  i>.  Van  Deusen,  4 
Pai.  64,  73 ;  and  see  Williams  v.  Sloan, 
infra. 

671 


641, *  642 


TITLE   TO    CHOSES   IN    ACTION. 


§  302 


rupt  act  entitled  to  them,  the  rule  of  the  common  law  being  that 
creditors  cannot  compel  the  husband  to  exercise  his  power  in  their 
favor.1  The  assertion  of  title  to  the  wife's  chose  in  action  by 
a  bequest  in  the  husband's  will  cannot  affect  rights  which  she  had 
Mere  manual  otherwise  been  permitted  to  retain ; 2  so  the  mere  manual 
noteeSetc.n  does  Possessi°n  OI>  a  note  or  other  chose  in  action  payable  to 
not  constitute  the  wife  is  not  sufficient  to  constitute  a  reduction  by 
reduction.  the  husband  so  as  to  divest  the  wife's  right; 8  nor  hold- 

ing it  as  administrator,  before  final  distribution.4  But  where  the 
husband  is  the  executor  of  a  will  under  which  the  wife  is  entitled 
to  a  legacy,  taking  it  and  mingling  it  with  his  other  property  is  a 
reduction  of  it  to  possession  such  as  bars  her  right  thereto.5  So, 
where  the  husband  receives  the  legacy  from  the  executor,  receipting 
for  it  in  his  wife's  name  and  using  the  money  as  his  own,6  the  pos- 
session must  come  to  the  husband  in  the  exercise  of  his  marital 
right,  and  for  the  purpose  of  appropriating  it  to  his  own  use.7  An 
assignment  by  the  husband  of  a  reversionary  interest  expectant  on 
the  death  of  a  tenant  for  life  is  not  valid  against  the  wife,  if  both 
she  and  the  life  tenant  survive  the  husband.8  Nor  is  a  con- 
tract made  between  husband  and  wife  during  *  coverture,  [*  642] 
disposing  of  the  wife's  expectancies,  binding  on  the  wife 
after  the  husband's  death.9     And  an  agreement  made  before  mar- 

1  Gibson,  C.  J.,  in  Shay  v.  Sessaman,  he  take  them  as  trustee  for  the  wife,  cred- 
10  Pa.  St.  432,  433  ;  State  v.  Robertson,  itors  of  the  husband  cannot  subject  them 
5  Harr.  201 ;  Timbers  v.  Katz,  6  W.  &  S.  to  the  payment  of  their  debts :  Terry  v. 
290,  298,  299  ;  Terry  v.  Wilson,  63  Mo.  Wilson,  supra.  So  where  a  wife  collects 
493,  499  ;  Williams  v.  Sloan,  75  Va.  137.  insurance  money  on  her  house,  and  rein- 

2  Grebill's  Appeal,  87  Pa.  St.  105, 108.       vests  it  in  real  estate,  her  husband  assent- 
8  Latourette  v.  Williams,  supra  ;  Burr     ing  to  her  control  and  disposition  of  the 

v.  Sherwood,  3  Bradf.  85.     So  the  posses-  money  :  Cox  v.  Scott,  9  Baxt.  305. 
eion  by  a  husband  of  his  wife's  distribu-  8  Because  the  defeasance  of  the  wife's 

tive   share   of  her  father's  estate,  where  right  by  survivorship  depends  upon  the 

the  executor  has  not  qualified,  does  not  actual  conversion  by  the  husband  during 

constitute  an  exercise  of  his  marital  right,  coverture,  and  this  is  impossible  of  an  in- 

the  title  being  in  the  executor;  and  on  the  terest  which   exists  only  iu   expectancy. 

husband's  death  the  title  to  the  property  See  a  thorough  discussion  of  this  question 

survives  in  the  wife :   Hairston  v.  Hairston,  by  Ryland,  J.,  in  Wood  v.   Simmons,  20 

2  Jones  Kq.  123,  127.  Mo.  363,  in  which  the  view  of  Sir  Thomas 

4  Johnson  v.  Brady,  24  Ga.  131,  136;  Plumer,  Master  of  the  Polls, in  Purdew  v. 
Crawford  v.  Brady,  35  Ga.  184,  192;  Jackson,!  Puss.  Ch.  1,  is  quoted  with  ap- 
Walker  r.  Walker,  25  Mo.  367.  So  an  proval,  viz. :  that  all  assignments  by  the 
administrator,  having  in  his  hands  the  husband  of  the  wife's  choses  in  action  pass 
distributive  share  of  an  estate  belonging  them  sub  modo,  on  condition  that  the  as- 
fi  a  married  woman,  who  is  summoned  as  signee  receive  his  share,  or  its  value, 
trustee  in  an  action  against  her  husband,  during  the  life  of  the  husband.  Moore  v. 
will  be  discharged  if  the  husband  die  be-  Thornton,  7  Gratt.  99,  110;  Browning  v. 
f..re  judgment:  Strong  v.  Smith,  1  Met.  Head  ley,  supra;  and  if  in  such  case  the 
(Mass.)  476.  wife  die  before  the  life  tenant,  her  interest 

5  Bridgman  v.  Bridgman,  138  Mass.  58.     will   pass  to  her  children:   Matheney  v. 
*  Rice  >:  McReynolds,  8  Lea,36.  Guess,  2  Hill  (S.  C),  Ch.  63. 

7  Tennison  v.  Tennison,  40  Mo.  77.     If        a  Hardin  v.  Smith,  7  B.  Monr.  390,  392. 

R70 


§  303     ACTIONS  ACCRUING  TO  THE  REPRESENTATIVE.  *  642,  *  G43 


Wife's  admin- 
istrator de  bonis 
non  is  entitled 
to  her  choses  in 
preference  to 
the  representa- 
tives of  the 
husband  who 
died  before 
completing  ad- 
ministration on 
her  estate. 


riage,  stipulating  that  the  wife's  equities  and  expectancies  should 
be  settled  on  her,  will  be  regarded  as  constituting  a  trust  in  the  hus- 
band, which  will  prevent  his  marital  rights  from  ever  attaching.1 
Where  the  husband  survives  the  wife,  he  is  entitled  to  administer 
on  her  estate,2  and,  as  such  administrator,  to  all  her  personal  estate 
remaining  in  action  or  unrecovered  at  her  death;  but  if 
he  die  before  obtaining  a  grant  of  administration,  or, 
having  taken  letters,  before  all  her  property  in  action 
is  reduced  to  possession,  such  property  does  not  go  to 
his  representatives,  but  administration,  general  or  de 
bonis  non,  must  be  obtained  on  her  estate  for  that  pur- 
pose;8 and  in  such  case  the  wife's  representatives  hold 
the  property  in  trust  for  the  husband's  next  of  kin  or 
legatees,4  subject,  of  course,  to  the  wife's  debts.5  But 
it  is  to  be  remembered  that  recent  legislation  in  most  of  the  States 
has  greatly  changed  the  law  with  reference  to  the  property  rights  of 
married  women,6  and  that  in  many  cases  choses  in  action  of  the  wife 
not  reduced  by  the  husband  during  her  lifetime  now  go,  upon  her 
death,  to  her  next  of  kin,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  she  had  been  a 

feme  sole."1 
[*  643]        *  §  303.    Actions  accruing  to  the  Representative,  Officially 

or  Individually.  —  It  results  from  the  ownership  of  all  per- 
sonal property  of  a  deceased  person,  which  by  law  is 
placed  in  the  executor  or  administrator,  that  for  any 
injury  thereto  occurring  after  the  decedent's  death,  and 
before  the  final  disposition  to  the  parties  entitled,  the 
action  must  be  brought,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the  per- 


Cause  of  action 
arising  after 
death  gives  the 
action  to  the 
personal  repre- 
sentative. 


But  a  post-nuptial  settlement  upon  the 
wife,  if  not  fraudulent,  is  good  in  her 
favor :  Picquet  v.  Swan,  4  Mason,  443 ; 
Duffy  v.  Insurance  Co.,  8  W.  &  S.  413, 

1  Ramsay  v.  Richardson,  Riley,  Ch.  271, 
273.  Ante-nuptial  contracts  intended  to 
regulate  and  control  the  interest  which 
each  of  the  parties  to  the  marriage  shall 
take  in  the  property  of  the  other  during 
coverture  or  after  death,  will  be  enforced 
according  to  the  intention  of  the  parties  : 
Johnston  v.  Spicer,  107  N.  Y.  185;  Des- 
noyer  v.  Jordan,  27  Minn.  295  ;  Forwood  v. 
Forwood,  86  Ky.  114;  and  see  ante,  §  287, 
p.  *  608,  note. 

2  Ante,  §  236. 

8  Allen  v.  Wilkins,  3  Allen,  321  ;  Bur- 
leigh v.  Coffin,  22  N.  H.  118,  125  ;  Curry 
v.  Fulkinson,  14  Ohio  R.  100;  Hunter  v. 
Hallett,  1  Edw.  Ch.  388 ;  Cobb  v.  Brown, 
Speers,  Eq.  564 ;  Hendren  v.  Colgin,  4 
Munf.  231,  234;  Lee  v.  Wheeler,  4  Ga. 
vol..   i  —  43 


541  ;  Rice  v.  Thompson,  14  B.  Monr.  377  ; 
Tem  pieman  v.  Fontleroy,  3  Rand.  434, 
439  ;  Olmsted  v.  Keyes,  85  N.  Y.  593,  602  ; 
Robins  v.  McClure,  100  N.  Y.  328,  334; 
Brown  v.  Bokee,  53  Md.  155,  163;  Glas- 
gow v.  Sands,  3  G.  &  J.  96,  103  ;  Chadsey 
v.  Fuller,  6  Mackey,  117.  And  the  ad- 
ministrator may  maintain  trover  for  their 
conversion  :  Brown  v.  Bokee,  supra. 

4  Bryan  v.  Rooks,  25  Ga.  622 ;  Stewart 
v.  Stewart,  7  Johns.  Ch.  229,  246  ;  Hunter 
v.  Hallett,  supra ;  Donnington  i».  Mitchell, 
2  N.  J.  Eq.  243.  If  the  husband  inter- 
meddles without  taking  letters  of  adminis- 
tration, he  will  be  held  liable  for  her 
debts :  Lockwood  v.  Stockholm,  1 1  Pai. 
87. 

6  Clay  v.  Irvine,  4  W.  &  S.  232  ;  Lock- 
wood  v.  Stockholm,  supra. 

6  See  ante,  §  286. 

7  Holmes  v.  Holmes,  28  Vt.  765 ;  Dixon 
v.  Dixon,  18  Ohio  R.  113. 

673 


G43 


TITLE   TO    CHOSES   IN   ACTION. 


§303 


When  the 
amount  recov- 
ered will  be  as- 
sets, the  action 
is  in  his  repre- 
sentative 
character. 


sonal  representative.1  And  in  such  case,  as  well  as  in  all  cases 
•where  the  action  accrues  upon  a  contract  made  by  or  with  him  as 
such  since  the  death  of  the  testator  or  intestate,  the  action  may  be 
brought  in  the  proper  name  of  the  executor  or  administrator,  or  as 
such : 2  whenever  the  money  when  recovered  will  be 
assets,  the  executor  or  administrator  may  sustain  a  suit 
in  his  representative  capacity ; 8  and  may  join  a  count  for 
conversion  before  the  death,  and  one  for  damages  after.4 
He  cannot,  however,  join  counts  on  causes  of  action 
accruing  to  him  in  his  private  right  as  individual,  with 
counts  on  causes  of  action  in  his  representative  capacity.6 

The  duty  of  the  personal  representative  to  prosecute  or  defend 
actions  by  or  against  the  estate,  is  elsewhere  discussed,6  as  well  as 
under  what  circumstances  he  may  maintain  actions  concerning  the 
real  estate.7  But  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  mention 
When  designa-  here  that  since  a  party  to  a  judicial  proceeding  is  bound 
sonal represen-  thereby,  or  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  thereof,  only  in 
the  capacity  in  which  he  is  before  the  court,8  it  is  often 
of  vital  importance  to  determine  whether  one  who  is  an 
executor  or  administrator  appears  in  his  individual  or 
representative  character.  In  such  cases  it  has  been  held 
that  the  insertion  or  omission  of  the  word  "  as  "  before  the  represen- 
tative title  was  decisive  of  the  question,9  and  that  without  it  the 
word  "administrator,"  "executor,"  etc.,  must  be  regarded  merely  as 
descriptio  personw.10  But  it  is  now  generally  held  that  the  title  and 
pleadings  may  be  considered  together  to  ascertain  the  true  nature  of 
the  action,  and  it  will  be  treated  as  an  individual  or  representative 
one  as  disclosed  upon  an  inspection  of  the  whole  record.11     So  where 


tative  may  be 
considered 
merely  as 
descriptio 
persona. 


1  Ante,  §  293.  See  also  §  200  on  the 
necessity  of  an  administrator;  Holbrook 
v.  White,  13  Wend.  591. 

2  Kent  p.  Bothwell,  152  Mass.  341, 342  ; 
Ham  p.  Henderson,  50  Cal.  367  ;  Patchen 
v.  Wilson,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  57  ;  Manwell  v. 
Briggs,  17  Vt.  176;  Haskell  v.  Bowen,  44 
Vt.  579 ;  White  v.  Pulley,  27  Fed.  Rep. 
436,  440;  McDonald  v.  Williams,  16  Ark. 
36;  Yarborough  p.  Ward,  34  Ark.  204, 
208;  Carlisle  p.  Hurley,  3  Me.  250;  Tre- 
cothick  p.  Austin,  4  Mas.  16,  34;  Catlin 
v.  Underbill,  i  McLean,  337  ;  Campbell  p. 
Baldwin,  6  Blackf.  364;  Ilarn  p.  Hender- 
son, 50  ( !al.  867  ;  in  New  Jersey  the  action 
must  be  brought,  in  his  own  name:  Stewart 
v.  Richey,  17  \.  J.  L.  164. 

1  Boggs  p.  Hard,  2  Rawle,  102  ;  Brown 
?•.   Lewis,  9    I!.  I.  497  ;    Evans   p.   Cordon, 
a  Porter,  846;   Yarborongb  v.  Ward,  34 
Ark.  204,  208. 
674 


4  French  v.  Merrill,  6  N.  H.  465. 

5  French  v.  Merrill,  supra ;  Epes  v. 
Dudley,  5  Rand.  437. 

6  Post,  §  324  ;  also  §  323. 

7  Ante,  §  293  ;  post,  §§  337  et  seq. 

8  Collins  v.  Hydorn,  135  N.  Y.  320; 
Insley  v.  Shire,  54  Kan.  793,  798  ;  State 
v.  Branch,  134  Mo.  592,  604;  Wood  v. 
Curran,  99  Cal.  137. 

9  See  Lucas  v.  Pittman,  94  Ala.  616. 

10  Lowery  p.  Daniel,  98  Ala.  451.  And 
a  judgment  pursuant  to  such  a  writ  binds 
the  administrator  only  individually,  al- 
though the  judgment  be  expressed  to  be 
against  him  "as  adm'r  ":  Rich  p.  Sowles, 
64  Vt.  408. 

11  First  National  Bank  v.  Shuler,  153 
N.  Y.  163,  172;  Jennings  v.  Wright,  54 
Ga.  537 ;  Beers  v.  Shannon,  73  N.  Y.  292, 
297. 


§  303  ACTIONS   ACCEUING   TO   THE   REPRESENTATIVE.  *  643 

an  administrator  has  obtained  judgment  against  a  debtor  of  the 
estate,  he  may  maintain  an  action  on  such  judgment,  in  another 
State,  in  his  individual  capacity,  and  if  he  describes  himself  as 
administrator  the  term  will  be  surplusage  and  disregarded  as  being 
simply  a  description  of  the  person.1 

An  executor  or  administrator  cannot  bind  the  estate  by  his  contract 
although  made  in  the  interests  of  the  estate,  and  he  is  personally 
liable  thereon,  though  he  describe  himself  by  his  representative  title 
and  assumes  to  contract  as  such.3 

1  Ante,  §  162.  *  Post,  §  356,  and  cases  there  cited. 


END   OF  VOL.    I. 


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